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VOLUME 1

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EDITOR IN CHIEF

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Preface

The *Oxford Encyclopedia of Medieval Warfare and Military Technology*, which comprises more than one thousand entries contributed by nearly two hundred scholars from twenty-two different countries, is by far the most comprehensive reference work ever devoted to the military history of the Middle Ages. It is written to be accessible to general readers and undergraduate students, while at the same time providing a useful tool to professionals teaching or conducting research on the medieval period or on military history. As with any encyclopedia, the alphabetically organized entries provide an introduction to and summation of what is known about their topics; in many cases, they also distill the authors' insights, comment on scholarly debates, or suggest what work remains to be done to improve our understanding of the subject. Each entry has a bibliography of suggestions for further reading, scaled to match the size of the entry, but usually including the best available fully documented scholarly works on the subject, in English and (where applicable) in other languages as well. Primary sources are noted when they are particularly useful and accessible, or when the secondary literature is problematic. Entries describing individual battles, sieges, leaders, military technologies, and other focused topics are complemented by the large-scale key entries ("Narrative," "Sources," and "Historiography") on broad topics like high medieval Britain, late medieval Italy, or chivalry. The extended bibliographies for these key entries offer further avenues for research. Together, the different types of content make the Encyclopedia an ideal starting point both for those seeking to explore the wealth of knowledge scholars have accumulated about warfare during the Middle Ages, and also for those who are preparing to launch new investigations, that will expand the frontiers of that knowledge.

Scope. The idea of the "Middle Ages," or the "medieval period," is one that developed in the early modern period, when humanist thinkers saw themselves as more closely connected to the men of Greco-Roman antiquity than to their more immediate predecessors. The beginning of the medieval period is generally associated with the collapse of the Roman Empire in the West in the late fifth century. Different national

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historiographies find different endpoints for the Middle Ages: one common marking point is 1453, when the Hundred Years' War between France and England ended and Constantinople fell to the Turks; but in Spain 1492 is the common delineation (marking both the voyage of Columbus and the Catholic Monarchs' final triumph over the Moors); and in England 1485, the start of the Tudor period, is often used. Hungarian medieval history is often taken to extend to 1526, with the extinction of the Jagiellon dynasty at the battle of Mohács. There are sound reasons for these different periodizations, and rather than impose a set of arbitrary start and end dates, this Encyclopedia takes the Middle Ages as extending roughly from 500 to 1500, with variations allowed depending on the subject.

The term "medieval" is sometimes used with reference to areas outside Europe, such as "medieval Japan" or "medieval Mali," but that practice has not been followed in this work. Here, the Middle Ages are understood as a period of European history. Hence, the geographic coverage of the Encyclopedia extends from Portugal to Muscovy, and from Iceland to Byzantium and the Crusader States of the Middle East. There are some entries related to non-European states or peoples with whom Europeans had important military interactions—the Huns, Mamluks, and Mongols, for example—but the focus is firmly on the Western world. Broader coverage would have required either a much larger work than this already substantial one, or less depth, which would undermine its value.

Medieval Warfare and Its Historiography. It has often been said that medieval society was organized for war. This may be an overstatement, but there is more than a little truth to it. Medieval emperors, kings, and lay magnates universally depicted themselves as warriors on the seals they created to authenticate documents. Along with churches and cathedrals, the greatest constructions of medieval architecture were castles and town walls. War rivals love and faith as a principal topic of medieval poetry and romance, and surpasses them as the main subject of medieval chronicles and histories. Although modern historians debate the meaning, chronology, and importance of the feudal system, there is no denying that by the late twelfth century much of the land of Latin Europe was organized into a structure of hierarchical fiefs that tightly linked landholding to military obligation—indeed, a system in which armed service as a heavy cavalryman was the foremost, though not the only, justification for noble status and fief-holding vassalage. Chivalry, one of the most interesting, most studied, and most characteristic value systems of the era, was at its heart a warrior ethos; the word itself comes from *chevalier*, the French word for "knight," which in Latin was rendered *miles*, or "soldier." In medieval Europe, war was widely considered the natural state of humanity, peace an exception. It is debatable whether Britain, for example, enjoyed a single year of full peace between 1294 and 1453. There were many years of Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-French truce during this period, but a time of truce was one of war suspended, not of peace.

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War had a substantial impact on the lives of most medieval people. Among aristocratic men, active participation in warfare was the norm. Townsmen typically included "soldier" as one of the strands of their self-identities: they were organized into urban militias, stood watch on walls and gates, engaged in martial games and sports, and fought to defend their ramparts when necessary. Those medieval people who themselves had no military roles saw significant portions of their economic produce drained off in one way or another to support the warriors and their military endeavors, and often suffered grievously from the campaigns of burning and devastation that were a principal mode of medieval warfare. Because of the connection between landholding, wealth, and military service, and because this nexus held such a prominent place in the interests and concerns of the literate elite, a large portion of the written records, documentary and narrative, that have come down to us from the Middle Ages deal with soldiers and warfare. For all these reasons, nearly all aspects of scholarship about the Middle Ages—from gender studies to economic history to Scandinavian literature to analysis of the role of the episcopate in society—relate in one way or another to military matters.

In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when biography and political, institutional, and constitutional history were among the dominant branches of medieval studies, military topics were naturally relatively well represented in the literature. In the second and third quarters of the twentieth century, however, all of these areas of inquiry began to fall out of favor in academia, with social and economic history, gender history, and studies of the *longue durée*, rather than the actions of individuals and their consequences, coming to the fore. In the 1950s and 1960s, medievalists like R. C. Smail, H. J. Hewitt, and Warren Hollister were among the leaders in revitalizing the study of military history, with a new emphasis on military institutions and structures rather than on battles and campaigns. Scholars of "War and Society" or the "New Military History" were more concerned with preparations for and the aftermath of war than with the actual fighting. They studied topics like recruitment, war finance, logistics, social and intellectual attitudes to war and peace, the distribution of booty, and ransoming practices, more than battles or sieges. When they did look at combat itself, it was often from the perspective of the individual soldier's experience (an approach brought to prominence by John Keegan's seminal *The Face of Battle* [1976]) rather than the traditional focus on tactics, strategy, and the decisions of great commanders. These innovative approaches to the topic greatly improved our understanding of both the conduct of medieval warfare and its impact on society.

The decisions collectively made by society about raising armies (who should serve, how they should be equipped and supplied, and who should pay for their gear and their time and how) have obvious and direct effects on how governments, economies, and social systems function, as well as on decisions about strategy and the course of military operations.

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But organizational decisions are not made in a vacuum; the experiences and outcomes of battles, sieges, and raids affect how rulers and peoples allocate wealth, prestige, and manpower in support of their warriors. To practice the "new military history" and to study war and society in the Middle Ages properly, scholars must therefore have a good grasp of traditional military history. The same goes for scholars who study the medieval world from other disciplinary perspectives. War and its attendants—fiefs, tournaments, war horses, armor, weapons, skill-at-arms, and glory and honor—were among the principal preoccupations of the mental world of the medieval aristocracy, especially, but not only, the male lay aristocracy. And it is the nature of an aristocracy, with its control of economic resources and its prominence in setting society's norms and laws, that its concerns must be to some extent the concerns of the rest of society as well.

Recognition of the need to take account of actual fighting in the study of medieval warfare has led recently to renewed interest among scholars in the practical details of campaigning and combat, and on tactics and strategy. To balance the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century focus on battles, writers since the 1950s have given more attention to siege warfare and ravaging. These phenomena, they noted, were more characteristic of medieval strategy; many campaigns and some wars ended without a single battle fought. The new historiographical emphasis on siege warfare also encouraged new work on medieval military technology, through studies of trebuchets, gunpowder, artillery, fortress design, and related topics.

Nevertheless, medieval knights who wrote about war made it clear that they viewed battles, more than sieges or mounted ravaging expeditions (*chevauchées*), as the highest test of manly virtue and the most significant form of martial endeavor. "The true measure of a man's worth," wrote Jean de Bueil in the fifteenth century, "is to fight in a field where there is no hedge, bush or ditch, nor any fortification between the two sides, and one marches against the other." Moreover, even campaigns in which no battle took place were often very much shaped by the *possibility* of a battle, as when an invader broke off a siege and retreated to avoid an engagement. Thus, in the early twenty-first century there has been a renewal of scholarly attention to tactical history—and to the micro-level components thereof, including weapons, armor, and hand-to-hand combat techniques. Within the past decade, for example, in England alone there have been books published on Agincourt by Anne Curry, Juliet Barker, and Michael K. Jones, and others on Hastings, Crécy, Neville's Cross, Poitiers, Bosworth Field, and Towton.

Types of Entries. More than 250 entries (averaging four hundred words each) are devoted to individual battles, making this the most numerous type of entry in the Encyclopedia. This is true for a number of reasons. As noted already, current trends in scholarship are putting some renewed

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emphasis on the importance of battles; but the recent general histories of medieval warfare and encyclopedias of the Middle Ages offer little coverage of individual battles (especially outside the English experience), or are now badly dated. The 661-page first volume (*Aachen to Augustinism*) of the massive and excellent *Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, for example, has an entry of fewer than one hundred words for Agincourt, and no entries for the battles of Adrianople, Ager Sanguinis, Alarcos, Aljubarrota, Altopascio, Andernach, Arbedo, Arques, Arsuf, Ascalon, or Auray. A convenient reference work offering up-to-date short treatments of a large number of medieval battles was therefore much needed. Moreover, by their nature battles adhere to the three dramatic unities of time, place, and action, which make them well suited to individual treatment in encyclopedia entries.

The same is true of sieges—sustained efforts to capture fortified places such as castles or walled towns—which are the subject of well over one hundred entries, averaging about six hundred words each. It may seem odd that there are more entries on battles than on sieges, when the latter were far more common in the Middle Ages and often equally important. It would be easy to identify sieges not given individual entries in this work that were far more significant in terms of the numbers of soldiers involved or in terms of their consequences than battles that have been included. Indeed, many readers will doubtless be able to identify important battles as well as important sieges that lack their own entries. Likewise, they may wonder why some relatively minor engagements such as Worringen in 1288 have rather long entries, while others of larger scale and significance, such as Tertry in 687 (a battle-royal that was a key turning point in the rise of the Carolingian dynasty, which did so much to shape the history of Europe) are shorter. The explanation lies in the uneven character of our sources of information about the Middle Ages. In general, we know much more about later events than earlier ones, more about western Europe than eastern Europe, and (often) more about battles than sieges. Since individual entries on battles and sieges are intended (in most cases) to include details about the conduct of the fighting, not merely on the context of the action and the consequences of its outcome—those topics are addressed in the key narrative entries (see below)—the scale of these entries was determined principally by the amount that is known about the actual combat, given our sources, and only secondarily by the inherent importance of the event.

A variation on the same principle applies to another class of more than one hundred entries, those focusing on individual military leaders. In this case, though, the guiding question is not "How much do we know about the person?" but rather "How much can we say about the person *as a military figure*, whether war leader or military reformer?" A subsidiary determinant for the length of entries on individual commanders was the extent to which we can go beyond a mere listing of their military activities

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to sum up their character as military leaders: were they cautious or bold, battle-focused or siege-oriented, good strategists or good tacticians or both? Richard II and Henry V of England are both kings about whom we know a great deal, and like nearly every medieval king, Richard led armies on campaign—but there is far more to say about Henry as a military commander than about Richard, and so Henry has an entry and Richard does not. Naturally, given the specific focus of this Encyclopedia, these entries on individuals are not meant to be rounded miniature biographies of the sort that might be found in a more general reference work. The entry on Emperor Justinian I, for example, deals with his military strategy and policies, but makes no reference to his epochal codification of Roman laws or his construction of the Hagia Sophia.

Much the same is true of the numerous entries on more difficult-to-categorize topics like "Chivalry," "Training," "Saints' *Lives*," "Nobility," "Bishops," "Youth," "Cumans," "Feudalism," "Fire," or "Ships and Sailing." All of these entries have an implied "and Warfare" in their title. The one-thousand-word entry on "Masculinity," for example, leaves aside topics such as clerical masculinity, homophobia, and even economic self-sufficiency to concentrate on how martial virtues like courage, aggressiveness, and fighting ability were definitional elements of ideal "manliness" during the Middle Ages. Likewise, "Britain: Narrative (1300–1500)" leaves out Wycliffe and the Lollard heresy, whereas "Slavic Lands: Narrative (1300–1500)" devotes substantial attention to the Hussites, because the Hussites, unlike the Lollards, developed important new battlefield tactics and used military force on a large scale to defeat efforts to suppress their religious reformation.

The two entries mentioned in the last sentence are examples of the most important and most innovative component of the Encycopedia: the "key entries." Most but not all of these are geographically delimited: the principal key entries are for Britain (including Ireland), Iberia, France, the Low Countries, Germany, Italy, Byzantium, and the Slavic Lands. These topics are further divided into regionally appropriate chronological segments, often with the early, high, and late medieval periods treated separately. With some exceptions, each period-region pairing has not one but three entries devoted to it: a narrative, an entry on sources, and a third on Historiography. Simply put, the narratives describe the wars and military developments that took place in the areas and times they cover; the sources entries are guides to the documents, chronicles, and other forms of evidence that enable scholars to write about warfare in the period; and the historiography entries discuss what modern historians (and some scholars from other disciplines) have done and are doing with the material, with a focus on recent works and how they have changed or deepened our knowledge of the topic. Smaller-scale geographic key entries for Switzerland, Scandinavia, East Central Europe, Hungary, and the Baltics are also included, as are less precisely "geographic" key entries

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on the Crusades (with focus on the crusades to the Levant and covering the warfare of the Crusader States, because crusades in other geographic areas, such as Iberia or the Baltics, are covered in those key entries) and the Franks. There are very few entries in the Encyclopedia for particular wars, such as the First Crusade, the War of the Two Pedros, or the War of the Eight Saints. Instead, these conflicts (and the many other nameless ones) are covered by the narrative key entries.

The Encyclopedia also includes some entries conceived as key entries that are thematic and pan-medieval, rather than geographical, for example those on Chivalry (approximately eight thousand words on "Chivalry" and four thousand each on "Chivalry: Sources"; and "Chivalry: Historiography") and castles ("Castles: 500–1100"; "Castles: 1150–1350"; "Castles: 1350–1500.") The large entries of four thousand or more words on major technological topics like armor, artillery, and hand-to-hand weapons should also be considered as belonging to this class, as they subsume many smaller topics that otherwise might have appeared as entries of their own.

Together these key entries are the second-most numerous type of entry, after those on battles, but since they are on average much longer—often three to six thousand words—they are the real center of gravity of the Encyclopedia, accounting in all for more than one third of its content. Each is, of course, written by an expert on the military history of the time and place covered. Together they provide an unrivalled survey of what we know about medieval warfare and military technology, one that while fully accessible to general readers, can also serve as a solid platform from which scholars may launch new investigations.

There are more than one thousand entries and subentries in *The Oxford Encyclopedia of Medieval Warfare and Military Technology*, arranged in alphabetical order, letter by letter. Composite entries gather together discussions of similar or related topics under one headword. For example, under the entry "Orders, Military" the reader will find three subentries: "Iberian Orders," "Levantine Orders," and "Northern Orders." A headnote listing the various subentries introduces each composite entry.

To guide readers from one article to related discussions elsewhere in the Encyclopedia, cross-references appear at the end of many articles. Blind entries direct the user from an alternate form of an entry term to the entry itself. For example, the blind entry for "Swords" directs the reader to look under "Weapons, Hand-to-Hand." The Encyclopedia includes approximately 185 illustrations and maps.

Volume 3 contains the topical outline, the directory of contributors, and the index. Readers interested in finding all the articles on a particular subject (e.g., battles or fortifications) may consult the topical outline, which shows how articles relate to one another and to the overall design of the Encyclopedia. The comprehensive index lists all the topics covered in the Encyclopedia, including those that are not headwords themselves.

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Acknowledgments. This Encyclopedia was originally conceived in 2003 as part of the series of medieval encyclopedias published originally by Garland and later by Routledge, with the assistance of Marie-Claire Antoine of the latter publisher. Given the scope of the topic, it was obvious that a substantial team of associate editors with the appropriate subject-matter and linguistic expertise would be needed to develop a balanced list of entries, to recruit contributors, and to help ensure that the entries submitted for publication met high standards of quality. I had the good fortune to assemble a team of highly distinguished historians to take on the job. They are:

William P. Caferro: *Italy*
Kelly DeVries: *Technology and the Low Countries*
John France: *Crusades*
Donald J. Kagay and L. J. Andrew Villalon: *Iberia*
Hans-Henning Kortüm: *Germany and Francia*
Stephen Morillo: *British Isles*
Helen Nicholson: *Pan-Medieval and Cultural Topics*
István Petrovics: *East-Central and Eastern Europe*
Paul Stephenson: *Byzantium*

Without their contributions, it would have been impossible to put this Encyclopedia together. I am very grateful to them for their work and for making the editor-in-chief's task as painless as could be hoped for with an endeavor of this size. I am also indebted to Shelley Reid, who as assistant editor helped with various organizational tasks, especially in the early stages of the project and who as cartographer worked closely with me to develop the large majority of the thirty-four maps and plans, which add so much to the utility of the Encyclopedia.

After Routledge dissolved its encyclopedia division and abruptly stopped work on the project, Oxford University Press decided to pick up the contract for the Encyclopedia. After some preliminary work by executive editors Damon Zucca (who acquired the project for Oxford) and Stephen Wagley, Mary Funchion took over as development editor for the project. She has performed that role with exceptional efficiency, initiative, and competence; I cannot imagine having a better development editor to work with.

I am also indebted to the United States Military Academy, and particularly its Department of History, for many years of support of my scholarly activities, and for the opportunity to teach a stimulating elective course on "Ancient and Medieval Warfare."

A number of maps in the Encyclopedia were based on electronic map files, and we gratefully acknowledge the authors of the base maps: Frank Martini of the United States Military Academy for "Eastern Mediterranean" and "Battle of Poitiers;" Eric Galba for "France;" and the

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Wikimedia Commons users Smurrayinchester (for "Britain and Ireland") and Nécropoatme and Cplakidas (for "North-East Mediterranean"). The latter three maps are licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution ShareAlike license.

Clifford J. Rogers
West Point
31 March 2010

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Common Abbreviations Used in This Work

b.	born; ibn (in Arab names)
B.C.E.	before the common era (= B.C.)
c.	*circa*, about, approximately
C.E.	common era (= A.D.)
cf	*confer*, compare
d.	died
diss.	dissertation
ed.	editor (pl., eds.), edition
f.	and following (pl., ff.)
fl.	*floruit*, flourished
HRE	Holy Roman Empire
l.	line (pl., ll.)
n.	note
n.d.	no date
no.	number
n.p.	no place
n.s.	new series
p.	page (pl., pp.)
pt.	part
rev.	revised
ser.	series
supp.	supplement
vol.	volume (pl., vols.)

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THE OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDIEVAL WARFARE AND MILITARY TECHNOLOGY

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A

Aachen, Siege of

Following the death in 1247 of Henry Raspe, who had been the rival of the excommunicated Emperor Frederick II, the archbishops of Cologne, Mainz, Trier, and Bremen and the Duke of Brabant elected Count William II of Holland as German king on 3 October 1247. The coronation was to be held in Aachen (Aix-la-Chapelle), where German kings were traditionally crowned, but the city remained faithful to Frederick II and refused to allow William to enter.

William's supporters began the siege of Aachen at the end of April or the beginning of May 1248, while William himself was occupied at Kaiserswerth until 1 May. According to the *Königschronik* of Cologne, an initial skirmish took place at one of the city gates, in which sixteen assailants and one defender of the city died. On 7 May at the latest, but probably a few days earlier, William arrived with the main army, followed in the middle of the month by the papal legate, Cardinal Petrus Capocci. The chronicle of the monastery of Bloemhof mentions the archbishop of Cologne, the bishop-elect of Lüttich, the counts of Geldern and Hennegau, and John of Avesnes, the count of Hainaut, as being in William's company. Initially, the besieging forces were not sufficiently numerous to surround the city totally and thus could not break the resistance of its defenders, although, as the *Königschronik* of Cologne reports, they employed trebuchets to this purpose. During the summer, William's army was reinforced by troops from Brabant, Flanders, and Picardy that had joined the crusade against Frederick II. The besieging troops dammed one of the rivers flowing through Aachen with a wall 12 meters (40 feet) high, causing the flooding of approximately one-third of the city. In autumn 1248, a further contingent of crusaders from Frisia joined the siege, building their camp on the previously unoccupied eastern side of the city. Aachen was thus completely surrounded and cut off from supplies, while being continuously bombarded day and night. Matthew Paris speaks of the employment of mangonels and pedreros. Finally, the starving citizens of Aachen sought mediation through the archbishop of Cologne and capitulated on 18 October 1248. The imperial bailiff and twelve nobles of the city pledged their obedience to the pope and to the king and were in turn granted freedom by King William, who entered Aachen on 19 October and was crowned on 1 November.

[*See also* Frederick II.]

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Julia Knödler

Translated from the German by Duane Henderson

ABU YUSUF YA'QUB

See Mansur, Abu Yusuf Ya'qub al-.

ACHELOOS, BATTLE OF

See Anchialos, Battle of (917).

ACRE, SIEGE OF

The epic siege of Acre began on 27/8 August 1189 and lasted until 12 July 1191; it was the great set piece of the Third Crusade. Following the battle of Hattin in 1187, Jerusalem and Acre had fallen to the Muslims; in order for the Crusade to regain the Holy City it first had to take Acre, a formidable stronghold and the major port of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, vital for the supply and security of the campaign.

Guy de Lusignan, the King of Jerusalem, advanced through hostile territory to invest Acre. He encamped around the hill of Toron, a necessarily defensive position to counter Saladin's relief army. A Pisan squadron held an essential coastal strip north of the city, which was vital for communications and supplies. Guy's army has been estimated at between 400 and 600 knights and seven thousand infantry, and no more than nine thousand in total. The Muslim garrison comprised more than three thousand men under the command of Baha 'al-Din Qara-Qush, a veteran commander and an expert in military architecture. Both sides suffered heavy casualties, with many leading crusaders being named among the fatalities in the chronicles. The crusaders were reinforced at stages, most strongly by the summer of 1191, when Philip II, King of France, and Richard I, King of England, arrived with up to ten thousand men.

Within three days of arrival Guy unsuccessfully attempted storming the walls by escalade; thereafter the besiegers tried to break the city through artillery barrage, blockade, mining, ramming, and further assaults. With new reinforcements arriving in September, in October Guy launched a fierce attack on Saladin's relief army, encamped nearby at Tell al-'Ayyadiya, but was driven back with heavy losses. This failure made urgent engineering works in the form of two lines of circumvallation and contravallation around the city, the former providing defense against the Muslim relief forces. The crusaders' blockade did not prevent essential supplies and reinforcements occasionally reaching the garrison: on 27 December 1189, twenty-five ships broke through just as the starving city was on the point of seeking terms of surrender, and their sailors joined the garrison. The blockade was tightened effectively only with the arrival of Philip and Richard.

Bombardments from both sides and assaults continued even during the winters, when the disruption of seaborne supplies produced famine among the besiegers. Saladin, meanwhile, was faced with the problem of troop retention in his field army. His main strategy was to respond to signals from the city when it came under assault, launching diversionary attacks on the crusaders to draw off their troops. The crusaders, however, continued to batter and assault the city. The dangerous task of filling Acre's ditch at various points allowed three huge siege towers to be brought up against the wall in April 1190. Despite the protection afforded them by hides soaked in vinegar, the garrison's incendiaries of Greek fire sent them up in flames (probably on 5 May). Incendiaries were equally effective on 25 September 1190 against a siege tower built on two galleys bound together and on 6 October against a ship's mast that was made into an iron-tipped battering ram with an armored roof. The garrison made a number of sorties against the crusaders' lines, as on 2/3 September and 6 October.

Neither side could gain the decisive upper hand before Richard and Philip's arrival broke the stalemate. Philip disembarked on 20 April 1191; his relatively small force gave heart to the defenders. A French artillery assault at the end of May (probably the 30th)

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

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was unsuccessful. Around the time of his arrival on 8 June (with a much more substantial contingent than Philip), Richard dealt a major blow to the increasingly beleaguered garrison by sinking an enormous Muslim relief ship, laden with troops and supplies. While the French pressed the siege, the English defended the crusaders from Saladin's attacks. The fighting intensified after mid-June: on the 14th a concerted Muslim attack by the reinforced relief army on the besiegers was defeated, while more of the city's ditch was filled, allowing French siege machines to be brought up to the walls on the 17th, where they were again destroyed by incendiaries. Heavy artillery took its toll on the walls, with one Arab chronicler recording that in places they were reduced to the height of a man. Mining brought down other sections (despite a countermine), encouraging storming attempts at the breaches that were bloodily repulsed; the collapse of the important Accursed Tower on 2 July initiated successive assaults. A final assault by Pisans and Richard's men on 11 July broke the exhausted resistance of the garrison. The next day, fearing, according to one Arab chronicler, they all "would be put to the sword if the city were carried by storm," they surrendered on terms of a ransom for their lives. Saladin was slow in paying this ransom, however, and the garrison of 2,700 was eventually slaughtered. With Acre finally taken by weight of numbers and constant pressure, Richard was able to lead the Crusade southward to within sight of Jerusalem.

[*See also* Crusades, *subentry on* Narrative (1180–1245).]

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ADRIANOPLE, BATTLE OF (378)

Chased in 376 by the Huns from present-day Romania, tens of thousands of Tervingi Goths led by Alaviv and Fritigern crossed the Danube in Moesia Secunda, most of them with weapons. After entering imperial territory, they were subjected to mistreatment and starvation (food was stolen by Roman officials). They were relocated near Marcianopolis for future recruitment, while other Goths led by Alatheus and Saphrax, from the Greuthungi branch, entered the empire without permission in the spring of 377. After a riot of his men in Marcianopolis and a plot by General Lupicinus, Fritigern rebelled because he felt betrayed. The mutineers burned all the places where the Goths were living in Moesia Secunda and Scythia. Even the Gothic units from the Thracian army were involved. Fritigern became the commander of a large and well-equipped army that ravaged the Thracian diocese during 377 and the spring of 378.

Victorious skirmishing operations led by General Sebastianus against a small Gothic force in Thrace convinced Fritigern that he must gather all his men into a strike force and attack the headquarters of Sebastianus in Adrianople. The coalition, which also included Greuthungi, Huns, and Alans, had around fifteen to eighteen thousand soldiers—cavalry and infantry (mostly archers). Wanting to defeat the Goths himself, the emperor Valens departed Constantinople leading an army of around thirty thousand soldiers (or twenty thousand according to other interpretations), and summoned reinforcements from the western army. When a corps arrived under the leadership of Richomeres, Valens decided to start the battle, believing that he had enough forces to win, since his scouts reported his enemy numbered only ten thousand. Fritigern, however, delayed the fight because he was awaiting the return of the Greuthungi, who were involved in other operations.

After an 8-mile (13-kilometer) march on a hot day and without water supplies, the Roman army arrived on the afternoon of 9 August near the Goths' camp (near present-day Demirhanli), which was encircled by chariots. The negotiations proposed by Fritigern ceased when two units of the imperial guard launched a surprise attack against the camp's right flank, before an order had been given. The attack was repelled by infantry pushing out from the camp in combination with the light cavalry corps of Alatheus and Safrax, who were just then returning to camp. These Greuthungi struck the left-flank Roman cavalry that was advancing toward the Gothic camp, separating them from the rest of the troops, who were not yet completely arrayed for combat. This decided the fate of the battle. The Roman infantry, without cavalry protection, was encircled and crushed by the Gothic cavalry and by the archers who left the camp. The lines broke out and the survivors fled in disorder, while the reserve (a Batavian unit) deserted. Two-thirds of the Roman army was destroyed. The emperor and many officers were killed in what came to be considered the worst defeat suffered by Roman forces. Fritigern, however, failed to conquer Adrianople in the aftermath of the battle and was thus unable to exploit his victory.

[*See also* Huns.]

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ADRIANOPLE, BATTLE OF (1050)

The Pechenegs, Turkic-speaking nomads dominating the Black Sea steppes in the tenth century, were expert mounted archers. Under pressure from

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nomads from further east, they raided the Byzantine Balkans from the 1020s on. In midwinter 1046–1047 they migrated across the Danube but were soon subdued and settled on agricultural holdings.

In April 1049, Emperor Constantine IX Monomachos rearmed fifteen thousand Pechenegs and sent them to repulse the Seljuk Turks' raids. They soon mutinied, swam their horses back across the Bosporus, and provoked a general uprising. They defeated locally stationed forces and then, at Diakene (north of the Balkan Mountains), overwhelmed troops that had been transferred from the eastern front. Additional regiments were withdrawn from the east and encamped behind a deep ditch outside Adrianople (modern Edirne). On 8 June 1050, while Byzantine commanders debated strategy, they were surprised by the Pechenegs, who had streamed across the Balkan Mountains. The officer commanding the camp's guard sallied forth without the commander-in-chief's authorization. These foot soldiers were overwhelmed and, when other units charged out pell-mell to their aid, they too were routed. The Pechenegs tried to storm the encampment, filling its ditch with stones and branches. Their morale suffered from the sight of one of their chieftains and his horse being crushed by a catapult's missile.

Byzantine losses had been slight, and the Pechenegs faced entrapment between crack units coming from Adrianople and approaching Bulgarian troops. They therefore withdrew, and dispersed in quest of easy pickings across Macedonia and Thrace, even foraging in Constantinople's suburbs. They operated mainly in dispersed units, however, and were vulnerable to Byzantine ambushes and attrition. They still proved capable, in 1053, of outmaneuvering a large field army at Preslav in Bulgaria, inflicting massive losses when it tried to withdraw. Later that year, they negotiated a thirty-year peace treaty permitting them to remain in the Danube basin.

[*See also* Byzantine Empire, *subentries on* Narrative (900–1204), Historiography (900–1204); *and* Patzinaks.]

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ADRIANOPLE, BATTLE OF (1205)

After taking Constantinople in April 1204, the Frankish victors of the Fourth Crusade tried to occupy the outlying Byzantine territories they had divided among themselves—a difficult and prolonged process. Great regional dissidence in the provinces had been allowed to grow under recent Byzantine rule, which had also been hard pressed to deal with external aggression, mainly by the revived Bulgarian or Vlach-Bulgar state. The Byzantine collapse in 1204 emboldened this neighboring power, especially under its new and energetic king, Kaloyan (or Ioannitza). Having overcome rivals, he briefly courted recognition from the papacy in Rome. But with the fall of Constantinople, and his spurning by the haughty Frankish leaders there, Kaloyan became determined to drive out the intruders, reviving historic Bulgarian dreams of taking the Byzantine capital itself. He attempted to win the favor of the regional Byzantine nobility, so quickly disillusioned by their would-be Latin masters. With initial Greek backing, and joined by his Cuman allies, Kaloyan began ravaging Thrace, at a time when the crusader forces were rapidly diminishing. In the spring of 1205 the new Latin emperor of Constantinople, Baldwin I (Iron Arm), finally mustered what Frankish forces he had in order to recover the pivotal Thracian city of Adrianople, recently lost. Geoffroi de Villehardouin, a participant in the Fourth Crusade, and its principal contemporary historian, has left an eyewitness report of the operation. Kaloyan's main forces consisted of Cuman mercenaries who had

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developed tactics combining diverse cavalry forces with horse archery. The crusaders, already encamped by 13 April 1205, were raided by the Cumans, who drew the Latins into pursuit by false flight and then mauled them badly. The crusaders vowed not to make the same mistake in the main engagement the following day, 14 April. Nevertheless, after a heavy Cuman attack on their camp, the crusaders were drawn out in pursuit and then forced into a close engagement in which they were crushed, Emperor Baldwin himself being wounded and captured. Villehardouin himself enabled survivors to escape in retreat. The defeat left the crusaders drastically depleted in manpower and repute. Baldwin was to die obscurely in captivity some months later.

Baldwin's energetic younger brother, Henry, moved meanwhile to revive the weakened Latin Empire's fortunes, while Kaloyan began an expanded campaign of devastation. He soon turned his attention to Thessaloníki, seat of one of the Crusade's chief commanders, Boniface of Montferrat. The latter was killed in a battle with the forces of Kaloyan, who then besieged Thessaloníki. There, however, Kaloyan himself was killed by one of his Cuman allies' Bulgarian momentum.

[*See also* Baldwin I (Iron Arm) *and* Cumans.]

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AGER SANGUINIS, BATTLE OF

The battle known to history as the "Field of Blood" (in Latin, *Ager Sanguinis*) was a major defeat of the Franks of the principality of Antioch (modern Antakya, Turkey) under their prince-regent Roger of Salerno, at the hands of a Muslim (largely Turkish) coalition led by Najm al-Din Ilghazi ibn Artuq, ruler of Mardin, on 28 June 1119.

Ilghazi's invasion of the Frankish principality was a response to the concerns of the people of Aleppo, who over the previous decade had been unable to prevent a tightening Antiochene control over the fertile territory between Aleppo and the Jabal Talat, a range of hills some 50 kilometers (30 miles) to the west. During a period of confusion following the death of the Aleppine ruler, the atabeg Lu' Lu' (1117), Frankish forces raided the environs of Aleppo itself and captured the important stronghold of 'Azaz, some 40 kilometers (about 25 miles) to the north. In the summer of 1119 the Aleppines responded by giving control of the city to Ilghazi, who launched an invasion of Antiochene territory in late June without waiting for his ally Tughtagin, atabeg of Damascus. Ilghazi had perhaps twenty thousand troops, the vast majority of them horse archers from various nomadic Turkoman tribes. It is possible that the city militia (Arabic: *ahdath*) of Aleppo was present; if so then it is likely that this force of Arab infantry was used to besiege Al-Atharib while the Turkish cavalry was kept in readiness to await the expected relieving force.

In the meantime Prince Roger marched east with some seven hundred knights and three thousand infantrymen, who probably represented the majority of the forces of the principality save for minimal garrisons. The Franks made camp at Balat, east of Sarmada, in a valley they thought well protected by hilly terrain. On 27 June, an advance force led by Robert of Vieux-Pont combined with the defenders of Al-Atharib to attack the main Turkish forces, but two charges were dispersed. On hearing of this reverse, Roger held a council of war that decided to move the main army to Al-Atharib the next day, but by this time Turkish scouts had acquired an excellent grasp of the Frankish position and the topography around it. Before the Franks could advance any significant distance, three separate divisions of Turkish cavalry had moved via mountain paths to surround them, scattering a reconnaissance party of forty knights. Roger was

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warned in sufficient time to send out a division under Rainald Mazoir to undertake a flanking attack, while the main army was able to form up in good order before the Turks closed the ring around it. Several Frankish charges failed to break the Turkish divisions, which repeatedly reformed and launched counterattacks, showering their opponents with arrows: the Arab chronicler Ibn al-Qalanisi later recalled hearing an eyewitness tell of innumerable horses that had been hit by so many arrows that they looked like hedgehogs. When the division of Turkopoles (light cavalry) under Robert of Saint-Lô turned and fled, the entire Frankish army began to break up in disorder. Prince Roger died from a sword blow that penetrated his brain, and with no possibility of retreat almost all the survivors were made captive; many of them were executed on the battlefield. Rainald Mazoir's detachment, operating outside the Turkish encirclement, inflicted considerable destruction on the enemy; eventually he and his surviving troops sought refuge in the tower of Sarmada, but the poor state of its defenses and the lack of provisions soon obliged them to surrender. Some commentators have faulted Ilghazi for failing to follow up his victory with an attack on Antioch, whose defense was taken in hand by the patriarch, Bernard of Valence, but it is doubtful whether the Turkish forces would have been able to take the well-fortified city, especially since it was difficult to keep armies of Turkoman nomads in the field for lengthy campaigns. Nevertheless, with its ruler dead and most of its fighting men killed or captive, the principality of Antioch was scarcely able to defend itself. A relieving army under King Baldwin II of Jerusalem and Count Pons of Tripoli arrived in August, winning a close victory against Ilghazi near Hab on 14 August, but Jerusalemite forces were required to march north to defend Antioch almost every year until 1125.

[*See also* Antioch, Siege and Battles of *and* Crusades, *subentry on* Narrative (1095–1183).]

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AGINCOURT, BATTLE OF

The most famous battle of the Hundred Years' War saw an English expeditionary force under Henry V defeat a much larger French army in a rain-soaked field near Agincourt in Normandy on 25 October 1415. Agincourt is probably the most richly documented of all medieval battles, illuminated by numerous fifteenth-century chronicles and extensive archival materials; there is even a tactical plan drawn up by the French leaders earlier in the campaign, before their full army had assembled. The mass and quality of modern analysis of the battle is also now unsurpassed. Nonetheless, various aspects of the battle remain controversial.

It had been generally accepted that the English army on the battlefield comprised around one thousand men-at-arms and five thousand archers. In 2005, however, Anne Curry argued from archival evidence that the total was more than eight thousand. Difficulties and lacunae in the accounts she used make it impossible to be sure. From chronicle evidence, it appears that the French army consisted of about ten thousand men-at-arms, a like number of *gros valets* (light-armored combatants), and perhaps four thousand crossbowmen and other common footmen.

The battle, which took place on 25 October 1415, became inevitable when this large French force took up a blocking position astride the road Henry V had to take to reach his base at Calais. The English king's march from Harfleur across northern France had probably been intended to lure the French into fighting, but he had doubtless hoped to choose the battlefield, as his great-grandfather, Edward III, had done at Crécy in 1346. Fortunately for Henry, the French, apparently vacillating between

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Battle of Agincourt. Illustration from the *St. Alban's Chronicle*, MS 6, fol. 243, 1415. © LAMBETH PALACE LIBRARY, LONDON, UK/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

defensive and offensive tactical plans, picked a narrow fighting ground that was far more favorable for his small force than for their own large, cavalry-rich one.

In the absence of Charles VI, who was incapacitated at the time, command of the French army should have fallen to Constable Charles d'Albret. However, the army also included the duke d'Orléans, leader of the Armagnac faction and arguably the most powerful man in France, so decisions had to be reached by consensus. The deep rift between the Armagnacs and the Burgundians also weakened the French. Still, their weight of numbers seemed to promise victory. Memories of French defeats at Crécy (1346) and Poitiers (1356) worried some, but the armor of the men-at-arms had improved substantially since then. Also, the numerical odds were more heavily stacked, especially in men-at-arms. French sources indicate that Shakespeare's depiction of their confidence (*Henry V*) was fully warranted.

The two armies initially faced off at opposite ends of the "pass" 550 meters (c. 600 yards) wide that was formed by the hedges and woods of Agincourt and Tramecourt. Each side hoped the other would assume the tactically disadvantageous offensive. The English were all on foot, in a single line. The center was composed of the men-at-arms formed four ranks deep, probably with two small troops of archers who first fought as skirmishers then fell back into narrow intervals between the three divisions of men-at-arms. The vast majority of the archers, however, were deployed on the wings, which were angled forward, probably at around forty-five degrees. Each bowman carried a six-foot stake that was used to form a hedge in front of the wings, with some also placed among the men. The small numbers of the English did not permit them a reserve, but did suffice to secure their flanks on the woodlines.

On each flank the French deployed a mounted strike force of around 500 to 800 men-at-arms, picked for the quality of their horses and their armor,

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and intended to sweep the longbowmen off the field. Between these contingents were drawn up two massive blocks of men on foot, each formation about three hundred men across, sixteen deep. The first division, composed entirely of noble men-at-arms, was parallel with the cavalry; the second, comprising about three thousand men-at-arms and sixteen hundred *gros valets*, was a bowshot farther back. A few hundred men-at-arms and the rest of the *gros valets* formed the third line, which remained mounted.

After hours of stalemate, Henry realized he had to act: the French were gaining reinforcements, while his men were growing hungrier. His archers advanced into arrow range, reset their stakes, and opened fire. The French were not ready for this, and many of the wing horsemen were out of formation. Thus they missed their best opportunity: to strike while the English were in motion. The French crossbowmen fired one ineffectual volley from behind the main line, then filed off to the flanks as the general attack began. The deep mud of the sodden, recently plowed battlefield made movement slow and difficult. The English archers would have had time to loose perhaps seventeen volleys, totaling 85,000 arrows, before the bravest and luckiest of the French horsemen on the wings reached the stake line. The French cavalry charge collapsed; many men and horses were killed, and a few maddened steeds turned back and crashed into the massed formation of dismounted men-at-arms like giant bowling balls. In infantry combat, a well-ordered formation was the key to victory, and some contemporaries considered the impact of these horses the root of the French defeat. Once the bowmen had defeated the cavalry charge, they turned their attention to the slower-moving footmen, who found themselves advancing into the jaws of a double envelopment. The "terrifying hail" of arrows, coming from all directions, compressed their already dense formation, inflicted casualties, and prevented the French men-at-arms from looking up at their banners, perpetuating the disorder. The sheer mass of the French columns nonetheless enabled them to push back the English men-at-arms at initial contact, but their success was short-lived.

The French labored under a concatenation of disadvantages: they were exhausted by the advance through foot-deep mud, under fire and wearing sixty to eighty pounds of armor; many had been hit by several arrows, which battered even when they did not pierce; their formation was disordered. Moreover, they had cut their lances in half to make them handier in a close fight. That gave them some advantage initially, but once the lines became separated by a belt of downed men, their lack of reach told heavily against them, and the chance of a French victory was essentially gone.

The French situation became worse still when the second line arrived at their backs, pushing forward. The English archers added to the disaster first by piling in arrows from flank and rear, then joining in the hand-to-hand struggle. Various chroniclers describe how "the living were pushed towards death; the living went under the dead; the battle lines, sinking to the ground, piled up into heaps," "so thick," "each on top of the other, that a great number of them were slain without making any stroke," "and were suffocated in the crush": "heap upon heap, extinguished by the thousands." The English fought; the French only died.

Once the soldiers of the vanguard and main body had all been brought down or fled, Henry's men began to pull apart the tall mounds of bodies, making prisoners of the lucky survivors. But standard English policy did not allow for the taking of prisoners until the battle was over, and it soon began to appear that it was not over, for some of the fugitives were rallying, the third French line was still on the field, and a minor attack was made on the English baggage train. Hence, King Henry ordered the execution of the prisoners. Substantial numbers were killed before the remaining French abandoned the field, ending the slaughter.

The combination of superb fighting by the English and a deeply flawed French tactical deployment made the battle's outcome entirely one-sided. Total French losses amounted to at least four thousand and probably six thousand killed, mostly noble men-at-arms—a death rate at least double that of Crécy or Poitiers. Hundreds more, including the dukes of Orléans and Bourbon and the Constable,

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de Richemont, remained prisoners. English losses were a few hundred at most. The crushing nature of the French defeat made possible Henry's subsequent conquest of Normandy in 1417–1419, and so the Treaty of Troyes in 1420 that recognized Henry as the heir to the French throne and the regent of France.

[*See also* Crécy, Battle of; Harfleur, Siege of; Henry V; *and* Poitiers, Battle of (1356).]

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AGRARII MILITES

This term (ostensibly meaning "farmer-soldiers") is mentioned in only one medieval source, *Res gestarum Saxonicarum* (Deeds of the Saxons), a narrative praising the achievements of the first two Saxon rulers of the medieval German kingdom, Henry I (r. 919–936) and Otto I (r. 936–973). Yet this solitary reference has precipitated an enormous number of scholarly disagreements because of ambiguities in the text and a wide variety of contradictory preconceptions concerning the nature of early medieval warfare. Widukind, the author of the text, began his description of Henry's military reforms with an account of the establishment and training of *milites agrarii*. He apparently thought that they played an important role in the reorganization of Henry's army to meet the threat of the Magyars, mounted archers from the Eurasian steppes who settled in the Carpathian Basin circa 900 and whose raids had severely disrupted the political, military, ecclesiastical, and economic order of Western Christendom.

The text states that the *milites* were organized into units of nine. One man from each unit was assigned to reside in a fortification (*urbs*) and bore the responsibility for maintaining the stronghold. The resident *milites* constructed quarters for their comrades, who continued to live in the countryside, and they guarded one-third of the harvest that the other eight had planted, harvested, and hauled there. Although the other eight did not reside in the enclosures, they attended assemblies there as well as public gatherings and festive meals. All participated in military training, "so that they might learn in peace what they must do against the enemy in times of necessity" (pp. 82–82), but Widukind does not relate precisely what kind of tactics the *milites agrarii* practiced when they assembled together. Some historians believe that they were trained to fight as cavalry and were "vassals of inferior status." Others insist they were infantry, whom they have labeled the "king's free," peasants settled by the ruler on crown lands to defend nearby fortifications. Still others are convinced that the *milites agrarii* were forerunners of the *ministeriales*, servile military retainers who centuries later developed into a class of "noble bondsmen." Recently it has even been suggested that *milites agrarii* is a term borrowed from Vegetius, a late Roman author of a treatise on military strategy and tactics. Widukind, the argument continues, slightly modified Vegetius' terminology to mean "soldiers from the open countryside." Thus the term refers to where they lived and how they fought (on horseback, like *milites*). They were "aristocratic knights who resided in the country." The point of Vegetius' passage, however, was that peasants constituted a demographic segment that could indeed be trained in arms because "they are accustomed to labour, have endured hardships, and have little acquaintance with luxury" (p. 7). Another interpretation is that they were indeed peasants who served in local levies and

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whose sole purpose was to defend the fatherland (*defensio patriae*) from the fortified enclosures. They were very different from other *milites*, who fought as heavy cavalry and who took part in expeditions "to conquer barbarians."

On the other hand, the evidence from Widukind's text indicates that the *agrarii milites*, once they had accustomed themselves to regulation and discipline, were capable of participating in engagements in the field and that they also took part in expeditions far from their home bases. Henry and Otto mustered forces from all ranks of society to meet and defeat the Hungarians, to launch campaigns against neighboring Slavs, and to put down insurrections within Germany. The *agrarii milites* probably did not constitute a distinct class of warriors trained for only one type of tactical deployment.

[*See also* Henry I; Otto I; *and Ministeriales.*]

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Charles R. Bowlus

AIGUES-MORTES

This port, situated between Montpellier and Marseille in the Camargue marshes, was the deliberate creation of Louis IX, known as Saint Louis (r. 1226–1270), the first French king to have direct access to the Mediterranean. The coast to the west of Montpellier was either in Aragonese hands or was controlled by the counts of Toulouse. To the east, Provence and its excellent ports, including Marseille, were not ruled by France. Louis founded the town in 1240, and the Seventh Crusade, inspired and led by him, left from the new port in 1248. The Eighth Crusade, on which Louis died, also departed from Aigues-Mortes, in July 1270.

The site of the town was formally acquired from the abbey of Psalmodi in 1248. By this time the most prominent feature of the fortifications, the Tour de Constance (30 meters [98 feet] high, 22 meters [72 feet] in diameter), had already been built. The church, Notre Dame des Sablons, followed in 1260. Temporary wooden and earth ramparts were replaced by masonry walls and towers after Louis's death in 1270, under the guidance of Guillaume Boccanegra, a Genoese. These were finished by the end of the century. In the port the stone jetty, the Peyrade, was also built. The town itself occupied 14–16 hectares (35–40 acres) and was designed as an irregular quadrilateral with a perimeter of 1.64 kilometers (1.02 miles). The walls (c. 11 meters [36 feet] high) were strengthened by five large gates, five small ones, two flanking towers, and three corner towers in addition to the Tour de Constance. Some 3.5 kilometers (2.17 miles) from the town, the only land approach was guarded by the Tour Carbonnière. The population varied between one thousand and three thousand five hundred despite the extensive privileges granted by Louis to lure people to his new town. Complaints that the harbor was not safe and that the anchorage silted up very quickly began as early as the early fourteenth century. Attempts to remedy this had little effect. When the king of France gained control over Marseille in 1481, Aigues-Mortes lost all its trading privileges and soon sank into virtual oblivion.

[*See also* Louis IX.]

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Susan Rose

AIGUILLON, SIEGE OF

Aiguillon, at the confluence of the navigable rivers Lot and Garonne in southwestern France, was of great strategic importance during the Hundred Years' War, a fact that was reflected in the strength of the castle and its fortified bridge over the Lot. The attached town was weaker—parts of its outer walls were nothing but wine casks filled with stones—yet, atop the high and steep riverbanks, it was strong enough to sustain its determined Anglo-Gascon garrison of three hundred men-at-arms and six hundred archers.

As French forces arrived to besiege the town beginning in late March of 1346, they had to occupy three positions separated by the rivers, posing the risk of defeat in detail. To reduce this danger, they fortified each encampment with ditches, then secured a crossing over the Lot at Clairac. Some three hundred laborers worked for weeks to construct a bridge of boats over the Garonne, which was twice wrecked by the garrison before finally being completed by late May. Artillery was set up to catapult stones into the defenses, but with little effect.

With perhaps fifteen thousand men stationary for weeks on end, the French army under Duke John of Normandy required vast quantities of supplies. Barge loads of grain and wine arrived daily, cattle were driven in from nearly two hundred miles away, and the neighboring countryside was stripped bare. Still, shortages developed and disease struck. An active Anglo-Gascon field force under Henry of Lancaster exacerbated the French difficulties, intercepting supply convoys and harassing camps from several nearby castles. The French suffered a demoralizing setback when the heir of the duke of Burgundy, keeping night-watch mounted, fell into a ditch and died. On the other hand, a major sally by the garrison was repelled, leading to the capture of their fortified bridgehead. All this prompted renewed efforts to capture Aiguillon by storm. Barge-mounted siege towers were deployed in one assault, but it failed when one was sunk by a trebuchet-stone.

In August, Duke John was ordered north to reinforce his father, King Philip VI, who anticipated battle with Edward III of England. After failing to secure a local truce with Lancaster, he broke off the siege on the last day of that month, burned his engines, and began the long march north, too late to fight at Crécy. In the rushed departure, some men drowned when crowded off the Garonne bridge. The garrison seized rich booty in the abandoned camp and pursued the scattering French fiercely, even capturing part of Duke John's baggage. Five months of expense and effort had brought him only shame.

[*See also* Edward III of England *and* Philip VI.]

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Clifford J. Rogers

AL-ANDALUS

The rapid Arab conquest of the Iberian Peninsula during the eighth century benefitted from the weakened state of the Visigothic kingdom at that time. The Visigoths were always a minority in Iberia; the Visigothic aristocracy held virtually unlimited authority over the native population and was especially vindictive toward Jews, who formed the majority of the merchant class. Visigothic mistreatment of Jews and native Spaniards played a part in the rapid Visigothic downfall, for while these subjugated groups did not actively support the Moorish invasion, they certainly did not rise up in sufficient numbers to adequately oppose it.

Initial Muslim Conquest. In July 710, four hundred soldiers boarded four small ships and crossed what is now called the Strait of Gibraltar on a

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reconnaissance raid for the governor of the Arab province of Ifriqiyah, Musa ibn Nusayr. The success of this raid prompted Musa to order his lieutenant Tariq ibn Ziyad to launch an attack with some seven thousand (mostly Berber) troops against the Visigothic king, Roderick (710–713). Tariq and his troops established an outpost at Gibraltar (from the Arabic *Jabal Tariq*, the "mountain of Tariq") by May 711. Engaged in a military campaign against the Basques, King Roderick was woefully unprepared for the Arab attack. Mustering what forces he could, Roderick launched a frontal attack against Tariq's stronghold along the Río Barbate. This brash action ended in disaster for the Visigoths. According to Muslim sources, two flanks of Roderick's army were commanded by supporters of Akhila, the deposed son of Roderick's predecessor, King Witiza (r. 702–710). When faced with a rapid Muslim attack, this group fled the battlefield. After this surprise victory, Tariq's lieutenant Mughith seized Córdoba while Tariq himself pressed north to Toledo, the ancient Visigothic capital, which fell without resistance.

Tariq's rapid conquest motivated Musa to raise a second invasion force of some eighteen thousand mostly Arab soldiers in June 712. Musa's army quickly conquered Seville and then mopped up Roderick's remaining supporters at Mérida, near what is now the Portuguese border, before joining Tariq's army at Talavera. In the next year, Musa and Tariq moved into Galicia and the northeast, occupying León, Astorga, and Zaragoza. Musa was recalled to Damascus by order of the caliph Walid I (r. 705–715) to report concerning his Iberian conquests. Musa and Tariq left Spain—by now almost completely under Muslim rule—never to return. Caught up in palace intrigue, Musa was thrown into prison, where he died in disgrace; Tariq passed away in complete obscurity, despite having won for the caliphate its richest province in just four years of campaigning.

Musa's son, Abd al-'Azis, was left in command of the Muslim forces in Spain after his father's recall to Damascus in 714, and he was the first of a series of governors ruling over the newly conquered territory. This was a period of great rivalry between the various Muslim clans. Musa's Arab troops were primarily Qaysites from northern and central Arabia and Kalbites from Yemen. Originally desert nomads, these two tribes had been bitterly opposed to one another long before they arrived in Spain. This rivalry was further complicated by the presence of the North African Berbers who made up Tariq's original army. These intense rivalries led to great political confusion and also caused a number of failed attempts to spread Muslim rule toward Gaul, most notably the expedition against Charles Martel by 'Abd ar-Rahman al-Ghafiqi, who was killed at the Battle of Tours (near Poitiers) in October 732.

Umayyad Emirate. The man who eventually founded the Umayyad emirate in Spain was a relative of the caliph Marwan II (r. 744–750). 'Abd ar-Rahman ibn Mu'awiya, "the Immigrant" (756–788), had barely escaped the Abbasid revolution with his life. Evading his pursuers, he eventually found his way into North Africa. In time, this exiled Umayyad prince crossed over to Spain, where he defeated the governor, Yusuf al-Fihri, near Córdoba in 756. He was proclaimed emir of Al-Andalus in May of the same year. As emir, he withstood a sizable expedition against Zaragoza launched by the Frankish ruler Charlemagne (r. 768–814). This campaign was later celebrated in the French epic poem *The Song of Roland*, although the events depicted in the poem are largely legendary. Disillusioned by the failure of his Spanish expedition, in which his rear guard was attacked and wiped out by the Basques, the Frankish leader made no further incursions against the Moors until the capture of Barcelona in 801.

The Marwan-descended emirate of Al-Andalus over subsequent decades was also marked by revolts instigated by Berbers, Arabs, and the *Muwalladun* (native Spaniards who had converted to Islam). A number of internal revolts against the tyrannical emir al-Hakam I (r. 796–822) placed the emirate in an especially dangerous position. Obsessed with the internal security of the emirate, al-Hakam ruthlessly intervened at the first hint of insurrection. In 792, the citizens of Toledo rebelled against the heavy financial burdens imposed upon them, and in response,

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the emir beheaded at least seven hundred of the citizens—and perhaps as many as five thousand—and buried them in a ditch. But the most serious challenge to his authority was in Córdoba itself in 818. This uprising ended with the crucifixion of some three hundred civilians, the razing of the southern suburbs of the city, and the exile of some twenty thousand citizens to North Africa.

The reign of al-Hakam's son, 'Abd ar-Rahman II (822–852), was relatively peaceful. The learned and pious emir attracted musicians, poets, and scholars to his court, which quickly became the cultural center of western Islam. The reign of his son, Muhammad I (852–886), and his immediate successors, was perhaps one of the most critical periods in the history of Muslim Spain. Armed rebellion broke out among the *Muwalladun*, and this uprising created a serious challenge to Umayyad rule until the rebellion collapsed in 912. The *Muwalladun* revolt began on the frontier but it quickly spread into the heart of Al-Andalus and was clearly motivated by antipathy to the Arabs. The *Muwalladun* viewed them as foreign invaders who treated their coreligionists as second-class citizens, despite their profession of Islam. When the citizens of Toledo, *Muwalladun* and *Mozárabes* (Spanish Christian) alike, revolted against the emir, King Ordoño I of Asturias (r. 850–856) intervened on their behalf, only to be defeated by the emir's forces in 854. Ordoño continued to support the *Muwalladun*; his policy of repopulating previously deserted parts of the Douro Valley caused Muhammad I to send out expeditions to check his advances. The Asturians continued this policy during the reign of Alfonso III (866–910), who encouraged rebellion throughout Al-Andalus, notably among the Banu Qasi dynasty and with Ibn Marwan, a *Muwallad* who seized control of Badajoz in 875. In 878, the emir sent a large army to Asturias only to be utterly defeated and forced to ask for a truce—perhaps the first time that an emir of Córdoba submitted to a king of Asturias. However, this truce allowed Muhammad I to have a free hand against his internal enemies, the most dangerous of whom was 'Umar ibn Hafsun, a *Muwallad* who harassed the emir from his fortress of Bobastro in the mountainous region of Ronda, in what is now Málaga.

After Muhammad I's death in 886, his son al-Mundhir briefly ruled (886–888) until (as some Muslim sources attest) he was poisoned and replaced by his brother, 'Abd Allah (r. 888–912), during whose chaotic reign Al-Andalus almost disintegrated. 'Abd Allah defeated Umar ibn Hafsun in 891, and, after this loss, the latter took the unprecedented step of converting to Christianity in an effort to highlight his opposition to Umayyad rule in Spain. 'Abd Allah was succeeded by his grandson, 'Abd ar-Rahman III (r. 912–961), who set about consolidating his rebellious territory. He became the first of the Spanish Umayyads to assume the title of "caliph."

The Umayyad Caliphate. 'Abd ar-Rahman III ended the ten-year-old succession of the Umayyad Hajjaj family in Seville, and he captured the Bobastro mountain stronghold of 'Umer ibn Hafsun's followers in 928. 'Umer had died in 917 but when the caliph captured Bobastro, he had his enemy's body exhumed and crucified in Cordoba. In the next year, he regained control of Badajoz and Toledo, then campaigned against the Christians on his borders. His only setback was against King Ramiro III of León (r. 966–984) (as the Kingdom of Asturias had been renamed) in 939, when the combined forces of León, Navarre, and Castile met 'Abd ar-Rahman's army of one hundred thousand near Valladolid. Ramiro's forces slaughtered the Muslim army. Thrown from his horse, 'Abd ar-Rahman lost his gold armor and was barely able to escape with his life. He never again personally commanded an army in battle. However, with the death of Ramiro, León was torn apart by feuds, and soon all three Christian kingdoms were forced to acknowledge the caliph's suzerainty and pay tribute to him. After 'Abd ar-Rahman's death in 961, his son al-Hakam II emerged as the new caliph; his fifteen-year reign (961–976) was marked by internal tranquility and supremacy over his Christian neighbors. In fact, the kings of León and Navarre as well as the counts of Castile and Barcelona all acknowledged his lordship. His death in October 976 marked the end of the greatest splendor of the caliphate. His ten-year-old son, Hisham II, succeeded him as caliph (976–1009), but power was in the hands of his counselor, Abu'Amir, who later took the title al-Mansur.

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Fall of the Caliphate. Al-Mansur and al-Mushafi, the *hajib* (chief minister) of Córdoba, defeated an attempt by the Slavic mercenary palace guard to overthrow Hisham. In time, al-Mansur's strong military support enabled him to defeat al-Mushafi and assume the office of *hajib* himself. He reduced the caliph to a figurehead and recruited a personal army loyal to him, which was made up of Berbers from North Africa and Spanish Christian mercenaries. In 981, he attacked León and defeated King Ramiro III, who was later deposed by his subjects. Ramiro's successor, Bermudo II (r. 984–999), took an oath of fealty to al-Mansur. In 985, he invaded Catalonia and sacked Barcelona; two years later, he overran Coimbra in Portugal and Zamora in León. In 997, his army swept through Santiago de Compostela, razing the city to the ground, including its cathedral, yet sparing the shrine of St. James. Despite this military prowess, his dictatorship hastened the destruction of the caliphate and the end of the Umayyad dynasty. After al-Mansur's sudden death on campaign in Castile in 1002, Hisham II appointed al-Mansur's son, ʿAbd al-Malik, as *hajib*. He continued his father's policies, and plundered Catalonia, Castile, Galicia, and Navarre. On campaign in October 1008, ʿAbd al-Malik died—possibly poisoned by his brother, ʿAbd al-Rahman, who succeeded him. ʿAbd al-Rahman, popularly known as Sanjul, was able to persuade the childless Hisham to appoint him as heir presumptive to the caliphate.

Hisham's proclamation of Sanjul as his heir led to an Umayyad coup d'état. The rebels stormed both al-Mansur's great palace of Madinat al-Zahira and the caliph's palace, Madinat al-Zahra. The destruction of these classical Muslim edifices symbolized the coming end of the caliphate. Hisham abdicated in favor of his son, Muhammad II (r. 1009–1010), who was ill-prepared to restore order to the caliphate; In the meantime, Sanjul, now abandoned by his troops, was taken prisoner, killed by his guards, crucified, and beheaded.

When Berber troops loyal to al-Mansur's family appealed to the count of Castile, Berber and Castilian troops attacked Córdoba and plundered the city. Muhammad fled and, arranging an alliance with Ramon Borrell I, count of Barcelona (992–1018), recaptured Castile, only to be assassinated shortly afterward. Al-Andalus disintegrated: there was a rapid succession of caliphs, most reigning only a year or two; Hisham III (r. 1027–1031), the last of these weak rulers, governed so poorly that the Córdoban aristocracy deposed him and abolished the office of caliph. With this action the last veneer of unity in Al-Andalus disappeared.

Muslim Spain now collapsed into a series of small states, or *taifas*, ruled by petty kings and based on the largest Andalusian cities, until the rise of a fanatical North African sect, the Almoravids, in the late eleventh century. After capturing all of Morocco and establishing a polity, the Almoravids, eventually headed by an emir, conquered al-Andalus and dealt a sound defeat to Christian forces at Zallaqah (1086). By the first half of the twelfth century, the Almoravid regime fell into decline in both Africa and Spain. This political and military gap was filled by the emergence of a second wave of *taifas* and then by the appearance of a new set of Muslim fanatics, the Almohads. This group quickly established a caliphate over Morocco and Andalusia, while dealing severe defeats to Christian forces at Alcácer do Sal (1190) and Alarcos (1195). With the miraculous Aragonese, Castilian, and Navarrese victory at Las Navas de Tolosa (1212), the Almohad caliphate entered into a deep decline, which facilitated the great reconquests of Castile, the Crown of Aragon, and Portugal. By the mid-thirteenth century, the sole surviving portion of Spain under Muslim control was the Nasrid realm of Granada, which held out against intermittent Christian pressure until 1492.

[*See also* Alarcos, Battle of; Clavijo, Battle of; Covadonga, Battle of; Granada, Siege of; Iberia, *subentry on*, Narrative (500–1100); Las Navas de Tolosa, Battle of; Mansur, Abu ʿAmir al-; Mansur, Abu Yusuf Ya ʿqub al-; Pelayo; Reconquest, Concept of; *and* Zallaqah, Battle of.]

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ALARCOS, BATTLE OF

The battle of Alarcos (19 July 1195) between Alfonso VIII, king of Castile (1158–1214), and Abu Yusuf Ya'qub, caliph of the Almohads (1184–1199), was the last major Almohad victory in the Iberian Peninsula.

Between 1158 and 1190, the Christian rulers of the region had conquered a great swath of territory stretching from Lérida through Calatrava to the Algarve. They continued numerous raids against Muslim settlements in Al-Andalus during the 1180s and the start of the 1190s. During this period, the Almohads were preoccupied with North African affairs and ignored Al-Andalus. Negotiations for a treaty between Castile and Al-Andalus broke down in 1192. In the following year, Alfonso VIII gave Alarcos, located to the south of Toledo, to the Order of Calatrava. The settlement consisted of a small, unwalled village adjacent to a hilltop fortress with a barbican. The defenses were still incomplete in 1195.

Alfonso planned a major offensive against Muslim Spain, with support from the Castilian church and the papacy. In 1194, he made treaties to fight the Almohads with León, Portugal, and the papal legate. The Castilian king then mounted campaigns against the Muslim settlements on his southern frontiers. One army, led by Martin, archbishop of Toledo, advanced to the Guadalquivir River and devastated Muslim holdings along the watercourse and southward into Andalusia. Alfonso's army reached as far south as Seville. This prompted Abu Yusuf Ya'qub to call the governors of Al-Andalus to prepare for war. The caliph left with his army from Morocco in April 1195 and crossed into Spain on 1 June, arriving at Córdoba a month later.

Alfonso summoned his army, which consisted of contingents from León and Navarre, the military religious orders, magnates, and the town militias, to meet him in Toledo. On 25 June, he arrived in Toledo, where he received intelligence of Ya'qub's advance into Castile. Concerned about the caliph's approach toward Toledo, Alfonso decided not to wait for his cousin, Alfonso IX of León (1188–1230), but to advance against the Almohads. Ya'qub's army reached Congosto, between Salvatierra and Alarcos, on 13 July. Alfonso arrived five days later with a tired and thirsty army. The battle that took place the following day was a clear Almohad victory. Neither the Christian nor the Muslim chroniclers provide much information about the battle itself. The Christians attributed Alfonso's defeat to the incomplete state of the fortifications of Alarcos and his decision not to wait for the Leónese contingent. Muslim writers claim that the victory was due to Ya'qub's superior leadership and the deadly effect of his archers. In the aftermath of the battle, Alfonso returned to Toledo attended by twenty knights, and Ya'qub took the name "al-Mansur" (the Victorious). Al-Mansur captured the fortresses to the south of Toledo, including Calatrava. After this defeat, Sancho VII of Navarre (1194–1234) and Alfonso IX of León attacked the fortresses along their borders with Castile, while the Almohads raided the Tagus valley to the south of Toledo.

[*See also* Alfonso VIII of Castile *and* Iberia, *subentry on*: Narrative (1100–1300).]

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ALARIC

(c. 370–410), king of the Visigoths. This chief of a Gothic band, who was born north of the Lower Danube, was defeated in 391 by the Roman general Stilicho and entered Roman service in 394 in the

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war against the usurper Eugenius. Because he was not rewarded with a high command, Alaric started a rebellion in 395, raiding Thrace, Greece, and Epirus, fighting against the army commanded by Stilicho. Finally, in 397, the emperor Arcadius appointed him *magister militum* of Illyricum and granted subsidies to his men. In 395, Alaric was elected king of the Goths, but he continued to be a Roman general, involved in the rivalry between the two empires.

Alaric's Goths invaded northern Italy in 401, when payments from Constantinople were stopped. After some minor victories and a siege of Milan, they suffered defeats at Pollentia and Verona in 402 at the hands of the army commanded by Stilicho. The truce allowed the remainder of Alaric's troops to retreat to Savia (in northeastern Croatia). Stilicho asked him in 407 to invade Illyricum to detach it from the eastern empire, but the plan failed because the forces were redirected against the rebels in Gallia. After Stilicho's death in 408, Alaric took command of his men and departed to Noricum (in modern Austria).

Because Emperor Honorius refused to pay him, Alaric invaded Italy in 408 and started a year-long blockade of Rome, leading three sieges. Alaric supported the election of another emperor in Rome, Priscus Attalus, in December 409, who appointed Alaric *magister militum*. The Gothic king was now the real master of Rome. He deposed Attalus and captured the city on 24 August 410. After this, Alaric planned an expedition to Africa against a rebel who had stopped Rome's grain supplies. The fleet was sunk by a storm and Alaric died at Consentia in southern Italy at the end of 410, being buried under the Busento riverbed.

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Alexandru Madgearu

ALBA SOCIETAS

Also known as La Compagna Bianca, the Alba Comitiva, and the White Company, the Alba Societas was a mercenary company operating in Italy in the 1360s recruited from English, German, and Hungarian professional soldiers who were veterans of the Hundred Years' War and the Neapolitan expeditions of King Louis I of Hungary (r. 1342–1382) and skilled in all areas of warfare. It was a singularly effective fighting unit, a cohesive, well-ordered force, noted for strict discipline, loyalty, and acute leadership. As an offshoot of the *grandes compagnies* in France, in 1360–1361 it moved to the Italian theater of war. Supplemented with Hungarians and Germans it became in effect Pisa's own army against Florence, under John Hawkwood as captain-general, numbering 2,500 to 3,500 cavalry and 2,000 to 2,500 infantry. In 1364 the majority, under the leadership of Miklós Toldi, defected from Pisa to form a new Anglo-Hungarian White Company in Florentine pay. They defeated Hawkwood at Cascina, then served Queen Joan I of Naples (r. 1343–1382) and the papacy. In 1365 they were crushed by the German Company of the Star near San Mariano, most of them being imprisoned in Perugia. The remainder joined Hawkwood again within the Company of Saint George.

The name "White Company" may derive from their polished plate armor, which "appeared white in the sun like mirrors" (Villani, vol. 5). In fact, however, they were mostly modestly armored, wearing leather cuirasses and only a few men having iron breastplates, but they wore white surcoats over their armor (Azarius, p. 128).

They "almost always fought on foot," having in the front "large lances with long iron tips," reportedly wielded by two or three dismounted soldiers, in a "round" battle formation, backed up by longbowmen (Azarius, p. 128). Assuming a defensive posture, "holding the lance low, moving in small steps toward the enemy" (Villani, vol. 5, p. 260), they were precursors of the Swiss phalanx. Supplemented with swiftly maneuvering Hungarian light archers also, in lieu of longbowmen, arrayed in the advance

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or on the flanks, they employed surprise attacks, ambushes, and techniques to conceal reverses; traveled boundless distances rapidly; and took account of the terrain wisely. They were broken into small units under corporals, chosen by internal election. They used artifice to seize fortresses, scaling the walls, operating siege engines "with craftiness," and employing sappers for tunneling (Villani, vol. 5, pp. 259–260).

[*See also* Great Companies; Hawkwood, John; Mercenaries; *and* Toldi, Miklós.]

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Attila Bárány

ALBERICO DA BARBIANO

(1348?–1409), a leading Italian mercenary captain. Alberico came from the local aristocracy of Cotignola in the Romagna, a town and region that produced several notable mercenaries and was briefly (1379–1381) the home of the great English mercenary captain, John Hawkwood (1323–1394).

Alberico first emerges from the sources in the early 1370s as a captain in the employ of the city of Milan. He subsequently worked for numerous states, including Florence, Venice, Naples, and the papacy. In 1377, as captain of the forces of the cardinal legate Robert of Geneva (later the French antipope Clement VII), Alberico participated in the infamous massacre of civilians at the town of Cesena, not far from his own home territory. He earned his most notable battlefield victory on behalf of Pope Urban VI in 1379 at Marino (near Rome) against a largely Breton force of mercenaries employed by the antipope Clement VII. Urban hailed the victory as the "liberation of Italy from barbarians," a proclamation that has led modern historians to view the battle—and Alberico's career more generally—as inaugurating a new phase in Italian warfare in which native mercenary captains began to replace foreign captains and their companies as the dominant element in local armies. More recent scholarship has, however, questioned this view. After his victory at Marino, Alberico joined foreign captains in free companies, looting Italian lands in search of profit during times of peace.

At the end of the fourteenth century, Alberico fought in the wars between Florence and Milan. He served as captain for Milan at Casalecchio in 1402, in a stunning victory that left Florence encircled. The sudden death of the Milanese ruler, Giangaleazzo Visconti, ended that threat, and Alberico changed sides. He spent the last years of his career fighting in the south, in Naples, and died in April 1409 in Città della Pieve in Umbria.

Alberico is credited with initiating several military innovations, including improvements to armor and more aggressive field tactics, notably reliance on cavalry charges. Scholars have also attributed to Alberico the practice of recruiting soldiers from his own feudatories in the Romagna, allowing his armies greater cohesion. The validity of these assertions remains unclear, as does much concerning Alberico's reputation. He nevertheless remains a proto-nationalist hero in the literature, treated as precursor to the unification of the peninsula in the nineteenth century.

[*See also* Cesena, Massacre at *and* Marino, Battle of.]

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ALBERT III ACHILLES

(9 November 1414–11 March 1486), margrave and elector of Brandenburg. Status-conscious prince, brave and skilled warrior, experienced military leader, circumspect administrator, persuasive diplomat, influential adviser to the emperor, single-minded pursuer of the interests of his house, and father of twelve children from two marriages—thus do his deeds and his contemporaries describe this extraordinary man. Albert, third son of Elector Frederick I of Brandenburg, of the house of Hohenzollern, and Elisabeth von Bayern-Landshut, was born in 1414. He owed his unusual second name to the learned humanist Enea Silvio de' Piccolomini (1405–1464), later Pope Pius II (1458), one of his admirers. His political opponents, however, had a less flattering but respectful nickname for him: "Vulpes Germaniae" (the Fox of Germany).

Albert spent his childhood and youth in the Kurmark, ruled by his father as elector since 1417. When he had completed his training at the age of sixteen, his father sent him to the royal court. The very next year, in 1431, Albert went with his father, who had been named imperial commander against the Hussites, and acquired his initial military experience in several conflicts. He was knighted in 1435 on a pilgrimage to Jerusalem. When, in August 1438, the imperial parliament at Nuremberg decided to defend Bohemia against the Lithuanian Grand Prince Casimir—later King of Poland (from 1444)—Albert of Brandenburg received another military command. He acquitted himself so well that, in 1439, King Sigismund named him his lieutenant "in Silesia and Breslau."

Upon his father's death in 1440, Albert inherited the Hohenzollern princedom of Ansbach. Having already distinguished himself many times in Bohemia through his outstanding skill and courage in battle, he enhanced his reputation at many tournaments in the succeeding years. At the great tournament in Augsburg in 1442, he won the field seventeen times, fighting with no armor, only sword and shield. In all the tournament records of the fifteenth century, Albert is celebrated as the bravest, the strongest, the most skilled, and the only undefeated knight.

His political and military activity in the next decades was characterized by an adroit linking of his own interests with those of the emperor and the empire. This strengthened his influence but also caused him repeated setbacks. As a declared enemy of the cities' claims to power and a proponent of nobles' rights, he found allies in the archbishop and elector of Mainz, Dietrich von Erbach, and Bishop Gottfried of Würzburg in 1443. They were ready to join with him to take violent action against a league of forty-four south German cities, including the powerful and very prosperous free imperial city of Nuremberg. Not only did he want to cut the political influence of the cities permanently, but he also claimed part of Nuremberg's territory for himself, supposedly as a former Hohenzollern possession. The princes attacked in the summer of 1449. In this "War of the South German Cities," Albert conquered the Nuremberg fortress of Lichtenau and a large portion of the city's territory. He could not take the strongly fortified and well-defended city itself, however, and suffered a severe defeat at Pillenreuth Pond in March 1450. By the terms of the Peace of Bamburg on 22 June 1450, he had to return all conquered territories to Nuremberg. The later expansion of his dominions took place peacefully: when his brother Johann died in 1464, Albert Achilles inherited the princedom of Kulmbach, and upon the abdication of his eldest brother, Frederick II, as elector of Brandenburg in 1470, this honor, along with all the Hohenzollern possessions, fell to Albert.

At the age of sixty-four, he rode to war once again in 1476, against the Pomeranians who had invaded

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his territory, and defeated them. He then fought as imperial captain against Duke Charles the Bold of Burgundy, within the framework of Emperor Frederick III's reforms, as advocate of an imperial war tax to counter the Turkish threat, and continued to represent the princes' interests in the imperial parliaments with his characteristic brilliance. Despite serious illness he traveled to Frankfurt am Main in 1486, in order to participate in the election of the young Habsburg archduke Maximilian as German king on 16 February. Albert Achilles did not live to see his coronation, however; he died in Frankfurt on 11 March at the age of seventy-two. Like a good householder, he left his Frankish princedoms not only debt-free but also with an immense treasury of more than four hundred thousand gulden.

[*See also* Charles the Bold; Frederick III of Habsburg; Maximilian I; Pillenreuth Pond, Battle of; *and* Tournaments and Jousts.]

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Translated from the German by Johanna M. Baboukis

ALBIGENSIAN CRUSADE

See Crusades *subentry on* Narrative (1180–1245) *and* France, *subentry on* Narrative (900–1328). *and* Crusades, *subentry on* Narrative (1180–1245).

ALBRECHT ACHILLES

See Albert III Achilles.

ALESSANDRIA, BATTLE OF

The town of Alessandria is situated on the Tanaro River in Piedmont, 89 kilometers (55 miles) south of Turin. It was a stronghold of the Lombard League against the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick Barbarossa in the twelfth century, and the victim of intense Allied bombardment during World War II. In July 1390, the town was the site of an overwhelming Milanese victory over a French mercenary army in Florentine employ.

Florentine forces at Alessandria were led by Jean III, count of Armagnac, who had been hired by the city to invade Milan from the north. Florentine officials hoped to link his army with another led by the English mercenary John Hawkwood, who advanced upon Milan from the south. Armagnac, however, had difficulty assembling his forces and was further hampered along the way by dissension and desertions. These delayed his arrival in Italy, and left Hawkwood, who had advanced to the environs of Brescia, overextended and short on supplies. Hawkwood was forced to retreat, an arduous journey that involved crossing three rivers.

When Armagnac finally arrived, he faced the Milanese forces alone. Italian chronicle accounts suggest that Armagnac moved impetuously and in poor order to the attack. The Florentine writer Minerbetti accused Armagnac of "too much boldness," owing to the fact that he was "very young and accustomed to winning." The two armies engaged outside Alessandria on 24 July, an intensely hot day. Armagnac's army purportedly had 1,500 lances and an uncertain number of infantry. Milanese forces, led by the mercenary captain Jacopo dal Verme, consisted of two thousand cavalry and four thousand infantry. Dal Verme's more disciplined army won an overwhelming victory. Armagnac and many of his leading knights were killed.

The battle was a turning point in the Milanese-Florentine war. It ended Florence's offensive and allowed Milan to take the initiative and move more strongly on Tuscany. The defeat of Armagnac also brought into sharper relief the virtues of Florence's other mercenary captain, John Hawkwood, whose retreat across several rivers was seen by Florentine sources as a heroic deed that remains part of the English captain's claim to fame.

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[*See also* Hawkwood, John; Italy, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1493); *and* Verme, Jacopo dal.]

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ALEXANDER NEVSKY

(1220–1263), grand prince of Novgorod. Alexander Nevsky came from the Vladimir–Suzdal branch of the Rurikid dynasty. His father, Yaroslav, played a political role (1238–1246) after the Mongol invasion of 1237–1238. Alexander became the prince of Novgorod for the first time between 1236 and 1241. He fought two successful battles; his surname "Nevsky" comes from his victory at the first, fought along the river Neva on 15 July 1240 against the Swedes. After the victory he quarrelled with the people of Novgorod, who drove him away. He was recalled to face an attack by the Teutonic Knights, whom he fought in the battle of Lake Peipus (also known as the Battle of the Ice or Battle on the Ice) in 1242. In 1246 he went to the court of the Tartar khan and only returned in 1250. He was probably held there as a hostage. In 1252 he received from the khan the *yarlik*, a patent that safeguarded the title of a grand prince. After this he cooperated with the Mongols: he supported the activity of their tax collectors, and he arrived in Novgorod together with the Mongol army. In 1262 there were uprisings across the entire territory of the Grand Principality (Rostov, Vladimir, Suzdal, Yaroslavl). As it is written in the Lavrent'evskaia chronicle (1377), "the pagans were driven away from all the cities as their cruelty was unbearable." To avoid the scandal, Alexander went to the court of Khan Berke, and died on his way back in Gorodets.

Alexander Nevsky was evaluated differently by posterity and by later tradition. He is known from the annals and from the legend (*zhitie*). In the latter, which was written some centuries after his death, his role in Novgorod came to the foreground. His victories over the Swedes and the Teutonic Knights are related, as are his less important, yet successful, fights with the Lithuanians and the rejection of the offer of the papal envoys (who promised a royal crown in return for a church union). Facts were mixed with fiction. There is no word of his visits to the Tartar court. The work ends with the narration of Alexander's death and burial. It contains quasi-biblical and hagiographic elements. We find a vision in which the first martyr saints of the Rus', Boris and Gleb, come to assist the warriors. The style of the *zhitie* recalls the heroic songs (*voinskie povesti*) and the *bylinas* of oral tradition. The work was probably written in the 1280s, some decades after Alexander's death. It is supposed that the author maintained contacts with Dmitrij, Alexander's son, and Metropolitan Kirill II (1250–1281), and the monastery of the Birth of the Mother of God, where Alexander was buried.

The word "Nevsky" appeared in the fifteenth century as a sign of a stand against the West. The sixteenth-century canonization underlined his fights against the Mongols. The canonized Alexander became an important element of Russian national consciousness. Meanwhile, his actual links to the Tartars faded away. His idealized picture reemerged in Russian and Soviet historiography.

[*See also* Mongols; Peipus, Battle of Lake; *and* Slavic Lands, *subentry on* Narrative (1000–1300).]

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Márta Font

ALEXIOS I KOMNENOS

(c. 1057–1118), Byzantine emperor (1081–1118). Alexios, third son of John Komnenos and Anna Dalassene, was born around 1057, the same year that his uncle, Isaac I Komnenos, ascended the imperial throne. Alexios died 15 August 1118. Alexios's reign is the subject of the *Alexiad*, by his daughter Anna Komnene, completed a generation after his death. A contemporary, and often highly critical, account is contained in the *Epitome historion* of Zonaras. The divergence between these sources has been perpetuated in modern scholarship, where Alexios is considered either a paragon or an arch reactionary.

Alexios came to prominence as a ruthless and effective general. As *megas domestikos*, supreme military commander, after 1078 he defeated the imperial pretenders Nikephoros Bryennios and Nikephoros Basilakes, thus securing Nikephoros III Botaneiates's tenuous hold on power. This was ended by his own coup, when Alexios's troops entered Constantinople on 1 April 1081. He entrusted general administration to his mother and older brother, Isaac, and forged an association with the Doukas family, marrying Irene Doukaina and betrothing his infant daughter, Anna, to Constantine Doukas (son of Michael VII Doukas). Alexios was thus free to remain in the field, where for the next decade he campaigned against both the Normans, under Robert Guiscard, and the nomadic Pechenegs (Patzinaks). To defeat the Normans, Alexios required the support of the Venetians, to whom he granted extraordinary trading privileges. The first phase of his reign ended with the crushing victory over the Pechenegs at Levounion on 29 April 1091. Consequently, Alexios was able to disinherit Constantine Doukas in favor of his own infant son, John.

Wishing to recover territory in Anatolia from the Seljuk Turks, Alexios appealed to Pope Urban II for aid. The response provoked by Urban's preaching—the First Crusade—was a shock and a challenge for Alexios, who succeeded to some extent in turning the crusaders' energies to his advantage, recovering the southeastern and southeastern littorals of Asia Minor. Nevertheless, the tensions between East and West that resulted, and the establishment of the Latin crusader states free from Byzantine suzerainty, set the agenda for future Byzantine foreign policy. An immediate consequence of soured relations between Alexios and certain Latins was the threat of a second crusade aimed at capturing Constantinople, which was promoted by the Norman Bohemond of Taranto. Although this greater menace was averted by Alexios's diplomacy, a second phase of Byzantine-Norman wars in the western Balkans ensued. The treaty of Devol, which brought these to an end in 1108, sealed Alexios's last major foreign policy success, but to a great extent revealed how hollow were his achievements. Alexios failed to drive the Seljuk Turks from Anatolia, and his last campaign of 1116 reinforced this failure: he created a frontier zone around Bithynian Olympos and evacuated the local population.

Alexios's last years were plagued by illness, and among the most powerful scenes in the *Alexiad* are those that describe his death, surrounded by his kin. John II had a series of panels commissioned that celebrated Alexios's exploits in war, but also featured his death. Alexios's image was created and recreated after his death as a means to legitimate the competing imperial claims of his children. In this context we might better understand the *Mousai*, a work attributed to Alexios, and supposedly intended as advice to his son, to be another posthumous creation.

[*See also* Levounion, Battle of.]

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ALFONSO I OF ARAGON

(*El Batallador* [The Battler], c. 1073–1134), king of Aragon and Navarre (r. 1104–1134). The son of Sancho I Ramírez of Aragon (r. 1063–1094) by his second wife, Alfonso eventually succeeded his elder half-brother Pedro I (r. 1094–1104) as king of both Aragon and Navarre in 1104.

Shortly before his death in 1109, Alfonso VI of Castile (r. 1065–1109) arranged to marry Alfonso to his widowed daughter and heir, Urraca (1109–1026). The Aragonese king grasped the opportunity to expand his small realm with the extensive territories of Castile-León, and even began calling himself *imperator totius Hispaniae* (Emperor of All Spain). However, Pope Paschal II (r. 1099–1118) annulled the marriage on the grounds of consanguinity, and, even though the couple did not immediately separate, no children were born of the match. Nonetheless, Alfonso garrisoned towns and fortresses across Castile along the Santiago de Compostela pilgrimage route extending from La Rioja to Sahagún and moved south to garrison Soria and Toledo as well. Urraca and her partisans worked diligently to parry Alfonso's thrusts into these areas and remove them from his control. They were assisted by Alfonso's increasing interest in the principality of Zaragoza.

Reconquest of Zaragoza by any of the Christian realms had been thwarted by the invasion of the Almoravids from North Africa in 1086. With his Aragonese warriors, joined by Catalan, Castilian, and French forces, and energized by a crusade indulgence, Alfonso besieged the city in May 1118, finally capturing it the following December. Within two years, he had moved south of the Ebro River, conquering the Muslim towns of Tudela, Tarazona, Borja, Calatayud, and Daroca. His military successes earned him the sobriquet *el Batallador*. He also persuaded Christians to settle in the region by granting them extensive legal privileges (*privilegio de los veinte*). Alfonso crowned his military career with a spectacular march through Andalusia, in order to join the Christian Mozarabs of Granada in a planned uprising against the Almoravids. Arriving at the outskirts of Granada in January 1126, he achieved a victory near Lucena before returning to Zaragoza and his task of settling Andalusian Mozarabs in the Ebro Valley.

His last years found his plans and his achievements overshadowed by a new generation of rulers. Alfonso VII of Castile, Urraca's son by her first husband, Raymond of Burgundy, came to power in 1126 and moved to recover territories and garrisoned towns still in Alfonso's hands, eventually forcing him to reconstitute the border between Castile and Navarre as it had been in the days of Sancho III el Mayor (r. 1000–1035). His final years found him in Gascony fighting on behalf of his vassal, Gaston de Béarn, and then returning to the Ebro Valley to continue his repopulation efforts. His military achievements there were reversed in July 1134 when the Muslims defeated his forces at Fraga. His final months of illness resulted in his death without heirs of his body on 7 September 1134. Alfonso was succeeded by his younger brother Ramiro II (r. 1134–1137), after unsuccessfully attempting to leave his realms to the military Orders of the Hospital, the Temple, and the Holy Sepulcher in a controversial will overturned by his own nobles.

[*See also* Fraga, Siege and Battle of; Iberia, *subentry on*, Narrative (1100–1300); *and* Urraca.]

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ALFONSO V OF ARAGON

(1369–1458), king of Aragon (crowned 1416). Called *el Magnánimo* ("the Magnanimous"), Alfonso's military activities took place during two periods, the first (including campaigns in 1425 and 1429–1430) taking place in the early years of his reign, with incursions into the neighboring Castilian kingdom's civil war in support of the political ambitions of his brothers, the "Infantes of Aragon." However, the Aragonese *cortes*'s refusal to provide financial and military backing forced him to abandon this conflict.

The second period of Alfonso V's rule had greater transcendent significance in Aragon's political and military history. He led an aggressive expansion into the western Mediterranean and through the south of Italy between 1420 and 1448. This drive culminated in the consolidation of his reign over the isles of Sardinia and Sicily against the Genoese (1420–1421), and especially in his conquest of the Kingdom of Naples in 1442.

This latter period was undoubtedly the most complicated, lengthiest, and most successful in Alfonso's military career. The first military campaigns took place between 1420 and 1423, when the queen of Naples, Joan II (r. 1414–1435), chose Alfonso V as a successor, thereby positioning him face to face with his rival, Louis III, duke of Anjou. After a series of initial defeats, Alfonso V repeated his attempts beginning in 1432, though with lackluster results. He was defeated by the Genoese in 1435 and taken prisoner in the naval battle off the island of Ponza. After his great battles of 1441 and 1442, he finally entered Naples as victor. The war in central Italy, however, would continue on from 1443 to 1448.

The prolonged and costly maritime and land campaigns in Italy called for a large amount of resources, human, financial, naval, and military. These needs caused the Aragonese monarch to introduce significant modifications in the organization of the kingdom's military to allow for protracted campaigns. Undoubtedly, these changes in organization are Alfonso V's greatest contribution to Aragon's military rule and to the administration of its war initiatives.

Alfonso's important changes to the Aragonese armies he commanded in Italy are considered improvements in several areas of military administration: the system of recruiting men, which was similar to that of deploying companies of mercenaries, such as the Italian *condotta*; the recruitment and mobilization of effective troops, planned in detail by state administrative services; the search for economic means to finance war through new taxation and merchant and banking loans; and the mechanisms used to pay the companies of soldiers. These changes allowed for the maintenance and mobilization of troops over long periods of time and were far more effective than the methods used up to that time by the Crown of Aragon. For example, in the military campaign of 1441 almost fifty-five hundred knights and sixteen hundred infantry were deployed, whereas in the Reconquest campaigns of the previous centuries, seldom were more than two thousand knights and as many infantry used. The end result of these linked actions was the creation of a permanent, professional, contracted army in Naples, organized into units with stable squadron commands. This permanent army, however, did not survive past Alfonso's reign.

[*See also* Iberia, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1500); *and* Italy *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1493).]

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Translated from the Spanish by Daniella Sforza

ALFONSO III OF ASTURIAS

(r. 866–910), last king of Asturias, known as "The Great." Son of Ordoño I (r. 850–866), he inherited a kingdom that corresponded to the modern Spanish province of Asturias, centering on the city of Oviedo. By engaging in constant warfare against the Muslims, Alfonso expanded his kingdom to include much of what is now Galicia, northern Castile-León, and northern Portugal, eventually leading to the transfer of his capital from Oviedo to León.

His succession to the throne was challenged by the neighboring count of Galicia, Fruela Bermúdez, who was killed by Alfonso's supporters while the king was a refugee in the adjacent county of Castile. Alfonso continued his father's policy of repopulating the abandoned Duero River valley, which formed a no-man's-land between Christian- and Muslim-controlled territories. Taking advantage of internal strife within the Umayyad Caliphate, he extended his control southward into the northern portions of the Spanish Meseta and into what is now northern Portugal by a series of raids that reached as far south as Mérida.

Contemporary chronicles, particularly the *Chronicle of Albelda*, record Alfonso's numerous victories against both Muslims and other Christians. He twice defeated Basque rebellions on his eastern flank and put down at least one other uprising; as early as 868, he seized from Muslim control the cities of Braga, Oporto, Orense, and other outposts between the Minho and Duero rivers. He then repopulated them with Christians. Alfonso defended the city of León against a major Muslim attack. Extending his power into Castile, he founded the city of Burgos and extended the fortifications of such natural strong points as Zamora and Toro. He seems to have been effective on both the offense and defense, and was pragmatic enough to have friendly relations with the Muslim ruler of Zaragoza, with whom he allied against the emir of Córdoba in 882.

[*See also* Iberia, *subentry on*: Narrative (500–1100).]

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ALFONSO VI OF CASTILE

(r. 1065–1109), ruler of León and, after 1072, also Castile. Alfonso was involved in conflict throughout his forty-four year reign. Although his military reputation is overshadowed by that of his sometime vassal, Rodrigo Díaz de Vivar, "El Cid," Alfonso VI was a vigorous military leader. He is best known for his conquest of Toledo in 1085 and his catastrophic defeat by the Muslims at Sagrajas (Zallaqah) in 1086. Alfonso's early reign was spent fighting his two brothers, but by 1072 he had outlived one and defeated the other to become the king of Castile and León.

Upon consolidating his power, Alfonso's main military objective was the conquest of Muslim-held territory. The Muslim threat to the Christian kingdoms in Spain had dissipated greatly with the disintegration of Umayyad rule in the eleventh century. Alfonso continued his father's policy of extorting tribute (*parias*), from many of the *taifas*, mini-states succeeding the caliphate that had ruled from Córdoba. Alfonso was skillful in playing one *taifa* against

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the other. Indeed, though personally leading raids as far south as Seville, his conquests resulted as much from shrewd political and diplomatic maneuvering as from brilliant generalship.

Alfonso's most significant victory, the conquest of Toledo, was the result of both negotiation and military pressure. During his exile in Toledo, he had established a strong connection with its ruler, al-Ma'mun. When al-Ma'mun's grandson, the unpopular and incompetent al-Qadir, was overthrown in 1080, he fled to the Castilian court. Alfonso agreed to restore al-Qadir to power in Toledo with the proviso that the Muslim prince cede Toledo to Alfonso in exchange for Valencia if he should conquer it. When Alfonso successfully restored al-Qadir to power in 1081, the Muslim ruler surrendered to his benefactor several important castles. Thus, from 1081 Toledo was effectively under Castilian dominance. As al-Qadir's grip on power weakened due to his unpopularity, Alfonso's grip on Toledo tightened. The final siege lasted less than a year, and Alfonso entered the city in triumph on 6 May 1085.

Alfonso's greatest victory was, paradoxically, the trigger for his greatest defeat. Following the loss of Toledo, several *taifa* rulers requested military assistance from the powerful leader of a new fundamentalist Islamic movement in Africa, the Almoravids, led by Yusuf ibn Tashufin (r. 1061–1106). This new wave of Islamic invaders crossed into Spain in June 1086. Alfonso immediately abandoned his siege of Zaragoza and called for help from his Christian neighbors. Meanwhile, the Almoravid ruler assembled a Muslim host at Seville. This force numbered, perhaps, twenty thousand men. The size of Alfonso's army is not precisely known; one source provides an exaggerated estimate of sixty thousand.

Alfonso's army met that of Yusuf ibn Tashufin at Sagrajas in western Spain near the city of Badajoz, on 20 October 1086. The Castilian ruler launched a surprise attack on Friday, 23 October, and initially succeeded in driving back the Muslim forces. But when Yusuf ibn Tashufin unleashed his African reserves, the outcome swung decisively to the Almoravids. Alfonso, wounded, fled the battlefield with only a few companions. The Castilian king fended off repeated Almoravid incursions for the remaining twenty-three years of his life.

[*See also* Díaz de Vivar, Rodrigo; Iberia, *subentry on* Narrative (1100–1300); Toledo, Siege of; *and* Zallaqah, Battle of.]

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ALFONSO VII OF CASTILE

King of Castile and León (r. 1126–1157). Alfonso VII was engaged in warfare throughout his reign. He was a master of diplomacy, strategy, and siegecraft, and is perhaps most closely associated with the capture of the city of Almería in 1147 during the Second Crusade (1145–1149) and with the loss of the same city a decade later. Inheriting a condition of chronic warfare between Alfonso I of Aragon (r. 1104–1134) and Castile-León from his mother, Urraca (r. 1109–1126), Alfonso campaigned either

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against neighboring Christian kingdoms or against the Muslims in southern Spain throughout his adult life.

The military threat posed by the Almoravids during the reign of his grandfather Alfonso VI (r. 1065–1109) had waned by Alfonso VII's reign. He was able to maintain in a state of vassalage the fragmented Muslim kingdoms or *taifas*, while exacting from them tribute (*parias*). He conducted annual raids deep into Muslim-held territory and extended his rule into the Guadalquivir Valley, even holding the city of Córdoba for a time. But at the same time fundamentalist Islamic movement, the Almohads, had arisen to challenge the Christian rulers of Spain. Alfonso was well able to exploit for his own strategic purposes the resistance of the Spanish Muslim kingdoms to this new fundamentalist invasion. Nevertheless, the power of the Almohads blunted, then reversed many of Alfonso's conquests in the south as the African fundamentalists consolidated their hold on Al-Andalus. Further, although Alfonso VII commanded the most powerful military capability on the Iberian Peninsula, his need to maneuver almost constantly between the competing Christian kingdoms of Portugal, Navarre, and Aragon reduced his ability to permanently solidify his conquests against the Muslim kingdoms in the south.

Alfonso's military ability is demonstrated by his success in conquering cities. He was able to generate an army almost annually, move it through enemy-controlled territory, and expertly lay siege to a targeted city. Even when he failed to take the urban site, he was able to extricate his army through enemy-held territory back to his own kingdom. The anonymous *Chronicle of Alfonso the Emperor* provides some details of these sieges. For instance, in capturing the fortified town of Castrojeriz from the king of Aragon in 1131, Alfonso built a rampart around the town during the six-month siege that helped to starve the defenders into submission. Perhaps contributing to his success in carrying sieges to completion, Alfonso had a reputation for scrupulously observing the terms of surrender, going so far in 1139, following the surrender of Colmenar la Oreja, as escorting its defenders into Muslim-held territory to prevent their slaughter.

When he was not warring against them, Alfonso collaborated with neighboring Christian kingdoms to jointly coordinate their campaigns against the Muslims, most notably during the Second Crusade. While the king of Aragon and count of Barcelona advanced down the eastern Mediterranean coast in 1147, and the king of Portugal took the city of Lisbon with the help of English and Dutch crusaders, Alfonso VII allied with the Genoese to successfully besiege the city of Almería in the extreme south of the peninsula. But ten years later, when the Almohads were absorbing the fragmented Muslim kingdoms into their own empire and pressuring his possessions in the south, Alfonso was unable to raise an Almohad siege of Almería and died during the return to Castile-León.

[*See also* Alfonso VI of Castile; Almería, Siege of; *and* Iberia, *subentry on* Narrative (1100–1300).]

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ALFONSO VIII OF CASTILE

(c. 1155–1214), king of Castile (1158–1214). Alfonso VIII inherited the throne of Castile at the age of

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two from his father, Sancho III (r. 1157–1158). Sancho's premature death left his son ruling a kingdom not only perched on the Christian-Muslim frontier but also at the mercy of warring Castilian nobles and predatory neighboring monarchs. Sancho VI of Navarre (r. 1150–1194) captured Castilian towns along the Navarrese border, while Alfonso's own uncle, Fernando II of León (r. 1157–1188) garrisoned the Castilian city of Toledo until Alfonso came of age in 1169. Although Alfonso's father-in-law, Henry II of England (r. 1154–1189), resolved Castile's boundary dispute with Navarre in 1176, the rest of Alfonso's life was marked by open warfare with the other Christian and Muslim rulers of the peninsula.

The Almohads of North Africa, under the emir Abu Ya'qub Yusuf (r. 1163–1184), began an offensive against the Muslim cities of Valencia, Jaén, and Murcia in 1172 that threatened the city of Toledo. Alfonso's first military success was the capture of the mountain city of Cuenca in 1177, which secured Toledo's eastern frontier. The Castilian king granted Cuenca a *fuero* (municipal law code) that integrated town militias into the municipal power structure. Alfonso used this *fuero* as a model in other border towns, including local militias as part of a frontier defense system that also included the Toledan church and the native military religious Orders of Calatrava and Santiago.

Throughout the 1180s and the 1190s, Alfonso used Toledo as his base to attack Almohad possessions to the south, extending his lands and intimidating his neighbors. His campaign against Seville in 1193 provoked the Almohad caliph, Abu Yusuf Ya'qub al-Mansur (r. 1184–99) to cross the Straits of Gibraltar in command of a large army. Al-Mansur's defeat of Alfonso at the battle of Alarcos in 1195 left the city of Toledo exposed to the Almohads, who captured fortifications and raided Toledo and its hinterlands. At the same time, his neighbors Sancho VII of Navarre (r. 1194–1234) and Alfonso IX of León (r. 1188–1230) took advantage of his sudden weakness to attack Castile's border fortresses. The marriage in 1197 of Berenguela, Alfonso VIII's oldest daughter, to Alfonso IX of León created peace between Castile and León. The Castilians also made a treaty with the Almohads, and Alfonso ceased his campaigns in southern Spain.

Alfonso only returned to the Toledo frontier in 1209, when Pope Innocent III and the Castilian bishops convinced his son and heir, Fernando, to crusade against the Almohads. As a consequence, Castilian and Aragonese forces raided Al-Andalus. In retaliation, the Almohad emir Muhammad al-Nasir (r. 1199–1213) captured the castle of Salvatierra in 1211, but postponed an advance upon Toledo until the following year. Ferdinand had died in the winter of 1211, so Alfonso assumed responsibility for his son's crusade. The old king collected an army at Toledo that represented the combined forces of Castile, Aragon, and Navarre, along with contingents from the military religious orders, Castilian town militias, and various French troops lured by Pope Innocent's offer of a crusade indulgence. Alfonso located al-Nasir's army in the mountains of Toledo and defeated it in the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa on 15 July 1212. Alfonso had expected to die in battle, but instead won a resounding victory that ended the Almohad threat to Christian Spain and secured the Toledo frontier. His triumph opened the door to the great Reconquest victories of the thirteenth century.

[*See also* Alarcos, Battle of; *Fueros*; Iberia, *subentry on* Narrative (1100–1300): Las Navas de Tolosa, Battle of; *and* Salvatierra, Siege of.]

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ALFONSO X OF CASTILE

King of Castile and León (r. 1252–1284). From a military point of view, the reign of Alfonso X is significant for three reasons: his campaigns, his legal corpus, and his interest in the navy.

Born at Toledo on 23 November 1221, Alfonso's first task as royal *infante* and military commander was to ensure the submission of the Muslim emirate

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of Murcia. This was not as easy a task as he had expected, and took him two years, from 1240 to 1242. During this period, he worked very closely with Pelay Perez, the master of the Military Order of Santiago.

His military activity as king was focused on the conquest of the remaining Muslim kingdoms of the Iberian Peninsula, gaining control of the Straits of Gibraltar, and exporting the Reconquest to Africa. He obtained papal support for these enterprises in the form of crusading and other ecclesiastical privileges granted in 1252–1260, 1264, and 1275. In 1255 he gained control of the area of Jerez. In 1260 he finally launched an attack on Salé, on the African coast. The independent Muslim kingdom of Niebla (Algarve) fell in 1262. But between 1264 and 1266, Alfonso was surprised by a Mudejar uprising, supported by the Muslim kingdom of Granada. In 1275, when he was forced to give up his imperial ambitions, he also faced a Merinid invasion. The Castilian king's response was to lay siege to the important port of Algeciras. The enterprise was a complete disaster due to logistical shortcomings that weakened the army and, more specifically, the Castilian fleet, which was crushed by a Merinid squadron in 1279.

His legal treatises included his *Especulo* and *Setenario* and the *Siete Partidas*. The second part of the latter code is an invaluable source for military historians, since it contains a discussion of military and naval affairs as well as a treatment of tactics and strategy. The *Libro de los doce sabios* (*Book of the Twelve Wise Men*) also incorporated military advice, although some scholars argue that this text was compiled during the reign of Fernando III (r. 1217–1252). Both his legal compilations and the municipal laws, the *fueros*, reflect a society prepared for war. The local charters of Carmona and Seville provide a particularly good illustration of this militarized society.

As early as 1252, Alfonso X ordered the renovation of the old Almohad dockyards of Seville, built in 1171. His intention was to create a trustworthy and almost permanent royal fleet. To this end, he granted various concessions to the people of *el barrio del mar* (the sailors' quarter) to ensure a supply of manpower for twelve royal galleys, and another one belonging to the Order of Santiago. He also created the first ever naval military order, the Order of Santa María, in 1272. However, the pope refused to approve this organization, which was governed by the Cistercian rule, due to its subordination to the Crown. The order controlled four main ports, from which it patrolled the surrounding seas: the port of Santa María (the Straits of Gibraltar), the port of Cartagena (the Mediterranean Sea), El Ferrol (the Atlantic), and Santander (the Cantabrian Sea).

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ALFONSO XI OF CASTILE

(1311–1350), king of Castile (r. 1312–1350). A military reformer and commander of European-wide fame, Alfonso XI ascended to the throne when he was barely a year old after the death of Fernando IV (r. 1295–1312). The ensuing thirteen-year minority saw Castile sink into a state of almost constant civil war as various magnate factions sought control of the regency. This state of affairs did not end even when Alfonso started ruling as an adult. The young king, in spite of the vulnerability of his position, continued southward Castilian expansion by launching two campaigns against Granada that captured several Muslim outposts along the frontier. Alfonso's expansionist policies, however, were halted in 1333, when he was threatened simultaneously by several Castilian magnates, Granada, and a Marinid force that laid siege to, and later captured, Gibraltar. After failing to recover the outpost and needing to concentrate on domestic affairs, Alfonso signed a peace treaty

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with Granada and Morocco the following year. During the next four years, the king's attention focused on the pacification and defense of Castile-León. In 1335 he ordered his forces to march through Navarre after border incidents between the two realms escalated into a full-blown conflict. After quickly defeating his much smaller rival to the northeast, Alfonso then assembled his armies to repel attacks from Portugal. The struggle dragged on for nearly two years and required papal intervention for the two sides to declare a truce. In quick succession, Alfonso also quieted the Castilian aristocracy through a combination of force and negotiation.

With his kingdom stabilized, Alfonso felt free to introduce reforms and resume his expansionist policies. In response to what he felt to be a decline in the ideals and practice of *caballería* (chivalry), he consistently promoted the ideals and customs of knighthood through his coronation and other rituals, as well as by the creation of the Order of the Band, one of the first monarchical chivalric orders in Europe. He also focused on Castile's customary institution of *caballería popular* (popular knighthood). To stimulate an increase in the numbers of mounted warriors available for service, he substituted the so-called Castilian or promotional system—in which a man who achieved a certain amount of personal wealth could choose to maintain a horse and arms and serve in return for some specific social and fiscal privileges. Following a Leonese custom, ascent into the ranks of Castilian popular chivalry became mandatory for those engaging in such service. Alfonso also addressed the apparent lack of popular *caballeros*, or knights, by requiring his towns to update the lists of their citizens who were required to serve and setting minimal standards for equipment and arms. With regard to the royal armies, Alfonso, in his *Ordenamiento de León* (1338), introduced a new recruitment mechanism for mounted warriors and infantry. Under the new statute, all royal vassals had to spend two-thirds of monies received from the Crown to gather an armed force. Specifically, the recipient had to recruit one mounted warrior, one spearman, and one crossbowman for every 1,000 *maravedíes* (55 florins). Through these diverse reforms, Alfonso increased the pool of Castilian military manpower and took further control over royal military expenditures. Yet in order to finance his campaigns, he further squeezed his subjects by relying on extraordinary levies of taxation rather than established rents.

In 1340 the Marinids crossed the Straits of Gibraltar and besieged the port city of Tarifa with the aid of a Granadan force. Alfonso, securing an alliance with Portugal and enjoying the naval support of Genoa and Aragon, headed south with all due haste. In the ensuing battle of Salado (30 October), the Christians, despite being outnumbered, thoroughly routed the Muslims. The great victory enabled Alfonso to thwart Moroccan expansion across the Straits, further solidify his power as king, and achieve European-wide fame. In the next two years, he further strengthened his position through the capture of several frontier towns and fortresses. In 1342 he laid siege to Algeciras, one of the most strongly fortified cities along the Straits of Gibraltar. This multifaceted operation, requiring both land and naval forces, lasted nineteen months and strained the Castilian resources to the breaking point. Yet in April 1344 Algeciras surrendered. Despite his continuing desire for conquest, this was to be his final triumph. In 1350, while besieging the lone remaining Marinid possession in the peninsula, Gibraltar, Castile's armies were hit by an outbreak of plague. In spite of advice to the contrary, Alfonso chose to pursue the siege, promptly became infected, and died, a rather anticlimactic end for a very successful military commander and reformer.

[*See also* Algeciras, Sieges of *and* Iberia, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1500).]

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ALFRED THE GREAT

(849–899), king of Wessex (r. 871–899). The life and career of Alfred of Wessex, known to history as Alfred the Great, is the stuff of legend. He was born, the youngest of five brothers, sons of Aethelwulf, king of Wessex, at Wantage, Berkshire, which was then on the northwest boundary of the kingdom. As a child, Alfred accompanied his father through Francia to Rome, and it is likely that this journey made a lasting impression on the young prince—how a country could be managed effectively to achieve prosperity, how it could be organized for security, how its military resources could be concentrated for maximum effect. It seems that Alfred was able to draw on his Frankish experiences when faced with the Danish threat to his own kingdom.

In the late 860s, Alfred was joint commander of the Wessex army with his elder brother, King Ethelred I, and had some opportunities to fight the Danes (Vikings) in the neighboring kingdom of Mercia; after Mercia's defeat, Wessex agreed to pay tribute to the Danes in exchange for peace. After several years of campaigning, Ethelred died in 871, leaving Alfred as the last surviving adult male of the royal line. Alfred again bought peace, using the five-year respite to reorganize his defenses and military resources.

In 876, the Danish leader, Guthrum, decided to eliminate the last independent English kingdom, launching a surprise attack over Christmas while the king was at Chippenham, Wiltshire. Alfred and his leading men escaped into the Somerset marshes and established a fortified base on the island of Athelney, from which they were able to muster forces for a counterattack at Edington in 878, which resulted in a decisive English victory. The fleeing Danes were besieged in Chippenham and only secured their freedom by accepting baptism and swearing binding oaths to the king in the Treaty of Wedmore, under the terms of which some eastern territory was ceded to Guthrum's control, the so-called Danelaw. Alfred's remaining years were spent campaigning against successive marauders; he shared military control with his eldest son, Edward, for the latter part of his reign.

Alfred's principal military achievements were in the reorganization of the *fyrd* or land army, the establishment of permanent land defenses (the *burh* system), and the creation of a viable naval force. He split the military obligation of his thanes so that there were, in effect, two armies: one at home protecting the harvest and the other out on campaign. After a defined period, the home forces would take to the field and the campaigning forces would return home. This provided the king with a logistically manageable, fast-moving, and self-supporting army.

Alfred famously employed Frisian skippers to command his naval forces and took a personal interest in the design of the ships, which were intended to be both faster and more stable than those of the Danes. While the new ships were never the shock weapon the king intended, they did at least break the Danish supremacy in seaborne operations.

Perhaps Alfred's most lasting military innovation was in the use of fortified towns. Although strongholds had long been used by the Anglo-Saxons, Alfred saw that they were ineffective unless they could command territory, and for this purpose they had to be carefully sited to control nodes in the road and river network, forcing the enemy to come within operating range of their garrisons; they were established so that throughout Alfred's kingdom the population should always be within twenty miles of a stronghold. By centring economic and governmental functions within these strongholds (*burhs*, boroughs), the king created a deep systematic defense to which the Vikings of his day had no effective answer.

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[*See also* Edington, Battle of.]

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ALGECIRAS, SIEGES OF

Because of its location, Algeciras was one of the most important strategic ports on the Straits of Gibraltar. Under Marinid control, it served as a landing point for Muslim raiding parties into Andalusia. In the complex diplomacy that centered on the Straits, it was no surprise that Alfonso X of Castile (r. 1252–1284) entered into a temporary alliance with Granada that aimed at recovering Malaga from the Marinids by launching an operation to capture it. Since this expedition was given crusade status, the Castilian king was able to collect shares of ecclesiastical revenues to fund it. Algeciras, however, was a well-fortified port requiring sea and land forces to reduce it. In August 1278, a Castilian fleet blockaded Algeciras bay while a Granadan army surrounded the city from the interior. The situation changed drastically by February 1279, when Granada, having recovered Malaga by dealing directly with its governor, withdrew from the operation. Alfonso X, well aware this could happen, sent in a Christian army. Between their fleet and army, the Christians subjected Algeciras to coordinated attacks. The garrison's tough resistance forced the Castilians to settle down to try and starve out the city, while occasionally bombarding the city with siege engines.

By the summer, Algeciras was in dire straits and the Marinid Moroccan ruler, Abu Yusuf Ya'qub (r. 1258–1286), needed to act, but hesitated because of the size of the Castilian fleet. To ascertain its condition, Abu Yusuf and his advisers sent a small craft, with a truce flag, supposedly carrying an embassy for the Christian commanders. While they distracted the siege leaders with fictitious peace talks, experienced Moroccan captains observed the deteriorated condition of the Castilian ships, with their many sailors suffering from lack of supplies and widespread evidence of scurvy. They then returned to Tangiers with this news. On 21 July 1279, a Muslim fleet attacked the Castilians by surprise. The sorry condition of the Christian fleet assured its complete defeat. A great number of Castilian ships were sunk, captured, or scattered, leaving many Castilian sailors marooned on the shore only to be slain by Muslim soldiers. Knowing that their presence was pointless without naval support, the Castilian land armies chose to withdraw to Seville, leaving behind much of their heavy equipment. In spite of Alfonso X's admonitions, the reason for the operation's failure was the Castilian king's own inability to adequately supply his navies and armies during the siege.

The Marinid crown prince, Abu Ya'qub, crossed the Straits to inspect the condition of Algeciras and decided to further fortify it, assuring that it would never be as vulnerable as during his father's overlordship. Six or seven years later, Algeciras had become one of the most impregnable cities in the Mediterranean. It was divided into two sectors: the Villa Vieja, or the original city, and the Villa Nueva, a district constructed largely for defense. Thick, high walls, anchored by towers placed at regular intervals, protected both sectors. A smaller outer barrier bolstered the walls, while a moat roughly twenty-five feet (twelve meters) from the base of the walls surrounded most of the city. In addition, a sizable garrison defended it at all times, making any approach toward the city walls virtually impossible. Facing the shore, Algeciras's shipbuilding facilities were state-of-the-art, and this crucial port area was eventually surrounded by the urban defenses. Since the docks were located within the walls, ships could be

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berthed, loaded and unloaded, or repaired without any danger. Algeciras's naval capability was virtually impossible to destroy.

To capture Algeciras, Alfonso XI (r. 1312–1350) organized a complex operation, surrounding and attacking the city by land and sea. The siege began in August 1342, with the Christians surrounding the city, and submitting it to a constant artillery bombardment from approximately twenty siege engines. This barrage baited the defenders of Algeciras to exit the city in an effort to break the siege. Even so, Alfonso, mainly because of financial and logistic difficulties, was unable to completely encircle Algeciras by land until early 1343. At that point, the Castilian strategy switched from actively trying to penetrate the city walls to starving the city residents. In December 1343, Alfonso and his forces defeated and drove away the last relief force sent out by Granada in the battle of the Río Palmones. In the next month, the Castilians constructed a floating barrier impeding access into Algeciras from the sea. In April 1344, the starving city finally surrendered and the interminable siege came to an end. For Alfonso, it was a victory that had stretched his kingdom to the breaking point, but it cemented Castile's ascendant position and further isolated Granada.

[*See also* Alfonso XI of Castile.]

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ALGHERO, SIEGE AND NAVAL BATTLE OF

The town of Alghero is situated on the northwest coast of the island of Sardinia. From the eleventh century it was dominated by the Doria and Malaspina families of Genoa. In the middle of the fourteenth century the fortified town became a focus of conflict between the Crown of Aragon and the Republic of Genoa. The principal sources for the events that followed are the Genoese annals of Giorgio Stella; the Catalan chronicle composed under the patronage of the Aragonese king, Pere III; and Matteo Villani's Florentine *Cronica*. All are in substantial agreement as to the events, with only a few minor differences.

A Catalan force of forty-five galleys, four smaller vessels, and four sailing ships, under the command of Bernat de Cabrera, arrived at Alghero on Monday, 25 August 1353. They disembarked and immediately established siege lines around the town. On hearing of the Catalan and Venetian plans, the Genoese had hurriedly assembled some sixty galleys commanded by Antonio Grimaldi, hoping to engage their enemies before they could join forces. According to Matteo Villani, the Genoese haste meant that some of their galleys were not fully manned. Men and arms from eight of them were therefore distributed so that the remaining fifty-two were fully armed. On the same evening that the Catalans had disembarked, news reached them that the Genoese were only a day's sail away. Bernat ordered the nearby forces of Riambau de Corbera, the Catalan governor of Sardinia, to advance to Alghero. On Tuesday, as scouts reported the approach of the Genoese fleet, Bernat handed command of the siege over to Riambau, along with all the cavalry, while the naval personnel were reembarked. Meanwhile, Niccolo Pisani

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Battle of Aljubarrota. João I of Avis in battle with Juan I of Castile, 14 August 1385. Illustration from Jan Bâtard de Wavrin's *Chronique d'Angleterre: From the Coronation of Richard II to 1387*. Roy MS 14 E IV, fol. 204, fifteenth century. © BRITISH LIBRARY BOARD. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

had arrived with the Venetian fleet of twenty galleys. Bernat paired each Venetian galley with a Catalan one and ordered them to be tied together in twos, except for sixteen smaller vessels and the sailing ships.

The Genoese arrived to find that they were too late to defeat their enemies in detail, but, because the lighter allied vessels were placed behind the main fleet, they did not realize the extent to which they were outnumbered. With the wind at their backs, they remained cautious and advanced slowly. Most of the day was spent in skirmishing and exchange of crossbow fire. Late in the afternoon, the wind changed. With a favorable wind, three or four large Catalan cogs with fighting castles and filled with armed men bore down on the Genoese line, sinking several galleys on impact. The battle spread as the Catalan and Venetian galleys uncoupled from one another and entered the fray. With night closing in, Antonio Grimaldi withdrew nineteen surviving galleys and fled back to Genoa. Darkness prevented pursuit by the Catalans and Venetians. The Catalan chronicle reports approximately 8,000 Genoese dead and 3,200 prisoners, with over 350 dead and more than 2,000 wounded among the allies, including Bernat de Cabrera, who was struck in the face by a crossbow bolt.

On Thursday, the garrison of Alghero opened negotiations with Bernat. On the condition of a general pardon and safe conduct off the island for the Doria and their families and personal possessions, the town surrendered on Friday, 30 August 1353, five days after the Catalans had disembarked.

[*See also* Italy, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1493); *and* Naval Combat and Tactics.]

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ALJUBARROTA, BATTLE OF

The battle of Aljubarrota, on 14 August 1385, was the climax of the struggle over the Portuguese throne begun in 1383 after the death of King Fernão I (r. 1367–1383). After several unsuccessful wars, the king married his daughter Beatriz to Juan I of Castile (r. 1379–1390). Fernão wished the oldest child of this match to inherit Portugal with his widow, Leonor Teles, as regent. Some Portuguese feared Castilian domination, but the nobility largely supported Queen Leonor. Exclusion of Portugal's cities from the privy council weakened the regency. When Juan I claimed the throne in his wife's right, this set off an anti-Castilian reaction. After João, Master of Avis, a half-brother of the dead king, murdered Leonor's supposed lover, a rising in Avis's favor followed. The queen fled to Castile, and Avis was named "governor" in her place.

The campaign of 1384 started well for King Juan. João withdrew into Lisbon and the king of Castile besieged the city in April. Castilian ships blockaded Lisbon, and the populace suffered extreme privation for several months. Elsewhere, however, Castile was less fortunate. An expedition into northern Portugal failed to capture Oporto; and Nuno (Nun) Alvares Pereira, "the Holy Constable," campaigned successfully against the Castilians in the south. When plague erupted in the Castilian camp, King Juan resisted withdrawing until the queen fell ill and many of his commanders perished. Once the Castilians had withdrawn, João was proclaimed king of Portugal by a *cortes* at Coimbra.

King Juan returned the next year with an army of perhaps twenty thousand men. Eschewing a southern route of march, he attacked from the north. The campaign did not start well. In July, a detachment returning from a raid attacked a strongly held Portuguese position near Trancoso and was routed. Urged on by inexperienced captains, King Juan advanced from Ciudad Rodrigo along the main road to Coimbra and Leiria. King João, encouraged by Nuno Alvares, decided not to endure another siege of Lisbon, confronting the Castilian host at Aljubarrota, near Alcobaça. The Portuguese army, reported at around seven to ten thousand strong, was joined by a small contingent recruited in England. Chroniclers credit the tactics used in the battle (standing on the defensive and using enfilading missile fire) to English advice.

The region is hilly, and the chosen ground was protected by streams on either side. These obstacles could protect the Portuguese flanks, forcing Juan's army to attack on a narrow front, nullifying its superior numbers. On the morning of 14 August, the Portuguese host formed up with the vanguard under Nuno Alvares facing north, supported on either flank by archers and men-at-arms. King João deployed the main body of his infantry behind the vanguard. The baggage was placed within a hollow square in the rear. The king of Castile responded by marching around the Portuguese position and cutting the Lisbon road behind it. Probably warned of this, Nuno Alvares moved southward to a position near the hermitage of São Jorge. The terrain there favored defense, and the Portuguese adopted a formation similar to that previously utilized. The constable hastily improved the position with an improvised palisade, a chest-deep defensive ditch, and a field of small pits that has been revealed by modern excavations.

The battle was preceded by a token effort to persuade the Portuguese to give up, possibly a covert reconnaissance. King Juan was advised to avoid a direct assault, but caution was rejected by the younger captains, supported by the exiled Portuguese nobles present. The vanguard, which included many well-equipped French men-at-arms, started forward, with artillery support, late in the afternoon, while light cavalry rode back to harass the Portuguese baggage train. The Portuguese were compelled to stand their ground, which favored them. The Castilian vanguard, advancing on foot and forced into a restricted space, was badly cut up by flanking fire and completely defeated. The main

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Castilian body advanced (at first on horseback, then on foot) and collided with the Portuguese vanguard, which, after a period of ferocious fighting, was penetrated. At this key moment, João I committed his main body to repel the enemy, while his wings attacked from the flanks. At the height of the fighting, the Castilian royal standard fell, and King Juan was persuaded to take flight. The rest of his host scattered, leaving twenty-five hundred men-at-arms dead on the field.

The battle was commemorated by King João with the foundation of the abbey of Batalha. More practically, his opponents among the Portuguese nobility were slain. John of Gaunt, duke of Lancaster and Aquitaine, made a treaty with Portugal and arrived with an army to seek the throne of Castile in the right of his wife, a daughter of Pedro the Cruel. This campaign failed; but Castile was unable to sustain any further claim to the Portuguese throne, leaving the kingdom in the hands of the house of Avis.

[*See also* Black Death; Iberia, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1500); *and* John of Gaunt.]

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ALMERÍA, SIEGE OF

Located in the southern province of Andalusia, Almería served as the chief Mediterranean port of the Córdoba caliphate. Having been promised by King Alfonso VII of Castile (r. 1126-1157) a third of all Arabic conquests, the right to establish commerce, and an exemption from tolls, a Genoese fleet of 63 galleys and 163 other vessels led by the urban consuls Oberto Torre, Filippo di Platealonga, Balduino, Ansaldo Doria, and Ingo and Ansaldo Pizo targeted Almería. Almería's siege started in July 1147 and ended 17 October that same year.

To unite with Alfonso's forces, Consul Balduino forged ahead to Cape de Gata with fifteen galleys as an advance guard until the whole fleet could arrive as a body. Not finding Alfonso there, Balduino waited a month outside the harbor.

Trying to engage the Genoese leader, Muslims sallied forth frequently but were unsuccessful. Count Ramón Berenguer IV of Barcelona (r. 1131–1162) eventually arrived with one ship and fifty-three knights. He ordered Balduino's fleet to approach Almería's mosque early in the morning, as if launching an attack. The count and his men hid inland while Ansaldo Doria's galley remained on watch at the Lena River. Another fifteen galleys waited beyond this watercourse.

Suspecting an ambush, the Muslims sent two soldiers to scout the area, but they did not spot the count's hidden troops. The Muslims then launched a violent attack against Balduino with 1,040 combatants. The Genoese lost eight men in that first clash. Finally, the total cohort of galleys joined Balduino's fleet at the docks, and the Muslims retreated in fear, losing five thousand men. The Genoese ordered their galleys to be beached in order to unload siege machinery.

After the Genoese had already set up engines, battering rams, siege towers, and catapults, King Alfonso VII arrived with four hundred knights and one thousand foot soldiers. Siege engines were positioned in strategic places opposite the ramparts. The Muslims counterattacked many times, but the Genoese persevered and eventually destroyed fifty-two feet (seventeen meters) of the city wall.

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In fear for their lives, the Muslims held a secret parley with Alfonso's representatives, Armengol of Urgel and García Ramírez of Navarre. According to the chronicler Caffaro, the Muslims offered one hundred thousand *maravedís* and hostages for Alfonso to withdraw and abandon the Genoese. Upon hearing the arrangement, the Genoese refused and decided to attack the city by themselves, one day prior to St. Luke's Day (18 October).

Twelve thousand Genoese attacked the city in silence, without battle cries. King Alfonso and the count of Barcelona were reluctant to join the attack, but Alfonso eventually joined in. Within three hours the city was taken, except for the citadel. That day more than twenty thousand Muslims were killed, and ten thousand women and children were captured. Within four days the Muslims surrendered the citadel and paid the crusaders 30 million *maravedís* to spare their lives. The Genoese fleet sailed to Barcelona, but left one thousand men to garrison Almería. The city remained in Christian hands until 1157, when it was retaken by the Almohads.

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ALMOGAVERES

Almogávers, almogávares, or almogaveres (from the Arabic *maghawir*, raiders) were vanguard soldiers engaged in cross-border raids on behalf of the Christian kingdoms of medieval Spain. They were recruited from light cavalry and infantry forces of the mainland and could also include Muslims. They were often integrated into municipal militias or the royal army. By the thirteenth century they had become Iberia's most effective frontier forces and were commanded by officers, such as the *almocadén* (infantry commander) or *adalid* (cavalry commander).

Booty was distributed according to this internal hierarchy. Originally, the *almogaveres* were armed with large knives, short spears, and light javelins. Later on, slight differences between the *almogaveres* of different Christian states emerged: in the Crown of Aragon they were usually foot soldiers, while in Castile they also included horsemen. *Almogaveres* were instrumental in the capture of Córdoba (1235), breaking into the eastern quarter of the city with the help of a Muslim traitor before summoning Fernando III of Castile (r. 1217–1252). A unit of 150 *almogaveres* aided the expeditions of Jaime I of Aragon (r. 1213–1276)' against the rebel al-Azraq, joining forces with the king's 130 knights and 700 foot soldiers. Murcian *almogaveres* were also active on the border of Nasrid Granada during the fifteenth century. According to Muntaner, one force of *almogaveres* fighting in the War of the Sicilian Vespers marched 93 kilometers (150 miles) in three days, carrying their own supplies, then engaged in a battle where they fought so well that the people of Messina reckoned each one to be worth more than two knights.

Probably the most famous *almogaveres* were those serving with the Catalan Company. After the treaty of Caltabellota (1302), these lightly armed Aragonese, Catalan, and Majorcan foot soldiers, concentrated in Sicily, were hired by Andronikos II of Byzantium (1282–1328) to fight the Turks. They were renowned for their role in the expansion of Aragonese power in the Mediterranean and their ability to resist cavalry attacks. Andronikos could not pay them, and their desire for booty resulted in cruelty that is mentioned in all the Byzantine sources. When their commander, Roger de Flor, was murdered at the imperial court, they ravaged much of Anatolia and Greece before defeating the duke of Athens in the battle of Cephisus or Orchomenus (1310). They eventually took the duchies of Athens and Neopatria (Thessaly), recognizing the overlordship of Frederick III (1311–1390) for these lands.

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[*See also* Catalan Company; Córdoba, Siege of; *and* Sicilian Vespers, The.]

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ALNWICK CASTLE

One of the best-preserved medieval castles in England, Alnwick is situated on the River Aln, where it is crossed by the old Roman road. From this strategic location, Alnwick Castle defended the plain of Northumberland for centuries against Scottish invasions and raids and against the depredations of border raiders.

The castle covers an area of 2.8 hectares (7 acres). Eleven towers (eight major towers and three garrets) and three gates are incorporated into the outer curtain wall; the area within is divided into "middle" (or eastern) and "outer" (or western) wards; and a large circular keep, surrounding an inner courtyard, is situated at the junction of the dividing wall and the northern curtain wall.

A motte-and-bailey castle may have built on the site late in the eleventh century by Gilbert Tyson. However, the subsequent owner, Yves de Vescy, the first Baron Alnwick, is known to have built fortifications in 1096. Eustace FitzJohn, Vescy's son-in-law, completed the basic plan of the castle. In 1172, and again in 1174, Alnwick was besieged by William the Lion, king of Scotland (r. 1165–1214); on the latter occasion William was captured. King John (r. 1199–1215) visited Alnwick Castle twice as part of his efforts to put an end to the threat of Scottish invasion. When the Vescy lord of Alnwick rebelled against the king in 1215, John ordered the castle to be destroyed. However, it was too strategically valuable to be razed, and despite the order, it remained in Vescy hands.

Following a century of relative quiet, the Anglo-Scottish Wars erupted in 1296. In 1309 the castle was sold by William, the last of the Vescy lords, to the acquisitive bishop of Durham, Antony Bek, who sold it on to Henry de Percy (1272?–1315). It has been in the hands of the Percys and their descendants almost continuously ever since.

At this critical stage in the Anglo-Scottish Wars, when the Scots under Robert I (Robert the Bruce, r. 1306–1329) were on the offensive, Percy began to update the castle's defenses to meet the standards of the day. He added seven semicircular towers to the shell keep, and the Middle Gateway, which is a square tower of three and (in part) four stories, projecting beyond the curtain wall. He also strengthened the curtain wall by the addition of formidable towers. His son, Henry Percy II (1299?–1352), continued the castle's modernization. He added the pair of semi-octagonal towers that flank the gateway to the keep, and the barbican—which Nikolaus Pevsner called "the finest in England"—to protect the gate into the outer ward.

In 1404–1405, the Percys rebelled against Henry IV of England, who besieged and captured the castle. In 1424 and again in 1448, it was besieged and burned by the Scots.

During the Wars of the Roses (1455–1485), Alnwick Castle changed hands many times. The Lancastrian sympathies of the Percy Earls of Northumberland ensured that it became a target for the Yorkist kings. It was besieged twice in 1462 and fell to the Yorkists the following year. However, the Percys regained the castle in 1469. In the sixteenth century, it was extensively renovated and developed thereafter into a stately home.

Alnwick Castle is still the residence of the dukes of Northumberland and is now a Grade I listed building, the second-largest inhabited castle in England.

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ALPS AND ALPINE PASSES

The Alps were a point of passage for northern armies into Italy. Mercenary soldiers, who came to the peninsula to fight in the frequent wars among local city-states, also crossed over the mountain passes. In medieval times, these mountain passes were essentially the same as they were in antiquity. Armies often followed old Roman roads, which were passable when the weather was good. The most enduring obstacles were brigands and local inhabitants, who often opposed the movements of armies, and limited supply of shelter and provisions.

Holy Roman emperors routinely traveled through the Alps to assert their authority over northern and central Italian states. The Ottonian emperors, from Otto the Great in 936 to the death of Lothair of Süpplingenburg in 1137, crossed the Alps some twenty times. They usually followed the Brenner, Septimer, and St. Saint Gotthard passes in the east and central region, initiating their journeys in August and September. The passage of German emperors into Italy was facilitated by their control of the alpine bishoprics of Trent and Bressanone. Italian states such as Verona and Milan, which lay near the mountains, often contested German authority, setting the stage for numerous confrontations.

The western passes through the Alps, from France into Italy, were dominated by the duchy of Savoy, a small state that lay on both sides of the mountains. Savoy controlled the Montgenèvre, Mont Cenis, Little Saint Bernard, Great Saint Bernard, and Simplon passes. The French king Francis I called the little country the "gatekeeper" of the Alps. When Emperor Henry VII entered Italy in 1310, he chose the Mont Cenis Pass, because the ruler of Savoy was his brother-in-law.

The frequent traffic through the Alps, which included merchants and pilgrims as well as armies and men-at-arms, suggests that the mountains were not as forbidding a border as they have sometimes been perceived. There was indeed considerable work done on the roads to improve passage, including construction in the thirteenth century of the so-called Devil's Bridge, spanning the gorge created by the Reuss River near the Saint Gotthard Pass. The bridge is considered one of the technological wonders of the era.

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ALTENESCH, BATTLE OF

Since the beginning of the thirteenth century, the peasants of Stedingen, an area on the western shore of the river Weser near Bremen, had been engaged in conflict with the counts of Oldenburg and the archbishop of Bremen. After several fruitless attempts to subdue them militarily, Archbishop Gerhard II of Bremen declared that the Stedingen peasants were heretics, and, on 29 October 1232, Pope Gregory IX called for a crusade against them. His appeal did not have the desired effect, so the pope repeated it, adding as an incentive the full absolution of sins.

The army that answered the pope's appeal was composed of crusaders from northern Germany, the lower Rhine, Brabant, Flanders, and Holland. Besides Henry II of Brabant, who commanded the army, the counts Dietrich VI of Cleve, Otto II of Guelders, and Floris IV of Holland were among the prominent participants. According to the *Sächsische Weltchronik*, the crusading army numbered 40,000 men; a more realistic estimate would be around 8,000. On the other side, the number of Stedingen peasants is estimated by Emo of Wittewierum at 11,000, but

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here, too, the actual size of the army will have been considerably less, probably not exceeding 2,000 men.

The peasants were poorly equipped compared to the crusaders, having no armor and, as weapons, only long pikes and short swords. According to the report of Albert of Stade, their army was led by the otherwise unknown persons Boleke of Bardenflete, Tammo of Hunthorpe, and Thedmarus of Aggere. On 27 May 1234 the crusading army marched along the western shore of the Weser to the mouth of the river Ochtum, which it crossed with the help of a pontoon bridge; arriving in the field of Ochtum, it attacked the peasant army in the rear. Several charges were necessary to break the wall of peasant lances. As the peasant army then moved forward and opened its formation, the count of Cleve seized the opportunity to launch a flanking attack, which proved to be the decisive stroke. The crusaders massacred the peasants of Stedingen, not sparing women or children, but many peasants still managed to escape into the marshes or into the adjacent territory of Frisia. The possessions of the peasants were confiscated and their lands divided between the counts of Oldenburg in the north and the bishop of Bremen in the south.

[*See also* Germany Narrative (1125–1250).]

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ALTOPASCIO, BATTLE OF

In 1325, Florence and the other Guelph (pro-papal) cities of Tuscany decided to attack the territory of Lucca, whose leader was the Ghibelline (pro-imperial) commander Castruccio Castracani. According to the account of the chronicler Giovanni Villani, the principal source, an imposing force was gathered upon the orders of Ramon de Cardona, consisting of nine hundred Florentine cavalry, two hundred Sienese cavalry, fifteen hundred mercenaries, and fifteen thousand infantry. After having pretended to attack Pistoia, in the beginning of July the Guelph army turned on Lucca by surprise, taking the fortified bridge of Cappiano on the Usciano River, and the important castle of Altopascio. Castruccio, who had lesser forces (roughly fifteen hundred cavalry and an uncertain number of infantry), took up position on the hills above, in a fortified field, observing the enemy movements. The territory was swampy, and throughout the summer the Florentine forces were tormented by sickness, so that many offered large sums of money in exchange for discharges. Castruccio, meanwhile, augmented his own troops by enrolling Ghibelline contingents in Lombardy. In particular, in exchange for the enormous sum of sixteen thousand florins, the Milanese Azzo Visconti led eight hundred heavy cavalry to his aid. At the beginning of September, Ramon advanced to the abbey of Pozzoveri, along the route to Lucca, though by now the balance of forces had shifted in favor of the Ghibellines.

On 21 September, Castruccio defeated a Florentine detachment near the village of Porcari. Even though he lost only forty men, Ramon de Cardona decided to retreat toward Florence. According to Villani he had two thousand cavalry and eight thousand infantry. Castruccio's forces were only slightly superior in numbers, but the morale of the Guelph troops was very low, while that of the Ghibellines was exceedingly high. Moving rapidly with only his cavalry, Castruccio was able to reach the Florentine forces and force them into battle on the plain of Altopascio on 23 September. Ramon set his troops in three units: a small advance guard of roughly 150 French

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cavalry, a group of assault troops (*feditori*) composed of around seven hundred Burgundians who were intended to sustain the first shock, and finally the main body formation (*schiera grossa*) composed of the remaining twelve hundred cavalry, led by Ramon himself, and the infantry. From the start the French advance-guard posed difficulties for Azzo Visconti's contingent, but the Burgundians, instead of aiding them, fled, perhaps because of the betrayal of their commander, the marshal Bornio of Burgundy. Ramon de Cardona at first hesitated to order a counterattack, while Castruccio threw himself into battle with his men. At this point, the rest of the Florentine cavalry was seized by panic, even though the infantry was able to offer resistance to the advancing enemy. Castruccio then ordered two detachments of German mercenaries to block the bridge of Cappiano, thus cutting off his adversaries' retreat. In the end, the infantry of Lucca joined to kill and capture the stragglers. Victory was complete; Florentine losses amounted to roughly five thousand men dead or captured, and Castruccio, after quickly recapturing Cappiano and Altopascio, directly threatened the territory of Florence.

The battle of Altopascio was the product of an age of transition between two diverse models of the organization of armies. Citizen forces and infantry still had an important role, but the weight of the cavalry, especially mercenary, was decisive. Also, the two commanders were true professionals of war, who in fact knew how to undertake complex strategies; this brought about one of the largest battles of the fourteenth century, involving almost twenty thousand men.

[*See also* Castruccio Castracani.]

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AMALFI, SIEGE OF

Amalfi was under the control of nearby Salerno from 1039 until 1052. The tribute paid by this small and mountainous, but wealthy, trading city was vital to the policy of Guaimar IV (r. 1027–1052) of Salerno, which relied heavily on paid troops, especially Normans. In 1052 an Amalfitan revolt was part of a series of events that ended with Guaimar's assassination and the succession, with Norman support, of his young son, Gisulf II (r. 1052–1076). The exiled duke of Amalfi, John II, returned with Byzantine support. Facing multiple threats to his territory, Gisulf had to come to terms with Amalfi, which was threatening Salerno's shipping. The treaty terms required each city to send three hundred troops to the other's aid.

Some years later, Gisulf began efforts to regain control of Amalfi and its revenues. His raids made agriculture all but impossible, and he attacked the shipping that was Amalfi's lifeblood. Amatus of Montecassino, whose obvious detestation of the Prince of Salerno makes his tale suspect, reports that those captured were subjected to imprisonment, torture, and ruinous confiscations. The piracy and exactions financed Gisulf's aggressive policy, which probably began as a response to the failure of Byzantine aid. Geoffrey Malaterra writes that Gisulf's goal was to take control of the coast from Naples to Calabria.

Gisulf concentrated on the capture of Amalfi's castles. He took three coastal forts early in 1073. Despite their position, Amatus mentions only horse and foot troops, but the frequent references to ships and piracy make some kind of combined action likely. Shortly afterward, Duke John's successor, Sergius IV, died, and his wife fled with their small son. The city then sought the protection of the papacy, but the new pope, Gregory VII (r. 1073–1085), had just entered into an agreement with Gisulf of Salerno and the Norman prince Richard of Capua. The pope was, however, at odds with Gisulf's brother-in-law, Robert Guiscard, the Norman duke of Apulia, Calabria, and much of Sicily. Nominally also a papal vassal, Robert was excommunicated for most of the next seven years.

It was to Robert Guiscard that Amalfi then turned, offering him rule of the city and asking him to fortify

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it. Robert had returned to Calabria from Sicily to deal with a rebellion led by his nephew Abelard. The possibility of an alliance between Gisulf and Richard—the latter had expanded his territory while Robert was campaigning in Sicily and supported the Calabrian rebels—or of Gisulf in control of Amalfi's fleet and its strong trade connections with Sicily and the Islamic world—was not something that Robert could ignore. But neither could he afford to leave Calabria unsubdued. The duke sent ships and troops to Amalfi with the condition that a tribute would be paid. By October or November Amalfitan charters were being dated by the reign of Duke Robert and his son, Roger.

The duke's help was at first ineffective. Gisulf intercepted some of Robert's ships and then succeeded in taking a fortified base somewhere in the immediate vicinity of Amalfi. The situation for the city had become so alarming that Robert asked for peace terms, going so far as to offer to become Gisulf's vassal. The prince, however, did not want Robert in possession of Amalfi under any terms. Gisulf had no heir, and the suggestion of his sister, Sichelgaita, Robert's wife, that the duchy be left to their son, Roger, was alarming.

Although apparently close to success, Gisulf's campaign against Amalfi stalled. The city held out until 1076, when Robert was free to come in person and quickly decided to settle the conflict by force. By May, Salerno was invested by land and by sea. As Gisulf had clearly foreseen, Amalfi's support for the attack on Salerno was substantial. The city sent ships for the blockade and reinforcements for the siege and also built four forts to quarter some of the land army. After Salerno fell in December 1076, Robert sent part of the Amalfitan fleet to support his now-ally Richard of Capua's attack on Naples.

[*See also* Robert Guiscard.]

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ANASTASIOS I

(430–518), Byzantine emperor. Born in Dyrrachium (modern-day Durrës, Albania), Flavius Anastasios after a long civilian career was elected successor to the emperor Zeno by his widow, Ariadne, in 491. His most important military achievement was the improvement of defenses along the Danube, on the eastern frontier, and in other potentially dangerous regions. These extensive works were facilitated by a new fiscal policy that increased state revenues, which was continued by Justinian.

Apart from several clashes with the Bulgars and Arabs, the single war of Anastasios's reign was that fought against Kavadh I of Persia, who attacked Armenia in 502. Lost fortresses were recovered in 506, when a peace treaty was concluded. The experience of this conflict prompted the emperor to consolidate the eastern frontier. One major achievement was the construction of Dara at a strategic point on the way to the Persian capital.

In particular, Anastasios faced two serious military rebellions. The first was initiated in 491 by the Isaurians, a warrior mountain people from southern Asia Minor (possible ancestors of the Kurds). They were led by Longinus of Cardala, the brother of Zeno, who considered himself to be the legitimate Roman heir. Longinus was defeated at Cotyaeum in 491, but the unrest continued until 497. The second mutiny was started by the general Vitalian in 513, in Scythia and Moesia Secunda. The reasons given were the

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harsh fiscal policy and hatred for the Monophysite heresy supported by the emperor. The crisis lasted until Anastasios I's death in 518.

[*See also* Dara, Battle of; Justinian I; *and* Vitalian.]

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ANCHIALOS, BATTLE OF (708)

The western Black Sea fortress of Anchialos (present-day Pomorie, Bulgaria) played an important role in the relations between the Bulgarian khanate and the Byzantine Empire. Although the Bulgarian Khan Tervel (r. c. 701–c. 722) had rendered military assistance in 705 to restore the deposed Byzantine emperor Justinian II Rhinotmetus (r. 685–695, 705–711), the emperor, for unexplained reasons, launched a campaign against Bulgaria in 708. The Byzantine cavalry was concentrated on the plains near Anchialos. The emperor himself arrived there with the rest of the army, by sea. Warned by his scouts, Khan Tervel took measures for the defense of the Balkan strongholds and passes, to make sure that the Byzantines could not cross the passes.

Justinian's self-confidence, the arrogance of his commanders, and the lack of discipline among the warriors foreshadowed the failure of the Byzantine campaign. When defenders saw the imperial forces scattered all over the plain to gather fodder for their horses, the Bulgarians unexpectedly attacked them and their camp, which had been left unguarded. A vast number of the Byzantines were massacred, and many were taken captive. The few survivors sought protection behind the walls of the fortress. Anchialos was besieged by the Bulgarians for three days. On the third night Justinian withdrew secretly to Constantinople with the remainder of his defeated army, having cut the blood vessels of his horse and ordered the others to follow his example, so that the Bulgarians could not use the horses left behind in the stronghold. Justinian also ordered weapons to be abandoned on the walls of the fortress—presumably in acknowledgment of the Bulgar victory. According to another interpretation, however, Justinian was seeking to demonstrate that, despite his withdrawal, he was the victor, because the Bulgarians could not take the fortress by siege. These two interpretations continue to divide researchers seeking to construe the symbolic imperial gesture. Despite the outcome, the Bulgarian-Byzantine military conflict in 708 did not cause a lasting break in relations between the two states.

[*See also* Byzantine Empire, *subentry on* Narrative (500–1000); *and* Slavic Lands, *subentry on* Narrative (500–1000).]

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Vassil Gjuzelev

ANCHIALOS, BATTLE OF (917)

At this battle the Bulgarian ruler Symeon inflicted a crushing defeat on a Byzantine army on 20 August 917. Although Byzantium and Bulgaria had formally been at peace for several years, tensions lingered and Empress Zoe's regency government determined "to overcome and annihilate Symeon," according to a Byzantine chronicle. The Byzantine strategy was to launch a "first strike." Land forces advanced northward from the environs of the capital Constantinople (present-day Istanbul), hugging the Black Sea coast, under the Byzantine commander-in-chief Leo Phokas. Meanwhile warships commanded by Admiral Romanos I Lekapenos were sent up the Danube

Bahan dengan hak cipta

River to meet with the nomadic Pechenegs and ferry them across the river to Bulgaria. The same strategy had been applied against Symeon some twenty years earlier, when Byzantine vessels shipped the nomadic Hungarians to devastate Bulgarian territories. In 917 the pincer movement failed on both counts. The Pechenegs never were ferried across the Danube: perhaps because of sabotage by Lekapenos; perhaps because Symeon won over enough Pechenegs to abort the operation; perhaps sheer mischance. Symeon was left free to concentrate on his southern front, and no Byzantine ships were available to attack the peninsula fortress of Mesembria (now Nesebŭr, Bulgaria), a prime target of Phokas's expedition.

Symeon set upon the Byzantine army close to the Acheloos River near the Black Sea coast. Little is known of the course of the battle, save that the Byzantines were eventually routed and, although Phokas escaped, many commanders perished. In fact, so many died that the battlefield was said to be still littered with bones in the 970s. Symeon led troops to ravage as far as Constantinople's suburbs, but made no attempt on the city walls. The defeat left Byzantium still formidable, but it discredited the regency government under Zoe, leaving it vulnerable to the machinations of Lekapenos.

[*See also* Adrianople, Battle of (1050); Byzantine Empire, *subentries on* Narrative (500–1000) *and* Historiography (500–1000); *and* Romanos I Lekapenos.]

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ANCYRA, BATTLE OF

In 1394 Bayezid I (Yildirim "the Thunderbolt"), the Ottoman sultan (r. 1389–1403), began his extended siege of Constantinople, hoping for the final conquest of a diminished Byzantium. The failure in 1396 of the Crusade of Nicopolis against the Turks confirmed Byzantium's mortal peril. Leaving Constantinople's defense to his nephew, John VII, Emperor Manuel II Palaiologus (r. 1391–1425) journeyed through Western Europe to plead for Christian aid as his last hope.

Just then, however, the Mongol-Turkic ruler of Samarkand, Timur (otherwise known as Tamerlane) undertook a sweeping campaign in the Middle East as a calculated challenge to Bayezid, the champion of Timur's enemies. After a bloody descent into Syria, Timur resumed his attack on Turkish lands and in June 1402 advanced on Ancyra. Moving with characteristic speed, but outmaneuvered by his rival, Bayezid finally faced him on the plains north of that city on 28 July.

Accurate numbers for the two armies are not known; estimates run from 80,000 for Timur and 120,000 for Bayezid, to 20,000 for each side—still large numbers for the time. Timur had secured advantages of position, and the fighting was fierce. Both armies included dependent allies. Although Bayezid's Christian vassals (mainly Serbians) fought loyally, his Anatolian Muslim units deserted to Timur, which proved decisive. As the Ottoman lines broke and the Turks were overwhelmed, three of Bayezid's sons escaped, while he was captured in flight. His treatment in captivity has been wildly fictionalized, and the cause of his death the following 8 March is uncertain.

Timur continued his rampage in the Middle East with devastating impact but without a coherent plan or constructive result. By the time he returned to Samarkand in 1404, he had left the nascent Ottoman state shattered. For the next decade, the sons of Bayezid fought each other over the task of beginning its reconstruction. However, Timur had guaranteed that Byzantium's ultimate destruction by the Turks would be deferred for a half-century.

[*See also* Nicopolis, Battle of *and* Ottoman Armies and Military Methods.]

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ANDALUS, AL-

See Al-Andalus.

ANDERNACH, BATTLE OF (876)

After the death of Emperor Louis I "the Pious" (840), the Carolingian Empire broke up into different parts, all ruled by members of the Carolingian family. Charles II "the Bald" ruled the western parts of Charlemagne's territories and sought to expand his possessions toward the Rhine. After the death of his brother, Louis II "the German" (876), he invaded the eastern part of Lotharingia, but met the fierce resistance of Louis III "the Younger," his nephew and the eldest son of Louis the German. Charles did not advance past the Rhine, but was confronted by Louis's troops on the left side of the river near Andernach, which was at that time a royal estate with rich economic resources. Louis successfully gave the impression that the majority of his troops were still at Deutz on the right side of the Rhine just opposite the great archbishopric of Cologne. The tents of the camp were still standing. So it was a great surprise for Charles, on the left bank, when he found himself surrounded by his opponent's troops, which had crossed the Rhine some 20 miles (32 kilometers) southward, between Koblenz and Andernach.

According to the *Annales Bertiniani*, Louis, before the fighting began, had ten of his warriors undergo the ordeal of hot water (their hands were boiled with hot water) and ten the ordeal of cold water (they were probably thrown into the Rhine and had to keep under cold water for some time). All men were found without wounds and no one was drowned, signifying that God would be in the following battle on their side. The annalist, explaining the defeat of the troops of Charles the Bald, also notes that the horses of the invading army were already worn out by the steady rainfall and the difficulties of passing through rough, unknown terrain. The losses of the high nobility on Charles's side were great: many counts and abbots were killed or taken captive. The ultimate sign of defeat was the death of Charles's standard bearer. Charles himself managed to flee with only a few warriors. The flight of the army was hindered by the great baggage train and the merchants accompanying the warriors. There was great booty for Louis and his warriors. Their enemies, if not killed, were totally stripped, so that they had to use hay and straw to hide their genitals. The annalist may exaggerate the scale of Charles's defeat; because he disapproves of the intervention of Charles in the eastern part of Lotharingia, he depicts it as the act of a sinner, which was destined to fail.

A more detailed reconstruction of the battle is difficult. Bernard Bachrach undertakes a speculative reconstruction. In many details it departs from the best-informed contemporary sources, that is, the *Annales Fuldenses* and the *Annales Bertiniani.* Neither of these sources describes a well-planned tactical retreat of Louis's Saxon infantry. Likewise, neither source suggests that Louis's cavalry was "screened, at least in part, by wooded land," which Bachrach assumes nevertheless.

[*See also* Charles the Bald *and* Louis I.]

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ANDERNACH, BATTLE OF (1114)

During a campaign against the Frisians that started at the end of May 1114, the German king and—since 1111—Roman emperor Henry V became aware of a serious rebellion. The head of the insurrection was Archbishop Frederick I of Cologne, who was supported by his vassals and the citizens of the town. Count Henry of Limburg, former duke of Lower Lorraine, who had fought against Henry V's followers at the battle of Visé in 1106 and hence was deposed as duke, also participated in the 1114 uprising, as did Godfrey of Leuven, whom Henry had installed as the new duke of Lower Lorraine in 1106. The greater part of the higher nobility of this region participated in this insurrection for a number of reasons, including the emperor's harsh treatment of noblemen who had opposed him and the oppressive rule of a certain royal *ministeriales* in the area. Moreover, the *Annales Rodenses* (Annals of Klosterrath) mention that the emperor planned to enact high and permanent taxes on the local princes.

Henry V abandoned his Frisian campaign and turned against Cologne. If we may believe the annals of the monastery of Saint Pantaleon in Cologne (which, however, were not composed until the first half of the thirteenth century and tended to glorify the deeds of local citizens), the emperor was finally driven from the town by the efficient combat of the young men of Cologne, who fought as archers.

After his forced retreat to the south, the emperor gathered a great host. He began a new offensive around 1 October and invaded Westphalia, where Count Frederick of Arnsberg had supported the revolt. A second part of the imperial army, mainly composed of Bavarians and Swabians, approached Cologne from the south and met the opposing troops north of Andernach, a royal possession situated on the left bank of the Rhine some twenty-five miles (forty kilometers) south of Bonn. Once again, the only description of the battle's course comes from the *Annals of Saint Pantaleon*. According to this source, Count Henry of Limburg, with only a small force, first encountered Henry V's troops, which were superior in numbers and comprised a mix of horsemen and combatants fighting on foot. The former duke of Lower Lorraine had to retreat to an unnamed fortified place or camp, but Archbishop Frederick of Cologne and the other rebellious princes, along with their forces, then met and soundly defeated the imperial army. In particular, Count Theoderic of Ahr and, once again, the young men of Cologne were credited with the defeat of Henry V's host.

The victory near Andernach, however, was no overwhelming military success. To be sure, the emperor abandoned his attack on Cologne, but he did not flee from the region. Instead he went to Dortmund, fortified the town, manned it with a strong garrison, and built another castle amid the possessions of his Westphalian adversaries, thus consolidating his position. When the Saxon princes, probably encouraged by the rout of the imperial followers near Andernach, joined the insurrection, Henry V arranged for a new campaign, which led to the battle of Welfesholz in February 1115.

[*See also* Henry V; *Ministeriales*; Visé, Battle of; *and* Welfesholz, Battle of.]

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ANE, BATTLE OF

In 1225, a quarrel began between Rudolf, Lord of Coevorden, and Engelbert, Lord of Groningen. Otto II of Lippe, the bishop of Utrecht, attempted to arbitrate the conflict, but open war erupted in spite of his intervention. The bishop decided to end the conflict by bringing Rudolf under tighter control. He hoped this action would also reinforce his authority in the Drenthe region.

The bishop received support from the counts of Holland, Guelders, Cleves, and Bentheim, as well as the bishop of Munster and the archbishop of Cologne. This support enabled him to gather a great number of knights, and his army established its

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camp close to the village of Ane (located near the present-day German-Dutch border).

Rudolf began gathering forces of his own, which included a small number of knights and some crossbowmen. He was further aided by peasants who were in revolt against the bishop of Utrecht. The exact reason for the rebellion is unknown; however, a possibility is that the local population did not wish to pay taxes imposed by the bishop. Whatever the reason, the resentment was such that a contemporary source noted that even the women had taken up arms. The troops assembled by Rudolf were poorly equipped and had little military experience; they had no chance of overcoming an army of knights in open country. To compensate for this weakness, Rudolf made camp between Ane and the fortress of Coevorden behind a marsh called De Mommenriete.

On 28 July 1227, the bishop ordered his men to attack Rudolf's army. The vanguard advanced toward Rudolf's forces, but they quickly became bogged down in the marshy ground, which was unable to support the weight of the heavily armed riders and their mounts. Not realizing what was happening on the battlefield, the remainder of the bishop's army advanced, only to become stuck in the marsh as well.

Chaos swept over the bishop's army, which became easy prey for Rudolf's forces, who were familiar with the terrain, fought on foot, and were more lightly equipped. First, the crossbowmen fired volleys into the immobilized army. This was followed by the charge of peasants. The bishop's army broke and ran. More than five hundred nobles lost their lives as the army was "cut down like cattle," with the bishops of Utrecht and Bremen as well as the counts of Guelders and Cleves among the dead.

Willibrand of Oldenburg, the new bishop of Utrecht, continued the war, but with little success. In 1230, Rudolf proposed reconciliation, and the bishop agreed to meet him in Hardenberg. However, after Rudolf's arrival he was placed under arrest and executed on 25 July 1230. Although Rudolf's execution did not end the war, which continued until 1234, much of the conflict's intensity was lost.

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ANGHIARI, BATTLE OF

The commune of Anghiari is situated approximately 12 miles (20 kilometers) more than 12 miles northeast of Arezzo in the modern Italian region of Tuscany. The battle took place on 29 June 1440 between the armies of the Republic of Florence and the papacy—with a contingent of Venetian cavalry—on the one hand, and the forces of Filippo Maria Visconti (r. 1412–1447), duke of Milan, on the other. It should be seen in the broader context of a confrontation in northern and central Italy between the Visconti duchy of Milan and an alliance between the republics of Venice and Florence and the papacy.

For some historians this battle had an ideological character, a conflict between republicanism—represented by Florence and Venice, and lordship, or "tyranny"—represented by the duke of Milan. In reality it was a struggle for territory and influence. Pope Eugenius IV (1431–1447), in exile in Florence and dependent on the support of its government and his Medici bankers, was anxious to restore papal authority in Rome and the States of the Church. Venice was seeking to retain massive territorial gains made earlier in the century, in large part at the expense of the Visconti. Florence wanted to strengthen its authority in southern Tuscany and was nervous about signs of unrest in Arezzo and the activity of families hostile to a regime directed by Cosimo de' Medici. Principal of these were the Albizzi led by Rinaldo (1370–1442),

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driven from Florence by Cosimo and his allies in 1434.

The Visconti army, which was superior in numbers, was led by one of its most experienced military captains, or *condottieri*, Niccolò Piccinino (1386–1444), while the principal captains on the allied side were the Roman noble Pier Giampaolo Orsini, and Micheletto Attendolo (c. 1390–1451). Piccinino enjoyed some military success in northern Umbria, on the borders of Florentine territory, exploiting resentment at the republic's expansionist policies, before being ordered by Filippo Maria to return to Lombardy. However Rinaldo degli Albizzi and some local supporters persuaded him to launch a surprise attack on the allies on 29 June 1440. This failed, and after a hard-fought battle to control a strategic river crossing, he was forced to withdraw.

Anghiari had little effect on the overall balance of power in Italy, but it secured Florentine authority on its southern frontier. This success was clearly important on a private and public level. It was commemorated on a *cassone*—a wedding chest—now in the National Gallery of Ireland; one of its panels represents the battle in detail and celebrates the role of the Capponi family, Neri Capponi (1388–1457) being one of the Florentine commissioners present. Much more famous was Leonardo da Vinci's heroic treatment, commissioned by the Florentine Republic for its council hall in 1503. This survives only in drawings and copies, though something of the original fresco may yet be discovered.

However, in the seventh chapter of the fifth book of his *History of Florence*, Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527) claimed that in a battle of four hours only one man was killed, trampled by his horse, with most combatants being saved by their armor and their readiness to surrender. For Machiavelli, Florence's victory was blunted as its soldiers released their prisoners and looked for plunder; but most modern historians link his disappointment at its outcome with his jaundiced view of mercenary soldiers.

[*See also* Italy, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1493) *and* Piccinino, Niccolò.]

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ANNALES GANDENSES

The Annals of Ghent were written in a simple, straightforward Latin by an unknown Franciscan friar. In a short prologue the author reveals a little about himself and the circumstances under which he wrote: he wrote the annals in 1308 in his Franciscan house at Ghent for the amusement and edification of his fellow friars. Modern scholars have noted that although the friar was a Fleming, and thus biased to the Flemish cause, he was still an excellent overall observer and eyewitness to the events recorded in the annals. The author organized his work by year, in the traditional manner for annals, although he occasionally makes reference to earlier events in his entries. The annals cover only a short period of time, from 1296 to 1310.

This was a fortunate span to cover, because the work details many important military events, most notably the background, battles, and effects of Courtrai in 1302 and Mons-en-Pévèle in 1304. Though the annalist references God in several places in his description of Courtrai, he makes it clear that it was the "weavers, fullers, commoners and common infantrymen" who carried the day for the Flemings. Yet he did not absolve his fellow citizens of their excesses as they eagerly mopped up the battlefield at Courtrai by killing all the French they could, regardless of social status.

As the annalist records, the massive defeat of French arms at Courtrai did not dispel King Philip IV's ire against the region. In spite of the French loss

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in 1302. Philip moved against Flanders in 1304. The annalist again provides crucial details but a skewed conclusion for the resulting battle at Mons-en-Pèvéle; all the contemporary sources and modern scholars acknowledge the battle as a French victory, except the *Annales*. Its author reports a Flemish success, one in which the French king barely escaped with his life and his army fled the field. While Philip did indeed narrowly avoid death, in fact the Flemings lost. Among the heavy casualty list was Willem van Jülich, who had led them to victory just two years before at Courtrai.

The annalist's account is especially rich for the many military events of 1302–1305. After 1305 the coverage becomes more anecdotal, although it still provides details of important internal events in Flanders. Although highly partisan, the unknown annalist remains a critical source for understanding the period, place, people, and battles about which he wrote.

[*See also* Courtrai, Battle and Siege of *and* Low Countries, *subentries on* Sources (1300–1479) *and* Historiography (1300–1479): *and* Mons-en-Pévèle, Battle of.]

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ANTEQUERA, SIEGE OF

At the beginning of the fifteenth century, the city of Antequera (situated in what is today the province of Malaga) was one of the most important Islamic enclaves on the border of Granada and Castile. The city was a well-populated and protected urban center surrounded by a highly productive countryside and therefore of importance for the Castilians in their ambitions to conquer the Kingdom of Granada.

Within the framework of the war, the Infante Don Fernando of Antequera—the future king of Aragon—as regent under Juan II of Castile, began in 1407 to conquer Zahara and other fortifications. On 26 April 1410, he set up an encampment just outside the walls of the city of Antequera and thus began the siege, reinstating warfare after three years of cease-fire. The Castilian army, composed of twenty-five hundred men-at-arms and ten thousand infantry distributed over five camps that were fortified by small walls, surrounded Antequera. In July, after defeating a relief army dispatched urgently by the king of Granada during the battle of La Boca de la Asna (The Mouth of the Jackass) on 6 May 1410, the Castilians unleashed their attacks upon the city. They relied on several pieces of gunpowder bombard (wall-breaker) artillery and siege engines, including two wooden siege towers on wheels made fire resistant by leather, along with a large ladder device used for scaling walls. These were built on-site using materials brought from Seville.

The besieged were initially successful in their defense, employing bombards and crossbows, which caused considerable casualties among the Castilians, though in the end did not defeat them. After filling in a moat, which had impeded the siege towers from advancing to the walls, the attackers undertook a general assault on the walls of the city on 26 June. They divided their troops into eight contingents and launched their attacks against several sections of the wall, though these assaults failed. The scaling ladder was too short, and it was damaged by fire from the besieged forces behind it when it was propped up against the wall. During the weeks that followed, the Castilians attacked the

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neighboring townships, delaying another attempt at the wall until after the arrival of more materials to rebuild their siege engines. During the month of August they constructed a wall surrounding the city wall so as to completely isolate the besieged from entry or exit.

The definitive assault came on 16 September and was aimed at one tower on the fortress wall, where the scaling ladder was successfully placed, protected by the wooden siege towers. This initial victory allowed the Castilians to penetrate the city through several locations. Although the besieged took refuge in the castle, the lack of potable water forced them to negotiate an inevitable surrender.

The imminent winter, coupled with his eager desire to go to Aragon to fulfill his political ambitions for the throne, led Don Fernando to offer them a generous settlement, allowing all twenty-five hundred inhabitants safe conduct from the city, guaranteeing their freedom and possessions. The town was then heavily secured by a garrison against any possible attempt at retaking the fortification.

[*See also* Ceuta, Siege and Battle of; Fernando de Antequera; Iberia, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1500); *and* Zahara, Sieges of.]

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ANTHON, BATTLE OF

In 1430 France was bogged down in the Hundred Years' War. From 1407 to 1435 hostilities between the Armagnacs and the Burgundians were added to the larger conflict, and it was in the context of this civil war that the Burgundian Louis de Châlon, prince of Orange, bought the domain of Anthon in the Dauphiné, in Armagnac territory. Prevented from taking possession of the territory, he determined to force his way in, believing that this military operation would help him conquer the whole Dauphiné county and create a compact domain comprising Franche-Comté, Dauphiné, and the Principality of Orange.

Châlon gathered an army of four thousand men from the county and duchy of Burgundy, as well as Savoyards. Indeed, the duchy of Savoy, which had had ambitions regarding this province for centuries, had joined the project. On the opposite side, Raoul de Gaucourt, the governor of Dauphiné, gathered sixteen hundred nobles, Lombard and Castilian mercenaries led by the famous captain Rodrigue de Villandrando. The confrontation, which took place near Anthon, by the Rhône River, on 11 June, was more an ambush than a conventional pitched battle. Advancing into enemy territory, the Burgundian army, in a column formation, traversed a forest. As soon as the first men emerged, they were attacked by the mercenary cavalry, while the rest of the Dauphiné army, hidden in the forest, attacked from all sides. Within a few minutes, 1,500 Burgundians were killed or captured. Mounted, Châlon succeeded in escaping by crossing the Rhône, while 400 of his companions drowned in the river. After this defeat Châlon lost not only his Dauphiné lands but also the Principality of Orange. He withdrew to his counties, where he became a tyrant as he tried to restore the fortune lost in Anthon.

This moment in history is remembered much more for the disappearance of the symbolic figure of France's revival, Joan of Arc (captured on 23 May), thus condemning the history of the battle of Anthon to obscurity.

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

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Philippe Gaillard

ANTIOCH, SIEGE AND BATTLES OF

The siege of Antioch (modern Antakya, Turkey) by the crusaders (20 October 1097 to 2 June 1098) and the following countersiege by their Turkish enemies

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(6–28 June 1098) constituted the pivotal event of the First Crusade (1096–1099). The privations of the siege almost ended the whole enterprise prematurely, but the capture of the city and the defeat of three major Turkish relief expeditions enabled the crusade to proceed from a secure base with renewed vigor toward its ultimate goal, Jerusalem.

A large proportion of the fifty to sixty thousand crusaders who set off across the Anatolian plateau in late June 1097 had died as a result of combat, starvation, and thirst by the time they crossed the Anti-Taurus Mountains. They turned south toward Antioch, the main metropolis of northern Syria, situated on the left bank of the river Orontes in a plain south of the Amanus Mountains (modern Nur Daglari). Reaching Antioch from the east via Artah on 21 October 1097, the crusaders seized the fortified "Iron Bridge" (a misnomer deriving from their misunderstanding of a local name for the Orontes), which crossed the river 20 kilometers (12.4 miles) east of the city. The city had been wrested from Byzantine control by the Seljuk Turks in 1084, but Greek-, Arabic-, and Armenian-speaking Christians still made up the majority of its population. Its governor, the Turkish emir Yaghi Siyan, had been appointed by the Seljuk sultan Malik Shah, but his own military forces consisted of only a few thousand Turkish mamluks (professional slave soldiers) and some local Muslims and Christians he had recruited or pressed into service.

Antioch was protected by over 9 kilometers (5.6 miles) of walls and towers. On the eastern side, and parts of the northern and southern sides, the fortifications were sited to make use of the heights of Mount Silpios, which was crowned by the ancient Byzantine citadel. The crusaders decided on a blockade, hoping that they could cut off the garrison until reinforcements arrived from the west or from Byzantium, or that they might find the opportunity to take the city by a ruse. They took up positions on the even ground between the Orontes and the western side of the city, facing the section of the walls that ran from the Saint Paul Gate in the north to the Gate of the Duke at the midpoint of the western wall. However, the Turks controlled the key crossing of the Orontes outside the Bridge Gate, another kilometer farther south, and this and other unguarded exits enabled them to mount numerous surprise attacks on the besiegers.

By the end of 1097 the crusaders had exhausted the once plentiful food supplies available in the environs of Antioch and had to go ever farther afield to forage, leaving them vulnerable to surprise attack. Even a very strong foraging expedition led by Bohemond of Taranto and Count Robert of Flanders had a major scare when it ran into a force from Damascus. In the course of the winter, Genoese, English, and Byzantine fleets seized control of the ports of Saint Symeon, Alexandretta, and Laodikeia, which enabled a certain amount of supplies to be brought in by sea from Byzantine Cilicia and Cyprus, but these had to be carried some 60 to 80 kilometers (roughly 40 to 50 miles) inland. As they neared Antioch, convoys could still be attacked from the Bridge Gate, and for this reason a pontoon bridge was constructed to link the crusader camp with the roads from the coast. This may have occurred in December, when a tower (named Malregard) was also built to protect the crusader camp from the north.

On 9 February 1098, despite the scarcity of horses and food, the crusaders intercepted and defeated the army of Ridwan of Aleppo south of the Lake of Antioch (modern Amikgölu), largely owing to Bohemond's generalship. The threat of this relief column shocked them into redoubled efforts to tighten their grip on the city; using expertise and material from the English fleet, a tower (called La Mahomerie) was built to block the Bridge Gate in March, followed in April by Tancred's Tower opposite the Saint George Gate on the southern wall. Although victuals were now coming in from the region of Edessa (modern Urfa, Turkey), where Baldwin of Boulogne had joined an Armenian insurrection to expel the occupying Turks, the supply situation was still dire.

A breakthrough came in May, when Bohemond, whose followers from southern Italy included speakers of Greek and Arabic, established contact with an Armenian officer named Firuz, who agreed to admit the crusaders to the city under cover of darkness.

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After learning of the approach of the biggest Turkish army so far, under Karbugha of Mosul, the crusade leaders agreed to Bohemond's demand that the city be given to him if he could engineer its capture. On the night of 2–3 June, Bohemond's men climbed a ladder into a tower situated at the southeastern corner of the walls, under Firuz's command, then seized towers on either side and opened a postern to admit their comrades below. In shock and confusion the garrison fled to the citadel, allowing the crusaders outside to storm some of the gates and enter in strength.

The capture of the city came in the nick of time. Over the next four days Karbugha's huge army arrived, after a three-week delay during which he had tried in vain to capture Edessa. Karbugha's arrival precipitated a stream of desertions, including even prominent personages such as Count Stephen of Blois. Those who remained were starving: the innards of a horse or donkey could be sold for ten shillings, a sum that would normally feed a man well for four months. The Turks set up positions around the city and mounted repeated assaults, exploiting their access via the citadel. The mounting starvation, exhaustion, and fear engendered a series of revelations from visionaries who articulated the concerns of the poorer crusaders and enjoined penance on the whole army. The claim by one of them, Peter Bartholomew, to have discovered the Holy Lance that had pierced Christ's side at the Crucifixion was rapidly accepted by the whole army, providing a major psychological boost when material comforts were scarce.

In an effort to break the siege, the crusader commanders decided to launch an attack on 28 June 1098, masterminded by Bohemond. Karbugha, whose own forces were dispersed, failed to prevent the crusaders deploying via the Bridge Gate. Maneuvering and fighting with iron discipline, they defeated the Turkish formations stationed west of the Orontes before Karbugha could bring up his main force. Seeing him retreat, the Turkish garrison surrendered the citadel; eventually his coalition army broke up. Given that they were starving and could only deploy a few hundred horses, it is understandable that many crusaders regarded their victory as having been achieved by divine intervention; some reported seeing a heavenly army led by saints on white horses. Bohemond now demanded lordship of Antioch according to the agreement made by the other leaders. In keeping with the oaths they had sworn at Constantinople, they had added the saving clause that the city should be returned to the Byzantine emperor if he came to their aid there. But he had not appeared, and the army's small Byzantine contingent under his representative Tatikios had withdrawn in February. The mood in the army was anti-Byzantine, and Bohemond was the hero of the hour. The city became the nucleus of a new Frankish principality in northern Syria, but the failure to restore it to the emperor meant that it would constitute a major bone of contention between Franks and Byzantines for most of the twelfth century.

[*See also* Bohemond I *and* Crusades, *subentry on* Narrative (1095–1183).]

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ANZEN, BATTLE OF

Fought in 838 between forces under the emperor Theophilos (r. 829–842) and troops under al-Afshin,

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commander of a column dispatched toward the area of Dazimon (modern-day Dazmana, Turkey, between Tokat and Amasya in north-central Turkey), the battle of Anzen was the first reported encounter of imperial troops with Turkish mounted archers on the Islamic side. On 21 July imperial forces came into visual contact with the Muslim force. The emperor's forces took up a position somewhat to the south, near an unidentified hill called Anzen from which the enemy positions could be observed. Theophilos attacked at dawn on 22 July and was immediately successful on one wing, driving the enemy forces from their positions.

After this initial success, however, and perhaps toward noon, the Muslim commander launched a strong counterattack, led by his contingent of Turkish horse archers, whose effective shooting halted the Roman advance and gave the withdrawing Arab forces time to regroup and reform their lines. Troops on the Byzantine wing and center remarked on the absence of the emperor and his standard—he had moved to reinforce the other wing—and, assuming that he had fallen, began to waver. Muslim forces surged forward and drove back the Roman troops. Some units broke up; many were able to withdraw to the north, in the district of Chiliokomon. The units that remained with the emperor were surrounded and isolated on the hill of Anzen. A sudden and very heavy shower of rain that adversely affected the Turkish archery, however, prevented the Muslims from pushing home their attack. The Roman forces were able to regroup and reorganize. Al-Afshin brought up siege catapults from his baggage train in an effort to drive the Roman units from their cover. Eventually, the emperor was persuaded to slip away. The remainder of the surrounded force was in time forced to surrender, although their fate is unknown.

[*See also* Theophilos.]

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ARABS

Pre-Islamic Arabia has often been described as a provincial backwater on the distant periphery of great empires. The imperial world of the Middle East embraced cities, agriculture, centralized political organization, and eventually monotheistic religion, but Arabia was largely pastoral, politically fragmented, and pagan. Thus, Arabia seems an unlikely locale for spearheading the rise of a monotheistic religion of global reach and a series of conquests that transformed the Near and Middle East as well as significant parts of the Mediterranean world.

Yet in military practices the Arabs learned much from the imperial centers, while also making their own contributions to progress in the art of warfare. The Sassanian (234–634) and Byzantine empires had clashes over Yemen, so the tribes of the Arabian peninsula grew familiar with their military practices. From Persian and Greco-Roman sources came new weaponry, mail armor, tactical innovations, and lessons in the importance of discipline.

Islam began its extraordinary rise in the seventh century, and in the centuries to come spread through several agents: merchants, saints, and warriors. Many contemporary accounts are folkloric, and archaeologists admit that few artifacts have been recovered, so historians have found it difficult to reconstruct the many victories on the battlefield. The Prophet Muhammad's armies relied on archers, javelin throwers, and infantry prepared to fight zealously in close quarters. Arabia tended to be short on horses, so it would take Muslim expansion into horse-breeding territories, and especially the adoption of the Syrian-Arab crossbreed, to give its armies new horse-related advantages. Byzantine critics would later praise the swiftness of the horses used by Arab and Turkish fighters, but they suggested that the notable advantages in speed sometimes came with a lack of endurance.

Even so, during the medieval centuries, Arabs, Kurds, and Persians seemed more enamored than Turkish forces with heavier cavalry. Certain Persian breeds of horses proved better able to carry burdensome equipment loads. The Umayyad dynasty

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(661–750) introduced the trend toward heavy armor. With reduced mobility, warriors would often dismount and fight with pikes. The Abassid dynasty (750–1258) developed a tradition of heavy cavalry, which may have taken centuries to go into decline. These heavier armored forces made more use of the lance than the bow. Although metallurgy advanced in Muslim lands, Europe had a greater abundance of iron, so Arabs frequently used materials other than metal to reinforce their armor: hardened leather, felt, padded fabrics, and wood. In contrast with most medieval European warriors, Arabs on horseback turned to the dagger when in close proximity to adversaries.

Although there is much popular film and literary depiction of Arabs fighting in torrid deserts, in reality, no premodern militaries could sustain long campaigns without close access to either towns, agricultural lands, or, perhaps, semidesert zones near rivers and oases. King Louis IX of France chose to attack Tunis in his last Crusade in 1270 under conditions of maximum heat, with encampments surrounded by atrocious drinking water, and these circumstances proved fatal to him and many of his troops.

On many occasions, Muslim armies did not seem eager to convert Christians and Jews under their rule to Islam. This discretion may have facilitated some of the quick triumphs over military opponents in the early centuries of Arab conquests. Beyond the Qur'an's important sura calling for no compulsion in religion (sura 2, verse 256), Muslim tolerance may have had a material basis insofar as Christians and Jews were subject to a lucrative head tax from which Islamic believers were exempt. Nevertheless, the ferocity of the early Crusades led some Muslims to have reduced tolerance for Christians, although Jews in Jerusalem won new respect by fighting together with Islamic warriors to repel European invaders. Christian victories in the early Crusades did not augur well for Christian-majority areas of the Near and Middle East because Muslim rulers stepped up pressure for conversion over the long run.

Muslim leaders had to confront the role of military duty in Islamic societies. In the Iberian Peninsula known to Muslims as al-Andalus, Muslim conquests in 711 had created a society seemingly fully engaged in arms. Over the following centuries, demilitarization set in, as al-Andalus became the center of Europe's most sophisticated civilization. Córdoba was western Europe's largest city in the tenth century, with population estimates ranging from 100 thousand to 500 thousand—dwarfing Paris, which did not exceed 40 thousand inhabitants. Islamic rulers had turned to Berber mercenaries, since fewer Muslim Arabs desired to serve in the military. The *taifa* monarchs of the region soon diverted funds to pay Christian adversaries not to attack them, and this often failed to provide security while it eroded support from an overtaxed citizenry. Some Iberian Muslims grew uncomfortable with a series of alliances with Christians, who came to be seen as fair-weather friends open to opportune moments for supporting attacks on the rulers of Al-Andalus. Improvements in European cavalry performance in the eleventh century, including heavier armor and larger horses, may have further rendered undermanned Iberian Muslims vulnerable to rollback.

Although Islam in the Iberian Peninsula suffered a series of humiliations from the eleventh century to the final expulsion of Muslims in 1492, Islamic forces inflicted many defeats on crusaders in the Near East and, perhaps most significantly, on Mongols in the thirteenth century. Arab infantry performance has been regarded as being in decline between the eleventh and fourteenth centuries, but the cavalry had many successes, although it would be a mistake to identify military horsemanship as the sole source of victories. The Kurdish-born Saladin (d. 1193) became legendary in the Arab world for enlightened military leadership. Saladin walloped enemies by combining Arab and Egyptian foot soldiers with largely Turkish mamluks known for swift horses and timely delivery of a barrage of arrows. His willingness to offer compromises and a measure of mercy to vanquished European foes elicited grudging admiration among some Christian elites. Meanwhile, the Mamluk dynasty (1250-1517) produced one of the most effective fighting forces in the high Middle Ages. However, the slave origins of many of the soldiers remains a source of controversy among scholars seeking to

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explain the interrelationship of slavery and warfare in Islam. Former slaves rose to become kings in the Islamic world, where heroism in battle could put slave soldiers on the route to liberty. Mamluk Turks frequently demonstrated to Arab societies the power of horse-mounted archery, until the early sixteenth century when cannon and harquebus-brandishing Ottoman Turks on foot delivered defeat to the cavalry of the Mamluk sultan of Cairo.

[*See also* Al-Andalus; Crusades, *subentries on* Narrative; Mamluks; *and* Saladin.]

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ARBEDO, BATTLE OF

The battle of Arbedo was an episode in the centuries-long struggle between the Duchy of Milan and the Swiss Confederation for control of the Alpine trade routes. The stage was set for battle when, in March 1422, Milanese troops under the command of the condottiere Angelo della Pergola occupied, by surprise, the town of Bellinzona, which controlled access to the Leventina Valley and the Saint Gotthard Pass, snatching it from the control of the Swiss cantons of Uri and Obwalden.

Uri and Obwalden tried to press the other cantons to send their troops to help them retake Bellinzona. However, owing to the reluctance of most of the Confederates to pursue in that phase an aggressive foreign policy south of the Alps, in the end only the contingents of Lucerne, Obwalden, Uri, and Zug crossed the St. Saint Gotthard (24 June) to launch an attack on Bellinzona.

On the morning of 30 June 1422, while camped near the village of Arbedo about 5 mi (3 km) north of Bellinzona, the Swiss force—amounting to approximately three to four thousand infantrymen, most of them halberdiers, with a few hundred pikemen and crossbowmen—was attacked by the joint troops of Angelo della Pergola and Francesco Bussone (best known as "Carmagnola"), the captain general of the duke of Milan. Under their command were about six thousand "lances" of heavy cavalry and three thousand infantrymen.

The Swiss took on their traditional squared formation and, early on in the battle, sustained with success repeated charges by the Milanese cavalry, which suffered heavy losses. Seeing this, Carmagnola called off the assaults and ordered his men-at-arms to dismount and attack the front of the Swiss square with their swords and lances, which, brandished as spears, outreached the Swiss halberds. Meanwhile, the Milanese infantry hit the flanks of the enemy formation with a combination of crossbow and hand-to-hand attacks.

Outnumbered and surrounded, the Swiss started a difficult withdrawal toward the village of Arbedo and the Ticino River, harassed by the Milanese. At some point, however, reaching the river appeared impossible, and Ulrich Walker, commander of the contingent of Lucerne—the largest of the Swiss force—tried to negotiate an honorable surrender. Carmagnola rejected the offer but, after an eight-hour fight, the arrival on the battlefield of about six hundred foragers, initially mistaken by the Milanese for the vanguard of another enemy force, eventually gave the crumbling Swiss formation the chance to break the encirclement, wade the Ticino River, and withdraw

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toward the Saint Gotthard. During the course of the battle, the Swiss lost about five hundred men and their baggage train; several officers were also taken prisoner. The Milanese losses amounted to about one thousand soldiers.

Though costly and incomplete, Carmagnola's victory at Arbedo established Milanese rule over Bellinzona for the following eighty years. At a tactical level, the dynamics of the defeat at Arbedo ensured the progressive use of the pike over the halberd as the main weapon of the Swiss infantry.

[*See also* Bussone, Francesco; Italy, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1493); *and* Switzerland, *subentry on* Narrative.]

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ARBITRATION AND PEACEMAKING

The forms of peacemaking in the Middle Ages had as their goal the termination of a state of discord. This state could take quite varied shapes. "Discord" meant not only war, but also civil wars, uprisings, or feuds, with no strict distinctions being made among them. Similarly, the basic peacemaking practices can be found at work in small feuds as well as in armed conflicts between two kings and their vassal armies. As a result, the terminology used during this period remained very vague for a long time. A distinction was made between judicial and amicable proceedings, but the means by which a peace was concluded—whether by bilateral negotiations, the appointment of mediators, or a king's decree—was secondary. Significantly, it was late in the Middle Ages before the concept of "mediator" implied a specific form of conflict resolution, rather than the more general notion of "peacemaker."

Since in the early Middle Ages it was difficult to withdraw from alliances, and in many conflicts there were no disinterested parties available anyway, many disputes were settled by means of bilateral negotiations. Thus it was usually envoys working under instructions who undertook negotiations for a temporary cease-fire or a peace settlement after a battle or after the conquest of a fortified place, or sometimes to avert an attack. Not infrequently, the conditions for such negotiations were arrived at by messengers whose job it was first to sound out the opponents' willingness to negotiate. In disputes between the rulers of different kingdoms or peoples, what was usually at stake was the recognition or nonrecognition of overlordship, the establishment of borders, the payment of tribute, of compensation, or of ransom, and the conclusion of terms of peace. In internal conflicts within a kingdom, the negotiation of payments of satisfaction, the regulation of land tenure and feudal relations, and the conditions of a *deditio* (capitulation or terms of surrender) played a larger role.

From the twelfth century on, the bilateral dealings via envoys underwent a change, in that the representatives could conclude a complete, long-term peace treaty between conflicting rulers. The representatives had complete authority to negotiate a treaty, down to the last detail, which was then merely ratified by the respective rulers. It was characteristic of medieval politics that this type of peacemaking was not limited to the settlement of disputes between rulers of equal rank, but was also used in conflicts between kings and princes or cities.

In the early Middle Ages, third-party mediation between individual rulers was an exception. This type of arbitration, however, played a role in ecclesiastical as well as many secular conflicts, in conjunction with legal processes. Bishops at first, then secular noblemen and even wealthy citizens made names for themselves as mediators. Since these mediators were not neutral with respect to the parties, but had ties to one side or the other—either as friends or relatives, or as members of one or the other camp—the line between "mediator" and mere advocate or envoy was not always clearly drawn.

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The qualification for engaging in this kind of mediation or arbitration effort was mainly an institution-based authority or high social prestige. By virtue of their office, the king and the pope were considered natural candidates for the position of a mediator, since they stood in superior positions to the parties. Women, too, who often served as mediators in conflicts within (ruling) families, were seen to embody the desired qualities of mediators, since they often had ties to both sides and were therefore presumed to be particularly inclined to peaceful settlement.

The mediators' central task consisted of reestablishing the broken communication between the parties, so that they could reach an agreement for an end to the conflict, or at least a cease-fire. Normally, the conflicting parties proposed the terms of the resolution, but if a king, a pope, or a count intervened, they tried sometimes to settle the dispute by decree. Because the peace agreement was usually sealed with some symbolic act (kiss of peace, *deditio*, grant of land, etc.), it often fell to the mediator to negotiate these details with the parties. Mediators could also influence the formulation and the conditions of a treaty. On some occasions they also took on the task of reminding the parties to fulfill the promises that they had negotiated.

Besides mediation, there developed at the end of the twelfth century legal arbitration proceedings and arbitration courts. At first they functioned primarily in the ecclesiastical domain, and then they came into use in secular disputes as well. In contrast to the mediators, the arbitrators were established by oath in advance to decide the conflict by their judgment. This judgment was supposed to result in an amicable solution. For this reason, a decision from an arbitration court was often preferred to a traditional court judgment. The arbitration panels usually had an equal number of representatives from each side, plus one additional person in order to avoid a stalemate. Arbitration proceedings not only supplemented the traditional court proceedings, they were particularly relied upon in situations where normal courts did not exist or were not recognized, such as in conflicts between rulers of equal rank or nearly autonomous princes. The popes, in particular, tried repeatedly to insert themselves or their legates as arbitrators into the great conflicts of their time, with only moderate success, because any acknowledgment of their pronouncements could be interpreted as submission to their authority. Besides, the arbitration courts were most often called upon for peace treaties in disputes that could not be resolved by ad hoc means. Even if peace treaties in the late Middle Ages bore the stamp of arbitration, mediation and bilateral negotiation continued to be important forms of peacemaking.

[*See also* Peace and Truce of God.]

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Translated from the German
by Johanna M. Baboukis

ARCADIOPOLIS, BATTLE OF (970)

Sviatoslav, leader of the Kievan Rus, had served as an ally of convenience for the Byzantines against the Bulgarians. After his victories in Bulgaria he turned against his allies and, according to Leo the Deacon, told the Byzantines to move to Asia and threatened to attack Constantinople. In response the emperor John I Tzimiskes selected his brother-in-law Bardas Skleros to lead troops to the border region

Bahan dengan hak cipta

and watch for Rus raids. The Rus are said to have gathered an army including Magyars, Bulgarians, and Pechenegs; they reached Arcadiopolis (modern Lüleburgaz, eighty-seven miles [140 kilometers] west of Constantinople) in the spring of 970. Skleros had sent out scouts and, in response to the reconnaissance, deployed his forces in three units, leading one himself against the enemy while the other two hid in ambush. Leo the Deacon, using a source favorable to Skleros, reports that the Byzantine force consisted of 10 thousand men, the enemy force of 30 thousand. The initial encounter was indecisive, but then Skleros ordered the troops in ambush to attack, and the Byzantines were victorious. Leo reports that the Byzantines lost fifty five men in the pursuit that followed (another Byzantine source, John Skylitzes, says twenty five), though many were wounded, while 20 thousand of the enemy were slain. The Russian *Primary Chronicle* credits Sviatoslav with a victory at Arcadiopolis and reports significantly greater Byzantine forces. While this is undoubtedly incorrect, the Greek sources are themselves biased, and the sizes of the forces and the number of casualties they report must be viewed with skepticism.

[*See also* John I Tzimiskes.]

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Denis F. Sullivan

ARCADIOPOLIS, BATTLE OF (1194)

The reign of the Byzantine emperor Isaac II Angelos (r. 1185–1195) was plagued by unrest in the Balkans, further complicated by the passage of German Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa through the region on the Third Crusade. After Frederick's departure, a Vlach-Bulgar coalition within the divided Bulgarian state posed new threats to Byzantine Thrace. The emperor's direct participation in military responses was limited by his indolence. Responsible for opposing the menace, one of Isaac's cousins, Constantine Angelos, instead moved to seize the throne in a military revolt in 1193. The chaos accompanying its collapse allowed the Vlach-Bulgars to ravage freely. The following year, 1194, the regional commander, Basil Vatatzes, was joined by reinforcements under Alexios Gidos, in order to launch a major counteroffensive. But the Vlach-Bulgars, with Cuman allies, had penetrated deeply into Byzantine territory with large forces, reaching as far as Arcadiopolis (present-day Lüleburgaz in modern Turkish Thrace), between Adrianople and Constantinople itself. There the Byzantine forces under the two commanders encountered this ravaging expedition and fell into a panic. His courage failing, Gidos abandoned his troops and fled, while Vatatzes was killed in the battle and the Byzantine army was slaughtered. This was the greatest disaster for the Byzantines in their Bulgarian wars during the 1190s and threatened their control over Thrace.

Deeply alarmed, Isaac planned a serious new response. He renewed contact with his ally, Béla III of Hungary, projecting coordinated action against the Bulgarians. More important, Isaac began preparations for a renewed expedition under his personal command. This, however, led to his undoing. Convinced of Isaac's general incompetence, a cabal of nobles joined in a conspiracy with the emperor's treacherous and irresponsible brother, Alexios Angelos. Isaac had begun his military movements when, on 8 April 1195, the conspirators seized him and had him blinded, removing him from power.

[*See also* Byzantine Empire, *subentries on* Narrative (900–1204) *and* Historiography (900–1204); Cumans; Frederick I Barbarossa; *and* Isaac II Angelos.]

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John W. Barker

ARDRES, BATTLE OF

In early June 1351, Sir John Beauchamp, the new English commander of Calais in northern France, launched a raid with three hundred men-at-arms and three hundred mounted archers from the garrison toward Saint-Omer. However, the French had strongly reinforced their garrisons around the pale, and Beauchamp's force soon found itself subject to repeated attack. After repulsing two ambushes, Beauchamp ordered part of his force to return to Calais with the plunder and the wounded. Then on 8 June, he stood at bay to fight his pursuers, fifteen hundred men-at-arms led by the French Marshal Édouard de Beaujeu in a river bend close to the town of Ardres. Sir John, an experienced commander who had carried Edward III's standard at Crécy, drew up his men in a defensive position, with his front protected by a wide ditch. Beaujeu was killed in the opening assault, but the numerically superior French, advancing on foot, pressed home the attack. Running out of arrows, the English archers threw themselves against the French men-at-arms "boldly though not wisely" (Baker, p. 116). The exhausted English, many of whom were wounded, were finally overwhelmed by the arrival of fresh reinforcements from Saint-Omer, who may have attacked on horseback. Beauchamp and most of his men were captured, leaving the Calais garrison dangerously weakened. However, the French were unable to exploit the situation before reinforcements from England were rushed to Calais.

[*See also* Crécy, Battle of.]

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Matthew Strickland

ARGILERS, SIEGE OF

The siege of Argilers (21 May–6 June 1344) formed part of the campaign conducted by Pere III "the Ceremonious" of Aragon-Catalonia (r. 1336–1387) to capture the counties of Roussillon and Cerdagne, Pyrenean regions that shared borders with France. Argilers was a fortified outpost with strategic access to the north and the Mediterranean coast. Pere III set out with a large and varied army composed of magnates, knights, *almogaveres*, and infantrymen. On 21 May, with his armies resting near Elne, the king moved upon Argilers, setting up encampments to the east, between the city and the Mediterranean shore. This permitted the Aragonese army to receive supplies both by sea and land. To keep pressure on the enemy and prevent any relief efforts, he had a segment of his army march and besiege nearby Collioure.

Pere III's strategy consisted of blocking all access in and out of Argilers, while submitting the outpost to constant artillery bombardment. By 22 May, Aragonese forces massed around the northern and western sides of the city, cutting it off from Elne. In addition, other forces were placed in the south, preventing access to the local hills. At the same time, one mangonel and two other large siege engines were built on site and ordered to constantly fire on the town walls. The urban garrison, much affected by the bombardment, attempted to set up its own engine to fire back, but apparently failed. On 27 May, another contingent of light and heavy cavalry arrived, and Pere III had it guard the road from Argilers to Collioure.

At this point, Pere III held a war council. He decided to launch a new artillery bombardment while simultaneously unleashing a frontal attack on the town and raiding the countryside around Pujol. With Argilers encircled, the largest of the Aragonese siege engines directed its fire against the house of En Amoros. This structure was outside the walls and was garrisoned to defend the town. By 1 June Argilers's resistance started to crack. The stone shot severely damaged En Amoros, forcing its garrison to seek safety in the city. Aragonese forces then stormed the building, encountered some resistance, captured

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prisoners, and apparently refrained from going further only because it was evening and it was too dark to continue.

On the very next day, Argilers offered to surrender. The terms imposed on the city forced it to send fifteen hostages in return for the chance to send for help. A relief force did make it to Argilers, but it was far too small to make any difference and was taken prisoner when it tried to enter the town. The endgame had begun, with Pere III feeling so confident that he even allowed some food to be brought into Argilers. On 6 June, the city officially surrendered. In return for its submission, the king moved his forces and the engines away from Argilers and targeted nearby Pujol. He also confirmed the citizens' liberties and formally forgave their resistance.

[*See also* Iberia, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1500) *and* Pedro IV.]

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Nicolás Agrait

ARMIES

[*This entry contains three subentries, on the organization, the rates of movement, and the size of armies.*]

Organization

In general, armies in the Middle Ages were social organisms: retinue leaders recruited and served alongside men whom they knew personally or resided near. At the same time, commanders and sub-commanders were keen to impose order on the mass of men placed at their disposal, and adopted measures to achieve this end. Because of this, the organization of medieval armies, as with armies of most eras, has to be understood on more than one level—both centralized and decentralized. It is also necessary to consider the different circumstances in which medieval armies functioned. The requirements of an army on the march, for example, differed from those of an army faced with a set-piece confrontation, such as a siege or battle, though inevitably there was overlap between the different scenarios.

Two Main Elements. Most armies, when mustered, comprised two main elements: heavily armored troops, often drawn from the social elite, and a body of more lightly armored troops, usually armed with projectiles (though sometimes with handheld weapons such as spears, pikes, axes, and knives). In this way, an army could adapt to a variety of situations and engage in both hand-to-hand and long-range combat. Within these general parameters, cultural influences dictated the exact makeup of a host. Mongol and Hungarian armies of the thirteenth century contained large numbers of nomadic warriors: fast-moving mounted archers capable of firing at speed from horseback. Such troops were alien to the armies of Western Europe, where invariably bowmen fought on foot. Nevertheless, Mongol and Hungarian armies also contained sizable numbers of heavily armored troops that were pivotal to their successes.

Heavy Armor. In most medieval armies, these heavily armored troops would be drawn up into several large divisions, often referred to in contemporary sources as *échelles* or *batailles*. The standard formation in English armies of the later Middle Ages was for three or four divisions of heavily armored warriors. Soldiers serving within these squadrons might be mounted (as at the battle of Falkirk in 1298) or on foot (as at Crécy [1346] and Agincourt [1415] during the Hundred Years' War). Wings might be attached to these main divisions, as demonstrated in the Order of Battle for the English army in Scotland in 1385, and it is clear that, on occasion, more divisions might be created. When on the march, the heavily armored part of the French royal army that confronted the Flemings in 1328 comprised ten *batailles*. These were led by some of the most prominent nobles in the realm, including the king himself, the count of Alençon, the duke of Burgundy, and the duke of Brittany.

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It is not clear, however, whether this tenfold division was maintained when the two armies eventually clashed at Cassel.

The ten major divisions within the French royal army in 1328 were further broken up into 196 banners. This was the point within most medieval armies at which the centralized command structure gave way, at least to some extent, to its decentralized components. Although the *batailles* appear to have been organized according to the designs of the armies' commanders, marshals, and constables, the banners were under the control of retinue leaders (termed in England bannerets), who recruited their men from their own estates and localities. Sometimes—as in the decimal structure adopted by the Mongol horsemen and in Western European armies of the contract era—there remained at this level an element of central planning. Often, however, commanders were unaware of how many men would serve within each retinue, and the numbers within the retinues might vary wildly. One way of circumventing this problem from the commanders' point of view was to create a large household division: a body of retinue leaders directly in the service of the ruler and therefore more easily brought under his supervision and control. The benefits of having such a household force at the core of one's army were demonstrated on numerous occasions during the Middle Ages, including at Nicopolis in 1396, when the victorious Ottoman army under Bayezid I (r. 1389–1402) consisted primarily of his household troop.

Light Armor. Usually the lightly armored element of a medieval army marched and fought separately from the heavily armored part. Men serving as archers, crossbowmen, pikemen, or spearmen tended to be of lower social status than men-at-arms. Most were peasants, though in heavily populated regions such as Flanders and northern Italy they possessed an urban, communal identity. More often than not, such social divisions were reflected in the organization of the armies. In English armies of the twelfth, thirteenth, and early fourteenth centuries, for example, peasant soldiers were recruited by royal officials (at first sheriffs, but later commissioners of array) and marched in groups of twenty, a hundred, and a thousand, separately from the retinues of the bannerets, knights, and sergeants. Groups of twenty were led by *vintenars*, groups of a hundred by *centenars* or constables, and groups of a thousand by *millenars*. From the 1330s, use of indentures of war—in which retinue leaders contracted to gather both men-at-arms and archers—might have seen men-at-arms and archers marching (or riding) together within the same unit. The general consensus, however, is that men-at-arms and archers continued to fight in separate formations during battles of the Hundred Years' War.

The organization of lightly armored soldiers in battle tended to vary from period to period, country to country, and even battle to battle. In some societies, such as Switzerland, Friesland, and Dithmarschen (northern Saxony), warfare was dominated by peasant foot soldiers because of the difficulty of serving on horseback in mountainous or marshy terrain. During the First Scottish War of Independence (1296–1328) the Scots relied heavily on their foot soldiers at the battles of Falkirk (1298) and Bannockburn (1314), while the Flemish victory over the French at Courtrai (1302) was achieved predominantly by their urban levies. The Scots fought in circular formations known as schiltroms, the Flemings across a wide front, and the Swiss in deep formations. English foot soldiers at the battle of Hastings (1066) adopted a shield wall formation. Later, at Agincourt (1415), the English archers appear to have flanked the men-at-arms, firing into the French men-at-arms from the sides of the battlefield. There was, then, no single way of employing lightly armored soldiers in battle, and tactical alterations were often based on the most recent developments in warfare. At the battle of Boroughbridge (1322), a decisive battle in an English civil war, Sir Andrew Harclay adopted the Scottish schiltrom formation against the army of Thomas of Lancaster. The *militia portalis* of 1397, an attempt by the Hungarians to maintain a reserve force of some twenty thousand mounted archers, was a response to the defeat at Nicopolis in the previous year. In 1448, Charles VII of France (r. 1422–1461) developed the system of franc-archers after the French had suffered repeatedly at the hands of the English

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Supply Train. Charlemagne's army transporting provisions. Illustration from a Venetian codex, fourteenth century. BIBLIOTECA MARCIANA, VENICE, ITALY/GIRAUDON/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

longbowmen. In the Middle Ages, contact in battle with other cultures and systems drove the process of organizational change.

Discipline and Command. Responsibility for enforcing discipline and imposing order on an army lay with a number of individuals. However, the muster provided a perfect opportunity for the commander of an army to impose his centralized authority onto the whole. In the later Middle Ages this was often achieved through the issuing of disciplinary ordinances of war. One of the earliest sets of ordinances within the British Isles relates to the Scotland campaign of King Richard II (r. 1377–1399) in 1385. The first clause stressed that all men within the army, of whatever state or condition, were to obey the constable and marshal. This order was intended to turn a mass of independent units into a cohesive host. The ordinances also demonstrate the importance of staying in formation, with anyone found marching ahead of the royal banner to suffer the loss of their mount. The older Rule of the Knights Templar was of a slightly different nature, concerning as it did a knightly order rather than an ordinary army. Yet it shared many of the concerns of the ordinances of 1385, with similar emphasis on discipline on the march and in battle.

In armies of thousands of men, the banner acted as a rallying point and as an aid to coordinated movements, with special significance being attached to the royal standard. Trumpets were also used to communicate orders. They can be found as early as the ninth century in the armies of Louis the Pious (r. 814–840), and at the battle of Worringen in 1288, the trumpet sounded the call to arms in the army of Duke John I of Brabant (r. 1267–1294). Different blasts of the trumpet might signal different stages in an army's preparations. In the army of Edward III (r. 1327–1377) of England in 1327, for example, the first blast signified that the men were to saddle their horses, the second that they were to arm, and the third that they were to get into formation. Ultimately, a commander could make his wishes known only if he could be heard.

[*See also* Agincourt, Battle of; Bannerets; Bannockburn, Battle of; Britain, *subentries on* Narrative (1000–1300) *and* Narrative (1300–1500); Cassel, Battle of (1328); Cavalry; Charles VII of France; Courtrai, Battle and Siege of; Crécy, Battle of; Edward III of England; Falkirk, Battle of; France, *subentries on* Narrative (900–1328) *and* Narrative (1328–1483); Hastings,

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Battle of; Household Knights; Hundred Years' War; Hungary, *subentries on* Narrative (1000–1300) *and* Narrative (1300–1526); Infantry; Knighthood and Knights; Louis I; Low Countries, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1479); *Militia Portalis*; Mongols; Nicopolis, Battle of; Ottoman Armies and Military Methods; Signals; Switzerland, *subentry on* Narrative; *and* Worringen, Battle of.]

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David Simpkin

Rates of Movement

Tactical movement on the battlefield was determined by the speed of men and horses. Clearly this would vary according to circumstances. Tired foot soldiers moved slower than fresh ones, while weather and terrain had a considerable influence. Variations were generally only minor, though a minor difference might be crucial in the cut and thrust of battle. The speed of cavalry was subject to much greater variation, depending on the state of the horses, the type of animals, the nature of the ground, and the number of mounts held by each soldier. The strategic movement of armies was subject to much similar conditions, and obviously the presence or absence of an enemy could have a considerable impact. But probably the key factor governing speed was logistics.

Clumsy supply trains could carry only limited amounts of food and relatively little bulky fodder for horses, whose need to graze severely restricted movement. Purchasing or stealing food forced armies to disperse, which was dangerous: in 1177 Saladin's forces spread out to ravage and were defeated by the crusaders at Montgisard in Palestine. Any army could force-march for a short period, but exhaustion and the demands of supply meant that a too-rapid pace could not be long sustained. In 1099 the First Crusade left Tripoli on a 360-kilometer (223-mile) march to Jerusalem (1 kilometer = 0.62 mile). They made 40 kilometers in each of the first two days, but this could not be sustained, and allowing for rest days, they averaged 15 kilometers per day. This was a not unusual rate of march for a European army advancing without serious opposition. On 8 October 1415, Henry V of England, with his army of about eight thousand, set off from the French port of Harfleur on a forced march of 193 kilometers to Calais. By 12 October, unopposed, they had made 130 kilometers in five days, a rate of 26 kilometers per day. Subsequently they became aware of an enemy army. Unable to move directly, they rested and then, on 21 October, they made 29 kilometers. On 25 October, hungry and tired, they were brought to battle at Agincourt.

In general the fastest-moving armies were those of the steppe peoples. Mongol armies, for example, were entirely mounted and acquired a reputation for rapid movement and sudden appearances. Each soldier could change mounts from his string of at least five horses. Armies were broken down into smaller units moving in parallel to avoid congestion and provide for ample forage. The commanders planned and timed their marches carefully so that there would always be grass available, and their wandering way of life meant that they were accustomed to limited logistic support. But even so, on the march their armies traveled at about 24 kilometers per day, which was not so much greater than other armies. What was remarkable about the Mongols was their range and the way they sustained movement over long periods of time. In 1219 an army of 150 thousand was sent from Mongolia to destroy the Khwarazmians in the southern steppes of Central Asia. Strong elements under Subedei went on to attack Georgia, a round trip of over eight thousand kilometers in three years. Feeding men, and most

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

Military Indenture. In this indenture, Richard FitzAlan, earl of Arundel, commits to provide 3,500 soldiers—including one peer, 20 bannerets, 150 knights, 1,329 esquires, and 2,000 archers—for a naval expedition in 1388. TNA E101/41/4 (A). CROWN COPYRIGHT. IMAGE COURTESY THE SOLDIER IN LATER MEDIEVAL ENGLAND PROJECT (WWW.MEDIEVALSOLDIER.ORG). PHOTOGRAPH BY DR ADRIAN R BELL

particularly horses, limited the speed of medieval armies, and failure to prepare for such problems could be disastrous.

[*See also* Agincourt, Battle of; Cavalry; Horses; Logistics and Transportation; *and* Mongols.]

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John France

SIZE

When the armies of the First Crusade united at Nicaea in October 1097, an eyewitness, Fulcher of Chartres, estimated that there were 100,000 soldiers, along with 5 million noncombatants, and that another 5 million had taken up the pledge but failed to come. These figures suggest that a quarter of the population of Western Europe had set off on the Crusade, which is highly unlikely. His estimate has to be seen in the context of a world where large gatherings of people were rare. At the time of the First Crusade, no city in Christian Europe was bigger than about 20,000, and north of the Alps the largest probably did not exceed 10,000. In October 1097 the papal legate estimated the crusader army at 100,000. Another eyewitness, Raymond of Aguilers, indicated that by the time the army of the First Crusade attacked Jerusalem, it was reduced to about 12,000. Modern estimates point to an original strength of 40,000 to 60,000, a number that must have seemed amazing to Fulcher and

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that accounts for his astronomical figure, by which he essentially meant a very large number. Sources for the First Crusade are numerous, but by contrast, we are never given figures for Charlemagne's armies, a fact that forces historians to speculate. By way of comparison, the total mobilization for the Norman invasion of 1066, about 14,000, including sailors supporting about 6,000 combatants, was clearly enormous by contemporary standards.

Low figures were long in vogue, but in 1968 K. F. Werner's careful analysis of Carolingian resources suggested a potential to raise over 300,000 horsemen, implying a far greater number of supporters on foot. On this basis, Bernard S. Bachrach has argued that Charlemagne could actually raise forces of up to 100,000. The Burghal Hidage, an important piece of evidence for numbers, needs careful handling. It describes a system of fortified places in Wessex manned by 27,000 troops, but this was purely for territorial defense in a grave emergency. By contrast, King Alfred (r. 871–899), who probably originated the network, could raise only 5,500 for his field army and at any one time mobilized about only a third of these. Guy Halsall has pointed out that though the late Roman Empire had 400,000 men in arms, this was drawn from and spread over a gigantic area. Even so, to counter a major barbarian incursion at Strasbourg in 357, only 13,000 men could be gathered, and for his invasion of Persia in 363 Emperor Julian (r. 360–363), after enormous exertions, could raise barely 65,000 troops. In light of the decline of the European population after the fall of Rome, the crudity of Carolingian administration, and evidence that suggests an enormous disparity between military potential and actual forces raised throughout the Middle Ages, Halsall thinks that Charlemagne's biggest armies were of the order of 5,000 to 6,000 combatants, together with noncombatant servants.

The European population certainly grew sharply after about 1000, but most historians consider that a force of 5,000 to 10,000 constituted a major effort for any high-medieval European state. Contemporaries estimated the imperial army that besieged Milan in 1158 at up to 100,000, but it was an allied German and local Italian force, and 15,000 seems more likely. One of the most important battles of the period was Bouvines in 1214, fought between a German-led coalition and the French, at which each side had 7,000 to 8,000 men and the French, with 1,400 mounted knights, had a slight advantage in that category.

The growing wealth of Europe and its increasingly elaborate administration produced much larger armies in the thirteenth century. In 1265 Charles of Anjou conquered the Sicilian kingdom with an army of 4,000 knights and 10,000 to 12,000 infantry soldiers. By the end of the century, Edward I of England (r. 1272–1307) was raising armies with an infantry of up to 26,000 men for his conquests in Wales and Scotland.

Eastern armies were much bigger because they could draw upon greater wealth and more sophisticated administrations. The Islamic conquest of the Middle East in the seventh century was accomplished with 300,000 soldiers. Tang China (618–907) had an army of 600,000 and could mount a field force of about 20,000. When the Mongol general Subedei invaded Europe in 1240–1241, he had 150,000 mounted men and could afford to detach 30,000 of these to crush a German army of 20,000 at Liegnitz on 9 April 1241 while his main force defeated the Hungarians at Mohi on 11 April.

European governments gradually became more capable, but while large numbers could, potentially at least, be recruited, logistics imposed a real brake on the growth of army size. Pack animals and wagons could carry supplies, but any army would have to acquire more by purchase or plunder, both of which imposed substantial delays that grew worse as the size of an army increased. Worst of all, horses require enormous amounts of food, and they were vital for transport as well as for fighting. It is perhaps significant that a bone of contention between Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa (r. 1152–1189) and the rebellious Lombard cities in the mid-twelfth century was the *fodrum*, the right of the king to collect food for horses.

Because administrative capacity improved, we have better sources for estimating the size of armies of the later Middle Ages. The Hundred Years' War against France forced the English crown to

Thirteenth-Century Armor. Stone fragment from the original rood screen of the Cathédrale Saint-Étienne, Bourges, showing soldiers wearing *hauberks* with attached coifs, mail sleeves ending in mittens, and mail *chausses* (leg armor), c. 1230. PHOTOGRAPH BY ROEL RENMANS

systematize administration, and this improved administration has left rich records for the historian. In 1346 Edward III (r. 1327–1377) ordered an immense military effort, but the army of 14,000 that landed in France was significantly short of his expectations, and their number probably shrank by at least 1,000 in the six weeks of campaigning before the battle of Crécy on 26 August. English expeditions to France in 1387 and 1388 can fairly certainly be numbered at 3,500 and 5,000, respectively, but the presence of the king would produce much greater forces. In 1415 Henry V (r. 1413–1422) attacked France with an army of about 12,000. It captured Harfleur, though only after substantial losses, then marched north with 7,000 to 9,000 effective soldiers, encountering and defeating a French force of about 12,000 at Agincourt on 25 October 1415.

Overall, European armies in the Middle Ages were relatively small, though crusading forces could be significantly bigger. In the great empires of the East, much larger forces could be raised.

[*See also* Burghal Hidage *and* Recruitment, *subentry on* Overview.]

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John France

ARMOR, BODY

The most common form of armor available after the fall of Rome was mail. It had been in use for a very long time and continued in use into the early modern period as it was relatively easy to produce and did not require large masses of iron for its manufacture. It could be worn with or without a helmet. Plate armor was developed beginning in the thirteenth century.

Mail Armor. Throughout its period of use, mail armor was always made in the same way, although there are some small variations. It was formed from rings of iron (or, more rarely, steel) each of which was linked through four others—two above and two below it—making a pattern of rows of rings, which faced alternately one way and then the other. The rings were manufactured in one of two ways. In the first method, today called *riveted*, the ends of the rings were overlapped slightly and flattened, then a hole was punched through the overlapping ends and closed up with a small rivet. The second type of ring was made *solid*—that is, it was a continuous ring. Just how solid rings were made is still open to some debate, but in the later period, they were made

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by wrapping a thin wire around a mandrel twice and then hammer-welding the whole together to form a solid ring. It has also been suggested that solid rings could have been made by punching and cutting them out of solid sheet iron, although there is little evidence for this. Where solid rings were used to make mail, they alternated with riveted rings in a characteristic fashion, one row of riveted rings, the next of solid, then one of riveted and so on—the riveted rings used to fasten rows of solid rings together.

The wire used to make rings varied in cross-sectional shape from round to flat. Rings could also vary in size, although a garment was normally made from rings of equal size, from just a quarter of an inch (6 millimeters) to around half an inch (12 millimeters) or slightly more, with most in the region between a third to half an inch (8–10 millimeters). To create a completed mail garment, the armorer added or subtracted rings or rows in a manner similar to knitting and was able to build up complex shapes and forms to fit the torso, head, and arms. Mail armor was usually worn over some form of underclothes, either normal everyday garments or special, padded clothes that helped to cushion heavy blows and provide additional protection. Used as a defense against attack, mail armor was flexible and easy to wear, but it was also very heavy—much of the weight of a mail shirt was borne by the shoulders. Although mail offered good protection against slashing and cutting blows, and left no vulnerable gaps, it was less effective against attacks from sharp-pointed weapons such as arrowheads. Nonetheless, before the advent of plate armor, mail offered the most effective protection from the dangers of warfare.

The mounted and foot soldiers of Charlemagne's armies wore a mail shirt, the *byrnie*, which extended from the neck to the thighs or knees. It was loose with short sleeves reaching to the mid-arm or elbow, and, unlike later examples, apparently had no slit between the legs at front and back. The opening at the neck was round and wide with no defense for the neck itself. Soldiers had a shirt underneath the *byrnie*, but apparently did not wear additional protection on their feet, lower arms, or hands, though the Monk of St. Gall describes Charlemagne himself as wearing iron gauntlets. The same author says all of Charlemagne's army wore iron greaves, but the lack of supporting archaeological evidence makes this unlikely.

The best evidence for the armor worn in the eleventh century comes from one of the most remarkable examples of Western art, the Bayeux Tapestry, which is not in fact a tapestry but an embroidered linen strip. It depicts the events leading up to the invasion and the conquest of England by Duke William of Normandy in 1066. Most of the soldiers shown on the tapestry, both cavalry and those on foot, are wearing mail shirts, called *hauberks*, which cover the torso and arms, extending to just above the elbow, and most include an attached head protection, the *coif*. The upper parts of the legs of the soldiers are also shown protected by mail, though whether this completely encloses the legs or just covers the front of the thighs is not easy to determine. In the margins of the battle scenes dead soldiers are shown being stripped of their armor, and this would confirm that the mail was just a long shirt reaching down to just above the knee, and split at front and back to enable enough movement to walk and ride a horse. It is clear from other pictorial evidence, illustrations, and sculpture, that the forms of armor depicted on the Bayeux Tapestry were used throughout Europe. Little actual armor has survived from this period.

The period from around 1050 to the end of the thirteenth century saw surprisingly few changes to armor. Mail armor was used to protect the body from the head to the thighs. From the middle of the twelfth century a surcoat or coat armor, a long textile garment worn over the armor, was adopted, although the reasons for this are still open to debate. The old suggestion that the *surcoat* was used to display heraldry to enable the identification of the wearer cannot be sustained, as *surcoats* bearing arms do not appear until the early fourteenth century. Instead, their use may have been a result of copying the fashion of the crusaders' Muslim enemies in the Holy Land. Whatever the reason, the *surcoat*, rare until the end of the twelfth century, became increasingly common after about 1210, when it developed into

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a loose sleeveless garment with a deeply slit skirt reaching to around midcalf. It was widely used throughout the thirteenth century and eventually disappeared at the beginning of the fourteenth century. Its widespread use and depiction in illustrations and sculpture obscures the detail of the armor worn beneath with the result that it is often difficult for us to see its development.

The lengthening of the sleeves of the mail shirt to the wrist, which occurred from about 1100, was followed toward the end of the twelfth century by their extension to cover the backs of the hands, to form so-called *mufflers*, a fashion that lasted until the early years of the fourteenth century. *Mufflers* protected the backs of the hands, with the palm covered with cloth or leather. Occasionally separate fingers are shown in illustrations, but these are rare. To hold the sleeve tightly in position, cords or thongs tied around the wrist were also common.

Alongside the use of mail armor, various quilted textile defenses were also worn from the second half of the twelfth century—the *pourpoint*, the *aketon*, and the *gambeson*, although how they actually differed in style, purpose, and use is difficult to ascertain. Both *gambeson* and *aketon* were used indiscriminately as terms for garments worn both over and under the *hauberk*. However, it is probable that both terms referred to garments worn over the mail shirt, rather like the *surcoat*. The *aketon* was probably a plain, quilted coat worn underneath the mail armor, although it could also have been worn by common soldiers as their only defense. *Pourpoint* may have been a more generic name used for all types of soft, quilted defenses. Unfortunately, none of these garments survive, and all our information on them is derived from written sources, or from illustrations, sculptures, or brasses, which are often difficult to interpret. Of course, as they were worn beneath other defenses, by their very nature, they are not prominent, so that one can only catch glimpses of them at best. Finally there were *gamboised cuisses*, essentially padded thigh defenses, which were used beginning in the later thirteenth century.

Plate Armor. By the late thirteenth century, a new defense had been developed, the coat of plates—a

Full-Plate Armor. Suit of armor with *poulaines*, French style, c. 1480. The skirt of mail may be part of a mail shirt worn under the plate or may be attached to a leather arming jacket. MUSÉE DE L'ARMÉE, PARIS, FRANCE/GIRAUDON/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

textile or leather coat with small iron plates attached to the inside. The exact form and construction of the coat of plates is not always clear, as it is hidden by the *surcoat* that was worn over it. However, the excavation of mass graves from the battle of Visby, fought in 1361, has provided many examples of coats of plates. All have the same basic characteristics—all are sleeveless and consist of overlapping iron plates that had once been riveted or laced onto the inside of a leather or textile covering. Only two armors have plates riveted to the outside of the covering, and in both cases these were only small shoulder plates. On some armors from Visby the plates are placed vertically, while others are horizontal, with some having combinations of both. Most cover the torso with a skirt reaching to the hips, while others are

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more tight-fitting and extend only to the waist. Extra shoulder plates appear to have been added to a few of the armors. Most of the Visby coats of plates covered the front and back, although at least five may have covered only the front and sides, leaving the back without plate protection. Almost all opened at the back, with two opening on one side, two on both sides and one in the front. Some are also decorated with bronze mountings in the shape of heraldic shields, fleurs-de-lis, or shells.

Plate gauntlets and *gorgets*, plates protecting the neck and chin, appeared at the end of the thirteenth century. From about 1300 *poleyns* and *greaves*, the armor for the lower legs, became more common, and *sabatons*, armor for the foot often made in the shape of the shoe in fashion at the time, first emerged around 1320. Though later always made from iron, early plate defenses could also be made from hardened leather called *cuir boulli*. Full plate arm defenses appeared about the same time and consisted of two gutter-shaped plates, for the upper and lower arms, and a central cup-shaped *couter*, over the elbow, all strapped over the sleeve of the hauberk. *Besagews*, small disc-shaped plates, were sometimes fastened with laces at the shoulder and elbow to protect these vulnerable areas from sword cuts. Rectangular plates, called *ailettes*, shown in illustrated manuscripts from about 1275 to about 1350, were attached to the sides of the shoulders and projected up on either side of the head. These probably filled no defensive purpose, but were only flimsy pieces bearing ornamental or heraldic devices. From about 1250, the mail coif was made separate from the hauberk, which was often shortened and called a *haubergeon*.

Over the course of the decades after 1320, armorers continued to develop pieces of plate armor for the body and limbs. The *haubergeon* remained in use, worn under armor, as did the *aketon*. From about 1340, the plates covering the chest were combined to form a rudimentary breastplate, which at first covered only the upper chest area. In addition, series of horizontal plates, riveted to a fabric cover, were added to protect the hips. By about 1370 the breastplate was extended downward by means of an attached skirt of hoops, a *fauld*, so that the whole torso was protected. The evolution of the backplate is more difficult to follow but was probably similar to that of the breastplate.

Toward the end of the fourteenth century two new developments to the breastplate appeared. The first was a hinged bracket fastened to the right side of the breastplate, the "lance rest," which acted as a stop and support for the couched lance. The other was an additional bar of iron riveted to the breastplate, just below the neck, that acted as a stop if the wearer was hit by a weapon, hence the name *stop-rib*. These became common on armor until about 1450.

The armorer continued to improve protection for the limbs. From about 1340 *cuisses*, for the upper legs, were made from plates, rather like the *brigandine* (see below), while *poleyns* were made smaller to cover just the front and sides of the knee. After 1370 the *cuisses* were made from a single iron plate, and the *greaves* usually consisted of two plates, at front and back of the leg, fastened together with straps and buckles. The defenses for the arms developed in much the same way as those for the legs, although there were many variations in shape and form across Europe. Tubular or gutter-shaped plates for the upper and lower arm, *cannons*—with or without a *couter* at the elbow—secured to the hauberk were the most common form. Until about 1375 gauntlets were made from small plates, but from about 1380 the hourglass form in which a single plate covered the back and sides of the hand and the wrist became common, with small overlapping plates protecting the fingers.

Regional Variations. By the second decade of the fifteenth century complete full-plate armor had been developed, and two very distinct armor-making regions had emerged—northern Italy, mainly round Milan and Brescia; and southern Germany, especially in Augsburg, Nuremberg, Landshut, and Innsbruck. Each area produced armor of a distinctive style, and both were dominated by a small number of great armor dynasties: the Missaglia family of Milan and the Helmschmieds of Augsburg were possibly the greatest of these. Of course armor was made in other parts of Europe, such as England, France, Spain, and the Low Countries, but little is known about these workshops and armorers. All produced not only

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Fifteenth-Century Brigandine. The *brigandine* was made of small plates of iron riveted to a sleeveless fabric jacket. Musée de l'Armée, Paris. PHOTOGRAPH BY CLIFFORD J. ROGERS

high-quality armor, tailor-made to fit an individual who could afford it, but also cheaper types. Indeed, the workshops in Italy practiced an early form of mass production—specialists in the different parts of armor supplied a central arms merchant, who made up complete suits or harnesses to fulfill orders from all over Europe. High-quality armor was shaped to fit every part of the body and followed the fashion of the dress of the day—for example the high waistlines and closely fitted clothes of the later fifteenth century were copied by the armorer.

Italian full-plate armor is characterized by its rounded form, while that made in Germany or in the German fashion was more angular. For much of the fifteenth century, the Italian breastplate was formed of an upper breastplate, which was rounded and cut off at the waist, and a lower breastplate, the *plackart*, attached by leather straps and buckles. The *plackart* was usually fitted with a skirt, or *fauld*, of two or three plates. The backplate was similar and attached to the breastplate at the shoulder and waist. The *vambraces* consisted of a short tubular upper *cannon*; a *couter*, or disc-shaped plate covering the elbow joint; and a lower *cannon* extending to the wrist. The rectangular-shaped *pauldrons* were usually asymmetrical, that on the wearer's right smaller than that on the left to allow greater freedom for the right arm for fighting. The armor for the legs was very similar to that used earlier and consisted of plate cuisses and greaves attached to *poleyns* at the knees. The feet were usually covered with mail rather than plate *sabatons*.

From about 1430 the bottom plate of the *fauld* was split into two rectangular plates, called *tassets*, which hung from the breastplate by straps and buckles. Sometimes additional *tassets* were added to the sides and backplate. The arm defenses changed little over the following decades, although the asymmetrical *pauldrons* were made larger at the back, sometimes even overlapping each other, and the upper *cannon* became longer, covering the upper arm. Earlier fingered *gauntlets* developed into mittens, the right consisting of a wrist plate with two plates covering the fingers, and the left of a single plate over the hand. The leg harness also changed very little, except that the side wings on the *poleyns* were made larger.

The German breastplate of the 1420s and 1430s was more angular than the Italian style, with the upper part flared out and the lower back angled into the waist, giving it a very characteristic "box" shape. However, from the 1460s it developed into one characterized by slender, elongated forms, often with ripple-like fluting, and with applied brass borders, sometimes known as the "High Gothic" style.

In the 1420s a small arm defense for the shoulder, the *spaudler*, came into use, and by the 1450s this was attached to the upper *cannon*, a feature that continued into the sixteenth century. The leg harness was

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similar to that of the Italian style, although with smaller side wings on the *poleyns* and with *sabatons* made of horizontal plates in the shape of contemporary footwear.

Around 1500, the separate styles that had evolved in Italy and Germany came together, resulting in a single line of development. The two main armor centers, northern Italy and southern Germany, continued to supply both the fine harnesses for those who could pay as well as plain armor for the common soldier. During the first decades of the sixteenth century a popular style of armor was introduced in which the surface was decorated with parallel lines of ridges; this so-called Maximilian style was probably a fusion of the earlier German ripple-fluting and Italian rounded styles. The decorative ridges also strengthened the armor by providing additional rigidity. At around the same time, armorers replaced the applied-brass borders of the earlier period with turned edges, often decorated with roping.

The breastplate was now usually globular in shape, with attached *tassets*. The arm defenses were almost always in one piece, the lower and upper *cannons* joined permanently to the *couter* with internal leathers and rivets, the whole often permanently attached to the *pauldron*. The collar, or *gorget*, became a standard feature, worn underneath the cuirass, to which the arms were attached. The *almain collar*, where *spaudlers* were attached to the collar, covering the shoulders and worn with mail sleeves, also became popular. For the first decades of the century, mitten gauntlets were common, though they were replaced from about 1530 by fingered gauntlets. There were few major changes in the leg harness. The *sabatons*, often attached to the *greaves*, were usually of plate, although in Italy there was still a tendency to wear mail *sabatons*.

The infantry, poorer and less well paid than the knights on horseback, wore simpler armor. Those who could afford it, especially those recruited from towns, urban militias, and mercenaries, commonly wore mail shirts augmented by other pieces of armor, such as a breastplate. For the poorest, protection might be nothing more than a quilted jacket, perhaps with a simple helmet. However, it became increasingly common for infantry to wear either the *brigandine* or the *jack*. The *brigandine* was made of small rectangular plates of iron riveted to a sleeveless fabric jacket that fastened up the front or on one side, providing a continuous but flexible protection, much like the modern flak jacket. The plates overlapped one another to provide good protection for the chest and back, especially against sword thrusts. The iron plates, prone to rusting especially from the sweat produced in the extremes of battle, were coated with a protective layer, applied by dipping them in a molten bath of a lead and tin, a mixture similar to modern solder. Though *brigandines* were mostly used by the poorer soldiers, deluxe versions for knights and princes were also produced, made from costly silks and velvets with gilt rivets.

The *jack* was made from small, square plates of iron, each with a hole through its center, laced between two layers of fabric with string, giving a characteristic quilted appearance. Jackets and hats were made in the same way but, unlike *brigandines*, *jacks* seem to have been made only from cheap, coarse materials for the common soldier. Both the *jack* and the *brigandine* were especially popular in the fifteenth century, but thay had been in use before then and, with the addition of mail sleeves, were still being worn by the light infantry in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.

Scale armor, made from small plates of iron rivcted to a backing, was common throughout eastern Europe until the seventeenth century but was rare elsewhere in Europe. In surviving examples, the individual plates were often highly decorated.

Surface decoration had been quite rare in the fifteenth century, but became more common in the sixteenth. Armors were often "etched and gilded"; patterns were drawn on the surface, often in narrow bands, and these were treated with acid, which etched them into the surface of the metal. The patterns were then gilded, giving the armor a glittering and rich appearance, similar to the costly fabrics of the day. Fine armor was always a status symbol, proclaiming one's wealth and position in society, and this reached

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a climax in the sixteenth century, when highly elaborate and decorated "parade" armors were produced. Often copying ancient Roman originals, or more fanciful in nature, imitating fashionable contemporary dress, these were usually not suitable for actual use in battle.

Armor in Use. There is a popular myth that the armored knight needed to be winched into his saddle, but this was never the case. A full suit of battle armor weighed about 50–90 pounds (23–40 kilograms) distributed over the entire body. Armorers made armor thicker where it was necessary, especially in the breastplate, and thinner and lighter on the arms and legs, to keep the weight to the absolute minimum. The armor mimicked the joints of the body, at the elbow and knee for example, to enable the knight to move much as in normal life, although with some curtailment of the extremes of movement.

Just how effective armor was as a protection is not easy to determine. Mail is very good at deflecting slashing blows, but less effective against the piercing attack of a sharp point such as an arrow or crossbow bolt. Plate armor was a much better form of defense, but it too was vulnerable, especially to attack between plates. Modern experimental work on armor-piercing arrows indicates that armor could sometimes be defeated, but only if the impact was at right angles to the surface, which was unlikely given the curving surface of armor.

Armor could be pierced by small-arm fire, and armorers increased its thickness to be more resistant, though this made it heavier and more cumbersome to wear. The increasing use of gunpowder weapons as well as changes in tactics and the increasing sizes of armies led to the demise of armor in the seventeenth century.

From at least the middle of the fifteenth century, there was an increasing demand for armors designed and made for specific uses, particularly for the tournament. From early times young men trained to fight and to develop their combat skills in the *melée*, a mock battle where groups of mounted knights fought one another in a "friendly" fashion. However, *melées* could get out of hand and result in serious injury or even death. By the 1200s the tournament had changed so that, instead of many knights fighting together, individuals fought one another. This could take many forms, from jousting on horseback with blunt lances to fighting on foot with *pollaxes* or *halberds*.

At first the armor for tournaments was similar to that worn for war, but gradually specialized harnesses were developed. For jousting on horseback, the knight used a special saddle and was protected with extra plates of iron or wooden shields. Sometimes, for foot combat, the knight wore armor with a wide skirt of iron to protect his legs. Unlike armor for war, armor for jousting could be very heavy and often did not allow very much movement—just enough to be able to hit the opponent.

Tournaments could be elaborate affairs lasting days, or even weeks, complete with all sorts of entertainments, fighting of every kind, with scoresheets and winners and losers. At the other extreme, knights sometimes challenged each other to single combat. As the tournament became ever more elaborate and special armor was needed for each type of fighting, the *garniture* was developed—a basic suit of armor supplied with additional plates, over sixty in very elaborate *garnitures*, which could be added or exchanged with pieces for each type of fight. These extra pieces were often secured with nuts and bolts, needing special tools to put them together.

[*See also* Barding (Horse Armor); Helmets; Metallurgy; Shields; *and* Tournaments and Jousts.]

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An Armorer Workshop, c. 1416. Grisaille painting by Guillaume Vrelant in Christine de Pizan's *L'epistre d'Othéa*, fifteenth century. COURTESY CLAUDE GAIER/UNIVERSITY LIBRARY ERLANGEN, MS 2361, FOL. 23V

ARMOR, HORSE

See Barding (Horse Armor).

ARMOR INDUSTRY, MILANESE

The city of Milan was a leading maker of armor and arms in medieval and early modern Europe. Its heyday was from the fourteenth to the seventeenth century, when it dominated the market, selling its wares throughout Europe and beyond. Milan's leadership in the industry was facilitated by its nearness to iron-bearing hills to the north and its location on major trade routes through the Alps. There is evidence that the industry existed already in the eleventh century. By the thirteenth century it was flourishing. As described by the Milanese writer Bonvesin de la Riva in 1288, it was a major enterprise that daily produced armor and weapons of every kind—from mail shirts to breastplates, helmets to basinets, swords to spears—and exported them even to the Turks and Muslim East. A hundred years later Milanese armorers became leaders in the production of plate armor, which was replacing mail as the standard type of armor.

By the fifteenth century Milan was the undisputed leader in Europe, outdistancing German rivals in variety and quality of goods. The high end included ornamental armor, prized in Renaissance courts for its artistic value rather than for its military use. The best-known Milanese manufacturer of the period was the Missaglia family from Como. They maintained close ties to the Duke of Milan and by the end of the fifteenth century had established a half dozen workshops, gained control of two mines, and were purportedly worth over a hundred thousand scudi.

Unlike most other urban professions, the Milanese armor industry was not organized into guilds, and so it had unusual flexibility. The skill of the Milanese armorers created a great demand for their services, and some emigrated to elsewhere in Europe, most notably to France (especially Lyon), an ally of Milan, in the early fifteenth century, but also to Spain, Burgundy, and various places in Italy. The great potency of the Milanese industry is indicated

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by the famous story that after the city's humiliating defeat by the Venetians at Maclodio in 1427, Milanese armorers purportedly refurnished within several days the entire army of four thousand cavalry and two thousand infantrymen, whose equipment had been seized by the victors.

[*See also* Armor, Body; Helmets; Metallurgy; Shields; *and* Weapons, *subentry on* Hand-to-Hand.]

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William Caferro

ARMS INDUSTRY AND TRADE

Very little is known about the arms industry and trade in Europe during the Early Middle Ages, even though weapons were of course widely used by the warrior tribes of the Migration Period and in the various kingdoms they established after their settlement.

Early Medieval Period (c. 500–1000). In the agrarian civilization of those times, the manufacture of artifacts, whether domestic or military, was usually carried out locally in the landed estates where magnates resided and also in the few cities and urban sites that had retained (or regained) some economic activities after the fall of the Roman Empire. The mining regions were privileged in that respect and may have developed an early specialty in arms metallurgy and trade. The case is obvious in the area between the Rhine and the Meuse rivers, home of the famous "Frankish swords." These were produced in large quantities and exported widely—to Scandinavia, Russia, and the Mediterranean states. The repeated attempts, on the part of the Carolingian rulers, to oppose the traffic of swords and armor with such archenemies as the Vikings and the Muslims bear testimony to the strategic importance of this war material from Western Europe and to a production surplus, giving rise to an export trade of some magnitude as well.

A majority of these swords were forged by hand according to the pattern-welding process; that is, they were hammered out of twisted pieces of more or less carburized iron. However, during the ninth and tenth centuries, this technique gradually disappeared and was superseded by the process of steel forging. A variety of makers' names appear, inlaid into the blades, on these later swords; most of them are of Germanic origin. Among the most famous are Ulfberth and Ingelrii, which are recorded until the twelfth century. This is evidence of their being reused as trademarks by succeeding workshops as a token of excellence. The sometimes-held opinion according to which these much coveted swords of the Dark Ages originated in the Norica region (on the Danube River), not in the Rhineland, can probably be rejected.

Late Middle Ages (c. 1000–1500). From the eleventh century on, a less sketchy picture of the European arms industry and trade can be drawn from the existing body of literary, narrative, and administrative primary sources. The medieval epics and romances repeatedly refer to various places of origin assigned to the weapons handled by their heroes. These place names (cities or regions) are thought to allude to the most renowned production centers of Western Europe in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. They are usually associated in these sources with a specific range of military products.

- France: Anjou (coats of mail), Beauvais (all types), Blois (shields), Bordeaux (swords, spears, axes, arrows), Cambrai and prominently Chambly (coats of mail), Poitiers (swords, helmets, spearheads), Senlis (helmets), Toulouse (spearheads), Valence (swords, spears), and Vienne (all types)
- Germanic Empire: Bavaria (swords, helmets, coats of mail), Cologne (swords), Lothringen (swords), Passau (swords), and Saxony (swords)
- Italy: Aquileia (helmets), Benevento (spearheads), Brescia and Milan (swords), Otranto (helmets), Pavia (helmets, spears, swords), and Sardinia (helmets, shields, coats of mail)

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- Spain: Zaragoza, Toledo, and Valencia (all types, in the footsteps of the craftsmen formerly active under Muslim rule), Almería (coats of mail), Barcelona (swords, coats of mail), Castile (spearheads), Murcia (coats of mail), Navarre (shields), and Seville (swords)

The assumption that these places may be the most well-known production centers of the period can be misleading and ought to be qualified. First, the information thus provided is extremely vague in terms of chronology. Second, the frequent use of literary stereotypes may convey an obsolete or distorted view of contemporary realities.

Beginning in the thirteenth century, the layout of the arms industry and trade in Western and Central Europe is well known. As a rule, all major medieval cities were producing, to various extents, some sort of armaments, either for their own needs, to answer an overlord's request, or even for sale to other customers. The making of arms and armor was carried out by craftsmen affiliated with trade guilds, either members of chartered and specialized companies, such as sword makers, mail makers, and plate hammerers, or simply members of a less specific trade, such as ironmongers, cutlers, or woodworkers. As a rule, these craftsmen worked in small workshops, which were more or less strictly regulated by the guild statutes. These rules aimed to protect them against competitors, counterfeiters, and social abuses and to guarantee a high level of quality. On the other hand, these rules tended to restrict the masters' business by limiting the number of employees, their working hours, and even the volume of their production. To circumvent these barriers, the master craftsmen resorted to subcontractors, to temporary commercial associations with other craftsmen (chiefly in Italy), and to activating a number of rural home-workers established outside the city limits, who were not subjected to such restrictions. This was part of a vertical production scheme that enabled city merchants to control a great deal of the "upstream" activities necessary to their trade: iron mining and smelting; charcoal production; and making of hafted weapons, arrows, and crossbow bolts. Thus, the importance of peasant workers in the hinterlands of sizable cities should not be underestimated; they were actively supplying neighboring urban centers or even more distant customers with raw or half-finished products.

As for heavier military matériel, such as catapults and other siege engines, it was usually designed by "engineers." These components were manufactured by carpenters and ironmongers and assembled on the spot wherever needed, either during the defense or attack of fortifications or prior to a pitched battle.

The scale of the arms production in the late Middle Ages is astonishing, considering the amount of handwork required in a preindustrial society in order to achieve such quantities. To give a few examples: in 1272, the king of Aragon ordered the provisioning of 100,000 crossbow bolts from Aragon, Valencia, and Catalonia; in 1295, the king of France bought in Bruges 1,885 crossbows, 666,258 bolts, 6,309 shields, 2,853 helmets, 4,511 quilted coats, 751 pairs of gauntlets, 1,374 neck and arms defenses, 5,067 coats of plates, 13,495 lances or lance heads, 1,989 battle axes, and 14,599 swords and daggers; and in 1341, the king of England ordered at least 22,000 longbows and 320,200 arrows from various places throughout Great Britain. From 1353 to 1360, the arsenal at the Tower of London purchased and manufactured 15,365 bows, 4,000 bow staves, and 567,432 arrows. In Lisbon, the king's arsenal acquired at one time during the period between 1438 and 1447, 1,174 basinets, and 1,014 suits of armor from Flanders.

No matter how spread out the weapons production was in Europe, some centers rose to an outstanding prominence. Not only did they develop a very large production capacity, they succeeded in establishing very intricate commercial networks that enabled their products to be distributed widely. By far the most important of all was northern Italy, from Genoa to Venice and from Milan and Brescia to Florence, with the center of gravity in Milan. This city-state was renowned for the volume of its trade and the superior quality of its products, which were exported internationally. Also, many Milanese arms makers emigrated throughout Europe and established

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a weapons industry (chiefly but not exclusively armor) in other cities such as Tours, Artois, Avignon, and Bruges. Then there was the Germanic Empire with the Rhine Valley (Cologne, Solingen), Bavaria (Nuremberg, Passau, Augsburg), and Austria (Landshut, Innsbruck, Mühlau). The making of firearms and artillery also became a major activity in southern Germany. The Low Countries rose to prominence chiefly in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, with cities such as Tournai and Brussels for defensive harness, as well as Bruges for the big exchange market it provided before being superseded by Antwerp. Under the dukes of Burgundy, the Low Countries became one of the major producers of gunpowder artillery in the West.

With the birth of the nation-states, the fifteenth century gave rise to state arsenals. These permanent production facilities, usually with a heavy industrial infrastructure, were managed by technical experts. In the fast-developing sector of artillery and portable firearms, the specialized manufacturers became definitely distinct from the expert gunners of old who were originally used to fire the weapons they had themselves made. It appears that the weapons business was dominated by city merchant-entrepreneurs who were both producers and traders. Some of them became very wealthy and achieved social prominence, eventually becoming moneylenders to kings and princes from the fifteenth century on.

Also, the centralization of power in the hands of kingly or princely rulers favored the creation of court armories where craftsmen were appointed to work principally, if not always exclusively, for their sovereign masters. However, these late attempts at centralization and state control did not significantly affect the flowering of free enterprises in the arms business.

[*See also* Armor, Body; Armor Industry, Milanese; Artillery; Engineers and Architects; *and* Metallurgy.]

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Claude Gaier

ARMY, BLACK

See Black Army of Hungary.

ARQUES, BATTLE OF

Following their overwhelming victory at the battle of Courtrai (1302), the Flemish burghers returned to their cities to celebrate their freedom from French rule. The leaders of the rebellion knew, however, that the French king would soon return and that they had to prepare for future conflict. They felt the best way to do this was to enlarge their territory. Before the end of 1302 campaigns were pursued north into Zeeland and south toward the cities of Tournai and Saint-Omer.

Although not large, the French garrison at Saint-Omer, led by Gaucher of Châtillon, the constable of France, decided on 4 April 1303 to leave the protective walls of the city and attack a rebel army at the nearby village of Arques. Two Flemish narratives, the *Annales Gandenses* and the *Chronique de Flandre*, and one French narrative, Guillaume Guiart's *Branche des royaux lignages*, record the battle; the latter is especially important as Guiart fought with the French at Arques.

Willem van Jülich was the Flemish general at Arques. He had successfully led the rebels at Courtrai and, more recently, in the capture of Lessines, and this confidence is perhaps why he marched his forces into France. Just a few months earlier, a French force

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had soundly defeated a Flemish army near Saint-Omer, and the city was also known to have a garrison of French soldiers and German mercenaries, although all sources claim that the Flemings were substantially more numerous.

Once they had reached Arques, Willem van Jülich divided his army into three parts. The first division was positioned nearest to Saint-Omer; the second, which also contained the supply train, was behind the first, but at quite a distance; and the third, the largest, with Williem among them, was positioned to the rear, closest to the Flemish border. The battle effectively opened when a small French force of sixty cavalry ran into the Flemings nearest to Saint-Omer. Many French were killed, although they were able to get news to the troops inside the town, who quickly left to engage the rebels.

While the French infantry fought with the first Flemish contingent, the cavalry rode to engage the second. After a short fight both of the French units prevailed, sending the Flemings into flight and plundering the supply train. The French then marched against the third division of rebels, which Willem van Jülich had ordered into a circular defensive formation. Although they tried valiantly, the French could not break this formation, and as night approached they returned to Saint-Omer. The Flemish held the field, but their victory had cost them a large number of troops, and Willem van Jülich was unable to march on Saint-Omer.

[*See also* Courtrai, Battle and Siege of; France, *subentries on* Narrative (900–1328) *and* Historiography (900–1328); Low Countries, *subentries on* Narrative (1300–1479) *and* Historiography (1300–1479); *and* Willem van Jülich.]

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Kelly DeVries

ARSENAL OF VENICE

See Venetian Arsenal, The.

ARSUF, BATTLE OF

The engagement at Arsuf between the forces of Richard I and Saladin on the Third Crusade is a classic example of a medieval army fighting on the march. The sizes of the armies are impossible to ascertain, especially in the fluctuating conditions of the Third Crusade: a rough estimate suggests that English and French forces embarked on the crusade with ten thousand men. Having taken the crucial Palestinian port of Acre in July 1191, Richard led his army southward toward Jaffa on 22 August, 1191. From here he planned to take the port of Ascalon, a vital objective if Jerusalem were to be freed from Muslim hands (it had fallen in 1187). The army was under constant assault from Turkish troops, especially the bowmen of their light cavalry. Richard marched his forces along the coast, shadowed by the crusaders' fleet, which kept the troops and mounts supplied. The army advanced in three divisions: the infantry was split evenly between one column marching by the shore with the baggage train while the second, comprising mainly spearmen and archers, formed a defense line on the left flank and attempted to keep the Turkish cavalry out of range of the cavalry column in the middle. The greatest danger from Turkish arrows was not to the mailed knights, but to valuable horses. The army was under strict orders to maintain its close formation at all times so as not to expose vulnerable gaps to the enemy. The infantry's role was central in achieving this; the eyewitness chronicler Ambrose d'Évreux singles out "the good crossbowmen [who] did fine service to the army."

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As the crusader army approached Arsuf, Saladin intensified his attacks in an effort to break the crusader host. This allowed Richard an opportunity to launch a shock cavalry charge, the crusaders' most effective tactic. Richard reorganized the cavalry, planning to launch such a counterattack when the Turks were closely engaged and had tired their horses; his signal for the coordinated mass charge was six trumpet blasts. The Hospitallers in the rear were suffering heavy casualties, especially of their horses. Repeatedly they requested permission to charge the enemy; repeatedly Richard denied this. However, cracking under pressure, two of their knights broke ranks and charged the enemy. They were immediately followed by their fellow Hospitallers and the French cavalry in front of them. Richard saw the danger: with the rear guard peeling off in attack, it would soon be swamped by the enemy, leaving the rest of the column critically exposed by the loss of close formation and of men. He ordered other cavalry contingents into combat, so quickly that it seemed to one Arab chronicler that they charged "like one man." The Turks counterattacked, and in the combat that ensued, both sides threw in their reserves. But the day was won by the crusaders' heavy cavalry, led in a series of charges by William des Barres and Richard. Although the victory was a great one for the crusaders and their leader, it was not a decisive battle; however, it did help to give Richard an advantage in his future negotiations with Saladin.

[*See also* Crusades, *subentry on* Narrative (1180-1245); Richard I; *and* Saladin.]

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Sean McGlynn

ARTEVELDE, JACOB VAN

(c. 1290–1345), rebel leader who governed the County of Flanders from 1338 to 1345. Little is known about Jacob van Artevelde before he rose to power. He was a wealthy townsman who had been selected as one of the seven captains of Ghent, the largest city in Flanders, although when and by what means is not known; nor is it known when he became chief captain, although this was certainly before 1338. Having previously supported Count Louis de Nevers of Flanders, he grew dissatisfied with the restrictions placed on the political and economic sovereignty of Ghent, especially when this affected the wool trade with England. That England was now on the verge of war against France, to which the count was allied, led to concerns that were not answered before Ghent declared its neutrality early in 1338. When Bruges and Ypres, his next two largest cities, followed suit, the count initially recognized this neutrality, but later that year he tried to rescind his recognition and to remove van Artevelde from power by military force. This failed, and on 21 June 1338 Louis de Nevers was forced to sign a treaty agreeing to transfer much of his power to the rebels and Jacob van Artevelde.

By the beginning of 1340 van Artevelde had joined Flanders to the English cause, in the company of several other Low Countries principalities whose economies depended on the importation of English wool. When Edward III returned to the Low Countries in June 1340, van Artevelde and the Flemish people welcomed him, supporting the English forces from shore at the battle of Sluys and, later, with Jan III, duke of Brabant, and Willem (Guillaume), the count of Hainault and Holland, and their armies, at the siege of Tournai. However, dissension broke out among these leaders at this siege after van Artevelde slew a Brabantese knight who had insulted his non-noble background, and, in response, Jan III withdrew from the coalition, breaking the alliance and ending the siege.

Edward returned to England and Jacob van Artevelde to Ghent. There he governed absolutely, bringing prosperity to the city and county but also enraging many, especially in Ghent, who accused

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Cannons. Illustration of an attack on a castle or fortress using a cannon on a four-wheeled carriage, handguns, and crossbows firing incendiary arrows. The defenders protect their walls using small cannons and crossbows, and remove the arrows from the roof with hooked staves. From *Feuerwerkbuch* (The Firework Book), c. 1420. HIP/ART RESOURCE, NY

him of tyranny. His proposal to recognize Edward, the Black Prince, as count of Flanders instead of Louis de Nevers especially angered those aligned against him, and he was murdered in 1345 during a popular uprising in Ghent. His family members were not punished, however, and later in the century, during another Ghent-led rebellion, his son, Philip van Artevelde, became chief captain before dying at the battle of Westrozebeke in 1382.

[*See also* Artevelde, Philip van *and* Tournai, S iege of.]

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Kelly DeVries

ARTEVELDE, PHILIP VAN

(1340–1382), the son of Jacob van Artevelde, rebel leader of Flanders from 1338 to 1345, and his second wife, Kateline de Coster. Born in 1340 at the height of his father's power in Ghent, he was too young to know him well before his murder in 1345. Despite the dislike of Jacob van Artevelde at the time of his death, no punishment was meted out against his family—perhaps due to his mother's wealth and familial influence—and Philip seems to have grown up in the elite of Ghent's society. Throughout the middle of the fourteenth century Philip seems to have shown little interest in political or guild leadership, but this changed in 1380 when Philip was asked to become the leader of a Ghentenaar-led rebellion that had started the year before. This rebellion was different from that of his father, though, as it did not have the acceptance of all the subjects of the county of Flanders. The towns of Bruges, Oudenaarde, and Termonde were the most notable absences. Throughout 1379–1381, fighting had been sporadic and indecisive, but on 3 April 1382 a significant blow was struck by the rebels at the battle of Beversshoutsveld, outside the walls of Bruges, where rebel armies led by Philip handily defeated an army made up mostly of Brugeois militia and nearly captured the count of Flanders, Louis de Male. This forced Louis to seek French military assistance, and at the battle of Westrozebeke, fought on 26 November 1382, these forces trounced those of the Flemish rebels. Philip van Artevelde was among the many casualties.

[*See also* Artevelde, Jacob van.]

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

Mons Meg. A large bombard, c. 1460, made from iron bars welded over with rings of the same material. The gun weighs more than 13,230 pounds (6,000 kilograms) and fired stone cannonballs weighing 330 pounds (150 kilograms). PHOTOGRAPH BY ZACH EVERSON

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ARTHUR

See Chivalry, *subentry on* Sources.

ARTILLERY

Gunpowder weapons had appeared in Europe by the 1320s, though gunpowder was certainly known there from the later thirteenth century. It is impossible to separate the development of artillery from that of gunpowder, of which the vital ingredient, saltpeter (potassium nitrate), is now known to have been discovered in China around the year 500. By the tenth century the Chinese were using primitive gunpowder to create a flammable mixture that, once alight, was difficult to extinguish, and by the 1040s it had been discovered that mixing saltpeter with sulfur and charcoal produced an explosive material. Over the next two to three centuries the Chinese developed a bewildering array of handheld fire devices, fire lances, and bombs. It seems likely that by the twelfth century the Chinese had developed the first guns, though this is still disputed. Certainly by the middle of the thirteenth century gunpowder was being used to fire projectiles at enemies. That bombs were produced in the thirteenth century is attested by their discovery on the wrecks of the fleet sent by Kublai Khan to invade Japan in 1281.

Introduction of Guns and Gunpowder to Europe. Just how the secret of gunpowder traveled westward to Europe will probably never be fully known, although it seems likely that there was not just one route but several—via the ancient trading route known as the Silk Road; by travelers from the west; by the Mongols; or by peoples of the Russian lands.

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By whatever means, the secret of gunpowder was known in Europe by the late thirteenth century; writers like Roger Bacon and Albertus Magnus described its effects and wrote down secret recipes. However, it was not until the early decades of the fourteenth century that we can be certain that guns had finally arrived in the West; the first documentary evidence as well as the first illustrations are from 1326/27. The former refers to guns made in Florence, while the latter is contained within two manuscripts made in England and illuminated by the same artist. These show a "vase-like" gun lying on its side loaded with an arrow projectile—possibly in imitation of the traditional longbow and crossbow. The gun is similar to early dated pieces from China.

For the next fifty years, references to guns and their ammunition become more frequent throughout most of Western Europe, from England to Italy and from Spain to northern Germany, but it is clear that their use was still minimal. The guns themselves were probably small, and supplies of saltpeter were limited and expensive. The two were inextricably linked. Just where Western Europe obtained its saltpeter at this period is not known, although its contemporary name, "Chinese snow," would suggest that it was being imported from the East—the cost of transport making it a luxury product that only kings and princes could afford. From the late fourteenth century, references to larger cannon and saltpeter "plantations" in Western Europe appear. The two were probably related, with the increasing availability of saltpeter and its lower cost stimulating the production of larger and larger cannon capable of taking larger charges of gunpowder.

Development of Gunpowder. Saltpeter is produced by the action of bacteria on animal waste products, primarily feces, although urine must also be added; the bacteria convert ammonia salts to nitrates. The earth removed from stables and dovecotes was a rich source of raw material for the salpeterman. Piles of the raw material, called saltpeter beds, together with a source of chalk, were first made and left to "ferment." The saltpeter was then extracted from the bed and purified using water, followed by evaporation and crystallization. The addition of wood ashes to convert the calcium nitrate to potassium nitrate was a crucial part of the process. This early method of making saltpeter was difficult and time-consuming, taking from one to two years to obtain good yields, and thus was relatively expensive. The product was also liable to be impure and possibly fraudulently adulterated. The *Feuerwerkbuchs*, treatises on gunpowder and guns, produced from the early fifteenth century, are full of methods, based on taste, feel, and the way that it burns, to check that saltpeter was good.

Gunpowder, or black powder as it was also called, was made by mixing finely powdered saltpeter, sulfur, and charcoal. The mixture was then pounded together for several hours in a stamp mill to ensure that the ingredients were thoroughly combined. The rate at which gunpowder burns and the force it produces on ignition depend on a number of interrelated factors, including the composition of the powder, how much of each of the ingredients is present, the quality of the manufacturing process, and the physical size of the grains of powder itself.

The amount of each of the components—saltpeter, sulfur, and charcoal—was critical, and the amount of saltpeter was especially important. The best composition was when saltpeter made up about 75 percent of the total. The quantity of sulfur and charcoal was less important, but a composition of 75 percent saltpeter, 15 percent charcoal, and 10 percent sulfur, often abbreviated as 75:15:10, was discovered to be about the strongest proportion. Using less saltpeter in the mixture and increasing the amounts of sulfur and charcoal resulted in a powder that was less powerful, but the weaker combination was sometimes used because it was safer and meant that guns were less likely to be damaged when fired.

The actual manufacturing process was also important: grinding the ingredients together for a long time, several hours, made a better powder. It was discovered, furthermore, that if the mixture was wetted with vinegar or alcohol as it was being ground, the resultant powder would be more powerful and also more reliable than a mixture which was dry mixed. The size of the powder grains, called corns, was also important. Small grains were good for small-caliber

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weapons, such as handguns, while larger corns, about a quarter inch (a little more than 6 millimeters) in diameter, were best in larger guns. All these factors affecting the way that gunpowder mixtures explode were understood, although not completely, by the late medieval gunner.

Early European Artillery. From the sixteenth century the names of cannon were fairly well fixed and were dictated by the size of the bore of the piece. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, however, names of guns in the sources do not appear to follow any easily identifiable system. Contemporary scribes frequently refer to guns of widely differing size, bore, length, and weight by the same name. In Burgundian sources, for example, which are particularly rich and have been well studied, only two names for artillery are used, *bombard* and *canon*. During the fifteenth century other names occur, including *couleuvrine*, *veuglaire*, and *crappadeau*, suggesting that different types of guns were developed, probably for different purposes. Information is elusive because few guns with definite medieval provenances have been found in excavations, and these have all been unstratified and their dating not secure.

The *bombard* developed as a type of gun in the fourteenth century, and during the first half of the fifteenth century it became a major feature of most siege trains. A *bombard* was large and heavy, weighing up to fifteen or even twenty tons, but it could nonetheless be moved around. Late medieval armies of ten to twelve thousand men were not that mobile, with a rate of movement normally of 8 to 12 miles (12 to 20 kilometers) a day, much the same rate as has been calculated for some of the largest *bombards* in the fifteenth century. These large guns were transported on specially reinforced carts capable of taking their enormous weight, and on campaign they were escorted by pioneers who ensured that the road was suitable and that bridges would take the weight—though accidents occasionally happened. Once the guns arrived at the site of a siege they were taken off their carts by means of cranes—called *engins* (or *gins*) in French sources—and were then mounted within large reinforced frames of wood for firing.

The effective range of a *bombard* was very short, perhaps less than 200 yards (180 meters). To protect the artillerymen working the piece from attack, wooden hoardings and walls (prefabricated and transported to the siege or made up on the spot) were set up in front and around the gun position. Whether *bombards* made a difference to the outcome of sieges is hard to ascertain, although their continual use and transport to siege operations strongly suggest that they were seen as important, even vital, weapons. The larger guns always fired stone shot, which in modern tests has been shown to be effective against almost all defenses. However, evidence for their use and effectiveness on the battlefield is, for the early period at least, circumstantial. They were stockpiled by rulers and kings and taken on campaigns, but written sources neither state what they were capable of nor whether they made a difference to the outcomes.

The name *canon* that appears in the early sources probably refers to all artillery pieces that were not large enough to be called *bombards*. From the 1420s, other types of gunpowder weapons are noted in accounts and inventories. In the Burgundian sources, for example, *veuglaires* seem to have been a shorter weapon with a large bore, while *crappadeaux* were long and thin. This mirrors the development at the end of the fifteenth century and the beginning of the sixteenth of the two classes of guns that went on to dominate artillery in the subsequent three centuries, the *canon* and the *culverin*. The former was a shorter, large-caliber weapon used for battering walls and fortifications, while the latter was used for longer-range fire.

From fairly early in the fifteenth century, handguns, called in many sources *couleuvrines*, were being ordered in large quantities. They must have been used extensively on the battlefield, although again there are few written sources and only rare glimpses of them in the chronicles of the period. Presumably they augmented the archers and crossbowmen and were probably used in much the same way. Whether they were more effective than these two traditional projectile weapons is not an easy question to answer. While the longbow needed years of practice and considerable skill to shoot, the crossbow was a relatively

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easy weapon to master, and both could be shot considerably more quickly and were more accurate than the early handgun. The fact that the handgun was loaded by the muzzle was not the only reason for the slow speed of fire—it also had to be loaded with propellant and projectile, while the bows had to be loaded with only projectile. The velocity of a bullet was considerably greater than either the crossbow's bolt or the longbow's arrow, however, so the advantage of greater range and firepower might have offset the handgun's inaccuracy and low rate of fire.

Although round shot was used from the introduction of gunpowder weapons, another common form of ammunition throughout the fourteenth century was large arrows, called *garros*, probably a logical extension of the traditional projectile weapons of the period, the crossbow and the longbow. Fired at a low trajectory, *garros* were probably highly effective, especially against soldiers standing shoulder to shoulder in dense formations. The main ammunition for almost all guns, however, during the late Middle Ages, was a stone ball cut by masons using hammer and chisels, made from whatever stone was commonly available. Some sources refer to marble cannonballs, while in sixteenth-century England, Kentish ragstone was used. Contemporary accounts of artillery mention that the mason's chisels needed to be sharpened with great frequency, and they also discuss the use of molds—wooden boards with a hole of the correct size cut in them—that allowed the mason to check that the ammunition was the correct size and completely spherical. For smaller guns, primarily handguns, lead was also used for ammunition, created by casting the molten metal into suitable molds.

The impact that gunpowder weapons made on the battlefield and at sieges in the fourteenth century has been questioned by modern historians, who have suggested that they were just a means of creating noise and confusion and were not necessarily effective weapons in their own right. However, the fact of their use would suggest that they were seen as an effective addition to the military arsenal in whatever role they played. By the final decades of the fourteenth century large guns were being produced, and in the early decades of the fifteenth century, the manufacture of gunpowder had progressed to the extent that there was a differentiation made between powders for smaller handguns and larger pieces. From about 1420, the sources also communicate a growing differentiation between types of guns, pointing to their increasing sophistication and the development of cannon for specialized uses.

Artillery was used increasingly through the fifteenth century especially for sieges, the most famous of which was the taking of Constantinople in 1453 by the Turks, where artillery was used to open a breach in the walls through which the army was able to attack and take the city. That artillery was not always the key to success, however, is shown by the sieges of Belgrade in 1456 and Rhodes in 1480, when the Turks were repulsed despite their use of a large number of guns, including great *bombards*.

Innovations in Design and Production. The major developments in artillery came in the final decades of the fifteenth century—from the early 1470s to the turn of the sixteenth century. Earlier pieces, before the 1460s and 1470s, are essentially parallel-sided barrels of large caliber in which the bore of the barrel proper is of larger diameter than the bore of the powder chamber at the rear. By 1500 the form had changed to the long tapered shape characteristic of barrels until the nineteenth century.

This development in form signals a number of changes to artillery that had far-reaching consequences. The crucial change was in the way that guns were cast. Just how copper-alloy cannon were cast in the fifteenth century is not known—there are no treatises, no illustrations, and, as far as we know, no descriptions of how it was accomplished, though the technique was probably similar in outline to the method used from the mid- to late sixteenth century. Cannon were cast in molds formed of baked clay set vertically. The technique was to make an exact model of the cannon required, over which a one-piece mold was formed. The model was then broken up and removed, leaving a hollow mold that was set vertically in a pit in front of a furnace. A bar or core that

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served to form the bore of the finished cannon was secured in position within the mold. Molten bronze was then poured into the mold from the furnace.

The crucial developments were twofold: setting the mold with the muzzle of the gun uppermost instead of breech upward, as earlier; and extending the length of the casting beyond the end of the muzzle. These were important because when molten metal is poured into a mold it contains a small quantity of impurities as well as trapped air. These impurities tend to accumulate in the later stages of the pouring and most end up floating on top of the molten mass of metal. By turning the mold so that the muzzle was uppermost and by extending the mold, these impurities and the trapped air could be largely removed by cutting off this extension, called, in later sources, the gun head. The result was a finished casting, a cannon, in which the breech, the part that had to contain the full force of the exploding gunpowder charge, was the best casting, free from flaws, cracks, and holes that would diminish the gun's performance and durability.

This change not only produced the best possible barrel for the containment of the gunpowder explosion but also allowed the use of larger charges of powder. It was now possible to exploit the full power of artillery safely with guns that were considerably lighter than before but could fire heavier shot at greater velocity. The technique was in use by the 1470s, as shown by extant pieces, but it was probably adopted at different times in different parts of Europe and was not universally used until around 1500.

During the same period, changes to gunpowder were also taking place, though these are far less obvious and more difficult to study. It is believed that the last significant development in making gunpowder was the process called "corning"—making the loose powder into uniformly sized pellets, or corns. Earlier gunpowder makers produced a type of gunpowder called *knollenpulver,* powder formed into large cakes that were then broken down into smaller, variously sized pieces before use. In corning, the loose powder was wetted, usually with alcohol (brandy, for instance), and then forced through holes in a sieve, making grains of gunpowder of a uniform size. Although corning was definitely being carried out in the 1520s, it was almost certainly developed much earlier. Contemporary sources tend to exaggerate the difference that corning made, but clearly the end product was stronger, more reliable, and consistent. Corned powder was especially better for the type of cannon with long, tapered barrels that were cast muzzle uppermost; these cannon could take a greater quantity of corns, which increased the gun's explosive power and the velocity of the ball it fired.

When a projectile hits its target, the amount of damage done is proportional to the mass of the ball and its velocity (following the formula $E = mv^2$, where E is the energy, m the mass [or weight] of the ball, and v its velocity). Increasing velocity has a greater effect than increasing mass. For example, if the impact velocity of a cannonball increases just 25 percent, from 200 to 250 meters per second, the energy of the ball as it hits the wall increases by 64 percent. The best cannon, therefore, will be one that fires the fastest cannonball.

The next significant development in artillery was the change from using hand-cut stone to cast-iron shot. Although cast-iron shot was available from the early fifteenth century, it did not become universally adopted until toward the end of the century. For example, the accounts of the artillery of the dukes of Burgundy clearly show that it was only in the 1470s that cast-iron ammunition became common in the Burgundian artillery. This change had two important consequences. The first was that cast iron is some three times heavier, size for size, than stone shot. Smaller-bore cannon could fire the same weight of shot and were lighter and easier to handle. The second was that cast-iron ammunition could be made more standard than balls of stone that were cut by hand. A mold for cast-iron shot could be used over and over again, turning out balls of regular size and weight, with the result that cannon could be more accurate.

Changes in Transport and Mounting. Over the period from about 1480 to 1522, carriages and mounts for cannon changed fundamentally—from

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complex and relatively immobile, or at least of limited mobility, to simple and highly mobile. The purpose of the carriage or mounting was twofold: to transport the barrel and to absorb recoil on firing. That carriage and mounting went through changes in response to the developments in gun barrels is unmistakable. When guns were large and heavy, firing large-diameter stone balls, they were moved around on large four-wheeled carts; they needed a machine, a *gin*, to take them on and off the carts; and they were set up in large solid frameworks on the ground. Smaller pieces could have been moved on their own wheeled mounts, but these were more for antipersonnel use than for battering down walls. With the developments in gun barrels that took place from 1470 through the 1490s, carriages had to change as well.

The first mobile carriages for large pieces of artillery were similar to those of smaller pieces. The barrel was set into a trough formed in a large beam of timber, which was then extended backward and angled downward in the form of a single solid trail. A single axle was fitted beneath and the whole mounted on two large-diameter wheels. Fitting a removable second set of wheels to the end of the trail resulted in a mobile artillery piece. The way that the barrel was set into a trough of wood meant that it was not that easily elevated when in position, although the end of the trail could be manipulated to allow for some vertical movement. Other ways to effect elevation included adding a second, hinged piece of wood underneath the timber carrying the barrel, so that the upper piece could be raised and lowered. Although this was probably not a bad solution, it was complex and still probably quite heavy—especially for the larger pieces of artillery.

With the changes to cannon barrels that occurred around 1500—reductions in their size and weight—the carriage changed, too. The result was the trail carriage, consisting of two long, angled pieces of wood held together by crosspieces of wood, with transoms mounted on two large wheels bearing on a transverse axle. The trunnions of the barrel fitted into cutouts in the top of the two side pieces, with the rear of the barrel resting on one of the transoms, which was carefully positioned to take it. Elevation was effected by adding or removing blocks (quoins) between the transom and the breech of the barrel. Adding a similar two-wheeled piece at the rear meant that the whole was very mobile. The trail carriage meant that not only was artillery more mobile but it provided a stable platform from which it could be fired. The trail carriage remained the basic carriage for artillery on land for the next three and a half centuries.

Casters, Gunners, Defenders, Rulers. A few of the names of cannon founders from this period of medieval artillery are known, and in one or two cases a little of their background, but information about their working practices, production methods, or how much they produced is scarce. The names of some casters, such as Jorg Endorfer and Alberghetti, and where they worked are known, but nothing further. Of the gunners themselves only scraps of information have been gleaned from the records, though the skills of a good gunner were rare and sought after all over Europe. Gunners, especially in the later period, often formed themselves into guilds, usually with St. Barbara or St. George as their patron. These more regularized bodies stipulated codes of conduct and discipline as well as provided means to learn and practice their "art."

The period from about 1480 to 1522 probably saw the most important changes in the development of artillery since the introduction of gunpowder from the East at the beginning of the fourteenth century, changes that were to define artillery for the next three and a half centuries. The long, thin shape of the cannon barrel, tapered from rear to front, corned gunpowder, cast-iron ammunition, and the trail carriage were all largely developed in the last twenty years of the fifteenth century—after that, changes were, by and large, minimal and confined largely to refinements. But these changes did not take place overnight nor were they universally and quickly taken up. In the late fifteenth century, technological change and its adoption took place slowly, over many years or even decades, and especially in the field of artillery. The production of gun barrels required expensive labor and raw materials. Once made, guns

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lasted a long time. Few, if any, rulers in late medieval Europe could or would be able to renew their artillery quickly. All relied on the gradual replacement of guns as they wore out, or were damaged or lost. Older guns were used alongside pieces of the most up-to-date and modern type. In the second Ottoman siege of Rhodes, in 1522, for example, the Knights Hospitaller were still using guns that had been cast before the first siege, in 1480, alongside ones that had been made just the year before.

By the later fifteenth century, some rulers had considerable artillery trains—most notably the kings of France, the dukes of Burgundy, and the kings of Aragon—but it is questionable as to how effective these were. Two particular examples show just how difficult it is to evaluate these new gunpowder weapons. After the death of his father, Philip the Good, Charles, Duke of Burgundy, embarked on a campaign of conquest and vengeance against the Duchy of Lorraine. In response to the declaration of the people there to free themselves from Burgundian control, Charles marched with his army to bring them to heel. He quickly recaptured the town of Nancy and restored his rule over the duchy. His next move was to march against the Swiss who had helped the Lorrainers in their rebellion. Although possessing one of the most up-to-date and abundantly equipped artillery trains in Europe, the well-funded Charles was resoundingly defeated outside the small town of Grandson in the Vaud, losing virtually everything except the clothes he was wearing at the time. The success of the Swiss can be viewed as the result of surprise and superior resolution, which allowed them to overcome Charles's seeming advantage in having some of the best equipment in Europe. Less than three months later, Charles was once more soundly defeated outside the walls of Murten, again by the Swiss. In the early days of 1477, Charles had rearmed and returned to try to retake Nancy, which had been lost to him over the preceding months. But in a daring move by the city's defenders, Charles's forces were outflanked and he was cut down and slain.

In 1494, Charles VIII, king of France, invaded Italy, taking with him a significant artillery train. He swept all before him on his dramatic and sudden march through the peninsula, only pausing upon reaching Naples. Modern understanding of this spectacular event has been much influenced by the words of Francesco Guicciardini, who claimed that Charles VIII's success was due completely to the use of a new type of artillery mounted on mobile carriages that enabled him to subdue town after town and fortification after fortification. Actually, it seems that Charles used terror tactics to attain submission from the towns on his march. After arriving at the town of Monte San Giovanni, to which he laid siege and managed to take by force, he then proceeded to massacre the town's entire population—ostensibly for resisting his approach. As he marched south thereafter, each town or fortification threw open its doors to him—thus sparing themselves the fate of Monte San Giovanni. When he reached Naples, where the local forces put up a spirited defense, he had to mount a prolonged siege and was forced to retreat, losing considerable numbers of troops to disease.

[*See also* Grandson, Battle of; Murten, Battle of; Siege Warfare, *subentry on*, Tactics and Technology; *and* Weapons, *subentry*, Missile.]

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ARTS, VISUAL

The subject of warriors and warfare has a long history in the art of the Middle Ages. It becomes, however, particularly popular and rich in application around the tenth century in Byzantium and the twelfth century in Latin Christendom, encouraged, at least in part, by the emergence of new patron types and the character of contemporary military confrontations.

Actual Battles. The technical aspects of medieval warfare, the weapons used, the armor worn, the siege engines built, are represented in pictorial records of actual battles. The best known of such works include the Bayeux Tapestry, probably commissioned for Bishop Odo of Bayeux around 1077, which depicts in over 70 meters (230 feet) of embroidery events related to the battle of Hastings (1066) and includes details of large shields, swords, lances, and the long-handled battle ax. To this group can be added William of Tyre's *History*, which describes the fight for territory in the Holy Land during the twelfth century. By the middle of the thirteenth century, numerous copies of this text existed, enlivened by pictures of battle and siege, formulaic in composition but inspired in particulars. Thus, not only do combatants wear the latest fashion in armor, and their horses the latest in trappings, but they also take up the weapons and shields typical of their respective peoples: the crusaders bear "triangular" shields and large swords, the Muslims circular shields, bows, and crossbows. Similar contemporary details appear in John Skylitzes's history of Byzantine emperors, written c. 1070, with its miniatures of military engagements at the borders of the empire. (The manuscript, known as "The Madrid Skylitzes," is preserved in the Biblioteca Nacional, Spain, Vitr. 26-2.)

Epics. More abundant in its representations of warfare than these battle chronicles, however, was the epic. As a literary genre, the epic quickly gained in appeal during the twelfth century, although corresponding images of events described—those, for example, of legendary heroes such as Alexander the Great, Aeneas, the knights of King Arthur, and Roland—do not appear until around the middle of the thirteenth century, thereafter remaining popular throughout the medieval period. Their presentation includes not only combat and its ever-evolving appearance, but also complementary scenes relating to the court and chivalry, depicting jousting, hunting, and audiences with damsels and royalty.

The portrayal of epic heroes in modern dress, with modern weapons, and employing modern tactics of engagement, was certainly intended to draw parallels with contemporary knights and their deeds. Similar motivations are found in depictions of noteworthy Old Testament warriors, such as Joshua, David, and Judas Maccabeus. The courage shown and the divine favor received by these figures made them particularly popular during periods of real conflict, when their successes were highlighted to draw associations with pressing military ambitions. Although the figures were "antiqued" in weaponry and costume, among other things, such a desire may have inspired the creation of the Joshua Roll during the reign of John I Tzimiskes (r. 969–976; Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vatican City, Vat. Pal. Gr. 431). If this theory holds, this Byzantine emperor used the victories of Joshua in Palestine as a potent precedent for his own attempts to conquer the same area. Famous additional examples of a similar type include, in the West, the Picture Bible now in the Morgan Library (c. 1250; New York, M.638) and the Painted Chamber at Westminster (the wall paintings dated to the late thirteenth century), and, from the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, the Arsenal Old Testament (c. 1250; Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal, Paris, MS. 5211). Both the Picture Bible and the Arsenal Old Testament are related to the patronage of the French king Louis IX and the beginning of his involvement with the Crusades; thus, the privileging of biblical battles and their delineation according to contemporary means and outfit served to elevate and to picture optimistically military endeavors in the Mediterranean, now against the Muslims. The modernization and poignancy of these biblical records is perhaps nowhere more apparent than in the hanging of the king of Ai from a trebuchet, rather than a tree as told in the Book of Joshua. Based on existing remains, King Edward I's Painted Chamber seems to have been devoted largely to the heroic

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battles of the Maccabees in Jerusalem. The updated portrayal of Judas and his army in the bedroom of Edward, who planned to organize a crusade to Jerusalem himself, was certainly intended to equate the two as model soldiers of the faith.

Military Saints and the Battle for Virtue. The relevance of sacred military figures to those involved in the Crusades, an endeavor that consumed two centuries of the medieval period in deed and many more in thought, is perhaps best illustrated by the legend that Saint George fought alongside the crusaders at the battle for Antioch (1098), especially given the cult that developed around the site of his martyrdom and tomb in Lydda (or Lod, in present-day Israel). Indeed, military saints and objects related to their devotion became increasingly popular among the crusaders and were eventually taken up by the population of Latin Christendom more generally. This group of holy knights is most commonly associated with Byzantium, where their numerous representations enjoyed a long history. In this context, they appear on icons as well as in the supports and walls of churches, as at Hosios Loukas northwest of Athens (early eleventh century) and the church of St. Panteleimon in Nerezi, Macedonia (1164), respectively. They are generally depicted in full armor and with sword and shield, standing or on horseback; their value lay in their roles as defenders of the faith and fighters of evil.

The literal equation of military saints with fighters for all things good is seen during the Middle Ages in more abstract ways as well. Thus, warrior imagery is frequently used to represent spiritual struggle. Such virtuous combat is pictured in a copy of Gregory the Great's *Moralia in Job*, made at the Cistercian monastery of Cîteaux (c. 1111), and in the marginal spaces of countless manuscripts and church exteriors. Likewise, the fundamental tension between virtues and vices is pictured in the language of embattled medieval knights, a particularly fine example of which is found on the ivory book covers of the Melisende Psalter (c. 1135; British Library, London, MS. Egerton 1139).

The capacity for such imagery to function on a number of levels is seen in symbolic representations of courtship. Thus, the "allegory of love" makes its appearance on precious objects made for women during the later Middle Ages, a good example of which is the French ivory casket now in the Walters Art Museum (c. 1330–1350; Baltimore). Here, well-armored knights shoot flowers instead of arrows at women defending themselves behind strong castle walls with their own floral arsenal.

[*See also* Bayeux Tapestry; John Skylitzes, Chronicle of; *and* Saints, Military.]

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ASCALON, BATTLE OF

The battle fought outside Ascalon (modern-day Tel Ashqelon in Israel) on 12 August 1099 was the first encounter in the field between crusaders and the Fatimid caliphate of Egypt, ending in a resounding victory for the former. When the armies of the First Crusade invaded northern Syria in 1097, the Fatimid vizier al-Afdal sent representatives to seek an alliance with them against the Seljuks (or Saljuqs), the Turkish dynasty that ruled Syria. This policy was abandoned once al-Afdal realized that the goal of the crusade was Jerusalem, which the Fatimids had seized from Seljuk forces in August 1098. When the crusaders entered Palestine, al-Afdal started to organize an army that could either intercept them or relieve Jerusalem if it had been besieged in the meantime. Troops and supplies were dispatched by

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land and sea to Ascalon in southwestern Palestine, the nearest port to Egypt; large numbers of cattle, sheep, goats, and camels were sent to graze on the plains north of the town.

The Fatimid concentration was still not complete when Jerusalem fell on 15 July 1099. The victorious crusaders had received good intelligence on the Fatimid preparations, and on 7–10 August contingents from their forces gathered under the command of the newly elected ruler of Jerusalem, Godfrey of Bouillon, at Ramla, nearly 25 miles (40 kilometers) to the north. They formed the majority of the able-bodied crusaders, about one thousand two hundred knights and nine thousand infantry. Their morale was excellent; they were buoyed by the capture of the Holy City and inspired by the presence of two important relics: the Holy Lance from Antioch, carried by the troops of Raymond of Saint-Gilles, and a portion of the True Cross recently discovered in Jerusalem, borne by the patriarch, Arnulf of Chocques. Like all of the caliphate's forces, the Fatimid army was multiethnic and included few native Egyptians. The cavalry was mostly recruited from Turks and Kurds, the infantry from Armenians and above all Sudanese (i.e., black African) slaves, whose presence attracted the interest of most crusade chroniclers. The entire army may have amounted to as many as twenty thousand men, including the town militia of Ascalon and Bedouin volunteer cavalry. Each ethnic group had its own distinctive arms and equipment.

On 11 August the crusaders camped some 15 miles (25 kilometers) north of Ascalon; they moved on the next day in three divisions comprising three squadrons each, taking with them large numbers of the cattle they had rounded up en route in the hope that from afar their numbers would look greater. As soon as the crusaders reached Ascalon, they recognized that their arrival was a complete surprise. Most of the Fatimid soldiers were still in their camp, situated north of the Jaffa Gate, and an attack had been so little expected that many civilians were caught by surprise outside the city. Godfrey's division swung around to the south in order to cut off the Jerusalem Gate, while the other two divisions charged into the main Fatimid forces. One or more units of Sudanese were able to mount a counterattack that checked the crusaders for a considerable time, but the suddenness of the strike ensured that the Fatimids remained too disorganized to keep up effective resistance. A crusader charge broke through into the Fatimid camp, and when al-Afdal abandoned his command post, the entire army dispersed in disorder. Far more Muslims were probably killed in this rout than in the actual fighting, for the crusaders cut down huge numbers who frantically crowded the gates into Ascalon, climbed trees in the orchards outside, or fled south along the plains. Al-Afdal was able to sail back to Egypt, but his great army had ceased to exist. The booty taken by the crusaders was extremely valuable, since it included all of the Fatimid army's baggage and most of its animals.

The Christian success would have been complete if it had secured the surrender of Ascalon, but Godfrey and Raymond refused to cooperate in dealing with the town's authorities, who soon went back on their initial decision to surrender the town. In the years that followed the Fatamids built up Ascalon into their main military and naval base in Palestine, and it remained a thorn in the flesh of the Kingdom of Jerusalem until its capture in 1153.

[*See also* Crusades, *subentries on* Sources (1095–1183), Narrative (1095–1183), *and* Historiography (1095–1183); Fatimids; Godfrey of Bouillon; *and* Raymond of St. Gilles.]

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ASSASSINS

The name "Assassins" was originally applied by the crusaders and other medieval Europeans to the

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Nizari Ismailis of Syria, a minority Shia Muslim community. During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the Syrian Nizaris possessed a regional principality in central Syria in the mountainous region known then as the Jabal al-Bahra, known today as the Jabal Ansariya, and they had numerous military and diplomatic encounters with the crusaders from the beginning of the twelfth century. But it was especially in the time of Rashid al-Din Sinan (c. 1164–1193) that European chroniclers of the Crusades and travelers to the region began to write about this mysterious oriental sect, which they designated as the Assassins. Sinan, their most famous chief, led the Syrian Nizaris to the peak of their power and glory for three decades until his death in 1193.

The term "Assassins," which appears in medieval European literature in a variety of forms, such as Assassini, Heyssisini, Hashishin, etc., was evidently based on variants of the Arabic word *hashishi* (plural, *hashishin* or *hashishiyya*), which was applied pejoratively to the Nizari Ismailis of Syria and Iran by other Muslims. This term was used in the sense of "people of lax morality," without accusing the Nizaris of using hashish, a product of hemp, in any organized or systematic manner. This term of abuse was picked up locally in Syria by the crusaders and their European observers, who transformed it into different variants in French, Italian, and other European languages.

The literal interpretation of the term "Assassins" as hashish users is rooted in the fantasies of medieval Europeans, who essentially remained ignorant of Islam and the Nizari Ismailis. Indeed, medieval Europeans, and especially crusader circles, were responsible for fabricating and disseminating, in the Latin Orient and Europe, a number of tales about the secret practices of the Nizaris. The crusaders were particularly impressed by the highly exaggerated reports and rumors about Nizari assassinations and the daring behavior of their *fida'is*, or devotees, who carried out targeted missions in public places against their community's prominent enemies. These so-called Assassin legends revolved around the recruitment and training of the Nizari *fida'is*, and they were meant to provide satisfactory explanations for behavior that seemed otherwise irrational or strange to medieval Europeans. These legends consisted of a number of interconnected tales, including the "hashish legend," according to which this intoxicating drug was systematically administered to the *fida'is* as part of their training to induce blind obedience to their beguiling chief, the Old Man of the Mountain. The Assassin legends developed in stages and culminated in a synthesized version popularized by Marco Polo, who also fantasized about a "secret garden of paradise" where the *fida'is* supposedly received part of their indoctrination with the aid of hashish.

By the fourteenth century, the Assassin legends had acquired wide currency in Europe and the Near East, and the Nizari Ismailis were henceforth generally portrayed in European sources as a sinister order of drugged assassins bent on senseless murder. Subsequently, the word "assassin," with origins forgotten, was adopted in European languages as a common noun meaning a professional murderer. The etymology of the name "Assassins" was eventually correctly explained by the orientalists of the nineteenth century.

Modern scholarship in Ismaili studies, based on authentic Ismaili sources, has now begun to deconstruct and dispel the medieval legends surrounding the Nizaris. It has also shown that the name "Assassins" is a misnomer rooted in a pejorative appellation and lacking basis in any communal or organized use of hashish by the Nizari Ismailis, who were deeply devoted to their community.

[*See also* Crusader Relations with Byzantium *and* Crusades.]

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Farhad Daftary

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ASSIZES OF ARMS

In 1181 Henry II of England issued two assizes of arms, one for England and the other for his continental possessions. These laid down that all free men were to have weapons according to their means, and were to bring them to the army at the summons of the king. Thus in England anybody with a knight's fee should possess all the arms of a mounted warrior; ordinary freemen worth sixteen marks should have a shirt of mail, a helmet, a shield, and a lance; and each city dweller worth ten marks should possess a hauberk, an iron cap, and a lance. The assize for the continent imposes rather heavier obligations, but is essentially the same.

At about the same time, the free cities of Europe, in Italy and Flanders, were also formally regulating the military service owed by their citizens, along much the same lines. Across all Europe there was an acceptance, derived from ancient obligation, that all freemen were bound to follow the king in arms. However, in practice military service had become much more selective by the year 1000, and in most parts of Europe was largely confined to the vassals called "knights" in English. In France no attempt was made to call a levy of the nation until 1302, though some of the great princes of the kingdom, such as the counts of Flanders and the dukes of Normandy, had always reserved the right to call out all men in case of foreign invasion. In Catalonia the general levy was important because it was used to defend against Saracen attack. *Folgepflicht* (duty to follow) was asserted in Austria and Saxony, presumably because these areas had to defend against pagan neighbors for a long time. In Anglo-Saxon England one man was called up for military service from every five hides of land, and the remaining population banded together to provide for his support in the army (*fyrd*), though this may simply have been a tax to support a military nobility. All this is evidence of some general obligation, but it could never have been used to provide forces for an expeditionary army. The general levy was a last-ditch provision for territorial defense against outside attack. In 1213 King John summoned these forces when French invasion threatened, declaring: "It is provided that if aliens come to our land, all should unanimously go to oppose them."

Henry II had two reasons to regularize this vague notion of obligation. Internal security was important, so he wanted the propertied classes to have arms to enforce law and order. At the same time he wanted to be able to mobilize a territorial force as a last resort. In the thirteenth century more English legislation along these lines followed: in 1230, those who were not free were included, and in 1242 archers were included. The process culminated in the Statute of Winchester of 1285. Under its provisions the crown established Commissions of Array to call up the levy county by county. These were used to persuade men to enter the army for paid service, especially in the Hundred Years' War, when they provided the basis for levying common soldiers for the English armies in France.

[*See also* Feudalism in Europe; Freedom, Personal; Henry II; Hundred Years' War; John; Knighthood and Knights; *and* Obligation, Military.]

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ATHENRY, BATTLE OF

The battle of Athenry was fought on or in the week of Saint Laurence's Day (10 August) 1316, and is presented, in both Gaelic and Latin annals, as a victory of the Anglo-Irish over the Gaels. More accurately, the battle was a struggle between rival Uí Briain segments; defeat of an Uí Conchobair bid for mastery of western Ireland; and defeat for allies of Edward Bruce, the brother of Robert I (the Bruce).

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On the victorious side were three prominent Anglo-Irish lords: William de Burgh, recently released from captivity in Scotland; Richard de Clare; and Richard de Bermingham, lord of Athenry; and the Gaelic king of Thomond, Muirchertach Ua Briain (d. 1343). It was unusual for Burgh and Clare to cooperate. They were rivals, but collaboration was necessitated by their shared opposition to Edward Bruce. On the losing side fought Fedlimid Ua Conchobair, king of Connacht, and Donnchad Ua Briain, aspirant to the kingship of Thomond. They were supported by Ua Maelsechlainn, king of Meath; Ua Ruairc, king of Breifne; and others. These were allies of Edward Bruce. Bruce was not present at Athenry, and, although Macdonald and Macruairidh gallowglass mercenaries were active in the west of Ireland at this time, they are not mentioned as present either.

Nothing is known of the size of forces involved or tactics used. Mortality on Ua Conchobair's side appears to have been high, and the slain included Fedlimid Ua Conchobair and Tadc Ua Cellaigh. Among the Uí Briain, the battle was decisive: although Donnchad escaped, the power of Muirchertach and the Clann Taidc segment remained clearly in the ascendant. For the Bruces, the defeat of their western allies was a significant setback. Their close interest in the region was demonstrated the following year, when Robert and Edward Bruce marched across Ireland to assist Clann Brian Rua against Muirchertach but, faced with superior forces, withdrew.

[*See also* Edward Bruce *and* Robert I (the Bruce).]

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ATROCITIES

Medieval warfare, like that of any other historical period, had its horrors. Chivalric concepts, along with the generally recognized laws of war, forbade the maltreatment of civilians and provided codes that should have prevented atrocities, and soldiers might also hold back out of fear of retribution. Still, atrocities took place, though often one side's atrocity was the other's justified action. In the case of a siege, if a town was taken by storm, the law of arms allowed the victors to slaughter, rape, and burn as they chose, though churches and churchmen were to be spared.

A ruthless commander might use atrocity as a deliberate weapon. William I, "the Conqueror," was insulted in 1051 by the inhabitants of Alençon, who mocked his lineage; he retaliated by cutting off the hands and feet of those responsible. Frederick I Barbarossa's notorious siege of Crema in 1159 showed how an army might turn terror into atrocity. Prisoners on both sides were executed. Italian child hostages were tied in front of Barbarossa's siege machines, in a vain attempt to protect the latter from attack. The surrender of the city was followed by savage destruction. In the Hundred Years' War the *chevauchée*, mounted raids through enemy territory, employed fire and sword to destroy villages and terrify their inhabitants. In the satirical *Vows of the Heron* (c. 1338), Edward III's ally Jean de Fauquemont swore that he "would spare neither church nor altar, neither pregnant woman nor infant, nor kinsman nor friend." The sack of Limoges at the hands of the Black Prince in 1370 was particularly brutal. Jean Froissart commented, "I do not know how they could be so pitiless towards poor folk."

The powerful hatreds often at work in times of civil war were particularly liable to provoke men to commit atrocities. In 1265 a hand-picked squad killed Simon de Montfort at Evesham; his body was then savagely mutilated. The success of Edward II at Boroughbridge in 1322 was followed by a series of vicious executions, with quartered bodies then hung from gibbets in the main towns of England. In mid-fourteenth-century France, the peasant rising

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known as the Jacquerie was marked by dreadful deeds that the chronicler Jean le Bel was reluctant to write about; he did, however, describe the way in which a knight was roasted on a spit, his wife raped and then force-fed her husband's remains before she was killed.

Mercenary troops were frequently blamed for unacceptable behavior. The collapse of royal authority, such as happened in England in the second quarter of the twelfth century and in France in the darkest days of Hundred Years' War, saw freebooters and *routiers* oppress the peasantry in every ingenious and unacceptable way they could.

Ethnic tensions might lead to exceptional violence. Raiding in the Welsh marches was characterized by head-hunting; in 1233 an Englishman received a shilling apiece for the heads of fifty-seven Welshmen his troops had killed, and in 1258 the Welsh decapitated the inhabitants of the English towns they captured. In the Baltic the pagan Lithuanians were given to burning their captured enemies alive, which contributed to the bitterness of the wars fought against them in the fourteenth century. The retaliatory killing of prisoners after the crusader defeat at Nicopolis in 1396 reflected ethnic and religious differences. In the Hussite wars of the fifteenth century, "Anyone who cannot speak German, or who appears to be Czech, is taken captive, beaten to death and burnt, because the men are out of control, since the army is so great and mighty" (Scales). The destruction of entire peoples could be envisaged in the Middle Ages, if not carried out.

Tales of atrocities made good propaganda. The alleged burning of two hundred small children in the school at Hexham by the Scots in 1296 was a notable case; this was coupled with the slaughter of children in their cradles, and of women in childbirth. Chroniclers told some stories in what sometimes seems a deliberate attempt to shock their readers; thus John Barbour's tale of the "Douglas Lardner" recounted how the Scots slew the garrison of an English-held castle and broke open the stores, so that the floor ran with a mixture of "meal and malt and blood and wine." Some stories are not to be believed; it seems unlikely that John Hawkwood, the English condottiere, resolved a dispute between two of his men as to which should have a pretty nun by slicing her in half.

Actions seen as atrocities in later centuries often received surprisingly little contemporary condemnation. The killing of prisoners is one example. At Acre in 1191 Richard I had some three thousand Muslim captives slain. He justified this act on the grounds that the time limit set in negotiations with Saladin had expired, and Christian authors, not surprisingly, did not condemn him for it. Muslim writers made much less of it than might be expected. The slaughter of the French prisoners taken at Agincourt can be explained by the English fear that they might turn against their captors; the act was an undoubted atrocity, but one that did little harm to Henry V's reputation. Equally, his decision not to allow the old and sick forced out of Rouen in 1419 to pass through his siege lines to safety was explicable; the fate of these poor people was the fault of the besieged, not the besiegers.

The extent to which chivalric behavior prevented atrocities from taking place is hard to tell. Geoffroi de Charny wrote that "all good men-at-arms are rightly bound to protect and defend the honour of all ladies against those who would threaten it." The capture of Caen by the English in 1346 saw ill-disciplined troops take every advantage of the situation, but Sir Thomas Holland, "a gentle one-eyed knight," and his companions did their best to protect the townspeople from the slaughter that followed. It is likely, however, that men were more often held back by the fear that if they committed acts of needless violence, they might suffer themselves in revenge should the wheel of fortune turn against them—as was explained to King John when he threatened to execute the garrison of Rochester castle in 1215.

Some dreadful atrocities took place in the course of medieval warfare in Europe, but it cannot be shown that they were worse, or more frequent, than those committed in the wars of other periods and other parts of the world.

[*See also* Acre, Siege of; Agincourt, Battle of; Bandits and Outlaws; Condottieri; Crema, Siege of; Devastation and Ravaging; Evesham, Battle of; Fire; Froissart,

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Jean; Geoffroi de Charny; Hawkwood, John; Jean le Bel; Laws of War and the Just Conduct of War; Limoges, Siege of; Mercenaries; Nicopolis, Battle of; Plunder, Division of; Rochester, Siege of (1215); *and* Rouen, Siege of (1418–1419).]

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ATTENDOLI, MUZIO

(1369–1424), military commander. Muzio Attendoli was born at Cotignola, Romagna, on 28 May 1369, the son of Giovanni and Elisa Petracini. The Attendolis were well off and powerful, capable of exercising a certain local influence thanks to their supporters and their ability in the use of force. By adolescence, the young Muzio distanced himself from the family, fascinated by the activities of the great condottieri who had fought in Romagna, such as John Hawkwood and Alberico da Barbiano. He joined the company of Boldrino da Panicale, and when he returned home in 1388 he was involved in a bloody feud with another local clan. Together with his brothers and cousins, he adopted the life of a soldier-adventurer.

The cohesion of this large and combative clan of captains was for several years the strong point of his military company. In the 1390s Attendoli fought with reputable captains like Barbiano and Francesco Broglia, then moved on to serve the city of Perugia, threatened by the expansionism of the duke of Milan, Giangaleazzo Visconti. He briefly served Milan, until an envious comrade denounced him, depriving him of any activity. He did not lack in new engagements, however, since he had become a famous and sought-after condottiere. The city of Florence enlisted him with increasingly honorable appointments and employed him in many enterprises. On 26 May 1402, however, the Florentine military was defeated by the Viscontis of Milan at Casalecchio, near Bologna, and Attendoli was taken prisoner. His fame nevertheless increased during the war between Florence and Pisa in 1406 during an important victory.

Barbiano gave him the nickname "Sforza" ("Force") for his tendency to violently impose himself on his companions at arms, especially on the occasion of dividing the spoils. Employed by Nicolò III Este in May, 1409, Attendoli profited from a meeting organized to negotiate peace and arranged a plot to kill the lord of Parma, Ottobuono Terzi. Este, relieved of a dangerous adversary, granted Attendoli a castle near Reggio Emilia as a reward. Attendoli returned to service for Florence and fought against the king of Naples, Ladislas of Anjou-Durazzo, winning an important victory at Roccasecca on 19 May 1411. He audaciously attacked the enemy camp, sacked it, and appropriated a colossal bounty that included precious horses, goods, and furnishings. He also gained rich ransoms for high-ranking prisoners.

Like other successful captains, Attendoli knew well that booty was indispensable to troops' satisfaction, and he sought to fight profitable "fat wars." Legend attributes to him great tactical abilities, but his battlefield successes were largely the product of his exceptional charisma with his soldiers, who followed him with conviction and ardor, and his capacity to reward them financially. Such opinions were also shared by his great rival, Andrea Fortebraccifrom Montone (Braccio da Montone), who had fought at length against him and Barbiano, so that it would be unadvisable to overemphasize the differences between the Sforza and the Braccio schools, since the military instruction and practices derived from the same tradition and circulated in the Italian military without distinction.

One condition of Attendoli's success was his flexibility and capacity to seize opportune occasions: these qualities he demonstrated in 1412 when he abandoned the Florentine and papal cause (even accepting from the antipope John XXIII the title of count of Cotignola) and put himself into the service of Ladislas, by then the deposed king of Hungary and weak sovereign of the Kingdom of Naples.

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His legendary competition with Fortebracci, who was fighting with Florence and aspired to rule the city of Perugia, dates back to these years. The two did not limit themselves to fighting for their respective employers but also undertook independent initiatives, plundering castles and homes, sacking towns, destroying fields and grain deposits, imposing levies, and blackmailing the countryside. When King Ladislas died in 1414, Attendoli took a decisive turn in his career and transferred his large clan of captains and its military to the Kingdom of Naples, where the presence of powerful baronial factions and the weak government of Joan II of Naples offered him the opportunity to gain riches and power. During the Neapolitan years, Attendoli's military company became an instrument of his personal ambition, a weapon of constant threat in the service of varying candidates to the throne or to baronial factions. It is difficult to follow the intricate events of these years and the continuous plot twists. It is adequate to say that the queen very much appreciated the services of Attendoli and did not fail to provide territorial rewards, though she was influenced by her favorites to support one or another faction or to designate alternating candidates to succession. In this unstable situation, Attendoli found himself often besieging Naples, or the opposite, fighting in defense of the city. He was at times victorious and at times defeated, but he was always assisted by a faithful and powerful military company. Attendoli's service in Naples procured for him various fiefdoms that provided a springboard for the career of his most promising son, Francesco Sforza.

In the end, Attendoli's disadvantages and losses overshadowed his conquests and achievements. His qualities as an able condottiere were not sufficient to overcome events in an unpredictable context, in which adventurers without scruple, bellicose barons, and ambitious contenders for the throne combated each other without respite. When his presence annoyed the current favorite, Attendoli was sent with his military company to fight elsewhere. Attendoli's last undertaking was directed against Braccio, who, following as always his dream of territorial domination, besieged the city of L'Aquila. On 4 January 1424, Attendoli died while crossing a river near Pescara. In adverse weather, covered in heavy armor, he was swept away by the water and disappeared among the currents. Attendoli's son, Francesco, the future duke of Milan and founder of the Sforza dynasty, inherited his company.

[*See also* Braccio da Montone and the Bracceschi; Condottieri; *and* Visconti, Giangaleazzo.]

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Translated from the Italian by Joe Jackson

AUGSBURG, SIEGE OF

The battle of Lechfeld, in which the German king Otto I destroyed a large Magyar invasion force in August 955, was preceded by a siege of Augsburg, a fortified episcopal center located in southern Bavaria on the northern fringe of the Lechfeld, a large steppelike plain and therefore an environment favoring the Magyar tactics of mounted archery. When the Magyars crossed the Enns River and invaded Germany in late June or early July, their leaders had "resolved to seek battle." They hoped that a siege of this important city would tempt Otto to march in relief. The Germans could then

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be lured onto the Lechfeld, where Magyar archery would have a decisive advantage. Contrary to the usual Magyar practice, infantry and siege engines were included in an invasion force that advanced very slowly through Bavaria. Some units reached the Iller River (sixty kilometers [thirty-seven miles] west of Augsburg), but they then fell back, pillaging the countryside in order to force Otto's army to transport supplies as it marched in relief. Bishop Ulrich, who commanded his retinue of professional soldiers to come within the fortress and shore up its walls and construct towers, led the defense of Augsburg. On 8 August, Magyar contingents attempted to seize a lightly fortified gate. Ulrich, leading his professionals, drove them off after killing one of their leaders. Throughout the night the defenders worked feverishly to prepare for a massive assault. The following morning, as Magyar captains were advancing their siege engines, word came that Otto's army was marching in relief from the west. The Magyars then deployed to meet the Germans in a pitched battle, which took place on 10 August.

[*See also* Lechfeld, Battle on the; *and* Otto I.]

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AURAY, BATTLE OF

This battle finally ended the civil war over succession to the Duchy of Brittany that began in 1341 on the death of John III. Charles de Blois, married to John III's niece, Jeanne de Penthièvre, was recognized as duke by his uncle, Philip VI of France, but this decision was contested by John of Montfort, John III's half-brother, supported by Edward III of England. When Montfort died in 1345, Edward III maintained the claims of his infant son, John. Blois was captured at the battle of La Roche Derrien in 1347 and spent almost ten years in prison in England while Brittany remained divided. Following several failures to resolve the dispute diplomatically, Edward III allowed the younger John, now of age, to return to win his duchy in 1362. After an unsuccessful French siege of Bécherel (1363), the two contestants agreed to a truce at the Landes d'Évran. Further efforts initiated by Edward, Prince of Wales, known as the Black Prince, to reach a compromise by dividing the war-weary duchy between the contestants followed. When these failed in February 1364, the stage was set for decisive military action.

In summer 1364, John of Montfort, ably assisted by leading English captains including Robert Knolles, Hugh Calveley, Matthew Gournay, Walter Huet, and William, Lord Latimer, laid siege to Auray, one of the few strongholds on the southwest coast of Brittany that Blois had held throughout the war in a region otherwise dominated by Montfort. Summoning Bertrand du Guesclin, victor over an Anglo-Navarrese army at Cocherel in May, and other troops usually serving in French royal armies, Blois prepared to raise the siege. Sir John Chandos hurried from Gascony, and Eustace d'Auberchicourt brought reinforcements from Normandy for Montfort's army of around 3,000 men. In late September, with between 3,500 and 4,000 men, Blois moved, probably from his base at Guingamp in northern Brittany, via Josselin and the left bank of the river Loch toward Auray. The town had already capitulated to Montfort, but the castle was still holding out when news came of the approaching enemy. Leaving a token force before the castle and with Chandos in overall command, the Anglo-Breton army was drawn up in the classic form of three battles and a rear guard on a plateau to the north of Auray on the right bank of the Loch, a site subsequently marked by a college (later charterhouse) dedicated to Saint Michael that was founded to commemorate Montfort's victory and the fallen. Relying on their carefully prepared position, the Anglo-Breton army allowed Blois to cross the Loch unopposed and deploy his forces in similar form. Du Guesclin was the principal commander, leading one battle, with the counts of Auxerre and Joigny a second, Blois himself a third, and a

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rearguard under the lords of Rieux and Rays. Some Blois forces deserted before the battle, and others apparently held back, nullifying any numerical superiority.

When last-minute peace efforts failed and fighting was joined, it was fierce, chiefly on foot and hand-to-hand. An English archer barrage was surprisingly ineffectual, as the French were, according to the chronicler Jean Froissart, too well armored and shielded. The French advanced in tightly arrayed formations, though disruption inevitably occurred as the English archers joined the melee. Many English soldiers "had expended their whole fortune, and were so poor, that they hoped by means of a battle either to lose their all or to set themselves up again" (Froissart). Calveley, in charge of the Anglo-Breton rear guard, had to come to the aid of Chandos and Montfort, who were hard pressed by Blois. Olivier de Clisson, the major Breton noble on Montfort's side, lost an eye but performed outstanding feats with his ax. The death of Blois finally ended resistance, and a high proportion, perhaps a third or more, of his men were killed or captured in the rout. Anglo-Breton casualties were minimal: only seven killed according to several near-contemporary English chroniclers, who may have derived their information from an official announcement or herald's report, since some also give precise and extensive lists of enemy casualties. Blois was the most notable fatality, and du Guesclin the most notable among the prisoners, but most leading Breton families lost members or had to pay heavy ransoms, while many Normans also suffered in Blois's cause. After the battle, most remaining Blois strongholds quickly surrendered to Montfort, who was recognized as Duke John IV by Charles V of France and sent envoys to mediate with Jeanne de Penthièvre. In the first treaty of Guérande, 12 April 1365, she also acknowledged John's title, peace terms were agreed, and the civil war officially ended.

[*See also* Chandos, Sir John.]

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AUXILIARY PEOPLES, MILITARY

The system of military auxiliaries in medieval East Central Europe stemmed from nomadic antecedents but was also affected by Byzantine and Persian-Khwarazmian military institutions. Auxiliary personnel were employed in field and frontier service as well as in the royal household retinue or palace/court bodyguard. Most of these troops were lightly armored mounted archers equipped with composite bows.

The nomads drew military levies from client tribes and assigned auxiliary duties to conquered tributaries. The Hungarians, for example, fought "together with" the Khazars "in their wars" (Constantine Porphyrogenitos). Auxiliaries were obliged to muster troops in the nomadic decimal system. A Terkh (Mongolia) inscription says, "when that the Khan subdued the Oghuz, he gained one hundred commanders and one *tümen* [ten thousand] by them." The Patzinaks (Pechenegs) "compel these peoples to raid and they go taking slaves for them" (Abu Sa'id Gardezi/Gardizi, *Zayn al-Akhbar* [The jewel of relations]). The Russian principalities were also to raise contingents for the Mongols' campaigns. Military colonists were either settled in blocks or dispersed along points of strategic significance. The Khazars set confederate chieftains (*elteber/iltabar*) tasks in territorial control or frontier defense.

Field Service. Most auxiliaries were deployed as the vanguard in column of march as well as arrayed in the advance in battles. They were portrayed as particularly skilled professionals. The Khazar-origin Khabars who joined the Hungarians "always led the advance guard," being "the strongest and bravest at war" (Constantine Porhyrogentitos, chap. 39). The first three Kangar hordes of the Patzinaks were known as "valiant warriors of noble birth"

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(Constantine Porphyrogenitos, chap. 3). In the eleventh and twelfth-centuries Hungarian Patzinaks, Khabars, and Szeklers (Székelyek) were obliged to supply both advance and rear guards and to harass the deployment of the enemy with demoralizing ambushes in the days before an engagement, or to dispatch rotating teams of archers to disrupt the enemy's battle array. They forged ahead from the wings in a curved formation, not engaging in close-quarters fights, then moved to the flanks and were used as reserve whenever necessary. They were noted for swift maneuvers, for the feigned flight in which they pretended to be "fleeing like sheep before wolves" (*Chronici Hungarici compositio saeculi XIV*, chap. 153), and for the use of terrain obstacles. They also served as sentries in outposts and had reconnaissance tasks.

Frontier Service. Frontier service in eastern Europe was also affected by the Byzantine system of akritai or limitanei, special border guard troops garrisoned in trading and military outposts who were also obliged to lead preemptive strikes into enemy territory. The Russians employed the Chernye Klobuki ("Black Caps") of Patzinak and Oghuz origin, settled in semiautonomous frontier communities, partly around fortifications. Cumans (*Polovtsy*) were later on also absorbed into military colonies. The Khazars settled tributary tribes (e.g., the Burtas) in uninhabited frontier zones to be a buffer against nomads, and they garrisoned salaried Patzinaks in the Don fortresses. In the tenth and eleventh centuries, Patzinaks were settled in homogeneous blocks in western Hungary and Byzantium (Paristrium *thema*, Bulgaria) as border guards. Abu Hamid al-Garnati writes of thousands of Muslim "Ishmaelites," possibly Khalyzians from Khwarazm and of Maghrib (North African) origin, in twelfth-century Hungary, "left in the practice of their religion, with whom they launch raids to Byzantine territories" (Ibn Abi al-Rabi, Muhammad ibn'Abd al-Rahim, 1991). Most often the auxiliaries were not confined to fortification service but performed field defense duties or preventive offensive campaigns. The *Chronici Hungarici compositio saeculi XIV* relates that in the 1050s the Patzinaks "were incessantly harassing the camp" of the German invaders in Hungary, "all night long with their poisoned arrows," and that they "noosed prisoners by laying snares between the tents" (chap. 90).

Auxiliaries were under the sole and direct command of the ruler. In Hungary the Cumans, the Szeklers, and from the fourteenth century the Alan-origin Iasians were organized in privileged, autonomous jurisdictional districts (*sedes*) on crown lands, and enjoyed collective freedom from taxation. They were divided along military ranks under the control of district captains or counts. The crown could rely on a fixed number of Szekler light cavalry (in theory twenty-four thousand) each branch of their tribes being obliged to equip 100 horsemen. The Cumans provided 4,000 to 6,000 mounted archers, also for foreign campaigns. The successes of the Hungarian armies against Western-type heavy cavalry from the late thirteenth century are attributed to the armies of mixed composition and the coordinated cooperation of heavy men-at-arms and lightly armored nomadic-type archers on the wings.

Certain auxiliaries were also used as self-sufficient tactical units in their own right, receiving regular pay. As John (Ioannes) Kinnamos records, Muslim troops were dispatched from Hungary as a separate expeditionary fighting force, for example, 500 archers at the siege of Milan in 1158 (chap. 17). Some (e.g., Cumans, Patzinaks) were especially used in close combat as well, having mail or lamellar armor and maces.

Paid auxiliaries were frequently recruited from foreign peoples outside the borders. Beyond the *foederati* and *auxilia*, semi-regular field troops raised on a voluntary basis, Byzantium also recruited auxiliaries from outside the empire, such as Patzinaks, Seljuks, Cumans, and Mongols in the Skythikon. Emperor Constantine VII advises to "keep peace with the Patzinakoi" and "make them lead excursions and plundering raids" against Byzantium's enemies. The Khazars relied on Slav and Rus infantry, consisting partly of heavily armored men equipped with javelins and battle-axes, and partly of light troops with bows and spears. Cuman or Qipchaq and even Mongol auxiliaries also contributed to the Lithuanians' stand against the Teutonic Order, for example, at

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Grunwald. A number of Turkic-origin light-horse auxiliaries took up service in the Polish-Lithuanian armies. A great proportion of Cuman and Mongol auxiliaries in the Balkans integrated into the South Slavic and Romanian boyars.

Most Asian-origin auxiliaries were noted for their skill in fighting from encampments, comparable to *wagenburgs*. Anna Komnene speaks of the Patzinaks' "circle of wagons," chained yurt-carts with a ditch dug in front (Komnene, Book VII, chap. 11). Some also encamped in prefabricated wooden palisades or cairns (e.g., the *obos* in the Kievan frontiers).

Court Service. A certain number of auxiliaries took bodyguard service, partly influenced by the Byzantine *auxilia palatina*. The eleventh-century court dignity of the Hungarian heir to the throne, Prince of the Russians (*dux Ruizorum*), probably refers to the fact that there was a court bodyguard or border guard retinue of Varangian origin from Rus. A detachment of the Cumans and the Ias in Hungary constituted a permanent court guard of the monarch as *neugerii* (*nöger/nökör*, "professional warrior mercenaries") from the late thirteenth century. *Nöger* troops served the Palaiologan emperors as palace guards from the 1270s–1280s.

[*See also* Boyars; Cumans; Grunwald, Battle of; Khazars; Mongols; Patzinaks; Szeklers; *and* Vlachs.]

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Attila Bárány

AVARS

In the mid-sixth century the emperor Justinian bribed nomadic warriors from Central Asia to attack barbarians residing in the Carpathian Basin. There they established a confederation of a mixture of peoples, known as the Avar Khaganate, which endured for a century and a half. When they arrived on the fringes of the Roman Empire, the Avars were already multiethnic and multilingual. Whether or not the core group of the confederation originally spoke a Turkic or an Iranic–Indo-European language is a topic of debates that have recently been called "pointless." Gradually conquering the Carpathian

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Basin, the Avars came into contact with remnants of Romanized and Germanic peoples. Slavs, accompanying the Avars, appear in the sources for the first time. Warriors in the core group, who dominated the confederation, fought as both light cavalry, equipped with composite recurved bows, and as heavy cavalry, employing lances and long swords. They are believed to have introduced Europeans to iron stirrups. The saber, a slashing weapon, appears in later archaeological finds. Following Justinian's death in 565, Avars began attacking Byzantine possessions in Pannonia and the Balkans.

The early Avars were not effective in siege warfare, for it took them three years to capture the ancient provincial city of Sirmium (present-day Sremska Mitrovica, Serbia). Although they were primarily involved in conflicts with the Byzantines, in 610 they attempted an unsuccessful invasion of Lombard Italy. The Avars were far from invincible. The emperor Maurice enjoyed much success against them until 602, when he made a catastrophic decision to winter in Avar territory between the Danube and the Tisza. A major turning point in Avar history came in 626, when, allied with the Persian Empire, the Avars besieged Constantinople, an operation in which Slavic auxiliaries played a major role. The failure to take Constantinople resulted in a Slavic revolt and the rise of an adventurer known as Samo, "king of the Wends," who challenged Avar rule for several decades. The Avars reestablished their domination of the Carpathian Basin, circa 670, with a power center between the Danube and the Tisza rivers. During two centuries in Central Europe the Avars amassed a huge treasure, probably as a result of Byzantine subsidies. The Franks pillaged it in 796. Under enormous Carolingian pressure, the Avar Khaganate collapsed suddenly at the end of the eighth century—an event that has not been satisfactorily explained. It is plausible that an epidemic of equine encephalitis decimated their breeding stock, making resistance to the Franks impossible.

In 803 a contingent of Avars submitted to Charlemagne. In 805 Khan Theodorus, a convert to Christianity, was allowed to settle his people in Frankish Pannonia between Szombathely and Petronel. He complained that because they were being attacked by Slavs it had become impossible for them to live in their former territories, presumably between the Danube and Tisza. Other Avars fled eastward, where they were defeated by the Bulgars and integrated into Khan Krum's empire. Pockets of Avars continued to exist in the Carpathian Basin (including the Morava Valley north of the Danube) throughout most of the ninth century.

[*See also* East Central Europe, *subentry on* Narrative (500–1000) *and* Hungary, *subentry on* Narrative (500–1000).]

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Charles R. Bowlus

AVIGNON, SIEGE OF

The second siege of Avignon (739) is understandable in a specific historical situation after the great victories of the Frankish ruler Charles Martel and his warriors against the Muslims (for example in 732 in a battle between Tours and Poitiers and in a battle at the river Berre south of Narbonne, which was also besieged by Charles). In 737 Avignon, which had been captured by the Arabs, was liberated by Charles. In 738 Charles was campaigning in Saxony, but in 739 he returned to Provence to liberate Avignon, which had been conquered by the Arabs, for a second time. The so-called *Continuatio Fredegarii* is our main source of information about the facts—however, because it is not written from a neutral,

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objective, perspective but instead from a rather partisan one, it is difficult to know how much we can rely on its accuracy. What is clear is that there was a definite anti-Frankish movement in Provence at the time, and therefore perhaps a sort of cooperation between the Provençal nobility and the Arabs against the Franks, who were regarded as invaders. There was in the seventh century already a long historical tradition of the people in the south acting independently from the more northern regions of the Merovingian realm. In 737–738 one of the leaders of the local resistance was Maurontus of Marseille, duke of Provence, who was condemned by the *Continuatio* for his cooperation with the Saracens. The *Continuatio* indicates he had been responsible for the first invasion of Avignon in 737. Once again in 739 Avignon, described as a city on a hill and well defended by walls, was liberated by Frankish warriors under the command of Childebrand and his half brother Charles Martel rushing from the north. In order to defend himself, Duke Maurontus probably fled to the little islands near Marseille.

[*See also* Charles Martel.]

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AZAZ, BATTLE NEAR

The successors of the Byzantine emperor Basil II (r. 976–1025) continued his "forward policy." Romanos III Argyros (r. 1028–1034), lacking military experience, supposed that victories would legitimize his rule and impress his army. According to the chronicler Michael Psellos, Romanos ignored his generals' advice and the fact that his prime target—the wealthy city of Aleppo in Syria—was of little strategic value to Byzantium. Romanos left Constantinople in March 1030, at the head of an army perhaps some twenty thousand strong; a large proportion consisted of foreign troops under their own commanders, including Pechenegs, Armenians, Bulgarians, Rus, and Abasgians. Romanos advanced from Antioch in July, underestimating what heat could do to an army in high summer. Encamped at a waterless site, behind ditches and a shield wall, on 8 August Romanos sent troops to reconnoiter the fortified town of Azaz nearby. Ambushed and suffering serious losses, they fled back, and a relief force was likewise worsted. Short of water and animal fodder, and with morale slumping, Romanos beat a retreat on 10 August. Discipline was poor, deaths often resulted from accidents, and the Armenians took to pillaging while many Byzantines made their own way to imperial territory at Qurus. The Arabs seized vast quantities of plunder, the emperor's baggage train being carried on at least seventy camels. Humiliating as this fiasco was, Byzantine casualties had been limited, and Romanos immediately began planning for an expedition to Aleppo in cooler weather. The emir of Aleppo sued for terms, and in 1031 agreed to pay tribute.

[*See also* Arabs; Basil II; *and* Byzantine Empire, *subentries on* Narrative (900–1204) *and* Historiography (900–1204).]

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Jonathan Shepard

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B

Baesweiler, Battle of

The dukes of Jülich disliked the Brabançon policy of territorial expansion on the southern frontiers of their territory. This resulted in tension between the two duchies. The minor German lords, with the tacit approval of their lord, regularly attacked merchants from Brabant, Liège, and Cologne. Wenceslas, Duke of Brabant, sent an embassy to protest these attacks, but William VI, Duke of Jülich, gave the protest a frosty reception. Vexed, Wenceslas decided to undertake a punitive expedition.

At the beginning of August 1371, Wenceslas defied William and gathered his men-at-arms. The combatants came not only from Brabant but also from Liège, Namur, Hainault, Flanders, and even France. The number of Wenceslas's troops reached twenty-five hundred.

William's army numbered one thousand knights, and he was aided by Edward, Duke of Guelders, with six hundred men-at-arms. Some German knights and some urban militias also answered his call. Thus the army of the dukes of Jülich and Guelders suffered from a significant numerical inferiority.

On 20 August the Brabançons advanced toward the town of Jülich. On the second day the village of Baesweiler was reached, and the Brabançons were now only a few miles from the enemy capital. The confrontation took place on 22 August. According to Jean Froissart, the only reliable chronicler, the Germans appeared at dawn in a large battalion before the camp, while the Brabançons were at Mass. The sudden arrival caused a panic, and the Brabançons did not have time to form their battle array. Only the vanguard, which had been formed the day before, was ready to fight. Seizing the opportunity afforded by the chaos, the Germans charged. The Brabançon vanguard, commanded by the Count of Saint-Pol and his son, received the first impact and were pushed back. A terrible melee followed, leading to a general rout. The Brabançons were defeated, and Wenceslas was imprisoned in the castle of Nideggen. In the other camp the losses were few, but the Duke of Guelders was killed, perhaps by an arrow in the eye.

Joan, Duchess of Brabant, immediately called for the help of Brabant and of neighboring lords, and finally, in February 1372, Charles IV, the Holy Roman Emperor, promised that as soon as summer came he would avenge Wenceslas. The army assembled at Aachen was imposing. Before enemy territory was invaded, a final council of war was held: many lords advised making another effort to remind William of his obedience to the empire. The emperor agreed, and a delegation was sent to the rebellious prince.

The Duke of Jülich received the embassy amicably and agreed to free the Duke of Brabant. On 21 June, Wenceslas and William were officially reconciled. The Duke of Brabant did not have to pay a ransom, and all those who were still held prisoner were to

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be released unconditionally. On 24 June a treaty of friendship was concluded. William promised to defend the Duchy of Brabant in exchange for the reasonably large sum of fifty thousand *petits écus*. Wenceslas in turn promised to protect the duchies of Jülich and Guelders without any financial gain.

The Duke of Brabant was obliged to refund his combatants' losses (horses, equipment, and ransoms). More than one thousand documents relating to this operation survived, and they enable us to study in detail the structure of the army and to know the names of almost two thousand men-at-arms.

[*See also* Brabançons.]

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Sergio Boffa

BALBEIN, BATTLE OF AL-

In 1167 the fate of Shia-governed Egypt hung in the balance. Since the early 1160s its ruling Fatimid dynasty had been torn by disputes that created two embittered rival factions led by the viziers Shawar and Dirgham. This infighting helped to persuade Amalric, the Latin king of Jerusalem, and Nur al-Din, the Sunni ruler of Damascus and Aleppo, that Egypt was ripe for invasion. Both men were aware of the Nile Delta's huge agricultural wealth and mercantile cities, and each wanted to prevent the other from seizing this advantage.

By 1167 each of them had attempted to seize power by armed force, but both had been thwarted. In this year, however, they returned with renewed vigor. Amalric was actually invited to travel to Egypt by Sultan Shawar, who had destroyed his rival but feared Nur al-Din's general, Asad al-Din Shirkuh. The Egyptian and Latin armies joined forces and sought to locate Shirkuh's force and bring him to battle. For a time the two armies shadowed one another along the banks of the Nile near Cairo, and they eventually came face-to-face across the river at Giza. To evade his enemy Shirkuh marched south, and Amalric followed with a mixed Frankish-Egyptian cavalry force. After a pursuit of around 185 miles (300 kilometers), Shirkuh turned to fight at al-Balbein, on the edge of the desert. The writer Ibn al-Athir reports that Shirkuh's men were dispirited, and many wanted to return home, but one of his commanders persuaded them to fight after outlining the consequences of returning home defeated. Shirkuh's battle plan was to lure Amalric into a frontal assault upon the Muslim line. The Muslim center would then fall back to encourage a pursuit, while the wings of the army, deployed on two flanking hills, would fall on the attacking Christian-Egyptian force.

The armies were not even in size. When Shirkuh set out, he apparently had 2,000 cavalry; by contrast, according to the Christian chronicler William of Tyre, Amalric had 374 knights supported by formations of Egyptian troops and light cavalry, both of which proved ineffectual. In the event, on 19 March 1167, Shirkuh's plan worked: the impetus of the Christian heavy-cavalry charge was lost, and the battle fragmented into a scattered and bloody melee. William of Tyre claimed that the encounter was indecisive and that Amalric lost one hundred knights. Ibn al-Athir claimed it as a great victory for Shirkuh. Either way, the battle lifted the morale of Shirkuh's forces sufficiently for them to march north to Alexandria, which opened its gates to him, creating a new chapter in the conflict.

The battle of al-Balbein was not a decisive encounter in the struggle for Egypt; the outcome did not grant either side victory, although if Amalric had triumphed, he might well have secured control of Egypt for himself. What is significant is the identity of Shirkuh's nephew and subordinate, Saladin. In time Saladin rose to power, and he crushed the kingdom

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of Jerusalem after the battle of Hattin in 1187. In this battle he replicated his uncle's strategy of evading the Christian cavalry charge, denying them a key tactical advantage. Admittedly, the idea of a feigned flight was hardly new, but this was the first time that Saladin saw it in operation against the Franks.

[*See also* Hattin, Battle of, *and* Saladin.]

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Nicholas Morton

BALDWIN I (IRON ARM)

(d. 879), Count of Flanders (r. 862–879). In the midst of the harsh Viking attacks of the ninth century, Carolingian kings often sought to place strong nobles in charge of their coastal marches. For this purpose in 864 the king of Francia, Charles the Bald, awarded Baldwin his very vulnerable northern coastal region as the County of Flanders. Initially Charles seems not to have liked Baldwin, nor did Charles support the marriage of Baldwin to his widowed daughter, Judith, in 862, forcing the couple to elope. In 863, however, at the request of the pope, Baldwin and Charles were reconciled, with Baldwin gaining the title "Marchio Flandriae" (margave of Flanders) a short time later. Baldwin held this position for the next fifteen years, ardently protecting the region from Viking invasions and raids. He was known for his strong defense of Flanders and his harsh punishment of those who violated its people and devastated its lands and villages, with later historiography awarding him the cognomen "Baldwin the Iron Arm" (French: Baudouin Bras-de-Fer; Dutch: Boudewijn de Ijzere Arm). When Charles the Bald died in 877, Baldwin threw his significant support behind Charles's son, Louis the Stammerer, helping him to gain the throne of Francia. Baldwin died two years later, in 879, with his title and lands passing to his son Baldwin II.

[*See also* Charles the Bald.]

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Kelly DeVries

BALTICS

[*This entry contains six subentries, on Baltic sources from 500–1300 and 1300–1500, an overview of Baltic military history from 500–1300 and 1300–1500, and on Baltic historiography from 500–1300 and 1300–1500.*]

Sources (500–1300)

Our knowledge of military history in the early Baltic is limited to archaeology and folklore because the native peoples were illiterate and Christian chroniclers had little interest in the pagan past. Folklore collections from the nineteenth century provide information about religious practices and society, but they mention war only rarely. Moreover, collections such as Wilhelm Mannhardt's *Letto-Preussische Götterlehre* (1936) are often viewed as presenting only the narratives of literate foreigners, without scholarly deconstruction to get at the truth beneath the superficial impressions of Western observers. As for the lives of the rural poor, they varied little from region to region, no matter what religion they professed. Scattered references to warfare indicate that it consisted largely of surprise raids on neighbors, with well-armed nobles slaying almost defenseless commoners, or of pirate attacks; archaeological excavations demonstrate such ubiquity of fortifications that attack must have been expected at any

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moment. It is clear from the occasional references that have survived that even the recorded lives of the most important rulers of the early Christian states in eastern Europe were formulaic in nature. Warfare was rarely mentioned, much less described.

The danger of life in the Baltic lands can be judged from the number of coin hoards buried each night by Viking travelers—merchants and mercenaries—who did not live to dig them up in the morning. Dating these coins provides information about the number and frequency of travelers and about lawlessness. The seriousness of tribal rivalries is indicated by the willingness of weaker tribes to assist crusaders against traditional enemies.

Good sources become available only when Christians began writing chronicles that dealt with Baltic matters or writing letters about trade, missionary activities, and diplomacy. The Russians were the first to describe wars in the Baltic. The most important of the regional histories was *The Chronicle of Novgorod*, dating from 1016. The translators compiled the best translation from several surviving texts, then used deliberately antiquated language to catch the essence of a deeply religious society in which it was possible to believe that angels fought alongside true believers against outsiders. Readers may have some difficulty with the complicated genealogies of a system based on the most senior of the ruling dynasty inheriting the highest office and with the complicated politics of a mercantile republic.

The Galician-Volhynian Chronicle (volume 2 of *The Hypatian Codex*), based on two sources of the great *Primary Chronicle*, describes the era in which Kiev was the dominant Russian state. It is not an easy text to follow, but it has fascinating anecdotes of warfare in the period 1205–1289 and shows that now-forgotten states to the south of Prussia and Lithuania were vital and important. *The Nikonian Chronicle* focuses on events farther inland, but it is still useful.

Western chroniclers are more informative, but they were also slower to offer firsthand information about the Baltic peoples and their conflicts. Adam of Bremen's *History of the Archbishops of Hamburg-Bremen*, for example, covers the growth of Saxon power in the north of Germany and the conversion of the kings of Scandinavia. It serves as a reminder that secular nobles were not the only men who had ability and ambition: monks and churchmen did, too. Adam's *History* does not tell very much about the Vikings who dominated the region, but it is the best contemporary source. Icelandic sagas contain occasional anecdotes about piratical activities along the Estonian and Finnish coasts, but nothing systematic.

Saxo Grammaticus, who may have been a secretary to an important archbishop of Lund in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, used oral history to reconstruct the development of the Viking kingdoms and the process of conversion. His is the best of the early Danish chronicles.

Two major ethnic groups along the southern shores of the Baltic—Germans and Wends—are described by the monk Helmold in *The Chronicle of the Slavs*. There was a time when it seemed that North Germany would be dominated by the Wendish tribes on the north bank of the Elbe, but as the Saxon peoples became better organized, they pushed the Wends to the east, then conquered their lands. This early stage of the *Drang nach Osten* (push to the east) was followed by the Second Crusade, then by the failed Polish incursion into Prussia that led the Duke of Masovia to invite the Teutonic Order to assist in his crusade.

The Teutonic Order encouraged the writing of chronicles describing its successful wars in Prussia. The best appeared in both Latin and German, the latter supposedly read to the knightly monks at mealtimes. These can be found in the major collection of chronicles, *Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*. There is a parallel Polish collection titled *Monumenta Poloniae Historica*. Stirring stories of battle abound in these works, but there is not much available in translation. One lively translated poem by Peter von Suchenwirt describes the crusade of Albrecht of Austria to Prussia; though his adventure was in 1377, it would have been familiar to earlier crusaders, or to Geoffrey Chaucer's Knight (who gives us no details about his travels except the places where he made war on behalf of Christendom).

There was an effort to create a similar scholarly collection of chronicles for Livonia, the *Scriptores rerum Livonicarum*, but it has proved better to read

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the chronicles as individually edited or translated. The best—in fact, among the very best of all medieval chronicles—is *The Chronicle of Henry of Livonia.* This is a marvelously detailed and insightful account of the period 1180–1227; apparently written for the benefit of William of Modena, the papal legate who arrived in Riga in 1225, it is a true classic in every sense. Henry's battle scenes are vivid and thoroughly plausible. Overlapping in time is *The Livonian Rhymed Chronicle.* Written by a member of the Livonian Order, it is the story of the crusaders' struggles until 1290, concentrating on the later decades. It is full of action, heroism, and sacrifice, with detailed information about sieges, raiding techniques, and tactics.

Some information can be gleaned from correspondence, though the letters and documents of any region from the era before 1300 was easily collected into one volume. Such collections are available for Livonia, Prussia, and Pomerelia (West Prussia).

A last primary source comes from papal legates, who investigated accusations of atrocities (and worse crimes such as heresy) committed by the Teutonic Knights. The best is *Das Zeugenverhör des Franciscus de Moliano,* dating from his 1312 mission to Riga but describing earlier events.

[*See also* Crusades; Orders, Military, *subentry on* Northern; Scandinavia; Slavic Lands; *and* Vikings.]

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William Urban

Sources (1300–1500)

We are not blessed with as many translations of works from the late medieval period as from the earlier epoch. The highly patriotic *Annals of Jan Długosz*, written in the fifteenth century by a talented and well-informed cleric, is available in an abridgment. *The Chronicle of Balthasar Russow* is a colorful account of the Livonian war that began in 1557–1558; it contains an overview of the crusaders' activities in Estonia. "Peter von Suchenwirt" is a chivalric poem describing the expedition of Duke Albrecht of Austria to Prussia, with vivid accounts of warfare in the wilderness and a description of the ceremony in which the duke was knighted.

The collections of chronicles described in the previous section are also useful for this epoch. Other pertinent collections include *Scriptores rerum Livonicarum*, *Akten der Ständetage Preussen unter der Herrschaft des deutschen Ordens*, and *Codex Mednicensis seu Samogitiae Dioecesis*, which includes records pertaining to the Christianization of the pagan stronghold of Samogitia. *Est- und Livländische Briefladе* contains awkwardly organized documents and studies relating to the Baltic German nobles. The very extensive and still incomplete *Preussisches Urkundenbuch* is available on the Web. Finally, Werner Paravicini has mined document collections and archives to create *Die Preussenreisen des Europäischen Adels*, which lists each known noble crusader to Prussia in the context of each expedition.

Wilhelm Mannhardt's *Letto-Preussische Götterlehre*, done in the style of James Frazer's *The Golden Bough*, provides descriptions of pagan religious practices in the original languages. Scholars who rely on folklore and archaeology discourage the use of this collection.

Highly important, but difficult to use, are two inquiries by papal legates into the activities of the Teutonic Knights. *Das Zeugenverhör des Franciscus de Moliano* is a Latin transcript of the investigation into the origins of the feud between Riga and the Teutonic Knights; it is one-sided, because the Livonian master refused to cooperate. It is often incautiously mined for snappy quotes, without noting that the charges were eventually dismissed. The other source, *Lites ac res gestae inter Polonos Ordinemque Crucigerorum*, is the Latin transcript of even more extensive hearings concerning Polish claims that the crusaders committed war crimes. The grand master won the case by appealing to the papal curia, but the testimony has been used by Polish historians to bolster a patriotically tinged understanding of the era.

[*See also* Crusades; Orders, Military, *subentry on* Northern; Scandinavia; *and* Slavic Lands.]

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William Urban

Narrative (500–1300)

Because there are no narrative sources for early Baltic history, we can only reconstruct an outline through archaeology and a handful of references in distant chronicles. We know that the region was highly militarized—the native peoples had been driven toward the sea by successive waves of Celts, Germans, and Slavs, until finally they found refuge behind a belt of swamps and forests. Linguistically, the peoples can be classified as Finns, Estonians, Lithuanians, and Prussians, in addition to those Livs, Letts, Semgallians, and Kurs who would later merge to form the Latvian people. The economy was based on two-field farming practices and horse-raising; government was organized around councils of clan elders. Pagan religious concepts prominently featured war gods, but warriors were so resistant to discipline that only the Lithuanians were able to create an effective army.

Each hill was topped at one time or another by log and earth fortifications, witnesses to the rise and fall of local powers. However, we know of no great warrior achieving supremacy over neighboring tribes—or even his own. Each tribe valued its independence too highly to give any authority to a noble for any longer than the emergency that had made it necessary for someone to lead the militia. Warfare consisted largely of raids on neighboring lands or, later, in the case of Estonians and Lithuanians, the more distant Scandinavia, Poland, and Russia. Estonians and Kurs were daring pirates, and Lithuanians served as mercenaries in Russian principalities.

Military equipment was primitive. Rich nobles owned some armor and good swords, but poor men were armed with little more than clubs, spears, and rocks; almost everyone rode the little ponies that thrived on the rich pastures in the forest clearings and along the major rivers.

Although romantics see this as an idyllic situation, warfare was limited only by the lack of incentive to conduct sieges. Life was hardly disturbed by the passage of Viking warriors along the great rivers from the Baltic Sea to Russia and thence on to Byzantium. We know that many of these warriors died on the return voyage; after having buried their wages and profits from trade for overnight safety, they were killed by robbers who must have found enough of these coin hoards to encourage them to murder more visitors. Indeed, robbery remained a problem for merchants for many centuries.

Crusaders arrived first to protect merchants and missionaries and then discovered that only a permanent presence would have a permanent effect. Their technological advantages were enhanced by organizational efficiency: feudalism made it possible to bring all resources to bear on one tribe at a time, while tribal democracy prevented the rise of talented leaders who could coordinate resistance.

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In the winter of 1184/1185, the first missionary to the Livs, Meinhard, watched in amazement when the tribesmen fled into the woods at the first report of Lithuanian raiders. He offered to build proper castles on two islands in the Daugava (Düna, Dvina) River if the people would convert to Catholicism; their tithes and taxes would pay the masons and the garrison, as well as the expenses of his priests. The natives agreed but then laughed at him when he asked them to keep their end of the bargain. His successor as bishop called on crusaders to enforce his rights, and that bishop's successor founded the city of Riga and a military order known as the Livonian Brothers of the Sword.

Subsequently, the crusaders employed a divide-and-rule policy, assisting conquered tribes in fighting their ancestral enemies, then requiring the newly conquered peoples to fight in further wars of expansion. These early wars of conquest were very complicated. First of all, the crusaders were not united. The kings of Denmark and Sweden had their own ambitions, the bishop of Riga quarreled with the Brothers of the Sword, and papal legates used their authority enthusiastically—sometimes to enhance their own careers, sometimes in efforts to bring crusading efforts together.

Competing crusader forces rushed in; Russian princes, belatedly realizing that ancient tributaries were being conquered, began to intervene; Lithuanian raiders took advantage of the chaos; and the powerful Danish king, Valdemar II (r. 1202–1241), conquered Tallinn (Reval) in 1218. In 1223 there was a native uprising in Estonia, during which a third of the Brothers of the Sword and many German knights and gentry were slain. The Brothers faced a financial crisis: they could not raise enough money from their own war-torn share of the lands. When they rejected the bishop of Riga's claims that they were his vassals, the pope sent a legate, William of Modena, to negotiate the matter.

When this effort failed, the Brothers seized Estonia for themselves and began making plans to take more land. It was ultimately a race toward death, because without more taxes, they could not hire mercenaries, but with each conquest, their responsibilities increased. In 1236 they suffered a crushing defeat at the battle of Saule.

The pope ordered the survivors to be incorporated into the Teutonic Knights, but when the last of the Brothers learned that they would have to return Estonia to Denmark, they rebelled and joined an alliance of Swedes, Danes, and poor German knights against Novgorod. It seemed like it would be an easy victory, since Russia had been weakened by Mongol invasions.

The popular understanding of the ensuing "Battle of the Ice" has been formed by Sergei Eisenstein's 1938 movie, *Alexander Nevsky*. Eisenstein had grown up in Riga. He got the costumes right, but little else. His story was a communist parable, preparing his audience to see Joseph Stalin standing firmly at the head of patriotic farmers and workers against armored Nazi columns.

The Livonian Knights (a semi-autonomous branch of the Teutonic Knights) organized a frontier defense along the Narva River, Lake Peipus, and the Daugava River, then along the Kurland frontier wilderness to Memel and Prussia, sharing responsibilities with bishops, abbots, cities, and corporations of knights.

Meanwhile, to the south, efforts by Poles to expand to the Baltic Sea, imposing Christianity on the Prussians, had been only temporarily successful; the pagan natives first drove the invaders out and then invaded Poland itself. In 1226 the Duke of Mazovia, desperate, called on foreign military orders for help. Only one came in sufficient numbers to make any difference, and those numbers were small. Still, this military order, the Teutonic Knights, garrisoned the conquered territories after the duke's vassals and allies went home. They soon expanded down the Vistula (Wisła) River from their original base in Thorn, a success that earned them the jealousy of Swantopelk of Pomerania to their west and the Duke of Mazovia to the south. Swantopelk they managed to defeat, and the Mongol invasion of 1242 left the Polish state weak, almost leaderless, and without any desire to fight over Prussia.

As the Teutonic Knights expanded eastward along the Baltic coast, assisted by German

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crusaders and reinforced by German and Polish immigrants, Lithuanian pagans intervened, laying waste to those Prussian communities that had surrendered and to vast areas of eastern and northern Poland. In the second half of the thirteenth century, German crusaders fought against desperate Prussian rebels and their Lithuanian allies, while Poles moved east into Volhynia, a once-powerful Russian state that was now a battleground of pagans, Roman Catholics, Orthodox princes, and Muslim Tatars.

A great expedition led by King Přemysl Otakar II of Bohemia in 1256 overawed the powerful Samland pagans, and the fortress built to keep them in subjugation was named Königsberg in Otakar's honor. Castles on the Samland frontier served as bases for an advance into Samogitia, a venture that seemed on the verge of succeeding—the area was opened more or less peacefully to merchants and missionaries—when the pagans retaliated in 1259.

Exhaustion brought the conflicts to an end just before 1300. A vast wilderness of forest and swamp separated the Roman Catholic conquests from the pagan lands. Prussians now willingly joined in the conflict, because if German rule was bad, Lithuanian domination was little better; furthermore, the Prussian warriors saw an opportunity to enrich themselves significantly as raiders. Changes in Prussian society were few: nominal acceptance of Christianity, an end to bigamy and infanticide, and payment of taxes and tithes.

The Teutonic Knights encouraged commerce and happily granted lands to immigrants who would assist in territorial defense and pay taxes, which would be lower than in Germany and Poland but more than those levied on the Prussians.

The Prussian state was better ordered than Livonia, but it could not have been sustained without the contributions of men and money from the German public, the crusaders, and the order's convents in the Holy Roman Empire. Support from popes and emperors was minimal but essential. Slowly, the land began to recover and even prosper, proving once again that the most essential elements of a good society are peace, order, commercial opportunities, and personal freedom. Prussia was no utopia, but neither were the neighboring states.

[*See also* Knighthood and Knights; Orders, Military, *subentry on* Northern; Peipus, Battle of Lake; Přemysl Otakar II; Saule, Battle at River; *and* Swantopelk.]

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William Urban

Narrative (1300–1500)

The government of the Baltic lands in the late medieval period is often equated with the strict rule of an aggressive military order, the Teutonic Knights, and its northern branch, the Livonian Order. The reality was more complex. Finland was Swedish; Estonia was Danish until after the peasant revolt of 1343; Livonia had independent bishops, abbots, and cities; and Prussia also had bishops and cities, though they tended to be more subservient and cooperative. In addition, Livonia and Prussia later had important corporations of secular knights and gentry. These were feudal states, although the knights of the Order were recruited in Germany, and the high offices were elective.

A central crusader goal was the conquest of Samogitia, an independent-minded and proudly pagan Lithuanian region that lay between Prussia and Livonia, hindering communication during the winter months, when sea travel was impossible.

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Critics of the crusade employed a double standard: kings could expand their lands by war, but monks could not. In contrast, the knights, who were raised as nobles, believed that they were entitled to all the privileges granted to them, with limits set only by the pope and the emperor. The popes themselves were strong supporters of crusading in all its forms, and they saw the knights as best fit to wage these wars. Nevertheless, the critics were a notable nuisance, and the pagan rulers of Lithuania understood well how to use the divisions among the Roman Catholics to their own advantage.

The grand master of the Teutonic Order and the Livonian master were responsible for military strategy, in which they were assisted by skillful marshals and experienced officers. Because they faced powerful enemies—Novgorod, Pskov, Lithuania, and Poland—protecting the overland route from Germany to Prussia was crucial to their defenses. In 1308 when the prince who became King Władysław I of Poland (r. 1320–1333) threatened to prevent crusaders from joining Polish expeditions, the Order annexed Pomerelia (West Prussia), thereby also acquiring the services of many skilled knights. Poles were encouraged to join Germans in settling vacant Prussian lands, thereby increasing the Order's tax base and pool of available warriors.

There were usually two major expeditions each year: one in the winter when the rivers and lakes froze sufficiently for armies to use them as highways into Samogitia and Lithuania, the other after the harvest was in, so that native Prussians could accompany the army. The Prussians were valued for their courage, their delight in ravaging the property of hereditary enemies, and their skill—but every commander understood that when faced with defeat, they, like all Baltic natives, would flee into the woods.

The crusaders gathered at frontier castles—at Königsberg or Ragnit in Prussia, at Dünaburg or Goldingen in Livonia. This permitted militiamen; secular knights; "pilgrims" from Bohemia, Germany, France, England, and Scotland, and even a few lords from Poland to come in at their own pace. The primitive roads and inns could not handle all the troops at once; when the king of Bohemia came, the pressure of numbers was even greater.

Supplies waited at frontier castles or, if the advance was up the Memel (Neman; Lithuanian: Nemunas) River, on ships. If the attack went overland, through the dense frontier wilderness, supplies were hidden for use on the way back to safety. During the campaign, the armies lived off the land as much as was possible. Usually the expeditions were intended solely to burn villages, round up cattle and people, and destroy crops that might have supplied the garrisons of nearby castles, making it easier to capture them later by siege. This was the practice everywhere in Europe.

The crusaders were at the leading edge in military technology, especially siege craft. However, whatever they introduced was soon copied: when they demonstrated the value of cannon, for instance, the Lithuanians obtained their own from Poland.

The Lithuanians were handicapped by the lack of transport and tax revenue to support garrisons, but they could draw strong reinforcements from their Russian domains. Because they could not easily maintain a large standing army in anticipation of invasion, the grand dukes customarily summoned their forces only when they were certain of the route that raiders would take on the way out; then they would prepare an ambush.

Such was the situation of Winrich von Kniprode in the winter of 1348. Trapped on the Streve River, he kept his international army in battle formation until the moment came for his heavy cavalry to charge the more lightly armed enemy. This victory made it possible for the kings of Hungary and Poland to advance deep into the Lithuanian possessions in Galicia and Volhynia. The offensive, however, was stopped by the plague. Winrich was elected grand master in 1351, and he held the office with distinction for three decades.

Roman Catholic incursions continued, while Lithuanians raided Livonia, Prussia, and Poland, destroying villages and carrying away prisoners to become serfs or be sold into the international slave market. In practice there was little difference between crusaders and pagans, and in time they came to value one another's skills, valor, and honor.

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The Teutonic Knights staged impressive pageants and ceremonies that attracted visiting crusaders with their displays of chivalric culture. The celebration of the Table Round, performed before entering the Samogitian wilderness, was a high point of every great expedition. During the festivities, the most valiant knights were singled out for honor, while squires were knighted by distinguished lords.

The Lithuanian rulers understood how to play on Christian gullibility, often saving themselves from dangerous situations by asking for truces to consider conversion to Roman Catholicism. Thus when the Lithuanian supreme prince married the queen of Poland and in 1387 ordered his pagan subjects to undergo baptism, the Teutonic Knights were skeptical of his sincerity. The war continued, but with more complicated political alignments: some Lithuanians joined the crusaders, some Poles joined the Lithuanians, and Russians and Tatars became involved. When the queen of Poland died, her husband, Władysław II Jagiełło (r. 1386–1434), made his popular cousin Vytautas (r. 1401–1430) the grand duke of Lithuania.

In 1394 the grand master led a great army of English bowmen and French knights to Vilnius, where they fought desperately against Lithuanian and Russian warriors and Polish knights. Vilnius did not fall, but peace came in 1398 at Sallinwerder, where Jagiełło and Vytautas ceded Samogitia temporarily to the crusaders.

During the following decade, joint armies of Teutonic Knights, Lithuanians, and Poles fought the grand duke of Moscow, the Tatar khan, and Scandinavian pirates. This promising alliance came apart in 1409 when a new grand master escalated a dispute over Samogitia into war.

The two armies met in the border wilderness at Grunwald. Władysław II Jagiełło and Vytautas won a decisive victory but failed to capture the great castle at Marienburg (Malbork), thanks to the swift actions of a minor castellan, Heinrich von Plauen. After the Polish retreat, Plauen recovered all the Order's territories, but he was removed by officers who wanted peace. Jagiełło, however, gave the grand masters no peace—he would call up his knights, whereupon the grand masters faced the choice of doing nothing and suffering a terrible invasion, or hiring an expensive mercenary army. The revolt of 1453–1466 ended with West Prussia under Polish authority; in 1525, East Prussia became a secular Protestant duchy.

The Livonian Order assisted in attacks on Samogitia and into the Lithuanian heartland, but its success was limited by conflicts with the nearest Russian states and with the archbishop and citizens of Riga, as well as by conflicts inside the order itself. The Livonian Order's greatest moment came in 1502, when Master Wolter von Plettenberg's army of knights and mercenary infantry smashed the army of Ivan the Great (r. 1462–1505) near Pskov.

[*See also* Crusades; Grunwald, Battle of; Knighthood and Knights; Marienburg, Siege of; *and* Orders, Military, *subentry on* Northern.]

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William Urban

Historiography (500–1300)

Because of a lack of written records, the study of the military history of the Baltics before the very end of the twelfth century is based on archaeological sources. Thus the main areas of research have included studies of artifacts and ancient technologies and the archaeological and typological examination of the numerous hill forts used in the pre-Crusades period and in the thirteenth century

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as well. Worthy of mention are the archaeological catalogs of swords by Mati Mandel and Vytautas Kazakevičius, and those of the hill forts in Estonia by Evald Tõnisson. The Baltics never constituted, politically or ethnically, a homogeneous entity, and thus research remains divided into several local and quite isolated traditions (Estonian, Latvian, Polish, and others). In Estonia a compendium of the research has been published, including a detailed bibliography (Lang and Laneman).

The crusading and other military conflicts in the Baltics between 1180 and 1300 have been investigated mostly in the framework of the history of the political events and of the military orders. The main sources of the period, the chronicles by Henry of Livonia (written in the 1220s) and Peter of Dusburg (1320s) and the *Livonian Rhymed Chronicle* (1290s), include several descriptions of battles and looting raids. Most of the research is split into shorter articles, however, and there is no monograph focusing on the military history of the Baltic Crusades. Still, the classic book on the Order of the Brethren of the Sword by Friedrich Benninghoven (1965) does discuss warfare in Livonia. The volume includes a special appendix on the military strength and corresponding economic potential of thirteenth-century Livonia. Also important is Benninghoven's paper (1970) on the technique of looting raids in the Baltic region. The publications by William Urban, dealing mostly with political history, pay much attention to the military aspects as well. Several minor studies discuss decisive battles like those of Saule (1236), Peipus (1242), and Durben (Latvian: Durbe; 1260). The *Crusade and Conversion* and *Clash of Cultures* volumes edited by Alan V. Murray provide the most up-to-date research in English.

A quite specific issue of research is the interaction between native warfare and the military technologies of the crusaders, such as the adaption of machines by natives or the participation of locals in crusading warfare. Sven Ekdahl and Ain Mäesalu are the most eminent authors on the use of western European arms on the Baltic battlefields, while Dieter Heckmann and Juhan Kreem deliver comprehensive summaries of the topic, including social and organizational aspects. Thus the research on the role of local militias in the crusading armies communicates with the shifting picture of the social order of Baltic peoples at the eve of the Crusades. Until the 1990s, Estonian prehistoric society was mostly considered quite egalitarian. The modern view stresses the significance of social stratification, which made the adaption of Western warfare by natives easy. Hence the militia provided an important and vigorous part of the crusaders' armies. Worthy of mention is the book by Silvia Laul and Heiki Valk, which follows the fate of a small aboriginal community and its military duties at the eastern frontier of Livonia.

[*See also* Orders, Military, *subentry on* Northern; Peipus, Battle of Lake; *and* Saule, Battle at River.]

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Anti Selart

Historiography (1300–1500)

Research on late medieval Baltic military history concentrates mainly on the warfare of the Teutonic Order. It deals with battles, most of all the famous battle of Grunwald (1410), and with aspects of military organization and technologies of the Order. Crusading aspects of the history of northeastern Europe have received more international attention since the 1980s in connection with the general turn to the pluralist approach to the history of the Crusades. In English the military topics are most comprehensively covered by the monographs of William Urban. Regrettably, the history of the warfare of the numerous internal conflicts in Livonia and the history of its late medieval clashes with Russia have yet to be well researched. The wars between Prussia and Poland and the fifteenth-century internal conflicts in Prussia enjoy a considerably higher level of coverage. The preserved Prussian sources also provide information on the economic side of warfare in the fifteenth century (Klaus Neitmann).

The monograph by Andrzej Nowakowski (1994) is recommended as an introduction to the history of arms and armor in Prussia. Several authors (Volker Schmidtchen, Sven Ekdahl, Ain Mäesalu) stress the relatively early and effective use of firearms by the Teutonic Order, its satellite bishoprics, and the towns, as well as the up-to-date level of the armaments in medieval Baltic countries in general. The most eminent scholar of the participation of Western knights in the Baltic Crusades is Werner Paravicini. His standard work on the phenomenon of the *Preussenreisen* (chivalry crusading tours to Prussia and Livonia) presents, besides the cultural and economic aspects, the history of warfare in the late medieval Baltics, especially the almost regular looting raids from Prussia through the frontier wilderness to Lithuania.

There is also some recent research on the mercenary armies in the region (Sven Ekdahl), which replaced the combined armies of knights and native militia there from the fifteenth century onward. Beside the role of the Teutonic Order, Juhan Kreem also discusses the participation of towns in the mercenary business. The articles by Friedrich Benninghoven, although published several decades ago, remain essential for fifteenth-century military history. He discusses the numbers and movements of warriors in late medieval and early modern Livonia (1963) and points out the role of castles in the military organization of the Teutonic Order (1976). This last study has more recently found support from Sven Ekdahl (2002). A rather marginal topic has been maritime warfare; only a few authors have contributed to the issue (most recently Juhan Kreem). However, the naval history of the medieval Baltic Sea area in general is represented within the framework of research on the Hanseatic League.

Several catalogs present the state of research on fortification architecture in Prussia (Tomasz Torbus). For medieval Livonia the 1942 book by Armin Tuulse remains the latest detailed discussion of the topic in Western languages. The series

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Castella Maris Baltici (Castles of the Baltic Sea) and *Latvijas viduslaiku pilis* (Medieval Castles of Latvia) contain more up-to-date information.

[*See also* Castles, *subentry on* 1350–1500; Crusades; Fortifications; Grunwald, Battle of; Mercenaries; Naval Combat and Tactics; Orders, Military, *subentry on* Northern; *and* Slavic Lands, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1500).]

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Anti Selart

BANATE

The banates (Latin singular: *banatus*; Hungarian singular: *bánság*) were separately governed smaller territorial units located along the southern borders of the medieval kingdom of Hungary—that is, south of the Sava River and at the Lower Danube—each administered by a ban (Latin: *banus*), a royal officer. The bans were designated by the kings themselves,

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and as members of the royal council, they were in charge of one or more banates, where they acted as royal judges and regional administrative and military leaders. The first banate, of Croatia and Dalmatia, was created in the early twelfth century. The term "banate" originates in the situation that in Croatia, already before the Hungarian occupation, there existed a territory that was administered by a ban. Other banates were subsequently organized on the same pattern. The banates of Szlavónia (corresponding to modern Slavonia); Bosznia (Bosnia and Herzegovina); Ozora (Usora) and Só (Tuzla), both in Bosnia-Herzegovina; Macsó (Mačva), Barancs (Braničevo), and Kucsó (Kučevo), all in Serbia; and Szörény (Drobeta-Turnu Severin), in Romania, emerged during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The short-lived Bulgarian banate of Vidin emerged in the fourteenth century, and those of Szrebernik (Srebernik), Jajca (Jajce), Szabács (Šabac), and Nándorfehérvár (Belgrade) emerged in the fifteenth century. (Before 1199 the viceroy of Transylvania was sometimes also referred to as a "ban," but in the thirteenth century the term *voivode* replaced this title and became exclusive.)

In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries each ban generally controlled several counties (smaller administrative units, headed by counts or *comites*) adjacent to their banates. The income and the political importance of the bans—especially in the case of Croatia, Dalmatia, and Slavonia, where they exercised viceregal powers—was considerable. With the increase of the Ottoman threat in the fifteenth century, all the banates had crucial strategic positions in the defense of the territory of medieval Hungary.

[*See also* Hungarian Defense System; Hungary, *subentries on* Narrative (1000–1300) *and* Narrative (1300–1526); Transylvania; *and* Vidin, Siege of.]

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István Petrovics

BAND, CHIVALRIC ORDER OF THE

The Chivalric Order of the Band was founded in 1330 by King Alfonso XI of Castile and León (r. 1312–1350). The military order takes its name from the device associated with the organization. This was referred to in all the surviving documents as a *banda* or *vanda*, a strip of cloth worn on the knight's clothing from shoulder to hip. A secular monarchical order of knighthood, the order was created to promote chivalry and loyalty to the king, and it drew its members from the middle ranks of the Castilian nobility who were vassals of either the king or one of his sons. As members of the organization the knights had no additional political responsibilities, and other than the prestige of membership, they had no meaningful privileges beyond those enjoyed by all *filiosdalgo* (sons of fortune), the new Castilian nobility whose titles were created in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries to reward those who served the king during the *reconquista*, the Christian war against Spanish Islam.

Two contemporary redactions of the order's statutes survive: the order's rules encouraged chivalrous activities, discipline, and cooperation among its members, especially on the battlefield. In addition to military service, members regularly participated in tournaments to develop their knightly skills. Created by Alfonso as a secular version of the religious orders of knighthood, the Band also had the distinct advantage of attracting to Alfonso's court those nobles who might otherwise have allied themselves with his enemies. The order's decline began around 1353 during the civil war fought between Alfonso's sons Enrique II (r. 1369–1379) and Pedro I, "the Cruel" (r. 1350–1369). It is likely that Enrique reestablished the order after his final victory at Montiel in 1369,

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but by the reign of his great-grandson Enrique III (r. 1390–1406), the nature and prestige of the order had long been forgotten.

[*See also* Alfonso XI of Castile; Enrique II; Iberia, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1500); Montiel, Battle of; *and* Pedro I.]

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J. M. B. Porter

BANDERIUM

A Latin word, *banderium* denotes a military unit in medieval Hungary. The Italian *bandiera*, meaning a banner or battle flag with coat of arms, came into use in Hungary in the fourteenth century. The term referred to the military flag of leaders, which was used in battles as a rallying point. By the fifteenth century, *banderium* was adopted to mean the unit itself, which went to war under the banner (*vexillum*) of a lord. Originally only the king and some members of the ecclesiastical and secular aristocracy—probably on the basis of their status of holding honors—were entitled to arm and lead *banderia*, but from 1498 a royal decree specified those prelates and lords who were obliged to put their *banderia*, containing four hundred warriors each, into the field. One half of a *banderium* should consist of heavy cavalry, while the other half should contain light cavalry (hussars). Theoretically this military force based on the *banderium* system would have meant a substantial army; in reality the number of soldiers serving in the units was well under that desired, usually ranging from fifty to two hundred. This was the result of the rising costs of mounting and equipping a *banderium*. From a military point of view, the constituents of *banderia* (heavy and light cavalry) put up an effective resistance against Turkish raiding parties.

[*See also* Hungary, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1526), *and* Hussars.]

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Ferenc Sebők

BANDITS AND OUTLAWS

Brigandage and outlawry were shaped by the complex forms that medieval warfare assumed. This included war between states, kingdoms, and principalities; private wars between nobles; kingdom-wide civil war; urban rebellion; peasant rebellion, or *Jacquerie*; and provincial, regional, and separatist rebellion. Brigandage and raiding were also associated with cultural and linguistic divides, such as divides between highlanders and lowlanders and between pastoral and arable economies. Brigandage and outlawry could also assume a form of intercommunal warfare.

The term "outlaw," from the Scandinavian *utlah*, had been incorporated into Anglo-Saxon by the time of King Alfred's laws in the ninth century. The process of outlawing placed the individual and his property outside the protection of the law. Not all outlaws were bandits, and not all bandits were outlaws. The term "brigand"—from the Italian *brigante*, meaning a light-armed foot soldier—had been incorporated into English and French by 1400. The term "bandit"—from the Italian *bandite*, meaning one who had been banned, banished, or outlawed—was incorporated only some two centuries later. Brigandage was a Europe-wide phenomenon. In some instances brigandage was almost indistinguishable from ordinary criminality, with individuals and groups seeking sanctuary in forest and remote regions and surviving through theft and pillage. The depredations

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of war provided a fertile ground for such actions, and military campaigns often included operations aimed directly at brigandage's suppression. In other instances, as in fifteenth-century Normandy, brigandage was more akin to guerrilla warfare, with bandits presenting themselves as resistance fighters against alien occupiers.

Outlaws commonly gained pardon through service in the king's or lord's army. In the fourteenth century the English crown granted pardons for military service but required the outlaws to serve at their own expense. Soldiers and disbanded soldiers, and particularly soldiers of defeated rebellions and secessionist movements, often provided the recruits for bandit gangs. The tactics of pillage and living off the land were employed by regular and irregular forces, both of which might also resort to guerrilla tactics. The mercenary soldier, or condottiere, often was difficult to distinguish from the brigand. In militarized frontier regions (English: march; French: *marche*), raiders were often protected by the authorities, who offered them immunity and sanctuary. Cattle raiding, the levying of blackmail, and the abduction of men and women as hostages were among the repertoire of brigand actions. Just as warfare tended to be seasonal, in the summer, so border raiding tended to be seasonal, in the autumn and early winter, when nights became longer and cattle and horses were in better condition for long drives.

E. J. Hobsbawm's study of "social banditry," Fernand Braudel's work on the Mediterranean basin in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and Nicholas Wright's study of the Hundred Years' War emphasize the class dimension to such actions. Yet bandit gangs might be headed by noblemen, and bandits were kept in noblemen's employ as enforcers and bodyguards. Braudel attributes the involvement of noblemen in such criminal enterprises to the "crisis in noble fortunes" of this period. In particular instances, banditry became a mass phenomenon. The heroic image of the outlaw, as exemplified by the Robin Hood legend, is found in the folklore and literature of most societies. But banditry could be used as a means of enforcing social control by dominant groups, as well as being a form of retributive justice on the part of subordinate classes, groups, and peoples.

Banditry is often symptomatic of the breakdown, or embryonic nature, of the state. Traditional patriarchal societies, with strong kinship ties and strict codes of honor, and cultures imbued with a martial ethic often saw brigandage as a legitimate and honorable calling. On account of its organized nature, its capacity to impose control over tracts of territory, and its capacity to create alternative structures of authority, it posed a direct challenge to the state. The strengthening of the power of the central state removed some of the conditions that fostered brigandage, and its suppression was often realized by a combination of juridical and military means. The English crown applied the lessons learned from Bishop Rowland Lee's campaign pacifying the Welsh marches in the 1530s to other frontier zones—namely, the Anglo-Scottish border and the Irish Pale.

The suppression of brigandage reflected the transition from a control of territory that was largely military to a control that was essentially administrative and juridical in character. The suppression was associated also with social and cultural changes, what Norbert Elias characterized as the "civilizing process," reflecting changes in mores and manners, whereby individual personal retribution for offenses committed against the person became less acceptable. This was associated with the strengthening of notions of personal responsibility and obligations, in opposition to kinship and communal allegiances.

[*See also* Laws of War and the Just Conduct of War *and* Private War.]

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E. A. Rees

BANNERETS

"Banneret" was the term applied to the superior type of knight in English and French armies during the later Middle Ages. Also referred to as "knights banneret," they are to be distinguished from knights bachelor. This grade of knighthood developed simultaneously in England and France from around 1180, though the word "banneret" did not come into use until the mid-thirteenth century.

The banneret was usually an individual of considerable wealth, but what really set him apart from most men-at-arms was the leadership position he assumed on military campaigns. At war his authority was demonstrated visually through his carrying a rectangular banner (knights bachelor carried triangular pennons) and by his leading a large retinue. During the campaigns of Edward I of England (r. 1272–1307), on average bannerets led about thirteen men-at-arms, compared with bachelors' two or three. In the period of contract armies it was common for English bannerets to lead larger retinues of more than a hundred men.

In fourteenth- and fifteenth-century France, bannerets formed the lowest rung of the upper nobility, which constituted less than 2 percent of the total body of men-at-arms (including knights bachelor and esquires). Bannerets also formed a minority in the armies of the period: they constituted only 0.3 percent of the force of 674 men-at-arms recruited in 1411 by Charles of Orléans. The bannerets' men were usually vassals or rear vassals. Thirty-five bannerets from Champagne served as recruiters on the Sixth Crusade, which was led by Louis IX of France (r. 1226–1270). Later, the French royal army at Cassel in 1328 was divided into eleven *batailles* and 196 banners, demonstrating the standard-bearers' crucial tactical role.

The banner had military significance throughout Europe. In fourteenth-century Hungary, the term *banderium* (from the Italian *bandiera*) denoted a combat unit. However, the development of a new socio-military status based on the carrying of a banner in war seems to have been restricted to England, France, and possibly smaller neighboring territories like Brabant (with its *baenrots*). Elsewhere, divisions within knighthood tended to be strictly social or economic in nature.

The title "banneret" was not hereditary, and promotions to the rank might be based on individual merit. By the mid-fifteenth century, owing largely to the magnates' preference for the term "baron," the title had lost much of its significance.

[*See also Banderium and* Knighthood and Knights.]

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David Simpkin

BANNERS

The banner's primary function was to announce the identity of its bearer. Even before the development of heraldry in the twelfth century, leaders had banners with distinctive emblems. For example, three leaders of the First Crusade—Robert Curthose, Duke of Normandy; Baldwin of Boulogne, who became Baldwin I, the first king of Jerusalem; and Bohemond of Taranto (or Bohemond I, prince of Antioch)—are recorded as carrying red, white, and gold banners, respectively. Such identification was vital for the cohesion of the troops who served under the banner. Not only did the banner serve as a point around which men could rally, but its movement across the field also directed the unit's advance, retreat, and maneuver. Furthermore, the importance of the individual leader to the morale of his men made it imperative that his troops know that he was still with them, and the banner signified this. The loss of a banner could be as devastating to morale as the loss of a leader. Its fall almost invariably meant that the leader it represented had fallen or been captured

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A Knight's Banner. A knight in armor and tabard holds a banner. Drawing from Legh's Men of Arms. Harley MS 4205, fol. 65, c. 1445. © THE BRITISH LIBRARY BOARD

and that the troops under it would flee. The twelfth-century Rule of the Knights Templar, governing the brethren's behavior on and off the field, stipulated that a brother who lowered a banner in battle be expelled from the order.

Banners identified the bearer to enemies as well as to friends. It served as a challenge and a threat, a target for one's enemies. Along with the surcoat and shield, it advertised the warrior's presence on the battlefield and his participation in the engagement, and it helped ensure that his valorous deeds were recognized. Banners could also be flown to indicate the support of an individual even if he was not there in person. When William the Conqueror embarked on the Hastings campaign of 1066, he carried a banner that had been given to him by Pope Alexander II as a symbol of the pope's blessing. The banners of particular saints and churches carried onto the field either individually or collectively on carrocci (singular "carroccio")—large carts drawn by oxen—served the same purpose.

Because they were flown by men who commanded warriors, banners were also an emblem of the authority to wage war. The unfurling of a banner was seen as a declaration of war and a statement of intent to fight. Battles in which banners were displayed seem to have had a special significance. Although the English knight Sir John Chandos commanded a company throughout the whole of Edward the Black Prince's 1367 campaign in Castile (now part of Spain) against Enrique of Trastamara, it was not until the battle of Nájera that he asked the prince for permission to fly a banner, thus declaring himself to have the status and wealth to be a banneret, an upper-level commander. A number of late medieval orders of chivalry placed particular emphasis on recording the deeds performed by members in battles in which banners had been unfurled, and a regular charge in English treason trials of the fourteenth century was that the accused made war against his lord with banner displayed.

[*See also* Armies, *subentry on* Organization; Bannerets; *Carroccio*; Heralds and Heraldry; Laws of War and the Just Conduct of War; Nájera, Battle of; Shields; *and* Signals.]

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Robert W. Jones

BANNOCKBURN, BATTLE OF

In late May 1314 the constable of Stirling Castle informed Edward II that he had agreed with the besieging Scots that if not relieved by midsummer he would surrender the castle. The relief of Stirling Castle became the goal of the advancing English army, now warned of the marshy ground south of it.

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King Edward summoned to his army some 21,640 infantry from England and Wales, with an additional Irish contingent of 4,000. Because of the tense political situation in England, most earls refused to serve, and letters of protection were issued for only 890 cavalry. J. E. Morris argued for an army of 15,000 on foot with 2,000 to 3,000 cavalry, but a comparison with the army of 1322—in which those paid numbered only about a quarter of the 55,000 summoned—suggests that the 1314 army may have totaled only around 9,000. John Barbour's *The Bruce* has the Scottish army under Robert I (the Bruce) at 30,000, including 500 cavalry on light horses, with carters and "pettaill" (humble folk) in addition. Modern scholars estimate the Bruce's force at 5,000 to 9,000 or even as low as 3,500, and trust the 500 but not the 30,000.

Fourteenth-century Scots named the battle "the battle of Bannock," but the English seem to have taken back the name "Bannockburn," after the stream that courses through the boggy Carse of Stirling. As the English approached on 23 June, cavalry pressed ahead toward a Scottish group, wherein Sir Henry de Bohun identified King Robert by his crowned helmet. Sir Henry charged and missed the king with his lance; the king split his skull with an axe. The main cavalry party engaged Robert's division, was mauled, and withdrew.

The Scots in the wooded New Park, covering the road to Stirling, were drawn up in three (according to English sources) or four divisions (one under Sir James Douglas, according to Barbour). The English cavalry division that set out to circle the New Park might have relieved Stirling Castle had not the king's nephew, the Earl of Moray, and his men, in a tight hedge of spears, held the English in a close conflict and thrown them back.

That evening and night—and darkness would last from 10 P.M. to 3 A.M.—the English army or at least the cavalry force (the sources are not agreed) crossed the Bannockburn and spent a wakeful, uncomfortable night, ready in arms. Sir Alexander Seton, deserting Edward's force, crossed to King Robert, who was contemplating withdrawal to Lennox, and persuaded him to stay and fight a demoralized foe. Then or the next morning the king gave a speech, presumably to his captains: they were fighting for freedom and right; premature plundering of the enemy would impair a victory, and the kin of any slain would pay no relief or wardship.

In the morning the Scots' army offered battle when it left the New Park for the open hard ground outside, an area constricted by the steep slope down to the carse. Before battle the Scots knelt in prayer, and English sources describe an opening archery duel, with English archers in their front line driving off the Scots. Barbour ignores this episode, which would mar his triumphalism, and opens the battle with the English cavalry van falling upon Edward Bruce's division; Gloucester and other prominent English fell to the impenetrable Scottish infantry in a hard-fought struggle. Unhorsed knights, riderless horses, wounded, and dead, as well as those fighting, prevented the rearward English ranks from reaching the front. Robert threw upon these constricted English Moray's division and that of Douglas, claims Barbour, who at this point has the troublesome English archers dispersed by King Robert's five hundred light cavalry; English archers may well have troubled the Scots from the beginning, as English sources claim.

Barbour (but not English sources) now has Bruce throw his own division into the assault. Certainly the battle became a desperate trial of wills, with that of the English slowly ebbing. The Scottish carters rushed to see the fray, seeking to help their lords and shouting "kill them! on them!"—giving the appearance of reinforcements but not joining the battle. Edward II threw himself into the fray but was forced by his knights to leave the field for fear of capture, and at Stirling Castle he was apparently told that it would be surrendered. His whole force fled eastward to Dunbar, shadowed by sixty mounted men under Douglas, too few to take him. Thirty-four barons and knights at least are known to have been killed in the battle; many infantry died fleeing across the treacherous streams of the carse; others, wounded, were slain as they lay, unworthy of ransom. Corpses yielded much booty.

The battle established Robert as undoubted king of Scots, but Edward's escape meant that he still had a war to win.

Bahan dengan hak cipta

[*See also* Britain, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1500) *and* Robert I (the Bruce).]

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A. A. M. Duncan

BARBASTRO, SIEGES OF

Located at the foot of the Pyrenees in the Zaragoza region, Barbastro underwent two sieges. The Christian siege began 24–26 June and ended forty days later in August 1064. There is scholarly debate about the participants. The Aragonese under King Sancho Ramirez I (r. 1063–1094) were joined in the siege by Aquitanians under Duke Guillaume VIII, Burgundians under Thibaut, Count of Chalon, Normans under Robert Crespin, and Catalans under Armengol III, Count of Urgel.

The chronicler Ibn Hayyan of Córdoba, a contemporary of the events, names Prince Yusuf ibn Sulaiman as the town's ruler and says that five thousand Christian knights besieged Barbastro. Dying of thirst because a giant rock had blocked an underwater canal to the town, Muslims were assured safe passage by the Christians, but the besiegers broke their word, raped the women, and enslaved or massacred many of the survivors. Stories of the plunder of Barbastro ensured that many more Christian knights would go to Spain to share in similar sieges, and the Aragonese realized that French expeditions could help them expand their mountain domain.

In 1063, Pope Alexander II (r. 1061–1073) had offered relief from penance and remission of sins to any knight participating in the Iberian conflict. The modern historians Menéndez Pidal and O'Callaghan believe that as a result, the Christian siege of Barbastro transformed the reconquest into a "crusade before the crusades." Alexander II's indulgence precedes the one offered in 1095 by Pope Urban II (r. 1088–1099).

According to Ibn Hayyan, the Christian occupation of Barbastro lasted nine months. In a second siege that ended on 19 April 1065, a Muslim force under al-Muqtadir of Zaragoza (Ahmad I) and al-Mu'tadid of Seville recaptured Barbastro. Six thousand archers surrounded the city, while other men undermined its walls and eventually opened a large breach in them with fire. More than six thousand Christians, including Armengol III of Urgel, were killed. Fewer than fifty of the Christian defenders escaped.

[*See also* Iberia, *subentry on* Narrative (500–1100).]

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Arnold Odio

BARDING (HORSE ARMOR)

Although it became common in the later twelfth century to cover a knight's steed with a large flowing cloth called a "caparison," the first horse armor, the mail trapper, protecting the horse from head to knees, appeared in the thirteenth century and continued in use into the fourteenth century.

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Barding. Italian heavy horse armor made by Pier Innocenzo da Faerno, c. 1450. Wien Museum Karlsplatz. PHOTOGRAPH BY ROEL RENMANS

More elaborate protection started to appear in the later thirteenth century: plate defenses made from either cuir-bouilli (boiled leather) or metal, including the shaffron for head defense, flancards (or flanchards) for the sides, and the crupper for the rear of the horse. During the fourteenth century the shaffron was more commonly made of metal and was extended to protect the front and sides of the horse's head. The top of the head and the neck were covered by the poll plate and the crinet.

By the middle of the fifteenth century the full bard, or horse armor, consisted of a shaffron, crinet, peytral (protecting the horse's breast), flancards, and crupper. During the fifteenth century the shaffron became narrower and more open, and the peytral was shortened and flared away from the body to allow greater freedom of movement for the horse. From late in the century, horse armor was also increasingly decorated to match the armor of the rider.

During the sixteenth century the shaffron and crinet were reduced until the former covered just the upper half of the head and the latter covered just the top of the neck. The full bard was common until the 1550s, after which it increasingly went out of fashion except for use in the tournament. Horse armor was used in the joust from about 1450, often being specially designed for it. In some forms of tournament, armor was replaced by a large semicircular padded cushion, the buffet, worn across the front of the horse with a shaffron and full caparison.

[*See also* Armor, Body; Cavalry; Horsemanship; Horses; Knighthood and Knights; Livery and Uniforms; *and* Tournaments and Jousts.]

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Robert Douglas Smith

BARI, SIEGE OF

The attack against Apulia's largest port city and capital was led by Norman warlords in 1068–1071. Located in the southeast of the Italian peninsula, Bari, which lies at the entrance to the Adriatic Sea, was the Byzantine governor's stronghold. This decisive struggle took place within the context of the wars between the Byzantines who controlled this region and Norman invaders from the north. The siege lasted nearly four years, and Robert of Hauteville, also known as "Guiscard," managed the feat of transforming a troop of valiant and adventurous horsemen into genuine siege strategists. The mercenary era was coming to an end, and the focus had shifted to an authentic territorial—and specifically urban—plan of conquest that would definitively facilitate the establishment of a principality in the center of the Mediterranean region.

The Norman forces first attacked Bari on 5 August 1068, perhaps to take advantage of the discomfort caused by the summer heat, and in hopes of a swift victory. The combined assault by land and by sea showcased the talent of a group of warriors at a moment when Byzantine elite troops had been recalled to fight in the east to defend Anatolia against the advancing Turks, who had just won the battle of Mantzikert. To ensure their greater military advantage, the Normans initiated a maritime blockade of this major port by building a large wooden pontoon—a sort of floating dock—on the sea, complete with a tower that would prevent the supply and rescue vessels sent by the emperor from Constantinople from reaching the port.

The fall of the city of Otranto, after that of Brindisi, dealt the final blow to any hopes of support from the region's other Byzantine cities. Nonetheless, Bari resisted the Norman assaults with such strength that Guiscard decided to use siege machinery to bring down the city's walls—an attempt that failed. Taking heart, the Byzantines expected assistance from a naval expedition that had been launched from Constantinople. By this time the isolated city could not hold out much longer, because the Normans had won a resounding victory on the land front. Some sources suggest that the Normans initiated dealings with nobles inside the city to negotiate surrender; in any case the Norman forces were regaining the upper hand under such dramatic circumstances that the city's famished population was calling for negotiations. Conspiracies emerged aimed at eliminating the warring leaders. The anticipated assistance from Constantinople never materialized. A Norman rebel entrusted with a supply convoy of twenty vessels tried to break through the blockade to bring renewed courage to the besieged, but the Normans defeated the convoy in February 1071. Disunion among its defenders further weakened the city: Argyros, the son of Melo, who commanded the Byzantine garrison, had cast off the protection of Constantinople, thus facilitating Norman initiatives.

Drained and destitute, Bari's inhabitants agreed to surrender, and Argyros, who had become a Norman supporter, obtained acceptable terms after difficult negotiations. On 15 April 1071 the metropolis of Byzantine Apulia was conquered by Norman horsemen after five centuries of Greek presence in southern Italy. To display their domination, the Norman horsemen built a castle overlooking the city, as they did everywhere else in Apulia, Calabria, and, later, Sicily. After this triumph their conquest of Sicily gained momentum.

[*See also* Norman Conquests, Norman Expansion *and* Robert Guiscard.]

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Bernard Doumerc

BARNET, BATTLE OF

See Roses, Wars of the.

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BASIL I

(811/30/35/36–886), Byzantine emperor and founder of the Macedonian dynasty. The date of Basil's birth is uncertain. Born in Thrace or Macedonia of humble origins, Basil rose through his skills as a horse trainer to become a groom in the imperial stables. Basil became friends with the Byzantine emperor Michael III and was crowned co-emperor by Michael in 866. He took full power after Michael's murder in September 867.

Basil's reign saw the continuation of the steady expansion of Byzantine military authority that had begun in the early ninth century. Entrusting most of his campaigns to generals, Basil oversaw efforts to reestablish Byzantine control in eastern Anatolia and in the Aegean and southern Adriatic. Basil significantly strengthened the navy in an effort to curtail Arab raiding in the Aegean. The naval commander Niketas Oryphas had several victories over Cretan Arabs in the early 870s. Cyprus was reconquered sometime around 875. In 876 the Byzantines recaptured the city of Bari from Louis II. Despite these successes the Arabs of Sicily conquered Syracuse, the empire's major foothold in Sicily, in 878.

In the east a major success of Basil's reign was the defeat of the Paulicians, a group of non-Chalcedonian Christians in eastern Anatolia who rebelled against imperial authority. The Paulicians allied with the Muslim emirs of Melitene and significantly weakened imperial control over the eastern frontier. Christopher, the *domestikos* (commander) of the *scholai* military unit, campaigned against the Paulicians with some success in 872. In 873, Basil himself led a campaign in the effort to conquer the important city of Melitene. He conquered Taranta, Zapetra, and Samosata but was forced to withdraw his siege of Melitene. The Paulician capital at Tephrike was captured in 878, ending the Paulician principality. Also in 878, Andrew the Scythian, who held the rank of *domestikos tōn scholōn*, defeated the Arab army defending Tarsos at the Podandos River, but he did not invest Tarsos. Basil I died on 29 August 886.

[*See also* Bathys Ryax, Battle of, *and* Byzantine Empire, *subentry on* Narrative (500–900).]

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BASIL II

(958–1025), Byzantine emperor from 976 to 1025. Basil II's reign, the longest of any Byzantine emperor, witnessed a number of episodes and events of enduring importance. The formal conversion in 988/9 to Orthodox Christianity of the ruler of the Rus' of Kiev, Vladimir I (Sviatoslavich), must be singled out. However, if one follows extant Greek histories, notably that of John Skylitzes (who must be used with care and skepticism), Basil's greatest military achievement was the annexation of Bulgaria, which followed a protracted war in discrete stages. Basil's first campaign in 986 ended in disaster, his army routed at Trajan's Gate. The historian Leo the Deacon was a witness to the victory of Samuel Kometopoulos, who claimed the title of emperor of the Bulgarians. From his base at Prespa, Samuel led invasions as far south as the Isthmus of Corinth, engendering great fear, as reflected in the *Life of St. Nikon*, which was written within living memory of Samuel's campaigns. Basil's ability to respond was restricted by the need to campaign in the east, where the Fatimids attacked Antioch and Aleppo. In 996, however, the Byzantines enjoyed a great victory at the battle of Spercheios under the general Nikephoros Ouranos.

In 1001, Basil took the field again, and his first advance toward Sardica (modern Sofia) in that year divided Samuel's realm in two. Success in the northeast was swift, as the generals Theodorokan and Nikephoros Xiphias easily recovered Preslav, Little Preslav (Presthlavitza), and Pliska. To the west, a four-year campaign may have led to a peace treaty. There is little evidence for Balkan campaigns between 1005 and 1014, when Basil won the infamous battle of Kleidion ("the little key"), also called

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the battle of Belasica, on 29 July. According to legend, the battle resulted in the blinding of fifteen thousand Bulgarians and the death of Samuel, who was shocked into a stroke by the sight of his returning army. However, the war continued for another four years, despite Basil's circulating news of his "atrocities" to instill fear in his opponents and to bolster the image he had chosen for himself—that of a tireless warrior emperor, ever vigilant in the service of his subjects. This sentiment was recorded on Basil's own epitaph, although there greater emphasis is placed on his eastern successes against Caucasian Iberians, Abasgians, and Arabs.

In contrast with Skylitzes's accounts of events in the west, Harun ibn Yahya's accounts of eastern affairs can be trusted. The historian Catherine Holmes suggests that Basil exercised his authority over and through the army, which she regards as the dominant force of the period. Rather than a struggle between the emperor and wealthy landed aristocrats for control of the empire's resources, Holmes discerns a competition for control of offices of state, principally military, as determining foreign and domestic policy. Thus Basil was compelled to undertake lengthy campaigns, which pushed forward the frontiers without regard for the long-term consequences of expansion. Basil trusted few men, and the success of those few as generals was rewarded with their appointments as plenipotentiaries. Notable among these was Nikephoros Ouranos, who from about the year 1000 operated over vast regions.

[*See also* Byzantine Empire, *subentry on* Narrative (900–1204).]

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Paul Stephenson

BASTIDES

Originally the word *bastide* meant mainly a structure, typically of wood, erected outside a castle or fortified town during a siege, at a short distance from the defended walls. This structure served as an outpost for various purposes: a mine might be tunneled under the wall to create a breach, the foundations might be attacked in a trench, or an attack might be launched directly from on top. The word *bastide* could also be used in the general sense of a stronghold.

However, for historians the word *bastide* generally has a different connotation, derived from its use in the dialect of Provençal. There the word was applied to new towns founded roughly between 1150 and 1450, mainly from 1250 to 1350, which often had a distinctive rectangular form with streets at right angles, along with strong walls. The streets may be arcaded, as at Monpazier, one of the best-known *bastides*. The explanation for the name may be that they were usually found in less settled areas. They were established by both French and English men (kings, monks, or local lords) and are particularly associated with Alphonse of Poitiers, Saint Louis's brother, and with King Edward I, who founded towns in both France and Wales. The Welsh towns are entirely overshadowed by huge castles, whereas the Gascon towns had either no castle or a fairly small one and indeed were mostly unfortified until well after their foundation. In Wales the object was to subdue a hostile population, and in Gascony it was to stake a claim to possession of a frontier area, as well as to enhance the profitability of underpopulated lands. For example, between 1279 and 1287, Edward's seneschal Jean III de Grailly, Captal de Buch, founded and granted liberties and franchises to at least twenty-four *bastides* in the Agenais, which had just come under English control.

[*See also* Edward I of England *and* Urban Defenses.]

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BATHYS RYAX, BATTLE OF

Part of the final Byzantine offensive against the Paulicians in eastern Anatolia, the battle of Bathys Ryax was fought in 878 to confront and bring to battle the rebel leader Chrysocheir. Toward the end of their campaigning season, Byzantine forces were still shadowing their enemy, although Chrysocheir seems to have been unaware of this. He eventually pitched camp in the plain at the foot of the mountains that form the head of the valley of Bathys Ryax (the modern-day Kalnırmak Gap) on the northeastern edge of the Akdağ, an important strategic location and established meeting place for the Byzantine forces of eastern Anatolia when campaigning in the region. The pursuing forces took up their position behind the enemy host and on the saddle between the two hills above them. A select force of some six hundred men from the pursuing imperial divisions then mounted a dawn attack, supported by the remaining forces, who created a great clamor, with trumpets and beating of drums, to panic the enemy soldiers into believing that the entire combined district army under the *domestikos* (commander in chief) had fallen upon them.

The plan worked perfectly. The enemy host fell into a complete panic, some leaping onto their horses and fleeing, others cutting the loads off their pack animals and trying to escape on them. Their baggage train and all the booty they had been able to collect were seized by the forces of Basil I. Chrysocheir himself fled with a few bodyguards but was killed during the flight, and the pursuit of the broken army, many of whom then ran into the much larger force under the *domestikos*, stretched across some thirty miles (fifty kilometers) of the province. The battle of Bathys Ryax marked the effective end of independence for Paulicians and of their resistance: their chief fortress, Tephrike, held out for only a short while thereafter.

[*See also* Basil I *and* Byzantine Empire, *subentry on* Narrative (500–900).]

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John Haldon

BATTLE, HISTORIOGRAPHY OF

In the writings of the ancient world, battle was always regarded as the supreme test of war. Although ancient histories describe other military events, notably sieges, battle was privileged and given an overwhelming prominence. Yet in the fifth century the Roman writer Vegetius advised against offering battle except in the most favorable circumstances: "Good generals never engage in a general engagement except when opportunity offers, or under great necessity." He went on to suggest that "a great strategy is to press the enemy more with famine than with the sword" (pp. 109–110). This advocacy of economic warfare reflected much of the reality of ancient warfare, in which the destruction of crops and the disruption of agricultural life were very important. Vegetius was regarded as the authority on war in Europe in the Middle Ages. But the glory of battle, its dramatic and apparently decisive nature, tended to obscure these other aspects of war in contemporary sources. Contemporary events were recorded by the clergy, who were normally drawn from the ranks of the knights, and petty aristocracy, who formed the military elite of medieval society. Though they sometimes deplored the destruction visited upon the poor by war, their attention was seized by great events like battles. This prominence was reinforced by the chivalric ethos of the warrior elite for whom they wrote, which rejoiced in battle as the supreme test of personal valor.

In medieval society, battle enjoyed a special prominence, and this did reflect a reality—that all armies, and therefore all soldiers, had to be prepared for battle even if they were bent on avoiding it, because in any campaign there was always the risk of being trapped by the enemy and forced to fight. Moreover, modern historians have been influenced by the nineteenth-century Prussian general and military strategist Carl von Clausewitz, who argued, "Wherever a great and positive goal exists, one that will seriously affect the enemy, a great battle is not only the most natural but also the best means of achieving it" (p. 259). At the same time, the Industrial Revolution made it possible to sustain intense conflict in a way that simply had never been possible before. The romanticism of

nineteenth-century thought was much affected by the drama of battle at a time when mass publishing appeared for the first time. The result was the production of popular works, exemplified by Edward Creasy's *Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World* (1851), that gave rise to a whole genre of books about decisive battles, emphasizing the notion that war is battle. This idea was powerfully reinforced by the experience of two world wars, which were, in effect, continuous battles. This view of warfare was projected onto the medieval past and dominated the work of Charles William Chadwick Oman, which is written around famous conflicts like Hastings and Crécy. As a result, much of the day-to-day reality of medieval warfare was simply written out of the historical record, and much military activity was dismissed as pointless.

Since the last quarter of the twentieth century, historians have evolved a much more complex picture of the place of battle in medieval warfare. R. C. Smail is concerned with crusading warfare, but he points out that the Franks of the East were very cautious about engaging in pitched battle. When faced with a superior enemy in the field, he argues, they resorted to the fighting march, in which the army formed itself into a kind of moving fortress, with the infantry protecting the knights and baggage train from the attacks of Turkish archers. Such a formation enabled the Franks to choose whether or when to give battle by opening their formation. Most important, John Gillingham portrays Richard I of England and Anjou and William I of England (William the Conqueror) as commanders who shrewdly directed ravaging and siege as the best and most effective ways of achieving their ends. John France broadly accepts such a view and argues, in addition, that even when battle occurred, it was not as decisive as was once thought; France points to Frederick II's great victory at Cortenuova (1237), which had no long-term consequences, especially considering that in the following year he failed to capture the city of Brescia. Overall such writers have been concerned with the period before 1300, and they argue that battle was an occasional, if highly important, event that was not necessarily decisive in its results when compared to the less spectacular business of siege and ravaging. Herbert J. Hewitt thinks that the large-scale raids of the Hundred Years' War continued this.

To the contrary, Stephen Morillo has suggested that battle was commoner than these writers have thought, while Clifford J. Rogers believes that the English under Edward III adopted a deliberate battle-seeking strategy against their French enemies. This discussion is closely linked to another important issue. Traditionally the heavy cavalry, the knights, were seen as the dominant element in medieval warfare. However, Bernard S. Bachrach has argued that this must be seriously modified because cavalry were useless in sieges, and Matthew Bennett has pointed to the importance of infantry even in battle. Kelly DeVries has considerably emphasized the importance of infantry in the later Middle Ages, when the archer was only one element among them.

Increasingly, therefore, battle is seen as only one aspect of medieval warfare, and out of the discussions and disagreements has emerged more information about how it was fought. Simple views of knightly charges sweeping all before them until they were superseded by English archers in the fourteenth century no longer stand. Battlefield archaeology, a new science, can, as at Aljubarrota, reveal the importance of temporary fortifications. At Wisby (1361) and elsewhere, investigation of mass graves has taught us a great deal about armor, weapons, and the wounds they inflicted. A detailed analysis of the use of firearms, notably by Bert S. Hall, has charted the development of these weapons and the way they were used on the battlefield. Since about 1970, new and intensive studies of medieval warfare have sought to present a more rounded picture of the way in which men fought, encompassing topics like logistics, which had hitherto been largely ignored. Although historians differ over the importance they attribute to battle in particular circumstances, there is a real consensus that traditional "battle history" has had its day and that we can no longer understand warfare simply in terms of a succession of spectacular clashes on the field of honor.

[*See also* Battlefield Archaeology: Strategy; *and* Tactics, Battle.]

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John France

BATTLEFIELD ARCHAEOLOGY

The archaeological investigation of battle sites is a relatively recent innovation but one that has the potential to shed important new light on events that thus far have been the exclusive domain of the historian. An ever-increasing number of battlefields, ranging in date from the most ancient to the relatively modern, are being subject to various types of examination, including topographic survey, metal detector survey, geophysical survey, environmental analysis, and excavation. A number of medieval battlefields have found a place on this growing list.

In the United Kingdom, where battlefield archaeology has had a notable flowering, the best-known work on a medieval site is associated with the battle of Towton, which was fought during the Wars of the Roses in 1461 and is reputed to be the bloodiest battle ever fought on British soil. In 1996, workmen discovered a mass grave while building a house extension near the battlefield close to Tadcaster, in North Yorkshire. Archaeologists were called in and the resulting excavation exposed the remains of forty-three individuals tightly packed into a pit measuring 6 meters by 2 meters (19 feet by 6 feet), and not much more than half a meter (20 inches) deep.

No clothing survived, and any armor had been removed prior to burial, but forensic examination of the trauma inflicted on the bones during the battle told an eloquent and rather shocking story about the nature of medieval warfare. In many cases the head and face seem to have been the focus for a series of deadly cuts, slashes, gouges, and blows, which in some cases were more than would have been required to kill the individual—it has been suggested that this may be an expression of the particularly bloody and vindictive nonchivalrous character of a civil war

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fought in the late medieval period. It was possible to match some wounds to specific weapon types. These include square-shaped puncture wounds in the skull created by a blow from the point of a war hammer, which was a distinctive weapon of the fifteenth century and capable of penetrating plate armor.

Since the discovery of the mass grave a prolonged program of metal detector survey has added much to our knowledge of the battle itself. The mass grave was located some distance to the north of the main battle site and may represent the burial of soldiers killed during the rout of Lancastrian troops—in many medieval battles the greatest amount of killing occurred when one side broke and was pursued by the other. Artifacts include numerous buckles, strap ends, chaps, and small pieces of armor, many of which had been pulled or cut free during close quarters fighting. Also recovered was an important assemblage of arrowheads, though these represent only a very small percentage of the tens of thousands of arrows launched on the day of the battle.

The striking results from Towton have inspired archaeologists to examine other British medieval battle sites—among them Bannockburn (1314), Shrewsbury (1403), and Bosworth (1485). Bannockburn was fought between a Scottish army under Robert the Bruce and a larger English army under Edward II. It is a good example of the uncertainty about the exact location of many medieval battles, which were fought before it was common practice to create maps of these events almost as soon as they had taken place. In a 2001 study, historians identified no fewer than six possible sites. Two of these are thought to be much more likely than the others: the first on low ground, on the flood plain of the river Forth that is known as the Carse; and the second on higher ground overlooking the Carse.

In theory, archaeological survey, including the use of metal detectors, is an ideal way to confirm the location of battles, rather than relying on the traditional crossed swords on much later maps. Limited metal detector survey on both of these areas has, however, failed to recover any artifacts that can unequivocally be identified with the battle, though evidence for previously unrecorded eighteenth-century engagement have been recovered—probably related to the Jacobite siege of Stirling Castle in 1746 (the battle of Bannockburn was itself fought as the English attempted to lift the Scottish siege of the castle).

The same story is thus far also true of the Shrewsbury battle sites, but at Bosworth the project has recently succeeded in recovering artifacts related to the battle. The popularity of battlefields as educational resources and tourist friendly sites has grown over the years and, like Bosworth, a number of them have visitor centers, with Shrewsbury being the most recent to open. It is likely that in the future the desire to establish visitor centers and provide on-site interpretation will motivate and indeed finance further archaeological surveys. It is clear that the archaeological visibility of medieval battles is not always high, assuming that the work carried out on those sites is in the right location. This is in contrast with battles from later periods, particularly once powder and lead shot replaced the bow and arrow as the principal forms of missile weaponry.

Even the battles that sit on the cusp of the two technologies, and therefore the boundary between the medieval and postmedieval periods, have demonstrated the potential for the survival of greater amounts of battle-related artifacts. These include the 1519 site of the battle of Flodden and the 1547 site of the battle of Pinkie. Metal detector survey of the former has resulted in the recovery of artillery shot while both artillery and musket shot have been recovered from Pinkie. It is relevant to note here that the key Bosworth artifacts recovered through metal detector survey are composite lead and iron shot from early handguns, of which relatively few were deployed, and not the arrowheads which would have been used in their thousands during the battle.

There are several possible explanations for this apparent dearth of artifacts. One is that medieval battles were fought a considerable time ago and so the metal artifacts are less likely to survive. Before the introduction of firearms most weapons were made from iron—tips of spears, arrowheads, sword and knife blades, and so on—and in even slightly acid soils iron is extremely prone to corrosion. Some factors

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that may promote the decay of iron include differential waterlogging and drying of soils, which occurred during the intervening centuries on the Carse at Bannockburn. Other factors are the nature of medieval society, technology, and the character of battle.

Given the vast quantities of arrows that must have been launched in most of the many medieval battles, the relatively small number of arrowheads recovered has caused some archaeologists surprise, if not consternation. This situation is in stark contrast with the relatively large quantities of lead shot recovered from battlefields of the seventeenth century (in the United Kingdom largely from the civil war period) and later. If musket balls miss their target they are likely to be lost and become incorporated within the archaeological record, essentially because of their small size and relative invisibility and the minimum expense and effort involved in their manufacture. Arrows, on the other hand, are highly visible—stuck in the ground in the thousands, with their feather flights upward, they must have appeared like crops of flowers waiting to be harvested. And harvested they certainly were; arrowheads that missed their targets were obviously reusable (at Towton arrows shot by the Lancastrians fell short of their targets in the wind and were shot back by the Yorkists). Unlike musket balls, arrows were difficult to manufacture, involving several elements in the composite whole—shaft, flight, and head.

The scavenging of battle sites was almost an industry, with auctions for armor taking place on the field no sooner than bodies could be stripped—looting was an important source of income for nonprofessional medieval troops. Other weapons, such as the spears and swords, being large, highly visible, and reusable, would also be collected after any battle. As demonstrated at Towton, the types of artifact most likely to be left behind as archaeology were personal items of clothing and equipment (such as fastenings, coins, small pieces of armor, etc.), which are not going to be picked up in the immediate aftermath of battle. Unfortunately for the archaeologist, these are also the types of object (nonferrous) most likely to be collected by hobbyist metal detectorists, who generally have an aversion to collecting pieces of rusty iron. This was apparent at Shrewsbury, where local detectorists recovered hundreds of such items over many years of detecting on the battle site.

Outside of the United Kingdom a rare example of a medieval site with plentiful evidence for artifacts and human remains comes from the grave pit at Visby in Gotland, where hundreds of skeletons were found along with much of the armor that the soldiers wore in the battle, which took place outside the city walls in 1361. There are perhaps two reasons why this site contrasts so strongly with the mass grave at Towton, where the soldiers were buried with no armor at all. The battle of Visby was fought in high summer temperatures—Towton in a snowstorm—and so the bodies would begin to putrefy very quickly after the battle, a factor that would make stripping armor and reusing it a less than appealing prospect. Additionally, the Swedish citizen troops defending the town included many older and some very young residents using arms and armor of some antiquity, which again may have made it less attractive to the victorious Danes.

All things considered though, perhaps the greatest threat to medieval battlefields is posed by modern development. Many battlefield sites, which after all can cover considerable expanses of the landscape, have been built on or lost to activities such as quarrying. In the early twenty-first century, the battlefields in the United Kingdom do not enjoy any form of legal protection, but this situation may change over time, though of course in order to protect a battle site one needs to know where it is. Despite the caveats, there is hope that archaeological research will continue play a vital role in the important task of defining the location and extent of these important sites.

[*See also* Armor, Body; Bannockburn, Battle of; Robert I (the Bruce); Shrewsbury, Battle of; *and* Visby, Battle of.]

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Tony Pollard

BATTLEWAGONS

Wagons are a necessary component for transportation of any sizable military group moving across terrain. Wagon burials of warrior elites are known throughout Germania from the late Hallstatt period (c. sixth century B.C.E.), and the chariot is well attested in premedieval and non-European contexts.



Battlewagons. The outer wagon line is made up of wheeled shields; the inner row is a line of supply wagons. Illustration from the *Mittelalterliches Hausbuch*, c. 1480.

Whether these military wagons were commonly used as battlewagons—that is, actively in any offensive manner—is debatable, although isolated examples (e.g., by the Visigoths at Adrianople in 378 C.E.) can be found. Throughout the Middle Ages, wagons are shown in military contexts transporting arms, equipment (including a huge wine tun in the Bayeux Tapestry), soldiers, and war booty, and there are occasional instances in which a disadvantaged group takes shelter behind its baggage carts in battle. By the fourteenth century, there are clear records of wagons being used either offensively or defensively in warfare. (The Italian *carroccio* was somewhat different in concept and is treated in a separate entry.) Guido da Vigevano proposed two geared battlewagons in his *Texaurus regis Francie* (c. 1335), one driven by men turning a crank inside and the other powered by a tower windmill. By the early fifteenth century, numerous military treatises, such as Robert Valturio's *De re militari*, Konrad Kyeser's *Bellifortis*, and many late medieval versions of the late Roman *De rebus bellicis*, describe or depict fanciful wheeled siege wagons.

The classic example of making a defensive formation of circled wagons into offensively capable battlewagons, however, is credited to Jan Žižka, general of the Hussite rebellion in Bohemia in the 1420s. The fifteenth century saw their widespread adoption in central Europe. In marching, Žižka used two wings of wagon trains to protect his flanks. When engaged, the wagons were circled in a hasty form of field fortification, but Žižka went further by adding an upper hoarding to defend his men, chaining the wagons together, and blocking up the spaces between the wheels with shields to make the *Wagenburg* relatively impenetrable. He also dug hasty ditches outside the ring. He then supplemented the hand and missile weapons used from within the wagons with small-caliber gunpowder artillery on stands and larger ordnance mounted in the wagons themselves. Žižka's *Wagenburg* tactics enabled the Hussites to decimate attacking cavalry and made him famous across Europe and beyond; by the sixteenth century, Crimean Tatars, Russian troops, and the Ottomans, as well as forces of the Holy Roman

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Empire (e.g., Emperor Frederick III), adopted the tactic, and even some in Spain and Milan argued for its value.

[*See also* Agincourt, Battle of; *Carroccio*; Frederick III of Habsburg; *and* Žižka, Jan.]

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BAUGÉ, BATTLE OF

In the early spring of 1421, Thomas, Duke of Clarence, acting as regent in Normandy for his brother Henry V, launched an offensive into Anjou at the head of an army of some five thousand to six thousand men. Clarence's target was the city of Angers, but failing to take it by surprise, he withdrew in a northeasterly direction. A Franco-Scottish force under the command of the Earl of Buchan flanked by French commanders such as the Sieur de Lafayette and Étienne de Vignolles was mobilized to counter the English threat. Its numbers and precise composition are unclear, though its overall strength was probably similar to that of Clarence's forces, and it contained significant numbers of Scottish archers.

It is not clear how far the armies were aware of each other's movements. Though contemporary chroniclers talk variously of Clarence's issuing a formal challenge to battle or of there being an agreed truce in force for Holy Week, it seems likely that Clarence became aware of the presence of hostile forces encamped in his line of march near the village of Baugé only when his foragers captured some Scots. Clarence instantly decided on a surprise attack, against the advice of his senior commanders; invalided home after the siege of Harfleur in 1415, he had not been present at Agincourt, and it is possible that he wished to make his own mark as a battlefield commander. In consequence he set off on 22 March with a mounted force of some fifteen hundred to two thousand men-at-arms but—crucially—hardly any archers.

Initially his gamble appeared to pay off. Scottish soldiers were playing ball and bathing in the river Couesnon (which lay between Clarence and the main Franco-Scottish force) when scouts spotted Clarence's advance. A hastily assembled group of Scottish archers held the bridge over the river and obliged Clarence's men to dismount in order to force their passage. On the far side of the river, a larger Scottish force further delayed their advance before being compelled to retreat. Clarence's men then remounted and headed for Baugé, where they met the main allied force. It is impossible to deduce deployments or even a coherent account of events from the sparse and confusing accounts of the ensuing battle, but Clarence's forces were ultimately overwhelmed by superior numbers. Clarence himself was killed, and senior nobles such as the Duke of Somerset and the Earl of Huntingdon were captured. In all, some one thousand English were killed and a further five hundred to six hundred captured. Franco-Scottish losses are not recorded but seem to have been relatively light.

The rest of the English army, composed mostly of archers under the Earl of Salisbury, succeeded in eluding a rather halfhearted pursuit. A number of towns were retaken by forces loyal to Charles VII, but a reinforcing English army under Henry V stabilized the situation in the summer. The victory did, however, bring substantial personal gains to individual Scottish commanders and justified Charles's policy of importing Scottish armies to sustain his cause—no more were they dismissed as "mutton guzzlers and wine bags."

[*See also* France, *subentry on* Narrative (1328–1483), *and* Hundred Years' War.]

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BAYBARS I

(c. 1223–1277), the fifth ruler of the Mamluk Sultanate, from 1260 to 1277. Baybars's reign saw the institutionalization of the state, the expansion and strengthening of the army, the successful struggle against the Mongols, and the reduction of the crusader (Frankish) presence in the Levant. Baybars was born into one of the Qipchaq Turkish tribes who were nomads on the steppe north of the Black Sea; as a young man he was brought as a captive to Egypt and eventually was enrolled in the Bahriyya Mamluk regiment of the Ayyubid sultan al-Malik al-Salih Ayyub (r. 1240–1249). Baybars participated with distinction in the battle of Mansurah (1250) in the Nile Delta against the Franks and in the assassination of the sultan al-Mu'azzam Turanshah later that year, which led to the establishment of what became the Mamluk Sultanate. In the infighting among the Mamluk units and officers, however, Baybars was forced to flee with his comrades from the Bahriyya to Syria in 1253, serving there as a mercenary to different Ayyubid princes.

With the approach of the Mongols to the area, Baybars returned to Egypt, cooperating with the new sultan Qutuz in the latter's unequivocal anti-Mongol policy. In this capacity he led the Mamluk vanguard that bested the Mongol advanced troops east of Acre in the Esdraelon Valley before the battle of 'Ayn Jalut (The Well of Goliath) on 3 September 1260. The battle ended in a complete Mamluk victory and with their gaining control over most of Syria up to the Euphrates. In the aftermath of this battle, however, Mamluk relations soured with Qutuz, who was murdered in a conspiracy led by Baybars; Baybars was thereupon named sultan and took the royal title of al-Malik al-Zahir ("the conquering king").

The biggest challenge facing Baybars was to prepare the Mamluk army for what was sure to be another conflict with the Il-Khanid Mongols, not only with an advanced division as at 'Ayn Jalut but also with a much larger army. Baybars set about expanding his forces in general and raising the army's level of preparedness through training, inspections, maneuvers, and frequent smaller campaigns (especially against Franks and Armenians; see below). His personal unit of Mamluks, the Zahiriyya, numbered some four thousand men (compared to about one thousand in the Bahriyya). The size of the Mamluk army was probably twice the size of the forces of their Ayyubid predecessors in Egypt and Syria. The continual supply of young Turkish Mamluks was guaranteed by the opening of diplomatic relations with the Mongol Golden Horde (whose rulers were at odds with their cousins the Il-Khanids of Iran), in the region of today's southern Russia and Ukraine, and with Michael VIII Palaiologos of Byzantium, because the ships carrying the young Mamluks could pass through the Bosporus without problems. A regular, efficient foreign espionage service was established; bridges were built and improved to facilitate the movement of troops, especially in the winter; and effective communications between Cairo and the main cities of Syria (and from there to the frontier) was maintained with a pony-express system, a pigeon post, and bonfires. Fortifications on the frontier and inland were improved and kept up. All Mongol raids and rumors of impending offensives were met with a forceful response, and there were frequent Mamluk raids across the border into Mongol-controlled territory, culminating in the campaign into Anatolia in 1276, in which the local Mongol garrison was defeated at Elbistan.

Vis-à-vis the Frankish crusaders, Baybars adopted a more aggressive policy than that of his Ayyubid predecessors, and from the mid-1260s he attacked

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Frankish forts and cities whenever there were breaks in the war with the Mongols. Thus Caesarea and Arsuf were taken in 1265, Safad in 1266, Antioch in 1269, Krac des Chevaliers in 1270, and Montfort in 1271, along with many other smaller castles. Coastal fortifications were generally destroyed as they were taken, because Baybars decided not to split up his mobile army, based on mounted archers, into garrisons. Several devastating raids were also launched into the Kingdom of Lesser Armenia in Cilicia, to punish it for its support of the Mongols.

Baybars died in 1277 in Damascus after returning from his campaign in Anatolia. He left his successors a strong centralized state, a much-reduced crusader entity, and an army ready to deal with the Mongols—as witnessed in the battle of Homs in 1281, at which the Mamluks under the sultan Qalawun won a difficult but decisive victory.

[*See also* Mamluks *and* Mongols.]

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Reuven Amitai

BAYEUX TAPESTRY

The Bayeux Tapestry, a monument of the Norman Conquest of England, is an embroidery of wool on linen, 68.38 meters (224 feet) long and about 50 centimeters (20 inches) high. Although documentation concerning its origin is lacking, general opinion is that it was created between 1066 and 1086 in southern England, although both Bayeux (in Normandy) and the Loire Valley have been argued as alternates. The visual narrative combines carefully chosen and edited events from the years 1064–1066, culminating in the battle of Hastings, in which William I, Duke of Normandy, defeated Harold Godwinson, King of England. Odo, Bishop of Bayeux and William's half brother, is considered to be the most likely patron, but William himself; Eustace, Count of Boulogne; and Queen Edith, Edward the Confessor's widow, have also been argued for this role. The likely audience would have been the military elite of the emerging post-1066 Anglo-Norman society, although the broader population might have had the opportunity to view the embroidery.

Because of its vivid representation of warfare, the Bayeux Tapestry has been seen as providing information about eleventh-century military matters. But this is an artwork, as well as a piece of overt Norman propaganda, and a certain skepticism is warranted in accepting the seeming veracity of its representations. It should also be kept in mind that the embroidery has been repaired and restored quite heavily in some areas, which could lead to a misreading of details. The embroidery re-creates two quite different military endeavors successfully undertaken by William I, "the Conqueror." The first is his campaign against Conan II, Count of Brittany, in which the Normans attack the fortifications at Dol, Rennes, and Dinan. Contrary to the account of William of Poitiers, the castles are attacked by mounted cavalry and torched. Although the tapestry clearly indicates motte and bailey fortifications in 1064 Brittany, there is no solid archaeological evidence to support their existence. This type of castle, which had become common in post-Hastings England by the time the tapestry was created, may very well be employed here as a symbol of Norman military dominance on both sides of the Channel.

The embroidery's battle of Hastings sequence pits the French cavalry against the English infantry, with both sides being supported by archers; the Continental heavy infantry noted by William of Poitiers is omitted entirely. The famous English "shield wall" is featured. The great carnage on both sides

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The Bayeux Tapestry. Detail of the English "shield wall" (*right*). c. 1066–1086. MUSÉE DE LA TAPISSERIE, BAYEUX, FRANCE/WITH SPECIAL AUTHORIZATION OF THE CITY OF BAYEUX/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

is directly referred to, and the brutality of hand-to-hand combat is witnessed in the many mutilated and decapitated corpses filling the lower border. There is little agreement concerning the accuracy of the specific tactics indicated, such as the handling of the lances or the axes, although the actual representation of the weapons can be supported by archaeological evidence. Both sides are shown in identical stylized chain mail, a motif that equalizes the French and English military elite, while the archers and the English levy are mostly clad in civilian clothing. The depiction of the battle of Hastings shares the tenor of the contemporary chanson de geste in its emphasis on fighting as the decider in territorial and dynastic disputes, in the emphasis on the bravery and heroism of the military class, and in its awareness of brutality and death as the lot of both the conquered and the conquerors.

[*See also* Arts, Visual; Hastings, Battle of; Norman Conquests, Norman Expansion; *and* William I.]

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BEAUMARIS CASTLE

See Welsh Castles of Edward I.

BEDFORD, SIEGE OF

The siege of Bedford castle during the minority of Henry III began on 20 June and ended on 15 August 1224. At the heart of the contest, and the reason for the considerable resources thrown into the siege by the crown, lay the matter of royal authority; one historian, F. M. Powicke, has judged the siege "the most considerable military operation in the reign of

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Bedford Castle. Model of how the castle might have looked. A mound of earth is all that remains of the castle today. COURTESY SIMON SPEED

Henry III." It was important enough to divert vitally needed help from Poitou, which was in the process of being conquered by Louis VIII.

Bedford's castellan, the notorious mercenary Fawkes de Bréauté, was accused of being a public enemy and of raiding the area surrounding the castle. Henry de Braybrooke, an enemy of Fawkes and his brother William, judged against him; Braybrooke was promptly abducted by William and incarcerated at Bedford. Royal commands to release him were ignored, and the king, not yet seventeen and under the influence of the justiciar Hubert de Burgh, ordered preparations for a siege. When royal forces invested the castle on 22 June, Fawkes was not there; the castle had been placed under the command of William. The besiegers had called upon the resources of the whole kingdom to take Bedford. Despite the impressive siege train, the garrison of eighty men or more, eleven of whom were knights, had confidence in the castle's strong design and Fawkes's promise to assist them; according to the chronicler Ralph of Coggeshall, they defended the castle "with foolish bravery and stubborn probity."

The castle was surrounded by siege machines: on the east side, two mangonels and another stone thrower, a petrary, kept up a constant barrage of the keep; on the west, two mangonels assaulted the old tower; and on the north and south sides, two other mangonels were placed. In addition to these a cat offered protection to miners sapping at the base of the walls, ballistae shot large bolts at the battlements, and two belfries, constructed higher than the castle walls, provided platforms for crossbowmen. As the contemporary chronicler Roger of Wendover records, "from that time no one in the castle could take off his armour without being mortally wounded." The defense was equally fierce: of the besiegers, some six royal knights and perhaps as many as two hundred soldiers and engineers were killed. However, the pressure of the siege began to bring results. First the barbican was taken, with the deaths of four or five defenders. Another costly attack took the outer bailey when the first mine was fired and brought down a section of the wall, allowing the besiegers to storm through the breach. The defenders then took to the keep, pursued too closely by some royal troops who were taken prisoner. On 14 August, another mine cracked the keep's walls and filled it with smoke. This marked the end for the garrison, many of whom were seriously wounded. They surrendered the next day. At the opening of the siege, Henry had sworn to hang every man if he had to take the castle by storm. This he did. (Three knights were actually saved when swinging.) Fawkes was treated more leniently: he was exiled.

[*See also* Fortifications, *subentry on* Overview; *and* Siege Warfare, *subentry on* Tactics and Technology.]

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BÉLA IV

(1206–1270), king of Hungary from 1235 to 1270. Béla, renowned as the second founder of the country, rebuilt Hungary after the Mongol invasion of

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1241–1242. He was the firstborn son of Andrew II and Gertrude of Merania. The assassination of his mother in 1213 and his conflicts with his father caused a difficult childhood that shaped his whole life. Béla was a serious, conservative, rather humorless person with uncommon administrative gifts, strongly disapproving of his father's happy-go-lucky ways. His model was his grandfather, Béla III. As a "younger king" (1228–1231), and later as king (1235–1239), Béla tried to recover the landed estates granted by his father to so-called undeserving persons—an anachronistic measure that made him very unpopular.

Béla was crowned in 1214 but not given a province to govern. In 1220, Andrew II was forced to cede Croatia and Slavonia to his son. In 1226, because Béla found strong support there, Andrew removed him from this province and made him the duke of Transylvania. Béla led an expansion toward the south and the east; attempted, with the Dominicans, to convert the Cumans to Christianity; and in 1233 took the title of king of Cumania. The so-called eastern Hungarians in Bashkiria informed him about the planned Mongol invasion of Europe.

As a military leader, Béla was rather unsuccessful. Before ascending the throne, he led a few independent campaigns (Bulgaria, 1228; Galicia, 1229; Austria, 1231), but then, and even later, he followed his father militarily. As king he gave asylum to Cumans fleeing before the Mongols, and he pursued a pro-Cuman policy, infuriating the Hungarians. Eventually the Cumans left Hungary, and the weakened royal army was annihilated near Muhi (1241). The Mongols devastated the country, and Béla, with his family and retinue, fled to Dalmatia.

Béla returned to his country and launched radical socioeconomic and military reforms only after the Mongols had left Hungary in 1242. He resumed the practice of granting landed estates to nobles, upon the condition that the grantees build new-style stone castles. He invited new settlers to Hungary, and fostered the creation of walled towns by granting extensive urban privileges. He lured the Cumans back into his country; together with the nomadic Alans (Jászok), they formed a special light cavalry in the royal army. Anticipating another Mongol attack, Béla formed matrimonial alliances with the Cumans and with eastern peoples (Poland, Galicia, Chernigov). Though he was able to reinforce his influence in Bosnia, he had to renounce Zadar, and he was defeated by Přemysl Otakar II at Kroissenbrunn. In contrast with Béla, his son, István V, was a very talented military leader who defeated his father several times in the civil war that erupted between them in the 1260s.

[*See also* Cumans; Hungary, *subentry on* Narrative (1000–1300); Kroissenbrunn, Battle of; Mongols; Muhi, Battle of; Přemysl Otakar II; *and* Slavic Lands, *subentry on* Narrative (1000–1300).]

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István Petrovics

BELGRADE, SIEGE OF

See Nándorfehérvár (Belgrade), Siege of.

BELISARIOS

(c. 500–565), Byzantine general. Born at Germana in Dacia Mediterranea (Sapareva Banya, in southwestern Bulgaria) to a family of romanized Thracians, Belisarios entered in the guard of the *magister militum* (master of the soldiers) of Justinian, the future emperor, in the 520s. In 527 he led his first expedition, into Persarmenia. After he was appointed duke of Mesopotamia in the same year, Belisarios began to strengthen the frontier with new forts, but a sudden Persian attack resulted in a serious defeat (528). Despite this failure, he became commander of the eastern army in April 529. The victory at Dara in 530 was followed by a grave defeat at Callinicum on 19 April 531, the worst in his career; the right flank was broken by the Lakhmid light cavalry,

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which was allied with Persia. Dismissed, Belisarios was soon recalled as a reward for suppressing, using his private soldiers (*bucellarii*), the *Nika* revolt, in which the populace of Constantinople rioted against the emperor (January 532).

This victory convinced Justinian that Belisarios deserved to be appointed commander of the army sent in 533 against the Vandals in Africa. The battles of Carthage and Tricamarum led to the conquest of the entire Vandal kingdom. Returning in triumph with the captive king Gelimer in spring 534, Belisarios subsequently became consul (535) and *patricius* (536). His actions had initiated the recovery of the lost western provinces of the Byzantine Empire, which recovery then continued with the campaign against the Ostrogothic kingdom of Italy.

After the rapid conquest of Sicily in December 535, Belisarios repressed a mutiny at Carthage and continued the campaign by landing in Calabria. Naples was occupied after a siege that lasted twenty days. The army advanced toward Rome, which was conquered on 9 December 536. The Gothic forces immediately left the city. After a desperate battle against the army of King Vitigis, Belisarios organized the defense of Rome, which endured a siege from 21 February 537. He used the human and material resources of the garrison and of the civilians with maximal efficiency. The siege ended in March 538. After the truce proposed by the Goths, Belisarios launched a campaign in northern Italy, seeking to occupy the Ostrogothic kingdom. Step by step the main cities were conquered in 538–540, including the capital, Ravenna, in May 540.

In 540 the war with Persia resumed, and the next year Belisarios was again given command of the eastern army. After some minor actions he advanced to Dara in the summer of 541, but in the winter he was recalled to Constantinople. Next spring, Belisarios was sent to repel a new Persian offensive; he convinced the envoy of the emperor Chosroes I that the Persians could not win. The withdrawal of the Persian army was considered another major victory for Belisarios. However, the intrigues of the empress Theodora led to his dismissal in the summer of 542.

Meanwhile, the Ostrogoths rebelled in Italy in 541. In the summer of 544, Belisarios was recalled to fight against them, but the forces he recruited from Illyricum were small—just four thousand men. After landing at Ravenna, his army advanced to Rome but failed to prevent the conquest of the city by King Totila on 17 December 546. After some months Belisarios entered Rome with new forces, but he suffered a grave defeat at Ruscia at the beginning of 548. Because the Italian campaign was a fiasco, Belisarios remained without a command for a long time, although he preserved the title of *magister militum Orientis*. He was recalled to service in early 559 when Constantinople was threatened by the Kutrigurs, a group of Turkic warriors who had advanced beyond the Wall of Thrace. Although his forces were weak, Belisarios was able to repel the invaders with an ambush that compensated for the great difference in manpower.

The victory at the Wall of Thrace proved that, even toward the end of his life (he died in March 565), Belisarios retained his brilliant capacity to achieve success with small but well-trained forces. He also distinguished himself through his skill at organizing and resisting sieges. He had a merciful attitude toward the conquered people, which often won their support, and he was held in high esteem by his soldiers, who never rebelled. The victories of Belisarios stemmed from a combination of audacity, personal involvement in battle, discipline, and wise management of human and material resources. In light of these qualities, many scholars consider him the most effective Byzantine general.

[*See also* Byzantine Empire; Carthage, Battle of; Dara, Battle of; Justinian I; Siege Warfare, *subentry on* Byzantine Siege Warfare; *and* Wall of Thrace.]

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Alexandru Madgearu

BENEVENTO, BATTLE OF

The battle of Benevento was fought near Benevento in modern southern Italy on 26 February 1266 between the armies of Charles of Anjou and Manfred, the king of Sicily, the illegitimate son of Frederick II Hohenstaufen.

At the death in 1254 of Frederick II's son and heir—and Manfred's half brother—Conrad IV, the rightful heir to the kingdom of Sicily (the Regno) was Conrad's son Conrad V, known as Conradin, who was only two years old. Taking advantage of false rumors that Conradin was dead (rumors that Manfred may well have started himself), Manfred usurped the Sicilian throne in 1258. Stung by the Ghibelline victory—aided by Manfred—at Montaperti in 1260, Pope Urban IV was determined to wrench the Regno from Manfred's hands and concluded a secret treaty with Charles of Anjou in 1263. The pope promised Charles the Sicilian crown and invited him to replace Manfred by force of arms.

Charles sailed from the harbor of Marseille and reached Rome in May 1265 after a storm near Pisa, where he risked facing Manfred's fleet. His progress was then halted temporarily because of financial difficulties and the need to wait for his army to pass through northern Italy, which was largely under Ghibelline control. Manfred, however, did not take the offensive until January 1266, after Charles's main army had reached Rome, where Charles was crowned king of Sicily by Pope Urban IV.

Instead of waiting for reinforcements from Sicily, Abruzzi, and Calabria, Manfred, fearing desertions and dissension among his ranks, moved toward Charles's army and intended to fight as soon as possible. Charles attempted to turn Manfred's position at Capua—the main access to the Regno—by a perilous crossing of the Apennines near Alife, but the crossing wrecked his supply line. Meanwhile Manfred was wise in his maneuvers and remained in a strong position across the river Calore, crossed by a single bridge near Benevento in a plain known as Roseto or Grandella.

Manfred divided his army into three divisions. The first division, of twelve hundred German knights, was led by his uncle, Galvano Lancia. The second division consisted of Italian Ghibellines and German knights totaling about a thousand soldiers, commanded by Count Giordano of Anglona, a vicar from Tuscany. The third division, consisting of fourteen hundred knights, many Saracen archers from Lucera, and infantry soldiers, was led by the counts of Apulia under Manfred's personal command.

Charles divided his army in a similar manner. The infantry and the first division of a thousand Provençal knights were at the front, led by Hugh of Mirepoix and Philip of Montfort. Behind them was the second division, of nine hundred men: Italians, Provençals, and knights from Champagne. This division was led by Charles himself, Guy de Montfort, and the standard-bearer Guillaume Etendard. The third division consisted of seven hundred men from Flanders under Gilles II de Trasignies, Constable of France, and Robert III of Flanders. Behind all was a final division of three hundred Tuscan Guelphs, led by Guido Guerra.

The battle began in the morning when Manfred advanced his first line of German heavy knights. They drove off Charles's first division, which was the most powerful. The German army advanced, and at first Manfred's knights seemed unstoppable: their heavy swords intimidated the enemy, and Charles was forced to bring in his second division of troops to help the vanguard. The Florentine Guelphs followed Charles, and the third line of the Angevins faced the knights led by Count Giordano. For some time the fate of the battle was left undecided. But then, against chivalric code, the Angevins began severing the legs of the enemy's horses. The Germans were swiftly broken.

The tide of the battle now rapidly turned against Manfred. His troops were forced to march across the bridge over the Calore to reach the field. Manfred ordered his third line to help those at the front, but after the Italian defeat, most of the nobles from

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the Regno, such as the counts of Acerra and Caserta, deserted him, leaving Manfred with very few followers. After exchanging the royal coat of arms with his faithful knight Tebaldo Annibaldi, Manfred and his followers charged into the fray and were killed.

Many counts were killed and captured by Charles's army, such as Giordano of Anglona and Pierasino Uberti. Some days later Manfred's body was found on the battlefield and buried under the bridge of Calore, outside papal territory, because he had been excommunicated. Manfred's defeat at Benevento marked the beginning of Angevin rule in southern Italy; this rule was later menaced by the coming of the young Conradin, who was ultimately defeated at the battle of Tagliacozzo in 1268.

[*See also* Charles of Anjou; Conradin; Montaperti, Battle of; *and* Tagliacozzo, Battle of.]

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BERENGAR

(d. 924), king of Italy (888–924) and Holy Roman emperor (915–924). When the emperor Louis II died without a male heir in 875, Marquis Berengar of Friuli was among the numerous collateral Carolingians who competed for the crowns of Italy and the Holy Roman Empire for the next ninety years. He was crowned king of Italy in 888 and emperor in 915. Berengar I remained a power in Italian politics for more than five decades despite an uneven military record.

It is unclear that Berengar ever won a pitched battle, and he unquestionably suffered a number of defeats. Guy of Spoleto (king of Italy 889–894, emperor 891–894), a rival claimant of the crown of Italy, won the battle on the Trebbia in 889. The resulting treaty left Berengar with a kingdom not much larger than his original march. Leading a numerically superior but internally divided force, Berengar was defeated by the Magyars at the battle of the Brenta on 24 September 899. A Magyar raid reached as far as Pavia but quickly retreated when Berengar's army approached. Seemingly exhausted by the pursuit across the Po plain, the Magyars tried to negotiate terms for withdrawal. The Italians, who had the advantage of numbers and were perhaps fooled by the enemy's quick retreat, refused. As the talks dragged on, the watch in Berengar's camp grew lax. The Magyars launched a sudden attack that cost many lives, and the raid turned into an invasion. Like many rulers, Berengar entered into treaties that bought off some Magyar attacks; he used the contacts thus established when he was threatened by rebellion in 921.

Berengar successfully used the threat of battle to force his opponents to withdraw or negotiate. Louis III of Provence received the crown of Italy in 900 and the imperial crown in 901. In 902, Berengar marched against him at Pavia. Although no battle took place, Louis left Italy with the promise not to return. When he did return in 905, Louis was taken prisoner by the citizens of Verona and, on Berengar's order, blinded as an oath breaker.

Berengar also did well when he had the advantage of surprise. In 921 a rebellion led by Marquis Adalbert of Ivrea, Count Giselbert of Brescia, Archbishop Lambert of Milan, and the former count palatine Odelric failed when Berengar made a surprise attack on their camp outside Brescia. The emperor eventually released the survivors, but Berengar's troops apparently included at least two contingents of Magyars led by Dursác and Bugat, and this aroused great

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anger. Shortly afterward, Rudolf of Burgundy was offered the crown of Italy.

The worst and final defeat was suffered at Fiorenzuola d'Arda on 17 July 923. Berengar, now in his mid-seventies, and Rudolf were both on the field. Initially victorious, Berengar allowed his troops to loot and was then routed by a second attack. Whether he was again deceived by a too-easy victory or had lost control of his troops, the bloody defeat ended his long career. He was assassinated in Verona the following year.

[*See also* Firenzuola, Battle of.]

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BERGAMO, SIEGE OF

By 1419, Francesco Bussone, Count of Carmagnola (1385–1432), had enjoyed several years of success in his reconquest of the Duchy of Milan on behalf of Duke Filippo Maria Visconti (r. 1412–1447), whose ambition was to reconstitute the duchy as it had been under Giangaleazzo Visconti (r. 1378–1402). Still outside the duke's control were some of the most important eastern districts, notably the towns of Bergamo and Brescia, both of which were occupied by the Malatesta lords of Rimini. Filippo Maria was intent on returning both to Milanese obedience.

Carmagnola began his spring 1419 campaign with a force that may have numbered as many as twenty-five thousand infantry and four thousand cavalry. He moved first against Cremona, occupied by Gabrino Fondulo. His soldiers laid waste to much of the surrounding country, but a relief force of three hundred lances sent by Pandolfo Malatesta in support of Fondulo forced Carmagnola to pull back from the town. Leaving a force near Cremona under his lieutenant Jacopo dal Verme, Carmagnola, reinforced with one thousand infantry and three hundred horse (under the Marquis of Monferrat), crossed the Oglio River and turned north toward Bergamo. In mid-June he paid twelve thousand florins to take possession without a fight of the castle at Martinengo. From there his troops descended on Bergamo and placed it under siege.

In early July, Carmagnola's troops defeated a relief column of militia sent from Val Seriana to raise the siege. According to the Milanese historian Bernardino Corio (writing in the early sixteenth century), the troops attacked with such ferocity in this engagement that their opponents fled into the mountains, never to be heard from again. Carmagnola's successes were not due to martial valor alone, however. By paying bribes he was able, in mid-July, to secure the surrender of the citadel at La Cappella from Cecco and Antonio Guastafamiglia, the captains from Rimini that held the fort. From La Cappella, Carmagnola was able to bombard the walls of Bergamo itself. After a week of bombardment, the Milanese army took the town. The defenders retreated to the citadel, located high on top of the town's volcanic outcrop. Under fire and without any real hope of relief, the citadel capitulated only two days later, on 26 July. On 8 August, Carmagnola received a pledge of fidelity from the commune of Bergamo and from the town's principal families. Under the convention, all of the town's citizens would be spared except for the assassins of Giovanni Maria Visconti (r. 1402–1412), who had been hiding out in Bergamo.

From Bergamo, Carmagnola went from success to success. Many smaller fortified places in the surrounding eastern districts soon fell to Milanese forces. Cremona was placed under siege in November, its possession ultimately bought from Fondulo in February 1420 for the hefty sum of forty thousand florins. Brescia surrendered to Filippo Maria in March of the following year. These successes were met with jubilation in Milan, and Carmagnola, who had succeeded where the famed Facino

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Cane had repeatedly failed, was rewarded handsomely, receiving Milanese citizenship and immunity from taxes. He was also given a grand palace in Milan, called Broletto Nuovo.

[*See also* Bussone, Francesco; Cane, Facino; *and* Malatesta, Sigismondo Pandolfo, and the Malatesta Clan.]

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BERRHOE, BATTLE OF

See Tryavna Pass, Battle of.

BERWICK, SIEGES OF

Berwick-upon-Tweed was frequently besieged in the Anglo-Scottish wars of the fourteenth century because of its strategic position: it was the gateway from Scotland to the English eastern march. In addition, the town was relatively large and was an important seaport, exporting wool, hides, grain, and salmon. It remained a bone of contention throughout the Middle Ages until it was finally captured for England in 1482.

Siege of 1296. In 1296, Berwick was the prime target for the large army of Edward I of England (r. 1272–1307). Edward methodically surrounded the town with a palisade and earthworks. Then, on 30 March 1296, he stormed and captured it easily, massacring the inhabitants, perhaps as a signal to the rest of Scotland of what would follow should further resistance be attempted. He resettled and rebuilt the town with the help of English merchants. In 1297, Sir William Wallace briefly recaptured the town for the Scots, although he did not regain control of the castle.

From 1297 to 1318, Berwick remained in English hands, but from about 1311 it was increasingly menaced by the forces of Robert I (the Bruce), King of Scotland (r. 1306–1329). Under Edward II of England (r. 1307–1327), payment and supply of English garrisons in Scotland were neglected. The large garrison at Berwick was ill-paid, ill-supplied, and, consequently, unruly. It raided the surrounding countryside, charged country people extortionately for admission in times of danger, and alienated those in the rural hinterland.

On 6 December 1312 the Scots made their first attempt to capture the town by stealth, using spears to place ingenious rope ladders against the walls. However, the townsfolk were warned of the attack by the barking of a dog, and the attempt was thwarted.

Siege of 1315–1318. Following the tremendous Scottish victory at Bannockburn in 1314, the English townsfolk spent £270 on emergency defenses, which included a new ditch, a new stretch of wall, and a barbican. Pressure on Berwick ebbed and flowed; the Scots rarely had the manpower or machinery to mount an attack. Attempts to take Berwick by stealth continued, and maritime blockade by Flemish, Scottish, and German privateers ensured that provisions ran desperately short.

Letters from the beleaguered garrison in the winter of 1315–1316 describe how people lived on horseflesh, wages were long overdue, and the men became increasingly prone to desertion. In January 1316 the Scots launched an amphibious attack. In February the warden, Maurice de Berkeley, reported that the town garrison was deserting, leaving only the castle garrison. That same month, twenty men-at-arms and sixty foot soldiers were killed when the garrison, which had risked a raid on Teviotdale in Scotland, was ambushed. In March, Berkeley wrote to the king, complaining that he had only three hundred men-at-arms, of whom only fifty were mounted. Also, two supply vessels were captured by the privateers who blockaded the town by sea. In the winter of 1316–1317, Edward II had to order that money be sent urgently to Berwick to prevent desertion from the garrison.

Siege of 1319. Robert and the Scots captured the town in 1318, and Robert set about raising the walls to a defensible height. The English knew that Berwick held the key to the eastern march, and that if it were not recaptured, the war was as good as lost. Accordingly Edward II and his bitter domestic adversary Thomas, Earl of Lancaster, made peace and deployed a force of seventy-seven ships and fourteen thousand troops to recover it.

Robert entrusted defense of Berwick to Walter Stewart, who was aided by a Flemish engineer, John Crabbe. Naval engagements began by 1 September 1319, and land battles commenced on 8 or 9 September. While their siege engines were in transit, the English resorted to primitive stratagems. They brought a ship alongside the seawall and hoisted a lifeboat full of soldiers up the mast until the boat was level with the parapet. The soldiers then tried to gain the parapet. However, the tide ebbed, and the ship ran aground. The Scots sallied out, attacking and burning the ship. Also, the English constructed mobile shelters known as "sows," placed under the walls so that sappers could undermine the foundations, safe from a rain of stones and other missiles. However, Crabbe, the engineer, smashed one sow with stones fired from a catapult, and destroyed another by using a crane to deliver flaming material onto it.

Robert recognized that if the siege continued, the English would eventually prevail. As a diversion he dispatched into England a swift force of mounted raiders that laid waste the countryside around York and put the men from Yorkshire to flight. Instantly the English army encamped before Berwick divided. Northern English lords, including Lancaster, wanted to return to defend their lands against the marauding Scots; the southern English, including Edward II, wanted to persevere with the siege. The king accused Lancaster of treachery, and the army disintegrated.

Siege of 1333. In 1333, Edward de Balliol, pretender to the Scottish throne, invaded Scotland with the connivance of Edward III of England (r. 1327–1377) and promptly laid siege to Berwick. As in 1319, siege was expected, and the town's defenses had been strengthened by Sir Alexander Seton, the warden. In April, Balliol's forces encamped outside the town and dug a ditch to sever its communications with the countryside.

At the end of May, Edward III arrived with a large force to support Balliol's siege. A bombardment commenced, with three engines firing stones into the town. Firearms, or fireworks, may also have been deployed. Several major assaults on the walls failed, but the besiegers succeeded in breaking the underground conduits carrying water into the town. On 27 June the English launched another simultaneous attack by land and sea. The defenders prepared large quantities of faggots soaked in tar with which to set fire to English ships, but in an accidental fire, these burned down a large part of the town. To secure a truce, the defenders surrendered twelve hostages and promised that, if not relieved by 11 July, they would surrender.

Accordingly, Sir Archibald Douglas, the Guardian of Scotland, confronted the English with a large force. After arriving outside Berwick, he raided English towns across the river Tweed. Subsequently the Scots made further raids, and they threatened Bamburgh Castle, where the English queen was staying. Edward III refused either to abandon the siege or to concede that Berwick had been relieved, and he began to hang the hostages. In negotiations, it was agreed that Berwick would surrender if the Scots failed to win a pitched battle, cross the river Tweed at a certain point, or insert two hundred men-at-arms into the town. Consequently, on 19 July the two armies met at Halidon Hill, where the Scots suffered a terrible defeat. On the following morning the defenders of Berwick opened their gates to the English.

[*See also* Britain; Crabbe, John; Edward III of England; Halidon Hill, Battle of; *and* Robert I (the Bruce).]

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Colm McNamee

BEVERSHOUTSVELD, BATTLE OF

The conflict that ultimately included the battles of both Beversholtsveld and Westrozebeke (Rosebeke) began as a rebellion by the town of Ghent against the Flemish count Louis de Male. Although Louis had a long reign, taking over when his father, Louis de Nevers, died at the battle of Crécy, his reign had not been easy. Not only did the French exert political influence and the English economic influence on his county, but the citizens of its largest cities—Ghent, Bruges, and Ypres—were constantly revolting against almost all of his policies. To secure his control Louis often played one of these cities off against another. In 1379 the count permitted the town of Bruges to dig a canal from the city to the Leie River, thus threatening Ghent's monopoly of river traffic. To stop the canal's construction, the inhabitants of Ghent rose up against the count. For more than two years the rebellion was fought, sometimes with great ferocity. Several times negotiations between the rebels and the count led to peace, but these agreements never lasted for long before rebellion broke out once again.

Peace was again attempted in April 1382, with most Flemings accepting the count's concessions, but the Ghentenaar forces, led by Philip van Artevelde, son of the earlier rebel leader Jacob van Artevelde, would not settle. On 3 May they attacked the town of Bruges, fighting a battle outside the walls of the town at Beversholtsveld. There are several contemporary sources for this battle, especially from the southern Low Countries, and these provide substantial evidence for recreating the battle.

Because of the destruction of the rebellion, recent Flemish harvests had been slim. Ghent had suffered hunger for several months, as the count had directed what food there was to those towns aligned with him, including Bruges. Louis de Male had also taken refuge in Bruges. Thus Philip van Artevelde and other rebel leaders decided to target that city for attack. The rebel army was between only four and eight thousand strong, but they were accompanied by a large number of gunpowder artillery pieces, brought by the Ghentenaar army to besiege Bruges. It is difficult to know how many were in the Brugeois force; it no doubt included the count's army, as well as the town's militia. Sources claim an overwhelming numerical advantage for Bruges, but they had also been celebrating the Holy Blood procession, and many of them were inebriated.

The Ghentenaar forces were well arrayed and prepared for battle, while the Brugeois troops were disordered and confused. But they still outnumbered the rebels, and Philip van Artevelde must have thought that the Brugeois forces still posed a threat. When the two armies closed in on each other, instead of engaging in hand-to-hand combat Philip fired his guns into them. This so surprised the Brugeois troops that they dropped their weapons, turned, and fled back into their city. The Ghentenaar troops then charged into them, catching most before they could enter the gates. Soon the rebels had control of the city, looting it and slaughtering any who tried to stop them. The number of casualties was high, but Louis de Male was not among them; evading the Ghentenaar forces, he fled to safety during the night.

Victory could not be celebrated for long, however, because the battle prompted the young French king Charles VI to enter the rebellion. His army's arrival later in 1382 led to the decisive defeat of Philip van Artevelde and his rebels at the battle of Westrozebeke.

[*See also* Artevelde, Philip van; Low Countries, *subentries on* Narrative (1300–1479) *and* Historiography (1300–1479); *and* Westrozebeke, Battle of.]

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BISHOPS

[*This entry contains three subentries, an overview of bishops and their role in warfare, on sources, and on historiography.*]

Overview

Traditional episcopal duties were theoretically restricted to the functions of a priest, a teacher, and a shepherd. Strategy in war was no episcopal job. Theoretically, theology and canon law banned clerical warfare throughout the centuries.

There were, however, two restraints. First, beginning in late antiquity bishops had to fulfill political and administrative functions in the secular sphere, and these sometimes led to belligerent activities. Second, beginning by the end of the sixth century, most bishops emanated from the martial nobility, with all the consequences that this close kin and spiritual connection had for episcopal administration. Over the centuries these two factors led to an episcopacy that could not be peaceful even if it wanted to be.

Ecclesiastical authors sought to escape this dilemma by trying to justify a reduced episcopal military authority of three sorts. First, they referred to the doctrine of a just war: war should be allowed to defend the *patria* (homeland) and to fend off pagans. Sometimes a bishop claimed in this way the royal function of peacekeeping. Second, bishops should not be allowed to fight on their own, but they should be allowed to encourage others to fight against the enemies of God. Third, by feudal law, bishops were obliged to pay tribute to the king for their fiefs, in the form of military contingents as well. This last argument was much more convincing if the support helped to sustain the God-given governance of the king as a *vicarius Christi* (representative of Christ on earth).

Episcopal Functions in War. Bishops had important military functions in war: pastoral care (especially by hearing confessions), moral support (by transporting relics that would contribute to victory, for example), and praying for victory. Furthermore, bishops played an important part not only in excusing or justifying use of force, but also in demanding it. Although best known in this respect, the Crusades were far from being unique. Another well-known example is that during the Hundred Years' War, English bishops distributed propaganda and rallied popular support for several campaigns. The border between spiritual or intellectual succor and passage at arms was vague. In 742 the Concilium Germanicum allowed "military chaplains" to carry weapons. Often, especially in France, bishops became victims of violent actions.

The secular military functions of the episcopate especially concerned the allocation of resources. Episcopal cities with their impressive fortifications (Cologne, Würzburg, Salzburg) were not only practically invincible military fortresses. Their urban merchants also amassed great wealth—a circumstance that offered possibilities for bishops to raise war loans—and they engaged in the production and commerce of weapons (Cologne). Episcopal castles had similar functions: they not only protected outlying areas but also served as residences for episcopal liege men, who administrated surrounding fiefs. All these factors enabled bishops to arm numerous military units. And the better the episcopal organization was, the more willingly the king raised the bishopric through the transfer of royal property.

In warfare the bishop could act as an independent warlord or as a leader of his contingent in the royal army. Bishops sometimes directly participated in battles. Furthermore, bishops were valuable court counselors. They often held responsible positions like treasurer or chancellor to the king, and as a result they played major roles in the fiscal and logistical

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Bishops at War. Two bishops lead a group of crusaders in mail armor during the invasion of Palestine. Illustration from *Chronologia magna*, Egerton MS 1500, fol. 46, fourteenth century. Photograph by Erich Lessing. ART RESOURCE, NY

arrangements necessary for the conduct of war. Their ecclesiastical office and high education made them suited to act as mediators—an important activity in the Middle Ages, because medieval conflicts could be calmed only by ritualized negotiations led by eminently respectable individuals (ecclesiastics).

Causes of War. Over the centuries there were a few interrelated causes for a bishop to be at war. On the one hand, there were personal, or diocesan, causes for making war. They concerned, first, defense against external threats directed at episcopal territory (the Normans, Hungarians, and Saracens). Second, there were conflicts with aristocratic rivals, provoked by the bishop's family connections and leading in some cases to schismatic elections, such as for Normandy and Greater Anjou. Third, bishops were threatened, sometimes fatally, by uprisings of the citizens and *ministeriales* (servile administrators) of the episcopal city. Fourth, bishops, acting as one secular liege lord among others, engaged in power politics that led to conflicts.

On the other hand, there were public causes of war depending on the special relationship between bishops and the king. First, there was the support called *servitium regis* (service for the king based on fiefs). Second, there were conflicts between emperor and pope involving bishops. And third, bishops sometimes had to take sides in conflicts between the king and a rival king.

To the End of the Carolingian Era. In late antiquity and the Merovingian era, the authority of bishops was concentrated in episcopal cities. The military mission of bishops was primarily to protect their own episcopal cities against barbarian raids by defense and fortification policies and to build up a corresponding administrative organization. This gain in power led to bishops' being involved in conflicts with regional nobility (and the king) and to a greater risk of being murdered by rivals.

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After Charles Martel broke the independent power of the episcopacy in the early eighth century, the military-political power of bishops and abbots was confined to service of the king. Bishops and abbots were obligated for military service in the army of Charlemagne and in this capacity strengthened the position of king and emperor. Thus did an objectively defined official duty of important churchmen, *servitium regis*, become institutionalized. The king compensated this service by assigning royal property to ecclesiastic institutions. In this way a special relationship between king and churchmen arose, the imperial church (*Reichskirche*). Furthermore, these prelates were exempted from the interdictions of canon law, which prohibited clerical warfare. All the while, prelates became increasingly interested in the art of ancient warfare, as the numerous copies of Vegetius's *De re militari* show.

In the ninth century, bishops organized the defense against the raids of the Normans, Hungarians, and Saracens, as the king failed in this function. One indicator of this development is the number of bishops killed in action in the period 880–907: around fourteen (arch)bishops, perhaps one of the highest numbers in the whole Middle Ages. The literature of this time depicts the ideal bishop as a holy warrior in the name of Christ, one who knows how to protect his flock.

Tenth to Thirteenth Centuries. During the tenth century, Carolingian traditions were intensified, especially in Germany. The king assigned bishops complete counties (e.g. Le Puy in 924), granted them the authority to coin money, and gave them permission to construct fortresses (the latter two privileges were called "regalia," or royal prerogatives). In return the king demanded greater military support. Royal influence on the appointment of a bishop was crucial for securing the loyalty of bishops, yet the appointment was not the authoritative act of the king, but rather the result of a complex selection process. Nevertheless the king could exert his influence on episcopal appointments far more than on succession to secular fiefs, which was usually by heredity. As a result the monarch typically had the economic and military resources of church lands under much better control than those of secular magnates. But in the eleventh century, criticism of bishops' role in warfare was expressed emphatically as part of the ecclesiastical reform movement. Nevertheless the attempt to disappropriate bishops (deprive them of their regalia) and to confine them to purely ecclesiastic functions failed. No one, not even the pope, could neglect the military potential of bishops, because in the tradition of the *pax Dei*, *treuga Dei* (peace and truce of God) movement, the episcopacy became more and more important to keeping the public peace in the diocese if the king could not do so.

The development of episcopal lordships differed from country to country. Especially in the medieval German empire, bishops were on their way to establishing themselves as independent and powerful sovereign princes, maintaining great bodies of vassals and amassing strongly growing resources. Being so excessively occupied with secular affairs, bishops could not fulfill their ecclesiastic functions. If a bishop wanted to live a religious life, he might be deprived of his power by aristocratic rivals, citizens of the diocese, or his own *ministeriales*. Not rarely, bishops adopted elements of the martial culture of the laity, boasting about their warlike deeds, flaunting their military forces, and conducting brutal military campaigns with the aid of great mercenary contingents. At the time of Frederick I Barbarossa (1122–1190), Italy was a main battle area involving many bishops. Furthermore, bishops played an important part in the Crusades.

From around 1200, bishops concentrated their efforts at expanding their own spheres of influence; the king could rarely count on the altruistic support of the episcopacy. Acting in this way, bishops assimilated themselves almost completely to secular territorial lords. But by around 1500 the military force of bishops was declining, like the military force of imperial towns. As secular territorial states got stronger and stronger, ecclesiastic lordships became middle-sized powers.

[*See also* Clergy, Roles in Warfare of; *Ministeriales*; *and* Peace and Truce of God.]

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Sources

The sources on episcopal warfare should be interpreted more carefully than sources on the warfare of secular potentates. Depending on what the scholar's objectives might be, some sources are more appropriate than others.

For the changing ideal of the fighting cleric, *vitae* (lives) and *gesta* (deeds) are the most useful sources. They try to give an idealized picture of the relevant bishop, to make him appear to be an outstanding person of his times. One of the most interesting examples of a Merovingian *vita* is the *Vita Sancti Landiberti*, composed about 730, which shows the bishop of Liège in his struggle between sanctity and secular demands. The *Vita Brunonis* of Ruotger (composed about 968–969) relates the ideal of an Ottonian imperial bishop who did not flinch from appealing to the sword in order to keep the peace; Ruotger—a monk in the service of the Cologne archbishop Bruno I—wanted to defend his master and his reign against the criticisms of straitlaced critics. The *Vita Sancti Uodalrici* (composed about 983) illustrates the exemplary behavior of an Ottonian bishop defending his diocese against pagan enemies: in one chapter, Gerhard, the former provost of Augsburg Cathedral, describes Bishop Ulrich's defense of the city against the Hungarians. The *Chronicon* of Thietmar of Merseburg most colorfully depicts the history of the episcopal see of Merseburg, especially in Ottonian times. The *Gesta Alberonis*, composed between 1152 and 1158 and written by a clerical confidant of the archbishop of Treves, gives an example from the Hohenstaufen era. The author praises Albero's slyness, boldness, and earthiness, drawing what is possibly a realistic picture of a Hohenstaufen imperial bishop. Additional sources on the changing ideals of exemplary clerics include normative texts, such as collections of canon law, decisions of councils and synods, and capitularies. The *Decretum Gratiani* in particular gives clear statements: D. 86 c. 25 (prohibition of killing people by bishops), C. 2 q. 5 c. 22 (banning of duels), and C. 23 q. 8 (general prohibition of carrying arms by churchmen, with possible exceptions and necessary punishment).

To evaluate battles, skirmishes, sieges, sizes of contingents, armament, and logistics in episcopal warfare, it is necessary to consult the *gesta* of contemporary secular potentates, looking for descriptions of the relations between bishops and secular nobles. Some chronicles describe the history of the dioceses, such as the *Kölner Königschronik* (The Cologne Chronicle of the Kings), composed after approximately 1170.

Rich discoveries of documents concerning episcopal mobilization of finance, prayer, and propaganda can be found in the bishop's registers, which collected outgoing or arriving documents of a bishop's chancery. The earliest series of registers in England is from 1214–1215. Probably by around 1300, registers were being kept in every English diocese. The books of Smith and Cheney give an overview of this type of source.

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Historiography

There are three different historiographical approaches to the theme of bishops and war. One approach considers the changing ideals of episcopal administration as they touch on the issue of episcopal warfare. Fundamental to the study of this issue remains Friedrich Prinz's work *Klerus und Krieg im frühen Mittelalter* (The Clergy and War in the Early Middle Ages, 1971). Some researchers, such as Alison McHardy, stress the ideal of worldly bishops who engage in politics and do not hesitate to deploy military force. Possibly as a result of the Crusades, these martial bishops were occasionally deemed as exemplary. But there was a strong crosscurrent: the ideal of the ascetic bishop who concentrated on pure spiritual functions. Nonetheless, historians including David Stewart Bachrach agree that opposition to the clergy's support of war was not stiff.

A second approach examines the interaction between bishops and kings, concentrating on the imperial church system. Older research insisted that the king had a leash on the episcopacy. By contrast, Timothy Reuter in particular has called attention to the fact that bishops, in fulfilling duties for king and empire, were acting in their own interest, while the king was limited by many interests in his influence on episcopal appointments.

A third approach analyzes the "mere facts" of the bishops' engagement in conflicts and warfare. For example, Holger Berwinkel's investigation of military organization and warfare examines how bishops engaged in warfare. Other historians, such as Myriam Soria Audebert, studied how bishops and clergymen suffered as victims of violence. A further research trend considers episcopal support for escalating or calming conflicts. Gerd Althoff, for instance, analyzes rituals, and Roy Haines presents a concise case study of the administrative, diplomatic, and propagandistic activities of a fourteenth-century English bishop.

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BLACK ARMY OF HUNGARY

The term "Black Army," coined after King Mátyás's death in 1490, applies only to the Hungarian

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monarch's mercenary formations. Mátyás formed his new model mercenary army not by a single decree but by gradual reorganization, and he never relied on mercenaries alone.

The civil war in Hungary following the death of King Albert of Habsburg in 1439 was dominated by Bohemian mercenaries who invaded Upper Hungary. Their leader, Jan Jiskra, finally surrendered to King Mátyás in 1462, thus providing the foundations of the king's foreign mercenary army, made up of Bohemians, Poles, and Germans.

Before that, the basis of the kingdom's military power was provided mainly by the baronial and royal battalions, the *banderia*, which were paid for by their lords. Added to this was an army of foreign mercenaries, which became important during the western wars and comprised small units whose commanders made fixed-term contracts with the king's agents.

In Wiener Neustadt in 1487, Mátyás held a review of twenty thousand cavalry and eight thousand infantry. Taken together with the garrison troops, this was a substantial army by the standards of the time, but Mátyás only rarely managed to muster such a large force. The army's weaponry was not uniform, and it included heavy cavalry, mounted crossbowmen, and mixed infantry. Its core was still the heavy cavalry, and some battles were fought without the participation of the infantry. There were also troops—mostly light cavalry—maintained by Serbian nobles who had moved to Hungary. These cavalry formations, later called Hussars, were also regularly deployed in the western wars. The raids of this excellent light cavalry paralyzed the enemy, isolated their strongholds, and broke the morale of the inhabitants.

In 1481, Mátyás himself summed up the battlefield duties of the third branch, his infantry, in a letter to Gabriele Rangoni, bishop of Eger:

> The third form of the army is the infantry, which divides into various orders: the common infantry, the armored infantry, and the shield-bearers. . . . The armored infantry and shield-bearers cannot carry their armor and shields without pages and servants, and since it is necessary to provide them with pages, each of them requires one page per armor and shield and double bounty. Then there are handgunners. . . . These are very practical, set behind the shield-bearers at the start of the battle, before the armies engage, and in defense. Nearly all of the infantry and the handgunners are surrounded by armored soldiers and shield-bearers, as if they were standing behind a bastion. The large shields set together in a circle present the appearance of a fort and are similar to a wall in whose defense the infantry and all those among them fight almost as if from behind bastion walls or ramparts and at the given moment break out from it.

According to this description, the disposition and tactics of the infantry effectively corresponded to the practices of Italian mercenary armies.

Although Mátyás had few occasions to try out prerehearsed battle formations in the course of open conflict, he made very good use of the infantry in sieges of cities, which were much more common than battles in the wars of the time. Traditional siege engines and guns were used to attack castles, and there were specialized soldiers whose trade was to operate the heavy artillery. The king's Hungarian and Czech commanders followed a strategy that combined sieges of forts with raids; this strategy was generally successful in Moravia, Silesia, and Austria.

Mátyás's foreign mercenaries were broken up after his death. In 1492 one of the king's protégés, Pál Kinizsi, Count of Temes, dissolved the remnants of the army, which was by then unpaid and living by robbery.

[*See also Banderium*; Hungary, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1526); Hunyadi, Mátyás; *and* Kinizsi, Pál.]

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Black Death

In terms of percentage of population killed, there is no war, even in the cataclysmic proportions of modern times, that compares to the disease outbreak known as the Black Death, which struck Europe between 1347 and 1350. Perhaps one-tenth of Europe's population perished in World War II; the figure for the Black Death was from one-third to one-half. But this is to compare apples to oranges: a disease, striking from within at the very bonds holding a society together, can act in ways that invasion from without cannot. Yet when the first and second horsemen of the Apocalypse ride together, the result can be fearsome.

On the face of it, however, the Black Death seems to have made surprisingly little impact on Europeans' ability or appetite for waging war, although the first outbreak of 1347–1350 does seem to have imposed, by the very severity of its mortality, a de facto truce throughout Europe and between Europeans and their Muslim neighbors. Evidence for a direct role that plague may have played in warfare is confined to localized incidents. The Piacenzan chronicler Gabriele de Mussis describes how the Mongols were forced in 1346 to abandon their three-year siege of the Genoese outpost at Kaffa, on the Black Sea, because of an outbreak of plague that "killed thousands daily." But in a parting shot to their enemies, the Mongols had their plague dead "loaded onto their catapults and lobbed into the city . . . in order that the intolerable stench of those bodies might extinguish everyone [inside]"—an early example of biological warfare. A Scots army reportedly gathered at Selkirk, just over the English border, in 1349–1350, hoping to capitalize on their neighbors' misfortune in order to invade, but the army was soon itself annihilated by the plague. Finally, a Florentine siege of Arrezzo collapsed when the communal army's commander succumbed to the disease.

The Black Death also exerted an indirect influence on late medieval Europeans' capacity for waging war. The havoc wrought on Europe's manorial economy, as the balance now swung the peasants' way, is well known. One might expect that the same economic forces were at work in terms of the soldiers available to man the armies that nations and other powers could put into the field. Yet the numbers that the English and French fielded in their major campaigns throughout the Hundred Years' War remained remarkably stable, before and after the Black Death. Likewise, basic pay rates for English soldiers remained fixed from before the Black Death until well into the fifteenth century. And yet taxation in both England and France remained at extraordinarily high levels for several decades after the Black Death in order to finance the war. Because lay subsidies were collected in fixed amounts from each community, it was inevitable that, after the ravages of the Black Death, the burden upon individuals would become higher. When these outlays were not followed by the expected victories, the tide of public opinion could turn sharply against war. It is suggestive that the *Jacquerie*, a major peasants' revolt in France, occurred just two years after the ignominious defeat and capture of the French king, John II, at Poitiers in 1356, while the English peasants in their own uprising in London in 1381 targeted the palace of John of Gaunt, Duke of Lancaster, whose expensive campaign in France in 1373 had led to so little result.

Finally, what effect, if any, did war have on the virulence or spread of the Black Death? Contemporary opinion certainly expected that war could at least be a proximate cause of the plague—that the unburied, rotting corpses left over in the aftermath of a battle created a stench that putrefied the air and, when spread by the winds, gave rise to a "universal pestilence." The Italian doctor Gentile da Foligno also explained that war could predispose people to the disease by forcing them to adopt a bad diet or regimen that then generated bad, putrefying humors, while the German physician Johann Vinck explained this predisposition in psychological terms: "in times of strife men suffer the most anguish, toil, fear, anxiety, penury," which alters and corrupts their blood and

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humors. Chroniclers of the Late Middle Ages also made note of when war corresponded with plague, a connection they often explained as a function of refugees overcrowding cities in wartime.

Although it is unlikely that men would give up war in order to spare themselves disease, one would expect to see changes in the way the dead were handled in the aftermath of a battle, as a consequence of what was believed to have caused the Black Death. Unfortunately, references to the treatment of battle corpses are few in either medieval chronicles or modern histories of war. Yet there are indications that, whereas before the Black Death massacred soldiers may have been left unburied for plundering armor and equipment, for displaying the scale of victory, or simply out of carelessness, now perhaps there was a new sense of urgency to get the bodies underground in order to prevent the spread of plague. This much is indicated by modern excavations of the mass grave at Visby in Gotland, the scene of a battle between local defenders and Danish soldiers in summer 1361, the same year that the second severe outbreak of the Black Death struck. The fallen at Visby—about two thousand of them—were buried in their valuable armor, which indicates that the dead were interred in great haste. Similar mass graves to receive casualties numbering in the thousands were specially prepared in the aftermath of the battles of Otterburn in 1388 and Agincourt in 1415. If cities such as Pistoia and Tournai could enact regulations during the Black Death to ensure that wooden coffins and deep graves would sufficiently enclose the dead's "foul stench," then it is more than likely that similar considerations spilled over into cleanup operations after any battle fought within living memory of the plague.

[*See also* Disease.]

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BLOOD-FEUD

The custom of the blood-feud was common to Germanic societies in the early medieval period, underpinning many aspects of the familial and social organization of Anglo-Saxon England, Francia, and the Scandinavian countries. Similar systems operated in Wales, Scotland, and Ireland. Violence of various kinds was endemic in society at a range of levels: from the personal, local, and temporary (brawling and opportunistic assault connected with robbery), through longer-term and more widespread conditions involving whole families and settlements (feuding and long-standing rivalries), to outright hostility conducted by political leaders in the form of raiding and war. Escalation was always likely: a fight between two men could ultimately involve dozens of their kinsmen in hostilities lasting years, even decades.

The individual in the modern sense had no place in Anglo-Saxon and Viking society. In theory every person belonged to a kinship group, through direct ancestry, through marriage, or, in the case of thralls, through bonds of service. An attack (murder, physical assault, wrongdoing, or insult) on any person was viewed as an attack on the kindred as a whole, and it was the duty of each adult male within the kindred to ensure that appropriate vengeance was taken promptly and in full. Atonement for an attack could take the form of compensation (Old English *wergild*, man price, a payment of money or goods equivalent to the fixed legal value of the dead or injured person), but kindred retained the right to

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retaliate with violence, a payment in blood to match the original crime.

The system was bound up with honor, the public reputation of the individual and his kindred. A successful attack by a foe diminished the group's honor, which could be restored by either fiscal means or a retaliatory attack. The victim of the retaliation need not be the perpetrator of the original assault; any member of his kindred was a legitimate target. The kindred was in some cases considered to consist of seven degrees of consanguinity, that is, all men sharing a common ancestor seven generations back.

Responsibility for pursuing the feud lay with the male relatives closest to the injured party. Despite the legal provisions for compensation and against unfettered violence, it was incumbent on the leading males of the kindred to assemble the necessary force and exact vengeance on their own behalf. Because, on a practical level, the safety of each member depended on the group's collective willingness to avenge wrongs, it was essential to ensure that no reluctance or hesitation be shown that might undermine confidence in the kindred's ability or enthusiasm for violence. A slow, weak, or disorganized kindred would invite both ridicule and further injury.

With so many people potentially involved, overlapping kindred membership often occurred in which a man might be related to both the injured party and the attacker. In such cases the kindred could request that this man intervene to ensure an equitable settlement.

Feuds form the backdrop to many Icelandic sagas, in which the cycle of killings and acts of retaliation often leads to a climactic showdown. The semihistorical *Njál's Saga* is a good example of this. A long-standing feud involving Njál's friend Gunnar was believed to have ended when a large group of men assembled to burn Njál and his family in their house. Unfortunately for the attackers, Njál's son-in-law Kari escaped and spent many months tracking down and killing the leading men who took part. Kari was finally appeased when he was shipwrecked near the house of the attackers' leader Flósi and went to him for help. The two noblemen showed as much magnanimity in their peace settlement as they had previously shown tenacity in their hostilities.

Early Anglo-Saxon law codes, such as that of Ine, King of Wessex (r. 688–726), often made provision for feuds. The law provided for legal redress through besieging the wrongdoer in his own house for a limited period, during which the king's representative was to be summoned. The besieged party could then either surrender to his foe or fight. The law forbade that a man should fight against his own lord, and provided for asylum within a church. It allowed a man lawfully to attack another if he found his wife, daughter, or sister under a blanket behind closed doors with him. Early codes sought to regulate the conduct of the feud; later ones imposed further restrictions and began to confine the legitimate use of violence to the state.

In continental Europe the blood-feud was vigorously upheld among the Franks and was incorporated into the Lex Salica in the guise of the *wergild* and the *fridus* (peace). Salic law formed the basis for the legislation of many early medieval European states, and the practice of blood-feuding was still very much a consideration in the late-thirteenth-century comprehensive French legal tract *Coutumes de Beauvaisis*, which devotes some space to the subject. Both Irish Brehon laws and the early Welsh codes recognize the right of kindred to vengeance—a tradition that likewise continued into the later medieval period.

[*See also* Honor; Laws of War and the Just Conduct of War; Private War; *and* Valor, Morale, and Cowardice.]

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BOENDALE, JAN VAN

(1279–1351; sometimes known as Jan de Klerk), Brabantese writer who is a major contemporary source for the early years of the Hundred Years' War. Two of Jan van Boendale's works in particular are valuable for the history of this period, *Brabantse yeesten* (also known as the *Rijmkroniek van Brabant*) and *Van den derden Eduwaert*. Both are written in Middle Dutch. *Brabantse yeesten* is a 16,318-verse rhyming chronicle that begins in 1318 and ends in 1350 (an anonymous fifteenth-century author continues the work to 1440). In this work Boendale is especially concerned with the reign of Jan III as Duke of Brabant (r. 1312–1355), but he extends his coverage to all the events that affected the duchy, including all the campaigns, battles, and sieges fought during this period. *Van den derden Eduwaert*, which exists only in an incomplete version of 2,018 verses, is a history of the campaigns of Edward III in 1338–1340. This poem is little more than a paean to Edward III, with an admiration for the king that few English writers of the period can duplicate. At the same time, when disputes arise between Edward and Jan III, Boendale always protects the actions of his ducal patron. This becomes especially apparent in his account of the siege of Tournai, when he defends the duke after he is blamed by other Low Countries chroniclers for destroying the English–Low Countries' coalition and thus losing the siege. Jan van Boendale wrote several other works, including a chivalric tome, *Het boec vander wraken*, and a political how-to book, *Hoemen ene stat regeren sal*.

[*See also* Edward III of England; Low Countries, *sub-entry on* Sources (1300–1479); *and* Tournai, Siege of.]

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BOHEMOND I

(c. 1058–1111), Prince of Antioch from 1098 to 1111. Bohemond I was a Norman adventurer whose entire life was driven by his desire to found a principality in the eastern Mediterranean. He faced an insecure future after his father, Robert Guiscard, Duke of Apulia and Calabria, repudiated his mother in favor of a new wife, leaving him with only a small share of the paternal inheritance. Bohemond therefore seized the chance to join the First Crusade (1095–1099). Lacking the status and military strength of the other leaders, he had to rely on his own ingenuity and daring to realize his ambitions.

Bohemond was a resourceful and cunning field commander who improvised a battle plan that defeated an ambush by the Seljuks of Rum near Dorylaion (modern-day Eskişehir, Turkey) on 1 July 1097 and who led the bedraggled crusaders to victory against the relieving army of Ridwan of Aleppo (9 February 1098). His greatest triumph was the capture of Antioch (modern-day Antakya, Turkey) on 2–3 June 1098, which he entered by stealth through an agreement with a traitor in the Turkish ranks, having persuaded the other Crusade leaders, contrary to their oath, to return Antioch to the Byzantine Empire if the plot succeeded.

Bohemond had campaigned with his father against the Byzantine Adriatic coast in 1081–1083, and Byzantium was always the greatest lure for him. At Constantinople in 1097, he had the effrontery to ask for the post of commander in chief of the imperial forces, and his expansion of the principality of Antioch was directed as much against Byzantine Cilicia as against Muslim territories. In 1107 he launched a crusade against Byzantium, but his assault on the fortress city of Dyrrachium (modern-day Durrës, Albania) ended in encirclement by numerically superior imperial forces. Bohemond's ambition had

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finally caused him to overreach himself, and the humiliating terms of the Treaty of Devol (1108) meant that he dared not show his face in Antioch again.

[*See also* Antioch, Siege and Battles of; Robert Guiscard; *and* Seljuks.]

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BOLESŁAW I CHROBRY

(966/7–1025), Duke of Poland from 992 to 1025 and King of Poland from April to June 1025. Bolesław I Chrobry ("the Brave") was the son of Mieszko I, a prince of Poland (d. 992), and the Bohemian princess Dobrawa (d. 977). As early as 992 he had enough power to be asked to send a detachment of the army to aid the German king and Holy Roman Emperor Otto III. Using the opportunity, he banished his half brothers and seized power over the whole of Poland. Relations with the empire became closer after the bishop Wojciech (Adalbert of Prague) was martyred while on a Christian mission in Prussia in 997.

After Otto III's death in 1002, Bolesław took over Meissen for a short time. Otto's successor, Henry II, offered Bolesław Milsko (Milzi) and Lusatia as fiefs. Relations between the two were tense. In 1003, Bolesław invaded Bohemia and occupied Prague. Having suppressed internal opposition, Henry II made an expedition to Milsko, then occupied Bohemia, attacked Milsko for a second time, and besieged and captured Bautzen (Budziszyn). In 1005 the German army reached as far into Poland as Poznań. In accordance with the peace treaty then signed, Bolesław Chrobry probably gave up Milsko and Lusatia. Soon Henry II broke off the peace, but Bolesław forestalled Henry's military operations and in 1007 attacked the land of the Archbishop of Magdeburg. Although he retook Bautzen and regained Lusatia, his expedition to Meissen was unsuccessful. Henry II made another expedition in spring 1010 and fought in the area of Silesia. In 1012 a five-year peace was announced. It was broken off by Bolesław, who attacked the stronghold of Lubusz (Lebus) at Lusatia. Nevertheless, peace negotiations took place, ending in 1013 in Merseburg. At that time the first expedition of Poles to Ruthenia (Ukraine) took place to support Bolesław's son-in-law, Sviatopolk I. The expedition was unsuccessful. Because the Polish prince failed to perform his duty as a vassal, Henry again attacked Poland in 1015 with the support of Czech units. Despite this support, the emperor did not achieve his aim. The next expedition, in 1017, was also a failure. The war ended with a treaty at Bautzen in 1018. Bolesław kept Milsko and Lusatia.

Bolesław also received German support in his 1018 expedition to Ruthenia, where he occupied Kiev. He personally led Polish units across the Bug River and beat Ruthenia's army at a battle on its bank. Throughout his career Bolesław skillfully used the internal problems of his opponents to his own advantage. During the wars with the Germans he often cooperated with the opponents of Henry II. In the campaign against the German and Czech armies in 1015, he managed to coordinate the actions of three separate groups of units defending Poland against simultaneous attacks from three directions.

Bolesław enlarged the area of the Polish state, connecting lands on the west (Lusatia) and south (Slovakia). He captured the Kijów, bringing huge treasures, and incorporated Cherven strongholds on the east. Before his death in 1025, Bolesław was crowned King of Poland in Gniezno.

[*See also* Henry II *and* Slavic Lands, *subentry on* Narrative (1000–1300).]

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BOOK-LAND

The tenurial arrangement that underpinned the ability of the later Anglo-Saxon military to mount campaigns—the means by which the landholding classes could supply themselves and their followers with food and equipment—was known in Wessex as *bocland*, land held by a written charter, or *boc*. To the English, book-land was originally an alien form of land tenure, introduced in the eighth century to provide economic support for the Christian church; it entailed a permanent assignment of ownership of territory to the beneficiary. Traditionally, in early English society each successive generation had to earn its right to land by service to the crown, and the land was not permanently assigned but merely "on loan." The acceptance of loan-land from the king automatically entailed service in the king's military endeavors.

For reasons of religious propriety, the church refused to accept secular duties and lobbied for a permanent tax base of its own; kings were pleased to make such donations for the good of their souls. The benefits to a freeman of establishing a religious house—without financial or military obligations to the king—were obvious, and by the early eighth century a number of bogus monasteries had appeared that served no purpose other than the avoidance of taxes for their "members." The spread of ecclesiastical privilege removed land from royal control, thus reducing the potential rewards available to the military classes and so undermining the offensive and defensive capabilities of the Anglo-Saxon kingdoms. This reduction in resources prompted ambitious warriors to seek opportunities for reward elsewhere, which both weakened the homeland and strengthened its rivals.

To counter this threat to stability, Anglo-Saxon kings imposed three "burdens" upon the holders of book-land: service in the *fyrd* (campaigning army), maintenance of roads and bridges, and maintenance of strongholds (*burh*). King Aethelbald of Mercia (d. 757) may have been the initiator of the system (which was drawn from contemporary Frankish practice) in England around 750; it was adopted in Kent and Wessex, but evidence for East Anglia and Northumbria is lacking. King Aethelwulf of Wessex (d. 858) is renowned for having granted by book one-tenth of his lands to the glory of God and his eternal salvation in 855; the church was not the only beneficiary of this act of generosity, which extended also to the king's favored thanes, whose loyalty was thus strengthened. From royal acts such as this, the expectation must have arisen among thanes that service would be rewarded with book-land.

The rise of book-land had transformed the army from a muster of the king's supporters into a collection of armed landholders, often with little interest in the king's success. In order to instill cohesion in the army, King Edmund I (d. 946) insisted on the taking of the hold-oath by all troops—a direct oath of fealty to the king that placed the individual soldiers of all ranks in a formal and personal relationship with the king. By the later Anglo-Saxon period and the Domesday records (1086), the ownership of hereditary lands had evolved to be a badge of nobility that set the king's own supporters apart from those whose service was due to a lesser, local lord; possession of book-land was by then the defining characteristic of the aristocratic classes.

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[*See also* Domesday Book.]

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BORDER DEFENSES, EARTHWORK

Border defenses in the form of earthworks have a long history in Europe. Beyond the significance of *oppida* (hill forts defended with earthen ramparts) and marching camps, linear earthworks were used as expressions of national power. Two well-documented early medieval examples are Offa's Dyke, along the border between England and Wales, and the Danevirke, which cuts across the neck of Jutland, dividing Danish from German territory. In both cases the modern political boundary is still in the vicinity of these monuments.

The construction of a rampart and ditch extending over several miles is a large civil engineering project, requiring many hours of human labor spent in the fabrication of the earthworks and a considerable investment of time in planning the route it must take to benefit from natural obstacles such as terrain and water features. Such projects were viable only when settled, relatively wealthy communities felt themselves sufficiently threatened by neighbors to warrant such an investment of time, effort, and materials.

Offa's Dyke consists of a ditch and rampart facing west, which suggests that the purpose was to protect the English Midlands against the Welsh kingdom of Powys; the Latin text on the Pillar of Eliseg in Denbighshire supports this interpretation. The dike runs from Prestatyn in the north to Sedbury on the Bristol Channel, a distance of about 182 miles (290 kilometers). Extensive surveys of the local topography and several trial excavations show that the original earthwork (bank and ditch) was up to ninety feet (twenty-seven meters) wide and that the rampart may have stood to a height of twenty-six feet (eight meters). The dike can never have been permanently manned by a static force, but was probably patrolled by horsemen; it formed an emphatic political statement. The dyke connects rivers and several preexisting earthworks, and it has passage points. The dyke's construction cannot all be assigned to the reign of Offa, although the association with this king dates from at least the ninth century. (Offa was the king of Mercia, the West Midlands of England, from 757 to 796.) The bank appears to have been turf-faced; watchtowers and other fortifications are almost entirely absent, but hills are normally incorporated on the eastern side to provide vantage points. Despite its solid construction, the dike was probably redundant by the early ninth century.

The Danevirke (Dane-work) is a bank-and-ditch construction in southern Jutland. Tradition associates it with Thyra, the wife of King Gorm of Denmark, but the many phases of construction extend from the seventh century (the Hovedvolden section) to the eleventh; King Godfred notably refortified parts around 800 C.E. against the Carolingian threat. Several preexisting ramparts in this area, such as the third-century Olgerdiget, indicate a long tradition of dike building among the Jutlanders. The earthwork was built in six major and several smaller sections, and the important Hærvejen military road crosses it. In some sections it was at least sixty-five feet (twenty meters) across the bank and ditch, with an overall height of about sixteen feet (five meters)—six feet of rampart and a ten-foot ditch (two meters of rampart and a three-meter ditch). Timber-faced terraces and revetments have been found, relating to the later periods of use. The Danevirke was still a military structure into the mid-nineteenth century.

[*See also* Fortifications, *subentry on* Overview.]

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BORNHÖVED, BATTLE OF

The battle of Bornhöved was fought between the Danish king Valdemar II Sejr, "the Victorious" (r. 1202–1241), and a coalition of north German cities and principalities. The context was conflict over Denmark's Baltic Sea empire, which had been created by Valdemar and his predecessors since the late twelfth century. By 1220, Valdemar's empire comprised the kingdom of Denmark (modern Denmark and Skåne in southern Sweden), Estonia, and Danish overlordship over most of the German principalities along the North Sea and Baltic coasts from the Elbe to Pomerania. The German principalities resented overlordship in general rather than harboring any proto-nationalistic sentiment; several German magnates fought hard for Valdemar during his captivity and in the ensuing war. Rivalry between the German principalities and dynasties also played a significant role in deciding the makeup of the two coalitions.

In 1223, while hunting on the island of Lyø with some of his vassals, Valdemar and his son were taken prisoner by Heinrich of Schwerin and then held at a castle south of the Elbe. Heinrich negotiated with the emperor Fredrick II, who could use the royal captives to restore imperial overlordship to some land recently ceded from the empire to Denmark. However, the price was too steep for the emperor, so Heinrich demanded a very large ransom from the Danish nobility instead. Several years passed before the Danes were willing or able to raise the sum, and in the meantime Valdemar's German vassal Count Albert of Orlamünde and Holstein fought and lost the battle of Mölln in an attempt to support him.

When Valdemar was finally released in 1225 for a huge ransom, he was bent on exacting vengeance and reestablishing his authority along Germany's Baltic coastline. He first received papal support for his claim that any oaths given to his captor were made under compulsion to an unfaithful vassal and hence invalid. He then set about raising an army of Danes and German allies, including several prominent bishops and counts, as well as a levy from Dithmarschen, which he had reconquered. His campaign moved south into Holstein, where he besieged Itzehoe and Segeburg. In the meantime his German ally (and nephew) Otto of Lüneburg attacked from the east. Valdemar had to abandon the sieges and meet up with Otto when the opposing coalition assembled an army at Lübeck. Their army consisted of forces under Heinrich of Schwerin, Archbishop Gerhard of Bremen, Adolf IV of Holstein, and Duke Albrecht of Saxony, along with levies from the cities of Lübeck and Hamburg.

The two sides met at Bornhöved, south of Kiel, on 22 July (Mary Magdalene Day). The exact tactics and composition of the forces are unknown, and the contemporary or near-contemporary sources are very brief. It appears that the battle was hard-fought and at first very even, and that it was decided only when Valdemar's levies from Dithmarschen, who were in reserve (presumably in the second line), switched sides and attacked the royal army from the rear in mid-battle. The result was a crushing defeat for Valdemar, who lost an eye in the battle and many of whose vassals were taken prisoner. Valdemar was forced to relinquish overlordship of most of Denmark's German territories within the empire as well as Estonia, effectively ending the Danish Baltic empire.

[*See also* Baltics, *subentry on* Narrative (500–1300).]

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BOSCO MARENGO, BATTLE OF

In August 1447, following the death of Filippo Maria Visconti (r. 1412–1447), the last of the Visconti dukes of Milan, the newly declared Ambrosian Republic was soon threatened on every frontier and struggled to maintain its territorial integrity. One of the most serious threats was an invasion of French troops under the leadership of Charles, Duke of Orléans, who sought to assert his claim to the Milanese succession. In the autumn Charles sent a force led by the governor of Asti, Rainaldo Dresnay, into Lombardy. The leader of the Milanese army, Francesco I Sforza (1401–1466), reacted to this threat by sending most of his troops to reinforce the strategic citadel at Alessandria. He sent another detachment under Bartolomeo Colleoni (c. 1395–1475) to the castle at Bosco Marengo dell'Alessandrino to block the movement of a force of at least three thousand French soldiers, including several hundred Picard archers. The castle overlooked a forested bend in the river known as Frascata and was essential for the defense of Alessandria. The French army deployed along the right bank of the river. Colleoni's force, which arrived after a forced march, numbered perhaps two thousand men, including about five hundred under his lieutenant Astorre da Faenza and five hundred infantry that had been raised in Alessandria itself.

Rather than engage in extended maneuvers, Colleoni chose to attack almost immediately, on 11 October 1447. Instead of sending his squadrons against his adversary in successive echelons, he committed his entire army at once against the French forces, disrupting them just as they were settling in for the siege of Bosco Marengo. At first it seemed that the French enjoyed the upper hand, as they overwhelmed the wing of Colleoni's army comprising the troops recently raised in Alessandria. But a final assault, with Colleoni himself at its head, turned the tide. The French army broke and scattered. The chronicler Antonio Cornazzano writes of some two thousand dead, about fifteen hundred of them French, with three hundred French cavalry taken prisoner. After the battle, when French prisoners were carried into Alessandria, the inhabitants of the town, in revenge for the behavior of the French in the surrounding area, set upon the prisoners and massacred many of them.

This short but decisive victory enhanced the reputation of Colleoni, who became one of the most sought-after condottieri in the decades that followed. The humiliation of a heavily armed French force by an Italian army was a surprise to many, and the battle essentially ended the Duke of Orléans's bid for the duchy of Milan.

[*See also* Italy, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1493).]

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BOSNIAN HIGHLANDS, BATTLE OF THE

The battle of the Bosnian highlands took place possibly on 27 May 927—more likely in the spring of 926—between the Bulgarians and the Croats. The result was an overwhelming Croat victory. The battle's cause was the desire of the Bulgarian czar Symeon (r. 893–927) to impose his authority in the western and northwestern Balkans, driving out the Byzantines. Information about the battle is provided by the emperor Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos (r. 945–959) and by the chronicler Theophanes Continuatus.

In 924, after two unsuccessful attacks, the Bulgarians succeeded in conquering the Serbian principality of Raška. This was followed by an unsuccessful invasion of Croatia.

According to Constantine Porphyrogennetos, the Bulgarian armies were led by one Alogobotur. According to some scholars, *alogobotur* is not a personal name but a proto-Bulgarian military title: *alp bagatur*, "great hero," or *alo bagatur*, "commander of heroes." According to others, this is a personal name: the name "Alo" plus the title *bagatur*, "hero." Because of the scarcity and contradictory nature of the sources, the date of the battle and the course it took remain unclear. According to Theophanes Continuatus, the Bulgarian campaign was under the command of Czar Symeon, the battle with the Croats took place on 27 May 927, and the battle ended with the destruction of nearly the entire Bulgarian army. Other sources give 27 May 927 as the date of the demise of the Bulgarian ruler far from Croatian territories. It is certain, however, that the Bulgarian czar did not actually take part in the battle. Scholars mention different dates—924, 925, 926—but the most probable one is the spring of 926. The Bulgarian army tried to penetrate into Croatian territory through the mountains of Bosnia, but neither the route they followed nor the precise location of the battle is known. Both sources that refer to the battle claim that the Bulgarians sustained a major defeat: according to Constantine Porphyrogennetos, the entire Bulgarian army died in battle, and according to Theophanes Continuatus, almost the entire army died. No territorial changes followed, and peace between Bulgaria and Croatia was restored with the mediation of the papal legates Madalbert and Johann.

[*See also* Byzantine Empire, *subentry on* Narrative (500–900).]

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BOSPORUS, BATTLE OF

See Genoese-Venetian Wars, *subentry on* Third War.

BOSWORTH, BATTLE OF

See Roses, Wars of the.

BOURGTHÉROULDE, BATTLE OF

After the death of Henry I's son and heir William Aetheling in 1121, Henry fell out with Count Fulk of Anjou over the return of the dowry of William's widow, Matilda of Anjou. Hoping to drive a further wedge between Henry and Fulk, Amaury of Montfort, Count of Évreux and Fulk's uncle, arranged the marriage of Fulk's second daughter, Sybil, to William Clito, Count of Flanders, Henry's nephew and a claimant to the duchy of Normandy. Fulk gave Maine to William until he could regain Normandy, and Amaury began a Norman rebellion aimed at overthrowing Henry in favor of William. A number of Norman barons joined Amaury, notably Waleran of Meulan and Hugh of Montfort-sur-Risle. Open warfare between Henry's forces and the rebels broke out in 1123. Although William Clito himself seems never to have entered Normandy, he did attack and perhaps capture some of Henry's holdings in Maine with the help of Fulk.

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By the end of 1123 the Norman rebels had been largely constrained to Vatteville, near the mouth of the Seine; Brionne, some twenty miles (thirty-five kilometers) south of Vatteville; and Beaumont, ten miles (fifteen kilometers) farther south. Henry's men had established a siege castle near Vatteville. On the night of 25 March 1124 the main Norman rebels led by Waleran left Beaumont and engaged in a successful sneak attack that captured the siege castle at Vatteville the following morning. But Henry's commander, Ranulf of Chester, learned of the attack and sent a force led by Odo Borleng, a member of Henry's military *familia*, to ambush the rebels on the way back to their headquarters at Beaumont. Odo deployed his forces at a point where the road came out of a forest; the exact location is not known, but it was near Bourgthéroulde. When the rebels emerged from the forest, some of the waiting royalists lost heart at the sight of the column of noble knights, but Odo revived their spirits with a stirring speech. He dismounted along with some of his men, leaving the rest mounted to serve as a mobile reserve, and placed a group of archers on the flanks of the front line to target the enemy's horses. When Amaury saw how Odo had arranged his troops, he argued against engaging in battle, but Waleran believed that the rebel noblemen were more than a match for Odo's peasants and mercenaries. He and forty knights charged Odo's line, but the archers downed all of them before they got within striking distance. In the ensuing battle, Waleran, Hugh of Montfort, and eight hundred others were captured; Amaury managed to escape and fled to France.

It was again demonstrated that a cavalry charge was no match for massed, disciplined infantry. Bourgthéroulde also showed the importance of good independent leadership of detached units; none of Henry's main commanders was present for the battle. After Bourgthéroulde, the rebellion of 1123–1124 was over. With William Clito's death four years later, there were no further serious threats to Henry's rule in Normandy.

[*See also* Norman Conquests, Norman Expansion.]

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Robert Helmerichs

BOUVINES, BATTLE OF

By early 1214 a great coalition threatened to dismember the kingdom of France. At its heart was King John of England (r. 1199–1216), who was determined to recover his lands in France lost to Philip II Augustus (r. 1180–1223) in 1204. John's subsidies drew in the princes of the Netherlands, led by Count Ferrand of Flanders, who were deeply anxious about the growing power of the French monarch. John's money also attracted his nephew, Otto IV, the Welf claimant to the German empire, throwing his opponent Frederick of Hohenstaufen and Frederick's supporter Pope Innocent III (r. 1198–1216) to the French side, although neither of them was able to offer Philip military aid.

John planned a two-pronged strategy. In February 1214 he landed at La Rochelle. Although he had little success, he pinned down some eight hundred French knights and thousands of infantry in the Loire Valley. Thus they could not support Philip against the German-Fleming coalition whose forces gathered at Valenciennes on 23 July, totaling fourteen hundred knights and seventy-five hundred footmen.

Philip marched north against the other prong of John's strategy. With about fourteen hundred knights and six thousand footmen, he set out to ravage the lands of the Flemish allies; he reached Tournai on 26 July but was dismayed to find that the allies were at Mortagne, only about seven miles (twelve kilometers) to the south. His plan was probably to delay the coalition, knowing that there was deep distrust

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

Battle of Bouvines. Philip II Augustus, king of France (*left*), falls from his horse during battle while Hugo de Boves, a commander of the allied forces, flees. Illustration from Matthew Paris's *Chronica maiora II*, MS 16, fol. 41r, thirteenth century. THE MASTER AND FELLOWS OF CORPUS CHRISTI COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE

in their ranks and that over time this would probably break up the army if there was no decisive success. Early on the morning of 27 July, Philip withdrew eastward to his base at Lille. Once aware of this, the allies quickly decided to force battle because they needed a success. They embarked on a forced march northwestward to ambush the French at Bouvines. This was an important bottleneck on the road from Tournai to Lille, a place where a narrow bridge crossed the River Marque, whose swampy course formed the western edge of an open plain delineated by marshes to the north and south. Philip's army, strung some three miles (five kilometers) along the road, would have taken considerable time to make the crossing. The king was advised early in the day that the enemy had left camp, but he seems to have assumed that they intended to occupy Tournai. The allies, however, marched at great speed toward Bouvines; though the Viscount of Melun and his small force attempted to delay them, he seems to have been unable to advise Philip of the approaching threat.

In fact, Philip was at Bouvines enjoying a rest after lunch when he received the unwelcome news that the allies' vanguard was at Cysoing, a little more than a mile (about two kilometers) to the southeast of Bouvines. His situation was appallingly dangerous because the greater part of his army had crossed the bridge, leaving a few infantry and the bulk of the cavalry to the east. If he continued his retreat, he risked losing the flower of his cavalry, but getting his troops back across the bridge could prove very difficult. The king, advised to stand and fight by Guérin, a former Hospitaller knight who was now bishop-elect of Senlis, acted decisively. He gave orders for those who had crossed the bridge to return, and he began construction of a temporary bridge. But most important, he gathered all of his cavalry and threatened the head of the enemy column at Cysoing. This was effective because the allies were marching through woodland along a narrow road, and so were strung out over about four miles (seven kilometers). They had probably hoped to make a headlong rush at the bridge, which would have cut the French army in half, but the presence of some four hundred excellent cavalry caused the lead elements to hesitate—fatally.

According to the Anonymous of Béthune, "As the hosts came close enough to see each other clearly, they stopped for a long time and put their affairs in order." It is not difficult to see why. Philip had to get his infantry back across the bridge, and the allies had to unscramble their long column in the presence of a strong French cavalry force, which under the command of Guérin reached a total strength of perhaps seven hundred knights and sergeants. To protect their deployment, the allies created a similar force under Count Ferrand of Flanders. As a result, a great cavalry duel developed south of the Tournai-Lille road, which roughly bisected the battlefield.

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Guérin kept his force under hand, but he dispatched squadrons of up to two hundred at a time to batter the enemy. These relatively small groups were operating under leaders known to them, such as the Duke of Burgundy, and so formed coherent fighting forces. Contemporary accounts indicate that the allies were poorly organized, perhaps because Ferrand found it difficult to command and to control individual units as they emerged from the order of march.

Under the cover of this duel, Philip deployed his main force on a front about two-thirds of a mile (one kilometer) northward from Bouvines to the marsh, while a huge force of allied infantry and a few cavalry struggled northward behind their cavalry into a column of attack facing him. In late afternoon Otto IV led this mass of men in a great charge, just as the last of the French infantry struggled across the bridge. This was the crisis of the battle, and in the confusion Philip was thrown off his horse, to be rescued by the efforts of his bodyguard. But the allied charge seems to have been poorly organized, and gradually a stalemate developed. It was broken by the victory of Guérin and the cavalry to the south of the road, marked by the flight of the Duke of Brabant and the capture of Ferrand of Flanders; this undermined the resistance of the allied forces to the north, who fled. King John's representative, his illegitimate half brother William Longsword, was captured, though Otto IV escaped. By contrast Renaud, Count of Boulogne, made a stand with seven hundred well-disciplined mercenaries who formed a double-ranked circle, bristling with long lances and axes, to protect his small cavalry forces. In the end they were annihilated, but their determined resistance inflicted heavy losses on the French.

Bouvines was an ambush that almost succeeded. That it did not was thanks to the boldness of Philip in creating a strong cavalry force and the skill of Guérin in managing it. Underlying this were other factors. Medieval armies were assemblages of retinues built around the commander's core force. The king of France was the undoubted leader in his army, but there was no comparable person among the allies. Otto IV was the highest in status but had only a relatively small force. So the allies' army was much more diverse. In both armies the mounted knights formed the best-trained element, but even they were accustomed only to working with their immediate neighbors and to obeying their immediate lord. Guérin skillfully adapted to this situation: he battered his enemy's small units with his own, never risking all on a single charge. His status as a high councillor of the king and his military expertise as a Hospitaller made him a charismatic leader. The footmen were a much more mixed body of mercenaries and followers, some—like those under Renaud—of high quality, some very poor. Among the French the city militias were quickly scattered by the allied charge, which had nearly killed Philip. But once again the French, with their single leader, recovered from their problems, and the capture of Ferrand enabled them to overwhelm their enemies.

[*See also* John; Otto IV; *and* Philip II.]

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BOVES, SIEGE OF

As a result of his marriage to Elisabeth of Vermandois, Philip of Alsace, the powerful Count of Flanders, succeeded in expanding his dominion to the edges of the royal domain, controlling important locations in Picardy such as Boves. The death of Elisabeth in 1182 provoked a succession crisis for the county of Amiens in Picardy, allowing the young king Philip II Augustus (r. 1180–1223) to position himself advantageously against his troublesome vassal. After a few skirmishes, in 1185 the king decided to move against Amiens, where he believed that he could count on

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Excavations at Boves. The keep of Boves, mid-eleventh century. PHOTOGRAPH BY SÉBASTIEN CHARRIER

the support of the townspeople. He realized, however, that he would first have to take the castles that surrounded the city, the chief of which was Boves. This ancient fortress, situated on a rocky outcropping that blocked a spur of land and recently rebuilt, had been held by the powerful family of the same name for at least a century. At the time of these events, Robert I of Boves was a vassal of the Count of Flanders.

Three chronicles recount the siege: the *Gesta Philippi Augusti* by Rigord (d. c. 1207), the *Philippidos* by Guillaume le Breton (d. 1226), and *La branche des royaux lignages* by Guillaume Guiart (d. c. 1306). The second of these, a detailed account, incorporates moral considerations and technical commentary. Often tendentious, the royal chronicler emphasizes the resistance offered by the defenders of the castle, which had prepared its defense in advance. He tries to enhance the image of the king's army, whose technical superiority and modernity he repeatedly underscores.

In spite of a few missing details, it is possible to reconstruct the stages of the royal attack, locating them on the present-day topography of the site, where excavations have been in progress since the mid-1990s (*Revue archéologique de Picardie*, 2007 and 2008). There was an assault on the outer palisades, the large moat blocking the spur where the castle sat was filled in, the outer stone enclosure was taken, and the outer courtyard was seized. After that the pace slowed and the siege itself began. To bring down the second circuit of walls and the keep (the strongest and most secure part of a medieval castle), Philip Augustus used siege engines, undoubtedly set up on a small outcropping leveled off for that purpose.

The sudden appearance of the Count of Flanders was quite a shock, and his forces threatened to surround the royal army. In the end the intervention of the king's maternal uncles, the archbishop of Reims and the Count of Blois, permitted a truce to be concluded, and negotiations were begun at the end of July 1185. A treaty was signed later, at Amiens or at Compiègne. The document itself has not survived, but the gist of it can be reconstructed through various chroniclers. Philip Augustus removed the Flemish threat and recovered the Amiens region as well as a good portion of Vermandois. Robert de Boves paid tribute

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to the king and accompanied him several years later on a crusade, during which he died (1190).

The castle of Boves, designated by the terms *castrum* and *moenia*, dominates the network of castles in the vicinity of Amiens. Besides the promontory itself, Guillaume le Breton identifies the various levels of defense. First of all the *vallum*, a set of wooden palisades with doors in it, was situated outside the moats (*fossae*); the moats formed a single line with the defensive walls, which are always mentioned in the plural (*muri*). The walls must have been made of stone, because the foundations were undermined with picks, and must have had a parapet, because the besieged forces threw projectiles from above (*ab alto*). Finally, the defensive redoubt, called *arx*, sheltered the towers (*turris*). Composed of a double wall and a steep cliff, it corresponds to the promontory on which a stone castle has stood since the mid-twelfth century.

The overall effect of this imposing sight, as well as the danger of being surrounded by the count's army, explains why, in the end, the king did not actually take the castle by force, choosing negotiation over armed confrontation.

[*See also* Fortifications, *subentry on* Overview *and* Philip II.]

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Philippe Racinet

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BOW

See Weapons, *subentry on* Missile.

BOYARS

The boyars represent the highest social category among the Slavs and Romanians. The term seems to be of Turkic origin (*bolyarin*), brought by the Bulgars to the territory of the present-day Bulgaria, and taken over by the Slavs. In Novgorod the boyars formed the aristocracy of the city. They were members of the *veche*, the assembly of the town, which governed the state alongside the prince. In Moscow, "boyar" meant a rank that could be inherited, granted by the grand prince to privileged families and even to émigré princes. The boyars held the main court offices, especially related to military service, and were members of the so-called boyar duma. Some were appointed governors of regions.

Concerning the Romanian principalities of Walachia and Moldavia there are two theories about the origin of the boyars: they were a Slavonic elite incorporated by the Romanians, or they were originally Kenezii, a lower but also privileged social class, strengthened after the creation of the Romanian principalities, who formed a new elite category. In the Middle Ages, in both Walachia and Moldavia, the main dignitaries were chosen from among the boyars. Until the end of the fifteenth century they could be members of the council of the voivode (prince), even if they were not high-ranking dignitaries. There are no traces of a multistage organization of the boyars: all of them were subject to the voivode in the same way and were equal before the law. It seems that in Moldavia some of the boyars managed to suppress members of the Kenezii, creating a somewhat more diversified social stratification. In all of these cases, because of their offices and social status, the boyars' retinue and army that assembled under their own banner formed the most important element of the state's army.

[*See also* Kenezii.]

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BRABANÇONS

The Brabançons were mercenary troops recruited in Brabant. They are first mentioned in 1166 in a letter to the French king Louis VII, in which the Abbot of Cluny complains about the bloodthirsty *brabantiones*. Their first important military engagement was under the command of William of Cambrai in the army of Frederick I Barbarossa at the battle of Tusculum (29 May 1167).

Little is known about the social background of the Brabançons. Besides the younger sons of knightly vassals who had been educated in the military arts, there were probably adventurers and criminals without professional military training who saw mercenary service as the only possibility of secure employment; historical sources even speak of women in their ranks. The Brabançons were mainly infantry troops with few horsemen, and they probably did not have quite the strategic value that mercenary troops had in the later Middle Ages, but they were feared in comparison to knights because of their particularly ruthless behavior in battle.

The Brabançons were employed in support of knightly armies to plunder enemy lands. They terrified the population with their brutality: they often marched autonomously through the countryside, leaving a wake of murder and destruction. On the way back from Rome after the catastrophic outbreak of the plague in 1167, the Brabançons caused such havoc in Champagne and in the archdiocese of Reims that Louis VII and Frederick Barbarossa signed a pact forbidding the use of mercenaries (*brabantiones sive cotorell*) in the region encompassed by the Alps, the Rhine, and Paris. Nevertheless Frederick employed the Brabançons again for his fifth Italian campaign in 1175. Previously, in the years 1173–1174, they had served Henry II in England against his sons. In the following year the Brabançons were employed by the Count of Angoulême in Poitou. They suffered a major defeat in the battle of Malemort at the hands of a local militia (21 April 1177); according to reports they lost their commander, William of Cambrai, and around two thousand men (and women). Although the Third Lateran Council (1179) prohibited the recruitment of mercenaries, the Brabançons continued to be employed in French and English armies. Their best-known commander after William of Cambrai, Mercadier (d. 1200), was one of the most important captains of Richard I. The last record of the Brabançons reports their engagement in the battle of Bouvines in 1214, where they fought as infantry troops for England.

[*See also* Bouvines, Battle of; Frederick I Barbarossa; *and* Louis VII.]

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BRACCIO DA MONTONE AND THE BRACCESCHI

Braccio da Montone (1368–1424), born Andrea Fortebraccio, was an Italian commander and tactical innovator, and his followers were known as the Bracceschi. The antipope John XXIII got it right when he told Braccio da Montone, "Your soldiers are led by an arm [*braccio* in Italian], the others by their feet," thus criticizing the inability of many captains to keep full control over their men. Every successful commander manages to impose a degree of battlefield discipline on his troops, but Andrea Fortebraccio, commonly known as Braccio da Montone, is rightly famous for creating something akin to tactical clockwork. In addition, like Muzio Attendoli (Sforza)—alternately Braccio's friend and rival—Braccio founded a military school of thought, the *braccesca*, destined to have a major impact on Italian warfare. It would be

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wrong to see the contrast between the two men's followers, the Bracceschi and the Sforzeschi, in purely military terms: the first emphasized speed, shock, and the rapid rotation of small units; the second stressed caution and preferred to mass the forces on the battlefield in a coordinated effort to knock out their adversaries. These approaches were in no way as rigid as they may appear at first, and indeed the two approaches often intermingled to allow for the necessary variations as circumstances dictated. Instead, the Bracceschi and the Sforzeschi were primarily factions of condottieri, united along the lines of camaraderie, place of birth, friendship, or rivalry.

These two schools very much reflected the origin and career of their founders. Sforza came from a family of wealthy landowners of Cotignola, in the Romagna, and throughout his career he could always count on a solid recruitment base made up of friends, relatives, or dependents. Braccio, on the other hand, spent most of his life away from his native Perugia—the Fortebracci having been forced into exile by political rivals—and thus his company revolved around a core of Umbrian émigrés. Unlike Sforza, Braccio had a personal axe to grind, earning a reputation for unreliability because of his habit of quitting every time there was a chance of retaking Perugia. For this reason, and also because of a long-standing lack of human and material resources, Braccio's career proceeded at a slow pace: up to his late thirties he remained a junior officer in charge of a cavalry squadron.

The need to husband his meager forces, coupled with a changing style of warfare, was at the origin of Braccio's tactical revolution. The increasing complexity and cost of cavalry armor meant fewer men-at-arms: an army of three thousand horse might have as few as five hundred heavy cavalrymen, at a moment when the mounted charge had made a comeback on Italian battlefields thanks to Braccio's teacher and former commander Alberico da Barbiano. In order to maximize the few men-at-arms at his disposal, Braccio grouped them into squadrons of about thirty each, with some 120 light horsemen acting in support. In battle Braccio would rotate these units in order to keep the enemy under constant pressure, while always himself having relatively fresh troops. In addition he employed his infantry in an offensive role, its primary function being to work in conjunction with the cavalry by gutting enemy horses. In this way the size of Braccio's army always belied its real tactical strength, as his adversaries painfully discovered on a number of occasions.

The breakthrough in Braccio's career came in 1407 when the citizens of Arcevia offered him the lordship of their town, besieged by Ludovico Migliorati of Fermo. Braccio moved swiftly, marching toward Arcevia and conquering a number of localities in the area but, according to one tradition, not allowing them to be sacked. It seems that Braccio, despite his cunning and ruthlessness, was always an advocate of what the Italians called *buona guerra* (good war), avoiding unwarranted bloodshed and devastation. This attitude is revealed in the famous, and possibly spurious, exchange reported to have occurred between Braccio and a number of Spanish captains. In the exchange Braccio emphasized the need to pursue war with the outmost drive and determination, but he also emphasized the foolishness of killing defeated opponents, who tomorrow could be one's allies, or of destroying the goods of people who might one day be one's subjects. Outside Arcevia, Braccio engaged Migliorati and his lieutenant Angelo della Pergola, defeating them in a battle lasting many hours—a battle that was won thanks to Braccio's novel tactics.

Possessing now a logistical base of some significance, Braccio quickly rose to the top of his profession, exploiting in the following years the vagaries of Italian politics and the schism within the Catholic Church. Another stroke of luck came when the anti-pope John XXIII entrusted Braccio with bringing the papal territories under his control, giving Braccio the castle of Montone in fief. Once the condottiere managed to take Bologna, he had the financial resources to build a large company and pursue the goal of his whole life: the conquest of Perugia. His chance came in 1416 when, with the excuse of bringing the city back to the pontiff's control, he took it after defeating Carlo Malatesta at the battle of San Egidio. Once lord

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of Perugia, Braccio tried to revive the citizens' martial spirit, engaged in a building spree, and by means of adroit maneuvering resisted the attempts of Martin V, now pope of a reunited Christendom, to deprive him of his possessions.

Braccio's downfall was caused ultimately by his own ambition, which caused him to meddle in the Neapolitan civil war in the hope of annexing Abruzzi to his domains. An alarmed Joan II, Queen of Naples, united forces with Martin V, and on 2 June 1424 the allied army under Jacopo Caldora faced Braccio below L'Aquila. In addition to outnumbering him significantly, Caldora had previously fought with Braccio and was therefore familiar with his tactics. Braccio also made the mistake of not fighting his adversaries separately, allowing them to deploy for battle. In the ensuing fight Braccio suffered a crushing defeat. Taken prisoner, he succumbed to his wounds three days later.

With his death the polity that he had managed to create fell apart, his heirs and successors lacking the necessary ability and charisma to keep Braccio's territories under control. His military heritage, however, was picked up by his former collaborators, such as Niccolò Piccinino and Erasmo Gattamelata. Both developed their mentor's teaching, Piccinino in particular adding the shock of firearms to the infantry component. The core of the Bracceschi survived until the death of Piccinino's son, Jacopo, in 1465, but during the war of the Pazzi Conspiracy (1478–1480) a number of Venetian and Florentine units still displayed a banner with a black ram (*montone*) on a yellow field. In the same conflict the commander of the joint papal-Neapolitan army was Federico da Montefeltro, one of Piccinino's pupils and a *braccesco* through and through. The tactical schools invented by Braccio and his rival Muzio Attendolo Sforza outlived their founders, and the enmity between Bracceschi and Sforzeschi likewise lived beyond the French invasion of Italy in 1494.

[*See also* Alberico da Barbiano; Attendoli, Muzio; Condottieri; Just War, Just Motive; Piccinino, Niccolò; *and* Sant'Egidio, Battle of.]

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BRATISLAVA, BATTLE OF

As the final military maneuver of the Hungarian land-taking (German *Landnahme*) process that began in 894, the Hungarians won a decisive victory over Bavarian troops at Brezalauspurch (modern Bratislava/Pozsony/Pressburg in Slovakia; others situate the battle at Mosaburg/Zalavár in Hungary). Contemporary sources provide few details, except that the mobilization began around 17 June 907 at the river Enns, where King Louis the Child fell behind until the final defeat around 4–6 July, as testified by the entries in church necrologies, which mention Luitpold, Duke of Bavaria; Theotmar, Archbishop of Salzburg; and Zacharias and Odo, bishops of Freising and Brixen, respectively. It was Aventinus (Johannes Turmair, 1477–1534) who reconstructed the battle on the basis of necrologies (since then partly lost), annals, and the chronicles of Regino of Prüm and Liutprand of Cremona. He suggested an advance in three columns (on both sides of the Danube, and by ships with supplies), very similar to Charlemagne's campaign against the Avars in 791. The columns were supposed to have had a final meeting point at present-day Bratislava, but because of some coordination mistakes they were annihilated column by column in a series of clashes over at least three days. Aventinus adds a long list of participants, mostly killed, their names recorded only in his text. Modern scholars are highly critical of his story, although it does fit very well with the geographical conditions and the light cavalry military tactics of the Hungarians. It is certain, however, that the Bavarians did give up the former

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Carolingian march of Pannonia forever, lost their territories east of the river Enns, and accepted the Hungarian conquests in the Carpathian Basin.

[*See also* Hungary, *subentries on* Sources (500–1000) *and* Narrative (500–1000).]

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László Veszprémy

BREGENZ, BATTLE AND SIEGE OF

The siege of Bregenz and the defeat of the Appenzell army and its allies outside Bregenz's walls represented both the culmination and the demise of Appenzell expansionism. It came as a blow after the Appenzell victory over a coalition of nobles—Austrian dukes, the Abbot of Saint Gall, and their allies—in the battles of Vögelinsegg in 1403 and 1405. In the wake of these successes, Appenzell joined with various partners in the Bund ob dem See (League on the Lake) and threatened the noble and monastic rulers in Tyrol, Algäu, and Thurgau with daring military maneuvers. In autumn 1407 the Bund ob dem See began its siege of the city of Bregenz, situated on Lake Constance and under Austrian rule: cannon were used to breach the city walls. The knights and lords of Upper Swabia in Hegau and Algäu united in the Order of Saint George's Shield to protect their own holdings and to fight against Appenzell and its allies, and they raised an army to relieve Bregenz. The majority of the Lake Constance cities joined this levy. The besieging army suffered from the severe winter cold. On 13 January 1408 the Appenzell besiegers were decisively defeated by relief troops led by Count Wilhelm von Montfort, who took advantage of thick fog. Despite their knowledge of the enemy's mobilization for war, the Appenzell army and its allies were taken by surprise and were unable to collect an effective defense. The besieging army was put to flight; about fifty men fell, including Captain Kupferschmid of Schwyz.

Although the defeat at Bregenz was by no means militarily decisive for Appenzell and its allies, the defeat's political and moral consequences were profound. The myth of Appenzell invincibility was shattered, and the Bund ob dem See gradually disintegrated and shrank to the Appenzell heartland.

[*See also* Stoss, Battle on the.]

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Oliver Landolt

Translated from the German by Johanna M. Baboukis

BRÉMULE, BATTLE OF

Beginning in 1116, Normandy fell prey to increasing hostilities as a number of external powers—including King Louis VI of France, Baldwin of Flanders, and Fulk of Anjou—instigated Norman rebellion in favor of Henry I's nephew and rival ducal claimant William Clito. The situation worsened when the important Norman county of Évreux passed from Henry's ally and cousin William of Évreux to his enemy Amaury of Montfort, and by 1119 major Norman barons had joined the rebellion. Henry experienced a number of gains and setbacks, both political and military, including his only defeat on the field of battle, at Alençon in December 1118. In the end the fate of the rebellion hinged upon the 1119 battle of Brémule, which was almost an accident.

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The sources are unclear and contradictory on specific details, but an overall picture emerges. King Louis, William Clito, and many other rebels were marching north into Normandy with a large army to seize Henry's castle at Noyon-sur-Andelle, apparently not knowing that Henry was nearby. Henry and about five hundred knights were ravaging the area south of Noyon, not realizing that Louis was in Normandy. Henry seems to have noticed his opponent first, and he arranged his forces carefully. Some four hundred knights dismounted and were placed into a dense formation of two groups (either side by side or front and rear), with the rest remaining mounted. Two groups of about four hundred French knights attacked in an undisciplined charge. A group of eighty broke through Henry's cavalry but was surrounded by dismounted knights, who killed their horses and captured them. The rest initially pushed Henry's line back, but were then driven off. In a desperate attempt to salvage the day, the rebel William Crispin attacked King Henry personally, but although he managed to strike Henry with his sword, the blow caused no injury, and William was quickly wrestled to the ground. King Louis and William Clito escaped, but they lost their horses and the royal standard. Once again it was demonstrated that a disorderly cavalry charge was no match for a well-organized, disciplined line of infantry. Some 140 rebels were captured, and only three men died in the battle. Although Louis and Amaury continued desultory hostilities in the weeks to come, after Brémule the rebellion was effectively over and Henry's control of Normandy reaffirmed.

[*See also* Louis VI *and* Norman Conquests, Norman Expansion.]

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Robert Helmerichs

BRENTELLE, BATTLE OF

Years of political tension between Francesco "Il Vecchio" Carrara, Lord of Padua, supported by Milan, and Antonio della Scala, Lord of Verona, supported by Venice, finally erupted into war in November 1385. The following June a large Veronese army under Cortesia da Serego—six thousand horsemen and twenty-three hundred footmen, plus a substantial siege train—crossed into Carrara territory and with adroit maneuvering managed to reach Brusegana, two and a half miles from Padua. The feisty Serego had vowed to destroy the Carrara within four months, and so sure were the Veronese of ultimate victory that Antonio della Scala had provided his army with a quantity of cloth, arms, and other goods to be distributed to the victorious soldiers.

Caught unawares by the enemy move, the Paduan commander, Giovanni degli Ubaldini, rushed east from his headquarters near Rovolon with about two thousand horsemen in a frantic attempt to stem the Veronese onslaught. Managing to arrive at the city gates in the nick of time, he took up position on the banks of the river Bacchiglione at Le Maddalene, outside Santa Croce gate, being reinforced by a number of county levies and city militiamen. Dividing his cavalry into fourteen squadrons and his infantry into three, Serego caught the Paduans as they were deploying, pushing them back across the Bacchiglione. While five mounted squadrons pursued the vanquished to Padua's gates, the rest of the Veronese army busied itself in pillaging the countryside.

Ubaldini managed to restore the situation, and with a hastily reinforced army counting about seven thousand men of varying quality, he once more engaged Serego on the following morning. Again the superior Veronese forces proved decisive, the outnumbered Paduans breaking ranks under the pressure and running toward the safety of the city's walls. Serego, however, was unable to stop his soldiers from dispersing to sack the surrounding area, leaving him with a much reduced force to continue pursuing the fleeing Paduans. Seeing his chance, Ubaldini launched a counterattack, sending his cavalry to strike the rear of the advancing Veronese, while engaging their front with some eighteen hundred infantry. Caught by surprise, the scattered Veronese attempted to resist, but after two hours of fighting they were forced to flee or surrender as

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Ubaldini proceeded to mop up the remaining enemy forces.

Virtually all the Scaligeri leaders were taken prisoner, including Serego, together with about 4,460 horsemen and footmen, 3,450 auxiliaries, 6,350 mounts, 120 merchants with 240 cartloads of merchandise, 52 artillery pieces, 172 trebuchets, and 211 prostitutes—the last being richly feted by the victorious Paduans. The Veronese also lost 821, many of whom drowned while attempting to flee across the Bacchiglione. The elated Francesco Carrara distributed double pay to the soldiers, and Ubaldini received a knighthood.

[*See also* Italy, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1493).]

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Niccolò Capponi

BRESCIA, FIGHT NEAR (1401)

The city of Brescia occupied a strategic position in eastern Lombardy, and its economy drew on valuable timber and mineral resources from the mountain valleys to the north, as well on the agricultural wealth of the surrounding plain. Brescia therefore was of considerable importance to its ruler, Giangaleazzo Visconti (r. 1385–1402), Duke of Milan from 1395, whose predecessors' lordship in the city dated from 1337.

Brescia also represented a tempting target for Giangaleazzo's enemies. Principal among these around 1400 was the Republic of Florence, fearful of Visconti expansion in northern and central Italy. The republic was joined by Francesco Novello da Carrara, Lord of Padua (r. 1390–1405), whose father, Francesco, had lost Padua to Giangaleazzo in 1388 and died in a Visconti prison. Moreover, within Brescian territory members of the Guelph faction, hostile to the Visconti, claimed to be ready to rebel.

To strengthen this alliance the Florentines engaged the services of a prince from north of the Alps, Rupert of Bavaria—Rupert III, Count Palatine (r. 1398–1410)—who was elected king of the Romans on 21 August 1400. His interest in the anti-Visconti alliance was partly to secure Italian support to facilitate his journey south of the Alps to obtain an imperial coronation in Rome. He was also anxious to act against his deposed predecessor as king of the Romans, Wenceslas of Bohemia, who was considered to have alienated the rights of the empire by selling Giangaleazzo the title of duke. Finally, Rupert was attracted by the prospect of Florentine pay. The protracted negotiations on this matter were vividly recorded by the Florentine ambassador, Buonaccorso Pitti. He eventually secured Rupert's involvement with the promise of an advance of two hundred thousand florins.

Rupert reached Trent on 14 October 1401 with a large but heterogeneous army of around fifteen thousand cavalry, which was joined by a contingent from Padua and by Guelph irregulars from the Brescian hinterland. However, though Giangaleazzo's force was smaller—perhaps six thousand horse—he had had ample time to strengthen the defenses of Brescia and have in place a tested team of loyal and effective mercenary captains, including the veterans Alberico da Barbiano and Jacopo dal Verme. In an encounter near Brescia on 24 October 1401, only the Carrara-led contingent on the German side showed discipline and resolve; the bulk of the invading forces broke up, leading to Rupert's retreat to Padua. As his own military credibility and German and Italian support melted away, he returned north of the Alps early in 1402.

The battle of Brescia was not a major or decisive military encounter, but it handed the Duke of Milan a considerable propaganda victory. He was able to present himself as a champion of Italian arms against "barbarian" invasion from north of the Alps and contrasted Visconti valor and military prowess with Florentine treachery. Giangaleazzo's early death on 3 September 1402 proved a more effective check on Visconti ambitions, though the victory of his armies over Rupert was remembered into the

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fifteenth century and beyond, demonstrating that Italian arms were not necessarily inferior to those of the north.

[*See also* Alberico da Barbiano; Verme, Jacopo dal; *and* Visconti, Giangaleazzo.]

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BRESCIA, SIEGE OF (1426)

In Venice's ongoing struggle with Duke Filippo Maria Visconti (r. 1412–1447) of Milan, the Venetians agreed in 1426 to an alliance with Florence and appointed Francesco Bussone, Count of Carmagnola (1385–1432), who had recently fled from Milanese service, as captain-general of the league. The war that began in March 1426 took place chiefly in the regions of Lombardy and the Romagna. One of the chief objectives of Venice's campaign was the fortified city of Brescia. In mid-March, Carmagnola secretly brought eight hundred infantry and fifty cavalry to the environs of Brescia. Friendly elements among the city's Guelph faction rebelled and opened the gates to the Venetian army. The Duke of Milan had believed the city to be impregnable and had posted few defenders there. The commander of the Brescian citadel, Antonio da Landriano, retired with his scant defensive force into the city's citadel and into a number of fortified places in the surrounding neighborhoods. A siege then commenced.

The duke ordered his commander Francesco I Sforza (1401–1466) to move his army, at that time lodged at Montechiari, to reinforce the resistance at Brescia. Arriving three days after the revolt, Milanese reinforcements barricaded some of the streets of the city to prevent the movement of troops. Sforza had scarcely arrived at Brescia, however, when he was ordered to go to Montechiari to face an allied army approaching from the south. A short and inconclusive engagement followed, after which Carmagnola returned to Brescia to take up the siege.

In the short term Carmagnola proved unable, or unwilling, to overcome the resistance at Brescia, despite the arrival of a force of four thousand cavalry and two thousand infantry sent from Florence, under Niccolò da Tolentino. To protect the besiegers Tolentino recommended to Carmagnola that he dig a vast double trench, some five miles (eight kilometers) in circumference, all the way around the town. Its completion took four months, the delay infuriating the Venetian government. In the meantime, according to the Milanese historian Bernardino Corio, the league army grew to as many as thirty thousand men and the ducal force to twenty-three thousand, with about equal numbers of cavalry.

As the siege continued, Filippo Maria Visconti was forced into increasingly desperate measures: he plotted to have agents burn the Arsenal in Venice and poison Carmagnola, and he sought to reach accords with the king of Naples, the Swiss, and the Holy Roman emperor. Filippo Maria's position became even more dangerous in July, when Duke Amadeus VIII of Savoy (r. 1391–1440) joined the anti-Milanese alliance, with plans to partition the duchy of Milan. Dissent emerged within the Milanese ranks, as many suspected Francesco Sforza was negotiating secretly with Venice.

On 11 August one of the gates of the city that had been holding out fell; another followed in September. With this the starving defenders of the citadel capitulated, followed by those holding out in the

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new castle. By 20 November all of Brescia was in Venetian hands.

The fall of Brescia made Bergamo and other important Lombard cities vulnerable to Venetian attack, and without active support from any allies, Filippo Maria recognized that peace was the only option. Brescia was then ceded to Venice in the peace that followed, brokered under the auspices of Pope Martin V (r. 1417–1431). But the Holy Roman emperor refused to certify the cession to Venice of a territory he deemed rebellious, and within a few months war between Milan and Venice had begun again.

[*See also* Bussone, Francesco *and* Italy, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1493).]

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BRIAN BORU

(d. 1014), King of Dál Cais (976–1014), King of Munster (978–1014), High King of Ireland (1002–1014), and Emperor of the Irish (1005–1014). Brian rose from the kingship of a small, relatively unknown kingdom in western Ireland to claim control of the entire island. He began his reign with a raid on Scattery Island, near the mouth of the Shannon River, where he surprised and killed Ivar, the Viking king of Limerick. Brian's forces then sacked the town, effectively announcing his right to rule, as well as eliminating his closest enemy. The new king of Dál Cais quickly fielded a force and moved south to engage his rival Máel Muad, king of the Southern Province of Munster. At the battle of Belach Lechta, probably near modern Killaloe, Brian bested Máel Muad and then pursued his routed foe all the way to Cork. By 978 he claimed the title of King of Munster.

From 978 to 1002, Brian jockeyed for power with King Máel Sechnaill of Tara. He raided into Leinster and Ossory and sent fleets up the Shannon River. In 985 he suppressed a revolt by the Déisi in southeast Ireland and built a series of fortifications throughout the south. In 999 he defeated the combined forces of Leinster and Dublin in the battle of Glen Máma, following that victory by sacking Dublin. In 1002, Máel Sechnaill submitted to Brian, giving him the title of High King of Ireland. Brian then raided the north of Ireland until 1011 when the king of Cenél Conaill submitted, the final Irish king to become subject to Brian Boru. In 1012, Cenél Conaill revolted, followed by Leinster.

Brian fought his last battle on Good Friday, 23 April 1014. The battle of Clontarf was fought outside Dublin by the forces of Brian against the combined forces of King Sitric of Dublin; Máel Morda, King of Leinster; and their Viking mercenaries. The fighting raged from morning to late in the day; the forces of Sitric and Máel Morda broke and fled, only to make a final stand on the beach at Clontarf. Brian's son Murchad, his heir and field commander, was killed in battle, as was his grandson Toirdelbach. Brian also lost his life, supposedly at the hands of a Viking named Brodar as the defeated Viking fled the field. The battle was a Pyrrhic victory for the Dál Cais. The Dublin forces were defeated, but the city did not fall.

Brian exceeded his peers in his use of battles, fleets, mercenaries, and fortifications, all of which contributed substantially to his military rise and success. He engaged in at least three large open-field battles in addition to over a dozen raids. His fleets provided a degree of mobility that later Irish kings attempted to emulate. His use of mercenary forces, primarily Vikings, runs counter to his image of having saved Ireland from the Vikings. These combined factors allowed him to claim the rule of all of Ireland.

[*See also* Britain, *subentry on* Narrative (1000–1300), *and* Vikings.]

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BRITAIN

[*This entry contains nine subentries, on British sources from 500–1000, 1000–1300, and 1300–1500; an overview of British military history from 500–1000, 1000–1300, and 1300–1500; and on British historiography from 500–1066, 1000–1300, and 1300–1500.*]

Sources (500–1000)

The sources for military history in Britain comprise literary and archaeological records. Each has its unique strengths and weaknesses and must be treated with caution. The geographical and chronological spread of available sources is often patchy and sparse, and their content is partial—in both senses. Consequently, interpretation can never be straightforward. In the literary sources there are two main problems, both of which result from copying. First, few of the texts dated to the period 500–1000 are preserved in manuscripts that actually date from this period; the texts are usually later copies, and in the process of copying, silent alterations have been made to the original. (This process can be observed in the several versions of the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*, discussed below.) This means that, for example, a text may contain credible seventh-century language—or something close to it—but content that may have been edited one or more times; the text then cannot be taken at face value as a seventh-century document. Second, sources may be misleading in the matter of intellectual copying, whereby a writer sets out to imitate the style of an admired predecessor and in so doing introduces literary motifs from elsewhere. This is especially the case with classical Roman authors, such as Virgil or Sallust, whose work influenced medieval compositions, and the Bible, which formed the model for a great many literary works, notably Gildas's *De excidio et conquestu Britanniae* and even *Beowulf* (according to one interpretative model).

Bede. The earliest reliable literary source of any length is Bede's *Historia ecclesiastica gentis Anglorum* (Ecclesiastical History of the English People), written in Latin and completed in 731. Bede was a Benedictine monk at the monasteries of Monkwearmouth and Jarrow, which were then important sites on the river Tyne in Northumbria. Although Bede's primary aim was to demonstrate the superiority of the Roman church over the Celtic and the hand of God working through the political supremacy of his native Northumbria, parts of the text deal in passing with matters relating to social and military matters. Bede had a clear political and religious agenda, but he was content to include tales of campaigning and slaughter in his narrative if, in so doing, he could show his heroes—mainly Northumbrian kings and Irish clerics—in a favorable light.

In Bede's texts we can infer something of the military culture of Bede's day and the organization that underpinned Anglo-Saxon political expansion. In one tale, Imma, a thane captured in battle, asks to be freed because he is of little importance, being a married man who merely serves with the baggage train; this implies that the important nobles on campaign were customarily of an age not to have married and that the management of supplies was entrusted to older men. Imma's subterfuge was not successful, and he was held for ransom. Elsewhere Bede relates the battle of Maserfeld in which Northumbrian forces under King Oswald engaged the Mercians under Penda, the last great heathen ruler in Anglo-Saxon territory. Penda's onslaught proved unstoppable, and Oswald fell with his men; Penda had Oswald's head and arms cut off and fixed to a tree as an emblem of victory.

For information about British history, Bede made use of the work of Gildas, a monk and historian (discussed below). In addition, Bede corresponded with informants who were able to provide details of local traditions. He seems to have taken to heart Gildas's

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casting of the Anglo-Saxons as God's punishment on a sinful British race.

Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, Burghal Hidage, and Vitae. The *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* (*ASC*) is not a single document but a series of six texts in seven separate manuscripts (manuscript G is a later copy of manuscript A, and some sections are copied into later documents). The relationships among the various manuscripts—which are all partial copies or extensions of an original text—have been established. The sources of the earlier annals (from 60 B.C.E.) are still debated but include Bede's *Historia ecclesiastica gentis Anglorum* and his *Chronica minora* (Minor Chronicles). A lost West Saxon record in annal form was also probably used, which would account for the relative frequency of southern and western entries up to the year 754. After the annal for 823, the entries appear to be composed firsthand, ending with that for 855, which gives the genealogy of the West Saxon king Aethelwulf as if in summary to complete the text. Copies of this document were made and distributed to religious houses under West Saxon domination, such as Abingdon and Canterbury, where they were continued independently. The *ASC* provides an invaluable record of the wars with the Danes from the ninth to eleventh centuries. It contains the following:

- Insights into the tactics used to defeat Danish sea power (for example, the recruitment of Frisian skippers and the building of a new class of warship)
- Establishment of a network of strongholds (the *burh* system)
- Division of the army into a campaigning force and a "national guard"
- Rise and fall of the Viking kingdom based in York
- Internal conflicts within the ruling family—and between this family and the major landholders—which led to instability
- Political turmoil that led to disloyal, irresolute leadership among the Anglo-Saxons
- Events before, during, and after the Norman invasion

Because England was at the center of many of the political and military developments in northern and western Europe, the *ASC* is able to shed light on the history of Britain, Ireland, Scandinavia, and the Carolingian state and its successors. The entries for the period from 1066 to the last annal, 1154, show in great detail the complex web of fear, brutality, and conflicting loyalties that ensued after the Norman invasion.

The Burghal Hidage is an administrative document from the tenth century that lists the strongholds established by the West Saxons for the defense of their territory from armies of marauding Danes. It indicates the number of men assigned to the defense of each stronghold. The earlier part dates from the time of Alfred the Great (d. 899), who created the system, but the existing document probably dates from the reign of his son, Edward the Elder.

Aelfric of Eynsham's *Vitae* (Lives [of the Saints]) is an important collection of literary reworkings of English saints' legends used as homilies. Aelfric wrote the text in about 996–997 and was active in church affairs up to his death in about 1010. Although this work is not in itself of great interest to the military historian, there are occasional glimpses into the life of the warrior, especially the warrior-king who shows fortitude in the service of God. Another vita of great interest is Felix's account of Saint Guthlac (*Vita Sancti Guthlaci*), who grew up in a noble household and entered military service as a young man. He earned great renown but later turned away from physical combat to a life of privation and asceticism.

In contrast to Aelfric, who seems to have pursued a constant theme of divine care, the sermons of Archbishop Wulfstan, who died in 1023, have a militant quality that does not shrink from describing the worst excesses of human behavior in the hope that such revelations will shame their perpetrators into reforming their ways. His *Sermo Lupi ad Anglos* (Sermon of the Wulf to the English) details the failings of the English in their wars with the Danes and bemoans that "often one [Dane] drives off ten [Saxons]."

Verse Records. Verse records from Anglo-Saxon times survive in a handful of important compendia, notably the Vercelli manuscript, the Exeter Book, and

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the *Beowulf* manuscript. Occasionally examples are found elsewhere: for example, an early version of the poem called the *Dream of the Rood* is carved in runes on a cross shaft at Ruthwell in Scotland, and a single folio of an epic poem, *Waldere*, was reused as part of the binding of a prayer book. Of the roughly thirty thousand surviving lines of Old English verse, many use imagery drawn from the so-called mead-hall culture of the warrior elite. Some poems are openly military in nature—the *Finnesburh Fragment*, the *Battle of Maldon*, *Waldere*, *Brunanburh*—whereas others use military themes to illustrate religious or social commentary. Satan, for example, is depicted as a renegade warlord who reacts against the authority of his king and tries to establish a chiefdom of his own; with all due loyalty and in obedience to the military code, his followers join him in exile from the Kingdom of God and help him set up the realm of Hell.

The most frustrating poem of all is *Beowulf*, which describes the exploits of a monster-slaying hero and his progress from a young adventurer bent on personal glory to a beloved king responsible for the protection of his land and folk. The date of the extant manuscript is about 1000, but the military culture of the poem and details of the armor and weapons are consistent with a date closer to the seventh century. For example, the poet mentions that "boar images shone above the cheek protectors," and on the Sutton Hoo helmet from the seventh century there is indeed a cast-bronze boar's head on the end of each ocular above the junction of the helmet's bowl and side flaps. Likewise, the description of a sword as "ring-marked" fits well with the pattern-welded construction of early Anglo-Saxon blades. The one likely historical character in the poem, Hygelac, is believed to have died in a raid on Francia in about 525. *Beowulf* is a complex poem that is set in heathen times but was certainly composed by a Christian who perhaps retained a fondness for the old stories and was moved to recast the "heathen warrior" as a prototypical "Christian knight."

Welsh, British, Irish. Contemporary Welsh records are not as plentiful as the English ones, but there was considerable interest in the early medieval period in later centuries. The Old Welsh *Llyfr Aneirin* (Book of Aneirin) comprises several narrative poems. The name "Aneirin" is associated with an early-seventh-century court poet who may have been contemporary with the events of the poem *Y Gododdin*, the most important work in the collection. The narrative of *Y Gododdin* stands at the head of the Welsh literary tradition. Although the surviving manuscript is from the thirteenth century, the orthography betrays its earlier composition, possibly ninth century. The poem describes a cavalry raid by three hundred warriors of the Gododdin, a British chiefdom, against an enemy force at a place called "Catraeth," and it is cast as a series of elegies for the glorious dead.

The standard interpretation sees the Gododdin state as the descendant of a tribe called Votadini in Roman times, residing in the Edinburgh area, and Catraeth as Catterick in Yorkshire. The poem does not identify the enemies, but the Angles of Deira (the region between the Tees and Humber rivers) are usually assumed, and the date is put at around 600. Bede mentions a battle at Degsastan in 603, which may be the same event, although this was fought between Bernicians under Aethelfrith and Dalriadans under Áedán mac Gabrain. There is a single reference to a possibly legendary hero, Arthwr, who is mentioned only as a standard of comparison for lesser men. Inferences from other historical records and linguistic data put the date of the raid in the early seventh century (for example, Edinburgh fell to the Northumbrians in 638), but the composition of the poem may have taken place up to two centuries later. The details of cavalry tactics, weapons, armor, and fieldworks are consistent with a seventh-century date. Whether it was composed in the seventh or the ninth century, *Y Gododdin* is an important work for its bearing on early British military organization and heroic culture.

Gildas Sapiens ("the Wise") was a sixth-century British cleric who wrote a long polemic on the contemporary political and spiritual situation, *De excidio et conquestu Britanniae* (On the Ruin and Conquest of Britain), that denounces the secular and religious leaders of his day. The first part offers a compressed history of fifth-century events in the Western Roman Empire from a British perspective; the second part names a series of British rulers and condemns them for brutality, sloth, avarice, and other failings; and

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the third part castigates the British clergy for its moral weakness. As Britain's only sixth-century firsthand source, Gildas's work is of great potential importance for understanding the process by which British-speaking lowland Britain became Germanic-speaking England, but unfortunately Gildas's fondness for florid language and biblical imagery makes interpretation of the text difficult.

The *Annales Cambriae* (Annals of Wales) is a term used for a series of four manuscripts that derive from a tenth-century original, probably compiled at Saint David's. The entries begin in 445, and the latest version (manuscript C) extends to 1288. The sources for the *Annales* include Bede's *Chronica minora* (Minor Chronicles), which itself draws on Isidore of Seville. The *Annales* are among the earliest sources for Arthurian episodes such as the battle of Mount Badon.

The *Book of Taliesin* is a medieval (mid-thirteenth century or later) collection of poems, attributed to the bard of that name who was associated with several legendary British kings, to whom some of the verses are addressed. One poem deals with the battle of Arderydd, which is mentioned in the *Annales*. The language of the texts can be no earlier than the tenth century, but the legendary framework of the poet's life is rather the sixth and seventh centuries. Taliesin's story suffered the misfortune of being woven into the Arthurian tradition, and thus any genuine historical content can no longer be identified with confidence.

Nennius is the putative author of at least one manuscript of the *Historia Brittonum* (History of the Britons), which was begun in the middle of the ninth century. The writer described his research method as *coercavi omni quod inveni* ("I piled up all I found"), and the manuscript reads like a scrapbook of chronological calculations, fragments, and condensed summaries of longer documents and other matter that caught the author's fancy. It is mainly read today as a primary source for Arthurian matters.

The Irish text *Senchus fer nAlban* (History of the Men of Alban) deals with kings in Dalriada, an Irish enclave in western Scotland. Composition is believed to have taken place in the tenth century, although the events are placed in the seventh century. There are several manuscripts, but those at Trinity College, Dublin, of the fourteenth century, are thought to be the most authoritative. Apart from the mythical and legendary genealogical data in the text, its great contribution lies in the understanding it gives of the political organization of the nascent Dalriada state. Each household within the three sectors of the kingdom was assessed for tribute (tax) and for military service; in some areas this was specifically related to marine warfare, as would be natural in the west of Scotland. The document shows that Dalriada was able to mobilize its military resources through an efficient system of local musters. What arrangements their principal foes, the Picts of central and northern Scotland, had are not known. If the assumed chronology is correct, Dalriada may have contributed to the downfall of the Gododdin kingdom.

The Old Irish text *Tain bó Cúailnge* (Cattle Raid of Cooley) describes a form of ritualized warfare that probably extends deep into the legendary past. There are two manuscript versions, the oldest in the *Book of the Dun Cow* of twelfth-century date, written in a very conservative prose style. The main narrative includes a number of digressions but deals with the war between Ulster and Connachta (Connacht), in which a series of great names from the heroic past take part, including Fergus mac Róich, Ferdiad, and Cúchulainn, as well as the goddess Medb and the god Lugh. Cúchulainn dies in the battle, having tied himself to a post in order not to fall before his enemies. Comparison with other Old Irish verse has led some scholars to see parts of the text as dating from the seventh century. The heroic ethos of the poem is consistent with such a date.

The Welsh tales of the *Mabinogi* cycle might fall within our chronological scope, but the two surviving manuscripts, *The White Book of Rhydderch* and *The Red Book of Hergest*, date from the mid-fourteenth century. The language does not appear to be substantially older than that period, in any event not before 1100. Some of the social conditions presented as fact in the stories would have been anachronistic at the time of the manuscript's creation, but extracting reliable historical information from the accretion of legend, myth, and recreational storytelling is difficult.

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Archaeological Evidence. Archaeological evidence can be less challenging than literary sources (unless it was recovered before accurate records were kept), and therefore it does not call for the lengthy critical analysis that literary evidence requires. Finds of spears, knives, and shields in Anglo-Saxon graves are unequivocal in displaying military accoutrements, and the rare finds of swords, axes, helmets, and mail along with cauldrons, drinking horns, tableware, and furniture offer a glimpse of the treasures described in *Beowulf*. The weapons found in the Sutton Hoo Mound 1 (the ship burial) demonstrate that the poet did not simply invent gold-hilted swords, boar-crested helmets, and shining mailshirts.

But grave goods are not without their own problems of interpretation. Men and women do not usually fall dead, fully clothed, into an open grave. Their funerary costume and equipment were chosen for them, mediated by the wishes of the surviving relatives and mourners, especially their desire to offer a last, favorable impression of the deceased. It is not certain that the weapon sets taken into the graves of men were even assembled before the funeral took place, perhaps being burial gifts from friends and family that the deceased had never so much as seen or handled in his life. Spear and shield were the badges of the free man in Anglo-Saxon society, whereas the bow, spear, and knife were common hunting tools. The inference that the presence of weapons must mean that the burial belongs to a warrior is therefore unsound, and the occasional examples of youths buried with adult weapons that they could hardly have wielded argues strongly for weapons' having been placed in graves as a contrived statement of social status, wealth, and power.

[*See also* Battlefield Archaeology *and* Burghal Hidage.]

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Stephen Pollington

Sources (1000–1300)

For Britain's medieval military history, the sources are rich—thin perhaps for the Anglo-Saxon period, but then rising upward dramatically with the materials centered around the Norman Conquest. Afterward a long twelfth century saw an exceptionally productive period for some of Europe's best historians, many of whom were churchmen linked to the government; on the other side of 1200, historical writing continued apace, although it came to be dominated by clergy who were more likely to be affiliated with an ecclesiastical house or church. Local histories complement national, even international, approaches. Many of the sources are actually annals or chronicles, bare-bones litanies of significant events that impinged on the consciousness of the writer tasked with keeping the record. That structure works to the modern historian's advantage because the descriptions therein are more often free of the thematic doctoring that accompanies more deliberative histories that seek to contextualize their subject matter. For Britain one also has the luxury of vernacular sources at an earlier date than for much of the rest of Europe, most famously the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* but also the great quasi-historical poems of the Angevin period and later.

There is more than just narrative. The authorities (royal, noble, and ecclesiastical) of the British Isles poured out a stream of documents, including charters, the Domesday Book, and various memoranda like the pipe rolls or Edward I's military summonses, that demonstrate the actual workings of administrations deeply concerned with military matters. The financial records are especially valuable in establishing more concrete numbers for military affairs (for example, numbers of troops) because medieval observers were famously unconcerned with numerical exactitude.

And not least there is the singular richness of the Bayeux Tapestry, which continues to reward scholarly analysis. Across seventy meters (almost 230 feet) of embroidery, images of sieges, cavalry attacks, archers, and occasional foot soldiers testify to the medieval elite's ideas of what constituted the essential elements of combat. The fifty-eight scenes provide detailed pictures of what armor and weapons looked like, how (perhaps) they were used, and how even a clear-cut victory such as Hastings is still open to political spin.

Why was there such a production of historical material in medieval Britain? A partial answer rests in the nature of historical reasoning. As Leah Shopkow and Emily Albu have shown in their studies of Norman historical writing, ongoing crises called into question collective memory and a community's sense of identity; in reaction, histories came into being to establish and safeguard those very identities, a tradition of history writing that came to be a part of the British equation as well. The ongoing military troubles of 1000–1300, so traumatic for the peoples of Britain, end up being our good historical luck.

Where are all these sources? The actual manuscripts are concentrated mostly, but not wholly, in the great research libraries of Ireland and the United Kingdom. The Web site of the National Archives lists the many catalogs that point researchers where to look. Some manuscripts migrated to other nations, often France and, thanks to collectors earlier in the twentieth century, the United States. But for the average scholar the long and abiding interest in medieval history has occasioned most of these sources to be published in printed volumes that make them reasonably accessible. Moreover, many have been translated from Old English, Anglo-Norman, and Latin into contemporary English.

The survey that follows is cursory and far from exhaustive. The purpose is to draw attention to those sources that make particular contributions to medieval military history. One of the greatest introductions to medieval historical writing remains Antonia

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Gransden's magisterial survey, *Historical Writing in England, c. 550– c. 1307* (1974). Much of what follows draws upon her work.

The Anglo-Saxon Period, c. 1000 to 1066. The *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* (often abbreviated as *ASC*) takes its name from both its subject matter and its primary language of composition. Like many medieval chronicles, it begins at the beginning: the creation of the world. For historians, though, it comes into its own as it reaches and records contemporary events, primarily from the late 800s until 1154. Copies of the *Chronicle* were sent out to monasteries across the kingdom, and in these localities the ongoing history of the kingdom was appended to the original copy, often with a new, localized slant. Of all these versions, only six remain (designated A, B, C, D, E, and F), but their variations and congruities enable scholars to read them against each other for a fuller picture of events. The *Chronicle*'s narrative is typically straightforward, especially for battles. Although it often situates the ultimate cause of English defeats in supernatural purposes, human actions appear to be presented as accurately as possible.

The other two great narratives of the later Anglo-Saxon period are royal biographies: the *Encomium Emmae reginae* and the *Vita Aedwardi regis*. The *Encomium* was produced in Flanders around 1041 under the patronage of Emma of Normandy, the exiled queen who had been wife to both Aethelred II and Cnut. Its focus, however, is actually on Cnut and his son by Emma, Harthacnut, so it is nearly contemporaneous with its subject. The author has an eye for detail—such an eye, in fact, that the *Encomium* seems to parallel the descriptive power of Norse saga, and this association has left some of his most vivid passages' veracity open to doubt. The *Vita Aedwardi* was likewise sponsored by its subject's widow. Although the promotion of Edward as a saint trumps most other concerns and topics, the events of Earl Godwin's last days and Tostig's 1065 revolt get more attention.

Hagiographies, or biographies of saints, may not at first seem a fruitful field for military material, but a general point and some specific examples bear keeping in mind. As the metaphor of the *miles Christi*, or knight of Christ, grew more common, much religious writing was couched in military terms. Specific to the Anglo-Saxon hagiographies are the confirmations of the 991 battle of Maldon to be found in the *Life of Saint Oswald* and the active aid that Saint Wulfstan, the bishop of Worcester, lent Harold in quashing his brother Tostig's invasion, described in the *Life of Wulfstan*. Of course, the need to present their saintly subjects in the best light can lead to significant omissions, such as Wulfstan's later cooperation with William I—something that the author, Coleman, did not mention in the *Life*. In a similar vein there are notable sermons and scriptural commentaries that can yield clues as to Anglo-Saxon views on war. Aelfric's homily on Maccabees has interesting commentary on permissible types of war, develops the idea of a military order, and simply relishes the military narrative of the Maccabean war of liberation.

The Anglo-Norman Period, 1066 to 1154. The totality of William's victory at Hastings has left few English sources; only the D and E versions of the *ASC* cover it contemporaneously. Not surprisingly Harold appears therein as a most capable king and military leader. The *Chronicon ex chronicis* (attributed variously to a monk named Florence or to John of Worcester) seems to have built its narrative upon a lost copy of the D version in the twelfth century. Another Englishman writing in Latin was the remarkable and prolific William of Malmesbury, whose *Gesta regum Anglorum* (Deeds of the Kings of the English) was probably completed by the 1120s. Along with Henry of Huntingdon's later *Historia Anglorum*, William's quest for information yields up stories found in no other source, and like Henry, he interprets the loss at Hastings as a divine judgment against the English nation, of which he nonetheless remains a proud son.

On the Norman side, at first glance the chroniclers may seem less defensive, but they are no less intent on explaining the justice of William's invasion. William of Jumièges produced the earliest apology for the Conquest, likely by 1070, the *Gesta Normannorum ducum* (Deeds of the Dukes of the Normans). Shortly afterward William of Poitiers produced an even

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more clear-cut panegyric to Duke, now King, William, the *Gesta Guillelmi II ducis Normannorum* (Deeds of William, Duke of Normandy). That William of Jumièges had a military career before he joined the church makes one want to rely heavily on his account, but his desire to justify William's invasion colors the events he purports to portray. So the Norman accounts must be used with caution.

Two other (poetical) sources are important for Hastings, but they also come with problems: Wace's *Roman de Rou*, a verse chronicle of Norman history, and the *Carmen de Hastingae proelio* (Song of the Battle of Hastings). Both are compelling reads, having some of the most detailed and dramatic passages about the battle. But the *Roman de Rou* was commissioned by Henry II nearly a century after the battle, and Wace understood what spin to put on his poem. The *Carmen* may have been written by Bishop Guy of Amiens soon after the battle and may thus rest on eyewitness accounts, but this authorship, and thus the poem's credibility, has been in contention ever since R. H. C. Davies attacked it in 1978.

Historical production continued apace in England, although the focus shifted somewhat in the immediate aftermath of Hastings. York and Durham saw local histories and hagiographies as their chief output, usually as a means to suggest why each diocese had supposedly incontestable rights to various lands and privileges. Symeon of Durham and Hugh the Chanter were the primary authors; although their works may be thin on military detail, their care about broaching or eliding certain topics shows an appreciation of the troubled state of the north at a time when the Normans were still trying to confirm their control of the whole kingdom and also gives a sense of changing relations with Scotland. Eadmer's writings on events at Canterbury and the writings of Saint Anselm of Canterbury have a number of important passages that show the church's complicated role in the military setup of the kingdom.

The dominant sources for the reigns of William and his sons are inarguably Orderic Vitalis and William of Malmesbury. For military history, both are treasure troves of detail and skillful analysis. Born in England, Orderic spent most of his monastic life at Saint Evroult in Normandy, where he wrote his *Historia ecclesiastica* of England and Normandy in the 1140s. Sympathetic to both sides, his treatment also shows the maturation of medieval historiography, for he took prior historians like William of Jumièges and William of Poitiers to task for their inappropriate twisting of the historical record. Orderic's care to safeguard through his writings the estates and privileges of Saint Evroult led to an interest in detailing local politics and struggles. This in turn led to evocative descriptions of contemporary warfare: he shows it to be small in scale, yet intense and frightening to those caught up within or even near such outbreaks. Thus some of the great heroes and villains of Anglo-Norman history populate his pages. Like Orderic, William of Malmesbury had a talent for the appropriate anecdote that has made him a favorite with historians ever since. His *Gesta regum Anglorum* relied upon the Anglo-Saxon tradition of annalistic reporting for its early material, but then it became itself a contemporary record in the early years of the twelfth century. William completed this work in 1120 but returned to it in later years. The rich manuscript tradition for William's work means that we can decipher this editorial process, one that saw him removing some of the more titillating passages in favor of sober analysis. His biases remained, but because he wore these on his sleeves, the modern student readily sees them.

Stephen's reign (1135–1154) was long called "the Anarchy" because of the civil war between Stephen and the empress Matilda, followed by Henry II's continuation of Matilda's cause. The earliest years are amply covered, with Orderic Vitalis still writing, as well as Florence or John of Worcester and an anonymous continuator of Symeon of Durham. The events were momentous enough to bring William of Malmesbury out of his literary retirement and resulted in his slender but locally detailed *Historia novella* (abandoned in 1142). William was a partisan of Robert, Duke of Gloucester, and by extension of Robert's half sister Matilda. As a counterbalance to William's interpretation, we have the pro-Stephen *Gesta Stephani*, although the unknown author began to cool toward the king in the later years of the work.

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The *Gesta* has detailed battle descriptions and shows a particular understanding of the growing importance of siege warfare in the conflict. Gransden is right that the narrative details bespeak a witness who knew well what he was describing. Henry of Huntingdon's *Historia Anglorum* reached its fullest development in this same period. To the north the Scottish invasion of 1138 and subsequent Battle of the Standard (the battle of Northallerton) impelled two historians to write. Aelred of Rievaulx composed his *Relatio de Standardo*, and Richard of Hexham the *Historia de gestis regis Stephani ci de Bello Standardii*. Both are small works, but their focus on the battle amply rewards the military historian.

Other historians who came into their own under Henry II found Stephen's reign worth their early attention. Robert of Torigni's own original work began in this period, and William of Newburgh is another valuable source. William has particularly engaged modern historians because of sympathy for his diatribes against the historical deceits of Geoffrey of Monmouth's mythical Arthurian history of Britain.

Angevin England and Its Neighbors, 1154 to 1216. Historical writing declined in the early decades of Henry II's reign, but as conflict loomed again by the 1170s, production picked up. The king's court drew talented writers, and Henry patronized a number, some of whom, like Wace, wrote on commission for him. Gerald of Wales and Walter Map were likewise on a sort of retainer, although neither wrote sycophantically for the king. Gerald is important for his *Expugnatio Hibernica* (Conquest of Ireland), which details how Anglo-Normans, especially his own Welsh kinfolk, began to mount expeditions and engaged in a number of close-run battles. The great chroniclers of Henry's reign, Roger of Hoveden and Ralph de Diceto, plus the work attributed to Benedict of Peterborough, had more interest in the administration of the king, as witnessed by their predilection to copy charters and letters wholesale into their tales, but the conflict of 1173–1174 between Henry and his family, involving nearly every neighboring power, still drew their attention.

Vernacular verse histories of contemporary conflicts in this period are remarkably valuable for military historians. Jordan Fantosme's verse *Chronique* covers the 1173–1174 war, especially as it transpired in England. Although Fantosme undoubtedly invented a great deal of dialogue, the military details ring true, and although the *Chronique*'s rhetoric and energy clearly mimic the chansons de geste, the impossible deeds are thankfully reduced in scale. With snippets of Flemish song, and less than generous treatment of the Scottish, Fantosme's work highlights warfare that was becoming ever more nationalistic while the impact of chivalry was still rising to a crest. A similar treatment of the Anglo-Norman incursions into Ireland appears in the *Chanson de Dermot et du comte* (Song of Dermot and the Earl), a verse history that serves as a useful corrective to Gerald of Wales's celebration of his relatives in the *Expugnatio*. In the *Chanson*, as with Fantosme, we get compelling, but likely fictionalized, depictions of actual combat and dialogue; nonetheless the poem's pragmatic treatment of tangled political dealings argues for its historical utility.

For much of the rest of Irish military history, the local annals, such as those of Ulster or Tigernach, can be most frustrating in their brevity. For an Irish view on how the Irish conducted military operations, one turns with care to fictionalized accounts, such as the *Cogad Gáedel re Gallaib* (War of the Irish with the Foreigners), under the assumption that such accounts used contemporary and realistic depictions to ensure their verisimilitude for their audiences. The primary source for Welsh history in this period is the *Brut y Tywysogion* (Chronicle of the Princes). The *Brut* exists in three Welsh translations of a Latin original that covered the years 682–1283 in an annalistic fashion, with its own original contributions appearing after 944. Internal intrigues, ambushes, and raids dominate the regional affairs of Gwynedd, Powys, and Deheubarth, but we also see the resistance and collusion of Welsh rulers (and would-be rulers) in the Anglo-Norman penetration of the country.

For the period up to 1300, the two volumes of *Early Sources of Scottish History* published in 1922 by Alan Orr Anderson still remain a foundational collection, often used in conjunction with his earlier *Scottish*

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Annals from English Chroniclers. These two works bring together and translate texts like the *Annála Uladh* (Annals of Ulster) and the *Chronicon de Lanercost*, as well as passages from one of Scotland's strongest monastic sources, the *Chronica de Mailros* (Melrose Chronicle). Melrose Abbey's location in the Scottish Borders gave the chroniclers plenty of opportunities to note (and decry, as monastic writers seldom fail to do) the incessant border conflicts of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

Among the English chroniclers as the 1100s drew to a close, Richard of Devizes gives an informed look at three years of Richard I's reign. Although prone to rhetorical flights of fancy, he does give military affairs thorough coverage, including the trouble within England during Richard's enforced absence. Some of the great historians of Henry's reign, like Roger of Hoveden, continued their work into Richard's. As an example of local history, the Latin *Cronica* of Jocelin of Brakelond shows Abbot Samson, like so many abbots, striving to protect the revenues of his monastery, Bury Saint Edmunds. For military historians, though, there is rich material in how Jocelin dealt with the abbey's knights, negotiated the abbey's military dues to the king, and confronted the local townsmen.

John's reign (1199–1216) continued the trend of strong historical writing. Ralph of Coggeshall produced his history soon after John's death, a wise maneuver because Ralph was fairly hostile to John. Even though he took the barons' side in the Magna Carta struggle, Ralph deplores the ravaging of the landscape and the atrocities committed against the church by armies of both sides. Monasteries again became centers of historical work as Dunstable, Worcester, Winchester, and Barnwell all produced annals that were often fuller and more detailed than their predecessors. Chief among their complaints were John's reliance on foreign soldiery and the ongoing civil war that so disrupted the country and the church. For the campaigns that occurred around Lincoln, the Barnwell Chronicler was exceptionally well informed.

The verse *Histoire de Guillaume le Marechal* is less history than biographical propaganda, perhaps, but amid its praise for its subject are rich veins for the military historian to tap. Chivalry is on full display, mixed with the tangled politics of the day, and the poem gives a realistic view of how the ethos worked in daily affairs. Some battle scenes are assuredly remembered hazily and with twists that put William Marshal in the best light, but for a statement of cultural values either praised or derided, especially on the battlefield, the *Histoire* is nearly peerless.

Rebellions, Conquests, and Reactions, 1216 to 1300. The great lights of the thirteenth century are Roger of Wendover and Matthew Paris, who exemplified the Saint Albans school of history. Roger's *Flores historiarum* (Flowers of History) was mostly original in its coverage from 1202 until his death in 1236. Matthew Paris incorporated Roger's work into his own and then continued the *Chronica maiora* (Greater Chronicle) on down to 1259. Matthew's attention was seemingly on everything in Europe and beyond (he notes the irruption of the Mongols), but in England he focused on what he perceived as injustices to the church. Along the way he naturally includes military details. Among his signal contributions, however, are the illustrations he crafted: heraldic devices predominate, but he included full-blown pictures of battles as well.

The monasteries continued to be the major historical centers throughout the reigns of Henry III and Edward I. Their focus on local history was easily drawn to a national scale by the events and issues of the Barons' War of 1264–1267. As Gransden points out, the closure of chronicles such as those of Tewkesbury, Battle, Burton, and other abbeys soon after the battle of Evesham in 1265 highlights the end of the crisis that had impelled the monks to commence their histories. Caught between the depredations of disinherited barons and royal exactions, the *Dunstable Chronicle* gives a very full account of the Barons' War.

The reputation of Robert of Gloucester's *Chronicle*, in verse, suffered after its nineteenth-century editor dismissed it as "worthless," but it remains one of the major sources for the conclusion of the Barons' War. Written in Middle English verse, it is replete

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with local details. Meanwhile, the "Merton" *Flores* (so named after its supposed production at Merton Priory), Thomas Wykes's chronicle, and that of Pierre de Langtoft were pro-royalist. Langtoft's chronicle, strong as it is for the wars of Edward's reign, came a generation after the Barons' War, and its bias must be kept in mind.

The developments of the age are all the clearer in the appearance of urban-centered histories, such as the *Chronicles of the Mayors and Sheriffs of London*. Social conflict is the constant thread therein, although the activities of Simon de Montfort garner attention, typically from concern for what they mean to the internal politics of the city.

Edward I's reign and, naturally, his wars stirred up historians. The *Chronicon de Lanercost*, or at least the 1201–1297 portion, has the advantages of being an eyewitness account and of being focused on northern concerns instead of having the southern perspective that informed many writers centered on the English court. The author, Richard of Durham, had contacts in the Scottish court, thus giving a much-needed insight into the other side of that conflict. Walter of Guisborough wrote at the end of Edward's reign, and this vantage enabled him to treat Edward's campaigns thematically. At the same time, his analysis is intermingled with anecdotes likely taken from participants in the many wars. For the military scholar the challenge is to distinguish Walter's inventions from his more sober reportage. Similarly, Langtoft's verse *Chronicle* becomes most historically valuable when he provides details about the Welsh and Scottish wars to be found nowhere else, details likely gathered from the participants. Langtoft's particular contribution is the light he shines on the experience of common soldiers and noncombatants. This same trait is the hallmark of Sir Thomas Gray's Anglo-Norman *Scalacronica*, which was written in the middle of the next century but which clearly drew upon the wartime memories of Gray's father (also known as Thomas Gray, d. 1344), as well as on a number of lost texts. It is a rare history of warfare by one who knew it from the inside.

Even as Edward's wars generated historical writing, their seeming conclusion led many chroniclers to lay down their pens. The Peterborough Chronicler had followed the Welsh campaigns, but by 1282 his interests no longer ranged so far afield. The Waverly and Norwich chronicles had focused on Scotland, but they closed down just as Edward was gaining the submission of the competitors to the throne there. And as Scotland proved an intractable problem (from the English point of view), the writing of the Dunstable and Furness chronicles, as well as of Bartholomew Cotton, stopped in 1298.

[*See also* Bayeux Tapestry; Chivalric Biographies; Domesday Book; Manuals, Military; Mirrors of Princes; *and* Romances.]

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Steven Isaac

Sources (1300–1500)

For the student of medieval military history, late medieval England—which in this period includes Wales—offers an extraordinarily rich mass of record and narrative source material. The wars and military institutions of Scotland are less well documented, particularly in terms of Scottish government records, and the sources for Ireland are much thinner still. However, because much of the military history of Scotland and Ireland in this period also involved England, that realm's expansive archives and chronicles provide much material of value.

Students beginning to explore the primary sources related to this topic can benefit from a number of collections of translated militarily focused materials

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that collectively provide samples of all the main classes of sources, including chronicles, government record documents, news bulletins and letters, and treatises and literary works. Chris Brown's *Robert the Bruce* covers the main conflicts of the early part of the fourteenth century, and Clifford J. Rogers's *Wars of Edward III* and W. J. Ashley's *Edward III and His Wars* take up where Brown's work leaves off. George Wrottesley provides a detailed look at a single campaign, the Crécy-Calais operation of 1346–1347. Richard Barber's *Life and Campaigns of the Black Prince* is an outstanding compilation. Anne Curry's *Battle of Agincourt: Sources and Interpretations* includes more than two hundred pages of source materials for the 1415 campaign. For the Hundred Years' War as a whole, with some emphasis on the fifteenth century, there is Christopher T. Allmand's splendid collection, *Society at War*. For the Wars of the Roses the starting point is J. R. Lander's volume of that title. J. A. Giles's *Chronicles of the White Rose of York* offers a selection of materials for the period 1460–1471, with modernized orthography.

Record Sources. The surviving administrative records of the English crown probably surpass those available for any other medieval monarchy. Moreover a large selection of the most useful documentary material has been published, either in full transcript or in "calendar" form (summary translation). Thomas Rymer's *Foedera* provides the full text of thousands of documents of importance for tracing royal policies, including treaties; orders for the mobilization of troops and requisitioning of supplies, ships, arrows, and such; appointments to royal lieutenancies (often, in essence, military theater commanders); and diplomatic documents. These documents are usually in Latin or Anglo-Norman French, but Thomas Duffus Hardy's *Syllabus* gives at least a minimal indication of their content. Many of the documents were drawn from the Scottish Rolls, the Gascon Rolls, the Norman Rolls, the Treaty Rolls, the Close Rolls (which recorded letters and writs intended to be read by particular individuals, and so sealed closed), and the Patent Rolls (for open documents, intended for public viewing, such as military service pardons). Of these record sets the Scottish Rolls (*Rotuli Scotiae*) for the period have been published, and the Gascon Rolls, which are an extremely important source for the military affairs of the English possessions on the Continent, are currently being calendared. The Close and Patent rolls have been printed in calendar form, as have the Treaty Rolls through 1339. The scale of the material available to scholars in these collections is immense. The calendars of the Patent Rolls for 1301–1453 alone extend to forty thick volumes. Other useful calendars include that of the Signet Letters (documents sealed by the king's personal signet rather than the Great Seal, which was used for documents issued by the Chancery as letters Patent or Close) for Henry IV and Henry V; J. Goronwy Edwards's *Calendar of Ancient Correspondence Concerning Wales*, useful mainly for the reigns of Edward I and Edward II; and especially Joseph Bain's *Calendar of Documents Relating to Scotland*.

Another extremely useful class of records is the Rolls of Parliament, which include summaries of speeches and deliberations in Parliament related to strategic-level decisions about war and war finance, as well as occasional important bits of information in the petitions made by individuals (including soldiers) for redress by the crown. These are now all available with full text and translation in the sixteen-volume *Parliament Rolls of Medieval England, 1275–1504*. Somewhat similar material for the period after 1385 can be found in the *Proceedings and Ordinances of the Privy Council*. Given the close relationship between diplomacy and strategy, the documents collected by Pierre Chaplais in *English Medieval Diplomatic Practice* are naturally important for military historians.

Scholars of medieval Britain have also long engaged in the editing of individual record documents and groups of documents of special interest. These are far too scattered and numerous to explore here, but a few examples of particular significance include J. R. S. Phillips's *Documents on the Early Stages of the Bruce Invasion of Ireland, 1315–1316*; Chaplais's *War of Saint-Sardos*; Henry Ellis's *Original Letters Illustrative of English History*; Frederick Bock's set of diplomatic documents related to the Hundred Years' War; *John of Gaunt's Register*; Nicholas Harris Nicolas's edition

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of the depositions in the Court of Chivalry trial between the Scrope and Grosvenor families, with each of the deponents listing campaigns on which he had served and seen the disputed heraldic arms displayed by one or the other; and Joseph Stevenson's *Letters and Papers Illustrative of the Wars of the English in France during the Reign of Henry the Sixth, King of England*, which along with much else includes Sir John Fastolf's fascinating strategic proposals of 1435. Although collecting a different class of texts, Thomas Wright's *Political Songs of England* (through the reign of Edward II) and *Political Poems and Songs Relating to English History* may be mentioned here; they are useful for, among other things, popular reactions to war taxation and to the vicissitudes of war and peace.

Among the most useful classes of still unpublished records housed at the National Archives in Kew, London, for this subject are E101 (miscellaneous accounts, including many relating to soldiers' and sailors' service, horse replacement, and purchases of war matériel) and SC1 (Ancient Correspondence, including many letters of kings and chancellors). The *Soldier in Later Medieval England* project—an online database summarizing many tens of thousands of records of the military service of named individuals for 1369–1453, based mainly on muster rolls in the E101 class, letters of protection and attorney from the Treaty Rolls, and muster rolls in French archives—has recently been made available online, and it offers many opportunities for research, particularly research of a prosopographical nature. The British Library also holds numerous documents of archival nature, among the most important of which for military history is the wardrobe book of Robert Ferriby (for 1334–1337), which contains, among other valuable information, records of war wages that show which retinues and arrayed contingents served for what dates and with what composition (MS Cotton Nero C.viii). William de Norwell's similar wardrobe book for 1338–1340 is available in print; William Farley's for 1359–1360 is in the National Archives (E101/393/11).

The archival and printed records of the Scottish crown are nowhere near so extensive. Of the surviving records, the following have been published: *The Exchequer Rolls of Scotland* (royal fiscal accounts), the *Regesta Regum Scottorum* (surviving royal acts for each of the kings of the period to 1424), and the *Registrum magni sigilii regum Scotorum* (a register of documents issued under the Great Seal, 1326–1424). Moreover the records of and relating to the meetings of the Scottish Parliament throughout the period are now available online, with both images of the manuscripts and translations of the texts (*Records of the Parliaments of Scotland*). A number of volumes of records from various earldoms, noble families, and religious houses have also been printed.

For Ireland the surviving archival documents are extremely limited; nearly all of what still existed in Ireland in 1922 was destroyed by a fire that year. The following are, however, available: a calendar in Latin of the Close and Patent Rolls still extant in 1828 (*Rotulorum patentium et clausorum cancellariae Hiberniae calendarium*), summaries of the Irish Pipe Rolls through 1348 printed in the *Reports of the Deputy Keeper of the Public Records in Ireland*, and, in the National Archives of Ireland, unpublished calendars of the 1356–1357 Pipe Roll and of the Memoranda Rolls. In the National Archives in London the accounts rendered by the treasurers of Ireland to the English Exchequer still survive, along with many English-generated documents relevant to warfare in Ireland.

Chronicles. As with documentary sources, so with narrative historical works, England is far better provided than the other parts of the British Isles.

The fourteenth century. The Irish annals—which do have the advantage of nearly all being available online, translated and in searchable format (at CELT, http://celt.ucc.ie/)—are mostly just that, annals: year-by-year lists of major events with minimal explanation or analysis. Not currently included in the CELT set, but important particularly for the period of the Bruce family's heavy involvement in Ireland (1315–1322), are the so-called *Laud Annals*, contained along with other material in the *Chartularies of St. Mary's Abbey, Dublin*. Fortunately the Irish annals can, at least for some periods, be supplemented by English and Scottish works—for example, by a

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continuation, revealed only recently by Seán Duffy, of Nicholas Trivet's (or Trevet's) chronicle dealing with the Bruce period. A large proportion of the limited information that the annals provide relates to the low-intensity warfare endemic on the island throughout the period.

For Scotland, although the quantity is relatively small (compared to England), the quality is reasonably good. For the period through 1332, John Barbour's exceptionally detailed chivalric verse biography *The Bruce* is invaluable, including for Irish affairs. Although composed well after the events it narrates, it draws on earlier written sources now lost, as well as on oral accounts that were still available at only secondhand when Barbour, then an official of the Scottish court, began work on the poem around 1372. Cross-checking with other sources reveals the poem to be fairly reliable for military matters, despite its bias in favor of its protagonists, the Douglases and the Stewarts, and against the Balliols and Comyns, and despite occasional distortions apparently for dramatic effect. For the same period and on through 1363, the *Annals* of John of Fordun provide some limited information. The *Scotichronicon* of Walter Bower, the learned abbot of Inchcolm, offers an expanded version of Fordun's *Annals* and adds an original narrative down to 1437. The *Book of Pluscarden*, composed in 1461, is mostly an abridgment of Bower's text, but for this period the author often differs from or (more often) adds to his model, sometimes from eyewitness observation. The author was probably Master Maurice Buchanan, treasurer to Princess Margaret of Scotland, who married the French Dauphin in 1436. Buchanan had served with his relative Sir John Stewart in France in the 1420s; the work is therefore an important source for the Scottish participation in the Hundred Years' War in that period.

Of the English chroniclers, the most useful for the Anglo-Scottish wars of the first half of the fourteenth century are the *Chronicle of Lanercost*, Thomas Gray's *Scalacronica* (which has the great and unusual virtue of having been written by a veteran soldier, mostly while he was a prisoner of war in Edinburgh from 1355 to 1359), the *Vita Edwardi Secundi*, and the *Gesta Edwardi Tertii* of the Bridlington Chronicler. The various versions and continuations of the Brut chronicle, published and manuscript, including the 1307–1334 *Anonimalle Chronicle*, are crucial for the Anglo-Scottish wars to 1333 and contain some additional matter of use for later periods. Thomas Burton's *Chronica monasterii de Melsa*, although written after around 1388, includes important material for this earlier period taken from Meaux Abbey's earlier chronicles, which are now lost. So far as they extend into the period covered here, the chronicles (including continuations) of Walter of Guisborough (to 1312), Pierre de Langtoft (to 1307), and Nicholas Trivet (to 1307) are also important, particularly for military matters.

For the continental campaigns of the Hundred Years' War, two of the most reliable chronicles are the works of Adam Murimuth (to 1346) and Robert of Avesbury (to 1356), both of which incorporate verbatim numerous documentary sources, including exceptionally valuable campaign bulletins. Because Murimuth served as a diplomat for Edward II and worked at Saint Paul's in London, and Robert was registrar for the Archbishop of Canterbury, both had excellent sources of information. Gray's *Scalacronica* is also useful for the first phases of the Hundred Years' War and for the 1359–1360 Reims expedition, in which Gray served. The *French Chronicle of London* is useful for the battle of Sluis (1340) and for the following siege of Tournai. Geoffrey Baker's chronicle, which covers events from 1303 to 1356 and was written between 1341 and 1356, is excellent on military matters. The early sections, up to 1337, are mostly taken from Murimuth, but Baker has independent accounts of Bannockburn (1314) and Halidon Hill (1333). The sections on the Hundred Years' War, notably the 1346–1347 and 1355–1357 campaigns, are especially valuable; Baker is certainly the best single source for the battle of Poitiers (1356). The 1346 and 1355–1357 sections are translated in Barber's *Life and Campaigns of the Black Prince*, along with, for the 1346 campaign, the important but sadly fragmentary *Acts of War of Edward III*.

The *Eulogium (historiarum sive temporis)* notably incorporates what is in essence a campaign diary

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for the Poitiers *chevauchée*. Henry Knighton's *Chronicle*—of which the section after 1366 is the work of an anonymous continuator—contains much relevant material for the period 1337–1396 and is especially valuable for matters related to Henry of Grosmont. The 1333–1381 *Anonimalle Chronicle* is especially important for the Poitiers campaign and the *chevauchées* of 1370 and 1373. The Rochester chronicle (*Historia Roffensis*) attributed to William of Dene has important material that is unknown to most historians because the text has not been fully published, although Mark Buck is working to remedy that lacuna. A sample of its contents, the section dealing with the Scottish invasion of 1346, has been published by Rogers and M. C. Buck. For the 1356 campaign and the prince's intervention in Iberia, Chandos Herald's *Life of the Black Prince* (included in Barber) is indispensable.

The reign of the relatively unmartial Richard II is best examined through the text recently edited and translated as Thomas Walsingham's *St Albans Chronicle: The "Chronica maiora" of Thomas Walsingham*, volume 1: *1376–1394*—a version of a work earlier published under the title *Annales Ricardi Secundi et Henrici Quarti*. Until the second volume of this Oxford Medieval Text edition appears, David Preest's translation of Walsingham's *Historia Anglicana* version of the rest of Richard II's reign and of the reign of Henry IV can be found in another recently published volume, *The Chronica maiora of Thomas Walsingham, 1376–1422*. Bishop Henry Despenser's "crusade" of 1383 is covered, from the English perspective, by Walsingham, Knighton, the *Eulogium*, and the *Westminster Chronicle*.

Continental chroniclers are, of course, also important for the study of England's wars abroad. For the first stage of the Hundred Years' War, through 1360, one of the best sources is a canon of Liège, Jean le Bel (who is also a principal source for the 1327 Weardale campaign, on which he served as a man-at-arms). Jean Froissart, although intermittently unreliable, is nonetheless indispensable, particularly for the period from 1356 to 1400. Also very useful are Jan van Boendale (for the initial Low Countries phase), the *Grandes chroniques de France*, the *Chronographia regum Francorum*, the continuation of William of Nangis's chronicle, the *Chronique du bon duc Loys de Bourbon* (d. 1410) attributed to Jean Cabaret d'Orville, the *Chronique Normande du XIVe siècle* (for 1328–1372), and the *Récits d'un Bourgeois de Valenciennes*, as well as the manuscript *Saint-Omer Chronicle* for 1343–1347 (which Clifford J. Rogers is working to edit and translate). Not of equal quality, but still of significant value, particularly for the period 1350–1393, is the *Chronique des quatre premiers Valois*. The Kervyn de Lettenhove edition of Froissart's *Oeuvres* contains a wealth of supplementary texts, both at the end of each volume and in a separate one of *Preuves* (vol. 18)—for example, an English diary of the 1339 campaign and a Tournaisian chronicle describing the English siege of the place in 1340. Given their focus, the translated extracts of Fernão Lopes's chronicle deserve mention here.

The fifteenth century. The principal chronicle for the Welsh revolt of 1400–1409 is that of Adam of Usk, although for the outbreak of the conflict it should be supplemented by the *Chronicon abbatiae de Evesham*. For the reign of Henry IV, including the Percy revolts, the best source is probably the Saint Albans chronicle known as the *Annales Henrici Quarti* (published in *Trokelowe*; see Walsingham, *Annales*). Another product of the same scriptorium (and likely the same author), Thomas Walsingham's *Historia Anglicana* (published in translation as the *Chronica maiora*), is less useful for that reign, although it is of value for the English intervention in France in 1411–1412. It is, however, a principal source for Henry V's French war from 1415 to 1422. Thomas Otterbourne's related chronicle adds some details on the 1408 siege of Aberystwyth and on the battle of Bramham Moor, as well as on English policy regarding France in 1411–1412. Although not composed until the 1450s and 1460s, the two versions of the chronicle of John Hardyng (only the second of which has been published) should be mentioned here. Their author, like Thomas Gray, was an experienced soldier, and as a young man Hardyng fought at Homildon Hill and Shrewsbury under Henry Percy (Hotspur), of whose household he was a member. He later served on the Agincourt campaign and probably in the naval battle

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of the Seine in 1416 and the Scottish operations of 1417. As a servant of Gilbert d'Umphraville, Hardyng was well informed about the 1411 expedition to France, the battle of Baugé in 1421, and various episodes of the Anglo-Scottish border conflicts. The texts are not as detailed on these matters as one might hope, given the background of the author, but still deserve attention.

The best English description of the 1415 campaign, including the siege of Harfleur and the battle of Agincourt, is in the anonymous *Gesta Henrici Quinti*. Thomas Elmham's *Liber metricus de Henrico Quinto* essentially abridges the *Gesta* (with some variations and additions) for the 1415 campaign but continues to 1418. The *Vita Henrici Quinti* of Tito Livio Frulovisi (Titus Livius) is another important though partly derivative source for the French wars and includes details seemingly received from the author's patron, Humphrey, Duke of Gloucester. John Streeche's chronicle, composed around 1422, is perhaps even more eulogistic of Henry V than are the biographies, but it is important for the fight at Valmont in 1416 and provides some other unique details regarding the conquest of Normandy. For the siege of Rouen in 1418, the poem of John Page (published as the *Siege of Rouen*) is a principal text. The chronicle of the soldiers Peter Basset and Christopher Hanson and the clerk Luke Nanton (in MS 9 of the College of Arms, London)—which is unpublished but is partly reflected in Edward Hall's *Union of the Two Noble and Illustre Famelies of Lancastre and Yorke*—gives annalistic, militarily focused coverage of the years 1415–1429, with much information regarding which soldiers served or were captured or killed during which operations.

For the rest of the Hundred Years' War, the English chronicles are of relatively little value, though the Brut and the London chronicles cover the period. The French and Burgundian narrative sources make up for the decline in English historical writing. There is a separate entry in this encyclopedia on French sources; here it will suffice to note that the most useful for military matters include the related works of Enguerran de Monstrelet and Jean de Waurin (both of which cover the whole fifteenth-century phase of the war), the *Parisian Journal*, Guillaume Gruel's *Chronique d'Arthur de Richemont*, and Guillaume Cousinot's *Chronique de la Pucelle*. Thomas Basin's *Histoire de Charles VII* and Jean Chartier's *Chronique de Charles VII* should also be considered. For Joan of Arc, see also Craig Taylor's collection of sources. As already noted, the Scottish *Book of Pluscarden* attributed to Buchanan and the chronicle of Walter Bower are also useful. A whole range of material on the final expulsion of the English from France is found in Stevenson's *Letters and Papers*.

For the Wars of the Roses (1452–1485), there are many English chronicles, although they tend to be concise and partisan. One of the most valuable is that of Croyland (or Crowland) Abbey, which covers the entire period and for the years after 1469 draws on information provided by (and indeed may have been written by) a councillor of Edward IV (see Ingulph). The chronicle composed by John Wethamstede, the abbot of Saint Albans, is important for the early period, to 1461, particularly for the battles fought outside his abbey in 1455 and 1461. From then to 1474, John Warkworth offers a relatively balanced narrative. Another relatively full narrative for the period to 1459–1469 is the *Annales rerum Anglicarum* formerly attributed to William of Worcester (in Stevenson, *Letters and Papers*). The chronicles of the London authors John Benet (covering 1440–1462) and Robert Bale (1438–1461), printed in Ralph Flenley's *Six Town Chronicles of England*, are especially valuable for military matters, as is, for the period 1450–1469, the text known (probably wrongly) as *Gregory's Chronicle* and attributed to William Gregory. Other Londoners—the anonymous authors of *An English Chronicle, 1377–1461* and various versions of the *Chronicles of London* (the "main" version of which ended in 1485), including the *Short English Chronicle* (in James Gairdner's *Three Fifteenth-Century Chronicles*)—give much relevant information, although mostly with a Yorkist bias. Outstanding sources for the limited periods they cover are the *Chronicle of the Rebellion in Lincolnshire, 1470* and the *Historie of the Arrivall of King Edward IV*. Less reliable but interesting is Dominic Mancini's *Usurpation of Richard III* (for 1483).

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One of the fullest military narratives of the wars up to 1471 is the work of a Burgundian soldier-chronicler, Jean de Waurin. Another foreigner, the Italian humanist Polydore Vergil (who completed the first version of his British history in 1513), provides much valuable information, especially for the 1480s, drawn from courtiers of his patron Henry VII. His text is naturally pro-Lancastrian. The *Paston Letters and Papers* also have much to contribute.

[*See also* Jean le Bel; Boendale, Jan van; France, *subentry on* Sources; Froissart, Jean; Iberia, *subentry on* Sources; *and* Low Countries, *subentry on* Sources.]

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Clifford J. Rogers

Narrative (500–1000)

The period of British history from 500 to 1000 witnessed the collapse of the Roman province of Britain under pressure of invasion, the establishment of Anglo-Saxon kingdoms, and these kingdoms' unification into a kingdom of England. To the north, Pictish and other kingdoms were absorbed into the kingdom of Scotland. To the west, Wales remained unconquered by the Anglo-Saxons, and consolidation of the native kingdoms produced two principal entities.

Sub-Roman Britain, 500–664. In the third and fourth centuries the Roman province of Britain came under attack from the Picts, who inhabited Britain north of the Forth-Clyde line, and the Scots, who inhabited Ireland. With the Roman Empire collapsing, the Roman army was withdrawn from Britain in 407 to meet crises elsewhere, and the province fell prey to invaders. Around 400, Hadrian's Wall ceased to be manned, the supply of Roman coin coming into Britain began to diminish, and production of mass-produced pottery ceased. The province became divided into several dynastic kingdoms. The Angles and Saxons of northern Germany embarked on a violent conquest and settled southern and eastern Britain. To what extent they adopted British customs and institutions and drove out the native population is not known. Certainly the invasion involved Germanic immigration on a large scale and considerable violence between the newcomers and the original inhabitants.

The historical sources for fifth- and sixth-century Britain are scant. Inscriptions on memorial stones yield some clues, but the earliest literary source is a perplexing history written by a British priest, Gildas, around 550. Gildas's knowledge and frame of reference may be to a limited locality. He describes how "a certain proud tyrant" invited three ships' companies of Saxons to Britain to help ward off the attacks of the Picts and Scots. However, these mercenaries grew dissatisfied, turned on the Britons, and began to take over large tracts of land. Of the later sources, the monk Bede, whose *Historia ecclesiastica gentis Anglorum* (Ecclesiastical History of

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Anglo-Saxon Soldiers. This drawing gives a good sense of the shields and weapons of Anglo-Saxon *fyrdsmen* (note the dominance of the spear and the relative scarcity of bows). Higher-status *thegns* would have had more metal armor and swords to go with their spears. Illustration from the "Harley Psalter," Harley MS 603, fol. 7, c. 1030. © THE BRITISH LIBRARY BOARD

the English People) was completed about 731, is the more reliable authority. Bede accords Gildas's "proud tyrant" the name of Vortigern and adds many details, including the statement that the Anglo-Saxons came to Britain in 449. The *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*, a compilation dating from about 892, draws on earlier materials.

Vortigern may have been lord of several kingdoms, but Bede attributes leadership of the British to another individual, called Ambrosius Aurelianus. Either of these figures, or both, may have been the model for King Arthur, whose legend crystallized in the twelfth-century works of Geoffrey of Monmouth. To Gildas the "proud tyrant" and Ambrosius are both figures from the past. By Gildas's time the area of Britain still controlled by the original inhabitants had broken into several kingdoms ruled by dynasties. Gildas names five rulers of those kingdoms: Constantine of Damnonia; Aurelius Caninus; Vortepor, tyrant of the Demetae; Cuneglasus; and Maglocunus. Two may be identified with confidence: Damnonia is thought to be Dumnonia, which corresponds to Devon and Cornwall, and the Demetae appears to be Dyfed, a kingdom of medieval Wales, in which there is a monumental stone commemorating "Vortepor the protector." Others are more tentatively identified: Aurelius Caninus may have been an early king of Powys in Wales; Cuneglasus may be Cynlas, a king in north Wales; and Maglocunus may have been Maelgwn, an early king of Gwynedd. These British kingdoms were Christian and preserved a Latinate culture, and most may have been situated in the country now known as Wales. Other British kingdoms besides those listed by Gildas are known: one at Elmet in Yorkshire, another based in Strathclyde, and a third, Gododdin, situated in what is now southeastern Scotland.

The Anglo-Saxon Conquest and Conversion. The earliest Germanic objects found date from the middle of the fifth century. Typically the invaders settled in nucleated villages, but in some instances they took over towns that the Romans had founded, notably Canterbury and York, and used them as centers of authority.

Historical sources agree, and archaeology seems to confirm, that the invaders did not have it all their

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own way. A battle or siege at an unidentified location referred to as "Mount Badon" figures prominently in both Gildas and Bede. The battle, dated by Bede to 493, was between the Christian Britons led by Ambrosius Aurelianus and the pagan Saxons. According to Gildas the outcome of the battle was the establishment of a peace that endured into his own time.

Such military technology as survives from the period reveals a reversion to pre-Roman forms. At Coygan Camp in south Wales is evidence of the reoccupation of an Iron Age site as early as the fourth century. Similarly at South Cadbury in Somerset an Iron Age fort that had lain derelict for four centuries was refortified in the fifth century, and those fortifications were improved in the sixth. Linear earthworks that may date from this period, Fleam Dyke and Devil's Dyke in Cambridgeshire, face southwest, which is consistent with resistance to an invasion advancing westward.

No firm distinctions can be drawn among the Germanic races involved in the conquest. Broadly speaking, Saxons appear to have settled in the south and Angles in the east, but Jutes, Franks, Frisians, Huns, and Danes are also associated with the settlement. The Jutes are said by Bede to have arrived first and to have established a kingdom of Kent. Saxons then founded the kingdoms of Sussex, Essex, and Wessex. Bede's account—supported by the archaeology of the uniquely rich ship burial at Sutton Hoo—suggests that the Anglian kingdoms of East Anglia and Mercia and the Saxon kingdom of Essex were founded in the sixth century. Two other Anglian kingdoms, Deira and Bernicia, were founded shortly afterward and combined to form Northumbria.

The Britons, Picts, and Scots bequeathed little in the way of archaeological evidence; in contrast, because the Germanic invaders customarily buried grave goods, Anglo-Saxon archaeology is very rich. Some thirty thousand Anglo-Saxon burials have been unearthed, mostly in southern and eastern England, some dating from the fifth century but many more from the sixth. Immigration from the Continent clearly increased as time went on. Grave goods provide some evidence for the military technology. The Sutton Hoo burial, thought to be that of Raedwald (d. 624 or 625), King of East Anglia, contains a helmet with a nosepiece, a sword, and a circular shield—all magnificently wrought. However, they are parade items, and it is questionable how typical they are of the weaponry of the day. Fragments of a second helmet survive from a burial of the later seventh century. An iron framework covered with horn plates, this helmet, too, has a nosepiece and is surmounted by a splendid boar crest.

Aethelberht (c. 560–616), King of Kent, is the first Anglo-Saxon king of whom anything significant is known, largely because he was the first to convert to Christianity. Bede states that he was overlord of southern Britain. In certain areas of England, Christian tradition survived unbroken from Roman times. Given the hostility between the Christian Britons and the pagan Germanic invaders, however, it is unsurprising that conversion of the invaders was brought about primarily by external missionary efforts.

Aethelberht's kingdom had long-standing connections with Frankish Gaul, where Christianity had survived. Before 598, Aethelberht married a Frankish princess who brought in her wake missionaries, led by Saint Augustine. Conversion to Christianity then took place in the kingdoms of Kent and Essex, although Essex later reverted briefly to paganism.

Over the next generation most Anglo-Saxon kingdoms converted; the southern kingdoms were won over by the successors of Augustine, and the northern kingdoms were won over by Saint Aidan and other Celtic missionaries from Ireland and Dalriada. Relations between the two varieties of Christianity could be tense: at the Synod of Whitby (664), King Oswiu of Northumbria chose between the two and decided in favor of the Augustinian variety. The pagan burial at Sutton Hoo, if of Raedwald, appears to have been something of an insurance policy for the afterlife, for Raedwald had already undergone some form of conversion. Christianity suffered many reversals and setbacks: an outbreak of plague in 664 was interpreted as divine punishment for apostasy. By 686, however, the conversion of the Anglo-Saxon kingdoms was complete, much of it achieved through the efforts of itinerant bishops.

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Christianity had important implications for Anglo-Saxon lordship and society. It introduced written codes of law, modeled on the Roman law; those of Ine, King of Wessex (r. 688–726), survive, whereas those of Offa, King of Mercia (r. 757–796), do not. The establishment of bishops contributed to a revival of urban life because each diocesan bishop had to have an established location for his seat. The anointing of rulers and ecclesiastical coronation in the Carolingian fashion further bolstered the already remarkable power of Anglo-Saxon kings.

The Early Anglo-Saxon Kingdoms, 500–664. A striking feature of Anglo-Saxon society is the importance of kingship, which dominated other aspects of social organization, such as kinship, tribal loyalty, and ethnicity. The early involvement of the clergy in king making emphasizes the quasi-religious nature of that kingship. Royal succession was open to all candidates of royal blood and was often settled by force of arms.

Anglo-Saxon Helmet. Iron and bronze helmet from the Sutton Hoo ship burial, c. 625. BRITISH MUSEUM, LONDON, UK/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

Traditionally the Anglo-Saxon kingdoms of England are discussed in terms of the heptarchy, seven kingdoms. The true picture was a good deal more complex and fluid. Several smaller kingdoms were absorbed by their greater neighbors but could also reemerge, as Bernicia and Deira reemerged from Northumbria in the ninth century. The larger kingdoms—Northumbria, Mercia, and Wessex—vied with one another for an overall supremacy, which Bede calls the "bretwaldaship." Bede provides a list of seven such predominant kings, whose reigns lasted from 477 to 651. The last three kings on the list are all Northumbrians, but the last two were killed in battle against Penda (d. 655), King of Mercia. Elsewhere in his *Historia ecclesiastica*, Bede says that Penda's successor Aethelbald (r. 716–757) ruled all the kingdoms to the south of the Humber. Therefore, the Northumbrian hegemony was succeeded by a Mercian.

From about 550 there are signs of a revival of urban life. By the end of the sixth century, York had once again become an important town, and by the time of Bede, London had revived as a center of commerce. Trade was facilitated by a revival of coinage. From the late sixth century, copies of the Gallic coins were being made, and the silver penny, whose name may have come from the name "Penda," is first referred to in the laws of Ine.

Generalizations can be offered regarding the military organization of the Anglo-Saxon kingdoms. The main functions of lords included leadership in war, protection of his sworn men, exaction of vengeance if these men should be slain, and the provision of armor, horses, and land. In return the lord received service and tribute. The lord was surrounded by a bodyguard of handpicked warriors, often described in Anglo-Saxon poetry, and a king could call out an army, known as the *fyrd*. Who exactly owed service in the *fyrd* is unclear, but the laws of Ine suggest that it was all free men. Maintenance of horses was a duty placed on estates, and armies traveled great distances to fight battles. Armies were, then, mounted on horseback, although Anglo-Saxon poems suggest that the fighting was done on foot. Kings appear to have been able to rely on a common

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obligation to maintain bridges and fortifications, perhaps including dykes. The most impressive evidence of military organization at this period is the existence of massive linear earthworks: East Wansdyke in Wiltshire is ten miles (sixteen kilometers) long, and the greatest of the earthworks, Offa's Dyke, is discussed below.

Northern Britain: Dalriada and the Picts. A Roman source, datable to 297, makes the earliest reference to the Picts, who upset the peace of the Roman province in the fourth century. To historians the Picts are enigmatic. All the indications are that Pictish society was similar to contemporary Anglo-Saxon and Irish society but with some surprising differences. The Picts were pagan and apparently illiterate. Little is known of their language (possibly a Celtic language influenced by an earlier, non-Indo-European language), and Pictish symbol stones are indecipherable. The custom among their kings was for matrilineal succession, a peculiarity that is also thought to be non-Indo-European. One interpretation is that in Pictland a Celtic aristocracy ruled a pre-Celtic peasantry. The Picts were known to Bede and to Adomnán, a seventh-century Dalriadan author, and Bede draws a distinction between northern and southern Picts. It seems likely that by the seventh century an overking led the Pictish kingdoms, and king lists compiled in the tenth century purport to list Pictish rulers.

In addition to the Picts, the area we call southern Scotland contained two other principal British kingdoms: Strathclyde, centered on Dumbarton, in the west, and Gododdin, centered on Edinburgh, in the east. From about 500 a fourth kingdom intruded from Argyll and expanded eastward. This was Dalriada, founded by the Scoti, Gaelic settlers from northern Ireland. Picts and Scots are said to have fought alongside one another against the Romans in the fourth century, so Dalriada was probably the product of a century of immigration from Ireland. We know much more about Dalriada than about the Picts because the Scoti, being Christian, had literate monks who produced annals, king lists, law tracts, and saints' lives, although all of them are of a much later date. In or about 563 the Irish saint Colmcille founded a monastery at Iona that became the spiritual center of Dalriada, and it infused that kingdom with missionary zeal. Adomnán's *Life of Saint Colmcille*, written 688–692, is an important historical source. The mountains of Drumalban became identified as the boundary between Dalriada and Pictland, but the encroachments of the Scoti are likely to have been resisted by the both the Picts and Strathclyde. Iona was influential in the conversion of the Picts, although Bede tells us that the British missionary Ninian had already begun to convert the southern Picts. A remarkable source, the *Senchus fer nAlban* (History of the Men of Scotland), contains the obligations for taxation or military service of the three main branches of Dalriada and lists the numbers of houses in locations that, unfortunately, we cannot now identify.

In the sixth century, Dalriada, Gododdin, and Pictland were all threatened by the expansion of Anglian Bernicia. An epic poem records how three hundred or three hundred and sixty warriors of Gododdin invaded Deira as far as Catterick about this time but met with defeat. Soon afterward Gododdin was swallowed up by Bernicia, and by 650, Bernicia had also subdued southern Pictland. In 685, however, the successor kingdom of Bernicia, Northumbria, was severely defeated by the Picts at the battle of Nechtansmere (also known as the battle of Dunnichen), near Forfar. As a result the Anglians withdrew to the south of the river Forth, and the center of power among the Picts also moved southward, settling, it is thought, at Scone. The main Pictish kingdom, Fortriu, was based at Scone and grew in strength, reaching a zenith in the middle of the eighth century, when Óengus mac Fergus (d. 761) attacked the kingdom of Strathclyde and subdued Dalriada.

From this time the Pictish and Dalriadic kingdoms began gradually to fuse—painfully and with open warfare on some occasions but with dual kingship on others. This was facilitated by a decline in Northumbrian power and was perhaps necessitated by the increase in Scandinavian settlers in the north and west. Furthermore, Scottish influence among the Picts was growing. Pictish matrilineal succession came to an end. In 839–844, Kenneth I MacAlpin

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(d. 858) emerged as the king of Dalriada and forcibly subdued the Picts, allegedly by massacring their nobility. The gradual union with Dalriada spelled the end of the Pictish identity: by 1100 the Pictish language had vanished, and Gaelic predominated, with Norse spoken in the north and west.

Kenneth I ruled the joint kingdom of Dalriada and Pictland for sixteen years. He was not the first to have ruled both kingdoms jointly, but he was the head of a dynasty. Scottish kings thereafter traced their descent to him. He attacked Lothian many times and made an alliance with the Norse king of the Hebrides. In 849 he also moved the relics of Saint Colmcille eastward, to Dunkeld, a transition symbolic of unifying the kingdom.

Mercia and Wessex. Aethelbald of Mercia controlled areas formerly subject to the West Saxon king, and he presided over several councils of the church. In a charter of 736 he styled himself "king of Britain." Offa (r. 757–796) succeeded, and his charters demonstrate that he could dispose of land far beyond Mercia without reference to the local king. In charters Offa styled himself "king of the English" and "king of the whole land of the English." He improved the coinage of his dominions by replacing debased silver coinages with an imitation of the Frankish denarius, which had a high silver content. The most powerful testimony to his power is the monumental earthwork Offa's Dyke. This great defensive earthen rampart was once continuous, and it marked a 150-mile (241-kilometer) frontier, from the mouth of the river Dee to the mouth of the river Severn. The dyke was a response to British counterattack and came to mark out the land of the Angles ("England") from that of the Britons ("Wales").

Early in the ninth century, dynastic disputes undermined Mercian power. Cenwulf, the last powerful king of Mercia, campaigned successfully in Wales, but from 821 to 840 there was a rapid succession of Mercian kings and an increasing preoccupation with containing the Welsh kingdoms. Egbert, King of Wessex (r. 802–839), ended the Mercian hegemony by defeating a Mercian invasion in 825 at Ellandun. The people of Essex, Sussex, and Kent submitted to him, and those in East Anglia appealed to him for help. Furthermore, Egbert invaded and subdued Cornwall and Devon in 825. By 829, Egbert had prevailed everywhere south of the Humber, and leadership of the Anglo-Saxon kingdoms passed to Wessex.

Wessex enjoyed dynastic stability in a way that Mercia and Northumbria had not. Whereas other Anglo-Saxon kingdoms used a debased currency, Alfred the Great of Wessex (r. 871–899) raised the weight of the West Saxon penny to Carolingian standards. A single currency was used throughout Wessex and Mercia, minted predominantly in the southeast of England, where most bullion entered Britain. Wessex was well organized; it had long been divided into shires, each led by a senior magnate known as the "ealdorman." In the middle of the ninth century, relations between Wessex and Mercia improved, and the two kingdoms cooperated. By then a much stronger enemy was to be confronted: the Vikings.

The Early Welsh Kingdoms. The name "Wales" comes from the Anglo-Saxon word for "foreigner." Early in this period the Welsh wrote of themselves as *Britones*, a reminder that they had much in common with the British of Strathclyde and Gododdin. In the seventh century a new term came into use, *Cymry*, from Old Welsh, meaning "compatriots."

There was, however, little unity in early medieval Wales. Three kingdoms among many stand out as significant: Dyfed, in the southwest; Powys, in eastern mid-Wales; and Gwynedd, in the northwest. Kings of Dyfed, as previously stated, claimed ancestry from Vortepor, tyrant of the Demetae. Gildas records that the Irish made incursions into Wales in the sixth century, and the ruling dynasty of early Dyfed appears to have had Irish origins. An Irish prose tale of the Middle Ages, *The Expulsion of the Déisi*, records that a people from Meath in Ireland were driven out by their enemies and went to live in Dyfed; this is consistent with Welsh pedigrees written in the tenth century. By the middle of the tenth century, however, the dynasty had lost or abandoned its Irish origin in accordance with contemporary necessity, and pedigrees of the kings of Dyfed were recast to claim legitimacy from the Roman period.

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The foundation legend of Gwynedd is recorded in a ninth-century source, according to which its ruling elite were descended from the Gododdin, who inhabited what is now southeast Scotland. Bede records that because Gwynedd came into conflict with the expanding Northumbria of the early seventh century, it tended to ally with Mercia against Northumbria. Bede also states that in 615, Aethelfrith of Northumbria (r. 593–616) fought a battle with the Britons at Chester, a location at which Gwynedd is likely to have supplied most of the British presence. The heartland of Gwynedd was the island of Anglesey, and it is on Anglesey that an inscribed stone commemorates King Cadfan as "the wisest and most renowned of all kings." The reign of Cadfan's son, Cadwallon, witnessed tumultuous events. Bede states that the Northumbrian king Edwin (r. 616–632) achieved the conquest of Gwynedd and the overlordship of both Anglesey and Man. Welsh sources confirm that in 632, Edwin besieged Cadwallon on Anglesey. Cadwallon rapidly recovered, however, and—allied with Penda, King of the Mercians—struck back against Northumbria. In 633, Cadwallon and Penda combined to defeat and kill Edwin at the battle of Hatfield Chase. Bede states that for a full year Cadwallon ruled Northumbria "not as a victorious king, but as a savage tyrant."

The third kingdom in Wales was Powys, often the victim of the alliance between Gwynedd and Mercia. The name "Powys" is thought to derive from Latin *pagenses*, which might imply that it was a kingdom of rural people or that the people had at one time been pagan. Powys bordered on Mercia and was subject to incursions and hostile settlements. Offa's Dyke, built in the late eighth century, was not built at the frontier of Anglo-Saxon settlement: there were settlements to the west of it. In 822, Powys was temporarily overrun by the Anglo-Saxons. An inscribed stone, the Pillar of Elise, says that the invaders were driven out after nine years.

The Viking Attacks, 793–900. In England the ninth century saw the collapse or near collapse of most of the Anglo-Saxon kingdoms, as Viking marauders threatened to overrun them. Under Alfred, Wessex alone resisted. It survived the Viking onslaught, and in so doing it forged a basis for expansion.

The Vikings were pagan seaborne adventurers whose first recorded attack on England was at Lindisfarne in Northumbria in 793. Not much is heard of them until 835 when serious attacks were suffered by towns on the southern coast. These early, isolated raids did not unduly affect the Anglo-Saxon kingdoms, but in 865 a "great army" invaded England, and the change in the nature of attack was marked. The Vikings proceeded to conquer and settle Northumbria in 867 and East Anglia in 869. A further "great army" arrived in the summer of 871, and thus reinforced, the Vikings took over most of Mercia in 874–877. Every kingdom came under pressure, and virtually the whole of eastern England fell under Viking rule.

Attacks on Wessex took place from 871 to 878, and, defeated, Alfred was forced to hide in the marshes of Somerset. He rallied the forces of the West Saxons, however, and overcame the Vikings at the battle of Edington in 878. Guthrum, the leader of one of the Viking armies, admitted defeat and withdrew to East Anglia; he also agreed to convert to Christianity. Guthrum and Alfred agreed on a treaty that divided England into Scandinavian and English areas: the boundary line was to be the Roman road of Watling Street, which ran from London to Chester, and the area east of it became known as the "Danelaw." Alfred capitalized on his victory. He assumed lordship over all of England that was not under Viking rule, and he married his daughter Aethelflaed to the Mercian ealdorman Aethelred, who led resistance to the Vikings in western Mercia. Alfred captured London in 886 but was able to make the gesture of returning it to Mercian lordship without losing control of it. In 893 a third "great army" of Vikings attacked England but found Wessex too strong to attack directly; instead, the army remained around the Thames estuary.

Alfred introduced reforms that improved military organization in Wessex. In 896 he had ships built to his own specification. They are described as longships, of sixty oars. They were not a complete success but were an obvious response to a seaborne enemy. Second, he divided the *fyrd* into two equal

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shifts: one remained at home, maintaining farms and agricultural production, while the other was away on active service—an arrangement that enabled Alfred to campaign for longer periods. Both these reforms appear to be based on Frankish models. In contrast, Alfred's third reform was based on the old Anglo-Saxon custom of *burh* service. A document known as the Burghal Hidage survives from the reign of Alfred's son, but it reflects Alfred's scheme of conscription and detailed military planning. It lists thirty-three *burhs* of Wessex: key towns evenly distributed throughout the kingdom, each no more than a day's march from another. The document allots to each *burh* a number of units of land—for example, "to Wallingford belong 2,400 hides," and so on. The hide was the basic unit of land used for the assessment of public duties and military service. Each hide was to be represented by one man, and specified lengths of rampart were to be manned by specified numbers of men. The *burhs* were places of refuge for the rural population, and they shared a common town plan that, in certain cases, dates from this period. They were planned probably as commercial centers intended to generate taxable wealth for the king, but they also served as a network of defensible forts resistant to hostile penetration.

In contrast to Wessex, the Viking attack and settlement caused enormous disruption in the north and east of England. Four principal Viking armies had settled south of the river Humber. Episcopal successions were disrupted, sometimes for decades, and the production of books and charters ceased as the pagan and illiterate Vikings took control. The scale of Viking attack after 850 was very large, and the armies of 865, 871, and 892–896 are all referred to as "great armies" in the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*. The Scandinavian area defined by Alfred's treaty with Guthrum was marked by distinctive forms of social organization. The persistence of Scandinavian legal customs, personal names, and place-names for centuries thereafter is a testament to the Vikings' impact. The Vikings are said to have "shared out" land in Northumbria, Mercia, and East Anglia, and this appears to have been a deliberate and organized process. The separate identity of each army was recognized well into the next century. In the Midlands, settlement was grouped around five *burhs* or fortified centers: Nottingham, Lincoln, Stamford, Derby, and Leicester. There was no extermination of the native peasantry in the Danelaw, for Anglian nomenclature persisted alongside Danish and Norwegian.

The Unification of England. Alfred's reforms in Wessex, which were born of the need to resist the Vikings, crucially contributed to the takeover of what remained of the other kingdoms. The Viking attack on the north and east created a more or less united front among the remaining Anglo-Saxon kingdoms, which had hitherto been deeply hostile to one another.

Alfred's son, Edward the Elder (r. 899–924), brought under his control all of England south of the Humber. Aethelflaed, his sister, facilitated the building of defensive *burhs* in Mercia. Welsh princes, traditional enemies of Mercia, recognized Edward's overlordship because he could be relied on to restrain Mercia's western ambitions. In 910, Edward defeated the Vikings of Northumbria at the battle of Tettenhall in Staffordshire. Furthermore, Edward seized Essex in 916, and following the death of Aethelflaed, he used force and diplomacy to incorporate Mercia into his West Saxon kingdom. Thereafter he exploited differences between the Danes of Northumbria and the Norse Vikings of the kingdom of Dublin, who strove repeatedly to establish a kingdom based on the city of York.

Edward's three sons succeeded him: Aethelstan (r. 924–939), Edmund I (r. 939–946), and Eadred (r. 946–955). Aethelstan's great achievement was the defeat of the Dublin Norse and hence the subjugation of Northumbria. Aethelstan won the allegiance of the Scots king, and he was powerful enough to invade Scotland and bring that country to heel in 934. In 937, York, Scotland, and Strathclyde cooperated in a joint invasion of English territory, which Aethelstan defeated in a battle at Brunanburh, thought to have been in Yorkshire. The battle is made famous by the Anglo-Saxon poem of that name. Aethelstan's victory did not quite spell the end of the Dublin Norse attempt to create a kingdom centered on York, but it enabled him to absorb the remainder of Bernicia, creating a united English kingdom. In 945 his successor,

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Edmund, devastated Cumbria, extending England to the Solway.

Scotland, 841–1000. The early kings of Scotland began to project their power south of the river Forth, at the expense of the Anglians of Northumbria and Lothian. Because his people were under such pressure from the Vikings to the north and west, Kenneth I MacAlpin attacked Anglian territory remorselessly. Kenneth's son, Constantine I (r. 862–877), experienced similar pressure from these invaders, as well as from the Norse of Dublin and York. Toward the end of the ninth century, that Norse kingdom was strong enough to take over what is recognized today as Cumbria. In 870 the Vikings besieged and took Dumbarton, probably with the connivance of Constantine. Strathclyde remained as a client kingdom of Scotland.

In 927 the kingdom of Scotland first encountered that of England expanding from the south: Aethelstan, King of England, met Constantine II (r. 900–943) and his client, the Bernician ealdorman Ealdred, at Eamont, on the frontier with England. Constantine and Ealdred made peace with Aethelstan. In 934, however, Aethelstan attacked the Scottish kingdom by land and sea as far as the river Forth and beyond, presumably because the kingdom was not adhering to the peace. The campaign probably took a form that was to become familiar: Constantine refused to attack, and, for lack of fodder and supplies, Aethelstan was forced to retreat at the end of the summer. In another three years, in 937, Aethelstan encountered an invasion by Scots, Dublin Norse, and Strathclyde at Brunanburh. The final Dublin Norse attempt to establish a kingdom of York occurred in 947–954, and on the fall of York the centers of Anglian and Scottish power shifted southward: Edinburgh was abandoned by the Anglians to the Scots, and the rump of Bernicia at last acknowledged the king of England as its lord.

From 962 to 1005 the Scottish throne alternated between two dynastic segments, the descendants of Constantine II and those of his cousin Malcolm I (r. 943–954). In 973, Kenneth II (r. 971–995) was one of six or eight British rulers who acknowledged the overlordship of Edgar, King of England, at Chester. But when the Vikings renewed their attacks on Britain at the end of the tenth century, the Norse of Cumbria and Strathclyde may have assisted them: in 1000, Aethelstan II of England raided Cumbria and attacked the Isle of Man as though by way of reprisal. In 1018 the Scottish king Malcolm II (r. c. 1005–1034) defeated the English and gained Lothian for Scotland, bringing Scotland to its modern frontier, the river Tweed. In the west, however, many lands were still independent of Scotland: Strathclyde was still a client kingdom, Galloway remained in the control of the Norse Irish, and the Western Isles owed obeisance to Norway.

Gwynedd and Deheubarth: The Line of Merfyn Frych. Rulers of the first dynasty of Gwynedd died out in 825, and the kingship passed to Merfyn Frych (r. 825–844), who founded the aggressive second dynasty. Rhodri Mawr, Merfyn's son, was Merfyn's successor. At the time, Wales enjoyed a rest from external interference. Anglo-Saxon Wessex showed little interest in Wales, and Viking attacks on Wales made slight impact; the Vikings' first recorded attack was not until 850. Rhodri Mawr extended his power over Powys and over the southern kingdom of Ceredigion. In 877, however, the growth of Rhodri's power faltered when Viking raiders drove him out of Gwynedd, and he fled to Ireland. By 878 he was reinstated in Gwynedd, and he subsequently died in battle against Anglo-Saxons.

Rhodri Mawr was evidently a ruthless and shrewd ruler, and his six, seven, or eight sons (according to the various accounts) were cut from the same cloth. It seems that they held the kingship of Gwynedd in common. Four of the sons are named in the Welsh chronicles; the two most prominent are Anarawd and Cadell. The king of Dyfed applied to Alfred of Wessex for assistance against them, but the sons of Rhodri forged an alliance with the Dublin Norse kingdom of York. But Alfred saw the value of taking the most powerful Welsh kingdom into partnership, and in 892–894 when a new Viking army menaced southern England and north Wales, the sons of Rhodri cooperated, with Alfred against it. Simultaneously, they intensified their power in south Wales—over Ystrad Tywi and Dyfed—sometimes with Anglo-Saxon help. Early in the tenth

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century the two surviving brothers effectively carved up the conquests between them in a division that became lasting. In the north, Anarawd held Gwynedd and Powys, whereas in the southwest Cadell held Ystrad Tywi and Dyfed together as a unit, henceforth known as Deheubarth, "the southern half."

In the first part of the tenth century these two kingdoms were held by two contrasting royal cousins. King of Deheubarth in the south was Hywel ap Cadell, known as Hywel Dda, or "Hywel the Good." Hywel submitted to Wessex in 918 and again in 927, and he made several visits to the court of Aethelstan, where he was treated with honor. His name is associated with the reform of Welsh law. To the north, in the kingdom of Gwynedd, Idwal Foel, or "Idwal the Bald," was more reticent in his dealings with England, and in 918 he may have fomented revolt against Aethelstan. In 942, Hywel attacked Gwynedd, where Idwal's five sons posed a threat to him. Hywel died in 949, leaving three sons of his own.

On the death of Hywel there was war between Gwynedd and Deheubarth, as the sons of Hywel fought those of Idwal, and at the battle of Llanrwst in 954 the sons of Idwal triumphed. Owain ap Hywel was left in sole possession of Deheubarth, however, which he ruled until his death in 988. His kingdom may have suffered from Viking raids in the west, but he compensated for this by expanding toward the southeast. In the north, Gwynedd was torn by internecine conflict, as the sons and grandsons of Idwal fought among themselves. Gwynedd suffered much more than Deheubarth did from the new wave of Viking attacks. Toward the end of the tenth century, Maredudd, Owain's second son, came close to emulating the hegemony that his grandfather Hywel Dda had enjoyed, and he even attempted to win back Gwynedd. But the northern dynasty reasserted itself against him, and it defeated Maredudd in battle in 994, forcing him to return to Deheubarth, where he died in 999.

The Apogee and Nadir of Anglo-Saxon England, 946–1000. The tenth-century kingdom of England was modeled on that of Wessex, which had been divided into shires by at least the late eighth century. With the extension of the kingdom in the tenth century, the Midlands of England were divided into shires in the same fashion. From about 1000 the chief royal official of the shire was known as the "shire-reeve," or "sheriff." The subdivisions of the shires were known as "hundreds" (or, in the Danelaw, as "wapentakes"). These were units of military obligation, and each hundred contributed so many men to the *fyrd*. In Wessex each shire had been headed by an ealdorman, who led the shire's contingent to war. As Wessex expanded over England, the status of the ealdorman grew, so that he became headman of a group of shires and a virtual provincial governor. It is clear that in Mercia, East Anglia, and Northumbria the ealdorman held viceregal power. The poem the *Battle of Maldon* shows that the men of the *fyrd* considered themselves to be the men of Ealdorman Byrhtnoth, and with the passage of time the ealdorman became equivalent to the Danish rank of earl.

A similar organization existed for the provision of a fleet. In this, King Edgar (r. 959–975), who is renowned for his naval exploits, may have been instrumental. An entry in the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* for 1008 suggests that three hundred hides grouped together formed a unit known as a "shipsoke," and that each shipsoke would provide a ship of sixty oars. But the size of both ships and the territories providing them may have varied.

Monastic reform was an important and divisive issue in tenth-century England. Ecclesiastical reformers, based at Cluny in Francia, attempted to free monasteries from lay ownership and interference, and they found adherents in England. Dustan, Abbot of Glastonbury, was the leader of an influential movement for monastic reform, and against him a myriad of private interests determined to retain powerful local families' influence on monasteries. King Eadred (r. 946–955) was sympathetic to the reformers, but it was not until Edgar came to the throne that the reform made headway. Edgar realized that reforming bishops and abbots were useful to the monarchy as counterweights to the power of long-established aristocratic families. He made Dunstan Archbishop of Canterbury, and Dunstan and other prelates ensured that monasteries were reformed,

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depriving wealthy patrons of their monastic property and influence.

Edgar's sixteen-year reign was followed by a succession crisis. He had two sons, each by a different wife and each of whom bears an epithet. The older was Edward "the Martyr," and the younger was Aethelred "the Unready." Edward succeeded first, probably because he was a supporter of monastic reform. The outline of events is unclear, but it seems that the enmity of entrenched aristocratic interests dispossessed by the monastic reform caused a brief and bitter civil war. Peace was reached, but Aethelred's supporters did not accept the settlement, and Edward was murdered in 978. No one was punished for the murder, but the ealdorman Elfhere of Mercia, a staunch opponent of reform, did penance for it.

Aethelred II, "the Unready" (*Unraed*, meaning "ill-advised"; r. 978–1016), succeeded his halfbrother and began a reign notorious for its calamities. The king himself was not personally responsible for many of them, and the fullest source, the *Abingdon Chronicle*, does him no favors. Considerable effort was made to effect a reconciliation of the warring parties, and Edward's body was reinterred with royal honors. But then a final wave of attacks began in 980—attacks that for the first time can be identified as largely Danish rather than Scandinavian. The reasons for the renewed assault are complex, but the fact that other countries had improved their defenses and that England was rich, relatively vulnerable, and possibly still somewhat divided may go a long way toward accounting for it. The Danish attack continued unabated for the next twenty years. Also, in the north, the Scots attacked, advancing the border to the river Tweed and weakening the English king's grasp on Northumbria.

Aethelred tried to bolster the power of the crown by making shrewd marriage alliances with important provincial families. He also tried to counter the raids by forming such an alliance with Richard, Duke of Normandy, the French equivalent of the Danelaw, in 991. The treaty denied hostile fleets access to the Norman ports, where they had habitually found supplies and succor. As a part of this policy Aethelred took Emma, the sister of Richard, as his wife.

Later in 991 the Vikings, led by Olaf I Tryggvason of Norway, inflicted a serious defeat on the English at the battle of Maldon. The battle is described in the poem of that name—one of the best descriptions of the Anglo-Saxon *fyrd* in action. Horses were dismissed before the fighting started, as a mark of resolution against taking flight. Fighting was on foot, with spears, swords, and axes, and, as earlier at Brunanburh and later at Hastings, the *fyrd* formed a wall of shields. The action resulted in a serious defeat of the English, a defeat of lasting significance. From that point the English began to buy off the raiders; this policy encouraged the Danes to come back for more and ultimately to take over England. Tribute was paid, in increasing sums, in 994, 1002, 1007, and 1012. The booty attracted not just independent warlords such as Tryggvason: by 994, King Sven Forkbeard of Denmark himself was bent on the conquest of England.

Aethelred had some success in disengaging such warlords from the Danish side. Olaf Tryggvason made a treaty with him and never again fought for the Danes. Thorkell the Tall defected to the English in 1012. With king and lords unable to protect them, however, English ealdormen and thegns (thanes) had no choice but to make whatever alliances might provide security. There was much changing of sides: Eadric Streona, ealdorman of Mercia, did so twice. Aethelred was forced into exile in Normandy in the summer of 1013, and London submitted to Sven, who was received as king by all the English. Aethelred made a brief comeback on the death of Sven in 1014, but the country was now torn by war between the Danish claimant Cnut and the English magnates. On the death of Aethelred in 1016, the era of Anglo-Saxon England ended and that of Anglo-Danish England began.

One last aspect, vital to military development, appears to have its origin in this period: the emergence of a permanent land tax, or *geld*, around 1012. Traditionally this tax is known as *danegeld*, but the contemporary name for it was *heregeld* (army money), raised to pay mercenaries. It was levied at so much per hide, and its existence implies the existence of lists of landowners and assessments of the extent of their lands.

Bahan dengan hak cipta

The tax was paid into a central treasury, permanently based at Winchester. It is the final and most telling expression of the power of Anglo-Saxon kingship.

[*See also* Alfred the Great; Border Defenses, Earthwork; Burghal Hidage; *Burh*; Celtic Styles of Warfare; Cnut; Edington, Battle of; Maldon, Battle of; Sven Forkbeard; Thane (Thegn); *and* Vikings.]

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Colm McNamee

Narrative (1000–1300)

The history of the British Isles from 1000 to 1300 begins in the midst of resurgent Viking interest in the British lands, moves on to the intrusion of the Normans into nearly every corner after the mid-eleventh century, and witnesses the growth of English royal power as military demands spurred both technological and financial innovations. Along the way, many different parties fought for their part in the tale—rebellious earls, adventurous marcher barons, and the polities of Wales, Scotland, and Ireland—as each sought to rival or emulate the military precociousness of the English monarchs.

Anglo-Saxons and Vikings. The British Isles saw much military activity in the centuries preceding the Norman Conquest, although the chronicles are often frustratingly terse in their coverage. Nonetheless the intensity of warfare in this period was often vividly portrayed in the sagas and poems that celebrated warriors' lives and deaths.

Aethelred. In the standard telling, Aethelred's reign over England, which lasted from 978 to 1016, had a murderous start and a disastrous finish, and his reputation has suffered accordingly. Certainly the spate of royally sanctioned murders and mutilations by which Aethelred sought to forestall possible resistance or treachery did not improve his standing. Of late, however, historians have noted that his brother's murder, albeit shocking, colored later accounts more than it did contemporary ones. Thus Aethelred's reign is now less a story of steady decline and crisis, resulting eventually in Viking invasions and conquest, than a story of long, occasionally successful resistance that was finally overcome by pressures too great for England—not just its erratic king—to withstand.

Danish raids resumed in the 980s, and Aethelred tried to establish a national posture against them. A treaty with Richard, Duke of Normandy, was supposed to close the Norman harbors to the Vikings, and in 1000, Aethelred led a campaign north to punish the Vikings' allies on the Isle of Man and around Strathclyde. All in all, however, the kingdom's fractures showed: local levies had to turn out on their own to counter landings in 999, 1001, and 1004. In 1003, Sven Forkbeard of Denmark came to England with a sizable force, ostensibly to avenge the massacre of Danes in England the previous year on Saint Brice's Day. The kingdom's weakness became obvious as Sven's army burned Exeter, Wilton, Norwich, Thetford, and Wallingford. The Danes left in 1007 after being bought off with £36,000, but the Danes now knew that the interior, and not just the coastal towns, was available for plunder. Aethelred tried to stave off further raids in 1008 by ordering new armor for a force of nine thousand men and by preparing a large fleet: every 310 "hides" (measures of land notionally equivalent to a small family farm) was responsible for one vessel, for a total of some two hundred ships. Archaeological evidence shows that boroughs both old and new also received attention. As Richard Abels has pointed out, Aethelred's maneuvers show a man with a grasp of the practical problems that had to be surmounted.

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But his effort was in vain. Although Aethelred could marshal significant resources, they never seemed able to work together. His new navy was on patrol by 1009 but missed entirely the fleet that landed Thorkell the Tall in England that year. For the next three years Thorkell and later-arriving allies plundered the center of the kingdom, capturing towns like Oxford, Cambridge, and Northampton. The *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* complains that the English levies always seemed a step behind the invaders. But Aethelred was also plagued by treachery, most notably in the career of Eadric Streona, the Mercian ealdorman who from 1007 was a liability to the Anglo-Saxon cause. In 1012, Aethelred turned disloyalty to his advantage by plying Thorkell with enough riches to move him from plunderer to royal supporter. The Viking's former career, however, had been played up back home, and this led Sven Forkbeard, now a king, to return to England with conquest in mind.

In late summer 1013, Sven's fleet arrived and moved up the Trent. He secured the submission of the northern shires, took hostages and collected provisions, and then turned south to gather up the quick surrenders of Oxford and Winchester. Only London, where Aethelred and Thorkell were operating, resisted; the townsfolk burned the Thames bridges and blocked Sven's entry. Sven withdrew westward, accepting still more surrenders from the Anglo-Saxon aristocracy. As the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* admits, Sven had effectively gained mastery of the whole kingdom, and he was recognized as king. Obviously sensing the coming conclusion, Aethelred sent his queen and sons to Normandy, and by Christmas, once London decided to resist no longer, he himself fled to the Isle of Wight.

Ireland. Even as the Danes grew ascendant in Anglo-Saxon England, their military fortunes in Ireland took a turn for the worse. For nearly fifteen years Brian Boru had managed to make his title of High King actually mean something, but in 1013 the king of Leinster rebelled and induced the Vikings of Dublin to join the fray. Sigtrygg (or Sitric) Silkbeard, the Dublin leader, was able to induce other Vikings—notably Sigurd, Earl of Orkney, and Brodir (or Brodar) of the Isle of Man—to enlist with their retinues. Brian mustered his forces, including the unwilling help of Máel Sechnaill, King of Mide and former High King, and the battle of Clontarf took place on 23 April 1014. Sigtrygg sat out the fight in Dublin, and at nearly the last minute Máel Sechnaill informed Brian that he would not fight, either. Brian still had the numerical advantage, but the Vikings had the advantage in weapons and armor. Indeed, the Viking advantage would have carried the day had not Sigurd died and Brodir fled from the fray. The battle lasted much of the day, with pauses for the exhausted sides, until the Vikings began fleeing for their vessels. At that point Máel Sechnaill led his troops into the battle and cut off the Vikings' retreat. But even as all seemed won, Brodir apparently resurfaced in the Irish rear and found Brian virtually alone at prayers, where he killed him.

Despite the loss of the High King, Clontarf signaled the resurgence of the Irish. The Vikings in Dublin remained economically significant but less significant militarily. Máel Sechnaill was able to regain his former position as High King, but no one ever quite regained Brian Boru's strong control, and factionalism was the norm for the next century and more.

The last Anglo-Saxon kings. Meanwhile Sven's death in February 1014 left the door open for Aethelred to reverse the Viking conquest of England. The Danes split over the succession to Sven, with the fleet opting to support his younger son, Cnut. Aethelred exploited the moment to return, but he was to face still more disloyalty. Eadric threw his support to Cnut in 1015, and apparently Thorkell joined him in the switch. By 1016 many other leaders were aligning with the Danes, including Godwin, whose family would dominate royal politics in coming years. The only real resistance to Cnut came from Edmund Ironside, Aethelred's son, who effectively pursued a policy independent of—perhaps rebellious to—the king's. The national levy (the *fyrd*) was called out several times to counter Cnut's landings, but internal suspicions forestalled action. Then, even as Cnut approached with a new invasion fleet, Aethelred died on 23 April.

Edmund was acclaimed king by the Londoners and the magnates present, and for the rest of the year the fighting was fierce because each side, thanks to the

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splintered loyalties, had bases from which to work and to regroup. At Sherston, Edmund set his forces up in the shield-wall formation that gained such fame in the later battle of Hastings. Eadric played a double game, and his tactics showed the key role of leaders over their forces. Eadric killed a man who resembled Edmund, and then held up the man's head and tried to start a panic. Edmund had to forestall a rout by taking his own helmet off. Still, the slaughter was so heavy that the armies fell back by mutual consent after the second day's fighting, against the two kings' wishes. As Edmund gained the upper hand, Eadric came back to the Anglo-Saxon cause, and Edmund summoned the *fyrd* for the fifth time that year. Near Ashingdon the two hosts collided, and the battle proved a thorough defeat for Edmund, especially after Eadric led the flight from the field. A division of the kingdom was agreed, but Edmund's death on 30 November left Cnut able to take the whole. Once his control was complete by 1018, he collected a staggering *danegeld*—£82,500—with which to pay off and dismiss much of the host that he had brought with him.

Military affairs in England calmed down under Cnut. In part this was so because of his attention to Denmark and Norway, where he campaigned repeatedly. And Cnut's English subjects played a role in those ventures. English ships were present at the defeat at Helgeå (the Holy River) in 1026, and Englishmen filled fifty ships for the 1028 expedition. Always on Cnut's mind, though, were Aethelred's heirs, who remained at large on the Continent. To forestall their claims Cnut arranged his own marriage to Aethelred's widow, Emma, a union that produced yet another later claimant to the throne, Harthacnut.

Whoever reigned in England faced a perennial problem in clarifying relations with the growing monarchy in Scotland. The Scottish king Malcolm II pushed his luck during the troubles in the south by raiding over the border, finally drawing Cnut north in 1031 to force his submission. A man named Macbeth was reported to be among Malcolm's retainers at the meeting of the two kings. This Macbeth fell into conflict with the next Scots king, Duncan, and removed Duncan in 1040 by victory in battle in his home territory of Moray. Macbeth then assumed the throne and seems to have held it without great trouble—and certainly without Shakespearean levels of villainy—until his death in 1057 in battle against another future king of Scotland.

When Cnut died in 1035, however, Harthacnut's claims were briefly set aside by his older half brother (Cnut's son) Harold Harefoot, who managed to turn apparent regency into outright kingship. Emma's role is difficult to sort out, but the up-and-coming kingmaker Godwin eventually backed Harold. Godwin's support was critical in ending the 1036 move by Alfred Aetheling (another son of Aethelred and Emma) to recover the throne for the house of Wessex. Godwin captured and blinded Alfred and massacred most of his guard. Godwin's family, however, later had trouble living down the reputation earned by Alfred's brutal blinding and subsequent death. By 1039, Harthacnut had settled the problems in Denmark and was preparing to return to England. He gathered an invasion fleet of sixty vessels—four times the size of the standing navies kept by Cnut or Harold—but this flotilla ended up being unnecessary. In March 1040, Harold died after a winter-long illness. Harthacnut landed in June and levied an immense tax with which to pay off his troops; the troops themselves, especially the housecarls, acted as the tax collectors. He kept much of this naval force in place, and the *heregeld*, the tax for the vessels, was so burdensome as to begin driving up the prices of basic commodities. Godwin had to buy his way back into favor by the gift of a magnificent warship. Two years later, in 1042, Harthacnut was also dead, leaving Emma's only surviving son, Edward, as king. Godwin played his hand well and parlayed support for Edward into a position of unparalleled prominence for his sons and daughter.

Now in his forties, Edward the Confessor, who had spent most of his life in Norman exile, focused on securing his grasp on his new kingdom. He put together an impressively large navy to patrol the coasts, especially against continuing threats from Scandinavia. To cement Godwin's support further, he appointed Godwin's sons Swein and Harold as earls in 1043. That same year he turned on his mother and

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seized her considerable fortune. Although he married Godwin's daughter in 1045, Edward resisted his new father-in-law's desire to meddle in the wars between Norway and Denmark. Perhaps recognizing the need for a counterweight to his new father-in-law's influence, Edward began turning back to the Normans whose support he had enjoyed while in exile.

A rupture with Godwin came in 1051, at the end of Eustace of Boulogne's visit. The continental lord (a kinsman of Edward) and his men sought to quarter themselves forcibly in Dover, and the inhabitants resisted. Fatalities occurred, perhaps even of women and children. Edward believed Eustace's version of events, which blamed the violence on the townsmen, and he ordered Godwin to punish the town. Godwin refused, perhaps from a desire to check the continental influences that were growing in Edward's court, and this rupture led to his and his sons' banishment. While Godwin and his sons were scattered to different refuges (including perhaps the court of Macbeth of Scotland), Duke William of Normandy may have indeed visited England and gained Edward's promise that he would inherit the kingdom—such was the later Norman claim. The next year, though, Godwin coordinated naval maneuvers between himself and his son Harold and thus outwitted the navy that Edward had waiting to block his return. The sailors (*butsecarls*) of southeast England joined the earl's cause, and the balance tilted against Edward, who had to extend forgiveness to Godwin and return most of his family's titles and lands.

Godwin died unexpectedly at Easter 1053, and his sons moved to the fore. Siward, Earl of Northumbria, had been pushing back against Macbeth of Scotland since 1051, but the campaigns had cost him his heirs. When Siward died in 1055, Edward gave Siward's earldom to Tostig Godwinson. Harold Godwinson, meanwhile, had gained his father's Wessex earldom; he garnered much acclaim in 1055 for leading the counterstroke to Gruffydd of Wales' invasion of Hereford. In an earlier debacle that year, under Earl Ralph the Timid, the English had fled "because they had been made to fight on horseback"—a phrase in the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* that has excited military commentators ever since, especially when they are looking for hints in Anglo-Saxon history to explain what happened at Hastings in 1066. In 1063, Harold Godwinson led both land and naval expeditions successfully against the Welsh king. When his brother Tostig led a widespread rebellion in 1065, however, Harold likely did not mind seeing him exiled. Harold was thus the most powerful man in the kingdom when Edward died on 5 January 1066.

Anglo-Normans. Consecrated the next day as king, Harold Godwinson faced multiple military challenges: his brother's clear intention to recover his lands by force as he recruited ships and men in Flanders; the claim to the kingship that William of Normandy had been building since 1051; and the interest of Harald Hardrada of Norway in re-creating Cnut's empire. Harold's eventual loss should not obscure the fact that he did an admirable job of using the kingdom's resources to mount a vigorous defense for roughly ten months. The C version of the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* credits him with raising "greater naval and land levies than any king in this country had ever gathered before." Tostig struck first, arriving off Lincolnshire with sixty ships and commencing to raid the area. Harold was in the south, mustering a grand army and organizing a naval interception against William. Earls Edwin and Morcar, however, now allied by marriage to Harold, repelled Tostig and reduced his forces considerably. He withdrew to Scotland to await the arrival of Harald's invasion forces. Much of 1066 belonged to the quartermasters. William in Normandy was gathering all the forces he could, weighing the need for an overwhelming force against the counterbalance of supplying such an army. In addition, the weather held him to the Norman coast for longer than intended. Harold faced similar difficulties, and when he disbanded his forces on 8 September, it was because the English ships had no supplies left.

About a week later Harold learned from Edwin and Morcar that Tostig and Harald Hardrada had landed and that York was in peril. In a signature move, he collected troops on the fly and rushed northward, marching even at night. Edwin and Morcar, meanwhile, gave battle on 20 September at Gate Fulford. They were defeated, and the invaders began taking

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Battle of Hastings. A group of soldiers leave Hastings to do battle with Harold's English troops, October 1066. Detail from the Bayeux Tapestry, c. 1066–1086. MUSÉE DE LA TAPISSERIE, BAYEUX, FRANCE/WITH SPECIAL AUTHORIZATION OF THE CITY OF BAYEUX/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

hostages to secure Northumbria. Harold's speed, however, brought him to the scene five days later, and he surprised Harald and Tostig at Stamford Bridge, west of York. Perhaps one-third of the Norwegian force was back at their vessels, and *King Harald's Saga* says that the day was so nice that the invaders had left their armor behind as well, because they were expecting no real resistance. The *Saga*'s details of what actually happened are a mixture of historical fact, myths for Harald's biography, and information transposed from the later battle at Hastings. In the end Stamford Bridge was easily one of the most lethal battles of the period, with reports of bones still visible decades later. Tostig and Harald Hardrada both died in the fight, and Norwegian reinforcements arrived only in time to face annihilation themselves; only twenty-four ships of the original three hundred were needed for the Norwegians' return home.

Harold's triumph was famously short-lived. On 28 September, Duke William's forces landed far to the south—behind Hastings in Sussex—fortified a site as their base, and began raiding the countryside both to gather supplies and to force Harold to come to battle. Harold again reacted with remarkable speed, perhaps too much so; it has been suggested that he should have given his troops more time to recuperate. In addition, he seems to have placed so much faith in his housecarls' abilities as to forego the assembling of the full *fyrd*. By early October he moved into Sussex to find William's army, having covered 250 miles in two weeks. They found each other on 14 October.

William the Conqueror (r. 1066–1087). The battle of Hastings has been picked over ever since by historians, both because of the fight's actual enormity and because of its pivotal legacies. Its duration, nine hours, staggered observers; both sides nearly lost in the early going and then held on. Supposedly it was a victory of Norman cavalry over brave but outmoded foot soldiers. But this traditional view has been losing ground. Both Harold and William played key roles as leaders, and in the end the losses at Hastings meant that the Anglo-Saxon cause had few leaders left around whom resistance could

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continue to rally. William sought a decisive battle, got his wish, and managed (barely) to achieve an unexpectedly thorough victory. It left the way to London open, and by Christmas 1066 the remaining magnates of the kingdom accepted his coronation as king.

After the battle, William's need to hold his new dominion meant that military developments continued apace. The most visible change was the installation across the countryside of numerous motte-and-bailey castles, which first served to cow the local populace but also could be centers of resistance for independent-minded lords. By 1070 the *servitia debita*, or system of military service based on fiefs, was being laid across the kingdom, resulting in a professional military reserve of approximately five thousand knights; this was in addition to the still extant *fyrd* of the Anglo-Saxon tradition. Military concerns also drove administrative precociousness as William tallied up the wealth of his kingdom in the Domesday Book or sought through the Salisbury Oath to tie the loyalty of vassals more directly to the crown than to their immediate lords.

One further military legacy of William the Conqueror came with the 1069 and 1070 campaigns known as the Harrying of the North. The murder of William's appointees to Northumbria and York set off a rebellion that the king rushed north to subdue; against overwhelming royal power, the rebels faded into the remote areas of the north and gave William an apparent victory. That autumn, however, a Danish fleet arrived to support the rebels and prosecute the claim of King Sven II (the grandson of Sven Forkbeard) to the kingdom. In the ensuing combats William's garrison at York was captured, but not before much of the city had been inadvertently burned. William again came north and forced the Danes to depart. Recognizing the pattern of northern resistance, he spent the remainder of 1069 not in hunting the hidden rebels but in destroying the productivity of the countryside. Homesteads and fields were ruined, and famine soon afflicted the region. In such straits, military resistance simply ended while the inhabitants sought any means to survive.

William Rufus (r. 1087–1100). When William Rufus succeeded his father in 1087, he faced a number of baronial rebellions by men who saw advantages in replacing William with his older brother, Robert Curthose, now Duke of Normandy. The largest outbreaks centered on castles across Kent and Surrey in the domains of Odo of Bayeux and Robert of Mortain and in the Severn Valley, where Roger de Montgomery had imported Welsh forces to supplement his feudal troops. William turned to the *fyrd* in April 1088 not out of desperation but because infantrymen were the appropriate answer for a campaign of numerous sieges. The siege at Pevensey saw English ships in sharp action as well, blocking Duke Robert's effort to send aid to Odo. For the siege of Rochester, William called up a fresh levy of troops, declaring that anyone who ignored the summons would be declared *nithing* (one without honor). The close investment with counterforts and machines, coupled with an outbreak of disease among the garrison, led to surrender and the overall collapse of the rebellion.

For most of the rest of his reign, William had the luxury of initiating his own military endeavors rather than reacting to others'. No small part of this situation derived from his immense financial resources. His foes marveled and complained about the sums he threw around to gain allies and troops. Abbot Suger of Saint-Denis called him a "merchant" of soldiers. As William sought to gain the upper hand on the Continent, he used English revenues to buy support from Norman magnates and castle garrisons; in 1093 he brought the Count of Flanders over to his side. As codified in the later Treaty of Dover, William secured a ready force of a thousand knights by an annual retainer to the Count of Flanders. The next year, in a novel maneuver to raise money, William summoned a force of twenty thousand Englishmen for campaigning in Normandy, only to have his agent Ranulf Flambard dismiss the troops after collecting the ten shillings each man had brought for expenses. On the kingdom's borders William seems to have been content to keep encroaching on the Welsh by the initiative of his marcher barons. He had more trouble with the king of Scotland, Malcolm III, who could mount significant invasions and count on

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the continued resentment of the north of England to control from London. Malcolm's raids seem to have had the usual goals: loot, gaining political clout through military victory, and pressing his claims to disputed borderlands. Ambushed in December 1093 as he returned from another raid, Malcolm was killed, thus leaving William free to pursue his designs on Normandy. In those designs, money again was his most effective weapon.

The biggest military surprise of William's reign was probably the Welsh uprising of 1094–1099. The marcher barons had recently made significant inroads into Gwynedd, Powys, and Deheubarth. The next two years saw Cadwgan ap Bleddyn and Gruffydd ap Cynan spearhead the Welsh efforts, reducing the isolated Norman castles, avoiding pitched battles with William's invading armies, and ambushing smaller, but significant, parties whenever they could. By 1099 both sides were ready to agree to a peace: Gruffydd gained recognition as king of Gwynedd, and Cadwgan gained recognition as lord of Powys and Ceredigion. Meanwhile the Normans were able to continue penetrating into Pembroke and southern Wales.

Henry I (r. 1100–1135). William Rufus's death in 1100 in a hunting accident left his younger brother, Henry, with the chance to secure the succession. This he did, moving first to control the treasury. As with William Rufus's reign, Henry I faced an initial round of rebellions by magnates who saw better opportunities for themselves to have the kingdom. Among these were Robert Curthose, Duke of Normandy and the eldest son of William the Conqueror. Encouraged by the likes of Flambard and Robert of Bellême, Duke Robert invaded in 1101, but Henry had the benefit of popular support and bought off his elder brother temporarily. The ensuing years saw Henry isolate his brother by suppressing supporters like Bellême, lavishing gifts on lukewarm notables, and creating a public relations campaign that called his brother's fitness to rule into question. Henry's investment in all these approaches paid off when battle finally came at Tinchebrai in 1106. Henry and Robert both divided their battle lines into three components, as was fairly standard. Henry, however, kept a fourth group apart as a reserve. In addition, Henry ordered many of his knights to dismount and intermixed them with the archers and infantry to stiffen the resolve of all his partisans. The battle itself was short, about an hour, and decisive. Robert was captured early, which contributed to the collapse of his forces. The lack of fatalities was highlighted by ecclesiastical writers, who praised the "Christian brotherhood" of the knights, although the profit to be gained in ransoms was the more likely fraternal glue.

Overall Henry's reign appears stable and placid, but this picture is doubtless the result of his stern control in England. His mutilation of ninety-four moneyers in 1124 was more than a fiscal "reform": it was a testament, too, as to where much of his royal and military strength lay. Another aspect of his control was the confidence that he had in the loyalty of the military household, the *familia regis*, which gave him professional warriors at potential trouble spots across his realm. Henry may have indeed been the "Lion of Justice," but no one doubted that royal justice served the king's interests foremost.

Outside England, though, Henry I had more troubles. In his early years he bargained lightly with the Welsh princes, conceding more than one would expect while he dealt with acquiring Normandy. After 1106 he tightened up and began skillfully to exploit the Welsh rivalries so as to augment English royal control. Henry watched the marcher barons carefully, but like many English kings he counted on these magnates handling the military threats first before he had to do so himself. In 1109 a wild cycle of violence began when Owain of Powys and Ceredigion seduced Nest, the wife of Henry's Pembroke castellan. What followed was not warfare per se, but rather a round of judicial expropriations and reassignments, accompanied by numerous imprisonments, murders, and ambushes. In 1115, Henry moved conclusively against the Welsh powers, using three armies to pressure all of them simultaneously. With promises of tribute from the Welsh, Henry backed down from a full-scale invasion.

On the Scottish border, Henry had better circumstances. Each of the Anglo-Norman kings endeavored to induce the Scottish kings to submit to their

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A Contested Throne. King Stephen (c. 1097–1154). Miniature from *Flores historiarum* by Matthew Paris, MS 6712, fol. 133r, c. 1250. © CHETHAM'S LIBRARY, MANCHESTER, UK/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

overlordship. Henry was no different, but his personal influence with Alexander I and then David I enabled him to forego major military interventions. David's reign in Scotland, however, was instrumental in accelerating the presence of continental-style knighthood and feudal structures into the kingdom after 1124. Normandy, of course, was Henry's primary concern, because his nephew William Clito remained a threat for years. Henry thus had to suppress important rebellions there in 1112, 1119, and 1123. The last two ended with dramatic battlefield victories at Brémule and Bourgthéroulde that permitted Henry to impose his terms on the peace.

Stephen (r. 1135–1154). Henry's death in 1135 left a muddled succession, which soon grew into a civil war. The king had tried to engineer a settlement in which his daughter Matilda, the former empress of the Holy Roman Empire, would succeed him. To bolster her acceptability to those who might have doubted a woman's capabilities to lead militarily, he arranged her marriage to the up-and-coming Count of Anjou, Geoffrey Plantagenet. Her cousin Stephen of Blois, however, reacted quickly to the news of Henry's death and raced to England, where he was able to be crowned before opposition could coalesce. Stephen never knew a truly peaceful reign; it used to be common to refer to this period as "the Anarchy." Within two years Geoffrey began pushing northward from Anjou against the Norman frontiers in both France and England—acting, in Orderic Vitalis's famous phrase, as "his wife's mercenary." Matilda herself landed in England in 1139 to begin actively contesting Stephen's rule there. Overall, centralized public order began to break down as localities and magnates reasserted control amid the royal rivalry. Whereas institutional historians lament the apparent breakdown of the Exchequer and royal justice, military historians have enjoyed a gold mine of activity.

Stephen was tested militarily from the very start and showed himself industrious in confronting opposition. His resolution in pursuing sieges was particularly remarkable. At the same time, he suffered criticism, then and ever since, for being harsh and lenient at just the wrong times. He could laugh when, as at Exeter, his foes managed to get the better of his own forces, but he might also execute whole garrisons, as at Shrewsbury. Sometimes the cruelty brought about submissions; sometimes it backfired terribly. In 1139, however, Stephen committed the blunder that has left observers stymied for an explanation ever since: with Matilda blockaded at Arundel in Sussex, Stephen let her leave the castle and proceed with an escort to her powerful patrons in the western shires, ensuring a continuation of their struggle.

Two major military phenomena characterize the civil war between Stephen and Matilda: the use of mercenaries and the role of castles. With the loyalty of vassals proving all too fluid, both sides quickly began recruiting extra soldiery. Stephen's most famous hire was William of Ypres, a former contender for the county of Flanders, who saw service in England as a way to rebuild his political and economic fortunes. Other Flemings, as well as Bretons, French, and men from across the Anglo-Norman world, came to support either side in a rush to employment and enrichment that left monastic chroniclers aghast. Of course, ecclesiastical writers were often horrified by any violence, and that of the mercenaries was rarely

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more excessive than that of their native-born counterparts. The presence of men willing to continue serving so long as they were paid meant that the king and his most powerful opponents could afford to prosecute long sieges. Some sieges were sharp and vicious affairs, but most became drawn-out blockades after the initial assault failed. Typically the king or Matilda's supporters built countercastles, small redoubts, to block the gates of the castle under siege and force an eventual surrender. Low-impact but incessant raiding by both garrisons then became the routine as each side tried to gain an advantage by denying resources to the other. These simple countercastle structures were all the more remarkable in that they proliferated at the same time that timber castles were giving way to stone ones.

A third interesting development was the role of women as military leaders. Stephen's queen, Matilda of Boulogne, proved herself an able commander. During the outbreak of revolts across 1138, Stephen entrusted her with the siege of Dover, which she brought to a successful conclusion, combining a landward investment with her own naval resources from the Continent. More critical, after Stephen was captured at Lincoln in 1141 by allies of Empress Matilda, Queen Matilda kept his cause alive and became the focal point of those followers, including Stephen's mercenaries, who remained faithful. Many nobles began arranging how to give their support to the empress, especially once she entered London and seemed to have the town's support. But the chronicles credit the queen with the coordinated attacks that pressured the empress out of London. The queen kept up the pressure on the empress and began drawing support back to Stephen's cause. This eventually resulted in the Rout of Winchester, during which the empress's half brother Robert was captured. Although the queen enjoyed both the eventual victory and kinder treatment in the chronicles, the empress showed her own hand in these same events as a strong leader who had her own policies to implement. Her choices were less fortuitous at times, and tactical fortune turned against her on several occasions, but there is no doubt that she, not her advisers, made the final decisions.

England's internal trouble did not mean that the other powers of the isles were free to direct their own affairs. Anglo-Norman control over the Welsh princes began a precipitous decline when a series of raids and counterraids resulted in the death of Richard FitzGilbert de Clare, Earl of Hereford, in 1136. Blocked by the marcher lords, who mostly preferred to support Matilda, Stephen had to leave Wales alone after his opening years. This typically suited the marcher barons, who preferred to be left alone to pursue their own agendas vis-à-vis their Welsh counterparts. To the north Stephen had more success, thanks mostly to his Yorkshire vassals and Archbishop Thurstan of York, who thwarted King David I's invasion at the battle of the Standard (the battle of Northallerton) in 1138. Stephen gave the Scottish king generous terms, to which he generally adhered, even after Stephen's seeming downfall at Lincoln in 1141. Peace with England gave David the opportunity to push effective royal control farther north, which he did with success until 1151. In that year the king of Norway arrived with a fleet to block the Scottish king's plans to incorporate the Orkneys fully into his realm.

In England in the late 1140s Stephen had reasserted control and continued to pressure Matilda's supporters. In 1148, Matilda left the kingdom for Normandy, which her husband, Geoffrey Plantagenet, had subjugated while Stephen was occupied in England. The king had no real peace, however, as the Angevin supporters—that is, adherents of the Plantagenets of Anjou—continued fitfully to resist and to benefit from the expeditions led into England by Matilda's eldest son, Henry Plantagenet. In 1153 the exhausted followers of both Henry and Stephen induced their leaders to make peace. The Treaty of Winchester pledged the return of the monarchy to Henry's line in return for letting Stephen enjoy the rest of his reign in peace. The next year, in fact, Stephen died, and Henry succeeded him without trouble.

The Angevin Empire. Henry's unprecedented success saw the creation of a conglomeration of territories that historians have called the "Angevin Empire." The theater of operations of the English monarchs now extended from Scotland and Wales across the Channel to Normandy and beyond,

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reaching to the Pyrenees, and, before long, to Ireland as well.

Henry II (r. 1154–1189). Henry's accession ushered in nearly two decades of peace for England. Royal government (or at least the documentary evidence of it) quickly resumed its former level. Mercenaries were expelled—some, at least—and unlicensed castles were leveled (with exaggerated totals reported in the sources). The royal fisc trebounded, as the return of the pipe rolls attests. But England's return to strong central government gave its neighbors fresh cause for concern. Scotland was in the worst position, with a young king, Malcolm IV, fresh on the throne himself, and Henry did not bother to finesse the situation. At a meeting in 1157 he took Northumbria and Cumbria back and left Malcolm with only the earldom of Huntingdon, for which he demanded and received Malcolm's homage. After Malcolm died in 1165, his brother William I, "the Lion" (r. 1165–1214), saw these lost territories as his chief grievance against Henry. Wales was a stickier situation, with Owain of Gwynedd and Rhys of Deheubarth both in commanding positions. Henry had to lead three invasions just to compel them to answer his summonses. His high-handedness led the Welsh to unite in rebellion, and Henry answered with a major invasion in 1165, even recruiting a fleet from Dublin to supplement his ground effort. Welsh resistance found an ally in the weather, however, and heavy rains turned chastisement into debacle. Eventually, and perhaps with an eye to other troubles on the horizon, Henry cobbled together a peace deal with Rhys and Owain that mostly endured to the mid-1180s.

Aside from the many campaigns on the Continent, the other primary theater of operations was Ireland, which saw its military situation transformed from the traditional internecine warfare into a new battleground for Anglo-Norman ambitions, first at the magnate level, then at the royal level. In the 1160s Diarmaid Mac Murchadha of Leinster was driven from his lands. He fled into Wales, from where he begged Henry II for aid. Henry balked at a personal intervention, but he gave Diarmaid permission to recruit among the Anglo-Normans of the Welsh marches. Numbers of these barons took the opportunity, chief among them the Earl of Pembroke, Richard FitzGilbert de Clare, known by his sobriquet "Strongbow." Strongbow's price was Diarmaid's daughter Aoife as wife and a promise to succeed Diarmaid as the king of Leinster. Another faction, the many cousins and uncles of the chronicler Gerald of Wales, also decided to test the opportunities in Ireland.

The Anglo-Norman conquest began in May 1169 when Robert FitzStephen landed with thirty knights, sixty other well-armed horsemen, and some three hundred infantry, described as the best archers in Wales. In a maneuver repeated many times in the sources, the small band attacked against stupendous odds and won the day, capturing Wexford. On occasion the invaders' impetuosity led them into disaster, but generally their discipline and weaponry gave them the victory. Diarmaid soon regained control over Leinster, and he began to envision the subjugation of all Ireland. He wrote Strongbow, requesting his presence and further military aid. Henry II was by now concerned with the success of his erstwhile vassals and tried to stop Strongbow's departure, but the earl left nonetheless, arriving in August 1170. Waterford soon fell, and then Dublin fell in September to a surprise assault. While the native Irish struggled to counter this unprecedented force, Henry II grew ever more concerned that his barons were building too strong a base. Diarmaid's death in May 1171 and Strongbow's bid for the kingship of Leinster only heightened this worry.

In September, Henry moved across England and Wales, gathering a formidable expedition. Strongbow came to meet him and surrendered the port cities of Ireland to Henry so as to keep the rest of his newly won fief. Lord Rhys likewise took the opportunity to make a solid peace with Henry, doubtless happy that the king's attention was focused beyond Wales. More than four hundred vessels transported Henry's invasion force. In the end Henry's numbers, rather than any individual battles, gave him the desired triumph in Ireland. The parade of Anglo-Normans and native Irish who came to swear their fealty let Henry play the role of benevolent protector of his new subjects. The further history of Anglo-Norman conquest would see the adventurism of the newly established

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Alnwick Castle. The earliest parts of the castle were constructed c. 1096. © ALNWICK CASTLE

lords collide with Henry's effort to oversee and tax the realm efficiently through royal officials. Resentment of both led to rebellions. In 1185, Henry sent his youngest son, John, as Lord of Ireland to quell the disturbances and cement his own reputation as a commander. He accomplished neither.

The chief military event of Henry's reign was the conflict of 1173–1174. Foreign fear of Henry's power and ambition, the resentment of vassals who had suffered the king's ill will, and the rivalries among Henry's sons all came together in a way that should have spelled a military debacle for the king. Instead he proved himself a master of strategy and tactics, knowing whom to trust, when to strike, and when to be patient while working out other solutions. The plots against Henry moved into the open in March 1173 when his eldest son, Henry the Young King, fled to Louis VII's lands in France and marshaled foreign military aid. Henry II readied himself by provisioning castles liberally and making sure that his mercenaries were ready to prove themselves, preparations quite evident in the English pipe rolls. The king stayed on the Continent and trusted England's defense to his loyal officers. That strategy proved sound; in the first year those officers checked an invasion by William the Lion of Scotland, who was attempting to recover his lost English titles. Although there was some military activity by disaffected Welsh and Irish leaders, those lands stayed mostly quiet and even supplied some troops and goods to the king.

In the early autumn East Anglia became an active theater when the rebellious Earl of Leicester landed with his own and Flemish troops. Their depredations were severe enough that their erstwhile "host," Earl Hugh Bigod, asked Leicester to move on to his own lands. On 16 October, however, this army was attacked by Henry's forces in a marshy spot near Fornham. A combined royal army of feudal levies, stipendiaries, and recent Irish arrivals struck hard and soon had the rebels in full flight, drowning many of them in the ditches. Henry continued to wear down his enemies on the Continent while his justiciar held the English fronts. In 1174 northern England became the critical theater when William invaded anew, this time with fresh help from Flanders. Numerous sieges were prosecuted, but it all

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came to nothing for William when he was captured outside of Alnwick by a contingent of Henry's knights. Because Henry himself had made a public penance only days before at Canterbury for the murder of Thomas Becket, medieval observers naturally read Henry's victory as a divine approval. Certainly it gave Henry all he needed to impose his will on most of the British Isles and end his sons' rebellion.

In 1181, Henry issued the Assize of Arms, which showed the king's growing reach into the military lives of his subjects. Besides mandating the minimum equipment expected of knights, the Assize made similar demands on ordinary citizens based on their wealth. Those with more weaponry than was called for had to disburse their armaments to other citizens, Jews were forbidden from having these same armaments, and the export of such weapons from the kingdom without the king's permission was forbidden.

Richard I (r. 1189–1199). England's most martial king, Richard the Lionheart, was also the least militarily active within the kingdom, occupied as he was by the Third Crusade and Angevin concerns on the Continent. For better or worse, depending on who is massaging Richard's reputation, he saw England as a pool of money and manpower to be tapped as often as needed. To that end he needed the kingdom peaceful. His appointment of William Marshal to lordship over Striguil, Pembroke, and Leinster not only created a powerfully loyal magnate but also placed a watchful eye over troublesome regions. Richard's brother Prince John was dispatched with an army to bring in Rhys of Deheubarth, which he succeeded in doing, but Richard was unable to craft a mutually satisfying treaty. Rhys would prove troublesome, but even so he did not take the full advantage that one might have expected of Richard's absence or captivity. For Scotland, Richard restored the kingdom's full independence in the Quitclaim of Canterbury, along with several castles taken by his father. Perhaps Richard's generosity did in fact keep King William from invading once John rebelled in 1193. Richard's battlefield prowess, already recognized in his youth and confirmed further while he was on crusade, lent him a heroic stature that in turn yielded great dividends wherever he appeared. This was evident in 1194 when his return signaled the rapid end of John's rebellion.

Richard has been appreciated for some time as a scientific practitioner of war, understanding especially the necessary role of finances; little wonder that contemporaries saw everything in England for sale as the king raised money for the Third Crusade. The same was true after his return when he turned his energy to regaining the lands recently lost to Philip II of France. In addition, Richard relaxed the Plantagenet ban on tournaments, holding them at established venues so that the country's knights would not lag behind continental knights in skill. As he left England in 1194, Richard left a further legacy: the origins of a naval base at Portsmouth.

John (r. 1199–1216). Whereas Richard's military reputation outshines the rest of his abilities, John's nonmilitary traits have long complicated our appreciation of his military policies. The epithet "Softsword" scarcely helped the picture, nor did his 1185 expedition as Lord of Ireland, which ended in a personal shambles. The early loss of Normandy and other Angevin heartlands to the French overshadowed the rest of John's reign. The losses also meant that John gave Britain more attention than any recent monarch had. As with all the cross-Channel kings, John saw England's potential in terms of military resources; even as he was losing his grip on Normandy, John ordered every English shipyard to produce one vessel for him. Within a year he had a dedicated fleet of forty-five ships and a steady resupply each year, thus institutionalizing the Royal Navy and moving beyond the usual policy of having merchants "lend" their vessels to the crown during a crisis. Using the maritime skills of Eustace the Monk, John recaptured the Channel Islands. This fleet also gave him the offensive capability to forestall invasions, as with the 1213 victory over the French in the Flemish harbor at Damme.

As for his neighbors, John was concerned that nearby polities not be refuges for his own troublemakers. In 1204 he tried to secure peace with Llywelyn I of Wales by arranging Llywelyn's marriage to John's illegitimate daughter Joan. At the same time, John

Siege of Bedford. The execution of the garrison following an eight-week siege of Bedford Castle, 15 August 1224. Illustration from Matthew Paris's *Chronica maiora II*, MS 16, fol. 64r, thirteenth century. THE MASTER AND FELLOWS OF CORPUS CHRISTI COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE

granted marcher lords like William de Braose permission to push as hard as they could against the Welsh. In 1209, Llywelyn joined John's northern expedition, ostensibly to return the "favor" of when Alexander I of Scotland had helped Henry I in Wales in 1114. By 1211, however, John saw Llywelyn as a threat and invaded Gwynedd in north Wales. At first Llywelyn had to give way to John and accept unfavorable terms, but before a year had passed he had regained his lost lands and was beginning to operate in conjunction with John's rebellious barons and Philip of France, even gaining church sanction for his revolt because John had been excommunicated in 1209 as a result of his dispute with Pope Innocent III. Eventually Llywelyn's gains were secured by clauses in Magna Carta.

In 1209, John and a large host moved north against William the Lion of Scotland, which cowed William into abandoning three strategic castles and surrendering his daughters as hostages. This gave John the security he needed to then move against enemies who had fled to Ireland. His expedition there the following year showed him at his best: moving quickly, keeping the tactical advantage, and benefitting from a well-planned and well-supplied campaign. The chroniclers of this period expressed no doubts about John's military expertise.

Nonetheless, John's long run of close, personal rule in England had created resentment among his own barons. One bone of contention was whether English knights were actually liable for service on the Continent; this had cropped up in Richard's reign, but it grew into a much bigger problem under John when it stymied his 1205 campaign into Poitou and threatened to do the same from 1212 onward. John moved north again in that year to quash a potential rebellion among the local English barons, who may have already been consulting with William of Scotland and Philip of France over how to replace John. Not surprisingly, John's reliance on foreign-born vassals and mercenaries increased. His exactions in order to pay for these troops, as well as the continental expeditions—which failed to recover the lost lands—finally pushed a number of barons into open rebellion.

The rebellion that led to the Magna Carta (Great Charter) was clearly underway by April 1215. John's effort to punish those barons who had refused to pay scutage for the recent campaign drove more notables

into the rebel faction. The cycle continued as John, not trusting his vassals, called in more foreign troops. Both sides realized that control of London was critical, but the barons were able to enter the town first on 10 June by promising the citizens that their ancient liberties would be preserved. Recognizing that the rebels had the momentum, John agreed to sign the articles that five days later became Magna Carta. This was essentially a feint while he continued gathering troops to suppress the rebellion forcibly. A year of campaigns followed in which John wore down his foes, as with the famed siege of Rochester Castle. In desperation the barons invited Prince Louis of France to join their cause as a rival candidate for the kingship. He arrived in London in May 1216 and was acclaimed the new ruler. By June he had captured Winchester, although Dover proved impossible to take. Louis was gaining the initiative, but then John died in October, and the animus against John that was energizing Louis's cause quickly evaporated. William Marshal, acting as regent for the nine-year-old Henry III, finished off Louis's invasion with the victory at Lincoln in 1217 that features prominently in the verse biography *L'histoire de Guillaume le Marechal*.

The Thirteenth Century. In the 1200s England was first consumed by internal conflicts as Henry III, whose long minority ended in 1227, began to push back against all those elements, especially his own nobles, who had encroached on royal power. This eventually resulted in the Barons' War in mid-century. Once Edward I ascended the throne, however, he focused England's military energies on the subjugation of his neighbors, Wales and Scotland.

Henry III (r. 1216–1272). After John's death the various states mostly pursued internal military affairs, although Welsh politics often lured in the English, and vice versa. Alexander II of Scotland (r. 1214–1249) had taken advantage of John's troubles to invade England in support of the barons, coming all the way to Dover with his armies. With the collapse of the revolt, however, he moved back north and concentrated most of the rest of his reign on extending control over the kingdom. Though he could raise impressive armies, Alexander often found it hard to bring elusive foes to bay; at Moray (1215) and Galloway (1235) his victories came through the fortuitous aid of local lords. He increased the pressure on the Western Isles (the Hebrides), which were still claimed by Norway. This nearly triggered a Norwegian invasion in 1230 in the Firth of Clyde. In Wales, Llywelyn I had reached preeminence during the English troubles; this enabled him to provide an effective check against Henry III's lieutenants until his own death in 1240. After that point, disunity among his heirs meant that the marches devolved back to a theater of raid and counterraid. Henry finally reacted with a massive invasion in 1245 that met with only mixed success during the campaign; his ability to project such force deep into Wales, however, brought many northern Welsh leaders to terms by 1247.

Henry's own troubles in England have typically garnered the most attention. The Plantagenets' reliance on foreign soldiery continued as some of his father's captains, like Fawkes de Bréauté, stayed on through the regency. Resentment against Fawkes and his kin boiled over in 1224, and an eight-week siege of Bedford Castle sealed his exile from the kingdom. By the 1240s a new swell of resentment focused on the Poitevins and Savoyards who had entered royal service through the patronage of the queen, Eleanor of Provence. In the late 1240s tournaments, sometimes canceled by the king, became a barometer of the animosity between English notables and their foreign rivals. The most famous foreigner of the period, though, was Simon de Montfort, Earl of Leicester. Montfort's role in the baronial revolt of the 1260s is difficult to summarize, so full and complicated it was. By 1263 he was clearly in the baronial camp and had the backing of London and other towns to enforce the Provisions of Oxford, a series of concessions that Simon and the barons had demanded from the king five years earlier. In addition, he appears to have negotiated with Llywelyn ap Gruffydd for possible aid.

During this same period, the young Prince Edward (b. 1239) began to show his own independence, at times moving militarily in defiance of Henry's strategies and importing new foreign troops. In March, Henry used the Welsh as an excuse to raise

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a formidable army, which he then used against the baronial rebels. Momentum seemed to be on his side as his larger army met Montfort's at Lewes in May 1264. Edward, commanding the right flank, routed the London contingent, but his pursuit of those levies let Montfort gain an advantage over the king's forces. After a long night Montfort was able to take Henry and Edward hostage and install his own government. For a year affairs were at a standstill, but Edward's escape in May 1265 rejuvenated the royal cause. With support dwindling and a Welsh alliance yielding no real benefits, Montfort was cornered at Evesham on 4 August. The royalist victory was total, capped off by the infamous mutilation of Montfort's body. A core of rebels held on at Kenilworth Castle, whose extensive defenses made assault, or even a siege, difficult, and Henry eventually made some concessions to wind down the revolt and end the Barons' War.

Edward I (r. 1272–1307). Edward's accession to the throne marked a dramatic shift in England's politics, internally and externally. Concerned to recover all the authority that he felt the monarchy had lost, he threw himself into both legal and military initiatives. This led to a more overtly interventionist approach toward Wales and Scotland. In the case of Wales, Edward opted for a full-scale invasion in 1276. A year passed as he mustered England's feudal levies and set the kingdom's logistical wheels in motion. An army of fifteen thousand was collected, of which nine thousand were Welsh, a testament to the fluidity of allegiances across the marches, as well as to Edward's diplomacy among Llywelyn ap Gruffydd's foes. It was an overwhelming force, and Llywelyn capitulated, admitting Edward as his sovereign and seeing his power restricted to Gwynedd. By 1282, however, many of Llywelyn's former Welsh rivals, including his brother Dafydd, were chafing under Edward's terms, and they instigated a new revolt. Llywelyn felt compelled to join the effort. Edward reacted vigorously, raising another enormous force. He faced a surprising shortage of horses in the kingdom, and documents show the difficulties surmounted to import enough mounts.

On 6 November the king's forces in the island county of Anglesey suffered great losses when they tried to attack the mainland. Llywelyn led a group southward that same month, intending to open up another front in the war, but he was surprised and killed near Builth, although the details of the fight remain controversial. His loss was irreplaceable; he was the one ruler who might have united the Welsh. Meanwhile Edward launched his invasion by January 1283. He moved without much trouble through Snowdonia, and at the same time, forces under the marcher barons moved up from Aberystwyth to isolate the last pockets of resistance.

Edward's resources enabled him to overwhelm the Welsh militarily; his real test was holding what he had conquered. To that end he began the building program of the famed castles that secured Gwynedd. Studies have shown a staggering investment as laborers and materials poured into Wales to build the concentric ringed fortresses like Harlech and Beaumaris. The architect who oversaw much of this work was the Savoyard James of St. George. The castles were as much political statements as military instruments, with the stonework at Caernarvon deliberately imitating the imperial walls of Constantinople.

Edward's attention next turned to Scotland in 1290, where, amid a disputed succession, he made the perennial demand that English overlordship be recognized as the price of his arbitration among the rivals. Even after selecting John de Balliol, however, he clearly had no intention of relaxing his claims over the northern kingdom. He issued a call for troops from Scotland in 1294 for service in France, and the subsequent refusal led to open warfare by 1296 after the Scots signed an alliance with France. A Scottish attempt to take the Cumbrian border fortress of Carlisle failed, and Edward riposted with the sacking of Berwick, a victory at Dunbar, the capture of Edinburgh, and a penetration as far as Elgin, taking the Stone of Destiny from Scone as part of his spoils. Although Edward was able to force oaths from most landholders, his control was never secure, and resistance continued to flare up. As the fourteenth century opened, he faced new leaders in William Wallace and, later, Robert Bruce.

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[*See also* Alnwick Castle; Assizes of Arms; Bourgthéroulde, Battle of; Bouvines, Battle of; Brémule, Battle of; Brian Boru; Castles, *subentry on* 1150–1350; David I; Edward I of England; Evesham, Battle of; Harald Hardrada; Hastings, Battle of; Henry II; Kings as Military Leaders; Lewes, Battle of; Lincoln, Battle of; Marshal, William; Norman Conquests, Norman Expansion; Robert II Curthose; Rochester, Siege of (1088); Sven Forkbeard; Tinchebrai, Battle of; Welsh Castles of Edward I; William of Ypres; *and* William I.]

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Steven Isaac

Narrative (1300–1500)

The period from 1300 to 1500 embraces the Scottish war of independence, the Hundred Years' War into which it merged, and the Wars of the Roses. It is characterized by a gradual decline in the military importance of the aristocratic cavalry charge, a corresponding growth in the importance of archery in winning battles, and a blurring of the distinction between the roles of cavalry and infantry, as mounted infantry, including mounted archers, developed. Gunpowder was gradually introduced during this time, but the effect of this was muted before 1370 by the rarity and ineffectiveness of early firearms. Developments in military institutions included a pronounced trend toward payment for military service and the emergence of contract or "indentured" armies, a gradual restructuring of armies around combined units of mounted men-at-arms and archers, and a narrowing of armies' social base, as the availability of manpower declined and the demand for particular military specialists grew. These changes so improved the performance



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of English armies that by the middle decades of the fourteenth century, England had the much larger and richer kingdom of France at its mercy.

General Outline. The broad outline of developments in the British kingdoms may be characterized as follows. Edward I of England (r. 1272–1307) had effectively subdued Wales and had consolidated his grasp on that country through the construction of chains of impressive stone castles, he had strengthened his hold on Ireland, and in 1300 he was directing the full strength of his kingdom toward subjugation of the parts of Scotland that still resisted. That organization—based on payment of household contingents, an effective logistical apparatus, and war finance based on credit—continued under Edward II (r. 1307–1327), although it was weakened by internal dissension and successive defeats suffered at the hands of the Scots. During the reign of Edward II, the Scottish kingdom under Robert I (Robert Bruce; r. 1306–1329) enjoyed a brief military hegemony that extended over northern England, Ireland, and the North and Irish seas. Under Edward III (r. 1327–1377) the Edwardian military machine recovered its strength and, with the commencement of the Hundred Years' War, was directed against France and Scotland simultaneously—with spectacular success.

From the 1350s, however, the effectiveness of that military machine declined: the size of English royal armies fell, and the recruitment and management of contingents was increasingly entrusted to private contractors and entrepreneurs. To a large extent those changes were because of the contraction of the economy caused by the Black Death, but they also reflect the increasing importance of specialists in warfare: specially trained mounted archers, for example, could not be recruited in the same numbers that common foot soldiers could.

The English success against France in the early fifteenth century, which culminated in a resounding victory by Henry V (r. 1413–1422) against the French at the battle of Agincourt in 1415, was in defiance of that general trend. Furthermore, Henry V's victory of 1415 bears a close resemblance to Edward III's victory at Crécy seventy years earlier. From the late fourteenth century the pace of tactical and organizational change began to slow, and the fifteenth century saw relative stagnation set in. By that time the Edwardian systems of recruitment, supply, and war finance based on credit (and driven by strong royal wills) had all been seriously eroded. As a result English conquests in France could not be maintained, and the protracted process of their loss had serious domestic repercussions.

During the reign of Henry VI (r. 1422–1471), success abroad gave way to civil war at home: in the Wars of the Roses, Lancastrian and Yorkist magnate factions competed for control of the throne and royal patronage. The civil war ended in 1483 when the Yorkist king Richard III (r. 1483–1485) was overthrown by Henry Tudor at the battle of Bosworth Field. Tudor, as Henry VII (r. 1485–1509), ushered in a new era of consolidation and civil reform but little in the way of military change.

Sweeping economic and demographic changes underpinned these developments. Britain's medieval population peaked a little before 1300, and following that, demand for land abated, bringing to an end

Siege Scene. This illustration from *Le roman du Saint Graal*, c. 1316, depicts the armor typical for knights at the turn of the fourteenth century. For head protection, most have open-faced basinets over mail coifs, but one has only a coif and two have visored helmets. The siege engine (*lower left*) is a counterweight trebuchet. HIP/ART RESOURCE, NY

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Bothwell Castle. Scottish castle captured by Edward I of England in 1301. PHOTOGRAPH BY CLIFFORD J. ROGERS

two centuries of rising incomes for landlords. The years 1315 to 1322 were years of deep agrarian crisis that formed the backdrop to the political crises of Edward II's reign. In the British manifestation of the great European famine of 1315 to 1318, torrential rains ruined successive harvests, and this was followed by drought and murrains of cattle and sheep. In the north of England the countryside was debilitated by long-range Scottish raids that devastated the border counties and destroyed the heartlands of Yorkshire and Lancashire. There is evidence of recovery from those catastrophes, however, for the simplicity of the medieval agrarian economy allowed for swift renewal.

But in the middle of the fourteenth century there came a catastrophe of such a scale that there could be no recovery. This was the Black Death, a pandemic of bubonic plague that reached England in June 1348 and peaked in the summer of 1349. By the time it abated, one-third of the population may have died. A second great plague occurred in 1361–1362, and it recurred, with diminishing severity, in 1369 and 1390. Further outbreaks occurred in 1407, 1464, and 1479, so that the plague became endemic in English society. The whole balance of social relations and economic pressures was upset. The great mortality brought to an end the high incomes for the landowning aristocracy, which had depended on high food prices, readily available labor, and constant demand for land, and it led to a shortage of manpower for peaceful and warlike purposes alike.

The effects on military matters of such a huge decline in population are difficult to quantify. One might expect that a fall in incomes would have restricted the ability of lords to invest in fortifications and armor and to participate in war. But landed incomes were to some extent protected by repressive legislation that forbade peasants from leaving manors to take advantage of economic opportunities. Furthermore, service in the Hundred Years' War brought wages and the prospect of winning plunder in France, which proved to be a significant incentive to participation. Lords continued to lavish expenditure on making war because they gave it priority over all else. War was their passion, the essence of the chivalric order that they represented, and, indeed, their raison d'être.

Other economic trends also profoundly affected the business of war. Early in the fourteenth century, native merchants gained control of the wool export business. That was achieved by the imposition of a levy on the exports of alien merchants in 1303 and by the development of a wool "staple" that involved the compulsory export and sale of English wool to a selected port on the Continent. Native wool merchants grew in importance to such an extent that they became an indispensable source of loans to finance the crown's wars.

Edward I's Scottish Wars (1296–1307). At the beginning of the fourteenth century, Edward I had devised a military machine that had no parallel in Europe and that remained unmatched for the remainder of the Middle Ages. Wales had been subdued, and Scottish defiance was crumbling. In 1298, Edward had led an army of thirty thousand soldiers into Scotland and inflicted a resounding defeat on William Wallace, the Scottish guardian. Similar invasions followed in 1300, 1301, and 1303. All were remarkable logistical achievements, but their effectiveness varied.

The expedition of 1300 involved nine thousand foot soldiers and eighty-seven banners of cavalry under knights banneret, and it serves as an example of all the Scottish expeditions of the three Edwards. The royal household formed the kernel of

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the army. The size of its military element varied, but it furnished, on average, a third of the cavalry and included the so-called household knights, who were companions of the king. Almost all who served in the household were paid wages by the royal wardrobe, and at the start of each campaign their horses were valued; recompense was made if the animal was lost in service. The remainder of the cavalry was contributed from outside the royal household by other great lords, who served at their own expense rather than at royal wages. The names and heraldic arms of the bannerets from outside the household in 1300 are known, and only twenty-three of the eighty-seven who are named served for pay. Their service does not seem to have been compelled by the feudal summons of that year; most lords who owed feudal service detached members of their retinues to perform that formality.

In a novel expedient, in 1300 Edward introduced a wealth criterion for service, binding any landowner whose holding exceeded forty pounds in value to serve in the army. The policy caused a great outcry, and there is no indication that it was enforced. Cavalry service outside the household appears to have been largely a matter of honor and duty for great magnates, since the prospect of booty in Scotland, a relatively poor country, was limited. Armor generally consisted of head-to-toe mail protection, occasionally supplemented by cuir-bouilli or plate armor on arms and legs. The most common helmet was the basinet, often with movable visor.

In contrast with the cavalry, infantry were paid by the royal wardrobe. Quotas of infantry—mostly foot archers—were ordered from each county in round numbers, such as two or three thousand at a time. A small number of individuals, usually local knights and professional soldiers, were named "commissioners of array" to fulfill the quota, by assigning quotas to each subdivision of the county. It is likely that local lords and communities had a say in the precise contribution of each vill or town. Local communities were responsible for ensuring that the arrayed soldiers were properly equipped. English foot archers were paid two pence per day, with double and quadruple pay for leaders of units of twenty and one hundred men. The numbers of troops who turned out fell far short of the targets: in 1300 sixteen thousand troops were ordered, but only nine thousand served. Only two years before, some twenty-six thousand men had been fielded for the Falkirk campaign, but as Edward's reign progressed the problems of supplying armies in Scotland persuaded Edward to reduce the size of the forces he deployed.

The expedition of 1300 achieved little beyond the capture of the minor castle of Caerlaverock, near Dumfries, and Galloway, but it kept the Scots on the defensive and broke the hold of the patriotic Scots in southwest Scotland. The government of the Scottish patriots held sway over the area of Selkirk Forest in the Southern Uplands and in Scotland north of the Forth, but the English continued to control virtually all the large castles and towns of Scotland from their chief administrative center at Berwick.

Edward's expedition the following year was more complex and formidable. The English king led an army from Berwick up the valleys of the Tweed and Clyde to besiege and take Bothwell Castle; his son Edward led a force along the coast all the way to Loch Ryan. With the help of a force from Ireland, he managed to capture Turnberry Castle. The Scottish patriots appeared more divided than ever. Robert Bruce, the future king Robert I of Scotland, defected for a short time to Edward's side.

The great expedition of 1303–1304 was described by the historian T. F. Tout as "the real conquest of Scotland." Although it was not as large as some that had preceded it, it penetrated farther and lasted longer. The expedition involved an army of some seventy-five hundred foot soldiers. Edward had three prefabricated bridges constructed for the crossing of the river Forth and had them floated up the North Sea coast. He marched from Berwick up the east coast of Scotland, crossed the Forth—although without using his bridges—through Aberdeen to Kinloss Abbey. Because of the shortage of supplies and fodder in Scotland, it was most unusual for the king to remain in Scotland over the winter, and it is a measure of Edward's resolve that he did so. The patriotic Scots no longer had the support of the king of France or of the pope, and in

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

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February 1304 almost all the Scottish magnates who still resisted submitted.

Edward then settled down to reduce at his leisure the single remaining Scottish garrison, that of Stirling Castle. The siege was a showpiece of the latest medieval siege technique: besides the deployment of trebuchets and battering rams, saltpeter and sulfur were supplied to the besiegers, suggesting that Greek fire was used. After heroic resistance the defenders attempted to surrender, but Edward tried out his latest siege engine on them before accepting.

After 1304, Edward believed that he had finally subdued Scotland, and in September 1305 he ordained for its future government. To Edward's bitter disappointment, Robert Bruce shattered Edward's settlement of Scotland by staging a coup d'état and having himself enthroned as king of Scotland in February 1306. The Bruce coup was swiftly defeated, and Robert fled into the wildernesses and islands of the west. Early in 1307, however, he landed in Scotland and established himself in the southwest of that country. Edward I died in July 1307 while leading yet another expedition into Scotland.

Edward II of England and Robert I of Scotland. The military machine that Edward I had built survived the disastrous reign of his heir, Edward II (r. 1307–1327). The second Edward was an experienced soldier who had played a prominent role in his father's Scottish campaigns. As a king, however, he left much to be desired, and he placed too much trust in and gave too much patronage to unpopular favorites. That alienated the leading magnates of the kingdom and led to bitter hatred and open warfare between the king and his powerful cousin, Thomas of Lancaster, who had inherited five earldoms.

Edward II's first campaign in Scotland, in 1307, was cut short by his need to attend to his coronation and marriage. Three crucial, wasted years elapsed before he could attend once more to Scotland. In that time Robert I broke out of encirclement in the southwest of Scotland and roused the north, demolishing English-held castles and establishing himself as a serious threat to the Edwardian government.

In 1310–1311, Edward II returned to Scotland and attempted to restore the position by replenishing castle garrisons and by wintering in that country as his father had done. The campaign saw the beginnings of two tendencies that distinguished Edward's reign: increasing demands for sophisticated body armor from foot soldiers and attempts to expand the terms of military obligation beyond what was customary. In 1310, Edward II ordered that Irish footmen wear chain mail, or hauberks. By 1319 he required freeholders with lands exceeding two pounds in value to provide for themselves basinets and iron gauntlets. In spring 1311, Edward demanded a levy of one foot soldier from each vill in England. That was unprecedented and lacked any parliamentary sanction, so little service was forthcoming. Similar measures were considered in 1315 and 1316, and in 1318 certain cities and towns were requested to send men for forty days at local expense and with special arms: *aketons*, hauberks, basinets, and iron gauntlets. These increased demands were necessitated by the deteriorating military situation, but during the famine years of 1315 to 1318 the burdens of military service on local communities increased when the communities were least able to cope.

Edward II was forced by the baronial opposition to abandon his Scottish campaign of 1311, and the crisis was exacerbated by the murder of his favorite, Piers Gaveston. Thereafter Scotland was neglected, and Robert seized the initiative. From 1311 to 1314 he captured most of the remaining English-held castles in Scotland, and he demolished them to ensure both that they would never again serve as footholds for

Helmet with Crests. The crests are shaped like buffalo horns, c. 1350. KUNSTHISTORISCHES MUSEUM

English occupation and that the Scottish aristocracy could no longer avoid committing to his standard. Because the Scots lacked siege equipment, the castles were taken by stealth, and various cunning stratagems are lovingly recounted in the Scottish sources. One notable technological innovation is described in detail in two sources: specially designed rope ladders. The area of English occupation was reduced to the environs of Berwick and one or two isolated strongholds such as Stirling. War also began to spill over the border into England as Robert invaded the northern counties and forced them to pay heavy tribute.

In 1314, determined to overwhelm the Scots, Edward II called up more than twenty thousand infantry: perhaps fifteen thousand men turned out for service. They were accompanied by perhaps one thousand cavalry. As in 1311 and in most Edwardian campaigns, the main assault on Scotland was by the east coast route, so that the army could be provisioned by an accompanying supply fleet. This was, as usual, accompanied by an attack from Ireland by way of the North Channel, which took advantage of Argyll's disaffection with the Bruce regime. Edward II expected guerrilla resistance, but contrary to past practice Robert, with perhaps five hundred cavalry and five or six thousand infantry, stood his ground and fought in open battle at Bannockburn. The battle has marked similarities with that at Courtrai in Flanders in 1302, where Flemish foot soldiers, weavers, and townsfolk defeated the cavalry of haughty French aristocrats. At Bannockburn, Scottish pikemen in tight formations known as "schiltroms" unhorsed the English heavy cavalry. Politically the Scots' victory changed everything: Robert's kingship had been vindicated, and although Berwick hung on grimly against him, he was now supported by many more Scottish aristocrats. Edward II, by contrast, returned defeated to an even more hostile baronage.

Bannockburn did not change the ability of the English king to invade Scotland at will, but in the late 1310s certain factors—the bitter baronial opposition led by Thomas of Lancaster and the onset of the famine of 1315 to 1318—made such invasions impossible for Edward II. The torrential rains of those years made roads impassable and rendered communications difficult, and the scarcity of food made it impossible to concentrate the numbers of men and beasts necessary for a campaign.

Another factor that inhibited the English from campaigning was the effects of the Scottish raids. The Scots adopted and perfected a strategy of long-range mounted incursions, destroying crops, barns, mills, and unprotected townships. Such warfare reduced the border counties to wasteland, and from 1314 to 1322 Thomas Randolph, Earl of Moray, and James Douglas led raids deep into Yorkshire and Lancashire. Typically the Scots devastated the rich plains of Yorkshire, then wheeled westward through the Pennine dales and rode home by the fords of Solway, driving herds of stolen cattle before them. Just as important as robbery and destruction was

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the exaction of ransoms and tribute from terrorized communities: in effect, Robert I took tribute from one-fifth of the English kingdom. His *chevauchées* were later emulated by the English in France during the Hundred Years' War.

The English found great difficulty in bringing the Scots to battle. Occasionally the raiders were ambushed as they returned, heavily laden, by the western march, but most success was to be had from adopting Scottish tactics and raiding Scotland. Andrew Harclay, in particular, deployed hobelars, a variety of mounted infantry that originated in Ireland, to counter the incursions. These were spearmen who rode swift ponies or hackneys rather than full-size war-horses, and they probably dismounted to fight.

Robert I's strategy was more than hit-and-run, however; he applied intense pressure on the crucial forward bases of the English on either march. In the west, Carlisle suffered an eleven-day assault in summer 1315, and in the east, Berwick was under prolonged and intermittent siege from 1312 to 1318, when the Scots finally took it by stealth. Robert expanded his war to Ireland, where the siege of Carrickfergus and its capture in 1316 amounted to an attack on a third forward base; meanwhile, on the Irish and North seas, Robert's privateers preyed on English merchantmen.

In 1319, Edward II and Thomas of Lancaster at last cooperated to besiege Berwick, but Moray and Douglas diverted them by launching a devastating raid into Yorkshire. In 1322, Thomas of Lancaster went into open revolt and was defeated at the battle of Boroughbridge. Free at last from baronial opposition, Edward II mounted his largest campaign against Scotland, involving perhaps twenty thousand men. Robert deliberately removed livestock and provisions from southern Scotland on the approach of the English army. The invaders occupied Edinburgh, but farther advance became impossible when the provision fleet that accompanied the army was destroyed both by storms and by Scottish and Flemish privateers. As Edward II retreated through Yorkshire, Robert almost intercepted him, determined to confront the royal person at the battle of Byland. Edward escaped capture, but this was the nadir of English military fortunes in the conflict.

Edward II agreed to a thirteen-year truce with Robert—which, although welcome to beleaguered and impoverished northerners, was deeply unpopular in the rest of the country. Untrammeled by opposition, the royal government of 1323 to 1326 became a tyranny. Eventually, in 1326, assisted by the mercenaries of John of Hainault, Edward's queen, Isabella, and her paramour Roger de Mortimer were able to overthrow the king. Edward II fled westward but was captured and formally deposed in favor of his son, the third Edward.

Edward III and the Scots to 1337. In his heyday Edward III (r. 1327–1377), "the gracious flower of all the knighthood of Christendom," was the epitome of chivalry. He presided over a golden age of English military superiority.

Edward III's military career began inauspiciously. In 1327 he was a fourteen-year-old royal figurehead controlled by Mortimer and Isabella. Support for their coup d'état had been based on popular criticism of Edward II's failures, and they soon mustered an army to invade Scotland. That campaign was the only occasion on which Edward III used a feudal summons to gather a host. (The feudal summons was resurrected one final time, by Richard II for his invasion of Scotland in 1385.) But Moray and Douglas struck first: on 14 July they crossed into England, looting and burning. At first the English force attempted to cut off the raiders' retreat, but frustrated by waiting, they eventually gave chase. After a long standoff in Weardale, the Scots found it easy to give them the slip. Two innovations were claimed for that campaign: the wearing of crests on knights' helmets and the use of what were called "crakys of war," a phrase that suggests the use of gunpowder. Indeed, the first known English illustration of a cannon dates from 1327. The campaign had further significance in that it was the first time that English knights and men-at-arms were called on to fight on foot, a practice that continued through the battles of Dupplin Moor and Halidon Hill and into the Hundred Years' War.

After 1327, at last both Scotland and England were inclined to peace. In Scotland the health of the

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forceful Robert I was deteriorating. In England, Isabella and Mortimer were defeated and desperate for cash. The English regime made a humiliating peace in the treaty of Edinburgh-Northampton, ratified on 4 May 1328: in the treaty Edward III recognized Robert I and conceded Scottish independence. But the boy king was careful to distance himself from the treaty.

On 19 October 1330 the young Edward III seized the reins of power by carrying out his own daring coup d'état. He had Mortimer arrested and executed and had Isabella sent into honorable confinement. It was inevitable that Edward would resume the conflict with Scotland, but at first he did so by proxy. A group of English and Scottish magnates whose lands in Scotland had been confiscated by the Bruces had considerable sympathy and following in England. Known as "the Disinherited," their hopes and expectations were aroused by Edward's seizure of power. The new king fostered their discontent, and at the beginning of August 1332, with five hundred men-at-arms and perhaps one thousand foot soldiers, they set out for Scotland by sea, to avoid implicating Edward in the attack. Edward de Balliol, a claimant to the Scottish throne, was at their head. They landed in Fife and saw off the shire levies with ease, but they found that in expectation of the invasion the Scots had amassed an army of great size: chroniclers' estimates vary from thirty to forty thousand. At the battle of Dupplin Moor, that huge army of Scottish pikemen was defeated, partly by dismounted men-at-arms and archers, but also partly by the weight of its own numbers. The action made possible Balliol's enthronement as king of Scotland in September and signaled the end of the short Scottish military hegemony in the British Isles that had lasted since Bannockburn.

Edward III intervened openly in Scotland in the following year in order to capture the strategically crucial town of Berwick. In May 1333 he led an English army to assist the Balliol faction in besieging the town, and in July at the battle of Halidon Hill he defeated the Scottish army that marched to its relief. No fewer than five Scottish earls died in that action. Once again the English men-at-arms fought on foot. The battle was also a significant milestone in the growing importance of the English longbow. At Boroughbridge and Dupplin Moor archery had already played a significant role, a role that culminated in the victories in the Hundred Years' War. The experienced archer could shoot perhaps twenty arrows per minute. In the mid-fourteenth century there is evidence that archery was widely practiced in England, and from around this time large numbers of archers began to be massed in batteries, providing a deadly long-range, armor-piercing hail of arrows against which horses had no protection. The very sound of a volley of arrows was terrifying.

The following year, 1334, a further refinement was added when mounted archers—who had horses for operational mobility but did not shoot from horseback—made their first appearance in the English royal host. The tradition that the mounted archer developed from the hobelar is now disputed, but there is no doubting the revolutionary impact of mounted archers on warfare in the period.

Although Balliol, assisted by Edward III, had forced the young King David II out of Scotland, the Bruce party made a remarkable recovery and forced Balliol to flee to Berwick. In 1335, Edward III assembled the largest force since 1322 and, accompanied by an equally large fleet, marched unopposed into Scotland. This force easily took control of all the lowland towns and castles. But the same insurmountable problems that had been encountered repeatedly in Scotland by Edward's father and grandfather—distance, time, inclement weather, and shortage of supplies—undermined even that effort. The English could not stay in Scotland with sufficient force for more than a few months, and as soon as the English king's back was turned, the Scots rose up against him. Edward returned in 1336 and 1337, but with a smaller forces and for shorter periods. From that point England's wars with Scotland became linked inextricably to the Hundred Years' War, as the Scots naturally sided with France, their partners in the historic "auld alliance" against England.

The Hundred Years' War, 1337–1369. The Hundred Years' War was an intermittent, rather than

continuous, conflict that is made up of two phases. The first, a triumphal period for the English, lasted from 1337 to the Treaty of Brétigny in 1360 and included three of five great English victories: Sluis, Crécy, and Poitiers. The second phase contained the remaining English victories—Agincourt in 1415 and Verneuil in 1424—but from Verneuil until the conflict's end in 1453 there was a gradual French recovery. The war is closely related to earlier Anglo-French conflicts: King John of England had lost Normandy to France in 1204, but because kings of England continued to hold the duchy of Aquitaine as vassals of France, renewal of conflict was virtually guaranteed.

The causes of the war were fourfold: long-running disputes over the boundaries of Gascony; the escalation of the Scottish conflict, in which the French interest lay in preserving the independent Bruce monarchy; constant rivalry and friction between English and French merchantmen in the narrow seas; and Edward III's claim to the French throne, lodged in 1328 on the death without direct male heir of the last Capetian king, Charles IV. This fourth factor added an element of intransigence that helps account for the war's interminable length.

The battles of the Hundred Years' War were dominated by the devastating range and accuracy of the longbow, which allowed England to punch well above its economic and political weight. The war illustrates the efficacy of strategies used by the Scots against England: the offensive strategy of *chevauchée*, or long-distance raid, made for English victories in the war's first phase, and the defensive ploy of avoiding battle helped the French achieve strategic success in the second. Mounting archers on horseback allowed the English to deploy their chief tactical weapon, the massed battery of archers, as an element in their strategy of *chevauchée*.

Crucial recent changes in the nature of English armies gave England an early advantage. First, they changed from fielding large, ill-equipped armies to fielding smaller, more highly skilled and specialized forces—in particular, mounted archers. Second, English forces now served for wages. Direct recruitment was abandoned in favor of short-term contract armies raised by private entrepreneurs. The crown contracted with military entrepreneurs who furnished the bulk of the infantry and horses, and it paid, in addition to wages, a bonus known as a "regard." Recompense for the value of horses lost in royal service was abandoned in 1373, and instead the regard was paid at a double rate, and the king reduced his share of the booty taken from a half to a third. The proportion of the army contributed by the royal household diminished from roughly one-third in the days of Edward I to perhaps one-sixth in the heyday of Edward III. But in 1338 the crown began to make provision for the equipment of archers, and bows and arrows were purchased in bulk. Body armor also began to change: plate armor, including breastplates and backplates, was more generally adopted by knights and men-at-arms to supplement their hauberks of mail.

In May 1337, Philip VI of France (r. 1328–1350) confiscated Gascony, and a French army entered the fief to reclaim it; in October, Edward III declared himself king of France and England. Just as his grandfather had done in his wars against France, Edward constructed a grand alliance of continental powers to encircle that country. The rulers of the Netherlands were swiftly brought to heel by an embargo on the export of English wool, and other powers were persuaded to become allies by the promise of large pensions. Hostilities commenced the following spring when a French fleet raided the south coast of England. In July, Edward sailed with a host to Antwerp, where he set up headquarters. The politics of financing the war and associated alliances dogged his progress, however, and dominated the opening years of the struggle. It was not until 1339 that the English-led army succeeded in advancing into Cambrésis. But the French refused to give battle, and the allies were forced to retreat. In January 1340, Edward assumed the title and arms of the king of France, both to lend some legality to the alliance with Flanders, which was in revolt against its sovereign, and to facilitate the defection of other dissatisfied French subjects.

The first major action of the war was the naval battle of Sluis on 23 June 1340, when Edward's fleet encountered the fleet of France and its Genoese

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allies. Longbowmen on board the English vessels kept up a hail of arrows, and although the battle went on into the night, the French fleet was utterly destroyed. The battle ended the danger of a French invasion of England.

Edward had hoped to finance the war by manipulating a royal monopoly on the export of English wool. His embargo on its export had starved the continental weaving industry, and he hoped that with the price of wool thus inflated, he would be able to fulfill his lavish promises to continental rulers. But Edward had grossly miscalculated, and the scheme failed to realize enough cash, forcing him to end his siege of Tournai prematurely. He bankrupted the Italian banking firms Bardi and Peruzzi and created enormous discontent in England through increases in taxation. In November 1340, a virtual prisoner of his creditors, Edward was forced to steal away to England. On his arrival there, he blamed his councillors; in 1341 he was forced to summon Parliament and reduce his more exorbitant demands for taxation.

A truce for three years was agreed in 1343, but it did not run its full course, and on its collapse the English attacked France directly, rather than through Flanders. In 1346 they began making great *chevauchées* deep into enemy territory; these raids did not pause to besiege towns, but carried on looting, burning, and destroying, as the Scots had done in northern England. The raids disrupted government and sapped the French population's will to carry on the struggle. The strategy allowed the English to wage war relatively inexpensively, for they could expect to live off the land and collect rich plunder, independent of supply trains and at the expense of the enemy (although the wage costs for the crown were still very large).

In 1346, Edward III landed in Normandy and set out on the first of these raids, but he encountered a superior French army, led by King Philip, in Picardy. It used to be thought that Edward did not intend to fight a battle, but the most recent study of Edward's strategy argues that the massive devastation that his army inflicted was intended to push the French into doing battle. Edward, whose army was perhaps half the size of his opponent's, chose to defend high ground. Summary pay records suggest that he had about ten thousand foot, three thousand mounted archers and hobelars, and twenty-seven hundred men-at-arms. The battle of Crécy, fought on 26 August 1346, was an awe-inspiring demonstration of the lethal firepower of longbows used en masse against the armored knights who charged against them. Primitive cannon—the earliest known to have been made in England—were also used against the French cavalry. Great was the death toll among the French aristocracy, but King Philip was able to escape under cover of darkness. Left in possession of the field, Edward advanced on Calais and settled down to besiege it. His army was joined by many additional forces: as many as twenty-nine thousand soldiers may have served during the siege. Here again the English used cannon, probably light weapons. Calais held out for almost a year before surrendering. The French inhabitants who refused to swear loyalty to Edward were expelled, and for the next two hundred years the town served as an English military and commercial colony.

Scotland, the ally of France, attacked England during the siege, in October 1346. Led by David II, son of Robert Bruce, the Scots entered by the western march and crossed the Pennines into Durham. The archbishop of York gathered an army and confronted them at the battle of Neville's Cross. There, after a long stalemate, the English goaded the Scots into taking the offensive and then attacked the broken formations as the Scots advanced. The Scottish army was routed; King David was taken prisoner and was eventually released for a ransom of one hundred thousand marks.

The triumphs helped Edward III cope with the many complaints of misrule in his absence and established him as the living embodiment of chivalry. The English continued their *chevaucheés* through France to devastating effect. In 1355, Edward the Black Prince, Edward's son, led a great raid, looting and pillaging across southern France. When he repeated the exercise the following year, he was confronted by King John of France (r. 1350–1364) at the head of a formidable army near Poitiers. On 18 September 1356 battle was joined, and once again French cavalry charges were repulsed by English archers

deployed en masse. The French then advanced on foot against the storm of arrows and the dismounted Anglo-Gascon men-at-arms, but again to no avail. In the greatest English victory to date, the Black Prince captured the French king himself, as well as many other French nobles and a fortune in booty.

After Poitiers a truce of two years was agreed to allow for negotiations. When the French failed to fulfill the terms of the first treaty arranged with the captive King John, then rejected a second version, King Edward led an army to Calais late in 1359 and marched on Reims with an army of about ten thousand men. Against all expectation, however, the French rallied sufficiently to defend the city and force Edward into retreat for lack of supplies. Mounting a comparable expedition the following year was out of the question; therefore, this time when the Dauphin proposed negotiations, Edward was prepared to listen. With remarkable speed a treaty was drafted, and the kings Edward and John ratified the Treaty of Brétigny in October 1360. King John's ransom was set at three million crowns, Edward renounced his claim to the throne of France, and in return Edward was accorded sovereign rights over a greatly enlarged Gascony, in addition to Calais and Ponthieu in the north.

The Hundred Years' War, 1369–1453. When the war recommenced in 1369, it had changed perceptibly in nature. The English continued to mount *chevauchées*, but the French now refused to confront them in battle. They preferred to shadow the invaders, force them to remain concentrated and ready for battle, and deny them the chance to cause widespread destruction in the countryside. Instead of fighting battles, the French preferred to reduce enemy territory by attrition. The English did not excel at sieges. Their triumph at Calais in 1347 was exceptional; their failures to reduce Reims in 1359 and Orléans in 1429 were much more representative. The scale of armies continued to diminish as plague reduced the availability of infantry. The English economy was unable to sustain the huge military and financial efforts of the past. A change also occurred in the nature of artillery: in the late fourteenth century, artillery was no longer light and cheap to make. At the siege of Cherbourg in 1379, the English had seven guns that fired stone balls that were two feet in circumference and whose average weight was four hundred pounds. From that time, artillery began to make a telling difference in the outcome of sieges. A single shot from one of Henry IV's cannon was sufficient to persuade Berwick to surrender in 1405.

Moreover, the English crown threw away some of its most significant military advantages by devolving further responsibility onto private entrepreneurs. The systematic supply of armies was abandoned: royal purveyance ceased, and merchants now supplied the army's needs by operating to contract. Edward III had wrecked the system of credit finance pioneered by his grandfather by overexploiting it and ruining the banking firms of Bardi and Peruzzi.

The war also spread farther afield as England and France became aligned with warring factions in the Iberian kingdoms. In the Castilian civil war, England supported King Pedro, and France supported Pedro's rebellious illegitimate brother, Enrique of Trastamara. Although an expedition to Castile in 1367, led by the Black Prince, successfully confirmed Pedro on the throne, the French ultimately succeeded in installing Enrique as king (as Enrique II). A result of the Castilian adventure was that the Black Prince alienated his Gascon subjects by taxing them excessively to pay for it. Further Iberian adventures followed: in 1385, English archers helped the Portuguese king João I defeat the Castilians at Aljubarrota, and from 1386 to 1389 the Black Prince's brother, John of Gaunt, led an expedition in pursuit of his own claim to the throne of Castile. King Richard II of England led expeditions to Scotland and twice to Ireland but achieved little.

Most actions in this phase were sporadic and largely indecisive. Two factors account for this: (1) the foreign distractions described above, which diverted resources from the main theater of conflict, and (2) the enormous internal problems and disputes that bitterly divided first England and then France. In the reign of Richard II, England was riven by faction, and its difficulties were resolved only temporarily in 1399 by the accession of the Lancastrian dynasty, which had a questionable title to the throne.

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France experienced even more intractable problems. In 1392, King Charles VI suffered seizures that left him incapable of governing, and royal dukes vied with each other for control of government. From 1410, France was torn apart by the rivalry between the dukes of Orléans (whose party was known as the Armagnacs) and the dukes of Burgundy. Each outbid the other for English support, and from 1419 Burgundy was committed to the English cause.

For the English under the first Lancastrian king, Henry IV, there was no departure from the strategy of *chevauchée*. Henry sent into France two great expeditions—the first under Arundel and the second under Clarence—both of which swept aside all opposition and accumulated substantial booty in treasure and prisoners.

Henry V led a brief and glorious return to triumph. Domestic rivalries and factions were sufficiently suppressed to allow a single-minded concentration on conquest: Iberian distractions had passed away with the demise of John of Gaunt in 1399, and those of the Celtic fringe were ignored. Henry was an inspirational leader. In August 1415 he invaded France with an army of nearly twelve thousand men and captured the port of Harfleur. Henry then set out to march to Calais but found his way barred at Agincourt by a vastly superior enemy force. The French rashly allowed themselves to be tempted to attack. Perhaps they were led to do so by an overwhelming numerical superiority, but the size of the English army is the subject of controversy. Anne Curry maintains that Henry's force was much more numerous than is usually allowed and the French army smaller.

The battle of Agincourt followed the pattern of all the great English victories: like Crécy and Poitiers, it was a triumph of long-distance archery combined with resolute defensive fighting by dismounted men-at-arms. But Henry V's archers also adopted a refinement not evidenced in earlier battles. Besides his longbow, each archer carried a six-foot wooden stake, sharpened at both ends, that he drove into the ground in front of his position and angled toward the enemy. The stake thus served as an obstacle to charging cavalry, and it provided some protection to the archer. The stake could be moved and replaced when the archer changed his location. At the battle of Agincourt, on 25 October 1415, French losses were terrible—far heavier than even the losses at Crécy—and those killed included the constable of France and three French dukes.

This great English victory in the field was consolidated by a campaign of conquest that locked the French into a cycle of demoralization and despondency. Henry invaded France afresh in 1417 and captured all the key towns in Normandy. John the Fearless, Duke of Burgundy, made a separate peace with Henry to save his duchy. Rouen fell to Henry in January 1419, and Henry began to threaten Paris. When Duke John was murdered by the Dauphin's men in September of that year, his heir Philip the Good allied with Henry to seek vengeance. This gave the English king control over the old and insane Charles VI. By the Treaty of Troyes in 1420, it was agreed that Henry should marry Catherine, Charles's daughter, and that the throne would pass to Henry on Charles's death; the Dauphin was declared by his mother to be illegitimate. The whole of northern France, including Paris, came under English control. Henry continued to wage war in France against the Armagnac faction, now led by the Dauphin, but this most martial of English kings died of dysentery in August 1422. Charles VI followed him to the grave a few months later.

Henry V's conquests were not destined to last. The single-minded will that had driven them was gone. Parliament, lacking direction, began to take the view that the French conquests should pay for themselves and, for seven years after Henry's death, voted no subsidy. Lack of finance now handicapped English commanders in the field. The short-service contract contingents that had made up armies were well suited to wars of conquest but not to tasks of occupation or consolidation, such as garrison duty, which promised no booty or short-term gain. Nevertheless there was no immediate deterioration. Henry V's brother, the Duke of Bedford, continued to carry the war into the territory of the Dauphin, and in 1424 he won an important victory at Verneuil against a French army strengthened by a large contingent of Scots.

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The initiative still lay with the English, but two pivotal events set the tide of war flowing in favor of France. The first was the appearance of Joan of Arc, a peasant girl who claimed to have been inspired by celestial voices to deliver France from the English. Joan led an army to the relief of the city of Orléans in 1429. She went farther, recapturing Reims, the ecclesiastical capital and traditional place of coronation. There she oversaw the coronation of the Dauphin as Charles VII of France. The ceremony made an enormous difference to the French nobility, who would not easily defy an anointed and crowned king. Joan's ascendancy was short-lived, however; she was captured by the Burgundians and sold to the English, who had no option but to dispose of her. She was tried and burned at the stake as a heretic in 1431. The second pivotal event was the end of the Anglo-Burgundian alliance, on which the settlement at Troyes depended. The Burgundians had been restive for some time: a mainstay of the alliance had been the marriage of Bedford to the Duke of Burgundy's sister, but she had died in 1433. At a peace conference, the Congress of Arras in 1435, English intransigence on the issue of their king's claim to the throne prompted them to walk out. That provided the Duke of Burgundy with the excuse he sought to return to the allegiance of the French king. Burgundy did not throw all his weight behind the French king, but the loss of his support seriously damaged the English position in France.

As a reaction to these events, Parliament in the 1430s at last resumed making grants of subsidies and taxes in support of the war. In 1431 the English had the young Henry VI crowned king of France in a ceremony at Paris. But leadership and money continued to be lacking. Bedford died in 1435, and from that point English commanders tended to align with the opposing political factions that vied for control of the boy king. The English lacked any real leadership until 1441 when the Duke of York took command in Normandy. York was successful and might have continued so but for the small size of his forces and lack of money.

In 1441 it was not at all inevitable that the English would be expelled from France. But meanwhile a second dramatic surge of improvement in the effectiveness of artillery had been taking place, and it redounded to the disadvantage of the English. The muzzles of cannon, or bombards, were lengthened to improve the speed and force of the shot, and the potency of gunpowder was improved by the process of corning. Fortifications could not withstand bombardment by such a weapon, and thus the change favored the side on the offensive—which in this phase was France. During Henry V's conquest of Normandy, towns such as Caen, Falaise, Cherbourg, and Rouen had all put up stout resistance to the English in spite of the deployment of artillery. Now during Charles VII's reconquest of Normandy in 1449–1450, these towns all fell rapidly to the French.

English failure was the result not so much of change as of the lack of it. The later stages of the Hundred Years' War illustrate the striking failure of the English to adapt. Their great victories had all been won by the same weapon, long-range archery. Henry V had made efforts to encourage Englishmen to settle in Normandy, but those efforts were not followed up, and thus the English could rely on no substantial planter community for support. Even at the end of the war, Edward IV in 1475 and Henry VII in 1492 both used the short-term contract armies that Edward III had used at the start.

France, in contrast, became a much more confident and able adversary. By a series of ordinances in 1445–1448, Charles in effect created a standing army, professional, committed, extremely well equipped, and always ready, for which the short-term contract armies of the English were no match.

Ultimately English politics lost what English martial prowess had won. Under the Duke of Suffolk, Henry VI's government adopted an inept foreign policy that vacillated between buying off the French with concessions and halfhearted, poorly financed defense. Negotiations for peace recommenced directly on the collapse of the Congress of Arras. Although not prepared to give ground on Henry VI's claim to the French throne, the dukes of Suffolk and Somerset, the more pessimistic of the English courtiers, considered ceding territory to buy peace. Other

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suggestions for compromise involved allowing both Henry and Charles to be kings of France; still other suggestions involved a proposed marriage between Henry and Margaret of Anjou, Charles's niece. The English populace was impatient with the courtiers' efforts and grew increasingly belligerent. In gestures aimed at reconciliation with France, Henry VI married Margaret; then, probably on the prompting of Suffolk, he also ceded the hard-won territory of Maine to the French in 1445. The news was greeted by an explosion of public anger in England and among the English in France. The fearful courtiers struck out at their opponents: in Normandy, Richard, Duke of York, a very able leader, found himself undermined in his command. Eventually Richard was relieved of his command altogether and sent into political exile in Ireland.

Aware that England was becoming increasingly embroiled in domestic conflict, Charles VII seized his chance and attacked Normandy at the end of July 1449 with a powerful army and heavy artillery. Prospects of relief for beleaguered English garrisons were poor, and the capture of the first few towns set off a domino effect, causing others to surrender in swift succession. A paltry English force of only three thousand sent to reinforce the position was destroyed in pitched battle at Formigny in April 1450. By August 1450 the French had recovered the whole of Normandy. The following year Charles turned on Gascony and captured Bordeaux before the English could reinforce it. It was not until 1452 that an English force belatedly arrived in Gascony. Heavily outnumbered, the force was destroyed by French gunners at Castillon in 1453, the last battle of the war. Calais remained as the sole English possession on the Continent, and the English nobility, stunned and outraged by the loss, bayed for blood.

The Wars of the Roses and Afterward (1453–1500). The government of Henry VI was thoroughly discredited by failure in France. Both aristocrats and the populace were outraged. Suffolk, who was widely held responsible for the loss, was murdered as he tried to escape to France. Somerset continued to head an increasingly unpopular administration of court favorites. The Duke of York, in contrast, emerged as a war hero who had been fatally undermined by incompetence and treachery at home, and he became a focus for discontent and rebellion.

The causes of the Wars of the Roses are complex, but the elements are readily identifiable: the sudden loss of overseas territory, a weak and incompetent king, a bellicose queen, a would-be king with a plausible claim to the throne, and bitter rivalry among magnates in the regions. The year 1453 saw not only the final loss of France but also the onset of Henry VI's madness, which rendered the king incapable of governing. As a consequence of his illness, Richard, Duke of York, became protector of England. Furthermore, at the battle of Heworth in the next year, the struggle between Lancastrian courtiers and Yorkist malcontents became aligned with that between the two great magnate affinities in northern England, the Percys (who supported the Lancastrians) and the Nevilles (who supported York). Further potential for serious disturbance in England had been created by the departure in 1399 from strict hereditary succession and by the tendency of magnates to gather about themselves paid retinues of liveried retainers. The latter element was largely a result of the crown's withdrawal from the military organization of the Hundred Years' War. Aristocrats had taken pride in the liveried retinues that they led to battle in France; now those contingents were available as small private armies.

The Wars of the Roses saw little development in military technology. Archers continued to be used en masse, for there was a ready pool of trained archers in England, and they were both effective and cost-effective. A century passed before the bow and arrow was outperformed by firearms. Now, however, complete suits of iron- and steel-plate armor were worn by knights and men-at-arms. Armor had increased markedly in hardness and tensile strength and often incorporated skillfully designed glancing surfaces to protect the wearer. Handguns or culverins were available, but their rate of fire was too slow for them to be very effective on the battlefield. Cannon were commonly used on the eve of a battle, and battles tended to commence with a cannonade. One salient characteristic of the war was that it tended to be

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fought through battles, rather than through sieges or blockades. The reason for that was probably the lack of fortified towns in England, which had been at peace for well over a century, coupled with the irresistible power of artillery.

The first battles of the period were fought for possession of the king, Henry VI, with the Yorkist rebels demanding only dismissal and punishment of the king's "evil courtiers," notably Somerset. Then in 1460, Richard, Duke of York, advanced his own claim to the throne, based on seniority of blood. From that point the wars became a contest for the throne. Henry VI's cause was prosecuted tirelessly by his wife, Queen Margaret, who had the support of Louis XI of France, her kinsman, and James III of Scotland, Louis's ally.

There is not space here to recount every swing of the political pendulum. On five occasions kings lost their thrones: the Lancastrian Henry VI lost his twice, in 1461 and 1471, and three Yorkist kings lost theirs—Edward IV in 1470, Edward V in 1483, and Richard III in 1485. At the battle of Wakefield in 1460, the Lancastrians defeated and killed Duke Richard. The Yorkist claim to the throne passed to Richard's son and heir, Edward, who was declared king by the Londoners in 1461. Edward IV vindicated his coronation by defeating a Lancastrian army at Towton, and Queen Margaret was forced to retreat into Scotland.

Edward ruled under the tutelage of his father's principal ally, Richard Neville, Earl of Warwick. When Warwick defected to the Lancastrians in 1470, Edward was briefly overthrown. Edward fled to Burgundy, while Warwick, known to history as "the kingmaker," reinstalled Henry VI as king. Henry's resumption of power was brief and inglorious, and Warwick's about-face destroyed his credibility with all sides. When Edward reappeared in England in the spring of 1471, the regime of Henry VI finally collapsed. Edward defeated Warwick at the battle of Barnet in April, and he defeated and captured Queen Margaret at Tewkesbury in May. Soon afterward the unfortunate Henry VI was found dead in the Tower of London.

Edward IV's government had held the Lancastrian courtiers responsible for the loss of France, and as a result he was virtually committed to a display of arms against Louis XI. In 1472 and 1473, Edward pieced together an alliance of France's enemies, the dukedoms of Burgundy and Brittany. In 1475 he collected an impressive army of about eleven thousand men (ten thousand of whom were archers), equipped with a train of artillery and generously financed by a pliant Parliament. He crossed to Calais, where he was met by Charles, Duke of Burgundy. The duke was less cooperative than Edward had hoped, and soon Louis XI had mustered a formidable enemy to oppose the English. In a sudden reversal of policy, Edward made terms with Louis. By the Peace of Picquigny the two monarchs concluded a seven-year truce: Edward agreed to abandon his campaign and his Burgundian alliance, and Louis paid seventy-five thousand crowns there and then and an annual pension of twenty-five thousand crowns.

Edward IV died suddenly in 1483, but his son Edward V was never crowned. It is thought that he was murdered by his uncle, Richard of Gloucester, who usurped the throne as Richard III. Richard's short and violent reign divided the Yorkist support and allowed Lancastrian sentiment to coalesce around the figure of Henry Tudor, Earl of Richmond and a descendant of John of Gaunt.

Henry of Richmond was exiled to Brittany, where he nevertheless appeared an attractive alternative to the unpredictable and despotic Richard. Sympathetic aristocrats began to defect to or correspond with Richmond, and with support from Brittany he landed in England in August 1485 to challenge Richard for the throne. There was no rush to join Richmond: English aristocrats had learned not to commit themselves hastily. He confronted Richard's host at the battle of Bosworth Field in Leicestershire. Richard's key supporters—notably Lord Stanley and the Duke of Northumberland—failed to commit until battle was joined, and at the last moment they opted to fight for Richmond. Richard III was killed in the battle, and the throne of England passed to a new king, and a new dynasty.

Henry VII, the new king, went some way toward healing the divisions of the past by marrying

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Elizabeth of York, the daughter of Edward IV, and the birth of two sons helped strengthen his dynasty—yet the succession never seemed secure. Henry faced several revolts, fomented by Margaret of Burgundy, Edward IV's sister. The first in 1486, led by Viscount Lovell, ended with the flight of rebels to Flanders. The following year, Lovell and two thousand German mercenaries landed in Ireland in support of the pretender-imposter Lambert Simnel. In the summer of 1487 the rebels landed at Furness and progressed south, but they were defeated at the battle of Stoke. A second pretender to the throne, Perkin Warbeck (impersonating Edward IV's son Richard), received more support from foreign rulers, including James IV of Scotland, Charles VIII of France, and Emperor Maximilian of Austria. In 1496, James invaded England on Warbeck's behalf, but he was persuaded to abandon the pretender and terminate the ineffectual invasion. The Anglo-Scottish negotiations led to a seven-year truce in 1497 and ultimately to the Treaty of Ayton, in 1502, which was the first full peace treaty between the kingdoms since 1328.

[*See also* Agincourt, Battle of; Bannockburn, Battle of; Berwick, Sieges of; Black Death; Calais, Siege of (1346–1347); Calais, Siege of (1436–1437); Carlisle, Siege of; Carrickfergus, Siege of; Castillon, Siege and Battle of; Crécy, Battle of; Dupplin Moor, Battle of; Edward I of England; Edward III of England; Edward IV of England; Edward Bruce; Edward the Black Prince; Falkirk, Battle of; Formigny, Battle of; Halidon Hill, Battle of; Henry II; Henry V; Hundred Years' War; Poitiers, Battle of (1356); Robert I (the Bruce); Rochester, Siege of (1215); Roses, Wars of the; Stirling Bridge, Battle of; Verneuil, Battle of; *and* Wallace, William.]

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Colm McNamee

Historiography (500–1066)

The historiography of warfare in early medieval Britain mirrors social trends and changing political and religious concerns. Certainly as far back as the mid-seventeenth century, the Protestant movement known as the "Levellers" was complaining of the oppressive "Norman yoke" imposed after Hastings by the unfettered violence of the military aristocracy. Later, Victorian notions of the Norman cavalryman as an idealized "knight" reflected the contemporary view of the "gentleman," a man who should be athletic and skillful with arms, but never needlessly pugnacious. Contrasted with this character was the Saxon "yeoman," who eschewed the affectations of the manor house, living an honest, simple life in his wooden hall and bringing his hunting tools to the battlefield. These notions are most clearly developed in the opposing presentations of Robin Hood, who could be either a dispossessed nobleman (Robin of Loxley) or an oppressed Saxon everyman. Another hardy perennial is the "King Arthur" topic, for which the popular appetite has never abated; long-standing claims for the (Romano-)British use of heavy cavalry have more recently been supplemented by an alleged naval capacity, such as in Bernard Bachrach's "The Questions of King Arthur's Existence and of Romano-British Naval Operations" (1990). A shelfful of Arthur books have appeared and quietly faded: typical is Michael Holmes's *King Arthur: A Military History* (1997).

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Emphasis on supposedly superior military technology has been replaced in some circles by a consideration of the astute use of political and economic factors, as in Ken Dark's *Britain and the End of the Roman Empire* (2000) and Christopher Snyder's *An Age of Tyrants: Britain and the Britons, A.D. 400–600* (1998). Many early Welsh sources have been republished, as well as later medieval material and speculative accounts; the "King Arthur" industry grinds on. John Morris produced a series of Arthurian books in the 1970s and 1980s in which he carefully gathered many of the less accessible sources (Saint Patrick's writings, for example) and published them in translation with a commentary. The series was given the unfortunate title of *The Age of Arthur*, and Morris's often unorthodox views and insistence on the historical reality of this nebulous figure compromised the usefulness of the work as a whole.

Battles, Leaders, Warriors. The grand sweep of historical narrative—as in Frank Merry Stenton's classic work—has been replaced by individual studies, collections of conference papers, and scholarly memoirs. With the growth and divergence of literary and archaeological evidence, few writers of the later twentieth century felt sufficiently comfortable with both fields to attempt synthesis. An ambitious all-round treatment of military culture, technology, and tactics can be found in Stephen Pollington's *The English Warrior* (2d ed., 2002). Detailed study can profitably be placed in its wider context, as in Tania Dickinson and Heinrich Härke's *Early Anglo-Saxon Shields* (1992).

Studies of a single campaign are notoriously difficult for the underdocumented early medieval period, but scholars have often taken the opportunity to draw together as wide a range of evidence as possible in compendia such as *The Battle of Maldon: Fiction and Fact*, edited by Janet Cooper (1993), and Donald Scragg's *The Return of the Vikings: The Battle of Maldon, 991* (2006). The value of such catholic works lies in the sheer range of approaches possible, including place-name studies, architectural history, archaeology, literary analysis, numismatics, economic and social history, and even geology (to help locate the battlefield). Few battles of the Anglo-Saxon age offer such rich pickings, but Hastings (Senlac) has inspired at least as many, notably Matthew Strickland's *Anglo-Norman Warfare: Studies in Late Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-Norman Military Organization and Warfare* (1992), Jim Bradbury's *The Battle of Hastings* (1998), Paul Hill's *The Road to Hastings* (2005), and Ian Walker's *Harold: The Last Anglo-Saxon King* (1997).

For the earlier period, Stephen Evans's work on the cultural milieu of the *Y Gododdin* poem was published in 1997 as *The Heroic Poetry of Dark-Age Britain: An Introduction to Its Dating, Composition, and Use as a Historical Source*. The battle fought at Dunnichen (Nechtansmere) in Scotland in 685 has benefited from several book-length treatments, of which James Fraser's *The Battle of Dunnichen, 685* (2002) is the most accessible. Engagements such as Clontarf, Brunanburh, Edington, and Stamford Bridge have been the subject of several academic papers but still await a more rounded treatment; Kelly DeVries's *The Norwegian Invasion of England in 1066* (1999) deals with the battle of Stamford Bridge in some depth, as well as with the lesser-known encounter at Fulford Gate, also tackled by Charles Jones in *The Forgotten Battle of 1066: Fulford* (2007). Individual leaders have sometimes fared better: King Alfred's military career has been documented by both John Peddie's *Alfred: Warrior King* (1999) and Alfred Smyth's *King Alfred the Great* (1995) and *The Medieval Life of King Alfred the Great: A Translation and Commentary on the Text Attributed to Asser*. Cnut, Aethelstan, and Harold Godwinson have also had modern biographers who have not neglected the military aspects of their lives and times.

Troop types remain contentious, with few literary (often legal) terms able to be matched to other evidence. The "thane," *cniht* ("knight"), and "ceorl" all have a military dimension to their status, but referencing good documentary sources that might offer insight has proved difficult. The main exception to this list is the "housecarl" (or "huscarl"), an anglicized Norse institution that has been studied in some depth, as in Nicholas Hooper's "The Housecarls in England in the Eleventh Century" (1985), which contextualizes these men within the framework of Cnut's Scandinavian empire.

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Useful book-length treatments of Scottish, Irish, and Welsh warfare for the early medieval period have rarely been attempted: Evans's *Lords of Battle* (1997) is perhaps the most successful, but perforce it relies on contemporary Anglo-Saxon evidence to flesh out the sparse native sources and therefore often fails to convince. David Beougher's dissertation on Irish kingship, "Brian Boru: King, High-King, and Emperor of the Irish" (2008), may rekindle interest both in Ireland's place in the military history of northwest Europe and in the relations of Irish nobility with their Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian counterparts.

C. Warren Hollister came to the fore in the 1960s: his particular insight centered on the close political and commercial relationships between late Anglo-Saxon England and the emergent Norman state. Family ties between the house of Wessex and the duchy were already established in the time of King Aethelred II's exile in the late tenth century. Although Hollister is known primarily for his work on Anglo-Norman institutions and the medieval period, his book *Anglo-Saxon Military Institutions on the Eve of the Norman Conquest* (1962) was influential in demonstrating that the eleventh-century Anglo-Saxon state was keeping up with contemporary European developments in military technology and organization, such as by adopting heavily armed horsemen. The images of English and Norman warriors on the Bayeux Tapestry clearly show differences—some of the English are bearded and are armed with long-handled axes and rectangular shields—but many of the English and Norman warriors are dressed and armed identically, with conical helms, long "teardrop" shields, and heavy swords. With some late Saxon manor houses also approaching the form of Norman keeps, the gradual convergence of the two societies in their military culture seems evident.

One interesting development since Hollister's day is in more critical use of sources: M. K. Lawson's *The Battle of Hastings, 1066* (2002) reminds us that over-reliance on Norman testimony and incautious use of the Bayeux Tapestry's evidence may have misled generations of scholars over the background to the battle at Senlac. Scandinavian documentary evidence, drawn mainly from Icelandic saga literature, has often been used to cast light on English history: for example, the details recorded in the account in the *Egil's Saga* of the battle of Vinheiðr do seem to offer potential for a better understanding of the encounter called "Brunanburh" in English sources. Set against this is the tendency of saga literature to lionize certain Icelanders and other approved individuals to the point where the credibility of the writer (or his use of sources) must be called into question.

The size of early medieval armies has been a matter of much conjecture. The *Y Gododdin* poem specifies a British cavalry force of the sixth to seventh centuries as numbering three hundred men, which many early commentators found to be risibly small, but a number of studies in the 1970s and 1980s, reviewing the evidence from law codes and cemeteries—and the almost statutory references to "three ships" in the foundation stories of the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*—tended to support the notion of military forces numbering around one hundred to two hundred, drawn from populations that numbered only a few thousand (for example, John Hines's "The Military Context of the *Adventus Saxonum*: Some Continental Evidence," in Hawkes, ed., 1989). However, the evidence from Norwegian ship-houses and elsewhere is quite clear in showing that Iron Age settlements often had access to many vessels at the same time, and at least some of these vessels were capable of conveying forty to sixty men.

Gunilla Larsson's study *Ship and Society: Maritime Ideology in Late Iron Age Sweden* (2007) demonstrates that warships were a specially designed class of vessel with specific handling capabilities and profiles (for instance, the length can be up to seven and a half times the breadth). The perennial question as to whether early ships had sails is also now settled: evidence for sails of wool and hemp has been detected archaeologically. Since the appearance of Hines's paper, further evidence has been adduced to show that grave goods need not reflect actual weapon sets, and that Danish bog deposits likewise represent the outcome of a deliberate process of selection. Härke has addressed this matter in several papers, notably "Warrior Graves? The Background of the Anglo-Saxon Weapon Burial Rite" (1990) and "Changing

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Symbols in a Changing Society" (in Carver, ed., 1992). The argumentation has been challenged in, for example, Andrew Tyrrell's paper "*Corpus Saxonum*: Early Medieval Bodies and Corporeal Identity" (in Frazer and Tyrrell, eds., 2000). Caution is therefore needed in interpreting sets of grave goods as if they were customary military equipment in use.

Military Forces and Weaponry. John Hayward's groundbreaking 1991 study of Roman and post-Roman seafaring in northern Europe, *Dark Age Naval Power: A Re-assessment of Frankish and Anglo-Saxon Seafaring Activity* (with a revised second edition issued in 1999), did much to topple the Vikings from their preeminent position as glamorous seafarers and shipbuilders: Hayward demonstrated that the sixth-century craft used by the Anglo-Saxons, Franks, and others were in every substantive respect the equal of the later Viking craft and that the seamanship of these earlier peoples was in no way less accomplished. The ratio of combatants to support personnel has also been a matter of debate: if the Sutton Hoo ship—at ninety feet (twenty-seven meters) long, the second-largest northern European medieval vessel of which records survive—could hold a complement of around fifty men, how many were warriors and how many were mariners? Perhaps this is not the right question to ask: if there need have been no firm distinction between sailors and fighters, then we should probably think more in terms of the potential "strikeforce" deliverable by such a ship. This is an area where further research would be very useful.

Detailed X-ray examination of existing weapons was a rarity up to the 1980s, but now new finds are often routinely subjected to appropriate analysis techniques and some older finds are likewise reviewed. Janet Lang and Barry Ager were commissioned to conduct studies of the Anglo-Saxon and Viking swords in the British Museum's collection (published as "Swords of the Anglo-Saxon and Viking Periods in the British Museum: A Radiographic Study," in Hawkes, ed., 1989), which contributed to a revision of the estimated skill of the early medieval smith and stimulated further research into the methods of construction of swords, spearheads, and saxes (or seaxes). In "Swords, Seaxes, and Saxons: Pattern-Welding and Edged Weapon Technology from Late Roman Britain to Anglo-Saxon England" (2007), Brian Gilmour published an overview of recent research that also summarized evidence for the surface patterns produced by the forging processes.

Typological studies of a single artifact class have been unfashionable since the 1960s, but sterling work has been carried out—for example, in establishing a typology of the Anglo-Saxon spearheads known from pre-Christian graves, devised by Michael James Swanton and published in 1973 as *Spearheads of the Anglo-Saxon Settlements*. Other individual weapons have received scrutiny: David Gale published a short monograph, "The Seax" (in Hawkes, ed., 1989), and H. R. Ellis Davidson published *The Sword in Anglo-Saxon England* (1962). Ian Peirce's *Swords of the Viking Age* (2002) is a compendium of fine monochrome photographs of some of the better-known swords found in Scandinavia and western Europe and has a short textual summary. Shields have been the subject of two books: I. P. Stephenson's 2002 work *The Anglo-Saxon Shield* and Dickinson and Härke's *Early Anglo-Saxon Shields* (1992). Härke's book is hampered by its very small sample size and restricted source area (a region around the upper Thames), but it does offer a detailed analysis of the target data; Stephenson's book is by comparison rather general, and it offers little that is new. By late 2009 no substantive typology existed for early Anglo-Saxon axes; the early finds are not numerous, but the sheer variety of forms known from fifth- to seventh-century Kentish cemeteries, in tandem with the curious axe-hammer from Sutton Hoo Mound 1, would make this a very fruitful area for research. Andres S. Dobat's paper "The King and His Cult: The Axe-Hammer from Sutton Hoo and Its Implications for the Concept of Sacral Leadership in Early Medieval Europe" (2006) seeks to show that this object could function as both a military weapon and a means of dispatching cattle.

The early medieval use of cavalry in Britain has been disputed, although a large part of the debate arises from a failure to define terms. It is well known that the Anglo-Saxons made use of the horse in war: we have ample testimony from the records of

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Alfred's struggle with the Danes, who stole horses from churches and even transported their mounts from Flanders (*Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*, under the year 892); from poetry such as *Beowulf*, in which a saddle is held to be part of the hero's war gear; from iconography such as the armed rider statue from Repton in Derbyshire; and from archaeology, such as the cemetery at Lakenheath in Suffolk, which yielded two sixth- to seventh-century burials of armed men alongside the remains of their mounts, or Mound 17 at Sutton Hoo, where a young noble was buried with his weapons and horse. R. H. C. Davies published a series of studies in the late 1980s on the subject.

The term "cavalry" seems quite inappropriate for early English horsemen, both because the horses involved are not large (around fourteen hands high) and because there are no existing literary references to the training of horses for warfare—and without acclimatization to the sights, sounds, and smells of the battlefield, a horse is rather a liability than an asset in such situations. The implication seems to be that the Anglo-Saxon use of the horse for war was limited to specific roles such as pursuit, reconnaissance, transport, and individual attack; troops of mounted men in drilled formations do not figure in the sources until the close of the period (but perhaps the reference in the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* entry for 937 to *eoredcyst*, "picked troops of horsemen," shows the beginnings of this trend?). There are references to stud farms in later Anglo-Saxon contexts, as well as to the office of *stallere*, which appears to have been introduced from Normandy in the late tenth or eleventh century and corresponds to the French constable, that is, *comes stabuli*, or "stable keeper." So long as the word "cavalry" need mean no more than "mounted warriors," the Anglo-Saxons can be safely held to have used cavalry; indeed, we should perhaps think of the Anglo-Saxon horseman as closer to the dragoon than to the cuirassier.

Another bugbear of early medieval military studies is the matter of bowmen: did the Anglo-Saxons make use of the bow in war? John Manley's paper "The Archer and the Army in the Late Saxon Period" (1985) concludes that a limited use of the bow was made, but that it was largely ineffectual. The bow was principally a hunting tool for the Anglo-Saxon nobleman.

Conduct of Warfare and Maintenance of Warriors. The conduct of warfare and the means by which warriors were maintained have been studied continuously since the early twentieth century, when scholars such as Stenton used economic and social models to explain elements of Old English vocabulary such as land-tenure arrangements, legal duties, and military institutions. Prominent among recent writers on these topics is Richard Abels, whose 1992 monograph *Lordship and Military Obligation in Anglo-Saxon England* deftly summarizes half a century of studies and debates on the social obligations and bonds that provided food, arms, and shelter for the military and that encouraged youthful participation in warfare as a prerequisite for social standing in later life. Likewise John Hill's *The Anglo-Saxon Warrior Ethic* (2000) demonstrates the use of martial imagery by skillful poets to bolster approved modes of behavior.

C. J. Arnold's *An Archaeology of Early Anglo-Saxon Kingdoms* (2d ed., 1997) uses a range of archaeological and mathematical modeling techniques to provide an image of the early Anglo-Saxon military and its place in society; as with many such studies, subsequent research has overturned some of the basic assumptions, but the book remains useful. I. P. Stephenson's *The Late Anglo-Saxon Army* (2006) is an attempt to salvage the reputation of the defense forces that fought at Maldon and Hastings. The book provides ample evidence for innovation in Anglo-Saxon warfare, but the word "late" in the title is misleading because a large part of the evidence is drawn from the ninth century. Guy Halsall has produced several fine studies of military culture in early medieval Europe, notably *Warfare and Society in the Barbarian West, 450–900* (2003) and the edited volume *Violence and Society in the Early Medieval West* (1998).

Military culture as an integral part of the larger society it served has been examined in respect both of the Anglo-Saxons, in Stephen Pollington's *The Mead Hall: The Feasting Tradition in Anglo-Saxon*

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England (2003), and of the Welsh, in Evans's *Lords of Battle* (1997). The early medieval notion of the formal communal meal was one of the mainstays of the so-called economy of prestige, in which public recognition of deeds done and oaths to be fulfilled was paramount: without the pivotal opposition of glory (success) and shame (failure), and the societal reactions that accompanied these, the honorifics and worldly treasures would have had no meaning. Although Welshmen, Irishmen, Scandinavians, and Anglo-Saxons often found themselves on opposing sides, the literary evidence suggests that their societies valued similar forms of behavior and used similar badges to reward success. "Lordship" among Anglo-Saxons, Britons, and Scandinavians likewise had its familiar rights and obligations, reviewed by Nicholas Brooks in *Communities and Warfare, 700–1400* (2000).

An entirely new development of the late twentieth century is the growth of battle reenactment as a hobby (not to say an obsession) on both sides of the Atlantic. A number of reenactors have committed thoughts on their experiences to paper, sometimes offering valuable insights into the conduct of men and horses on the medieval battlefield. While accepting that a modern re-creation (with all its attendant rules concerning safety and legal liability) is in no way comparable to the blood and filth of a medieval campaign, the modern reenactor can nevertheless suggest practical answers to scholarly questions: the small strap on the reverse outer edge of the Sutton Hoo shield, which has puzzled academic researchers, may perhaps have been used to keep the shield under control while holding reins, as suggested by a reenactment rider of many years' experience (Nigel Amos of the reenactment society Regia Anglorum). There is much scope for experimental archaeology's using faithful reproductions of genuine artifacts to address such questions.

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Stephen Pollington

Historiography (1000–1300)

Scholarship on British medieval military history has consistently evolved in conjunction with developments in wider military history, each influencing the other. The standard picture of medieval warfare for much of the twentieth century rested on the works of Sir Charles Oman and Hans Delbrück. Oman's 1885 essay "The Art of War in the Middle Age" grew over the next four decades into a magisterial, two-volume work whose strength lay not least in its compelling prose. Starting in 1900, Delbrück's multivolume history of war, *Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der Politischen Geschichte* (English trans., *History of the Art of War*), began to appear, which, in the finest German scholarly tradition, left no stone unturned. Delbrück had the further credentials of having been on active duty in the Franco-Prussian War. Together Oman and Delbrück established the picture of an age dominated by mounted knights, supplied by a system of feudal arrangements, fighting chaotically and recklessly for individual glory.

Despite its remaining influence in popular media, however, that image has long been debunked by

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military historians in monographs and specialist articles, especially since the 1980s. The tidal shift is clear in the numbers of books published since the 1990s, as well as in the appearance of many seminal articles in collections for a wider readership. For many of these works the British Isles have been a rich source of historical material. The proceedings of the Battle Conference (named after Battle Abbey where the conference is held) have contributed many groundbreaking military studies since the conference's inception in 1978 by R. Allen Brown, and the same can be said of its sister conference in the United States, that of the Haskins Society. Finally, the founding of the *Journal of Medieval Military History* in 2003, though not specifically British in its interests, has seen numerous articles on topics in England, Scotland, Wales, and Ireland.

For most military historians since 1976, there is almost no overstating the influence of John Keegan's *The Face of Battle*. Keegan's work reestablished the credentials of military history for much of the wider academic world by abandoning armchair generalship, and it called on fellow historians to return to meaningful questions. In the specific case of his book, Keegan bemoaned how institutional military history had spent so much time studying how armies were raised and supplied as "to forget what they were for." Keegan wanted a return to battle history and an analysis of why men behave as they do "at the sharp end" of things. Keegan's text then modeled how this might be done, using vivid narrative and analysis that avoided pandering to violent representation for its own sake. Since then, several generations of military historians have more than answered his call with respect to medieval Britain.

Administrative Focus. The administrative focus that Keegan bemoaned, however, has long been present in the military historiography of the British Isles: the precocity of royal finances and record-keeping in England, developments long recognized as a result of the English kings' need to raise significant numbers of troops, naturally drew historians' attention. Such records (e.g., the Burghal Hidage) appeared by the tenth century, but they do not show conclusively how the Anglo-Saxon kings raised military forces, nor does a retroactive reading of Domesday Book clarify the possible numbers and means. A debate arose in the 1960s concerning the "great" fyrd versus the "select" fyrd. C. Warren Hollister opened this question by arguing for the great fyrd as the "nation-in-arms," while seeing the king's ability to summon troops for specific expeditions as evidence for a "select" body of warriors. His interpretation influenced at least a generation of historians, but in 1988 Richard Abels countered with an argument against the existence of the great fyrd, seeing the mechanisms for recruiting and victualing draftees as a nationwide principle that grew out of the royal war band.

Part of this debate has continued in the contentions regarding the overall size and sophistication of Anglo-Saxon armies, especially in the century leading to 1066. Abels argues in a 2001 festschrift to Hollister that the components of the Anglo-Saxon military—the navy, the logistical arm, the levies—were individually sophisticated and capable, but earlier success had allowed the apparatus as a whole system to degrade. In addition, he sees the army as a smaller, but not insignificant, ad hoc affair, raised (often) to meet immediate needs. M. K. Lawson, however, has contended, with due care for the lack of clear evidence, that we should allow the forces of the later Anglo-Saxon state to tend toward the larger of possible estimates. Additionally, these troops contained professional and diverse units: heavy and light infantry, housecarls, archers, possibly slingers, and maybe even cavalry.

The navy of the Anglo-Saxon kingdom has been drawing more attention of late, testifying as it does by its very existence to the financial resources and strategic vision of Alfred and his heirs. This is a field still ripe for much exploration, but the 2005 monograph of John Pullen-Appleby has summed up much of the current state of studies while making a persuasive argument that the navy was best used as an offensive tool and found only limited success when deployed defensively.

Military needs helped drive bureaucratic growth in another administrative area: the construction

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and garrisoning of castles. J. H. Round drew medievalists' attention to the latter topic in 1902 in his "Castle Guard," Sidney Painter followed up in 1935, and John Beeler gave an excellent summary in his 1967 *Warfare in England*, but the topic has received less attention than one might expect. This is all the more surprising because the castle usually appears, alongside the knight, as the sine qua non of medieval warfare. In the British case the advent of the castle has been hotly contested, especially after R. Allen Brown argued for the castle as the key element in, and witness to, the introduction of feudalism to England. The archaeological work of Philip Barker and Robert Higham on timber castles has been exceptional in recovering evidence of island-wide fortifications from around the time of the Conquest and before stone became the standard building material. This has led to interesting debates over just when and where the motte and bailey developed, and how widely this form was used as the standard both before and after 1066. Since 1970 the biennial appearance of the journal *Château Gaillard* has led to a profound deepening of our understanding of the castle's physical fabric, military role, and social context. Much of this work was effectively synthesized by D. J. Cathcart King in his brief but clear 1988 analysis of the castle in England and Wales, a book whose ideas consistently reappear in other authors' works. Still, with so much research focused on architectural developments, scholarship since the late 1990s by Frederick Suppe, John S. Moore, and Michael Prestwich on castle-guard and provisioning has shown how underused the British sources remain for the administrative side of the equation.

The arguments around "feudalism" have, naturally enough, been both the most distracting and the most fruitful for British military history. In the once-dominant picture of the feudal knight built up by Oman and Delbrück, the supply of knights for medieval armies was the objective of the feudal arrangements that seemed to have been perfected under William the Conqueror and his heirs. The concomitant picture thus arose of pell-mell charges by masses of individualistic, glory-obsessed warriors with no sense of tactics, strategy, or military science. In this reading the Middle Ages fell below some sort of "military horizon" and stayed in a chaotically violent, militarily unscientific state until disciplined infantry formations began appearing in the late medieval period.

Military historians of the later twentieth century often had their doubts, though, and have effectively dismantled the consensus that once flowed from Oman, Delbrück, and other great medievalists. The biggest check to the former picture came from the success of E. A. R. Brown and then Susan Reynolds in showing that "feudalism" as a system or paradigm needed a radically strong reconsideration. Military historians were among the first converted, having spent so much time in their studies dealing with the very exceptions that Reynolds argued might be more normative than exceptional.

Reevaluation of Generalship and Mercenaries. In military affairs, then, historians had already been pushing back against the Oman picture of medieval warfare. In 1963, John Beeler called for a "re-evaluation of medieval English generalship": his essay demonstrated clear cases of "military competence" from even the much-maligned period of the anarchy, not just the formerly more accepted campaigns of the Hundred Years' War. Stephen Morillo's *Warfare under the Anglo-Norman Kings* continued this argument but went further, demonstrating that a steadily professional and disciplined corps of troops, the *familia regis*, lay at the heart of Anglo-Norman military success. Combined arms—the use of shock and missile attack, reserve forces, infantry, and cavalry used in support of one another—these became a more standard picture. John Hosler's 2007 study of Henry II stands in this tradition, analyzing the king as one who understood war fully as a craft with standard principles and practices.

Part of what had to be dismantled in this approach was the long-standing assumption in military circles that the purpose of war was to seek out a decisive battle that would resolve conflict definitively. Following somewhat in the footsteps of R. C. Smail's groundbreaking work on the crusader states' careful avoidance of pitched battles, John Gillingham has shown similar patterns for kings like William the Conqueror and Richard the Lionhearted, famed

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warriors who rarely let themselves get caught in a full-scale battle. In addition, his articles have pointed out how successful medieval leaders used raids, arson, and other seemingly pointless brutalities as levers to bring their foes to the bargaining table, not to the point of battle. In sum, the kings of England applied scientific, commonsense principles to their military endeavors.

That pragmatism showed in the financial attention that English kings applied to war. In 1954, J. O. Prestwich made what are still the seminal comments on this topic: "The whole history of the development of Anglo-Norman administration is intelligible only in terms of the scale and the pressing needs of war finance: the expenditure on the wages of troops, the construction and repair of castles, the pensions to allies, the bribes which eased the course of campaigns and diplomacy, and the upkeep of the bureaucracy itself" (p. 36). Prestwich showed that the military finances of Henry II's reign, even those of Edward I, had their roots anchored in the reigns of William I, his two sons, and Stephen.

Given this perspective, British military historiography showed ever less reluctance to explain mercenaries or stipendiary troops as somehow exceptions to a "feudal" model. The traditional image did not go away easily, though: in a 1968 monograph dedicated to the topic of mercenaries in the Anglo-Norman and Angevin polities, John Schlight still felt compelled to describe them as feudalism's "skeletons in the family closet." Marjorie Chibnall's subtle argument in 1977 further demonstrated just how fuzzy, even arbitrary, the distinctions were between feudal and paid military service in the Anglo-Norman period. In the later 1980s Nicholas Hooper showed the pivotal role of paid troops in Anglo-Saxon forces, especially the housecarls retained by the kings and the lithsmen hired to man the impromptu fleets. More than a few medievalists have gone through some tortuous semantics trying to distinguish landed vassals or retainers serving for pay from salaried warriors enfeoffed with lands. S. D. Brown and Steven Isaac have argued that in the medieval world built upon personal relations, the term "mercenary" is best avoided as a label whose pejorative nature belongs more to the later period of the nation-state. Following up on his own historiographical complaint about this issue, in 2005 John France brought together a conference at Swansea University that focused directly on this topic and that resulted in a volume of essays by established authorities and up-and-coming historians. The upshot of multiple articles was to pull the mercenary or paid warrior definitively out of the supposed closet and establish his centrality to medieval warfare in Britain and beyond.

Payrolls are, of course, but one expense among many in the prosecution of war, and much work has been done here on the logistics of campaigning. One of the most fascinating efforts has been Bernard Bachrach's calculations on the material needs of the Norman invasion. Although some have criticized his calculations and found the occasional anomaly, his imaginative re-creation of the dietary needs of the army and especially of its horses (most graphically in the amount of waste they produced) demonstrated clearly how thoroughly William must have planned his invasion. It also showed why, for reasons of supply, William could not afford a lengthy campaign against Harald Hardrada. In the absence of actual records, the paper is a marvel of detailed thinking about the daily realities of military life. The survival of later English royal fiscal records and memoranda has enabled historians to make exceptional strides. Perhaps not surprising, given his father's pioneering work in related fields, Michael Prestwich has particularly led the way. His study of royal financing of wars in the thirteenth century is still a standard work. In 1996 he built upon that earlier analysis to show how sophisticated the English supply network had become. One aspect of campaigns in the thirteenth century was their increasing length; not only were Henry III and Edward I producing larger armies, but they were keeping them in the field or engaged in sieges for longer periods. The subsequent burden was not felt equally across England: different counties would be tapped for foodstuffs based on proximity, as well as on their ability to transport the needed material, perhaps by river or roadway.

Reevaluation of Battle, Especially That at Hastings. And what of Keegan's other charge, namely that historians need to return to an exploration of

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battle itself? This has been answered as well, although there is much room remaining concerning combat across the British Isles in the central Middle Ages.

As the pivotal event of the epoch for all the polities of Britain, the battle of Hastings has a long historiographical tradition that shows no signs of abating. As R. Allen Brown notably quipped, the fact of a Norman victory may be the only incontestable fact, and even that truth, he felt, was at times imperiled by Anglo-Saxon apologists. Early on, the stakes were set high with the epic feud of Edward Freeman and J. H. Round in the late nineteenth century. Much of their debate, as Stephen Morillo noted in his 1996 collection of essays and sources on the battle, sprang from their differences over the long-term consequences of the battle. And for this larger debate, Marjorie Chibnall's *The Debate on the Norman Conquest* has a strong historiographical survey. But for the battle itself there have been contradictory views, often centered on the basic question of why and how William's forces triumphed.

Round's diatribes had established the Normans as the more professional soldiers, and William as the more accomplished general, but in a 1952 article Richard Glover reopened the question. Some of his points, such as rehabilitating Snorri Sturluson as a source, or suggesting an Anglo-Saxon use of cavalry in the battle, have been effectively dismantled, but his contention that the two armies were much closer in skill than had been previously allowed survives, albeit in a different form. The consensus now seems to accept that the armies were well matched because they were both quite professional about their business, not because they were poorly trained, as Glover argued. The set-piece example in this argument is the feigned retreat that finally began to open up the English lines. Bachrach argued for believing this tactic to have been deliberate, seeing it as coming at the end of a centuries-long developmental line of tactics. Morillo has likewise emphasized the tactic in several articles, noting in 2006, for example, the pre-battle psychological gamesmanship that must take place for one side to accept the feint as genuine.

Finally, the Scandinavian factor in the events of 1066 has enjoyed resurgent attention. The Norse sagas received another favorable resuscitation in Kelly DeVries's account of Tostig Godwin's and Harald Hardrada's invasion. Richard Huscroft's introductory text likewise has emphasized the Nordic context, not just at the tactical level of events in 1066, but also in the larger context of politics and culture for all the regions with something at stake that year.

One element alluded to in the debate over Hastings is whether either side enjoyed a technological advantage. That debate is far from settled, but a good starting point for entering it, especially with an eye on British specifics, is Ian Peirce's Battle Conference paper "Arms, Armour, and Warfare in the Eleventh Century." Several monographs have also appeared on the medieval warhorse, notably by Ann Hyland and R. H. C. Davis, but Davis's article from the 1987 Battle Conference gave a definite technological edge at Hastings to the Norman mounts.

The behavior of combatants in the press of battle has been one of the key interests of historians, and in this respect chivalry and the expectations assigned to it have proven a fertile ground. The standard introduction is probably still that of Maurice Keen, but he ranges far beyond the British Isles and the period under discussion here. Nonetheless his detailed study began deflating some of the sillier ideas about medieval warriors. In 1996, Matthew Strickland's long-awaited *War and Chivalry* appeared, with its focus specifically on Anglo-Norman military behavior from 1066 to 1217. Insofar as the church's ideas about violence permeated chivalry, Strickland found no impact on knightly violence: a reduction of injuries or fatalities on the battlefield stemmed more from economic considerations or a growing caste sense of solidarity. Thus when these same knights fought against their social "inferiors" or against "uncivilized" people from Europe's margins, there were no effective checks on their lethal force. Three years later Richard Kaeuper took the argument a step further, noting that in effect chivalry was a very poor brake on the violent impulses of "those who fight." A reading of chivalry's many tales showed a secular ethos that prized violent behavior, independence from church control, and, most tellingly, a

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propensity for violent outbreaks against commoners and women, the very sectors that chivalry supposedly protected. Coming at this paradigm from a different perspective, however, Richard Abels, Steven Isaac, and Stephen Morillo offered three studies of cowardice in the 2006 *Journal of Medieval Military History*, all of which were built primarily on cases drawn from England, Wales, and Scotland.

The role of non-knightly populations in war has been garnering long overdue attention as well. Jim Bradbury has been something of a publishing phenomenon since the late 1980s, turning out accessible monographs that are well grounded in the latest research and the primary sources. In *The Medieval Archer* he stayed oddly close to just British material, but the result is a work that shows how crucial these combatants were in battle from the Anglo-Saxon period on through the Anglo-Normans, the Angevins, and then the later Plantagenets. Bradbury's treatment of the civil war between Stephen and Matilda likewise highlights the role of non-knightly warriors. In a paper that appeared in the Battle Conference's sixth volume, Bradbury highlighted numerous trends of study in Anglo-Norman history: the repeated lethality of archers to nobles and kings, the importance of sieges, the regular pattern of knights who dismounted to fight on foot, and military actions by women. For this last topic, Jean Truax pointed the way to further studies in an essay from 1999 that showcased a number of women as combatants and capable generals.

Any suggestions of where British medieval military historiography should head next would be idiosyncratic, given the richness of the material that can still be exploited. Moreover, this entry has left out many authors and noteworthy studies. Historiographical essays continue to ask for more treatments of siege warfare as a neglected field; as noted above, women's roles seem to be due for serious investigation. The thirteenth century has never been neglected militarily, but the constitutional issues at stake seem to draw attention away from the military events. Naval warfare remains a difficult topic, mostly because of evidentiary challenges.

[*See also* Battle, Historiography of; Chivalry, *subentry on* Historiography; *and* France, *subentry on* Historiography (900–1328).]

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Steven Isaac

Historiography (1300–1500)

Partly a reflection of the nature of the sources—medieval chroniclers were mostly very interested in warfare, and the royal administrations that created archival records devoted much of their attention to paying and supplying soldiers—the military history of late medieval Britain has long been reasonably well understood. Narrative histories, regnal histories, and biographies such as those by James H. Ramsay (*Genesis of Lancaster*), James Hamilton Wylie and William Templeton Waugh (*The Reign of Henry the Fifth*), and Joshua Barnes (his unsurpassed seventeenth-century biography of Edward III) have included much information on military preparations and operations and the details of battles and sieges. Sir Charles Oman's *History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages* (2d ed., 1924), although European in scope, devotes disproportionate attention to England's domestic and foreign wars, focusing on tactical analysis. For the Hundred Years' War as a whole, in the mid-twentieth century Alfred H. Burne provided an insightful if somewhat idiosyncratic and battle-focused set of campaign narratives in *The Crécy War* and *The Agincourt War.*

Narratives and Biographies. Early in the twentieth century, John E. Morris's *Welsh Wars of Edward I*, Henry S. Lucas's hefty study *The Low Countries in the Hundred Years War, 1326–1347*, and Richard Ager Newhall's *English Conquest of Normandy, 1416–1424* set a high standard for the writing of analytical-narrative military history based on thorough knowledge of both narrative and documentary sources. At mid-century their work was equaled for the first war of Scottish independence in G. W. S. Barrow's biography of Robert Bruce and for the second war of Scottish independence through 1336 by Ranald Nicholson in *Edward III and the Scots.* More recently Colm McNamee, in accordance with general developments in historiography, has applied more quantitative analysis and attention to economic issues in his study *The Wars of the Bruces*, and has better set the Anglo-Scottish conflict into its broader British-Irish context. Michael Penman stresses the intra-Scottish warfare between the Bruce and Comyn-Balliol factions that was so bound up with the Anglo-Scottish conflict.

The war of Saint-Sardos still awaits comprehensive treatment, although materials have been assembled and published by Pierre Chaplais. But for the Hundred Years' War through 1399, there is now Jonathan Sumption's massive history. Although Sumption shifts the focus from kings at war and armies at war to the nation at war, as well as from the great battles and sieges to the minor ambushes and escalades of garrison warfare, the scale of his enterprise allows

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him to include plenty of traditional military history. Kenneth Fowler's biography of Henry of Grosmont, first Duke of Lancaster, and Richard Barber's biography of the Black Prince devote much attention to warfare, as did their protagonists. Clifford Rogers has written several pieces in the analytical-narrative style. His studies of the campaigns of Thomas Dagworth (1346–1347) and Henry of Grosmont (1345–1358), as well as of the Scottish invasion of England in 1346, distinguish themselves from earlier treatments mainly by incorporating previously unused chronicle material.

Herbert James Hewitt's *The Black Prince's Expedition of 1355–57*, from 1958, was very influential in its emphasis on devastation as the basic character of medieval warfare and in its insistence on the importance of giving the preparations for and aftermath of a campaign as much weight as the marching and fighting in between. Following Hewitt's lead, but with even more detail, more impressive research, and better military judgment, Andrew Ayton and Philip Preston have recently published in their volume on Crécy (1346) one of the most detailed studies ever produced of a medieval campaign. Rogers's *War Cruel and Sharp: English Strategy under Edward III, 1327–1360* is a revisionist work. Whereas the earlier tendency had been to view Edward as a strong battlefield commander but a poor strategist, Rogers argues that Edward was an outstanding strategist and that his military plans were both well aligned with his political aims and consistently oriented at bringing his foes to open battle, he retaining the advantages of the tactical defensive.

Although more focused on diplomacy than on the conduct of warfare, J. J. N. Palmer's *England, France, and Christendom, 1377–99* does describe the English campaigns in France during its period, with a valuable emphasis on the intensity of effort they represented. The late fourteenth and very early fifteenth centuries also involved some of the most intensive Anglo-Scottish warfare of the entire period, as Alastair Macdonald's *Border Bloodshed* stresses. Macdonald sees the Scottish offensives as driven more by rational national policy, and less by private magnates' interests, than earlier analyses had seen. For the English interventions in Iberia in this period, the impressive monograph of P. E. Russell remains unsurpassed. R. R. Davies's *Revolt of Owain Glyn Dŵr* is the book to turn to for the most important warfare of the reign of Henry IV; it can be supplemented with the focused study of Rhidian Griffiths, "Prince Henry's War: Armies, Garrisons, and Supply during the Glyndŵr Rising."

For the resumption of the Hundred Years' War under Henry V, the slim volume of E. F. Jacob is still a good starting point. For more detailed studies of the 1415 Harfleur-Agincourt campaign, including its preparation, conduct, and aftermath, there are now no fewer than three recent books, all of which can be read with profit. Anne Curry's *Agincourt: A New History* is archivally based and makes the revisionist argument that the numerical disparity between the English and French armies at Agincourt was much smaller than usually believed. Michael Jones focuses his study on the role of Henry V's leadership in sustaining the morale of the English in a very dangerous situation. Juliet Barker's more traditional narrative is particularly good on politics and personalities. Rogers has also contributed two smaller studies on this campaign, published in the two volumes of essays on the Hundred Years' War edited by L. J. Andrew Villalon and Donald J. Kagay. The first, analogously to Rogers's studies of Edward III, argues that Henry V was aiming for a battle in 1415 and was wise to do so. The second is the most detailed analysis of the battle of Agincourt itself. For the rest of the conquest and defense of Normandy, one can see, in addition to the monograph of Newhall and the military history of Burne already mentioned, Christopher Allmand's biography of Henry V and his history of Lancastrian Normandy. In addition there are the excellent biographies, with plenty of military detail, of the Duke of Bedford by E. Carleton Williams and of John Talbot, marshal of France for the government of Henry VI, by A. J. Pollard. Nonetheless an updated scholarly study of the military history of the Lancastrian phase of the Hundred Years' War, covering the same ground as Burne's *Agincourt War*, remains a desideratum.

The Wars of the Roses are well covered in a number of excellent narrative works, including Pollard's concise political history and the fuller and more militarily focused books by John Gillingham and

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Anthony Goodman. The narrative in Goodman's work fills only about half the book; the rest is devoted to thematic chapters dealing with recruitment, logistics, and the impact of war on society, among other topics. Although somewhat useful on the battles of the wars (particularly thanks to the numerous maps), Philip Haigh's *Military Campaigns of the Wars of the Roses* is not the equal of Gillingham's or Goodman's works.

The Wars of the Roses are also well treated in the numerous scholarly biographies and regnal histories of the protagonists, most notably Ralph A. Griffiths's of Henry VI. For more focused military narrative, there are two noteworthy books on the battle of Bosworth. Michael Bennett's is a good overview, setting the combat in the broader context of the war and fifteenth-century English society. Although, as E. M. Furgol has pointed out, Michael K. Jones's psychologically oriented analysis of the battle and its protagonists has some serious weaknesses as military history, it nonetheless remains worthy of attention, particularly for its argument about where the battle was actually fought. Jones has also written an excellent shorter treatment of the battle of Verneuil (1424), sometimes called the "second Agincourt," in which the English faced off against a large number of Scots, as well as Frenchmen and Lombards.

For the military history of late medieval Ireland, Katherine Simms's article "Gaelic Warfare in the Middle Ages" is very valuable. It can be supplemented by Cormac O'Cléirigh's "Irish Frontier Warfare: A Fifteenth-Century Case Study."

Thematic Approaches. By their nature, the narrative histories discussed above draw on and synthesize a great deal of more specialized work. The general trend in scholarship relating to late medieval British military history, as in historical writing generally, has been away from narrative work and toward thematic approaches: studies of institutions, structures, social and economic systems, and *mentalités*, rather than the cause and effect behind events. Of course, high-quality works along these lines (particularly institutional studies and works with relevance to constitutional issues) were written well before the middle of the twentieth century, such as *Muster and Review*, the dense and thoroughly researched study of the English military administration in Normandy by Newhall. But it was during and after World War II that these sorts of approaches truly came to the fore.

A milestone in this regard was the debate between M. M. Postan and K. B. McFarlane over the economic and social consequences of the Hundred Years' War, for which A. R. Bridbury serves as something of a capstone. Another early and very important work in this category is Hewitt's *Organization of War under Edward III*, which, characteristic of the new military history of the 1950s and 1960s, is more concerned with the impact of war and of military institutions on society than with the actual fighting. However, Hewitt also offers important insights into the role of devastation in the conduct of war. This was followed up by John Barnie's *War in Medieval Society*, which deals with Englishmen's responses to warfare, including issues of nationalism and chivalry, and later by Philip Morgan's focused regional study of the county of Cheshire, which examines the military community and the linkages among its members.

A related theme is the effect of warfare on English state formation. G. L. Harriss emphasizes the importance of war, and especially war finance, in driving the rise of Parliament to political significance. Richard Kaeuper's very important and wide-ranging book *War, Justice, and Public Order* takes a different tack, arguing that the royal government's focus on warfare distracted it from, and indeed conflicted with, its other principal duty, the maintenance and strengthening of domestic law and order. For Scotland, related issues of how war affected and was affected by monarch-magnate relations are well examined in Michael Brown's study of the Douglas lineage. Although actual warfare has relatively small play in it, Christine Carpenter's study of the English political-constitutional system of the Late Middle Ages and its collapse and reforging in the Wars of the Roses should certainly be of interest to military historians. However, they should be aware (as the author herself makes clear) that Carpenter's work falls on one side of a debate among historians, a debate in which others put more emphasis on long-term underlying frictions, rather than on the crisis caused by Henry VI's incapacity, in causing the wars.

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Another debated issue is the causes of the Hundred Years' War; G. P. Cuttino's 1956 article sums up the discussion. The dynastic aspect of the war—that is, Edward III's claim to the French throne—is now more or less universally discounted as a major cause of the war, although it is recognized as a crucial reason for its enduring character. The still-standing contenders for the primary impetus to war are (1) disputes over the nature and extent of French sovereignty over Guienne, exacerbated, according to Malcolm Vale's *Origins*, by conflicts among local noble lineages, and (2) French support for Scotland against Edward III's efforts to reestablish English suzerainty there, according to James Campbell, Sumption, and Rogers (*War Cruel and Sharp*).

Different interpretations of the cause of the war lead to different evaluations of its diplomacy and the relations between peace negotiations and military operations. In "Anglo-French Peace Negotiations," Rogers challenges some traditional understandings of the three treaties of 1358–1360, and his argument should be compared to the excellent overview in Fowler's edited volume on the Hundred Years' War. Fowler's collection offers an outstanding set of essays covering the war from a wide variety of perspectives. Curry and Michael Hughes and Villalon and Kagay have edited more recent collections of essays that, although not as coherent as Fowler's, provide the reader with a very broad-ranging overview of the types of research now being done on the war and its related conflicts. Pollard is the editor of a comparable collection highlighting recent work on the Wars of the Roses. The study of the Wars of the Roses has also benefited from two monographs focused on the soldier's experience of warfare. These two books—*The Medieval Soldier in the Wars of the Roses*, by A. W. Boardman, and *The Wars of the Roses: The Soldiers' Experience*, by Goodman—could be said to take to the larger issue of military activity the approach pioneered for the battlefield by John Keegan's highly influential chapter on Agincourt in *The Face of Battle*.

A related topic is the study of the medieval soldier's ideas and values regarding the conduct of war. Since the sources allow only limited access to the *mentalité* even of aristocratic soldiers, and virtually none to the minds of common soldiers, this topic can almost be summarized by the term "chivalry." Although broader in chronological and geographic scope than the parameters of this entry, Maurice Keen's books *Chivalry* and *The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages* are seminal in this area and draw much of their material from the Hundred Years' War. For the *cheval* that is so important to *chevalerie*, Ayton's *Knights and Warhorses: Military Service and the English Aristocracy under Edward III* is the key work; it is also important for service terms and the personnel of Edwardian armies. Two Scottish-oriented studies of chivalry should be noted here: Liam O. Purdon and Julian N. Wasserman's "Chivalry and Feudal Obligation in Barbour's *Bruce*," and Katie Stevenson's *Chivalry and Knighthood in Scotland, 1424–1513*. For England, Juliet Vale's study of Edward III and chivalry is valuable. Although it draws more on French than English material, Malcolm Vale's *War and Chivalry* is excellent and apposite.

Among other topics, Michael Vale treats the challenges posed to "chivalric" heavy cavalry as a practical military force by the rise of the archer and the cannon. These have become even more controversial subjects since he wrote in 1981. On archery, by far the best overview is now Matthew Strickland and Robert Hardy's *Great Warbow*, which also provides the best available collection of short narrative analyses of the battles of the period. The authors take somewhat of a middle view regarding the hotly debated question of the power of the English longbow, between the positions of Rogers in "Efficacy"—who sees the longbow as highly lethal—and Kelly DeVries. The significance of the longbow is a component in another debated topic, the question of whether there was a "military revolution" of some sort in late medieval England (and elsewhere). Ayton sees an "Edwardian military revolution" arising mainly from the development of paid retinues, the social militarization of the gentry, and the rise of the mounted archer. Rogers writes of a fourteenth-century "Infantry Revolution," the English strand of which he sees owing as much to the military talents of Edward III and his lieutenants as to social developments or the adoption and

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refinement of the longbow. John Stone nonetheless sees Rogers's arguments as suffering from technological determinism.

The question of a military revolution is used by Michael Prestwich to structure the conclusion of his outstanding survey of English armies and warfare in the Middle Ages. Although its chronological range is broader than the boundaries of this entry, the book draws on the author's exceptional knowledge of and insight into the wars of the three Edwards, as well as on material from the earlier and later Middle Ages. Those seeking up-to-date, concise treatments of military obligation and rewards, recruitment, command, logistics, chivalry, naval developments, and the practicalities of making war in the Middle Ages can do no better than to turn to his book.

Although its center of gravity is the late thirteenth century, Prestwich's much more focused 1972 book *War, Politics, and Finance under Edward I* of course extends into the fourteenth century, and the earlier material serves to set a baseline for understanding later developments. The same could be said of David Simpkin's strong new contribution dealing with the military community and military service among the English aristocracy between 1277 and 1314. Simpkin's use of computerized records of military service in database format for prosopographical analysis clearly reflects the influence of Ayton and Curry, as does Adrian Bell's somewhat similar but narrower study of the English armies of 1387–1388 and the retinues that composed them.

In sum, the military history of late medieval Britain is a vigorous field of scholarly inquiry and writing—so much so that space has required the omission of many admirable works, especially articles, from this entry.

[*See also* Battle, Historiography of; France, *subentry on* Historiography (1328–1483); *and* Hundred Years' War, *subentry on* Causes.]

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Clifford J. Rogers

BROTHERHOOD-IN-ARMS, BROTHERS-IN-ARMS

Chronicles of the period of the Hundred Years' War quite often refer to knights, esquires, and men-at-arms who are said to have been brothers or sworn companions in arms. Such brotherhood was a specifically martial version of adoptive fraternal kinship, based on a sworn covenant binding the parties to it to partnership in the profits and risks of war. The covenant between them could be for life, or simply for a single campaign, or even for a specific planned raid or *chevauchée*. The terms of the covenant might be recorded in a formal document. More often a verbal oath seems to have sufficed to seal the covenant and to carry customary conditions that would be legally enforceable, such as those concerning the equal sharing of spoils. A brotherhood relationship can sometimes be inferred from other indications—even when there is neither direct documentary evidence nor any allusion in the chronicles. For instance, two or three names may appear bracketed together on a pay or muster role. Or, in an example from heraldry, the joint tomb slab of two English knights, William Neville and John Clanvowe, displays on both their

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shields their family arms impaled—with Neville's arms in the dexter and Clanvowe's in the sinister half.

The written agreement to be brothers-in-arms sworn to at Harfleur in July 1421 between two young English esquires, John Winter and Nicholas Molyneux, offers an excellent insight into the sort of material conditions likely to be involved in a covenant of military brotherhood. John and Nicholas agreed that if either were taken as prisoner of war, the other would devote himself to securing his brother's release, contributing if need be to the brother's ransom from his own funds. Reciprocally they agreed to pool all their winnings of war in spoil and ransoms, the cash realized to be deposited in England to constitute a fund for the purchase of landed estates for their mutual benefit. In the event of the death of one party, his companion would be heir to the total of their joint winnings, on condition of making allowance of a sixth for the dower of the dead man's widow and of assuming responsibility for the education of the dead man's children.

What stand out most clearly from this business-like document are the material and financial obligations of brotherhood-in-arms. These were no doubt the principal attraction of the relationship to adventurous young soldiers like John and Nicholas. It is abundantly clear, however—especially from such literary references as those in the romances *Perceforest*, *Tirant le Blanc*, and *Amis and Amiloun*, as well as in Chaucer's *Knight's Tale*—that a good deal more was expected of adoptive brothers in aristocratic and martial circles than a straight business partnership. Chivalrous honor and religiously sanctioned vows committed them to act toward each other "in all ways that full and true brotherhood requires" (*Tirant le Blanc*) and to keep one another's counsel, to guard one another's honor, to stand by one another "to the death if need be" (*Perceforest*).

[*See also* Chivalry *and* Honor.]

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Maurice Keen

BRUGES, SIEGE OF

On 2 March 1127, Charles the Good, Count of Flanders, was assassinated by some of his vassals as he attended mass. Out of this poorly conceived murder arose one of the most meticulously described sieges of the High Middle Ages. By 7 March the conspirators, consisting of a few dozen at most, realizing how unpopular the count's murder had made them, had fled into the count's castle compound in the city. By 9 March a siege had begun, and as word of Charles's murder percolated to other towns, local lords and their men made their way to Bruges. In spite of several assaults through 18 March, some of them well planned, the men in the castle easily held off forces dozens of times larger. The assaults were not always coordinated well, mostly because no one had sufficient authority to take overall command of operations.

On 19 March defenders on the castle walls abandoned their posts to warm themselves. A small group of besiegers managed to open one gate to allow the thousands to pour in. The defenders retreated into the collegiate church of Saint Donatian. The besiegers' momentum wound down as men from Bruges fought with those from Ghent over the count's body, which still lay beyond reach in the gallery of Saint Donatian. Louis VI, King of France, arrived in Bruges on 5 April and slowly consolidated command, although competing factions squabbled over a variety of issues—mainly the disposition of Charles's body—until 11 April. Using siege machines for the first time, between 12 and 14 April the besiegers battered their way into the church and seized the main structure, while the besieged retreated into the church's twin bell towers. On 18 April the king ordered the towers to be undermined, which could have damaged or destroyed the church—something no one desired because of the treasures inside, most of all the count's body. Knowing that they could not escape because

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their food supply had now spoiled, the defenders, twenty-seven to thirty in number, surrendered to the king. Most were executed soon after, some by being thrown off the very walls they had defended so well for weeks. As it turned out, the siege of Bruges was only the opening conflict in the war to decide who would succeed the childless Charles as count of Flanders.

The siege of Bruges stands as a social and military snapshot of the twelfth century. All manner of people participated in it: the people of Bruges, those of surrounding towns like Ghent, local nobles and their retinues, and mercenaries drawn to a rich target and the air of political uncertainty created by the count's death. The siege neatly illustrates the tremendous advantages that the defense enjoyed in the twelfth century. The defenders could no doubt have held the castle walls significantly longer had some of them not neglected their duties. Repeated assaults had failed, and it took siege machines and Louis VI's assumption of overall command to end the siege.

[*See also* Galbert of Bruges; Louis VI; Low Countries, *subentry on* Narrative (855–1300); Siege Warfare, *subentry on* Tactics and Technology; Thielt, Battle of; *and* Urban Defenses.]

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BRUNKEBERG, BATTLE OF

In 1450, the Danish king Christian I (d. 1481) was also named king of Norway, uniting both countries under his rule. Seven years later he assumed the throne of Sweden, offered to him by the church and members of the upper nobility, even though the former imperial marshal Karl Knutsson (Charles VIII; d. 1470) had reigned there as king since 1448. Karl fled into exile in Danzig. The rebellions of Swedish townspeople, farmers, and nobles against Danish dominance restored him to the throne in 1464. Within a year Karl was driven out again by a large bloc of landowning nobles who sided with the Danish-Norwegian crown. With the support of the people and of the more business-oriented segment of the nobility, both of which opposed Danish rule, he returned to power in 1467, remaining until his death in 1470.

The succession fell to Karl's thirty-year-old nephew, Sten Gustafsson Sture (Sten Sture the Elder; 1440–1503), not as king but as an imperial representative. Sten Sture had already acquired military experience and success in the internal Swedish struggle over union with Denmark. He had taken part in a 1464 rebellion against King Christian I and in the victory near Harakar, and in 1467 he had repelled an invasion by the Danish king's army near Örsten in Västergötland. News of Karl's death induced Christian I of Denmark and Norway to try to depose Sten Sture and have himself reconfirmed as king. In August 1471 he appeared with his fleet at Stockholm, landed his troops, and encamped north of the city.

On the morning of 10 October, Sten Sture advanced with his contingent of cavalry and infantry to decide Sweden's independence in battle. King Christian's troops, including a number of his followers from the Swedish nobility, had taken up their position on Brunkeberg, a hill in the modern Stockholm district of Norrmalm. Sten Sture's battle plan involved staggered attacks on the hill from three directions. His troops were to begin with an attack from the west, while on the east side of the hill a division led by his kinsman Nils Bosson Sture was to await the command to advance; in the south the lord of Stockholm Castle, Knut Posse, stood ready.

Sten Sture sent his artillery into the fight first; they were immediately successful against Christian I's troops, tightly positioned on Brunkeberg. The king himself was shot in the face and lost a few teeth. As he was carried wounded from the field, the formation

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loosened, and the first of Sten Sture's troops, storming the hill, hit Christian's soldiers hard. Simultaneously the allied forces under Nils Sture and Knut Posse attacked from the east and south and split the king's army, which fled in disorder. Because the bridges on their route had been destroyed by Sten Sture's men, the Danish troops were unable to reach their ships on the shore. The numbers of dead and wounded on the two sides are not recorded. It is indisputable, however, that the Danish king suffered a serious defeat, establishing Sten Sture's position in Sweden for twenty-five years and preserving the country's independence.

[*See also* Scandinavia, *subentry on* Narrative.]

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Translated from the German by Johanna M. Baboukis

BRUNO OF MAGDEBURG

(d. after 1082), author of *Liber de Bello Saxonico* (Book on the Saxon War), a history of the conflicts of the German king and Holy Roman emperor Henry IV with the Saxons, written from a distinctly anti-imperial and pro-Saxon view. Bruno's life is known only through his work. Although his ecclesiastical career began under Archbishop Werner of Magdeburg (1063–1078), Bruno wrote sometime between 1081 and 1093 while serving Bishop Werner of Merseburg, to whom his work is dedicated. The verbatim use of official letters and documents suggests that Bruno held administrative posts that gave him access to such, but attempts to identify Bruno with specific individuals who held such offices remain speculative.

After reviewing Henry's early reign, Bruno covers in detail the Saxon rebellion of 1073 and the ensuing conflict, through the elections of the anti-kings Rudolf of Rheinfelden (1077) and Hermann of Salm (1081). Despite quoting many sources at length, Bruno is an unrelenting partisan for his Saxon compatriots, and his reportage must be filtered for ideological bias at every point.

Bruno describes important military engagements at the Harzburg (1073), at Lüneburg (1073), at the Unstrut (1076), at Mellrichstadt (1078), at Flarchheim (1080), and on the Elster (1080). Like many medieval writers, he does not provide sufficient detail to reconstruct the course of combat without the help of other sources. Instead Bruno concentrates on describing episodes such as the bravery of the Saxons after being surprised at the Unstrut, or the death of Bishop Werner of Magdeburg at Mellrichstadt. Despite these shortcomings, the *Saxon War* remains one of the most important sources for the wars of Henry IV.

[*See also* Elster, Battle of; Henry IV; Mellrichstadt, Battle of; *and* Unstrut, Battle at the.]

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BRUSA, SIEGE OF

Brusa (Prusa, Prousa; modern Bursa, Turkey) was the principal city and fortress of Byzantine Bithynia, in northwestern Asia Minor. The first Palaiologan emperor, Michael VIII (r. 1259–1282), had neglected

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his Asian territories, and only late in his reign did he attempt to bolster their defenses against mounting Turkish depredation. His son, Andronikos II (r. 1282–1328), renewed such efforts with limited effect. Meanwhile Osman (r. 1299–1326), the founder of the Ottoman (or Osmanli) dynasty, began building a Turkish principality at the expense of Byzantine territory. On 27 July 1302, Osman's forces defeated Byzantine troops at Bapheus, near Nikomedeia, opening Bithynia to Turkish raids and conquest and leaving fortified major cities such as Brusa isolated, out of mutual contact, and with little hope of relief from the weakened Byzantine government in Constantinople.

Recognizing the importance of Brusa, Osman attacked and besieged it in 1317, but the city resisted successfully. Nevertheless he signaled his commitment by building several new fortresses to ring the city and keep it, if not blockaded, at least seriously encumbered. The Byzantine central government became distracted by a struggle for the throne between Andronikos II and his grandson; the latter made plans for military action in Bithynia that were never carried out. By the mid-1320s Osman's son, Orhan, began a more determined siege of Brusa. Faced by starvation and with no hope of relief, Brusa surrendered on 6 April 1326. This pivotal achievement was Orhan's last gift to his father, who died shortly thereafter. Brusa became the new Ottoman capital and dynastic holy city, while Orhan (r. 1326–1362) furthered Ottoman expansionism and conquest, definitively eliminating any Byzantine control in Asia Minor.

[*See also* Ottoman Armies and Military Methods.]

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BRUSTEM, BATTLE OF

Following the destruction of Dinant in 1466, another peace treaty, the Treaty of Oleye, was arranged between Burgundy and Liège. Charles the Bold then returned to Dijon for the death of his father and his elevation to the dukedom, but as soon as he had completed this he took his armies again into the prince-bishopric of Liège, where they besieged the rebellious towns of Huy and Sint-Truiden. In response Liège put its own army into the field. Charles broke off the sieges and marched to intercept the Liège army. On 28 October 1467 the battle of Brustem was fought. There are two eyewitness accounts of the battle: one written by a Burgundian military leader, Jean de Haynin, and a second by one of the local magistrates on behalf of the duke; substantial accounts also appear in numerous contemporary chronicles.

Both armies arrived on the battlefield the night before the battle and were able to arrange their formations without hindrance from their opponents. A fairly thick marsh separated the two armies. The next morning, fire from both sides' gunpowder artillery began the conflict, although to little effect, most shots firing over the heads of the opposing lines. Finally, in the afternoon, Charles the Bold decided to move his soldiers into the battle: first his archers—including English longbowmen lent him by his uncle, Edward IV—and then his men-at-arms. The task of the lighter archers, it seems, was to find a path through the marsh so that their cavalry could effectively charge the Liège army. They were successful, but the rebels were able to repulse the cavalry charge. The Burgundians retreated to the small town of Brustem to regroup.

The Liège artillery renewed its bombardment, this time targeting Brustem. The Burgundian archers responded to this fire, first with their arrows and then with a charge at the Liège army. Other troops followed, and soon the more numerous Burgundian army began to gain the field. A rebel cavalry countercharge failed, and the Liège troops fled. By nightfall as many as three thousand to four thousand Liège soldiers had been killed, and all their gunpowder weapons, carts, tents, and provisions were captured by the Burgundians.

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There was no peace treaty following this battle. Charles the Bold now had an unhindered path to Liège, the capital of the rebellion.

[*See also* Charles the Bold; Dinant, Siege of; France, *subentries on* Narrative (1328–1483) *and* Sources (1328–1483); Liège, Siege of; Low Countries, *subentries on* Narrative (1300–1479) *and* Sources (1300–1479); *and* Siege Warfare, *subentry on* Tactics and Technology.]

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Kelly DeVries

BRYENNIOS, NIKEPHOROS

(d. after 1095), Byzantine general and rebel active in the eleventh century. Bryennios held the senior court titles of *magistros* and *proedros*. His family was prominent in Adrianople.

Bryennios participated in the battle of Mantzikert in 1071 as the commander of Romanos Diogenes's left wing. He was appointed *doux* of Bulgaria around 1074 by Emperor Michael VII Doukas (who ruled until 1078). Bryennios was subsequently made the governor of Dyrrachium (Durrës), where he worked to assert the Byzantine presence on the Adriatic coast.

In November 1077, Bryennios led a revolt against Michael VII. He was acclaimed emperor first in Trajanopolis and then in Adrianople. He gave his brother John the court title *kouropalates*, usually reserved for the imperial family, and sent him to attack Constantinople. The poor conduct of John's troops during the siege seems to have lost Bryennios support in the capital. Michael VII released Roussel de Bailleul, the former rebel, from prison in order to fight John. The future emperor Alexios I Komnenos also took part in the defense of Constantinople. John withdrew the siege in January 1078.

In the spring of 1078 the eastern general Nikephoros III Botaneiates also revolted. Botaneiates was acclaimed emperor in Constantinople in early April. Botaneiates offered Bryennios the title of caesar, normally designating the intended imperial successor, in return for ending his rebellion. Bryennios refused the terms and continued his rebellion. Botaneiates then sent Alexios in pursuit of Bryennios. When Alexios defeated him at the battle of Calavryta, Bryennios was blinded but allowed to retain all of his estates. Then in 1087, when Alexios, now emperor, attacked the Pechenegs (Patzinaks) on their own territory at Dristra, he acted against the advice of Bryennios. In 1094–1095, Alexios entrusted Bryennios with the defense of Adrianople against the Cumans, despite his blindness.

[*See also* Alexios I Komnenos; Calavryta, Battle of; Mantzikert, Battle of; Nikephoros III Botaneiates; *and* Patzinaks.]

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BULGNÉVILLE, BATTLE OF

The battle of Bulgnéville (2 July 1431) was one of the major episodes in the war of succession of Lorraine after the death of Duke Charles II, a struggle between his son-in-law, René of Anjou, Duke of Bar, and his nephew, Antoine of Lorraine, Count of Vaudémont. But this conflict also fell into the framework of the war between the French and the English because René of Anjou was the brother-in-law of King Charles VII of France, whereas the Count of Vaudémont was an ally of the English and Burgundians. Hence at Bulgnéville, Duke René had at his side one of the most experienced French captains, Arnaud-Guilhem, Lord of Barbazan, while the Count of

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Vaudémont looked to the Marshal of Burgundy, Antoine de Toulongeon, Lord of Traves.

At the opening of the campaign René of Anjou laid siege to the strong town of Vaudémont, which was defended by a small garrison. The Count of Vaudémont's army, having left the Langres region, entered the Duke of Bar's lands, intending to conduct a *bonne rèse* (campaign of destruction) in order to force René to lift his siege and join battle in the open countryside. The maneuver succeeded, and the Duke of Bar's troops abandoned their operation to oppose the enemy's advance.

The battle took place on 2 July 1431, west of the little town of Bulgnéville. The troops of the Count of Vaudémont and the Marshal of Burgundy were composed of Burgundian warriors with the addition of six hundred English fighters, the majority being archers, who had come from the Bassigny garrisons and were commanded by Thomas Gargrave and John Dodham. The total strength of this army was approximately four thousand combatants, of whom probably half were "shooters" (archers and crossbowmen). The Marshal of Burgundy also had several cannons and culverins; it is not known how many, but it is known that they were consigned to Jean Maréchal, the Duke of Burgundy's gunner.

Warned of the enemy's approach, the marshal, assisted by Gargrave, decided to adopt a battle plan modeled on English tactics: he arranged his troops facing north, on slightly elevated ground, with a small stream behind them; the men-at-arms occupied the center of the line, while the archers were placed on the two flanks and in front, along with the artillery pieces. Finally, the rear was protected by a line of wagons.

Arriving on the spot to find the enemy already in battle formation, René of Anjou's army formed facing south. It had about six thousand cavalry, in particular men-at-arms and more lightly armed *valets d'armes*, including both feudal contingents from Lorraine and Bar and the companies of hired captains, as well as fifteen hundred infantry from the city militias. René of Anjou, assisted by the Lord of Barbazan, adopted a plan of attack inspired by the tactics that the French had been trying to use ever since Poitiers and Agincourt: the army was split into three divisions in echelon, with a vanguard on the right flank, a main battalion in the center—both composed of foot soldiers—and a mounted rear guard of men-at-arms and *valets d'armes* on the left flank, whose task was to execute a turning movement to strike the opposing line in its right flank and its rear.

The battle began at 11:00 A.M. with a frontal attack led by René of Anjou. The firing of the culverins, along with the shooting of the massed archers and crossbowmen of the Anglo-Burgundian army, weakened the momentum of the attackers, whose right flank (the vanguard), commanded by the Lord of Barbazan, nonetheless managed to reach the opposing line. But this assault was repulsed and Barbazan was killed in action. This setback, accompanied as it was by the withdrawal of the cavalry on the left flank, who retreated without fighting, marked the turning point of the battle. The Marshal of Burgundy and the Count of Vaudémont took advantage of the enemy's disarray to lead a countercharge against its main division. After two hours of combat the forces of Lorraine and Bar were routed and pursued by the Burgundians and the English, who remounted for the chase. René of Anjou was taken prisoner, and the Burgundians claimed that their opponents had lost three thousand to four thousand men, killed or taken prisoner. The number of dead alone appears to have been approximately two thousand, or more than one-quarter of those engaged. The victors lost only about forty men.

[*See also* Agincourt, Battle of; Charles VII of France; Hundred Years' War; *and* Poitiers, Battle of (1356).]

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BUREAU BROTHERS

Jean Bureau (c. 1390–1463) and Gaspard Bureau (c. 1393–1469), developers of French artillery. Born in the Champagne province of France, Jean and Gaspard Bureau were sons of Simon Bureau, a local lawyer. Jean moved to Paris, where he worked as a lawyer from 1420 to 1434, during the English occupation; in 1424 he offered his services to Charles VII, the French king. Despite their apparent lack of military experience, both Jean and Gaspard quickly established themselves as experts in the procurement and use of a centralized, royally controlled artillery train.

By 1443, Jean had been appointed treasurer of France, and Gaspard held the title of Master of Artillery. The Bureau brothers' fame does not rest on their administrative skills, however, but rather on Jean's skillful use of guns in siege warfare between 1437 and 1453. (A centralized system for the use of gunpowder weaponry had existed in England, based at the Tower of London, since the middle of the fourteenth century.) Jean was first present at the successful siege of Montereau in 1437; he was also at Meaux (1439), Saint-Germain-en-Laye (1440), and Pontoise (1441). During Charles VII's 1449–1450 campaign to reduce the English fortresses in Normandy, the brothers' reputation became immortalized. The French guns battered Bayeux, Caen, Rouen, and Cherbourg into submission. In 1451, Charles VII turned his attention to Gascony, and Bordeaux fell in June. Jean was appointed the town's new mayor, but in October 1452 the English recaptured the town. In July 1452 the English, commanded by John Talbot, Earl of Shrewsbury, attempted to relieve the French siege of the town of Castillon. Jean Bureau organized the defense of the French camp, turning its guns on Talbot's army and inflicting the final, decisive defeat of the Hundred Years' War.

Contemporary French observers had little doubt as to the contribution of the Bureau brothers to Charles VII's success. Gilles le Bouvier, the Berry Herald, praised the royal artillery train's role, stating:

> And of this artillery the leaders and managers were sir Jehan Bureau . . . and Jaspart Bureau, his brother . . . who during the said war underwent great perils and pains. It was a wonderful thing to see the bulwarks, approaches, ditches, trenches, and mines which these said persons made before all the castles and towns which were besieged during this war. ("Le Recouvrement de Normendie," translated in Stevenson, ed., pp. 373–374)

Recent research has questioned the impact of any technological developments made during the Bureau brothers' influence. New "corned" powder was introduced only in 1453, as was cast-iron shot. The brothers' success instead probably rested on their skill in administration, and Jean in particular appears to have been adept in field fortifications and the siting of artillery pieces. After the end of the war, both brothers—especially Jean, who was ennobled as Lord of Montglat—continued to enjoy high favor at the Valois court. A measure of their standing is that both were retained by the new king, Louis XI, which was unusual.

[*See also* Artillery; Castillon, Siege and Battle of; France, *subentry on* Narrative (1328–1483); Hundred Years' War; *and* Siege Warfare, *subentry on* Tactics and Technology.]

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BURGDORF, SIEGE OF

The siege of Burgdorf (1383–1384) was an episode of the so-called war of Kyburg or Burgdorf (in present-day Switzerland), concerning the inheritance of the last Count of Nidau, Rudolf IV (1336–1375).

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Many powerful people were interested in the count's estate, spread between Erlach and Olten: the nobles of Neuenburg, Tierstein-Farnsburg, and Neu-Kyburg, as well as the town of Solothurn. Besides these parties, the immediate competitors were the town of Bern and the nobility of Habsburg Austria.

Count Rudolf II of Kyburg's failed attack on Solothurn on 11 November 1382 gave the town of Bern, which was allied to Solothurn, reason to go to war against the Kyburgs. They first targeted Kyburg vassals in the Emmental and Oberaargau, besieging and capturing several castles. At the end of March 1383 the Bernese attacked Burgdorf, the center of the Kyburg administration. The besieging troops comprised soldiers from Bern and Solothurn, supported by soldiers from Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden, Lucerne, Zurich, Savoy, and Neuenburg—a total of about six thousand men. They fought with catapults and—for the first time in Switzerland—with cannons. Under the leadership of Berthold I of Kyburg the town defended itself successfully during the forty-five-day siege. On 21 April 1383 the town of Bern and the citizens of Burgdorf confirmed an armistice, intended to strip the counts of Kyburg of their power in Burgdorf, but this attempt failed. The siege was broken and the subsequent guerrilla warfare was unsuccessful. The enormous cost of war and civil unrest in the town of Bern led the Bernese council to end the campaign. Peace negotiations of the Swiss Confederation were more successful. On 5 April 1384, Bern acquired the towns of Burgdorf and Thun for the immense sum of 37,800 florins. On 7 April 1384 the war finally ended with the conclusion of a peace and the decline of the counts of Kyburg.

[*See also* Switzerland, *subentry on* Narrative.]

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BURGHAL HIDAGE

The Burghal Hidage marks an important milestone in the development of military defenses in early medieval England. It is a list of thirty-three strongholds (*byrg* or *burga*; singular *burh* or *burg*), each of which is assigned a quantity of "hides" (units of land, each sufficient for a single family) that were to support it. The document exists in seven manuscript versions.

The systematic organization of such strongholds is believed to have begun with King Alfred of Wessex (r. 871–899), who borrowed the idea from Carolingian practice. The core areas of Wessex and the Channel coast were dominated by these military constructions, some sited at major transport junctions and others in existing fortifications. Alfred's son, Edward the Elder, extended the system into the eastern counties and Midlands during his partial reconquest of the Danelaw. The Burghal Hidage does not mention London but does include Southwark, on the opposite bank of the Thames. London was recaptured by Alfred's forces in 879; this part of the list may therefore represent the situation when the south bank of the Thames was under Wessex's control but London itself was not. But the inclusion of Warwick in the Midlands suggests that the full list dates to Edward's reign.

The hidage is not an arbitrary measurement but relates to the size of the *burh*'s garrison and the resources available to it: one hide contributes for one man and four feet of perimeter. Where it has been possible to match surviving walls to the hidage record, the results have shown the document to be accurate. For example, Winchester's 2,400 hides equate to 3,300 yards, and the Roman wall is 3,317 yards long.

Some of the larger strongholds had strong complements: Winchester, Warwick, and Wallingford each had an assessment of 2,400 hides; Bath and Sashes were middle-range towns with 1,000 hides each. The smallest is Lyng with just 100 hides. The assessments are nominal: Winchester probably did not house a force of 2,400 armed men for its defense, but it could draw on a tax base of that size.

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Most of the *burh* sites later became thriving towns, in part because of the decision to assign to them a governmental and economic function: trade could be legally conducted only in the presence of a *gerefa* (reeve), who was based in a *burh*. (Some places named as *burh* sites were temporary because of changing needs in the process of consolidation.) Since we know that Alfred's forces were divided into garrisons and campaign forces, garrisons were probably around half the troops available to the king; being based in the *burh*, the garrison could react quickly to any threat without the need to send a summons to war. The official hidage assessment would have allowed the reeve of the *burh* to draw on local resources to support the fortification and its troops: the Burghal Hidage was thus a record of the means to gather tax from those who benefited from the protection offered.

[*See also* Britain, *subentry or* Sources (500–1000), *and Burh*.]

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BURH

The word *burh* has a long history in English, denoting a high place, an elevated settlement, or a stronghold, but its technical use as a military term stems from the systematic establishment and refurbishment of such sites across southern England by Alfred of Wessex in the later ninth century in response to the threat of raiding by Vikings. The process of *burh* construction seems to have been a priority of Alfred's and may have begun during the short-lived peace after the battle of Edington in 878. A tenth-century document, the Burghal Hidage, records the names of thirty-three of these strongholds and their fiscal resources; many of them are still important towns today.

Excavation shows that *burh* construction was often a turf-faced earthen rampart strengthened and consolidated with timber revetments and surmounted by a wooden walled platform. Natural terrain features and existing Roman structures were used wherever possible. Outer ditches are evident at some sites, the excavated earth from which presumably formed the inner bank, and those that remained in use for a long time were eventually refortified with dressed stone facings for the ramparts. Palisades (rows of sharpened stakes driven into the ground) may also have been used, but there does not appear to be a uniform design, so details of the defenses may have been left to individual commanders.

The defensive capabilities of Anglo-Saxon *burh* fortifications must have been considerable: they were able to repel attacking forces, such as the Viking assault on Maldon, Essex, in 991, which forced the attackers to remain outside the town on Northey Island. With the ramparts manned by determined, well-equipped defenders using throwing spears, slings, and bows (all shown on the Bayeux Tapestry), a frontal assault would be costly. Warfare was more often conducted in the open field, and severe losses could be sustained in retreat to a defended site. Protracted siege warfare seems not to have been to the taste of Anglo-Saxon or Viking armies, but Anglo-Saxon kings were certainly able to use temporary earthwork defenses to deny river passage to a Viking fleet (e.g., Hertford in 911–912) and to construct double-*burh* fortifications—that is, on both banks of a river—that could act in mutual defense.

The importance of the *burh* sites was that they enabled Alfred and his successors to establish a coordinated defensive response to the threat of raiding and invasion. Alfred's constructions were centered

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on the heartlands of Wessex and the Channel coast; his son, Edward the Elder, extended the system into East Anglia and the Midlands. Serving economic and political functions, as well as a military role, the burghal system proved an effective countermeasure to fast-moving raiders intent on plunder and also to armies of conquest. Each *burh* was both a refuge from attack and a platform from which counterattacks could be launched. In the face of Viking invasions, each *burh* was effectively an island of Anglo-Saxon royal power in uncertain waters.

By the later tenth century the focus of activity switched to economic and governmental functions—many a *burh* housed mints and courts of law—and the role of the *burh* as a mainly military installation dwindled.

[*See also* Britain, *subentry on* Narrative (500–1000), *and* Burghal Hidage.]

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BURRIANA, SIEGE OF

Burriana was located near the Mediterranean shore on the road leading to Muslim-controlled Valencia. When Jaime I of Aragon (r. 1213–1276) embarked on his next reconquest campaign after conquering the Balearics, he quickly identified Burriana as a target because it would provide him with a strategically located point—a place about two days from Valencia—at which to receive supplies from Catalonia and from which to launch further operations. In 1232, as he fanned the enthusiasm for the campaign, Pope Gregory IX (r. 1227–1241) declared it a crusade, and the *cortes* of Aragon and Catalonia approved financial support for it.

When Jaime I summoned his nobles, however, the response was not as wholehearted as he desired. Even so, his host was supplemented by Aragonese and Catalan nobles, local town militias, and the orders of the Hospital and the Temple. He then commenced his march into enemy territory by conducting damaging raids through the countryside. By mid-May 1233 his forces laid siege to Burriana, establishing the royal encampments between the city and the shore. During the first few days the garrison attempted to break the encirclement by periodically rushing out to raid the Christian supply depot. According to Jaime's *Libre dels feyts* (Book of Deeds), however, these forays were conducted by no more than seven horsemen and one hundred infantry.

Jaime followed well-established strategy and tactics of siege warfare. The Christians cut off all access to the city, and with two siege engines, a *fonèvol* (trebuchet) and a mangonel, submitted the city walls to a constant barrage. After discussing the idea with his war council, Jaime ordered that a siege tower be built and then pushed toward Burriana's walls. Despite warnings that it would be vulnerable to Muslim artillery fire, the besiegers pressed on, only to have the tower repeatedly stuck well short of the walls. Not until the next day did Jaime order the structure to be pulled out of range; by then, however, it was too damaged to serve its original purpose. Jaime's anger did not prevent him from having dinner within the tower and bringing guests to honor them or to discuss important issues. At this point the tactics switched to mining the walls and keeping the city under constant artillery fire.

As the siege continued, the difficulties mounted for both sides. Within Burriana the lack of supplies and constant attacks sapped the defenders' resistance.

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Shortages also took their toll in Jaime's camp. For example, to prevent two galleys from departing and leaving him vulnerable to Muslim attack from the sea, the king resorted to using the resources of the masters of the Hospital and the Temple as assurance for a future payment to the shipowners of sixty thousand sous. Later on he had to deal with dissension within his ranks. A series of barons met secretly with the Muslim ruler of Valencia and then carried a peace offer for the Aragonese king. The nobles in question told Jaime that if he lifted the siege, the Valencian emir was prepared to give him a large sum of money. Jaime, fearing that failing before such a small town would severely damage his reputation, chose to continue and rallied most of his forces to remain steadfast.

The Christians now gradually crept closer to the city. The garrison tried several times to rush out at night to set fire to the Aragonese advance structures but was repulsed. Jaime then ordered a new attempt to take Burriana by storm. The Christians attacked from both their camps and their advance positions, targeting a tower that had been severely damaged by artillery. The townsmen resisted bitterly, raining crossbow fire and rocks on the invaders and engaging in hand-to-hand combat with some of the attackers. Although the attack was repelled, the Muslims had reached their breaking point. On the next day they sent an embassy that negotiated for some time before surrendering. Seeing that Jaime was having none of it, they agreed to hand over Burriana in return for permission to leave with whatever they could carry and a promise of safe passage. The king, knowing that he might face problems keeping his armed forces together, accepted and took the city. He then left two nobles, Don Blasco and Don Exemen, to defend it. With this victory Jaime also received several neighboring towns and fortifications. As such he secured several strategically important positions that set the stage for the conquest of Valencia.

[*See also* Iberia, *subentry on* Narrative (1100–1300); Jaime I; Siege Warfare, *subentry on* Tactics and Technology; *and* Valencia, Siege of (1238).]

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BUSSONE, FRANCESCO

(c. 1385–1432), condottiere and Count of Carmagnola. Francesco Bussone, often called Carmagnola, was one of the most distinguished condottieri in Italy in the early fifteenth century, serving primarily in the armies of Milan and Venice. He is perhaps most famous, however, for his tempestuous relations with both employers: the Duke of Milan sought to have him poisoned, and Venice ultimately executed him on charges of treason.

Hailing from rural (if not peasant) stock, as a young soldier Francesco served Facino Cane, the influential commander of Milanese forces during the reign of Giovanni Maria Visconti (r. 1402–1412). Brave, ambitious, and rugged, Francesco stood out to Facino early on as particularly promising, and upon Facino's death in 1412, Francesco became the new duke Filippo Maria's most successful military commander. Francesco's fame as a condottiere was secured in a series of nearly uninterrupted campaigns between 1412 and 1422, during which Francesco reclaimed for Filippo Maria (r. 1412–1447) the territories of the duchy lost during Giovanni Maria's reign, town by town and castle by castle. At Arbedo in 1422, Carmagnola claimed one of the few victories in the fifteenth century of an Italian army against Swiss infantry: he managed to surround the Swiss pike squares with dismounted cavalry.

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During these years of success Carmagnola demonstrated acuity both in lengthy, large-scale sieges of fortresses and towns and also in rapid maneuver in open warfare. Carmagnola was rewarded handsomely by the duke, receiving numerous properties in the duchy, the title of Count of Castelnuovo, and marriage into the Visconti family. Still, there never existed much trust between the talented captain and the neurotic duke, who soon became wary of his soldier's waxing profile.

By 1425 the relationship with Filippo Maria was irretrievably broken, and Carmagnola made his way secretly to Venice, where he was warmly welcomed by the doge Francesco Foscari. Carmagnola soon became the captain-general of a new anti-Milanese alliance, formed by Venice and Florence in February 1426.

Once in Venetian service, Carmagnola, thus far known for his energetic and decisive campaigning, became associated with inertia and conservatism; now Carmagnola generally chose to avoid risk. He enjoyed some notable successes in Venetian employ, taking Brescia in a siege in 1426 and accomplishing a comprehensive defeat of Milanese forces under Francesco Sforza at Maclodio, between Lodi and Brescia, in October 1427. In fact his tenure as Venetian commander was marked by running disputes related to strategy, the deployment of the Venetian army in the summer and winter months, and the Venetian government's insistence that it attach inspectors to Carmagnola's army in the field. Carmagnola had been thrown from his horse during maneuvers in 1426, and thereafter he suffered from recurring pain and dizziness. His ailments meant that Carmagnola was often absent from the front, and this fed Venetian suspicions of their commander's dedication to aggressive action against Venice's enemies.

By 1431 the Venetian government had decided that it had had enough. The campaign that year was a disaster, capped by Carmagnola's failure to support on land an attack on Cremona in the spring by a Venetian flotilla. After Carmagnola spent several months encamped outside Cremona without taking any meaningful military action, the Venetian government decided to act. In March 1432 he was called back to Venice and arrested in the Doge's Palace (Palazzo Ducale), and on 5 May he was convicted of treason. He was decapitated that same day. The question of his guilt is unclear, although Carmagnola did maintain a running correspondence with Filippo Maria Visconti. It seems likely that Venice was worried that Carmagnola's expressed desire to acquire a state of his own might make him willing to betray Venice to achieve his goal.

[*See also* Arbedo, Battle of; Brescia, Siege of (1426); Cane, Facino; *and* Condottieri.]

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BYZANTINE ATTITUDES TOWARD WAR

Byzantium has been characterized as a "reluctant warrior," but there was no single, immutable attitude to war in the empire's thousand-year history. It is perhaps more useful, if equally incorrect, to write of two competing visions: one championed by those who would fight to defend the Christian empire, and a second championed by those who presided over its church. The former group included many emperors, most generals, and a good number of the many thousands who served in the imperial army between the reign of Constantine I (r. 306–337) and that of Constantine XI (r. 1449–1453). The latter group was dominated by clerics, who adhered more consistently to the New Testament's "love command" presented in Christ's Sermon on the Mount (Matthew 5:38–45). More widely reported by the

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evangelists is Christ's aversion to the sword, of which his assertion that "all who take the sword shall perish by the sword" is emblematic, foreshadowed by the prophecy in Isaiah (2:2–4) that at the end of days, "He shall judge among the nations, and shall rebuke many people: and they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning-hooks: nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more."

A coherent pacifist ethic cannot be identified in the New Testament because Jesus never addressed the matters of military service or killing in war. Consequently emperors and generals might point to the militant language frequently employed in the New Testament, where Christians are increasingly urged to "fight the good fight" (1 Timothy 1:18). Saint Paul was particularly fond of military metaphors and referred to missionaries like himself as *milites christi* (soldiers of Christ). Paul compared his service to that of an army officer. He urged the Thessalonians to gird themselves with the breastplate of faith and love and the helmet of salvation, the Corinthians to don the armor of righteousness, and the Ephesians, having girt their loins with truth, to add to these the shield of faith and "the sword of the Spirit, which is the Word of God."

It was rather common for Byzantine authors to employ military language that echoed Scripture. This cannot be taken as an endorsement of warfare, but it does appear to reflect the ubiquity of strife, and of soldiers, in the world that the authors occupied. Many looked forward to a great military triumph of Christ at the end of time, as foretold in Revelation, where Christ does not turn the other cheek, but rather comes in majesty to avenge wrongdoing, seated on a white horse, "just in judgment and just in war," a sword projecting from his mouth to smite the nations: "For he it is who shall rule them with an iron rod and tread the winepress of the wrath and retribution of God" (19:15).

Clerics who were expected to minister to those who fought and killed in war were apt to cite Basil of Caesarea (Saint Basil the Great), whose thirteenth canon translates thus: "Our fathers did not reckon killings in wars to be among murders, it seems to me, giving pardon to those who defended on behalf of chastity and piety, but perhaps it is to be well advised that those whose hands are not clean be prohibited from communion alone for three years." Basil considered killing in war to be sinful, but to deserve only one-tenth the penance demanded for murder. This concept was employed by Patriarch Polyeuktos, who in the 960s denied a request by Emperor Nikephoros II Phokas (r. 963–969) to have troops killed in battle against the Arabs recognized as martyrs.

In the seventh century, if we believe the words of George of Pisidia preserved by Theophanes the Confessor, Herakleios (r. 610–641) had promised the status of martyr to his troops without seeking clerical sanction. Perhaps he was more confident than Nikephoros II in his status as the new David, both emperor and priest. In 740, between Herakleios's wars and Theophanes's account of them, the issue of military martyrdom arose again. According to Dionysios of Tell-Mahre, in an account preserved only in a later account by Michael the Syrian but corroborated in the anonymous Syriac *Chronicle of 1234*, when the Arab caliph Hisham ibn Abd al-Malik killed Byzantine prisoners of war, "the question arose of whether or not they should be recognized as martyrs." The testimony of the *Chronicle of 811*, which recounts the slaughter by the Bulgarians of a Byzantine army and their emperor Nikephoros I, suggests that a century later a distinction was being drawn between those who died in battle (who were not considered martyrs) and those who died as captives of war (who might be).

Leo VI (r. 886–912) held the common belief that the devil stirred man to war, and that his natural state was to be at peace. But when war was necessary, it was the emperor's duty to pursue it, as commander in chief of the armed forces. Christ himself was the ultimate victor, who had triumphed over death and left behind the relics of his Passion as sources of power for those who followed his path. In his *Taktika*, Leo recommended that the Byzantines emulate the Arabs, who assembled for war voluntarily and collectively, for all members of society shared in the expenses—the rich supplying the fighting men with arms and equipment—and hence also shared in the

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spiritual rewards of warfare. Moreover (in 14.35), he noted that at the burial of "those who die in war," they will be "perpetually honored and blessed because they did not esteem their own lives above their faith and their brothers." In effect Leo was calling for a special liturgy for those who died in war to ensure their special status as "perpetually blessed." This appears to have come about before the tenth century, when such religious services were performed, only a few of which have been preserved.

The clerical view of warfare appears to have triumphed from the eleventh century, and views hardened through the twelfth century as Byzantines confronted increasingly bellicose westerners. Anna Komnene (daughter of Alexios I) sets out the Byzantine case against the crusaders, drawing particular attention to the participation of clergy in war, which was deemed repugnant. For Byzantines, the phrase "monks of war" remained oxymoronic. But indulgences were offered to those who fought or died in righteous battle by the patriarch of Constantinople Michael Autoreianos (r. 1208–1214), although this reflected the Western influences that prevailed during his pontificate following the sack of Constantinople by the Fourth Crusade.

[*See also* Christianity; Clergy, Roles in Warfare of; Herakleios; Leo VI; *and* Nikephoros II Phokas.]

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BYZANTINE EMPIRE

[*This entry contains eleven subentries, on Byzantine sources from 500–900, 900–1204, and 1204–1453; an overview of Byzantine military history from 500–900, 900–1204, and 1204–1453; on Byzantine historiography from 500–900, 900–1204, and 1204–1453; on Byzantine military ranks; and on Byzantine regiments.*]

Sources (500–900)

The range of sources of information for the study of Byzantine warfare is broad, partly because few

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sources deal exclusively with that subject, with the result that historians must cull their information from all the available material. The information may even come from theological texts or hagiography, which occasionally throw light, even if obliquely or obscurely, on warfare and military matters. Byzantine history is complicated by the multiethnic and multilingual basis of its culture: even though Greek had become by the early seventh century the dominant language of state and administration, other languages—in particular, Latin and its medieval successors in Italy and substantial areas of the Balkans and Danube plain, along with Armenian in the eastern Anatolian regions—continued to play a significant role. In Syria and the regions to the south, Semitic languages—in particular, Syriac—continued to play an important role or, like Arabic from the seventh century, to develop in importance. Other languages, such as Georgian in the Caucasus and Coptic in Egypt, also played a role and provide important sources. And as time passed, new languages came to be relevant and important: the various Slav languages in the Balkans, for example, and Turkic languages both in the Eurasian steppe zone and in the Middle East and Asia Minor after the tenth century. Each language represents a specialist field of research and expertise.

The sources can be divided notionally into two very crude categories: written, and nonwritten or material. Written sources and material sources overlap, however, in many instances—lead seals and inscriptions count as both, for example—so that this distinction cannot serve on the whole as a subdisciplinary marker. At the same time written sources can be further broken down into literary and nonliterary, or perhaps "less" literary. Vast amounts of written documentation from archival sources—tax documents, lists of conciliar signatories and episcopal sees, wills, grants of freedom from taxation, and so forth—can hardly be classed as "literary" in the same way that hagiographies, histories, letters, legal documents, and both imperial and church legislation can be, yet at the same time there are substantial variations in style and register within all these categories, and each has now been the subject of detailed study and careful analysis over several generations. Archaeology, landscape survey, ceramic analysis, architecture and architectural history, art history, the study of minor objects—whether of metal, precious stones, ivory, or other materials—and other specialist areas all represent another aspect of the primary sources and can again be subdivided into many subsets, each with its own methodological and theoretical underpinnings, whether made explicit in published research and discussion or not.

The relative number, value, and accessibility of the sources depend on the period or subperiod in question. There is a marked dearth of straightforward, traditional historiography for much of the seventh through later eighth centuries; a dramatic increase and flowering of hagiographical literature from the sixth through eleventh centuries (with a subsequent tailing off); an enormous increase in the number of available private letters and collections of letters after the ninth century, an increase that lasts until the end of the empire in the fifteenth century; and a near-total absence of secular vernacular literature between the sixth and twelfth centuries. Lead seals play a crucial role between the sixth and eleventh centuries. This chronological disparity does not simply reflect accidents of transmission or survival, however, because the lack of traditional historical writing can be compensated for by a more careful and thoughtful analysis of—for example—theological writings, archaeology, art-historical data, and sigillographical texts (seals). Cultures evolve priorities, not necessarily consciously or in a planned way, that reflect their conditions of existence, social relations, and economic realities, and an understanding of how such priorities shift and change, and what the results of such shifts might be in terms of actual cultural production, can throw as much light on the process and course of historical change as a narrative text can. The lack of history writing in the seventh to ninth centuries is largely a reflection of such shifts in cultural perceptions and priorities, just as is the parallel expansion of theological literature of all types, and the revival of historical writing thereafter is likewise a reflection of such a key shift.

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Understanding Byzantine military history and warfare entails integrating many different types of information, both to deploy as many different sources and types of source material as possible and to exploit the expertise of a broader range of disciplines than was often deemed necessary in the early years of the subject. Again, the combination of such material varies from period to period as different types of evidence become available or disappear. Most important, the value of different categories of material may change over time. The economic and physical context for the production of written sources is thus a crucially important factor, one that has a direct impact on how texts were employed.

Written Sources. Among the most important sources for warfare, apart from the historical narratives—such as Prokopios of Caesarea, Theophylact Simocatta, and the *Chronographia* of Theophanes the Confessor, notably for the reign of Herakleios—are the military treatises of the sixth to tenth centuries. In the late sixth century a handbook known as the *Strategikon* of Maurice was compiled, probably by one of that emperor's generals, and this followed an earlier anonymous "On Strategy" (although its dating to the sixth century is problematic). Both took their inspiration in part from much older treatises of the Hellenistic and Roman periods, such as those of Aelian or Arrian, and, nearer in time, from the fifth-century Latin writer Vegetius. Neither seems to have had an immediate successor. The next known compilation is the very important *Taktika* of the emperor Leo VI, "the Wise" (r. 886–912), probably written in the early 900s. This represents the first of a series of such treatises that distinguish the later ninth and tenth centuries. Slightly later texts such as the so-called *Sylloge tacticorum* (Collection of Tacticians) and the *Leonis VI sapientis problemata* (The Problems of Leo VI the Wise)—which may or may not have been produced during Leo's reign—derive very clearly from the *Taktika*.

Nonwritten Sources. Nonwritten sources are no less the subject of debate and disagreement. Archaeological evidence provides us with insights into many key aspects of medieval life—dwellings, fortifications, diet, clothing, tools, and items of daily existence—as well as providing information on the production and distribution of luxury products. It offers information about patterns of exchange, both commercial and noncommercial, and about animal husbandry, technology, and related matters. Crucially, archaeology provides data relevant to areas of medieval life about which written sources are often entirely silent. Archaeological investigation is essential to any balanced picture of Byzantine economic and social history; written sources provide only partial information about topics such as the appearance and extent of houses, palaces, or fortresses, or the structure of village communities.

A considerable expansion and refinement in our knowledge of Byzantine society in its physical context has now been achieved through archaeology. The design, construction, and development of fortifications, for example, as well as the history of specific urban sites and their hinterlands, are all aspects about which archaeology has been able to tell us a great deal and at the same time act as a measure to judge the written sources against. A particularly obvious aspect in which this is true is the history of Byzantine towns, where a much more complex, regionally diversified, and locally diversified picture is emerging. Indeed, were it not for the archaeological evidence, an entirely different view of the nature of urban life and its relationship to rural society would have prevailed, an idea based on literary topoi and late Roman legislative terminology, which revealed little of the physical or actual social-economic evolution of towns and cities in the Byzantine period. Archaeological investigation can reveal the general physical disposition of an urban center, for example, and give some idea of appearance and land use, population density, social organization, and economic status. By 2009, however, relatively few sites (compared with work done in the western part of the empire) had been surveyed or excavated in detail.

In considering the value of different categories of primary evidence, therefore, the historian needs to bear in mind both the context of production for

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each specific document or set of documents and also the general historical and cultural context in which they were generated, a consideration that also applies to material and visual material. This is especially apparent with respect to art, where different types of visual polemic or choice of style and format for images or cycles of images reflected developments in ecclesiastical politics and theology, as well as cultural priorities and perceptions. Similar considerations apply to sigillography, too, where the choice of invocative formula, types of monogram, and use of imagery are part of a contemporary political as well as cultural world. In spite of the issues outlined above, however, it is possible to combine the various types of source to generate a remarkably detailed account of many aspects of Byzantine military history across the period from 500 to 900.

[*See also* Herakleios; Prokopios of Caesarea; *and* Treatises, *subentry on* Byzantine.]

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John Haldon

Sources (900–1204)

The chronicle tradition of the early Byzantine Empire (500–900) was continued by the chronicler known as Theophanes Continuatus and by the logothete's chronicle attributed to a certain Symeon. These two works, which cover the early tenth century, differ largely in the presentation of the deeds of Romanos I Lekapenos (r. 920–944). Theophanes Continuatus was compiled for Constantine VII, whose throne was usurped by Lekapenos, and contains a biography of Constantine's grandfather Basil I. Symeon Logothete is more sympathetic to Lekapenos, who acceded to the throne despite being implicated in the Byzantine defeat by the Bulgarians at Anchialos in 917. Remarkable insights into the wars between the Byzantines and Bulgarians are provided by the letters of Patriarch Nicholas I Mystikos and by those of the imperial secretary Theodore Daphnopates.

The tenth century is known as an age of compilation. Unique information on Byzantine military and diplomatic strategy, particularly the policy of divide and rule, is contained in Constantine VII's treatise *De administrando imperio*. The complementary treatise *De cerimoniis* was completed during the reign of Nikephoros II Phokas. Of practical value were a series of military manuals compiled at the order of emperors including Leo VI (*Taktika*) and Nikephoros II (*De velitatione*, *Praecepta militaria*, Nikephoros Ouranos's *Taktika*). Others may be associated with Constantine VII (*On Skirmishing*, *On Campaign Organization and Tactics*, *On Siege Craft*, *Three Treatises on Imperial Military Expeditions*).

Precedence lists, notably the *Escorial taktikon* or *Taktikon oikonomides*, were also produced during the tenth century; these list senior military offices and their relative hierarchy. These documents must be considered alongside many thousands of Byzantine lead seals, which can provide information of a type and volume sufficient to revolutionize our understanding of aspects of Byzantine military institutions. The typical lead seal of the tenth to twelfth century includes the first name, rank, office, and surname of an individual, providing evidence for some positions that do not feature in written sources and attesting

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to the functions and duties of thousands of otherwise unattested individuals.

Military affairs of the later tenth century are recounted most fully in a compelling, classicizing history by Leo the Deacon. Leo's account runs from Nikephoros Phokas's liberation of Crete in 960–961 (when he was a general of Romanos II) to the campaigns in the Holy Land by Phokas's murderer and successor, John I Tzimiskes. Leo also includes a vignette detailing the first defeat of Basil II by the Bulgarians in 986, in which expedition he participated. The remainder of Basil II's reign is covered best by John Skylitzes, whose work was conceived as a continuation of the chronicle of Theophanes the Confessor and thus begins in 813.

Skylitzes made use of secular biography, notably an account of the deeds of the general Katakalon Kekaumenos, although nothing of that genre has survived independently. Skylitzes had a tendency to abridge and condense his sources, thus telescoping events and introducing confusion and inaccuracy into his descriptions, while using set phrases and vocabulary to describe battles, sieges, and ambushes. A continuation extends Skylitzes's work from 1057 to 1079. Known as Skylitzes Continuatus, this displays similar traits and may have been written by the same man. Skylitzes's chronicle was reworked by John Zonaras, who added a lengthy, critical account of the reign of Alexios I Komnenos that provides much unique information. Further continuation was undertaken by Michael Glykas in the later twelfth century.

Roughly contemporary with Skylitzes, a certain Kekaumenos wrote a treatise of political advice from the curmudgeonly perspective of a minor provincial aristocrat: this treatise is replete with vignettes of interest to the military historian. The greatest historian of the eleventh century, Michael Psellos, rarely mentions military matters in his *Chronographia*. The reign of Constantine IX Monomachos, who preferred paying tribute to fighting foreign wars, occupies the greater part of this work. But Psellos is something of a hawk: he criticizes Constantine for his pacifism, and he frequently praises emperors who led their own armies, particularly Basil II, whom he singles out for having struck fear in his enemies, overcome barbarians in war, and extended the empire's frontiers to east and west. Yet Psellos has no truck with those whose vainglory drove them to war, and he condemns Romanos III for the pointless and disastrous battle at Aleppo in 1030. Psellos is sympathetic to Isaac I Komnenos, and contrary to his own testimony he may have been involved in the coup that brought Isaac to power, but he criticizes both Isaac's lack of political acumen and his flawed strategy for dealing with Pecheneg (Patzinak) invaders. He reports the failed military coups of both George Maniakes and George Tornikios (Tornikes) in a balanced fashion.

For others the stuff of history remained great commanders and their wars, as is evident from the works of Michael Attaleiates and Nikephoros Bryennios. The former championed the usurper Nikephoros III Botaneiates (r. 1078–1081); the latter described glowingly the rise to power of the Komnenos family. Bryennios was himself a general who was married to the daughter of Alexios I Komnenos, Anna Komnene. Alexios I was the hero of Anna's *Alexiad*, in which his exploits, principally on the battlefield, were lauded in Homeric language and with Homeric allusions. The *Alexiad* was composed early in the reign of Anna's nephew, Manuel I Komnenos, to whom she was poorly disposed, as she had been to his father, her brother John II Komnenos.

Manuel's biographer John Kinnamos provides a brief account of John's reign that serves as a prelude and counterpoint to that of Manuel, highlighting John's wars against the Seljuk Turks and Hungarians. His work ends before Manuel's disastrous defeat at Myriokephalon in 1176. A more critical account of the reigns of both emperors, John's briefly and Manuel's at length, is presented by Niketas Choniates. Choniates completed and revised his history in the aftermath of the sack of Constantinople in 1204 by the forces of the Fourth Crusade, which context dramatically affects his interpretations. Choniates's is the only full account of the reigns of the Angeloi, notably Isaac II, who presided over the rebellion of Vlachs and Bulgars that led to the foundation of the so-called Second Bulgarian Empire.

There are also historical accounts of unique events or episodes. Eustathios of Thessalonike's account of

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the Norman sack of Thessalonike in 1185 began as a Lenten sermon. Michael Choniates delivered a number of speeches, including one late in 1187 on a campaign of Isaac II Angelos that can be usefully compared to the account presented later in his brother Niketas's history. The survival of such speeches suggests that one must place historiography in a broader literary context, paying particular attention to its intimate link with court panegyric (*enkomia*).

Psellos frequently observed that his *Chronographia* was no work of panegyric, but he also wrote panegyric. His teacher, John Mauropous, delivered a number of panegyrics in praise of Constantine IX, including several in praise of a "bloodless victory," being a negotiated settlement with the Pechenegs. Niketas Choniates wrote orations on which he drew for his history. Theodore Prodromos is known for his poems in praise of John II and his family, several of which describe John's victory celebrations in Constantinople. Manganeios Prodromos, named for his alleged similarity to Theodore, has been identified as a lesser writer who composed third- or fourth-string orations (unpublished), largely in praise of Manuel I. Like Manganeios, the future patriarch Michael Anchialos praised Manuel's victories over the Hungarians and Serbs. The Angeloi similarly enjoyed hyperbolic praise from John Syropoulos and the aforementioned Eustathios of Thessalonike. Nikephoros Chrysoberges observed the Venetian fleet at anchor before Constantinople in 1203–1204.

[*See also* Basil II; Bryennios, Nikephoros; John I Tzimiskes; John II Komnenos; John Skylitzes, Chronicle of; Katakalon Kekaumenos; Manuals, Military; Manuel I Komnenos; Nikephoros II Phokas; *and* Treatises, *subentry on* Byzantine.]

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Paul Stephenson

Sources (1204–1453)

Sources for the Byzantine Empire from 1204 to 1453 can be divided broadly into two types: historical and institutional.

Historical. As with other aspects of Byzantine culture following the disruption of the Fourth Crusade (1199–1204), the recovery and continuation of the writing of historical narratives in the grand tradition were secured under the "empire in exile" of the Laskarids in Nicaea. The crucial figure in general was the scholar and monk Nikephoros Blemmydes (1197–c. 1269), who was the teacher of the new generation of intellectuals.

Significant among Blemmydes's students was George Akropolites (1217–1282). His great work, the *Chronike syngraphe* (Historical Digest), is the primary source—and a reliable one—for the history of the Nicaean empire (1203–1261). Akropolites himself was teacher and then chief minister to the emperor Theodore II Laskaris (r. 1254–1258), an important intellectual in his own right. Another student of Akropolites, George Pachymeres (1242–c. 1310), an important church official and writer, became the continuing narrator. His history covers the period 1260–1308, describing the full reign of Michael VIII and the earlier years of Andronikos II. Though some aspects of his work, especially chronology, require

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critical analysis, his information is generally sound and objective.

Picking up the chronological threads in his own way is the work of the distinguished polymath Nikephoros Gregoras (c. 1290–c. 1350). His learning won him court appointments under both Andronikos II and Andronikos III, and he was a supporter of the usurper John VI Kantakouzenos. But he broke with John over the theological issue of Palamism, which led to his discredit. Chief among his many writings is the *Rhomaïke historia* (Roman [i.e., Byzantine] History). Officially it covers the years 1204–1359, but the work is most important in its treatment of the first half of the fourteenth century and of events in which he participated. Gregoras apparently never fully finished the work.

Among its merits, Gregoras's history is a significant complement—and sometimes corrective—to the other major historical work of the epoch, that by the former emperor John VI Kantakouzenos, the only Byzantine sovereign to compose full-length memoirs. His *Historiai* (Histories) covers the years 1320–1356. It was intended very much as an apologia for his career, so in that context it must always be viewed critically. Nevertheless John's history is written in a direct form of classic Greek, displaying a fine flair for style, and is invaluable in its details, including at least some attention to military activities.

Possibly reflective of Byzantium's grim decline, the next three-quarters of a century produced no important writer of historical narrative. Scattered in many manuscripts are brief chronological and factual notices that have come to be called the *Brachéa chroniká* (Short Chronicles); collections include that edited by Spyridōn Lampros and that edited by Peter Schreiner. These chronicles help fill in many points of detail for which we have little or no other accurate information. A rare example of literary narrative—on a limited scale, however—is a brief account of Murad II's 1422 siege of Constantinople written by one John Kananos, otherwise unknown. Its style is simple but lively, and it is full of unusual military and weaponry vocabulary.

A sudden burst of final historical writing came about in Byzantium's last years, partly provoked by the drama of Constantinople's fall to the Turks in 1453, and involved four authors. The youngest author by birth but the most comprehensive in his coverage is Laonikos Chalkokondyles (c. 1423–c. 1490). A native of Athens, he studied with the great Plethon at Mistra in the Byzantine Morea. His historical work covers the years 1299–1463 but is thought to have been written late in his life, in the 1480s. For all his profound Hellenic culture, Chalkokondyles is no Byzantine patriot, for he takes as his theme the downfall of Greek polity and the triumph of the new Ottoman state—a kind of latter-day reversal of the classic portrayal of the Persian-Greek encounter by Herodotus (whose fascination with diverse peoples and lands Chalkokondyles imitates). The earlier parts of his history are full of inaccuracies and are of little value, and his work can be used (if critically) only as he moves into the fifteenth century, but he had access to Turkish sources, which gives us invaluable information on early Ottoman development.

Almost as comprehensive was perhaps the earliest-born of the four writers, known only as Doukas (c. 1400–c. 1462). He, too, stood apart from what was left of the Byzantine center: fluent in Italian and Turkish, and familiar with Italian and Turkish sources, he ended his days in the service of the Gattilusio rulers of Lesbos. His history covers the years 1341–1462 and breaks off incomplete at the time of his death. As with Chalkokondyles's work, the earlier sections are derivative and full of inaccuracies, but once Doukas enters his own time (sometimes giving eyewitness accounts), the work is reliable, if opinionated. Doukas supported church union, and in contrast to Chalkokondyles, he gives a very negative portrayal of Mehmed II.

With George Sphrantzes (1401–1477/8) we move to the court world of dying Byzantium. Adviser, official, and diplomat for Manuel II and Constantine XI, Sphrantzes was at the center of government activities through the fall of Constantinople, to which he was an eyewitness. His historical legacy, and even his name, were blurred for some time. It was long believed that he had left his historical account in two forms: a brief, colloquial combination of chronicle and memoir in a preliminary form called by editors

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the *Chronicon minus* (Small Chronicle), and a much larger work, the *Chronicon maius* (Grand Chronicle), that incorporated but greatly expanded the *Minus*, covering the years 1258–1477 and going under the name "Phrantzes." It has since been recognized that the *Minus* is the authentic work and that the *Maius* was created more than a century later by Makarios Melissenos (d. 1585), a notorious Moreote swindler and forger, at the end of his life (1570s) while in exile in Naples. That some material added by Makarios, in what is now called the Pseudo-[S]Phrantzes *Maius*, may have some validity—notably the tantalizingly vivid account of the siege in book 3—has been argued (for example, by the translator Margaret Carroll). The *Minus* is, however, the authentic source.

The fourth historian of the fall of Constantinople distanced himself to an even greater degree than Chalkokondyles did from the remnant of Byzantium, directing his eyes more fixedly on Mehmed II. Michael Kritoboulos (d. c. 1470) recognized the direction in which events were leading and made terms with the conqueror, for a decade governing Imbros in Mehmed's name. Written in his last years, his history covers the years 1451–1467. It is frankly a panegyric of the sultan, comparing him to Alexander the Great and seeing him as the true successor to the Byzantine emperor of old. Kritoboulos thus allows us to observe the fall of the great city and the end of Byzantium from the viewpoint of the conqueror, not the conquered.

Several collections of source texts on the 1453 siege and fall, as well as its aftermath (replete with military details), have been published. Examples include the collection edited by J. R. Melville Jones and that edited by Marios Philippides.

Institutional. Kodinos is the name of an unknown writer—now identified as Pseudo-Kodinos—who between 1347 and 1368 assembled a treatise titled *On the Dignities and Offices*. The work is modeled on earlier treatises on the ceremonial court (above all, that of Constantine VII in the tenth century) and, when describing a world of officialdom and rituals, is more wishful thinking than actuality. Still, the treatise is insightful in understanding the organization of the decaying government, and the author has included some useful personal and historical observations. Unfortunately the treatise tells us little about military organization beyond official titles. Moreover, the ages of highly sophisticated manuals on military operation were long past.

A major genre of literary expression was the letter, usually part of personal correspondence but often intended for collection and formal circulation among a wide consortium of intellectuals. A notable case in point is the body of letters written by the emperor Theodore II Laskaris of Nicaea, full of important cultural reflections. Palaiologan intellectuals were lively writers of letters, and these, however stilted, contain much valuable information. Such is the case with the letters of Nikephoros Choumnos (c. 1250–1327) with the strong-willed patriarch Athanasios I, with the anti-Palamite Gregory Akindynos, and also with the aforementioned historian Nikephoros Gregoras. The outstanding intellectual of the latter half of the fourteenth century was Demetrios Kydones (c. 1324–1398), among whose important writings is a vast body of letters ranging from the trivial to the highly important. His star pupil was the emperor Manuel II Palaiologos, who, among a number of very useful writings including treatises and orations, left behind a body of letters full of information on the circumstances of his day. Another Kydones disciple, Manuel II's friend and ambassador Manuel Chrysoloras (c. 1350–1415), was a pivotal figure in the introduction of Hellenic language studies to Italian humanism, and his letters join his other writings as important sources on many aspects of the events of the day. None of them, however, has much to say of a specific military nature.

[*See also* Constantinople, *subentries on* Siege of (1422) *and* Siege of (1453).]

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John W. Barker

Narrative (500–900)

It was its greater structural cohesiveness and flexibility that permitted the eastern half of the Roman Empire—henceforward known by historians as the "Byzantine" Empire—to survive the political and economic troubles of the fifth century. (See the map on page 310). During the sixth century, under the emperor Justinian I (r. 527–565), the strength of the empire enabled it to take the offensive and to recover large regions that had been lost to invaders or settlers—including North Africa from the Vandals (sealed by Belisarios's victory at Carthage in 533), Italy from the Ostrogoths, and southeast Spain from the Visigoths—as well as to stabilize, at least temporarily, the eastern frontier following a Byzantine victory at the battle of Dara in 530. Although the cost of this expansionism was very great, the East Roman state in the early 630s still embraced North Africa; Egypt; modern Syria, western Iraq, and western Jordan, along with Lebanon and Palestine; Anatolia; much of the Balkans, Sicily, and Sardinia; and considerable areas of Italy. Most of the Balkans was out of effective central control, dominated by Slav or other invaders—albeit this reality was not recognized in official imperial pronouncements on the region.

But these gains were short-lived: the Lombard occupation of much of northern, central, and southern Italy from the late 560s, the inability of the empire to maintain effective military forces in the western Mediterranean, and the distraction and threat of warfare in the East meant that most of these territorial gains had been lost well before the end of the seventh century. A major war with the Persian kingdom of the Sassanid dynasty—stimulated by Phokas's usurpation in 602 of the emperor Maurice, Maurice's subsequent murder, and Phokas's subsequent tyranny—resulted in the loss of Egypt and greater Syria to Persian arms, as well as in the siege and capture of Jerusalem in 614 and the carrying off of the True Cross to the Persian capital, a symbolic blow of great significance. Hostilities lasted until the Byzantine victory achieved by the emperor Herakleios in 627: the battle of Nineveh in that year was perhaps the most resounding victory ever won by a Roman army over the Sassanians. But both states were exhausted by the long years of warfare and economic dislocation.

Thus when the Arabs emerged in the 630s from the Arabian Peninsula under the banner of Islam and holy war, imperial resistance was little more than token. The loss of Syria, marked by the disastrous defeat at the Yarmuk in perhaps 636 (the date is still the subject of discussion), was swift and, as it turned out, irrevocable. By 642 all of Egypt and the Middle Eastern provinces had been lost, Arab forces had penetrated deep into Asia Minor and Libya, and imperial forces had been withdrawn into Asia Minor, to be settled across the provinces of the region as the only available means of supporting them. Thus within a period of some twelve years the empire lost

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Byzantine Solidus. The Byzantine emperor Herakleios (c. 575–641) and his son. A "cross on steps" is on the reverse of the coin, c. 610. © BRITISH MUSEUM/ART RESOURCE, NY

something over half its area and three-quarters of its resources—a drastic loss for an imperial state that still had to maintain and equip a considerable army and an effective administrative bureaucracy if it was to survive at all. Although many of the developments that led to this transformation were in train long before the seventh-century crisis, it was this conjuncture that served to bring things to a head and promote the structural responses that followed.

The defeats and territorial contraction that resulted from the expansion in the East of Islam from the 640s, on the one hand, and from the arrival in the Balkans of the Bulgars and the establishment of a permanent Bulgar khanate there from the 680s, on the other, radically altered the political conditions of existence of the East Roman state and established a new international political context. The evolution of this context was characterized both by the political, cultural, and economic relations between the empire and its neighbors and also by the fluctuations in imperial political ideology and awareness of these relations. The cultural imperialism of Byzantium, and the powerful results of this in the Balkans and Russia, had results that influenced and continue today to influence the Balkans and eastern Europe.

Internal History. The internal history of the Byzantine Empire from the sixth to the later tenth century is one of both remarkable transformation and surprising continuities. In respect of language, by the later sixth century, except for some of the central and northern Balkan regions, the official Latin of the Roman Empire was displaced by the Greek of the eastern Roman provinces. In respect of resources, of course, the massive losses of the seventh century meant the reduction of state income by something on the order of 70 percent, a reduction that had substantial implications for the way the state worked, for society and social cohesion, and for the way the armies were recruited, equipped, and supplied. The Arab Islamic conquests radically altered the strategic and political geography of the whole eastern Mediterranean region. The complete failure of attempts to meet and drive back the invaders in open battle induced a major shift in strategy whereby open confrontations with the Muslim armies were avoided.

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As a result of the defeat of the 630s, the field armies were withdrawn first to North Syria and Mesopotamia, and shortly thereafter back to the line of the Taurus and Anti-Taurus ranges. The armies that had operated in Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia were withdrawn into Anatolia and were reestablished within a greatly changed economic and strategic framework. The districts across which they were based were determined by the ability of these districts to provide for the soldiers in terms of supplies and other requirements. By the last decades of the seventh century, the districts across which these armies were garrisoned were known collectively by the name of the army based there. The distribution of the various units of the field armies across the provinces in this way was certainly connected with logistical demands, but it also had obvious strategic implications: it meant that Roman counterattacks were relatively slow to organize and that defense was fragmented and organized locally on a somewhat piecemeal basis.

A further effect of these changes was a degree of ruralization of society, a result of the devastation, abandonment, shrinkage, or displacement of many cities in Asia Minor caused by invasions and raids. The defensive properties of urban sites—their direct relevance to military, administrative, or ecclesiastical needs, and so on—played the key role in whether a city survived or not. Only with the economic recovery of the later eighth and ninth centuries and the revival of urban life on a large scale was this tendency reversed.

The state elite was transformed also, and in the course of the eighth century it began to turn into an aristocracy. At first this aristocracy was still very dependent on the state, but during the tenth century it became increasingly independent, dominating in particular the provincial military establishment, as well as key military and civil posts at court. Though it cannot be described as a military aristocracy, its military element was at times particularly prominent in both imperial politics and warfare. The state had to compete directly with a social group whose enormous landed wealth and entrenched position in the apparatuses of the state meant that it posed a real threat to central control of fiscal resources. But the continued power and attraction of the imperial establishment at Constantinople, with its court and hierarchical system of precedence, as well as the highly centralized fiscal administrative structure, consumed the whole attention of the Byzantine elite, hindering the evolution of a more highly localized aristocracy that might otherwise have invested in the economy and society of its own localities and towns rather than in the imperial system.

Political History. The political history of the Byzantine Empire is marked out by a series of key moments: the expansion under Justinian and the erosion and then collapse of his achievements in the period circa 570–640; the failure of the Arab sieges of Constantinople in the late 660s or 670s (again, recent discussion has focused on redating some of the key events of this period), along with the destruction of a major Arab fleet at the battle of Syllaion (probably in 677) and especially in 717–718, and the consequences of these events for both the caliphate and the empire; the iconoclasm of the eighth-century emperors; the stabilization and consolidation of Byzantine power in the ninth century; and the great reconquests and expansionism of the tenth century.

Iconoclasm in particular has attracted attention, especially the iconoclasm of the emperor Constantine V (r. 741–775). But although his reputation has been largely determined by his iconoclasm, his importance lies as much in his other achievements: provincial military and administrative changes, the establishment of a small elite imperial field army at Constantinople, changes in the fiscal system, and the establishment of a substantial balance in the imperial treasury. He seems to have been a careful financial manager of state resources; he employed the resources at his disposal in a series of well-planned military expeditions against both the empire's northern foes, the Bulgars, and in the East. Indeed, his frequent campaigns into the heartland of Bulgarian territory came near to destroying the Bulgar khanate entirely, although the Bulgars offered a tenacious and fierce resistance. In the East, Constantine campaigned against a number of

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key Arab fortresses, reestablishing military parity between the Roman and Islamic armies and thus providing the stability, both economic and political, to permit the devastated provinces to recover from the century and a half of warfare to which they had been subjected.

With the outbreak of civil war in the caliphate in 842 upon the death of the caliph al-Mu'tasim, Byzantium was able to take advantage of the situation to begin once again a reassertion of imperial military power on the eastern front. The main enemies in this region were no longer centrally led caliphal armies, however, but the forces of the many emirs who governed the frontier fortress towns such as Tarsus in Cilicia or Melitene (Malatya) farther east. The struggle was evenly balanced throughout the rest of the century, although the imperial armies were able to achieve several resounding victories, such as those at Lalakaon in 863 or Bathys Ryax in 878, and force the Arabs or their allies to be on the defensive.

The situation in the Balkans during the fifth and sixth centuries was characterized by the empire's efforts to cope with the various Germanic peoples who moved into and through the region—in the second half of the sixth century, Gepids, Heruls, and Lombards preoccupied imperial diplomacy. But the increasing pressure exerted by the migrations of various Slavic-speaking groups into the central and southern Balkan region complicated this picture. The arrival of the Avars, a Turkic-Mongol confederacy that dominated the region from the 580s and that in 626—in alliance with the Sassanid Persians—besieged Constantinople itself for some weeks, changed this picture yet again. The defeat of the siege was followed by the fragmentation of Avar power and the temporary assertion of Slav tribal independence.

But in 680 the arrival of a new Turkic people, the Bulgars—who after defeating an imperial army under the emperor Constantine IV at an unknown location near the Danube Delta established themselves to the south of the delta—changed the situation permanently. The Bulgar khanate rapidly grew in power, and already by 708 its forces were able to inflict a further serious defeat on the imperial armies at the battle of Anchialos. Until its extinction at the hands of the emperor Basil II, known as the "Bulgar-slayer" (r. 976–1025), the Bulgar khanate represented a constant threat to the security of imperial territory in the Balkans. During the early years of the eighth century the importance of the new power in the Balkans was underlined by the ways in which various Byzantine emperors, notably Justinian II (r. 685–695 and 705–711), employed the Bulgars for their own political ends, thereby drawing them more closely into the southern Balkan and Byzantine sphere.

Throughout the eighth and ninth centuries and into the early tenth century, Bulgar power and influence grew, in spite of successful counterattacks under the emperor Constantine V in the 760s and 770s. The nadir of Byzantine fortunes was probably the year 811, when the khan Krum defeated and destroyed an imperial army at Pliska, killing the emperor Nikephoros I. But following internecine strife within the Bulgar realm and a Byzantine victory near Mesembria (Nesebŭr) in 817 was a long period of peace, lasting through the 880s. Conversion to Christianity of elements of the Bulgar ruling elite in the 860s was intended to stabilize the situation in favor of Byzantium, yet paradoxically the gradual Byzantinization of this elite contributed to the growth of an imperialistic Bulgar politics that hoped to bring the two states together under a Bulgar dynasty. War broke out in the 890s, and Bulgar successes under the Christian czar Symeon in the first twenty years of the tenth century, notably at the battle of Achelous in 917, were a serious challenge to the empire for a while. But hostilities were eventually ended, partly an indirect consequence of the Bulgarian defeat at the hands of the Croats, allied with the empire, in 927 at the so-called battle of the Bosnian highlands. In spite of Symeon's continuing hostility until his death in 927, his successor Peter favored a peaceful resolution to the conflict, and a further relatively long period of peaceful coexistence followed. Diplomatic misunderstandings in the late 960s, warfare, the arrival on the scene of the Kievan Rus', and the reassertion of Bulgar imperial ideology under Czar Samuel then inaugurated a conflict that led finally to the eradication of Bulgar independence and the

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recovery in the early eleventh century of much of the Balkans up to the Danube.

Relations between Byzantium and the Rus'—Norse settlers from the central Russian river belt who entered the Black Sea to trade and raid for booty—were always fragile, although peace was the norm rather than the exception. The Rus' appeared initially in the middle of the ninth century as raiders hunting for booty, emerging from the rivers that brought them down to the Black Sea and sailing thence into the Bosporus and Constantinople. Raids against Constantinople in 860, 907, and 941 were beaten off with difficulty, but despite initial hostile relations and later mutual suspicion the Rus' had soon become close trading partners with the empire (by the 920s certainly) and provided mercenary household troops for the emperors—from the 980s, the famous Varangian guard. Relations came to breaking point in the late 960s after the Rus' were called in by Nikephoros II Phokas to attack the Bulgars in the rear. They were so successful that their leader Sviatoslav decided to stay and attack the Byzantines. But the imperial response was effective: the Byzantines defeated a much larger army near Arcadiopolis in Thrace in 970 and destroyed the Rus' forces in the battles of Dorostolon on the Danube in 971. In spite of this defeat, as well as the death of Sviatoslav on the way back to Kiev, peaceful relations were established under Basil II when acceptance of Christianity under Vladimir in the 980s and a marriage alliance between the two empires inaugurated a long period of Byzantine cultural and spiritual influence on the Rus', fundamentally inflecting the evolution of Russian culture, the church, and czarist ideology.

Until the extinction of the Sassanid Empire by the Islamic armies in the 630s and early 640s, this Persian state had been the main opponent, and the only recognized political equal, of the Roman Empire in the East. Thereafter the Umayyad and then 'Abbasid caliphates posed a constant threat to the empire. This complex history falls into several phases: a phase from the 630s until the 720s, during which Arab-Islamic invasions were a regular phenomenon aimed at the destruction of the East Roman state; a phase from the 720s until the middle of the eighth century, during which a modus vivendi had been established but Muslim attacks remained a constant source of economic and political dislocation; and a phase thereafter until the middle of the eleventh century, when the collapse of 'Abbasid authority made it possible for the empire to reestablish a military and political preeminence in the region. The reassertion of imperial military preeminence is associated in particular with generals such as John Kourkouas; various members of the Phokas clan, especially Nikephoros II Phokas (r. 963–969); and John Tzimiskes (later John I, r. 969–976), who successfully campaigned against the north Syrian emirates and the forces of the caliphate during the reigns of the emperors Romanos I Lekapenos (r. 920–944), Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos (r. 913–959), and Romanos II (r. 959–963). The increasingly important role of Turkic slave and mercenary soldiers in the caliphate from the 840s and the eventual arrival of the Seljuk Turks in the 1060s changed this picture drastically.

Relations with Italy and the West were no less complex. Under Justinian, Italy, North Africa, and the southeastern corner of the Iberian Peninsula were reconquered, at enormous cost, from the Ostrogoths, Vandals, and Visigoths, respectively. But the appearance of the Lombards in Italy (pursued by the Avars, at Byzantine request) soon resulted in the fragmentation of imperial possessions into a number of distinct regions under military commanders or *doukes*. Imperial territory in the northeast and central regions was represented by the exarch, an officer with military and civil authority. But distance from Constantinople, local cultural differentiation, and political conditions, together with the spiritual and political power of the popes in Rome, soon led to the gradual but inevitable diminution of imperial power. By the early ninth century, the extinction of the exarchate with the Lombards' capture of Ravenna, its capital, in 751, increased papal dependence on the Franks for support against the Lombards, and increasingly autonomous and mutually competing local polities in the Italian peninsula had led to the reduction of imperial power to the regions of Calabria, Bruttium,

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and Sicily. Other political centers such as Naples remained technically Byzantine but in practice were quite independent. Venice, which grew in importance from the early ninth century, likewise remained nominally an imperial territory.

The coronation of Charlemagne as emperor at Rome in 800 set the seal on the political and cultural separation of East Rome and the West. Despite various attempts at marriage alliances between the Frankish and Byzantine courts in the later eighth and early ninth centuries, and between the courts of the Ottonian and Byzantine rulers in the tenth, the growing political, cultural, and military strength of the western world precluded any serious reassertion of East Roman imperial power in the central Mediterranean basin. Byzantine influence was struck a further blow by the loss of Sicily to Islamic forces during the ninth century, even though a partial reestablishment of imperial political and military power took place in the later tenth and early eleventh centuries.

[*See also* Anchialos, Battle of (708); Anchialos, Battle of (917); Arcadiopolis, Battle of (970); Bathys Ryax, Battle of; Belisarios; Constantine V; Constantinople, *subentries on* Rus' Attacks (860, 907, and 941) *and* Siege of (717–718); Dara, Battle of; Dorostolon, Battle of; Herakleios; John I Tzimiskes; Justinian I; Kourkouas, John; Lalakaon, Battle of; Maurice; Nikephoros II Phokas; Nineveh, Battle of; Phokas; Pliska, Battle of; Syllaion, Battle of; *and* Yarmuk, Battle of.]

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John Haldon

Narrative (900–1204)

At the start of the tenth century, Byzantium sat between hostile powers: to the northwest Bulgaria, and to the east the emirates on the fringes of the fragmenting 'Abbasid caliphate. The appearance of the Hamdanid emirate of Aleppo posed a particular threat but also presaged a Byzantine revival under the generals John Kourkouas, Bardas Phokas, Bardas's son Nikephoros II Phokas, and Nikephoros's nephew John I Tzimiskes. Byzantine victories saw the recovery of frontier cities and their lands and the transportation of precious relics to Constantinople.

Bulgaria grew as a Christian power during the reign of the czar Symeon (r. 893–927), who shifted his capital from Pliska to Preslav. Inscribed boundary stones show that Symeon's Bulgaria reached to within about twelve miles (twenty kilometers) of Byzantium's second city, Thessalonike. Symeon's son Peter (r. 927–967) married Maria, the granddaughter of the ruling Byzantine emperor Romanos I. After 895–896, both Bulgaria and Byzantium had to deal with a new people, the Magyars (Hungarians), who had settled north of the Danube. For decades after their arrival in the Carpathian Basin, the Magyars raided lands to the west—until the infamous battle on the Lechfeld in 955—and to the south between 934 and 970. The raids were not indiscriminate: they were carefully planned and executed either to fulfill paid contracts or to extract payments of tribute. The Magyars also took over established trade routes, developing towns and becoming increasingly sedentary, although nomadism was still common at the time of the conversion of King (later Saint) Stephen I, around 1000.

In the year 1000 the northern Balkans were dominated by a realm centered on Ohrid and Prespa; Samuel Kometopoulos, the ruler of this realm,

Szerzői jogi védelem alatt álló anyag

Byzantine Emperor Basil II (958–1025). Basil II, known as the "Bulgar-slayer," stands over the figures of conquered Bulgarians. Frontispiece of a psalter, c. 1004. BIBLIOTECA MARCIANA, VENICE, ITALY/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

regarded it as a continuation of the Bulgarian empire. Basil II (r. 976–1025) annexed this realm and restored Byzantine political authority across the peninsula. The longest-reigning Byzantine emperor, Basil is known to history as the "Bulgar-slayer." According to contemporary stories, Basil committed numerous atrocities, including blinding ninety-nine of every hundred Bulgarian captives taken at the battle of Kleidion in July 1014; the hundredth was left a single eye to lead his comrades home. It is also recorded, however, that Basil was magnanimous in victory, allowing the Bulgarians their own autocephalous archbishop and permitting them to pay taxes in kind.

Threats from Nomads. Basil II's victories were achieved over sedentary neighbors. After 1025 the main external threats were confederations of nomads to the east and north. In the middle years of the century a new force emerged in the Islamic world, the Seljuks, who were determined to reunite and revivify the 'Abbasid caliphate as a strictly Sunni entity, incorporating the Shiite Fatimid caliphate. The Seljuk sultan Tughrul (r. 1055–1063) directed his efforts at the Fatimids but was content to have the Turkoman nomads channel their excess energy against Georgia, Armenia, and Byzantium. In 1071 the Byzantine emperor Romanos IV Diogenes launched a grand campaign against the Seljuk sultan Alp Arslan, culminating in a Byzantine defeat at Mantzikert. The capture of Romanos was a humiliation, and his subsequent release set him against the Doukas family, who had regained power in his absence. The struggle that followed was symptomatic of the factionalism within the capital among competing aristocratic families, factionalism that eventually brought the Komnenos family to power. In the extended aftermath of the battle of Mantzikert, bands of Turkoman nomads gradually settled the interior Anatolian plateau. Long-term strategic problems arose as the new occupants of the region stubbornly resisted Hellenization, and two powerful, competing emirates were forged: the Seljukid sultanate of Rum, based at Ikonion, and the Danismendid emirate beyond, in the north and east of the plateau.

To the northwest, between 1032 and 1036 a series of raids by the nomadic Pechenegs (Patzinaks) penetrated the empire as far as Thessalonike, laid waste much of Thrace and Macedonia, and sacked fortified towns on the lower Danube. Measures were taken to contain the threat, including the distribution of stipends and the promotion of commerce, but these measures failed to prevent a massive migration of Pechenegs into Byzantine lands between 1043 and 1047. The nomads pillaged widely before an outbreak of pestilence forced their surrender, and captives were settled in the western Balkans. A later attack on the eastern frontier by the newly arrived Seljuk Turks inspired the emperor to raise a force of fifteen thousand from among the Pecheneg colonists. Dispatched to the east under their own chiefs,

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the nomads rebelled as soon as they crossed the Bosporus. They made their way back across the Balkan mountains and settled near Preslav. Efforts to crush the rebellions led to a series of imperial defeats, and in 1053 the emperor Constantine IX Monomachos (r. 1042–1055) was left with no option but to recognize the settlement of an independent group of nomads between the Balkan mountains and the lower Danube.

Isaac I Komnenos (r. 1057–1059) renewed an aggressive policy in the late 1050s but achieved no substantial success. If the Pechenegs proved unwilling to relinquish territory, this had much to do with the Uzes, or Oğuz Turks, who had occupied their former lands north of the lower Danube. Ominously for both the Pechenegs and the Byzantines, in 1064 the Uzes crossed the frozen Danube and defeated those who attempted to block their passage. Fortunately for the Byzantines, the Uzes, like the Pechenegs in 1047, fell victim to disease. Some survivors were recruited into the Byzantine army.

The persistent threat posed by the various nomadic peoples led Constantine X Doukas (r. 1059–1067), formerly a general, to believe that security was better achieved by appeasement. But even this broke down in the fiscal and political crises of the 1070s. In 1071 the Hungarians attacked the Byzantine fortress of Belgrade, the Pechenegs plundered throughout Thrace and Macedonia, and the various Slavic peoples of the interior rebelled.

The Pecheneg war reached its bloody conclusion at Levounion in Thrace on 29 April 1091. This was a magnificent victory for the imperial forces and established Alexios I Komnenos (r. 1081–1118) in an unassailable position in Constantinople. Alexios had delegated the Pecheneg war to trusted generals and spent much of his time fighting the Normans under Robert Guiscard and his son Bohemond, who had invaded the empire's Balkan lands soon after Alexios's accession in April 1081. The greatest concern for the new emperor was retaining the loyalty of the native population, and the Normans had taken a crucial measure to secure their defection: they had in tow a man claiming to be the deposed emperor, Michael VII. Many defected before the Byzantines lost two pitched battles. Venetian support was instrumental in the Byzantine recovery of territory and authority. The Venetian doge maintained vigilant guard over the Adriatic sea-lanes, while the emperor slowly clawed back land.

Alexios won his first significant victory by avoiding a pitched battle, tricking the Norman cavalry into a chase and shooting at their horses from a distance. When Guiscard returned in full force in 1084, he was confronted by the Venetians. Then, having landed, the Normans were caught between a vigorous naval blockade and the mountains, where the Byzantines guarded the passes. Alexios had discovered how best to use the natural defenses of the western Balkans and the services of his allies. These tactics were to serve him well again in 1106–1107 when Bohemond launched another invasion but was obliged to sign the Treaty of Devol. This renewal of hostilities reflected developments in the east that had come to pass as a consequence of the First Crusade.

The First Crusade and After. The advent of the First Crusade (1095–1099) presaged a new era in which Byzantine eastern and western policy could no longer be regarded as wholly distinct. Arabic sources suggest that the situation in the Muslim world was such that the Byzantines could not afford to waste an unprecedented opportunity to recover lost territory and prestige. Between 1092 and 1094 the major Islamic polities in the Near East suffered political crises. In 1092 the vizier Nizam al-Mulk, the power behind the throne of the Sunni Muslim Seljuk empire, was murdered. A month later the Seljuk sultan, Malik-Shah, himself died in suspicious circumstances after a twenty-eight-year reign. Crisis also struck the Shiite Fatimid caliphate in Egypt when in 1094 the caliph al-Mustansir died. He had ruled for fifty-eight years and had been implacably opposed to the Seljuk expansion to the north. His vizier, Badr al-Jamali, died shortly afterward. Also in 1094 the Abbasid Sunni caliph al-Muqtadi died. Nor was the struggle over Muslim orthodoxy between the Sunni Seljuks and the Shiite Fatimids ended by the unprecedented series of deaths: various

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pretenders and new rulers saw the opportunity to press their claims to legitimacy by waging war against the others whom they regarded as heretics.

Alexios Komnenos sent letters to all parts of western Christendom appealing for fellow Christians to join his fight against the infidel. There is now little resistance from scholars of the medieval West to the notion that Alexios Komnenos played a significant role in calling the First Crusade. Moreover, following the successful siege of Nicaea, Alexios was able to use the First Crusade to regain much of the coastal strip of Asia Minor. But the emperor's luck changed at Antioch: there, convinced that defeat was inevitable, he failed to support the Latins, who proceeded to capture both that city and Jerusalem. Despite agreements to surrender any conquered lands to the Byzantines, the Normans and Franks retained control of the key cities and established counties and principalities, the so-called crusader states. The Seljuk Turks, meanwhile, consolidated their control of the Anatolian plateau.

To the northwest, Byzantium also ceded territory to neighbors and allies. The need to secure first Venetian and then Hungarian assistance for wars against the Normans saw the Byzantines delegate authority in Dalmatia and Croatia. As early as 1081–1082 the Venetian doge was granted the title "*doux* of Dalmatia and Croatia." The Hungarians did likewise, and in 1102 the Hungarian king Coloman completed the annexation of Croatia to his kingdom and had himself crowned king of Croatia in Biograd. The betrothal in 1104 of the Hungarian princess Piroska to the junior emperor John Komnenos gave this act Byzantine recognition and appears to have offered tacit imperial support to a Hungarian invasion of Dalmatia, which took place against Venetian interests in 1105. The inhabitants of the maritime cities surrendered to the Hungarian king in return for certain privileges, the details of which are found in extant charters. Venetian retaliation was delayed until 1115–1116, when the doge recovered the major cities. Despite Hungarian efforts the Venetians retained control of most of Dalmatia into the 1140s.

John II. John II Komnenos (r. 1118–1143) succeeded his father Alexios in 1118 after a bitter struggle with his sister, Anna Komnene (author of the *Alexiad*), and his mother, Eirene Doukaina. John followed his father's later policy and cast his gaze eastward. He demonstrated little interest in the Balkans, although in 1122 he defeated an invading force of "Scythians," possibly Pechenegs or Cumans. Also, a brief and opportunistic invasion by John in 1127–1129 forced the Hungarians to sign a lasting peace treaty. Thereafter his western flank was covered by an agreement with the German emperors Lothar III (r. 1125–1137) and Conrad III (r. 1138–1152). In 1136, Byzantine troops took part in Lothar's campaign that pressed into Norman-occupied southern Italy. Relations with Conrad were even better and from 1140 were cemented by the marriage of John's fourth son, Manuel, to Conrad's sister-in-law, Bertha of Sulzbach. This left John free to concentrate on his eastern campaigns. His chief ambitions, like those of his father, were to recover Antioch and to restore some form of Byzantine authority in the center of Asia Minor, where the Seljuks and Danismendids still held sway. It took three campaigns to capture the key fortress of Kastamonou, ancestral home of the Komnenos family, after which, in 1132, John held a victory procession in Constantinople.

Further campaigns brought John an ephemeral victory at Gangra, south of Kastamonou. Having achieved little in six years, John turned his attention farther east and besieged Seleucia, which commanded the coast road into Cilicia. He achieved rapid successes and pressed on to Antioch, where the ruler, Raymond of Poitiers, did homage to the emperor in 1137. The allied force of Byzantines and Latins failed, however, to take Aleppo in 1138 and retreated at news of the approach of Zengi, atabeg of Mosul. Nevertheless John made an imperial entry into Antioch, with Raymond and Joscelin of Courtenay, Count of Edessa, acting as his grooms. Returning to Constantinople after two years, John restored the frontier at the Sangarius (Sakarya) River, which had been threatened by Seljuk advances. Still, his goal remained the complete recovery of Antioch and Cilicia, and he died there in 1143, poisoned by an arrow while hunting. John was succeeded by the younger and more enterprising of his two surviving sons, Manuel.

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Manuel I. Manuel I Komnenos (r. 1143–1180) at first seemed set to pursue his father's policy of controlled aggression in the east. This was facilitated by a solid alliance with Germany, based on mutual antipathy toward the Normans in southern Italy and Sicily. The Second Crusade (1145–1149), however, saw problems emerge, and Manuel's attention was drawn increasingly westward. While the Germans were marching across the Balkans, a Norman fleet seized the island of Corfu and captured Thebes and Corinth. It sailed back to Sicily with great plunder and many captives, retaining control of Corfu. Manuel turned to the Venetians—who were equally troubled by the Norman occupation of Corfu—for naval support. Rebellions by the Serbs and attacks by the Hungarians were also provoked by the Normans, and between 1150 and 1155 King Géza II of Hungary and Manuel alternately came to blows and reached agreements. On two occasions Géza was acting as an ally of the Normans. Consequently Manuel renovated key fortresses on his border with Hungary and staged a trial to arbitrate a dispute between the Serbian ruler Uroš II and his brother Desa; the latter had ousted the former in the turmoil of the autumn of 1153.

After 1160, Manuel felt increasingly obliged to confront problems in the west. He determined to consolidate his authority in the northern Balkans and to annex the frontier regions that had fallen under Hungarian and Venetian influence: Sirmium and Dalmatia. His undertaking was successful but ephemeral. He also dispatched agents, money, and, occasionally, troops to northern Italy to support the Lombard cities in their struggle with the German emperor Frederick I Barbarossa (r. 1152–1189). This brought Manuel into closer contact with the papacy, from which the empire had become estranged, and encouraged Manuel in the notion that he could achieve church union.

Latins played an increasingly large and visible role in Manuel's court; the most conspicuous westerners were the Italian merchants. Manuel renewed the trading privileges of the Venetians and Pisans and in 1155 extended them to the Genoese. Spontaneous acts of aggression against Latins were not unknown in Constantinople, but the worst clashes accompanied political initiatives. On 12 March 1171 the emperor engineered the general arrest of Venetian merchants throughout the empire and the seizure of their property.

Between 1158 and 1162, Manuel had undertaken a number of successful campaigns to the east, obliging the Seljuk sultan, Kiliç Arslan, to recognize his overlordship. Over time, however, the sultan used the entente to expand his authority over the Danismendids. In the last years of his reign Manuel therefore determined on the eradication of Seljuk power and aimed at its center, Ikonion. In 1176, Manuel mustered a huge army and led it through the Maiander (Menderes) Valley toward Myriokephalon. There his army was ambushed and suffered a terrible defeat. The terms offered by Kiliç Arslan were generous, and Manuel's ambitions in the east did not end. The defeat greatly damaged the emperor's reputation, however, which he had gambled on a great victory. In 1177 the pope signed the Treaty of Venice with the German emperor, and the treaty made no mention of Manuel, reflecting how far and rapidly his influence had waned.

After Manuel's Death. The death of Manuel I Komnenos in 1180 had profound consequences. Béla III, Manuel's protégé who had been king of Hungary since 1172, reacted to news of the emperor's demise with the annexation of Dalmatia and Sirmium. At the same time, Stefan Nemanja declared Serbian independence and in the following years annexed Duklja and the southern Adriatic littoral, where there were many Latin bishoprics. In 1182–1183, Manuel's cousin Andronikos succeeded in removing Manuel's young son Alexios II. Before he entered the city, Andronikos ordered a massacre of Latins in Constantinople, regarding them as supporters of the regime that he intended to oust but also seeking to garner the support of the urban populace.

Andronikos had a power base in the upper echelons of the aristocracy, favoring alternative members of Manuel's, and therefore his own, extended kin group. Ultimately, however, his regime proved too cruel to secure widespread support and too brief to implement substantial reforms. Just two years after his accession, Andronikos faced a Norman invasion that

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captured Dyrrachium (Durrës) and Thessalonike. The Normans' threat to march on Constantinople precipitated the murder of Andronikos and the accession of Isaac II Angelos (r. 1185–1195), who mounted a spirited and successful counteroffensive. Isaac endured numerous coup attempts during his ten-year reign before he was overthrown and replaced by his own brother, Alexios III Angelos.

As members of the extended Komnenos family competed for control of the center, the periphery of the empire slipped from their grasp. Cities and lands fell to local dynasts in receipt of local taxes, and these dynasts were increasingly reluctant to recognize ineffectual rulers in Constantinople. Several, in regions with no history of independent rule, claimed autonomy. Notable examples are Theodore Mangaphas at Philadelphia in Asia Minor and Isaac Komnenos on Cyprus. Others, with dormant traditions of independent rule, began to throw off the Byzantine yoke and look elsewhere for patrons or symbols of power and prestige. Thus in 1185–1186 a rebellion broke out among the Vlachs and Bulgars settled near the Balkan mountains. Failing to reach an agreement with the emperor, their leaders Peter and Asen proceeded to establish an independent realm based on Preslav and Trnovo.

In 1189 the situation deteriorated still further for Isaac when Frederick Barbarossa led the German contingent in the Third Crusade across the Balkans. En route Barbarossa was approached by the Serbian ruler, Stefan Nemanja, and his brothers, who offered to provide aid against the Byzantines. Similarly, Peter and Asen sent envoys to the Germans offering forty thousand Vlach and Cuman archers for an assault on Constantinople. The German emperor was regarded as an authority who might lend legitimacy to autonomous rulers who had until recently owed loyalty to the Byzantine emperor, effectively recognizing their permanent detachment from the empire. This finally came about in 1203–1204 when Kalojan (Ioannitza), the younger brother of Peter and Asen, received his insignia of regnal and archiepiscopal office from Rome.

In the same year, 1203, the Venetian fleet that ferried the forces of the Fourth Crusade to Constantinople carried Alexios Angelos, son of the deposed Isaac II. We know from western sources that Alexios offered the Venetians full payment of the sum specified in their contract with the leaders of the Fourth Crusade. Instead of ferrying the Latins directly to the Holy Land, the fleet therefore sailed via Zadar (Zara) to Constantinople in order to install Alexios IV Angelos on the throne.

[*See also* Alexios I Komnenos; Anchialos, Battle of (917); Antioch, Siege and Battles of; Basil II; Bohemond I; Crusader Relations with Byzantium; Isaac I Komnenos; Isaac II Angelos; John I Tzimiskes; John II Komnenos; Kourkouas, John; Lechfeld, Battle on the; Levounion, Battle of; Mantzikert, Battle of; Manuel I Komnenos; Myriokephalon, Battle of; Nikephoros II Phokas; Patzinaks; Robert Guiscard; Romanos IV Diogenes; *and* Seljuks.]

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Paul Stephenson

Narrative (1204–1453)

The catastrophe of 1204 shattered Byzantium but could not kill it. The crusaders who had seized the capital had limited success in subjecting its territories. The Venetians did establish themselves in key island and coastal enclaves. The Latin empire set up in Constantinople showed brief energy under its second ruler, Henry of Flanders (r. 1206–1216), but thereafter subsided into impotence. Having become king of Thessalonike (r. 1204–1207), Boniface of Montferrat initially promoted the creation of a series of Latin principalities in Greece, notably the duchy of Athens in Attica and the principality of Achaia in the Peloponnesos. Other European areas remained unconquered, and the Latins failed to secure any territories in Asia Minor.

The Duel for Succession. As for the Byzantines themselves, their civilization refused to die. Even as the Fourth Crusade was in progress, descendants of

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the Komnenian dynasty were carving out a state of their own around the commercial and cultural center of Trebizond on the southeast corner of the Black Sea. They quickly laid claim to the imperial title and succession, only to find their expansion curtailed and their regime marginalized—though on such terms that the empire of Trebizond endured and even prospered for some two hundred and fifty years thereafter.

Checking Trapezuntine expansion was a more significant contender for Byzantine succession. Among numerous Byzantine leaders scrambling for power in parts of Asia Minor and the islands was the nobleman Theodore Laskaris, who set himself up in Nicaea and accumulated a considerable following. Besides the Komnenians of Trebizond, Theodore gradually defeated or overawed other competitors and enemies to create a stable and prosperous regime in northwestern Asia Minor. A remnant of Constantinopolitan Orthodox clergy chose a new patriarch (in exile), who in 1208 crowned Theodore as the emperor Theodore I Laskaris, thus giving him formal legitimacy as claimant to Byzantine imperial status.

The Laskarid empire of Nicaea had one major rival to contend with. In 1204 the shady Byzantine nobleman Michael Angelos succeeded in establishing himself in Epiros, in northwestern Greece. His pretensions were uncertain, but upon his death his kinsman Theodore Doukas Angelos (r. 1214–1230) undertook a forceful campaign against Latin territories. In a brilliant stroke, Theodore seized Thessalonike and had himself crowned emperor. His further military progress through Macedonia and Thrace seemed to promise his full renewal of Byzantium in the old capital. But in 1230 at the battle of Klokotnica the ambitious and expansionist Bulgarian king John Asen II defeated and captured Theodore, soon blinding him. The Epirote state thereafter fragmented, and the Angelan ambitions as the serious successor state were shattered.

More diplomat than soldier in his later years, Theodore I Laskaris left his throne to a son-in-law, John III Doukas Vatatzes (r. 1222–1254), a brilliant general as well as administrator. Under him the empire of Nicaea emerged as a secure, increasingly powerful, and remarkably prosperous regional state. Active in far-reaching diplomacy, John III strove to confirm his place in the Byzantine imperial line by successful expansion, above all into Byzantium's old European lands. His earliest venture, in 1224, proved ephemeral, but a round of new efforts against weakened Epirote elements culminated in his taking of Thessalonike in 1242.

John III's momentum was modestly maintained by his son, Theodore II Laskaris (r. 1254–1258), though with setbacks at the hands of the energetic despot of Epiros, Michael II Angelos (r. 1236–1271). Of bookish and neurasthenic personality, Theodore found it difficult to restrain the restless noble Michael Palaiologos. When Theodore died prematurely, he left a child successor, his son John IV Laskaris (r. 1258–1261), who quickly fell victim to Michael's ambitions. Michael systematically pushed the helpless John aside and assumed the throne as Michael VIII (r. 1259–1282). His forces won a landmark victory at Pelagonia in 1259 against the alliance of Michael II of Epiros, the Latin

Siege of Constantinople, 1204. Detail from the pavement of Saint John the Evangelist, 1213. BASILICA SAN GIOVANNI EVANGELISTA, RAVENNA, ITALY/GIRAUDON/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

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prince of Achaia, and the king of Sicily and ruler of southern Italy, Charles of Anjou. It was only a matter of time before the prize of Constantinople became his. In July 1261 his forces fortuitously entered the city and drove the Latins out. On 15 August, Michael VIII made a triumphal entry into the recovered capital, officially "restoring" the Byzantine Empire while confirming his grasp on the throne as the founder of that empire's last dynasty.

The "Restored" Empire of the Palaiologoi. Under the Laskarids the Nicaean empire was a successful regional state, a strong if minor power. By taking Constantinople and pretending to the grand imperial claims attached to that city, Michael VIII was, as it were, setting a great head on a body that was soon to prove too weak and unable to sustain it.

Initially Michael's ambitious policies seemed viable. He completed the containment of the Epirote despotate, which slipped into petty, dependent status after the death of Michael II Angelos. He gained a foothold in the Peloponnesian Morea, where the Byzantines gradually expanded their regime at the expense of the Latin principality of Achaia. Michael VIII also confirmed the isolation of the empire of Trebizond as an extra-Byzantine enclave.

Michael was, however, also caught up in desperate efforts to fend off the threat of western European powers to destroy him, embodied particularly in the menacing ambitions of Charles of Anjou. To that end his pretentious diplomatic ventures eventually helped cripple Charles by prompting the 1282 rising called the Sicilian Vespers, though at terrible cost to his finances. Along the way Michael sought to win the Roman papacy as a check on Charles by agreeing, through the Council of Lyons (1274), to submit the Greek Orthodox Church to the Latin Church. That step provoked bitter opposition at home, adding to the hostility of pro-Laskarid factions. Indeed, lingering Laskarid loyalties in the Asian territories contributed to Michael's negative policies there, creating a dangerous power vacuum with subsequent consequences.

The Descent to Marginality. When Michael died in 1282, scorned and vilified by his subjects, his overextensions were becoming evident. In a medieval world of rapid change, Byzantium no longer had the status or resources to be anything but a minor local state. Even that situation was jeopardized by threatening neighbors and internal mismanagement.

Michael's son and successor, Andronikos II (r. 1282–1328), already his co-emperor, was an amiable and well-intentioned man but totally lacked the abilities required by his position. He sensibly abandoned his father's hated policies of church union and sought to resolve factional disputes. He also continued to negotiate dynastic marriages for himself and his family to counter foreign claims on his lands and titles. The prime example was his second marriage to the ambitious and disruptive Yolande of Montferrat. Under Andronikos, however, the dilution of central authority grew apace at a time when the regional nobility held real political and economic power over a debased peasantry. Andronikos took his son Michael IX (r. 1295–1320) as co-emperor and began a practice of using other sons as his deputies in major cities or centers throughout imperial territories: this was his only way to bind the outlying lands to the capital and the dynasty.

Meanwhile neighboring powers began successful encroachment on Byzantine lands. Andronikos was powerless to resist the rising Balkan power of Serbia under Stefan Uroš II Milutin (r. 1281–1321), who began annexing parts of Macedonian and Albanian regions. At the same time, neglect of the Asian territories allowed the nascent Turkish state of the Ottoman house to germinate in those territories at Byzantine expense. When Michael IX's military efforts to resecure Asia Minor proved futile, Andronikos decided in 1303 to hire the fierce mercenary band known as the Catalan Grand Company, led by Roger de Flor. But their small military results were grossly outweighed by the damage they did as uncontrollable and, after Michael had Roger murdered, even rebellious elements. The Catalans pillaged their way through Byzantine territories for a few years before moving into and—after their victory at Kephissos in 1311—taking over the Latin duchy of Athens.

At a time when the Byzantine government had lost its commercial revenues to the Italian powers

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(Venice, Genoa, Pisa) that had taken command of Levantine trade, the imperial fisc became ever more dependent on regional taxation. But the losses of lands seriously reduced the tax base, and for some years Andronikos found himself unable to finance even the most minimal military forces. However Byzantium might still have struggled along on its reduced scale, its weaknesses were magnified by the first round in a pattern to which the Palaiologan house became intermittently addicted: rival claimants within the family creating factional strife. Andronikos II's irresponsible grandson and namesake became disaffected, and with the encouragement of his friend, the powerful nobleman John Kantakouzenos, he broke into open rebellion. The resulting civil war (1321–1328) devastated the countryside and made Byzantium vulnerable to intervention by the Bulgarians and Serbians. A compromise was reached by which the dwindling empire was divided between Andronikos the Elder and Andronikos the Younger, as co-emperors. But the damage was irreversible. In 1326 the Turks took Brusa (Bursa) as their new capital, and eleven years later they took Nikomedia. The new Ottoman sultanate took definitive shape under Orhan (r. 1326–1362), who ultimately reduced most of Byzantium's remaining Asian regions.

Reigning alone, Andronikos III (r. 1328–1341) could have brought some new vigor back to the throne, if only through the guidance of Kantakouzenos, now his chief minister. But beyond the Asian losses, Byzantium faced renewed European threats. With their victory over the Bulgarians at Velbužd in 1330, Serbia's Balkan ascendancy was clear. In its wake rose the mightiest and most ambitious yet of the Serbian rulers, Stefan Uroš IV Dušan (r. 1331–1355), who quickly annexed new areas of Byzantine lands. The best that Andronikos III could do was to make some gains in Epiros, Thessaly, and the Aegean islands. Ironically, the only bright spot was in the Morea, where Latin power was waning further and a successful local regime prospered under Byzantine governors.

New Strife and Degradation. The sudden death of Andronikos III brought to the throne his son, the boy John V, under the regency of his mother, the Latin-born princess Anna of Savoy. Kantakouzenos fully expected to be de facto ruler behind this facade. But the mighty minister's rival, Alexios Apokaukos, turned Anna against Kantakouzenos, who found himself driven reluctantly into rebellion, though still professing loyalty to John V.

Once again, dynastic conflict opened dwindling Byzantium to internal disruption and external vulnerability, this time on an even greater scale than before. At first Kantakouzenos was a weak contender, but his eventual progress allowed him to claim the crown formally in 1346. Born of one of the greatest landholding families in Byzantine Greece, Kantakouzenos relied heavily on the support of his fellow nobles, while the general populace tended more to support the legitimate heir, John V. It is a mistake to say that this civil war was a matter of clear-cut class conflict and division. Nevertheless the social implications of the struggle revealed grave divisions between the upper and lower orders, especially at the expense of the tiny middle class. Cities were particular theaters of social strife, none more so than the still-prosperous metropolis of Thessalonike, Byzantium's second city. Led by a militant group who called themselves Zealots, in 1342 the populace expelled or massacred the resident aristocrats and established for the next five years a kind of separatist republic, if officially loyal to the Palaiologan legitimists and Apokaukos (who was murdered in 1345). Scholars have debated extensively both the degree of social radicalism the Zealots represented and also their parallels with urban risings in western Europe.

Amid dynastic and social strife, Byzantium was further racked by its last great theological controversy over the issue called "Hesychasm." This doctrine of mystical discipline, generated by the monasteries of Mount Athos, was bitterly debated by theologians, bringing a new level of factionalism onto the scene. With the sympathy and support of Kantakouzenos, Hesychasts (also called Zealots, but in stark contrast with, and opposition to, the Thessalonian Zealots) won the day with the triumph of their champion. The chief advocate for Hesychasm was a close

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friend of Kantakouzenos, the last great Byzantine theologian, (Saint) Gregory Palamas, whose explication of Hesychast doctrine gave it the name of Palamism.

As his power and success mounted, the rebellious Kantakouzenos had to deal with threats. To help fight his battles, he took the fateful step of bringing in Turkish allies, thus making the Ottomans aware of the vulnerability of European Byzantium. Eventually Kantakouzenos was to scandalize contemporaries and posterity in general by marrying a daughter of his to the sultan Orhan I. And there was the ever-ambitious Stefan Dušan, who matched his new encroachments by proclaiming himself emperor of the Serbs, Greeks, Bulgars, and Albanians. Dušan seemed close to capping his ambitions by moving on Constantinople itself. But that was forestalled when the now-ascendant Kantakouzenos came to a power-sharing agreement with Anna of Savoy. Kantakouzenos entered the capital to be recognized as John VI (r. 1347–1354), while the rights of young John V (who became Kantakouzenos's son-in-law) were acknowledged, if subordinated.

A leader of genuine ability, John VI deserved better times for rule than the impossible ones he faced. While he was taking over Constantinople, the dreaded Black Death ravaged Byzantine lands, diminishing morale and population alike. He did what he could to hold off Dušan, to fight the dueling Genoese and Venetians, and to maintain friendship with the Turks. But in 1354 an Ottoman force seized the port city of Gallipoli on the Dardanelles and thus opened the Turkish pathway into Europe, a pathway exploited destructively in the years that followed. Dušan's death in 1355 quickly reduced Serbian power and menace, but only to clear the way to Turkish opportunities.

Kantakouzenos, who made his eldest son his co-emperor, brought new order to the ever-more-prosperous Morea by conferring its rule upon another son (whose title of "despot," meaning "lord," was the automatic one for any younger son of a reigning sovereign). In Constantinople, however, the Kantakouzenian star waned. Chafing in his supersession, the maturing John V won Genoese backing for a coup in the capital. The weary John VI agreed to abdicate at the beginning of 1355, becoming a monk, a writer, and then chief adviser to his son-in-law.

A man of profoundly mediocre abilities, John V Palaiologos at last entered in his own right into a reign that was to be disastrous and humiliating. A rare success was the eventual replacement of Kantakouzenian family rule in the Morea and the claim of its despotate as a Palaiologan appanage. But for much of his reign John had to look on helplessly as the Turks made relentless progress. At first under Ottoman freebooters, a series of Thracian cities was taken. Then with the accession of Murad I (r. 1362–1389), an able military and diplomatic leader, these territories were brought directly under the sultan's rule; with the capture of Byzantine Adrianople in 1365, that city became his residence in the new consolidation of Turkish holdings in Europe, or "Rumelia."

Alarmed, John V decided—against the advice of the anti-Latin Kantakouzenos—that Byzantium's only hope for survival would be aid from the long-hostile powers of the Latin West. His nearest hope was the king of Hungary, Louis I. A personal mission there by John yielded no more than a blockaded return by the Bulgarians—angry over a pathetic strike the Byzantines had recently made against them. At this moment the chivalric Amadeus VI, Count of Savoy (r. 1343–1383), mounted a mini-crusade that secured John's passage back to Constantinople. Colloquies there convinced the emperor that only a personal journey to Rome on behalf of church union would open the way for serious Latin aid to Byzantium. But John's visit to Rome and Venice in 1369–1370, during which he personally accepted Latin Catholicism, proved futile and embarrassing. From their new base in Adrianople, the Turks attacked Dušan's successors and in 1371 smashed them at the battle of Črnomen on the Marica River. Along with the Bulgarian king, John now found himself in the degrading position of vassal to the Ottoman sultan, and the Turks penetrated ever deeper into Balkan lands.

What Byzantium did at this point was mount another round of Palaiologan family strife. John's

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The Council of Constantinople. Byzantine emperor John VI (r. 1347–1354, center) presiding over the council. MS Gr 1242, fol. 5v, 1351. BIBLIOTHÈQUE NATIONALE, PARIS, FRANCE/ FLAMMARION GIRAUDON/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

discredited son and intended heir, with Genoese help, seized the capital, imprisoning his father and brothers and reigning as Andronikos IV (r. 1376–1379). With Venetian and Turkish intervention, John recovered his throne, yielding to a compromise with Andronikos and thus disaffecting his loyal second son, Manuel. Manuel set himself up in Thessalonike as a separatist leader against the Turks. That venture ended in failure, beginning Thessalonike's subjection to Turkish rule. Then after the death of Andronikos IV, his son (and John V's grandson) John, with further Turkish meddling, briefly seized power in Constantinople in 1390 and reigned as John VII Palaiologos. Manuel restored his father for a miserable last year on the throne. Manuel himself was serving as a vassal with the Turkish army when his father died, and only by quick action did he escape to Constantinople to claim his throne.

By this time the Byzantine Empire was a pathetic travesty of a state, limited to the city of Constantinople, some nearby Thracian and coastal points, with some islands, and the Morea. Though the emperor was himself a vassal to the infidel Turks, his situation soon worsened. On 15 June 1389 the Turks shattered the remains of Serbia at the fateful battle of Kosovo, opening those Balkan lands to Turkish control. The price was the murder of Sultan Murad I on the battlefield, bringing to power his ruthless son Bayezid I, "the Thunderbolt." Since his predecessors had conquered so much of the old Byzantine state, on both sides of the straits, Bayezid was determined to complete the job and take Constantinople as his logical capital. Content at first to impose renewed military service on Manuel, Bayezid assembled over the winter of 1393–1394 his various Christian vassals, including Manuel and his brother Theodore of the Morea. Failing to extort sufficient concessions from them, the sultan threw off pretense and initiated that spring the first Turkish siege of Constantinople, also mounting raids into the Morea. The disastrously unsuccessful Latin crusade of Nicopolis against the Turks in 1396 brought no real relief to the blockaded capital.

So humiliating was Manuel's position that his patriarch had to admonish the grand prince of Moscow for suspending the prayers traditionally due the emperor by all Orthodox. Manuel became convinced that he must go in person to the courts of western Europe to plead his case for aid. Reconciling reluctantly with his nephew, who ruled as deputy in Constantinople, Manuel spent three years traveling in the West. No real aid materialized, but the spectacular defeat and captivity of Bayezid by Timur (Tamerlane) at the battle of Ancyra in July 1402 suddenly brought reprieve—half a century's worth—to Byzantium.

In that battle's aftermath, Manuel worked out a new power-sharing arrangement with John VII and picked up diplomatic possibilities. Bayezid's fall had temporarily shattered the Ottoman advance. By picking the right side in the succession struggle among Bayezid's sons, Manuel won a temporary peace with the Turks, made some small territorial

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recoveries, took time to strengthen the Morea, and dabbled in token projects of church union with the West. But the death of Sultan Mehmed I in 1421 and the accession of Murad II (r. 1421–1444, 1446–1451) prompted restless Byzantines, under Manuel's son and co-emperor John, to play brash interventionist games. This brought down on Constantinople a new and fierce but brief Turkish siege, followed by the negotiation of a renewal of peace. Ailing and worn out, Manuel II—another late emperor worthy of a better age and state, a true grandson of Kantakouzenos—died and yielded his throne to John VIII Palaiologos (r. 1425–1448). Under him, his brother Constantine XI Palaiologos finally completed the total Byzantine control of the Peloponnesos, a last bright spot in the Palaiologan world.

The Lingering Death. Less realistic than his father, John sincerely believed that reunion of the churches was a worthy undertaking, as well as the only hope for aid against inevitable Turkish revival. He led a Byzantine delegation to an intended ecumenical council, under the aegis of Pope Eugenius IV, which began in Ferrara in 1438 and reconvened in Florence the following year. There a formal union of the churches was hammered out and proclaimed, but John returned home to bitter opposition over it. Hopes that it would at least lead to military aid were dashed when the ambitious crusade of Varna was crushed by Murad (10 November 1444).

The end was only a matter of time. Though he had threatened Constantinople once or twice, Murad had devoted most of his reign to consolidating the Turkish realm generally around the Balkans and Asia. Whereas the crusaders in 1204 had first seized the head but then could not secure the body, the Turks had done the reverse: only after first conquering the old imperial territories could they at last move on the capital. It was left to Murad's son and successor, Mehmed II, "the Conqueror," to mount the epic siege of Constantinople, at whose climax on 29 May 1453 the city fell into Turkish hands and made the Byzantine Empire formally extinct. There was still the Morea, which Mehmed gradually reduced during 1458–1460, and in 1461 he conquered that last outpost of separatist Hellenism, the empire of Trebizond.

[*See also* Ancyra, Battle of; Brusa, Siege of; Catalan Company; Constantinople, *subentries on* Siege of (1422) *and* Siege of (1453); Črnomen, Battle of; Kephissos, Battle of; Klokotnica, Battle of; Kosovo Polje, Battle of (1389); Pelagonia, Battle of; Sicilian Vespers, The; Thessalonike, Siege of (1383–1387); *and* Velbužd, Battle of.]

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John W. Barker

Historiography (500–900)

The historiography of Byzantine military organization and warfare has grown considerably since the 1970s. Much of the earlier literature was concerned chiefly with issues of organization and finance, with little attention paid to topics such as tactics and strategy, logistics, the archaeology of weapons and armor, Byzantine military technology in general, or fortifications.

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The Later Roman Period. A. H. M. Jones devoted a long chapter to the organization of the late Roman armies in his *Later Roman Empire*, and this remains a useful survey summing up the results of the previous generation of researchers. Presenting a masterly account of the history of late Roman military institutions from the beginning of the reign of Diocletian (284) to the end of that of Maurice (602), the chapter examines successively the origins and role of federate troops within the empire, the structure and role of the imperial field armies and guards regiments, methods and sources of recruitment, pay, rations, and equipment, conditions of service, career structure, tactical and unit organization and development, strategic dispositions, morale and discipline, categories of soldier, and officers and their social origins, ending with an account of the army in the sixth century, presented under the same headings. This is thus primarily a structural and descriptive analysis, although the processes of change are also highlighted and explained.

More recent works have supplemented, expanded, and built on Jones's work, as well as on that of a number of other scholars, such as Dietrich Hoffmann on the *Notitia Dignitatum* and the late Roman field armies. The English-language works by Pat Southern and Karen Dixon and by Hugh Elton bring the subject up to date by incorporating in particular the fruits of modern archaeological work, an area largely neglected by Jones. Of these, Southern and Dixon's work presents a structured and thematic analysis, looking at the context of the later third and early fourth centuries, during which recognizably late Roman institutions emerged, and tracing the evolution of the imperial armies from Constantine I (r. 306–337) to Justinian (r. 527–565). The book examines recruitment, conditions of service, equipment, fortifications, siege warfare, morale, and the fate of the armies, especially in the West, during the fifth century. In contrast, Elton examines the evolution of the western Roman armies only up to the middle of the fifth century, but he does so in the context of the armies' political as well as purely military or administrative role. He also looks at the evolution of battlefield tactics in the period, an issue largely ignored elsewhere.

Benjamin Isaac initiated a new approach when he set out to examine a different aspect of late Roman military history, analyzing the strategic and political evolution of the army in the East over the whole period from the first century C.E. to the fifth and sixth centuries, thus placing developments in the fifth through seventh centuries in their long-term context. He concentrates on political and social aspects of the army's effects on society rather than on administrative and organizational issues, although he devotes substantial space to the organization of the armies of the Principate (first to third centuries) and of the fourth century with regard to how they reflected broader social-economic and political priorities of Roman rule. Particularly important are Isaac's treatment of the role of the military in the urban structure of Roman society and political life and his treatment of the ideological as well as political and economic functions of veteran colonies. The section devoted to the later empire is short but in the overall context extremely illuminating. Especially important are Isaac's general conclusions with regard to the nature of the frontier, which he shows to have been not simply—if ever—a theoretical or actual linear border, but rather a region or zone, depending for its value and function on circumstances and the strategic perspective and imperatives of the time.

Another new initiative was Walter Kaegi's analysis of military unrest: mutinies, revolts led by officers or subalterns, refusals to fight, and related actions. Kaegi attempted to place this unrest in its social and political context, covering a somewhat later period, from the later third to the middle of the ninth century. After beginning with a useful survey of the political role of soldiers and officers in the fifth century, the book then proceeds to a discussion of the reign of Justinian and the various instances of military unrest depicted in the contemporary sources. One chapter dealing with the Balkans and another dealing with the eastern frontiers then deepen this discussion, leading on to a general discussion of the causes and effects of military action on the internal and external politics of the empire

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during the seventh and eighth centuries. Kaegi's work makes a serious effort to situate soldiers and the military as a set of institutions and practices in a social context and to relate the political activities of soldiers to a broader historical context. Although there are some methodological issues that the book does not address, it is an important contribution and has substantially influenced discussion since its publication in 1981.

A useful collection edited by Averil Cameron in 1995 represents the results of a workshop on the form and function of the military in the late Roman and early Islamic world. It is particularly concerned to examine the ways in which the availability of resources in manpower and materials affected patterns of recruitment and the organization of armies, with further effects on the government's foreign and domestic—especially fiscal—policy. New ground is broken in this volume in the papers by J.-M. Carrié and Michael Whitby on military finance and recruitment in the fifth to early seventh centuries, and comparative surveys of Sassanid Persian and early Islamic military and fiscal structures serve to place the discussions of late Roman institutions in their wider historical context.

Recent work, of which the articles in Cameron's volume are good examples, seeks a more dynamic and integrated view of the role of the army in the late Roman state and society, while also attempting to evaluate its tactical and strategic successes and failures within the framework of the technologies, communications, resources, and other infrastructural elements determining its structure and evolution. This appears to mark a clear break with the dominant tradition up to the 1960s, in which the assumed failure of Roman arms was still explained in terms of usually implicit moral issues. The regular conferences on late Roman military history, on late Roman military equipment and military technology, on the frontiers, and on the relationship between the military and society or the economy all illustrate the thriving nature of the debate and the state of the subject.

The Byzantine Period. As with the later Roman period, much of the work on Byzantine military organization, technology, and warfare is not available in English, but recent publications enable the English reader to obtain a good overall view of the state of current scholarly opinion on all major issues. Warren Treadgold's work has been concerned primarily with the size and financing of the late Roman and Byzantine armies. Using often complex calculations based on a wide range of sources, he attempts to calculate the exact size of units of different categories in the later Roman and middle Byzantine periods and, in conjunction with a few scattered figures in the medieval sources, attempts to extrapolate exact figures for the military budget of the empire at certain key moments (fifth and sixth centuries, ninth century, eleventh century). Most scholars reject these figures or question the methodology through which they were generated, so that the book on military finance and the budget as a whole is difficult to use. The debate on finances and numbers—of which the volume is part—continues, and in this respect Treadgold is keen to emphasize the larger estimates for the size of the imperial forces, preferring relatively large figures for the imperial field armies based at Constantinople, as well as for the provincial or "thematic" divisions.

Eric McGeer made an important contribution with his analysis of the Byzantine army in the tenth century, founded on the presentation in a critical edition with English translation and extensive commentary of an important late-tenth-century military handbook written by an active general. But the book ranges far more widely than this, looking at the evolution of tactics in the Byzantine armies from the ninth century onward, the fiscal basis for military service and recruitment, the weaponry and technology of Byzantine armies of the period, and the strategic development of imperial policy from the ninth century. The book also includes an excellent analysis and account of the empire's major opponents in the East, the armies of the various emirates of northern Syria and Mesopotamia. The importance of military expansionism at this period for the growth and consolidation of a relatively new magnate elite, which came to dominate the provincial

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and Constantinopolitan military administration, is also discussed.

John Haldon's work has focused on specific aspects of military financing and organization, as well as on military technology, and his work is the first directly to address issues of logistics at length. His volume on Byzantine warfare and society presents the only synthesis in any language of the history of Byzantine military institutions and warfare across the whole period up to 1204. Although concerned with all aspects of imperial military history, the work concentrates on social-cultural, administrative, and institutional evolution; the ways in which the empire assessed, collected, and consumed resources in manpower and materials to support its armies; and how this affected social relations as well as cultural attitudes and behavior. Haldon underlines the relative lack of uniformity of structures and administrative arrangements that characterizes the Byzantine armies of the period, and he tends also to emphasize lower numbers for units and divisions, arguing that the logistical base and the nature of communications and transport was insufficient to support the much larger forces that some figures derived from the sources might appear to suggest.

An important volume of papers, edited by Kostas Tsiknakis, from a conference organized by Nicolas Oikonomidès offers insights into a range of related topics for the period from the ninth to the twelfth century, with chapters by thirteen scholars on different facets of imperial military organization, attitudes to fighting, and relations with the empire's enemies. Examined are the relationships among landholding, recruitment, and the maintenance of the field armies; the logistics of field expeditions; tactical and battlefield structures in theory and practice; the assessment of the field strength of the forces before battle; siege warfare; concepts of fighting and bravery; military intelligence; and diplomacy.

The English-language literature is only part of the picture, of course. Important works include that by Ralph-Johannes Lilie on the evolution of Byzantine military structures in the face of the Arab conquests, that by Taxiarchēs Kolias on Byzantine weapons and armor, that by Gilbert Dagron on the guerrilla warfare of the eastern frontiers, or that by Paul Meinrad Strässle on warfare and strategy in the later tenth century.

[*See also* Frontiers; Obligation, Military; Theory, Military; *and* Treatises, *subentry on* Byzantine.]

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John Haldon

Historiography (900–1204)

The first part of the tenth century has received attention for Byzantium's wars with Bulgaria, and the second part has received attention for those in the East, led by Nikephoros Phokas and John Tzimiskes. One should now start with Eric McGeer, but there is still great value in Steven Runciman's *Emperor Romanus Lecapenus.* Since the 1970s the eleventh and twelfth centuries have received much scholarly attention, particularly in Britain and France, that has done much to revise the dominant interpretation established by George Ostrogorsky. He had argued that the empire achieved its medieval apogee under Basil II, who acquired parts of the Caucasus in about 1000 and annexed Bulgaria in 1018.

A number of recent works have reappraised Basil II's policies and his legacy, casting doubt on the notion that the reign was one of unalloyed power and achievement (Paul Magdalino, ed., *Byzantium*). In "The Balkan Frontier," Paul Stephenson offers commentary on the empire's predicament during the reign of—and as it was bequeathed by—Basil II, on the methods employed to deal with subject peoples and neighbors during periods of war and peace, and on the flow of resources within the empire's Balkan lands. A complementary interpretation, but with significant disagreements on military policy, is offered by Jonathan Shepard ("Byzantium in Equilibrium," "Byzantium Expanding") and Catherine Holmes ("Byzantium's Eastern Frontier," "Political Elites"). It may be that before 1014, Basil saw the Balkan lands as a theater for exercising his troops, and that only after the death in that year of Czar Samuel was he committed to the defeat and annexation of Bulgaria.

For dealings with the Hungarians, nomads, southern Slavs, and Normans in the eleventh and twelfth centuries see Ferenc Makk, Petre Diaconu, and Stephenson's *Byzantium's Balkan Frontier.* The Hungarians were a sustained threat to Byzantine suzerainty over their southern Slavic neighbors, notably in Raška and Dalmatia. An inability to force the northern nomads, primarily Pechenegs (Patzinaks) but also Cumans, into pitched battles fostered the development of a policy that promoted trade at the lower Danube to deter raids. In the later eleventh century the Normans posed the greatest threat to the southern Balkans, and the Byzantines relied on Venetian sea power to contain them. An increased reliance on allies and mercenaries may not initially have been a detriment, but the disappearance of provincial forces ultimately rendered the empire unable effectively to resist new forces that arose during the twelfth century.

For the army and military affairs in the twelfth century one must start with John W. Birkenmeier and Jean-Claude Cheynet, turning to Michael Angold's "Byzantine State," Charles M. Brand, Jonathan Harris, and Ralph-Johannes Lilie for the broader context and for the Crusades. The Crusades have been broadly

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covered by Shepard ("Aspects," "When Greek," "Father," "Cross-Purposes"), and the prose of Runciman's *History* is timeless. A more recent political overview of the period is presented in the *Cambridge History of the Byzantine Empire*, edited by Shepard. This may usefully be compared to Magdalino ("Medieval Empire," *Byzantium*), as well as to the volume edited by Margaret Mullett and Dion Smythe. The period 1025–1204 is comprehensively covered by Angold in *Church and Society* and *Byzantine Empire*; the latter's political history synthesizes and supplements research to 1984, the date of its first edition, and provides two fine critical surveys of major publications from then until the second edition. The dominant interpretation now highlights the precarious balancing act performed by an empire unable to engage on two fronts and increasingly unable to resist encroachments from Latins and Turks or to crush rebellion by Vlachs and Bulgars.

[*See also* Basil II; Cumans; Hungary; John I Tzimiskes; Nikephoros II Phokas; Norman Conquests, Norman Expansion; Slavic Lands; *and* Vlachs.]

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Paul Stephenson

Historiography (1204–1453)

Since the first definition of "Byzantine" history in the seventeenth century, the empire's final two and a half centuries have been looked down upon in relation to what went before. Both Edward Gibbon, who regarded Byzantine history generally as a burdensome obligation, and George Finlay, who was an enthusiastic Hellenist, reacted with degrees of backhanded contempt to the late epochs as no more than morasses of hopeless decadence. Amid even the thriving of Byzantinological scholarship during the past century or so, the eras after the Crusades, especially after the Fourth Crusade (1204), still are looked at askance by many "mainstream" specialists. To be sure, that was not so with George Ostrogorsky's landmark *Geschichte des byzantinischen Staates* (1940; English trans., *History of the Byzantine State,* 1968). Scholars in Greece have given more attention than others to the late period, a pioneer being Apostolos E. Vacalopoulos in his *Historia tou neou Hellēnismou* (1961; English trans., *Origins of the Greek Nation: The Byzantine Period, 1204–1461,* 1970). Nevertheless, general diminution of interest can still be found in Warren Treadgold's massive *A History of the Byzantine State* (1997).

It has become clear, however, that in its very decline the final Byzantine centuries tell us much about the strengths and character of Byzantine civilization in general. Recognition has now been given to the great Byzantine artistic flourishing in the late period, as well as to the vital contributions made by late-Byzantine intellectuals to Italian Renaissance humanism. Scholars in a range of specialties also

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understand the importance of late Byzantium in the contexts of Balkan and early Ottoman history. Such mounting perceptions have elevated the Laskarid and Palaiologan eras to a field of richly diversified study, not least in aspects of military history.

Surveys. For the backbone subject of political history, there have been important broad studies. The pioneering historical overview of Laskarid Nicaea was made by Alice Gardner and has been supplemented by Michael Angold's probing social and institutional study, as well as by Clive Foss's essay (with translated texts), *Nicaea: A Byzantine Capital and Its Praises.* A masterly overview of the entire Palaiologan era is *The Last Centuries of Byzantium, 1261–1453* by Donald M. Nicol, who has also contributed a large number of other important studies, notably two books on the despotate of Epirus. William Miller's *Trebizond: The Last Greek Empire* remains the only comprehensive treatment of a subject that deserves new coverage, although extensive contributions have been made by Anthony Bryer, especially his *The Empire of Trebizond and the Pontos.*

The post-1204 Latin world parallel to surviving Byzantium has its classic treatment in William Miller's *The Latins in the Levant.* This may now be supplemented by Peter Lock's *The Franks in the Aegean* and by Nicolas Cheetham's *Mediaeval Greece,* as well as by the textual collection assembled by Marios Philippides, *Mehmed II the Conqueror and the Fall of the Franco-Byzantine Levant to the Ottoman Turks.*

The end of the Byzantine Empire is also the beginning of the Ottoman Empire. Basic treatments are those by Halil Inalcik and Colin Imber. Also important is the collection of stimulating essays edited by Anthony Bryer and Heath Lowry, *Continuity and Change in Late Byzantine Society and Early Ottoman Society.* Byzantium's Slavic hinterland is treated in John V. A. Fine Jr.'s monumental *The Late Medieval Balkans.* More specific is the posthumous publication of George C. Soulis's *The Serbs and Byzantium.* See also John W. Barker's essay, "The Question of Ethnic Antagonisms among Balkan States of the Fourteenth Century."

Historical Monographs. Uneven impetus to historical study has been given by the publication of works on individual emperors. The only Laskarid thus addressed has been John III Vatatzes, in some studies by John S. Langdon. Conrad Chapman's antiquated treatment of the first Palaiologan emperor has yielded to the important treatment by Deno J. Geanakoplos, but Geanakoplos's work, like that of Angeliki Laiou-Thomadakis on Michael's successor, *Constantinople and the Latins: The Foreign Policy of Andronicus II,* deals with only part of the respective reigns. Andronikos III has been the subject of an important study (in German) by Ursula V. Bosch, and Nicol has climaxed his Kantakouzenian studies (e.g., *The Byzantine Family of Kantakouzenos*) with a study on John VI, *The Reluctant Emperor.* A hard-to-find Polish study aside, for John V one must still use the old and somewhat narrow work of Oskar Halecki. For the antepenultimate emperor there is John W. Barker's *Manuel II Palaeologus,* to which should be added George T. Dennis's *The Reign of Manuel II Palaeologus in Thessalonica.* John VIII still awaits a full monograph, but Constantine XI has been treated by Nicol in *The Immortal Emperor* and by Marios Philippides in a forthcoming work. Still the dominant treatment of the victorious Turkish sultan is the large monograph by Franz Babinger.

For the important and semi-independent regime in the Peloponnesos, the two-volume study by Dion A. Zakythenos remains standard. A more recent and brisk introduction is Steven Runciman's *Mistra, Byzantine Capital of the Peloponnese.*

Internal Institutions and Military Affairs. The treatment of internal institutions is still inconsistent. A somewhat thin attempt by Léon-Pierre Raybaud covers only part of the last centuries, from 1258 to 1354. On an aspect of governmental decentralization, see John W. Barker, "The Problem of Appanages in the Palaiologan Period." Angeliki Laiou-Thomadakis has contributed much to the understanding of Byzantine economic life, as in her article "The Byzantine Economy in the Mediterranean Trade System, Thirteenth–Fifteenth Centuries." She also explored other important aspects of the Palaiologan era in her *Peasant Society in the Late Byzantine Empire.* The Palaiologan age was punctuated by serious social

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stresses and explosions. The disruptive upheaval of the Zealot rising in Thessalonica still awaits comprehensive new explication, but a sketch of its complex history and interpretations will be found in John W. Barker's "Late Byzantine Thessalonike."

The picture of late Byzantium as simply a ruined state dependent upon the risks of mercenary employment is simplistic. Just what merits and successes balanced the deficiencies of military resources and organization has been explored extensively by Mark C. Bartusis, best represented in his important study *The Late Byzantine Army*, which sketches the military history of the era and explores what can be established of resources, organization, and practices. On a more superficial and popularizing level, the booklet by Ian Heath and Angus McBride in the Osprey series is a useful introduction. For fortresses and siege resistance, later sections in the study by Clive Foss and David Winfield are relevant. Unfortunately, although such writers as Emperor Theodore II Laskaris and especially the emperor-historian John VI Kantakouzenos were seasoned generals, their accounts usually report campaigns, sieges, and battles in fairly general terms, with little detail on field events. Exceptions to that generalization are at least two sieges of Constantinople by the Turks: one, in 1422, is described briefly but with great detail by John Kananos, and the other, in 1453, has the numerous and detailed sources that are exploited in a number of modern studies.

[*See also* Byzantine Attitudes Toward War; Constantinople; Crusader Relations with Byzantium; Crusades; Ottoman Armies and Military Methods; *and* Slavic Lands.]

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John W. Barker

Military Ranks, Army and Navy

The *Strategikon* attributed to the emperor Maurice (r. 582–602) provides a useful introduction to the system of ranks in the Byzantine army at the end of the sixth century, but it must be used with caution. Some titles probably were not used precisely. The issue of changes in organizational structure in later centuries is complicated both by the likely use of synonymous terminology and by differences in terminology according to the nature of the source—for example, hagiography as contrasted with the military manual.

The *Strategikon* focuses mainly on the cavalry and indicates that the basic cavalry unit, called *bandon* or *arithmos*, was commanded by a *komes* (meaning "count"). Within the *bandon*, the *hekatontarches* in

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theory commanded one hundred men; one of them was called the *ilarches* and was second in command to the *komes*. Files, presumably of ten men, had a *dekarches* leading them, and within the files a *pentarches* and *tetrarches* (also called the *ouragos*, "file closer") were in charge of subunits of five and four men, respectively, including themselves. There were also standard-bearers (*bandophoroi*) and messengers (*mandatores*).

Maurice indicates that *banda* were grouped into a *moira* or *chiliarchy* (two thousand to three thousand men) under the command of a *moirarches*, also called a *doux* or *chiliarches*; that three *moirai* were grouped into a *meros*, headed by a *merarches* or *stratelates*; but that the center *meros* was headed by the lieutenant general (*hypostrategos*). The entire force was under the command of the general (*strategos*). By the mid-seventh century the titles of these senior officers appear to have become somewhat standardized as *droungarios* (for *moirarches*) and *tourmarches* (for *merarches*).

This basic structure can be found in the thematic, or provincial, armies of the centuries that followed. The professional regiments (*tagmata*) initially formed under Constantine V after 743 were led by an officer titled *domestikos* (except the Vigla, which was led by a *droungarios*), with one or two second-in-command officers titled *topoteretes*. There was an administrative officer (*chartoularios*) and a head messenger (*protomandator*). In the absence of the emperor the *domestikos* of the Scholai in time became the commander of the entire army. About 960 this function was divided with the creation of *domestikoi* of the East and the West, although the former retained higher status. At the next level were the *banda* with a rank structure similar to that described by Maurice.

This structure served as the basis of the Byzantine army into the early tenth century and is found largely repeated in the *Taktika* (4.6–8) of the emperor Leo VI (c. 905) and in Arab sources, although with some variations in titles and particularly in unit sizes. In the mid-tenth century some significant changes become apparent. The title *taxiarches* occurs first in a military manual of the mid-tenth century for the leader of a unit of a thousand men, and the titles *archegetes* or *hoplitarches* are found for the leader of an infantry force in the field. One also finds *stratopedarches*, a title created by the emperor Nikephoros II Phokas to allow a eunuch to serve as a commander, the more usual title not being available to eunuchs.

The middle Byzantine period provides the clearest example of the rank structure of the navy. There were three thematic fleets: one each of the Aegean, of Samos, and of the Kibyrrhaiotai (named after the town of Kibyrrha in coastal Caria). Each was led by a *droungarios* who was assisted by a *topoteretes*, a *chartoularios*, a *protomandator*, and various staff *komites*. Squadrons of ships were headed by a *komes* or *droungariokomes*; individual ship captains were titled *kentarchos* or *nauarchos*, and there were two helmsmen, or *protokaraboi*. The imperial fleet stationed at Constantinople was under the command of the *droungarios tou ploimou*, with subordinates bearing titles similar to those of the thematic structure. In the late eleventh century the navy was reorganized with the creation of the *megas doux* as admiral in charge of the entire fleet, and the *droungarios tou ploimou* (now titled the *megas droungarios*) became his subordinate.

The rank structure of the late Byzantine army, particularly at command levels, is complicated by the fact that titles were related more to precedence in the imperial court than to function. The emperor himself might lead a campaign, or the *megas domestikos* might do so in his absence. The treatise *On Offices*, written by the anonymous Pseudo-Kodinos between 1347 and 1368, provides the titles of officers subordinate to the *megas domestikos*, including the *protostrator* and *krites* (judge) of the army, titles known from earlier periods, and apparently newly created titles including the *megas konostaulos* ("grand constable," initially head of the Frankish mercenaries), the *megas adnoumiastes* (an officer who conducted the muster and maintained inventories of horses and arms), and the *megas stratopedarches* (an officer responsible for basic camp necessities).

[*See also* Constantine V; Kings as Military Leaders; Maurice; *and* Treatises, *subentry on* Byzantine.]

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Denis F. Sullivan

Regiments

The Greek term *tagma* (plural *tagmata*) was applied in the mid-eighth century C.E. to two newly constituted regimental units of the Byzantine army. These units were created by the emperor Constantine V following a revolt in 743 by the thematic army of the Opsikion *thema* (province) of northwestern Asia Minor. That force had been the de facto field army of the empire, and the emperor's subsequent downsizing of the Opsikion created a need for a new force structure. In contrast to the thematic armies, which consisted of soldiers who supported themselves from grants of land, were dispersed and slow to mobilize, and had regional loyalties, the new units constituted a readily mobilized core of the field army, to be supplemented by the thematic forces. They were regularly paid, full-time professional soldiers, equipped by the central government, highly disciplined, and stationed near Constantinople. They were also recruited to be loyal to the emperor and to support his iconoclastic beliefs; their commanders were directly under the emperor and in regular contact with him.

The new units, the Scholai and the Exkoubitoi, were heavy cavalry and retained the names of older imperial guard units that originated with Constantine I and Leo I. By the time of their reorganization these had ceased to have any significant military effectiveness and were primarily parade troops. Two other preexisting infantry units, the Noumera and the Walls, were also reorganized, with responsibility for the supervision of the imperial prisons and the walls of the palace. The support of the *tagmata* for iconoclasm is evidenced in their disruption of the Ecumenical Council of 786 in Nicaea when troops of the Scholai, the Exkoubitoi, and the other regiments threatened with bare swords the patriarch and bishops gathered in the Church of the Holy Apostles and broke up the council.

Two other heavy cavalry regiments were added later, the Vigla and the Hikanatoi. The former was apparently created by Empress Irene (r. 780–802) for personal security as a counter to the two existing *tagmata* that had opposed her iconodule beliefs. She also purged the ranks of the Scholai and Exkoubitoi and replaced them with troops loyal to her. The Hikanatoi regiment was formed by the emperor Nikephoros I about 810. The unit initially comprised the adolescent sons of military officers. In 811 it suffered a severe defeat at the hands of the Bulgarians, with almost all killed. Other *tagmata* were created in subsequent centuries. In 970, for example, the emperor John I Tzimiskes created the Immortals, named after the famous Persian unit. The historian Leo the Deacon says that John "bade them to remain at his side" and subsequently describes their success at Preslav, where "sheathed in armor" they rode with spears couched against the Rus' enemy and routed them. This *tagma* was apparently disbanded by Basil II but reconstituted under Michael II after the battle of Mantzikert in 1071.

The size of the tagmatic units is contested. Arab sources suggest that there were four thousand men in each unit, a figure accepted by Treadgold but contested by Haldon, who argues for smaller units of one thousand to fifteen hundred men. Evidence for ranks and subunits of the *tagmata* is scarce for the eighth century; later sources indicate that unit organization was similar for all, but with variations in titles. A *tagma* was led by an officer titled *domestikos* (except the Vigla, which was led by a *drougarios*), with one or two second-in-command officers

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titled *topoteretes*. There was an administrative officer (*chartoularios*) and a head messenger (*protomandator*). In the absence of the emperor the *domestikos* of the Scholai in time became the commander of the entire army. About 960 this function was divided with the creation of *domestikoi* of the East and the West, although the former retained higher status. At the next level were subunits, termed *banda* (singular *bandon*), of perhaps fifty men, each headed by a *komes*. Within the *banda* were junior officers—a *kentarch*, a *dekarch*, and a *pentarch*—and a standard-bearer and messenger.

A valuable example of a tagmatic recruit is provided by the *Life of Saint Ioannikios*. As a young man, Ioannikios joined the eighteenth *bandon* of the regiment of the Exkoubitors and converted to iconoclasm. One version of his *Life* describes his conduct at the battle of Markellai (Marcellae, 792), where the Byzantines were defeated by the Bulgarian khan Kardamos. Ioannikios reputedly saved the life of Emperor Constantine VI and decapitated one enemy who was slaughtering Ioannikios's comrades. His experience of battle apparently led him to desert from the army and become an Orthodox monk.

[*See also* Basil II; Byzantine Attitudes Toward War; Christianity; Constantine V; John I Tzimiskes; Mantzikert, Battle of; Recruitment, *subentry on* Byzantine Recruitment and Conscription; Saints, Military; Saints' Lives; *Themata* (Themes); Treatises, *subentry on* Byzantine; *and* Weapons, *subentry on* Byzantine.]

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BYZANTIUM

See Byzantine Empire.

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Shelley Reid; see Byzantine Empire, *subentry on* Narrative (500–900)

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Caballeros Villanos

The *caballería villana* (non-noble knighthood) developed mainly in Castilian frontier towns during the latter's slow southward advance into Andalusia. While all citizens were duty-bound to defend their towns in one way or another, the *caballeros villanos* or *populares* (municipal or popular knights) became a distinctive group. Upon achieving a certain income, any resident (*vecino*) who maintained a house in the town could choose to purchase and keep a horse, armor, and weaponry and to serve as a knight in both offensive and defensive operations. In return for this service, the individual *caballero* received tax-exempt status, his horse and equipment could not be confiscated to pay debts for as long as they were maintained, and he had the eligibility to hold office in the town's *concejo* (council). The fiscal, political, and social advantages accompanying this type of mounted service made it particularly attractive. The *caballeros villanos*' duties and privileges, which varied somewhat from place to place, were set down in the Castilian *fueros* during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

By the start of the fourteenth century, this particular institution appears to have been in decline. As the frontier moved progressively southward, the ranks of *caballeros villanos* diminished, as the costs associated with the knightly accoutrements had become so onerous that only a wealthy elite could afford them, and others simply chose not to serve. Perhaps as a result of this, a second type of popular knighthood developed: the *caballería de cuantía* "knighthood by wealth." This institution operated much as did that of the *caballero villano* except that advancement into the knightly ranks was mandatory after a certain income had been achieved. The confusion associated with the diverse local requirements and practices prompted Alfonso XI (r. 1312–1350) in his *Ordenamiento de Alcalá* (1348) to do away altogether with the voluntary knighthood (the so-called Castilian system) and replace it with the Leonese or obligatory one, stipulating as well the required incomes for towns across the realm. The resulting short-term increase in those compelled to serve no doubt increased the number of knights available in Castile, yet led to this institution's steady decline. Even so, the service of the *caballeros villanos* was regulated throughout the Middle Ages, as in the *Cortes de Valladolid* (1385).

The traditional view, set down by Claudio Sánchez Albornoz and his students, saw the institution of popular knighthood as the exclusive province of rugged frontier individuals whose background lay in either agricultural or pastoral pursuits. The merchant, professional, and artisanal groups were excluded, except in a few cases such as commercially oriented Burgos. Furthermore, the *caballeros villanos* retained their character into the late medieval

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period. This view, along with the sources on which it is based, have been challenged and reassessed to show, for example, that wealthy merchants and other professional classes were amply represented within the ranks of the *caballeros villanos*, or at the least were not excluded by the bulk of the *fueros* and other related legislation.

[*See also* Alfonso XI of Castile *and* Band, Chivalric Order of the.]

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CAEN, SIEGE OF

On 1 August 1417 Henry V (r. 1413–1422) landed near what is now Trouville at the head of an army of some eleven thousand combatants. He brought a substantial siege train, and his objective was the conquest of Normandy. His first target was the town of Caen.

In addition to strong walls, which had been reinforced after the English sack of the town in 1346, Caen had significant water defenses. The lower town was built on an island in the river Orne, although it did not occupy the entire land area of the island, and the western wall was supplemented by a water-filled ditch. The upper town (dominated by the castle) was also partially defended by the river and by steep slopes.

Henry's brother Thomas, Duke of Clarence, took up position outside Caen on 14 August, taking the defenders sufficiently by surprise to prevent the demolition of the suburbs, and seized the two great abbeys built by William the Conqueror. These served as headquarters for the besieging army and light artillery was mounted on their towers. Henry, along with the main body of his forces and the siege train, arrived on 18 August.

Henry based himself at the Abbaye aux Hommes to the west. A portable bridge was constructed across the Orne to facilitate communications between units of the besieging army. The initial focus of the siege was the lower town, with the walls coming under heavy bombardment from both the western and eastern sides. In addition, the English attempted to undermine the walls, an enterprise countered by the defenders who filled bowls with water and placed them in threatened parts of the defenses to detect the tunneling and direct counter mining.

By 4 September the artillery had made partial breaches. After hearing three masses, Henry launched



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his assault along the west side of the walls. The English attack was hindered by the fact that their ladders were too short and was initially repelled in fierce fighting, with the defenders incinerating wounded attackers with burning straw. Clarence's attack on the east, however, was more successful. His men established a foothold in the town and pushed west. The defenders were caught between the two forces. The town was taken street by street and thoroughly pillaged; it was claimed that two thousand of the defenders died in the marketplace. The brutality of the storm may have been designed to intimidate other Norman towns into surrender.

The upper town and castle were now blockaded. After negotiations it was agreed that these would surrender on favorable terms unless relieved by 19 September. When no relief force appeared, the surrender was taken. The prospect of a relief was minimal. Political instability had plagued France for more than a decade. At the time Henry's campaign in Normandy was unfolding, John, Duke of Burgundy, was advancing on Paris against the royal government headed by the count of Armagnac, and French military efforts focused on this threat. Henry V was left undisturbed to consolidate his position in Normandy during and after the siege of Caen.

[*See also* Henry V.]

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CAERLAVEROCK, SIEGE OF

The siege of Caerlaverock took place on 9–10 July 1300 at Caerlaverock Castle, eight miles south of Dumfries on the shores of the Solway Firth in Galloway, between a force led by King Edward I of England and a Scottish garrison controlling the castle.

Southwestern Scotland had been a troublesome area for Edward I during the first phase of the Scottish Wars of Independence (1296–1328), and he left his base at Carlisle to lay siege to the castle, which he needed to capture in order to complete his conquest of Galloway.

The castle, built of red sandstone in a unique triangular shape, was held by a garrison of only about a hundred men, while the English army consisted of between 2,000 and 3,000 men, including 1,400 archers, 93 men-at-arms, 5 hobelars (hobblers), and 3 crossbowmen from the English-controlled garrisons of Berwick, Roxburgh, Jedburgh, and Lochmaben. Also included were 87 English barons as well as knights from Brittany and Lorraine. Edward's force made an easterly approach from Carlisle across the border, bringing siege engines from Carlisle, Roxburgh, and Jedburgh.

The army was divided into four battalions—the first and second led, respectively, by Henry de Lacy, Earl of Lincoln, and John de Warenne, Earl of Surrey. King Edward himself led the third, which consisted largely of members of his household, and finally, Prince Edward, the king's son, had nominal command of the fourth division, led in practice by Sir John de Saint John. The poem *La Siège de Karlaverock*, which chronicles the entire campaign, pays great attention to the role played by the chivalric knights and describes their heraldry with much ceremony. The actual role of the men-at-arms, though, was not so indispensable, as the boggy terrain around the castle—which was also surrounded by a moat—rendered them mostly useless and meant that King Edward relied instead on his siege engines and archers. When his navy arrived with further engines from Skinburness, Edward gave the command to commence the siege.

Though very heavily outnumbered, the Scots held off the battering of the English siege engines for a full day and night, mostly by lobbing stones over the walls at their enemies. The following morning at tierce (9 A.M.) the constable, Walter Benechafe (or perhaps Benechase), surrendered the castle after a breach was forced in the walls and the roof had collapsed. Some sixty men in the garrison survived the attack—the constable and eleven others were imprisoned at Newcastle and ten prisoners were

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taken to Appleby Castle in Westmorland. Others might have been held in Carlisle. The remaining men of the garrison were probably hanged, not rewarded with a new robe by Edward I as the contemporary poem recounting the siege claims.

This poem, sometimes assumed to have been written by the Franciscan Walter of Exeter, was used as propaganda following the siege, to highlight Edward I's capture of the castle. It remains invaluable for its description of a medieval castle-siege as well as the chivalric heraldry of the early fourteenth century.

[*See also* Edward I of England *and* Epic Poetry.]

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CAERNARFON CASTLE

See Welsh Castles of Edward I.

CALAIS, SIEGE OF (1346–1347)

On 3 September 1346, one week after his remarkable victory over the French at Crécy, King Edward III of England (r. 1327–1377) laid siege to the port town of Calais. Edward had sworn not to return to England until he had ended the war, but to continue his campaign he needed supplies and reinforcements from England. He also needed another victory, even more decisive than the last, over Philip VI of France (r. 1328–1350). The threat to Calais would either bring the French king to battle once more or result in its capture for future use as an English port and stronghold on the Continent.

Calais' defenses enabled it to withstand a long siege: it had multiple walls and moats on three of its sides and the English Channel on the fourth. It



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was also stocked with food and supplies to last its ten thousand citizens for nine months. Sir Jean de Vienne, assisted by Jean de Surie and Arnoul d'Audrehem, commanded the defense. Outside Calais, Edward constructed a fortified town and called it "Villeneuve-le-Hardi." Surrounded by wooden walls and a series of trenches, it protected his army from harassment until Philip arrived. Contemporaries recorded that the siege camp grew to rival the markets of Amiens and Arras. It was supplied mainly from Flanders because the Genoese ships that patrolled the English Channel sank or seized many English ships and their cargo.

The strength of the English army may have peaked at more than thirty thousand, of whom half were archers. Ultimately it was the largest and longest-sustained army that an English king raised during the Hundred Years' War. Edward did not want to risk his men by assaulting the walls directly, and the marshy terrain prevented the traditional siege techniques of mining or employing heavy siege engines. Thus Edward sought to outlast the defenders of Calais and to wait for Philip's relief army. In the interim he engaged in numerous clashes with the garrison of Calais, who were likewise eager to end the siege. To provide for his great force and to draw Philip once more to battle, Edward frequently dispatched troops of cavalry to pillage and harass the surrounding countryside.

Before actually risking another direct confrontation, Philip requested that David II of Scotland

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invade England from the north to draw Edward back across the English Channel. The resulting Scottish raid culminated in the battle of Neville's Cross, at which the archbishop of York routed the Scots, capturing David.

Throughout the siege the townspeople of Calais sent their king many requests for aid. In response to their cries and seeing that Edward had no intention of abandoning the siege, Philip began marshaling forces early in the spring of 1347. After ten months Philip finally approached Edward's camp outside Calais with a relief force of nearly fifty thousand men. The French had assembled at Arras, then moved through a series of other camps to a position at Sangatte from which they could observe the siege effort. Edward quickly recognized that Philip could attack only along one of two routes: a narrow coastal road or an inland route across a bridge over the marshy terrain. To defend the first, the English king arrayed ships equipped with archers and projectile weapons to prevent passage along the road. For the second he dispatched a sizable force under his cousin Henry, Earl of Derby, to defend the bridge. Philip agreed with his marshals, the seigneur Édouard I de Beaujeu and the seigneur de Saint-Venant, that to attack along either route would be to risk an outcome worse even than Crécy. Moreover, Edward's numbers had been bolstered by the arrival of a great number of Flemish soldiers.

The French were unwilling to assail the strong English defensive position, and Edward, who had spent a great deal of time and money on the endeavor, would not quit the siege without tremendous concessions. Edward agreed to a three-day truce to see if some arrangement might be met. Philip eventually did offer battle, but he retracted his terms when Edward showed enthusiasm for combat. Having accomplished nothing, on 2 August 1347, Philip struck camp and withdrew to Arras, much to the disappointment of both Edward and the townspeople of Calais. Observing their sovereign leave, the garrison of Calais requested terms. Edward sent a deputation under Sir Walter Mauny to deliver his conditions. Edward took possession of the town and all its wealth. At the instance of Queen Philippa and Mauny, Edward permitted the inhabitants to leave impoverished but unmolested. Though he had not ended the war, Edward returned to England after a successful campaign in which he stripped France of its martial glory and leadership, as well as gained for himself a strong foothold for future operations.

[*See also* Edward III of England; Hundred Years' War; Neville's Cross, Battle of; Philip VI; *and* Siege Warfare, *subentry on* Tactics and Technology.]

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CALAIS, SIEGE OF (1436–1437)

In September 1435, Philip the Good, Duke of Burgundy, concluded the Treaty of Arras with King Charles VII of France, and in March of the following year he announced his intention to invest the English-held town of Calais. News quickly spread, and on 26 March the English government launched a nationwide appeal for money and men for the defense of its vital continental stronghold. In fact, given the worsening military situation in general, English military preparations were already well advanced, with the duke of York, the earl of Salisbury, and Edmund Beaufort, Count of Mortain, all planning to take armies across the Channel, while Humphrey, Duke of Gloucester, had been appointed the new captain of Calais. By May, Philip had assembled a force of perhaps thirty thousand men and two hundred and fifty guns. His preparations were disrupted, however, by Beaufort's force, which had arrived at Calais in late

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April and raided Boulogne and West Flanders. In the meantime a relief force of almost eight thousand, led by Gloucester, had been assembled at Sandwich.

On 2 July the Burgundian army invaded the Calais Pale, quickly capturing and destroying the castles at Ballingham, Oye, Marck, and Sangatte. The castle at Guines was besieged, and by 9 July the Burgundians were outside the gates of Calais. The siege was a desultory affair: the Burgundians failed to block the harbor and were constantly harried by the garrison of perhaps a thousand men, led by Beaufort and Gloucester's deputy, Sir John Radcliffe. The counterattacks of the garrison, the strength of the defenders' own gunpowder artillery, and divisions in the Burgundian camp all contributed to the failure of the siege. The attackers soon fell into disarray, riven with disputes between the Ghent and Bruges contingents. On 28 July the Calais garrison attacked a large wooden artillery tower constructed by the Ghentenaars. Coupled with the arrival of the vanguard of Gloucester's relief army the following morning, this broke the spirit of the Burgundians, who conducted an ignominious retreat back into Flanders.

[*See also* Gunpowder; Hundred Years' War; *and* Siege Warfare, *subentry on* Tactics and Technology.]

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David Grummitt

CALAVRYTA, BATTLE OF

In 1079, Alexios I Komnenos, the *domestikos* (commander) of the *scholai* (army) of Emperor Nikephoros III Botaneiates (r. 1078–1081), defeated the *proedros* (a high-ranking court official) Nikephoros Bryennios, ending his rebellion. Although Bryennios's attempt to take Constantinople had been defeated in 1078, he controlled all the territory between Dyrrachium (or Dyrrachion) and Edirne (formerly Adrianople).

Soldiers whom Bryennios had commanded in his time as *doux* (duke) of Dyrrachium formed the core of his army. Bryenniose awaited Alexios in his own home city of Edirne, gathering considerable support. Alexios commanded a few hundred Frankish cavalry and a newly created elite unit, the "Immortals." Although Bryennios's forces were far superior in numbers and military experience, Alexios succeeded in using classic nomadic cavalry tactics to overcome that imbalance. Both commanders had nomadic cavalry allies: Bryennios's Pechenegs from the lower Danube, who had recently been raiding Thrace, and Alexios's Turks from eastern Anatolia, who had helped the emperor come to power. Alexios's allies proved to be more useful. In the middle of the battle, Bryennios's Pecheneg allies turned aside to attack Bryennios's own camp, causing considerable confusion. A sizable contingent of Turks sent by the emperor arrived to join Alexios at that opportune moment. Alexios hid these newcomers in the hills surrounding the field. With his remaining forces, he attacked and again withdrew, tempting Bryennios's army into an undisciplined pursuit until the Turkish cavalry suddenly attacked their rear and flank. Bryennios was captured and later blinded.

[*See also* Alexios I Komnenos; Bryennios, Nikephoros; *and* Byzantine Empire, *subentry on* Narrative (900–1204).]

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Leonora Neville

CAMPALDINO, BATTLE OF

Fought on 11 June 1289, this was a victory won by the city-state of Florence over that of Arezzo, the effect of which was the establishment of the political

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dominance of Florence over eastern Tuscany. The pretext for the military campaign that it concluded was an incursion by Aretine soldiers into Florentine territory earlier that year. In response, the Florentine government, which had raised civic levies to escort King Charles II of Naples on his journey from France to his coronation in Rome, resolved to use these troops as the nucleus of an army that could impose its control over the part of the upper Arno valley known as the Casentino. A force of sixteen hundred cavalry and ten thousand infantry was therefore built up by calling on contingents from allies, including Lucca, Pistoia, Siena, and Bologna, as well as on a hundred mercenary knights under Aimeric de Narbonne, supplied by the Neapolitan monarch Charles II. A decision was also made to launch an attack, not by advancing directly on Arezzo, but by taking a riskier route across a range of hills, the Pratomagno, which would allow the invading troops to surprise their enemies by entering the Casentino from the north and occupying a defensive position beside Poppi, a stronghold of the Guidi, the leading landed family of the region.

It was here on a long, narrow, flat piece of land called Campaldino that this critical military engagement took place. The field was bounded on one side by the river Arno and on the other by a highway, beyond which the ground rose. The two armies faced each other from opposite ends of this plain, their reserves stationed on the flanks, on the more elevated terrain across the adjoining road. The forces of Arezzo were smaller, comprising eight hundred cavalry and eight thousand infantry. The mounted section almost certainly included more men with experience of warfare than was the case with their opponents, because it included battle-hardened nobles loyal to the imperial or Ghibelline cause not only from Tuscany but also from Umbria, the Marches, and the Romagna, as well as patrician Florentine exiles, likewise accustomed to combat. Aside from four hundred mercenaries in their ranks, the knights among their adversaries were no more than amateur soldiers, more accustomed to trade than to fighting. It was presumably this consideration that induced the Aretine commanders to grasp the initiative and launch an assault that they hoped would throw their enemies into confusion and force them to retreat into the hilly country to their rear, where the fugitives could be easily cut down.

At first it seemed as though their plan might succeed because the Aretine cavalry managed to break through the Florentine front line. As a result, the bulk of the army behind it began to pull back. But when Corso Donati—who was in charge of the Florentine reserves, consisting of mounted detachments from Lucca and Pistoia, and who had orders, under pain of death, not to intervene in the battle to enable those under his command to cover a retreat in the event of defeat—saw his fellow citizens in disarray he ignored his instructions. He impetuously joined the fray with his troops who, coming at the attacking Aretines from the side and rear, surprised and overwhelmed them. His counterpart, Guido Novello, failed at this point to commit the Aretine reserves to the fighting. Judging the day to be lost, he fled with his men, thus assuring the outcome of this military encounter and leaving his comrades-in-arms to be slaughtered by their enemies. The casualties were heavy, seventeen hundred killed and two thousand taken prisoner.

In addition to its importance in helping to achieve Florentine dominance in Tuscany, the battle of Campaldino was remarkable for those who participated in it, including the poet Dante Alighieri, as well as Giano della Bella, Corso Donati, and Vieri dei Cerchi, who not only distinguished themselves in the fighting but were to play a prominent part in the dissensions that were to trouble their city in the 1290s. It was also the last significant military engagement in this region of Italy in which a critical role was assigned to citizen levies, who were to be overshadowed by mercenaries in battles, such as Montecatini (1315) and Altopascio (1325), fought early in the next century.

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Louis Green

CAMPOMORTO, BATTLE OF

In April 1482 the expansionist policy of Venice, together with the nepotistic ambitions of Pope Sixtus IV, caused Venice and the Papacy to launch an attack against the duchy of Ferrara, in turn allied with Milan and Venice's enemy Ferdinand I of Naples. In August of the same year a Neapolitan army of twenty-five hundred horsemen—including many Turks, who had changed sides after the capture of Otranto the previous year—fifteen hundred foot soldiers, and a number of artillery pieces, all commanded by Alfonso, Duke of Calabria, invaded the church's territories in support of the antipapal Colonna family. The Neapolitans pitched camp at Campomorto, near Nettuno, on some dry ground protected by marshes, woods, and two streams. From there they proceeded to pillage the surrounding countryside up to the gates of Rome.

Against them Sixtus sent an army of 4,500 cavalry and about 9,000 infantry, including about 2,000 handgunners, under Roberto Malatesta, Lord of Rimini. But by the time the papal army came to grips with its opponent, these numbers had dwindled to about 3,000 horse and about 6,000 foot soldiers. Despite Calabria's strong defensive position, Malatesta decided to engage battle on 21 August, dividing his forces into seven tactical units. Calabria placed his cavalry in the center and the infantry at the wings, positioning the artillery on higher ground so as to enfilade the advancing enemy. His defense was further strengthened by the falling rain, which soaked the soil and hampered Malatesta's movements.

Malatesta first sent his infantry into battle, but the papal soldiers were pushed back by Calabria's Ottoman horse. Subsequent cavalry charges made little impression on the Neapolitan defenses, forcing Malatesta to pull back and reorganize his forces. Now it was Calabria's turn to attack, only to be forced to make a hasty retreat behind the second stream. The encounter seemed to have ended in a deadlock, but at this point the battle entered its decisive stage. A papal force of two hundred light cavalrymen and fifteen hundred infantry under Jacopo Conti, having found a passage through the marshes and the woods, managed—under cover of the rain—to arrive undetected behind the enemy camp. Surprised and caught between two enemy forces, the Neapolitans put up a stiff resistance, but in the end Malatesta's superior numbers prevailed. At the end of the bloody fight 1,200 men lay dead on the field: the Neapolitan fatalities and wounded exceeded 1,000, including 150 Ottomans, and the papal troops captured a further 360 men-at-arms plus a number of Turkish cavalrymen (who went over to their captors and were employed to police Rome). Calabria managed to extricate himself with about 100 followers and retreated toward the coast. The exhausted Malatesta lacked the strength to pursue him.

[*See also* Condottieri; Italy, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1493); *and* Malatesta, Sigismondo Pandolfo, and the Malatesta Clan.]

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Niccolò Capponi

CAMPS AND BILLETING

The organization of camps was an important aspect of campaigning; it was, however, so much a part of the normal routine of army life that chroniclers and others paid it little attention. The elaborate Roman practices for setting up camp nightly when on the march were well known in the medieval period,

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Military Camp. Detail from the Sala del Mappamondo fresco by Simone Martini, 1328.
PALAZZO PUBBLICO, SIENA, ITALY/ALINARI/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

largely through the work of Vegetius. However, the chronicler Guibert de Nogent remarked on the fact that for those on the First Crusade nothing like the Roman system of regular encampments existed. Practice varied considerably with circumstances. Normally, harbingers would be sent in advance of an army, who would commandeer houses, if there were any, for billets, and who would make other preparations. The marshals took responsibility for organizing the men, assigning quarters, and allocating ground for tents, and they set up arrangements for sentry duty. In *The Siege of Caerlaverock*, a poet described the English encampment outside that castle on the Scottish campaign of 1300:

> We were quartered by the Marshal, and then might be seen houses built without carpenters or masons, of many different fashions, and many a cord stretched, with white and coloured cloth, with many pins driven into the ground, many a large tree cut down to make huts; and leaves, herbs, and flowers gathered in the woods, which were strewed within; and then our people took up their quarters.

Grand tents were often carried in the baggage train, but their use was limited to the great men; ordinary soldiers had to manage to find shelter as best they could. On occasion, arrangements were virtually nonexistent; before the battle of Falkirk in 1298 the English army spent the night near Linlithgow, the men "lying on the ground using shields for pillows, and armour for beds."

If an army halted in a town, lodgings would be commandeered; if the owners of houses taken over were particularly fortunate, they might receive payment for providing accommodation for the troops. There could be dangers for an army in a town; at Durham in 1069 most of the Normans billeted there were murdered in their beds. At York in 1327 many of those in the contingent from Hainaut in Edward III's army found the doors of their lodgings barred against them while they were attacked by English archers.

Relatively primitive arrangements might suffice for an army on the march, but elaborate camps were required for siege warfare. The English encampment outside Calais in 1346–1347 featured rows

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of wooden houses, with thatched roofs; markets were held every Wednesday and Saturday. When the Burgundian army besieged Neuss in 1474–1475, their camp resembled a defended town, complete with battlements. It featured two markets, a wide range of shops, and even a tennis court. Henry V's arrangements at Harfleur in 1415 were less impressive; by one account the army was "lodged in fields, gardens, closes and other near-by places." Hygiene in siege camps was an inevitable problem, as was very evident on that occasion, for dysentery swept through Henry's army, particularly affecting those in the king's own section.

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Michael Prestwich

CÂMPUL PÂINII, BATTLE OF

The battle of Câmpul Pâinii (13 October 1479) was one of the biggest and bloodiest battles between the Hungarians and the raiding Ottomans in the fifteenth century, ending with Hungarian victory. The battlefield (in Hungarian: Kenyérmező, Field of Bread) is located in southern Transylvania, in the land of the Saxons, between Szászváros (German: Broos; Romanian: Oraştie) and Szászsebes (German: Mühlbach; Romanian: Sebeş), adjacent to the River Maros (Mureş). The leaders of the Hungarian army were Stephen Bátori, voivode of Transylvania, and Pál Kinizsi, Count of Temes and captain general of the lower parts of Hungary, while the Ottoman troops were under the command of the beys Isa, Ali, and Bali. The Hungarians were supported by Serbian light cavalry under the command of Despot Vuk Branković and Demetrius Jakšić, while Romanians from Walachia fought on the Ottoman side.

The sources (Bonfini, Oláh, Długosz, an anonymous Saxon author, and Kemal Paşa-zâde) provide controversial information concerning both the numbers of participants and the details of the battle. After the peace of 1479 between Venice and the Ottomans, intensive Turkish maneuvers occurred along the Hungarian border. Their aims were to prevent further cooperation between Hungarians and Romanians and to consolidate Ottoman influence in the Romanian Principalities. A large-scale Ottoman campaign, ordered by Sultan Mehmed, began in early October and involved probably fifteen to twenty thousand men. Its principal goals must have been Szászsebes and the rich gold and silver mines and the salt deposits of Transylvania. Bátori, who had informed Kinizsi about the developments, wisely turned with his army against the plundering Ottomans only when they were beginning to withdraw with abundant spoils and many prisoners through the Iron Gate Pass. The Ottomans had pitched their camp near Alkenyér (Şibot), when on the morning of October 13 Bátori's army appeared. Both the Ottoman and the Hungarian armies were composed of three columns. Bátori occupied the center with the heavy cavalry, while on the flanks stood the Saxons and Szeklers. The center of the Ottoman army was commanded by Isa Bey, but we have no information about the flanks. The battle was opened by the Ottomans, who heavily outnumbered the Hungarians. Fighting ensued and went on for three hours. Bátori was bleeding from several wounds; even his horse had been killed under him. Then, finally, Kinizsi's army appeared, and the bewildered Turks allowed themselves for a time to be cut down almost without resistance. Kinizsi saved Bátori with a new charge and in the course of the onslaught turned the tide in favor of the Hungarians. Ottoman casualties were much heavier than those of the Hungarians. Isa Bey was executed and many of the fleeing Turks and Walachians massacred.

[*See also* Hungary, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1526); Kinizsi, Pál; Romanian Principalities; *and* Transylvania.]

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István Petrovics

CANE, FACINO

(1360–1412), condottiere. Scion of a noble and warlike family, Bonifacio (Facino) Cane was born in Casale Monferrato and began soldiering at an early age. The first stages of his career were marred by ill fortune: he was defeated and captured at Naples in 1381, at the battle of Brentelle in 1386, and a year later at Castagnaro, near Castelbaldo. In the course of his life Cane suffered numerous reversals in the field, yet he managed to build a solid reputation as a commander of troops for his skill of attracting men to his banner. Adored by his soldiers, with whom he shared the discomforts and risks of war, he won their loyalty by allowing them freedom of pillage. Renowned for his daring and speed in the field, the particularly brutal type of warfare practiced by Cane was also intended to cow his enemies into submission.

Facino's great chance came when Giangaleazzo Visconti, Duke of Milan, sought his services, and in 1402 he participated in the great Milanese victory at Casalecchio di Reno against the Florentines. Giangaleazzo's sudden death the same year proved a golden opportunity for Cane, who emerged as the duchy's strongman while ostensibly staying loyal to Visconti's widow and children. He was entrusted with the task of crushing rebellious vassals, a task that he used as an excuse to carve a state for himself from Giangaleazzo's heirs. Escaping from a number of assassination attempts, including one organized by his employers, Cane eventually succumbed to a gout-induced fever in Pavia on 16 May 1412. In a supremely Machiavellian move, the youngest of the Visconti heirs, Filippo Maria, married Cane's widow, thus gaining not only his family's former possessions but also a considerable sum of money and, more important, Cane's mercenary company.

[*See also* Condottieri *and* Visconti, Giangaleazzo.]

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CANNAE, BATTLE OF

On 4 May 1041, at Cannae on the Ofanto in northern Apulia, the forces of the Byzantine *catepan* (governor) of Italy, Michael Dokeianos, were defeated for the second time by the army of a Lombard rebel, Arduin of Milan, who had been appointed *topoterites* (warden) of the important stronghold of Melfi only a few months before.

Cannae was the second in a series of three battles that took place between March and September 1041. The surviving descriptions emphasize the personal exploits of the Normans, who were only one group among Arduin's followers, at the expense of any systematic description of the campaign itself. For their historians, the prestige and wealth gained by this victory marked the arrival of the Normans as a military power in southern Italy. They had been fighting in the employ of the Byzantine Empire or the Lombard princes for more than twenty years. Henceforth, they would choose their leaders and become lords in their own right.

Previously, Arduin had been the Greek-speaking commander of troops, including three hundred Normans, levied from Guaimar IV of Salerno for a Byzantine campaign against Muslim Sicily in 1038. Each historian gives a slightly different version of the story, but during the campaign a dispute broke out about either wages or distribution of loot. Arduin was punished and humiliated, and his troops either were dismissed or deserted.

Once Arduin received command of Melfi, he apparently recognized an opportunity; he gathered some of his former troops and quickly took

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over neighboring Byzantine towns. Dokeianos first attempted to regain control of the area on 17 March 1041. His troops were defeated in a battle that took place along the Olivento River between Melfi and Lavello. According to William of Apulia, only seven hundred of the twelve hundred "Normans" were mounted, and many of these lacked proper equipment. The better-armed among the infantry were positioned on the left and right flanks with some cavalry support, and were instructed not to depart from the field or to regroup quickly if they were driven off. Then the bulk of the Norman cavalry struck the first wave of Greeks, who, according to Amatus of Montecassino, suffered such heavy casualties that the river was "covered" by their bodies, which were in turn covered by the bodies of the second wave. In any case, the Greeks were routed and, William says, many more drowned in flight than were cut down in the fighting. This success strengthened the morale of the Normans and also consolidated their hold on the upper Ofanto valley.

The second battle took place at Cannae on the Ofanto in May. Once again, the Norman historians describe the catepan's army as huge, although it had been raised in less than three months. Again, the Greeks were defeated with high casualties. Dokeianos himself was almost captured when his horse bolted and threw him, but he escaped when his groom surrendered his own horse. Cannae provided a reversal of the earlier defeat. In October 1018 the rebellion of Melo of Bari was crushed when his army, which included Norman troops, was routed at Cannae by the catepan Basil Boioannes and a corps of Varangians. Dokeianos's replacement after his successive defeats by Arduin's troops was Exaugustus (viceroy of Augustus) Boioannes, Basil's son. According to William of Apulia, Arduin's troops included veterans of 1018.

Arduin disappears from the histories before the third battle, in September 1041 near Montepeloso (modern Irsina) on the Bradano River. The Normans elected Atenulf, the brother of Prince Pandulf III of Benevento, as their leader. Boioannes and his Varangian troops were defeated, and the catepan taken prisoner. The coastal cities, restive under Byzantine rule, allied themselves with the victors, but disputes over the distribution of land and wealth limited the lasting results of the victories. It would be another thirty years before the last Byzantine stronghold of Bari fell.

[*See also* Byzantine Empire, *subentry on* Narrative (900–1024); Italy, *subentry on* Narrative (1000–1300): Norman Conquests, Norman Expansion; *and* Varangian Guard.]

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CANOSSA, BATTLE OF

By October 1092 Emperor Henry IV had all but driven the countess Matilda of Tuscany from the Po valley. In 1091 Mantua surrendered, and Matilda's troops were betrayed and defeated in a field battle at Tricontai. The castle of Monte Alfredo fell, and her standard-bearer was captured in June 1092; Monte Morello surrendered without resistance.

Henry's siege of Monteveglio, lasting from August to October, failed and claimed the life of one of his sons. At the same time Matilda held a stage-managed war council at Carpineti and was able to persuade her wavering followers to continue the fight. The countess herself was Henry's greatest obstacle. He apparently received word that she was at Canossa.

Canossa was part of a network of castles and outposts that extended across the north face of the Apennines between the Secchia and Enza rivers,

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in effect making the entire region one large fortress. Henry marched westward via Reggio toward Parma, where he had strong support, apparently intending to winter there instead of his usual quarters at Verona. He suddenly turned south, and approached Canossa via San Polo (Cavilianum) and the Enza valley. There was approximately 9 miles of relatively open terrain between the Via Emilia and San Polo. Matilda was aware of Henry's movements and realized that Canossa could become a trap; she may have feared another betrayal. As Henry approached, she moved out to Bianello, one of four outlying castles on the lower approaches to Canossa. The maneuver was tight, and the two groups could hear one another moving on opposite sides of the low hills. Some of Matilda's escort returned to Canossa, ignoring challenges from Henry's troops, and reported that she was safely away and perhaps carried other messages. As the monks prayed, the trumpets of Canossa announced the presence of their enemy to the neighboring castles, including Baiso, Rossena, and Carpineti. Henry's approach was greeted with missiles from the walls of Canossa. At some point the infamous autumn fog of the Apennines descended. Henry literally could not see the castle before him. His standard-bearer, a son of the marquis Oberto defeated at Sorbara, was thrown down and the royal standard captured.

Henry knew neither where Matilda was nor how long it would be before there was a counterattack by troops who knew the land well. He could be caught blind in a pincer. The surprise failed, and the emperor prudently withdrew across the Po, followed by Matilda's troops. The countess soon recovered much of what had earlier been lost as Henry's support dwindled. He remained in the region of Verona for another five years, with limited forces at his disposal, until he was able to negotiate a departure in 1097.

In the only source for this action, written by Donizone, a monk of Canossa, the heroes are the countess and the castle itself. He clearly contrasts the courageous defenders of Canossa with the perfidy of the Mantuans, who surrendered.

[*See also* Henry IV *and* Mantua, Siege of.]

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CANTURINO, BATTLE OF

The battle of Canturino was fought on 22 April 1363 between a predominantly German mercenary army in the employ of Milan and a largely English mercenary force in the service of the marquis of Montferrat. The English force consisted of the famed White Company (known then as the Great Company), veterans of the Hundred Years' War, who came to Italy from Avignon at the behest of Pope Innocent VI. The battle, and the campaign leading to it, revealed the great military skill of the English soldiers.

Canturino occurred in the context of war between Milan and the papacy. The marquis of Montferrat, ruler of a small state in Piedmont abutting Milanese territory, supported Pope Innocent VI and accepted into his service a free company of English soldiers that had been harassing the pope at Avignon. The band, led by a German, Albert Sterz, and containing also John Hawkwood, who would become the premier captain in Italy, was bought off by Innocent and sent to Italy, passing through the Maritime Alps in 1361 and moving north through the Canavese region. The advent of the company impressed contemporary writers, including the Milanese chronicler Azario, who described it as a cohesive, battle-hardened group that fought in tight units on foot, supported by archers.

The initial activity of the White Company was against Montferrat's neighbor and rival, Count Amadeus VI of Savoy, who maintained overlapping territorial claims. The Company then turned on Milanese territory, attacking to the west, near Tortona and Pavia, and then, in January 1363, moving across the Ticino river to the outskirts of Milan itself. The Milanese army, commanded by the renowned

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German captain Konrad von Landau, was reluctant to engage the English directly. At the strident urging of his employer, however, Landau mobilized his force, consisting of perhaps a thousand cavalrymen. He advanced to a bridge near Canturino, close to the town of Romagnano, where the White Company made its base. The size of the Company is unclear. Like its opponent, its numbers were reduced by ongoing plague in the region. Both sides supplemented their forces with Hungarian mercenaries.

Konrad von Landau and the German force at first acquitted themselves well at Canturino, forcing the Company to retreat. But the Company rallied with the aid of reinforcements from a nearby castle. As the sides prepared for battle, the English dismounted from their horses; Landau and his cavalry did the same. The two armies then engaged. But as the battle intensified, Landau's Hungarian contingents deserted, joining their countrymen in the opposing army. As he was shouting at them (in German) to return, Landau was struck simultaneously in the face by a rock and in the mouth by a lance, and died. The Company and Montferrat won the day.

Further details of the battle are not available. For example, it is unclear whether the English longbow played a significant role in determining the outcome, and indeed the desertion of Landau's Hungarians seems to have been far more important. The battle nevertheless sealed the reputation of the English as the most effective and feared soldiers in Italy.

[*See also* Great Companies; Hawkwood, John; Italy, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1493); Konrad von Landau; *and* Mercenaries.]

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William Caferro

CAP D'ANZIO, BATTLE OF

See Genoese-Venetian Wars, *subentry on* Fourth War.

CAPUA, BATTLE OF

See Casilinum, Battle of.

CARAVAGGIO, BATTLE OF

In spring 1448, the Repubblica Ambrosiana, the government that ruled Milan after Filippo Maria Visconti, took the initiative in the war against Venice. Led by Francesco Sforza, its army conquered important towns such as Mozzanica, Treviglio, and Cassano d'Adda. Then, having defeated a Venetian fleet near Cremona, it reached Caravaggio, south of Bergamo, on 29 July. The town, held by a strong garrison, was soon surrounded by Sforza, who made camp nearby and had it surrounded with moats and earthworks. On 30 July, the Venetians, under the command of Micheletto Attendolo, arrived in Morengo, northeast of Caravaggio, and advanced on the following day. Sforza sent a large force against the enemy, and a violent fight took place, but eventually everyone returned to their camps, and both sides strengthened their positions. Further moats were dug on both sides, some defended by earthen bastions. In the weeks that followed, the two armies skirmished almost daily.

In the meantime, Milan had urged Sforza to take Caravaggio. At the beginning of September, he engaged his bombards and some days later breached the walls, leading the garrison to ask for terms. The Venetian captains were divided about whether to fight; some, including Attendolo, considered it too dangerous. Venice, which had been stressing the need to relieve the besieged town, eventually decided that the army had to join battle. The Milanese and Venetian forces each consisted of roughly twelve thousand horse soldiers and three to four thousand infantry. The Venetians had fewer crossbowmen and handgunners, and they suffered from

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a lack of mounts, many horses having died in the skirmishes of the previous weeks. On 15 September, Attendolo left Bartolomeo Colleoni at the camp and gave orders to engage the enemy. Meanwhile, a large part of the army, under Ludovico Gonzaga, Tiberto Brandolini, Gentile da Leonessa, Roberto da Montalboddo, and others, moved southwest, toward Fornovo San Giovanni, to the right flank of the Milanese. At first, the Venetian attack pushed back the enemy, but it then met with strong resistance at a mobile bridge situated between two moats and with little room to maneuver, the attack came to a standstill. When attacked on the left flank, the Venetians were forced to withdraw, and they fled after fierce fighting. Colleoni, still guarding the camp, held out for a time and then withdrew to Bergamo. Although Attendolo and Gonzaga evaded capture, many of the Venetians were taken prisoner, most notably Leonessa and Montalboddo. Shortly after the battle, the town of Caravaggio surrendered.

In the following weeks, Sforza moved his army toward Brescia, but on 19 October, dissatisfied with the Republica Ambrosiana and wishing to seize Milan—he was married to a daughter of Filippo Maria Visconti—he changed sides and signed a treaty with Venice. In 1450, he became Duke of Milan.

[*See also* Italy, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1493).]

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CARCANO, BATTLE OF

In July 1160 Milan was ascendant in its struggle against the Holy Roman emperor Frederick Barbarossa (r. 1152–1189), and dispatched an army of 600 knights and 6,000 infantry to besiege Carcano castle, threatening imperialist Como and opening the road to friendly Brescia. Frederick gathered an army of 400 knights and 3,000 foot soldiers, and marched quickly to relieve the siege. Carcano stands on a plateau whose cliffs rise sharply above the plain and that carries the road from Como east to Brescia. It is accessible through a gully at the foot of which was the village of Tassera, occupied by the Milanese. Frederick's army encamped in the plain by Lake Alserio, close to Tassera, cutting Milanese communications with their city. The Milanese, however, controlled all the heights above him.

On the morning of 9 August 1160, Barbarossa, with the bulk of his forces, mounted the plateau westward to Orsenigo, avoiding the main Milanese force concentrated around Carcano under the command of Archbishop Oberto. But the Milanese troops reinforced their garrison at Tassera and attacked the imperial camp. Barbarossa, with two hundred knights, promptly returned and totally defeated the enemy, inflicting great losses and throwing their *carroccio* (banner-bearing chariot) into a ditch. Barbarossa had left his Italian allies to continue the attack on Orsenigo, probably assuming that they were strong enough to deal with the enemy. However, two hundred cavalry from Brescia had arrived to join the Milanese, and with their aid the Milanese scattered the imperial allies at Orsenigo. Effectively there were two battles, one won by Milan and the other by Barbarossa, but the emperor's cavalry were now reduced to two hundred, and his infantry had suffered losses, so he withdrew. Pursuit was sluggish, but on 11 August the Milanese fell upon Italian reinforcements coming up to join the emperor and ignorant of his retreat, causing substantial losses.

The victory at Carcano was a pyrrhic one for Milan. Losses had been so heavy that Otto Morena, in his *Chronicle of Lodi*, tells us, "News of the victory caused both joy and sorrow in Milan." Even more unfortunately, it was a victory in the wrong place at the wrong time. Carcano duly fell and Milanese influence in the area grew, but because of this Milan failed to support its ally, Piacenza, in its efforts to

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attack Barbarossa in the critical area across the Po to the south, and this enabled the emperor, once reinforced in 1161, to attack Milan, which capitulated in March 1162.

[*See also* Frederick I Barbarossa; Italy, *subentry on* Narrative (1000–1300); *and* Milan, Sieges of.]

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CARCASSONNE, SIEGE OF

Following the decisive and unexpected storm of Béziers, the crusader army, numbering around twenty thousand and still commanded by the papal legates, marched to Viscount Raymond-Roger Trencavel's next holding, Carcassonne. Since Béziers had fallen in one day with hundreds, perhaps thousands, of its inhabitants killed during the assault, the defenders of Carcassonne, led by their viscount, knew what might happen if they did not defend themselves vigorously. Carcassonne was a secure fortification. Its population of less than nine thousand was protected by a strong circuit of walls and towers, but the city was not favored by geography, located as it was on a small outcrop east of its primary water supply, the Aude River. In addition to the main fortifications, Carcassonne had three suburbs, two of which were fortified with rudimentary walls and ditches. On 3 August 1209 the crusaders assaulted, seized, and burned the unfortified western suburb, cutting off Carcassonne from the river. On 4 August the army attacked the northern suburb but failed to take it after being assailed by rocks and other missiles thrown from the walls.

Eventually, the crusade army built siege engines, something they had not needed to do at Béziers. While missiles weakened the walls of the northern suburb, crusaders undermined one of its walls with a siege cat. By 8 August the wall crumbled, and the crusaders successfully captured the suburb only to lose it to a counterattack, at which point the defenders burned it before retreating into the city. Around this time King Pedro of Aragon, overlord to Raymond-Roger Trencavel, arrived at Carcassonne, where he mediated unsuccessfully between the two sides before departing for Spain.

By this time Carcassonne grew short of water, partially because of the August weather, overcrowding of refugees, and its being cut off from the river. Finally, Carcassonne's system of wells failed. Meanwhile, the crusader camp enjoyed ample water and a superfluity of supplies because of abandoned towns along their approach; also, salt obtained from a nearby marsh was traded off to other towns. The crusade army eventually prepared for an assault on the main fortifications, although its leaders feared what might happen to Carcassonne's resources if an assault were successful. Raymond-Roger Trencavel, mindful of his population's suffering, agreed to a parley and then essentially gave himself up to obtain minimal surrender terms, avoiding another Béziers. By 15 August, according to the terms of the surrender, the entirety of Carcassonne and its movables were forfeited to the crusade. The townspeople were expelled with nothing more than the clothes on their backs.

Raymond-Roger died in his own jail before the end of the year. Although Béziers was an extreme rarity in medieval siege warfare, Carcassonne was more typical both in general medieval warfare and the Albigensian Crusade (Cathar Crusade), especially because it was ended by negotiation. The diplomatic terms levied on it demonstrated that those who resisted the crusade would not be treated well. It helped strengthen the pattern begun at Béziers, that northern armies were more capable and ruthless than those of the south during the early years of the Albigensian Crusade.

[*See also* Castelnaudary, Siege and Battle of; Termes, Siege of; *and* Toulouse, Sieges of.]

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CARLISLE, SIEGE OF

The small city of Carlisle is situated on the west coast of England, 10 miles from the Scottish border. As Berwick controlled access from Scotland to the English eastern march, so Carlisle controlled access to the western. The strategic significance of both made each the focus of repeated sieges when England and Scotland were at war.

The most dramatic siege of Carlisle was that by Robert I of Scotland (Robert Bruce, r. 1306–1329) in July 1315. The previous summer, Robert had won a resounding victory over Edward II of England (r. 1307–1327) on the field at Bannockburn, and the Scots were in the ascendant. Robert's brother, Edward Bruce, had recently invaded Ireland, partly to cut off an important line of supply for Carlisle.

In the wake of their defeat at Bannockburn, the English expected an attack on Carlisle and had consequently strengthened the garrison. Carlisle was ably defended by Sir Andrew Harclay (d. 1323), who, six months before the siege, may have commanded a garrison of up to 9 knights, 87 men-at-arms, 45 hobelars, and 395 foot-soldiers. Robert's army arrived at Carlisle on 22 July 1315, and *The Chronicle of Lanercost* provides an eyewitness account of the siege:

> On every day of the siege they assaulted one of the three gates of the city, sometimes all three at once; but never without loss, because there were discharged upon them from the walls such dense volleys of darts and arrows, likewise stones, that they asked one another whether stones bred and multiplied within the walls.

The technology and resources employed by the Scots were far inferior to that of the defenders. The Chronicle continues

> Now on the fifth day of the siege they set up a machine for casting stones next [to] the church of Holy Trinity, where their king stationed himself, and they cast great stones continually against the Caldew gate and against the wall, but they did little or no injury to those within, except that they killed one man. But there were seven or eight similar machines within the city, besides other engines of war, which are called springalds, for discharging long darts, and staves with sockets for casting stones, which caused great fear and damage to those outside.

The appalling rains of the summer of 1315 undermined the Scots' efforts to take the city. They built a siege tower, but it became stuck in the mud while still at some distance from the walls, and their efforts to fill the moat with bundles of grain, hay, and other material came to nought, as all was swept away in the torrent. Other stratagems were employed: the Scots built a sow, a mobile shelter, to protect sappers undermining the walls; they had long ladders to help them gain access to the parapet; and they built extending bridges, mounted on wheels, which, however, sank into the moat. On the ninth and tenth days, the Scots mounted a general assault on all three gates. Then they concentrated an assault on the eastern wall, while mounting a stealthy attack on the western side.

On the eleventh day, 1 August 1315, Robert withdrew in poor order, either in response to rumors of the approach of a relieving army, or because he had received news of a defeat suffered by his brother in

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Ireland. Lacking experience, men, and materials, the Scots usually tried to reduce cities by show of strength or to take them by stealth. Robert's attempt to storm Carlisle illustrates the Scots' overconfidence in the wake of their victory at Bannockburn.

[*See also* Bannockburn, Battle of; Edward Bruce; and Robert I (the Bruce).]

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CARMAGNOLA

See Bussone, Francesco.

CARRICKFERGUS, SIEGE OF

Carrickfergus Castle on the east coast of Ulster pertained to the king of England. It was a formidable stone keep, surrounded by a stone curtain wall and built on a rocky promontory. The Scots under Edward Bruce first besieged Anglo-Irish defenders of the castle in May 1315 but, on reaching a truce shortly afterward, desisted. However, they renewed the siege from 10 September 1315 to September 1316. The strengths of both besieging and defending forces are unknown, but after the castle was recaptured from the Scots in 1318, it was held by a constable and subconstable, commanding twenty men-at-arms, fifteen crossbowmen, and five foot soldiers.

According to John Barbour's epic poem *The Bruce*, the Scottish invasion force landed (26 May 1315), worsted in battle the flower of Ulster chivalry, and turned straightaway to Carrickfergus and commenced the siege. The garrison resisted and made sallies against the Scots, but eventually both sides agreed to a truce until such time as "the folk of Ulster had come entirely to his [Edward's] peace" (Barbour, p. 524, line 524).

The action in Barbour's narrative then moves to Edward Bruce's first expedition beyond Ulster, his retreat and his victory over the earl of Ulster, Richard de Burgh, at the battle of Connor (10 September 1315). On this victory, the Scots lost no time in recommencing the siege. The constable Sir Thomas de Mandeville was not in the castle at the time and Henry de Thrapston, the treasurer of Ulster, appears to have been in charge.

In October or early November, a first attempt was made to relieve Carrickfergus with a seaborne attack on the besiegers. It succeeded in killing forty Scots and stealing their tents. The siege continued nonetheless through the winter and into the spring of 1316. On Palm Sunday, a truce until Tuesday of Easter week (4 to 13 April) was agreed to. However, on Holy Thursday (8 April 1316) a second relieving force, organized by Mandeville, said to consist of fifteen ships, arrived to lift the siege. Barbour says that the force succeeded in entering the castle secretly, for they had spied that Edward Bruce's forces had trusted in the truce and scattered. Thus the castle was relieved and reinforced, but the siege continued. The Scots too were reinforced, and succeeded in capturing some of the ships. Mandeville led the men of Drogheda into battle with besiegers but was killed in the fighting.

Again, at midsummer 1316, another agreement was reached between the garrison and the Scots but it too broke down, and thirty Scots, sent under safe conduct to receive the submission, were imprisoned. In early July a relief convoy of eight ships with foodstuffs was commandeered by the earl of Ulster and sent to Scotland to assist in the ransom of his brother.

Within the castle, Henry de Thrapston was foremost in negotiations with the Scots. He arranged a month's truce with Edward Bruce: the reference may be to the midsummer negotiations or to a subsequent truce. During that period he allowed Thomas Dun, the Scottish privateer, to enter the castle. Dun was treated to food and given cloth for a cloak, probably in the hope that he could intercede with Bruce to moderate the terms of surrender, and two of the

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prisoners were released to Dun. This subsequently provided occasion for accusations of treachery against Thrapston.

According to the Dublin annalist, the garrison was now reduced to eating hides and the flesh of eight Scottish prisoners. The garrison surrendered, in September 1316, having been promised security of life and limb. Although they may have been simply starved into surrender, the event may also be connected with a rumor in Dublin that Robert Bruce had arrived in Ireland to help his brother.

[*See also* Edward Bruce.]

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CARROCCIO

The *carroccio* was a characteristic feature of Italian warfare throughout the later Middle Ages. Its first recorded appearance dates to 1038 in Milan, where it was allegedly devised by the archbishop of Milan, Aribert of Intimiano. The *carroccio* consisted of a large ox-drawn painted cart on which stood a field altar and a tall mast—or sometimes more than one—supporting a standard that sported either the colors of a particular city or a religious image connected with a certain polity. The *carroccio*'s platform was designed to support a crew of varying size, usually a priest, trumpeters, and their armed escort: the clergyman was entrusted with seeking the Almighty's support through prayers and masses, while the musicians transmitted orders to the army by means of their instruments. The bell hanging from the mast had a similar function, the Florentines even going so far as to mount a large one, *la martinella*, on a separate cart. As befitted the mystique surrounding them, *carrocci* often received names: for instance, the one of Cremona was called "Berta," and Parma's was called "Biancardo." Given its crucial tactical and psychological role, the *carroccio* had a substantial contingent allotted to its protection: the number could reach up to fifteen hundred men between mounted troops and infantry.

The *carrocio* functioned not only as a communication center but also as a physical and symbolic rallying point. At the battle of Legnano in 1176, the staunch resistance of the Milanese infantry, including the *carroccio*'s guard, eventually won the day, and likewise the obstinate attempt of the imperial cavalry to capture the enemy's cart led to Frederick I's defeat. In order to guarantee its safety, the *carroccio* was always placed at the rear of a battle array; its loss signified utter defeat. The capture of the Milanese *carroccio* by the imperialists after the battle of Cortenuova in 1237 coincided with the collapse of the second Lombard League, while the alleged masts of the Florentine *carroccio* taken at the battle of Montaperti in 1260 are still proudly displayed in Siena's cathedral. (The masts' authenticity has been doubted, but they nonetheless bear witness to the *carroccio*'s symbolic importance.) In short, a *carroccio* represented the religious, political, and military essence of a particular polity. Significantly, one of the first things the Venetians did after taking Padua in 1405 was to destroy the city's *carroccio*.

The decline of Italy's communal values, united with the changing nature of Italian warfare, led to the *carroccio*'s demise by the end of the fourteenth century. One of its last appearances in a significant encounter was at the battle of Castagnaro in 1387, on which occasion both Padua and Verona, both under the rule of a *signore* (lord) but officially free communes, took their battle carts into the field. The defeat of the Veronese was magnified by the loss of their richly decorated *carroccio*.

[*See also* Battlewagons *and* Italy, *subentry on* Narrative (1000–1300).]

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CARTHAGE, BATTLE OF

The Vandal kingdom of Africa was a former Roman province, conquered by the Vandals in 429. When the Byzantine ally Hilderic was arrested by his cousin Gelimer, Justinian seized the opportunity to occupy this kingdom and erase the Arian heresy. He gave this mission to General Belisarios. The fleet departed from Constantinople on 21 June 533, via Sicily and Malta. It was composed of eighty-two warships and five hundred transport ships, carrying ten thousand infantrymen, five thousand cavalrymen, and one thousand *foederati* (Bulgars and Heruli), as well as the private army (*bucellarii*) of Belisarios (up to two thousand men).

The largest part of the Vandal army was in Sardinia, and the Vandal fleet was thus unable to repel the landing of the Byzantine navy. Belisarios decided to fight in the open and to draw the enemy outside Carthage. He landed at the beginning of September at Caput Vada (Ras Kapoudia, Tunisia), where he established a camp on the seashore, while the warships were sent toward Carthage, along the coast. From this field base Belisarios started a march to Carthage, during which he took care to attract the inhabitants to his side. The vanguard, commanded by John the Armenian, encountered and defeated the forces led by Ammatas (Gelimer's brother). The rest of the army arrived on 13 September near Ad Decimum (that is, 10 miles from Carthage). Here a new camp was established, where the infantry was left in reserve. Belisarios departed with the cavalry to search for the enemy. The vanguard, composed of *foederati*, was surprised by Gelimer and was forced to retreat in disorder. At this moment Gelimer made a great mistake: he did not pursue the enemy. Meanwhile, the main Byzantine cavalry force arrived there, and the fresh units set in combat disposition repelled the Vandals, who fell back toward Numidia. On the following day, the Byzantine army resumed the march toward Carthage. The city was occupied without resistance on 15 September. The fleet arrived on the same day. Gelimer, however, was still free. He fought at Tricamarum (15 December 533) but was again defeated.

[*See also* Belisarios; Byzantine Empire, *subentries on* Historiography (500–1000) *and* Narrative (500–1000); *and* Justinian I.]

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CASILINUM, BATTLE OF

In a desperate attempt to strike the Byzantines, the last Ostrogoth king, Teias, asked help from the Frankish king Theudebald. An army of about thirty thousand Franks and Alemanni crossed the Po River in June 553, led by two Alemanni dukes, Leuthar and Butilin. The Byzantine army that was sent against them was defeated at Parma, but the subsequent separation of the Germanic army into several corps weakened them and only Butilin continued the march. On their way to southern Italy, the warriors of this column, not accustomed to the climate, began to suffer from heat and disease.

The army of eighteen thousand men commanded by Narses arrived from Rome in autumn 554 near Butilin's camp on the River Casilinum, near Capua. In the center of the Byzantine disposition was the infantry, the heavy cavalry were on the flanks, and the Herul allies were in reserve at the rear. Narses commanded from the right flank. The Franks and Alemanni, who were comparable in manpower to

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Narses' army, launched the attack from their camp, which was surrounded with wagons and blocked by a bridge. They believed that the Heruli had deserted and were confident in their victory. The Franks advanced in a wedge formation that penetrated the center of the Byzantine disposition up to the third line. At that moment Narses ordered the cavalrymen equipped with bows to turn back from the flanks to attack the head of the Frankish column. Both sides of the Frankish columns were thus struck by a hail of arrows. After this, the Heruli advanced from the reserve, pushing back the Franks, while a detachment of Byzantine cavalry summoned from a forest attacked the opposite part of the Frankish formation. Surrounded, the Franks ran in disorder, and most of them were killed. This outstanding victory by Narses was based on perfect cooperation between infantry and cavalry.

[*See also* Byzantine Empire, *subentries on* Historiography (500–1000) *and* Narrative (500–1000); Franks, Merovingian, *subentries on* Historiography (482–751) and Narrative (482–751); *and* Narses.]

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CASSEL, BATTLE OF (1071)

Baldwin V, Count from 1035 to 1067, had built Flanders into the strongest of French principalities. However, his son, Baldwin VI, was Count of Flanders for only three years and his death brought a succession crisis that would lead the county to near ruin. Vying for the title was Baldwin VI's teenage son, Arnulf III, and brother, Robert I (known contemporarily as "the Frisian"). Arnulf was supported by the king of France, Philip I; the count of Boulogne, Eustace II; his sons, Eustace, who would succeed him in Boulogne, and Godfrey of Bouillon, the duke of Lower Lorraine and later king of Jerusalem; and Arnulf's mother Richilde, the countess of Hainault and Mons. He also had a larger number of soldiers than did Robert, including a number of Norman knights, among them the experienced William FitzOsborn (who with Eustace of Boulogne had fought at Hastings), sent by the king of France. But Robert was the better general. On 22 February 1071 Robert's army surprised Arnulf's forces at Cassel so that they were unable to organize and were soon chased from the field. Arnulf was among the dead, with Richilde captured by Robert's troops and Robert by Arnulf's. Later, a prisoner exchange of the two left Robert I as Count of Flanders, a position he held until his death in 1092. Unfortunately, although this battle is mentioned by a number of contemporary sources, none goes into detail on what tactics were used by Robert in his victory or what led to the death and capture of the leaders on both sides.

[*See also* Low Countries, *subentry on* Narrative (855–1300).]

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CASSEL, BATTLE OF (1328)

In September 1322 Louis of Nevers became Count of Flanders. Married to one of the daughters of the French king, Philip V, he was extremely loyal to the French crown, a position that differed from the one held by many of his county's inhabitants. To maintain order, Louis frequently played his prominent towns off against each other, with his most divisive decisions coming in 1323 when he granted a monopoly of the waterways to Ghent in direct violation of the privileges of Bruges. When the Brugeois heard this, they revolted, captured the count, and imprisoned him. Thus, yet another Flemish rebellion had begun.

For five years, 1323–1328, the county was in rebellion, directed by the citizens of Bruges, but fueled by the peasants of maritime Flanders. Attempts at peace were made during this time but none proved

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successful. The Flemish towns, except for Ghent, which had remained faithful to the count, controlled their own economic, political, and military affairs. Louis of Nevers on his own was powerless against them and seemingly unable to interest the French king, Charles IV, in entering the conflict. Only when Charles was replaced by his cousin, Philip VI, was a decision made to march an army against the rebels. On 28 August 1328 the French met the Flemings at the battle of Cassel.

The battle is covered by many contemporary sources from France and Flanders; from these it is easy to arrive at a narrative of events. Philip VI's army was large and well funded. It fought under the oriflamme, France's sacred banner that had surprisingly reappeared after being destroyed at Mons-en-Pévèle in 1304. Not knowing where the French were to attack, the Flemish army was divided into three sections. Each was much smaller than the French force. One of the Flemish armies had camped in the town of Cassel, built on a hill towering some 577 feet above sea level, an excellent position from which to see any approaching army. However, this may have been the weakest of the three Flemish forces, manned mostly by peasants from the Flemish countryside and a few Brugeois townspeople. They were ably led, though, by Nikolaas Zannekin.

Philip arrived on the plains outside of Cassel sometime before 25 August, but he did not immediately attack the Flemings there. The height of the hill meant that such an attack would destroy most of his army even if victorious. Instead, he decided to sit at the base of the hill, in effect besieging the Flemings camped on top of it. For the next three days the two armies skirmished with and taunted each other. Philip's army also pillaged and burned the land around Cassel, with the Flemings able to view the destruction.

This may be why the Flemish army was the first to break from their inaction. During the hottest part of the day when it was least expected, Zannekin charged his troops down the hill and attacked the French. Easily reaching their opponents' tents, the Flemings nearly captured Philip who was saved only by the valiant defense of nearby soldiers. However, the Flemings did not chase the French from the field and, when counterattacked, were themselves routed. The remnants of the Flemish army fell back to make a final defensive stand, but too few in number, they could not withstand new French attacks for long and were soon defeated. Flemish casualties were extremely high and included Zannekin. More importantly, hearing of the massacre at Cassel, the other two Flemish armies quickly disbanded and returned to their homes, hoping thereby to escape punishment. Another Flemish rebellion had ended by military defeat.

[*See also* Philip VI.]

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CASTAGNARO, BATTLE OF

In the wake of their victory at Brentelle in June 1386, the Paduans sought to keep the upper hand in their war against Verona by hiring the celebrated English captain John Hawkwood. Hawkwood joined forces with the main Paduan army in January 1387, receiving the baton of command from Franscesco "Il Vecchio" da Carrara, Lord of Padua, although the nominal supreme authority lay with Carrara's son, Francesco "Novello." Despite the winter season, military operations started immediately, with the Paduans advancing deep into enemy territory with a force heavy in cavalry. Unable to cope with the

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problems created by an overextended supply line, however, they were forced to retreat toward their logistic base of Castelbaldo, chased by a possibly larger, Venetian-funded Veronese army under Giovanni degli Ordelaffi.

On reaching the village of Castagnaro, just across the river Adige from Castelbaldo, the Paduans decided to face their pursuers, taking up a defensive position on a wide plane bisected by an irrigation ditch about 7 feet (2 meters) wide, with their right flank resting on the watercourse and the left protected by marshy ground. In this era no captain worth his salt preferred the hazards of battle, putting life, fortune, and reputation in peril, over the certainties of retreat. But in this case sound military reasons warranted such a choice: heavy rains had swollen the Adige, making it impossible to ford; had the Paduans attempted to cross the bridge below Castelbaldo, they could have lost their rear guard to the advancing Veronese, and risked being bottled up inside their supply base by a substantial enemy force. In addition, the ground chosen was suitable for defense: it was reinforced by some field fortifications previously built by the Veronese behind a narrow and steep canal, and Hawkwood turned this to his advantage. With a defensive/counteroffensive battle in mind, the English captain ordered the filling and smoothing of a small canal connecting the ditch to the river, in order to give his troops the possibility of counterattacking.

The Paduans drew up their forces in three lines, the men-at-arms divided into eight squadrons: six squadrons on foot, each of five to six hundred combatants, at the front, and two mounted squadrons—twenty-four hundred strong—at the rear of the formation. Hawkwood himself took position at the head of his troops with five hundred men-at-arms and the same number of English archers. The remaining infantry, a thousand spearmen and crossbowmen under Cermisone da Parma, deployed at the extreme right on an embankment overlooking the Adige.

Arriving on the field and beholding the enemy array, the Veronese also arranged for battle on soft ground. Ordelaffi divided his ninety-nine hundred horse and twenty-six hundred foot soldiers into twelve squadrons, dismounting most of his cavalry with the exception of about fifteen hundred mounted troops under Ostasio da Polenta. A further twelve to sixteen thousand infantry, mostly ribauds and peasant levies of inferior fighting quality under Giovanni dell'Ischia, were placed at the rear of the Veronese main line. Ordelaffi was in no haste to attack, believing that his adversaries had forced themselves into a corner where they could be either starved into surrender or destroyed piecemeal should they attempt a breakaway. In the event that the Paduans attacked, Ordelaffi could count on superiority of numbers, plus a new destructive weapon. The Veronese had constructed three large carts, each carrying forty-eight small artillery pieces on four levels, each gun firing a stone shot the size of a hen's egg. Placed in front of the Veronese formation, these contraptions were intended to create havoc among the advancing enemy, drilling through plate and breaking on impact into flying fragments so as to create a shrapnel effect. In addition, Ordelaffi had a number of soldiers with "fire trumpets," also intended to disrupt attacking forces. To all appearances the Veronese had checkmated the Paduans.

Hawkwood, however, had no intention of playing his opponent's game. An hour before sunset on 11 March, he ordered his archers to advance and fire volleys into the enemy ranks. Though the falling arrows did little damage to the heavily armored Veronese, they nonetheless galled Ordelaffi to order a general advance. Managing to ford the ditch to their front, the Veronese engaged the Paduans in a savage hand-to-hand combat but forfeited the possibility of using their artillery and fire trumpets. Advancing as rapidly as the soft ground would allow him, braving flying arrows and bolts, Ordelaffi charged Parma's infantry in an attempt to turn his opponent's flank. As the beleaguered Paduan infantry started to break, Hawkwood perceived that Ordelaffi's move had opened a gap in the enemy line. Tossing his baton into the thick of the fight and shouting the Paduan battle cry, the English captain led a mounted charge across the previously leveled ground, hitting the enemy rear with the force of a thunderbolt.

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As the Veronese turned face in a desperate attempt to repulse Hawkwood's attack, the Paduans under Francesco Novello's leadership moved in for the kill. Surrounded and in disarray, the Veronese had little option but to flee or surrender. Unexpectedly, Ischia's contingent stood its ground for some time, with Hawkwood's men wreaking terrible execution on the lightly equipped levies. The Paduans captured the Veronese *carroccio* (command wagon) with its insignia, 4,620 men-at-arms, and 840 infantrymen, the vanquished having lost 716 men with 846 wounded, many of them belonging to Ischia's contingent. Practically all the Veronese commanders, including Ordelaffi and da Polenta, were taken prisoner and led to Padua, where Francesco "Il Vecchio"—in a show of generous largesse—treated them to a great feast.

[*See also Carroccio*; Condottieri; Hawkwood, John; *and* Padua, Siege of.]

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Niccolò Capponi

CASTELNAUDARY, SIEGE AND BATTLE OF

After Simon de Montfort's abortive siege of Toulouse in the summer of 1211, the Count of Toulouse, Raymond VI, went on the offensive, hoping to destroy the Albigensian crusade in a single battle or siege. As summer passed into autumn, the crusade army was increasingly bereft of its usual forty-day servers from the north, while Raymond gathered a force many times as big as the crusade army. Knowing that the count of Toulouse would greatly outnumber him, the sensible move for Simon de Montfort, tactically and strategically, was to enter a friendly, strong fortification and wait out any siege. Instead he was urged to defend himself at the border of the territories he controlled. He therefore made his stand at Castelnaudary, a town whose fortifications had been partially destroyed earlier that summer and whose population was hostile.

Raymond's army probably numbered in the low thousands. Fearful of Simon de Montfort's military reputation, instead of investing the town and its fortifications and starving it out, Raymond camped some distance away and built a fortified camp, suggesting to both sides that yet again this commander would not confront Simon directly. Some partial attempts to seize Castelnaudary's suburb failed, but the count of Toulouse did little to bring the siege to a conclusion. For a time the crusaders brought food and water from the surrounding areas but Simon de Montfort eventually worried about his food supply and manpower. He sent out several lieutenants to raise men and supplies, the result of which, a substantial supply train, approached Castelnaudary. While the count of Toulouse remained behind, the most capable tactical commander on the southern side, Raymond-Roger, Count of Foix, took a substantial number of men and marched to a small town a few miles east at Saint Martin-la-Lande. As the supply train drew closer, its commanders realized they would have to fight their way through the count of Foix's army in order to reach Castelnaudary. With their few mounted men they charged the center of the count of Foix's troops, surprising the army by their aggressiveness and quickness. While this took place, some southerners reached the train and looted part of it, but unit discipline failed under the ferocity of the mounted attack. Unaware of these events and increasingly worried about the train, Simon de Montfort departed Castelnaudary with sixty mounted men to rescue it, leaving perhaps as few as a couple of dozen men to defend his stronghold.

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Coming up on the count of Foix's army from the rear, Simon's men charged, and the wavering ranks of Raymond-Roger's troops fell apart completely.

The result was a complete rout. The count of Toulouse, back at camp, was shocked that so few had put to flight so many. The southern army had suffered yet another defeat to more competent and aggressive northerners. The supply train got through, and the count of Toulouse's army soon lost heart and abandoned the siege of Castelnaudary, adding more luster to Simon de Montfort's military reputation.

[*See also* Carcassonne, Siege of; Montfort, Simon (IV) de; Termes, Siege of; *and* Toulouse, Sieges of.]

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Laurence W. Marvin

CASTILLON, SIEGE AND BATTLE OF

After the reconquest of Normandy in 1449–1450, the French king, Charles VII, turned his attention to English-held Gascony. In June 1451 the city of Bordeaux fell, and soon all the ancient duchy of Guyenne was in French hands. In a rare display of resolve by the Lancastrian government, John Talbot, Earl of Shrewsbury, landed near Bordeaux in October 1452 with three thousand men in a bid to recapture the duchy. The Gascons welcomed the English return, and Charles assembled a mighty army to expel the English once and for all.

Two armies, perhaps twenty thousand men, marched into Gascony from the north toward Bordeaux and from the west to recover Bayonne and its hinterland. In the spring of 1453 one of these armies, some seven thousand strong under Jean Bureau, laid siege to the town of Castillon. Talbot, reinforced by a further two thousand men under the command of Sir Edward Hull and hundreds of Gascons, decided, in response to a petition from the embattled townsmen, to relieve the siege. The English arrived outside the French camp early on 17 July 1453. Bureau had deployed three hundred cannons in fortified field defenses, the trace of which can still be walked on the field. Talbot, accompanied by thirteen hundred mounted men, routed a small detached force of *francs-archers* and, believing the French to be in retreat, decided to attack their main camp in the flank. With deadly effect, Bureau ordered his guns to turn and face the attackers: one contemporary French observer noted "each ball hit five or six men, killing them all."

Talbot ordered his men to dismount, while he remained mounted, wearing only a quilted jacket instead of full-plate armor. Piecemeal English reinforcements continued to arrive, but before long the battle had turned into a rout. Talbot's mount was cut down by cannon fire as he attempted to rally his men. Trapped under his fallen horse, Talbot was killed by an ax blow to the head by a French archer. His battered and trampled body was later identified



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by an old servant. Sir Edward Hull and Talbot's son John, Viscount Lisle, were also killed.

Despite its seemingly decisive nature, the battle did not lead to an immediate collapse in the Anglo-Gascon position. Although Castillon fell two days later and the Gascon garrison at Cadillac surrendered on 27 September, Bordeaux held out until late October. There was dissension in the French camp, and efforts were made to raise a new army in England. But the loss of Gascony had important political consequences for the Lancastrian government of Henry VI. At the beginning of August, on receipt of the news of Talbot's death, the king fell into a catatonic stupor that lasted for seventeen months, and the Gascon elites made their peace with Charles VII. Henry VI's illness also marked the beginning of the power struggle in England that led to the Wars of the Roses and the accession of the Yorkist king Edward IV in 1461.

[*See also* Britain, *subentry* Narrative (1300–1500): Bureau Brothers; Charles VII of France; Edward IV of England; Hundred Years' War; *and* Talbot, John.]

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David Grummitt

CASTLES

[*This entry contains three subentries, on castles from 500–1100, 1150–1350, and 1350–1500. See also* Crusader Castles.]

500–1100

A medieval castle was two things: a home and a fortress. In the modern world the word "castle" is used to describe a wide range of defended sites, from prehistoric hillforts to post-medieval artillery fortresses. In a medieval setting, however, it is the private character of castles, as elite defended residences, that distinguishes them from other forms of fortification. Accordingly, the medieval castle is as much defined by its social context as its physical appearance or the character of its defenses. Castles were constructed for a wide range of high-status individuals within medieval society, including kings and other rulers such as dukes and counts, the higher nobility, senior churchmen and knights, as well as more petty landlords. In addition to their residential and military uses, castles served as centers of justice and administration and had important symbolic roles as icons of authority and lordship.

Early Fortifications. The main developments in European castle design and planning occurred in the period after c.1000. The eleventh and twelfth centuries witnessed a "castral revolution" as nobles fortified their estate centers on an increasing scale, studding the European landscape with private castles. The Early Middle Ages saw important precursors to this process, however. The building of Europe's first castles was inextricably linked to the social and political transformations of the ninth and tenth centuries and, in particular, the delegation of authority by hard-pressed rulers to land-holding magnates with the means and motivation to defend their homes and lands. Social competition was as much a driving force behind early castle building as the need for security, as members of the lower nobility sought to emulate their superiors. Even if the location of an individual castle had a strategic character, the private nature of these fortifications meant that they were rarely built as elements within centralized military strategies; in defensive terms they rather served to protect lordly households, to fortify estates, and sometimes to protect populations at large by offering refuge.

Castles were not the only fortifications of the period, however. New forms of military threat had kings and rulers experimenting with fortifications whose functions were sometimes overlapping. The Early Middle Ages saw vulnerable towns and

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monasteries encircled with walls, linear defenses built to protect and demarcate territories and early kingdoms, and hilltop fortifications constructed as temporary refuges for populations. Together, three external threats—from Saracens, Magyars, and Vikings—created a challenging military landscape that witnessed marauding armies penetrate deep into the heartland of Europe. From the south, the Saracens threatened France and then Italy in the eighth and ninth centuries. They also erected powerful fortifications of their own in the form of *alcázars*, such as the immense tenth-century example at Almería, on the southeast coast of Spain. To the east, from the late ninth century mobile bands of Magyar horsemen made inroads that eventually penetrated as far as Lombardy and Provence, prompting a reciprocal wave of fortress-building. From the north, the depredations of marauding Viking armies were instrumental in the breakup of Carolingian society in the second half of the ninth century, the weakening of centralized authority creating an environment in which private fortification ultimately came to flourish. In the late eighth and early ninth century Charlemagne built guard posts and fortifications at river mouths and harbors as security against Viking armies. In the Edict of Pistres (864), Charles the Bald ordered other defenses to be constructed along the Seine and insisted on the destruction of all *castella et firmitates et haias* (castles, fortifications, and enclosures) built without permission, implying the presence of other preexisting private fortifications. The late ninth century also saw the Anglo-Saxon kings of England take defensive action through the construction of a network of fortified *burhs* (or fortified centers), some based on former Roman towns and others planned as new ventures. Viking kings and military leaders constructed fortified bases and over-wintering camps, while circular "geometrical fortresses" are known from tenth-century Denmark, exemplified by the example at Trelleborg, in Zealand, probably intended as garrisoned bases or military training camps.

Stone Castles. Two main types of technology were used in the construction of early castles: earth and timber, and stone. One of the very earliest known stone towers was built at Doué-la-Fontaine (also known as La Motte), in the Loire valley in northern France. Originally constructed around c. 900 as a rectangular hall, the building was converted in the middle of the tenth century into a towered lordly residence with an upstairs hall, reinforced in the eleventh century with a surrounding earthwork. Many other early stone castles were similarly towered structures, comprising multistory rectangular or square residential buildings known as *donjons* (derived from the Latin *dominium*, meaning "lordship"; the word "keep" is primarily a postmedieval coinage), usually freestanding within a walled courtyard. The important medieval ruler Fulk Nerra, Count of Anjou (987–1040), was one of the leading castle-builders of the period, commissioning numerous castles to fortify his expanding power base, and was responsible for the early stone donjon at Langeais, rectangular in plan and with base dimensions of 53 by 23 feet. Excellent tenth- and eleventh-century examples include (in France) Loches and Montbazon and (in England) Colchester and the White Tower of London. The German equivalent to the donjon was the *Bergfried*, with early examples of rectangular noble towers known from Düren, Soest, and Xanten.

Earth and Timber Castles. Castles of earth and timber were built in two main ways: as mottes or as ringworks. Mottes were artificial earthen mounds, providing elevated positions for defensive or other high-status structures, usually initially of timber. Depicted prominently on the Bayeux Tapestry, both in northern France (Dinan, Dol, and Rennes) and southern England (Hastings), in the 1060s they became increasingly common features of the European landscape from the middle of the eleventh century onward. Ringworks were ditched and embanked enclosures surrounding halls and other domestic buildings, their defenses relying on the strength of the enclosing bank and palisade and a gatehouse. While such castles of both sorts have sometimes been seen as a phenomenon that originated in northern France and diffused to England and other parts of Europe from the eleventh century, a newer view sees indigenous early medieval

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Alcazaba. Almería, Spain, tenth century. HL

societies as developing their own independent traditions of private defense that evolved, often gradually, into castle building. For example, while the history of castle building in Ireland traditionally starts with the Norman Conquest in 1169, the early medieval Irish rural landscape was scattered with tens of thousands of defended homesteads, sometimes of high status. These included ringforts (enclosed with earthen ramparts and ditches), cashels (protected by stone walls), and crannogs (in marshes and lakes), some of which were rebuilt as motte or ringwork castles.

Excavations. It is largely through archaeology that we can understand the appearance, plans, and defenses of Europe's earliest private fortifications. Excavation of numerous castles has shown long-term processes of defensive evolution stretching back into the Early Middle Ages. In the English county of Lincolnshire, for instance, excavation of a medieval manor house at Goltho, abandoned in the thirteenth century, revealed an underlying defended aristocratic residence established in the ninth century. This comprised a hall and other buildings enclosed within ringwork defenses, rebuilt in more powerful form in the tenth century and transformed into a compact motte and bailey castle in the eleventh or twelfth century. In Germany, investigation of the site of the Husterknupp, located northwest of Cologne, has shown a motte and bailey castle to have been preceded by several earlier phases of enclosed settlement. From late-ninth-century origins, improvements to the site's defenses late in the tenth century saw the settlement subdivided into two areas, with part of it raised on a low earthwork platform with a motte-like appearance. The site was developed into a powerfully defended motte and bailey between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries, the motte standing over 20 feet high and with a base diameter of over 164 feet. This stage-by-stage construction of an earth and timber castle over a lengthy period of occupation, typically between the ninth and eleventh centuries, is paralleled elsewhere in the British Isles and northwest Europe.

Comparable developments saw fortifications of earth and timber built by the nobility in the Slavic territories. The site of Gniezno, in Poland, for instance, developed as a stronghold from the middle of the tenth century, possessing powerful

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ringwork defenses built around a structure of enormous logs with layers of clay, sand, and stone. Other private fortresses of earth and timber are well known from eastern Germany, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. In Mediterranean Europe, meanwhile, castle building in the tenth and eleventh centuries was closely linked to the phenomenon of *incastellamento*, meaning the growth of rural communities around fortified elite residences. Naturally defensible hilltops were favored, with many sites built initially in timber and replaced by stone towers from the eleventh century. Some castles evolved from older roots. For instance, in the north of Italy the fortress of Castelseprio (*Sibrium*) grew from a late Roman military settlement: a late-fourth-century complex of watchtowers was transformed into a *castrum* used as a Lombard stronghold. In other cases communal refuge sites grew into castles. At Montarrenti, in Tuscany, a defended village occupied from the seventh century was transformed in the late eighth and early ninth centuries by a new seigneurial presence that saw its timber palisade replaced with a stone wall and the addition of a lordly residence and accompanying granary.

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Oliver Creighton

1150–1350

In antiquity and the early medieval period, the most important fortifications were urban defenses. The characteristic stronghold of the High Middle Ages, however, was the castle—a less extensive but often even more heavily built fortress, designed on the scale of a grand residence for a nobleman and his entourage rather than to enclose a whole community. This basic fact did much to shape the possibilities and practices of medieval warfare, medieval rulership, and indeed medieval daily life. England, where castles were for all practical purposes an exogenous development, introduced with the Norman Conquest, is perhaps the place where this can be seen best. Indeed, the summation of William the Conqueror's reign in the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* is that "he caused castles to be built and oppressed the poor." That is the perspective of the conquered; the ruler's view is expressed by the twelfth-century chronicler William of Newburgh, who called the royal castles "the bones of the kingdom." The progressive encastellation of the landscape was a Europe-wide phenomenon, broadly similar from region to region. Because space does not allow discussion of the differences that did exist in how and when castles were built in countries such as France, Germany, and Italy, this entry will focus on England as a case study.

Later Twelfth Century. As noted in the entry on early castles, in the eleventh century the main type of castle was the motte and bailey, with a wooden tower set atop an artificial mound as the main defense and with a larger area enclosed by a palisade to protect more people and goods against lower-intensity threats. By the second half of the twelfth century this design had been superseded by masonry castles with a stone tower or keep and

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Kenilworth Castle. The keep (right), constructed in the twelfth century, is the oldest part of the castle. VIEWS OF ENGLAND, PRINTS AND PHOTOGRAPHS DIVISION, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

sometimes also a walled enclosure, still known as the bailey. Stone keeps had been in use since the Norman Conquest—the White Tower at the Tower of London is an example—but their use reached something of a climax in the second half of the twelfth century under Henry II (r. 1154–1189), ruler of England and Wales as well as of large areas of France. The Pipe Rolls, or sheriff's annual accounts, have survived in the National Archives from Henry's reign onward. Since a substantial part of his outlay was expenditure on building and maintaining castles, information about royal castles in this period is exceptionally good—and is another reason to use England as a case study. The importance of such written sources cannot be exaggerated. Conisborough castle, Yorkshire, for example, with a very fine polygonal keep built in ashlar (as was common in France), must belong to this period, but without written evidence even the name of the builder is uncertain. In the case of the royal castles, it is known not only who built them, but how much they cost and how long they took to build when they were started from scratch.

The principal expenditure was at six castles: Dover, Newcastle upon Tyne, Nottingham, Orford, Windsor, and Winchester. At three of these the keeps survive. The numerous remains in the other castles where work was done need not be described. The mightiest of the works carried out was at Dover, the key to England, with a huge central keep, an inner curtain wall with square towers, and an imposing gatehouse with barbican and an outer curtain. It is a true monument to Henry II and to the castle concept.

Impressive as Dover castle is, it cannot have been very comfortable to live in, particularly in the keep. There was an element of symbolism in a keep, displaying the authority and power of its owner; it was not designed for comfort. One might compare the Tower of London and the Palace of Westminster built by William I and William II (1066–1100). Westminster's vast hall, required by the great household assembly for a meal, was not available at the Tower. At least part of the reason for the need for a strong outer defense to enclose a larger area was to make a space for ample domestic buildings. This is seen at Dover and became the main feature of thirteenth-century castles. The halls of Henry III's castles (r. 1216–1272) are almost legendary.

The older Norman keep could be left as an island inside the new layout, or it might be absorbed into

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a new curtain, as at Goodrich castle, Herefordshire. A new thirteenth-century castle might have merely a polygonal curtain wall with round towers on the angles, with two of the towers sitting close together to flank the entry passage joined over it by one or two stories. The room above housed the mechanism for operating the portcullis and contained apertures for dropping missiles on an enemy. Towers had been solid briefly, as at Conisborough, but now were flat at the back, with doors giving access to rooms at the ground floor and above. The tower rose above the level of the curtain wall that it overlooked and allowed for enfilading fire to be directed against an enemy attempting an assault. The great gatehouse flanked by its two towers was a new element in castle design, one that was particularly developed in England. In front of the gatehouse was a drawbridge, or rather tip bridge, with counterweights pivoting over a deep pit. The entry was a wooden bridge that closed the entrance when the bridge was up, and behind this were portcullises, one or more at both ends of the passage, consisting of iron grills that slid up and down and were held by grooves in the walls on either side. There might also have been a gate with a drawbar behind running into the masonry at either end.

A good example of the changes that took place is Kenilworth castle, Warwickshire, in the heart of England. The castle started off in the twelfth century with a Norman keep, but after it became royal, King John's Pipe Rolls record large-scale expenditures associated with major works that transformed the entire site. Previously a pond was on the west side, created by damming a small stream; there, as mentioned in their charter, canons of the adjoining Augustinian priory were allowed to use a boat to catch their Friday fish. But now the dam to the south was raised, and a huge lake, known as the Mere, was formed. The curtain wall of the castle was erected along its eastern edge, and the opposite side of the enclosure was protected by further waterworks. The dam to the south had its own defensive wall and terminated in another earthwork with wooden towers and a gatehouse by which the castle was entered from outside. No doubt, many service buildings were outside, including ponds for fish cultivation. The domestic buildings, since replaced, were in an inner enclosure on the hillock, which bore the Norman keep. The water defenses proved formidably effective in the well-documented siege in 1266 when the dispossessed followers of Simon de Montfort held out against the king, Henry III.

Kenilworth was perhaps the earliest of castles that made use of an artificial lake. Later such castles in the same century were Caerphilly in Glamorgan in South Wales, created about 1270, and Leeds castle in Kent, the work of Edward I (r. 1272–1307). Such lakes—created for leisure and beauty as well as for food and defense—became popular in later times, as in the chateaux of the Loire.

Adaptation. In England the great period for castles, as for monasteries, was the twelfth century, and to some extent their survival in later centuries depended on their ability to adapt to changing circumstances. The history of a castle involves noting its responses to social changes. A great many castles were not able to adapt and went out of use, even by the thirteenth century. The climate and vegetation did not change: rather, the military threats and the particular social needs of the people who used them changed. The weapons used or the techniques used probably did not change much in the thirteenth century. The towered curtain with its round towers was no doubt a more difficult objective to overcome with bows and arrows and stone-throwing machines, but it was just as vulnerable to mining unless protected by water. At least two explanations can be given for the falling off in the number of new castles in the thirteenth century and later. First, because so many castles had been created in the previous century, demand had to a great extent been satisfied. Second, a stronger monarch came to the throne, which reduced the amount of warfare so clearly in evidence since the so-called Anarchy of Stephen's reign. One region where castles were indeed needed to subdue a hostile population was Wales, where some of the finest castles of the Middle Ages were erected by Edward I (r. 1272–1307).

Much like Edward's castles is Gilbert de Clare's great construction at Caerphilly, begun in 1268. Like some of King Edward's buildings, it uses what

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is called the "concentric" design, with a tall inner curtain dominating a lower outer one. The idea of having an inner curtain overlooking an outer one was not new in the thirteenth century. The Iron Age Celts in England built splendid hill forts with two or three lines of defense. The system was by no means unknown to the Romans or after in the Mediterranean, and it occasionally happened almost accidentally in English castles, as at Dover. At Caerphilly the system was clearly intentional. The plan of the fortress had a central squarish element, with towers at the corners and massive gatehouses, the whole being surrounded by a low outer wall. Whether it was known to the king is quite uncertain. Caerphilly has a heavily fortified dam and elaborate waterworks. Because Caerphilly was a nonroyal castle, its documentation is much weaker, but nevertheless its earlier date can be kept in mind when considering Edward's castles.

[*See also* Dover Castle; Fortifications, *subentry on* Overview; London, Tower of; Urban Defenses; *and* Welsh Castles of Edward I.]

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Michael Thompson

1350–1500

There were always at least two motives for creating a castle: first, a functional military one—to gain self-protection and the ability to withstand attacks, and second, the human desire for display of power and authority, wealth, or even good taste. In France, there was a literary cult of castles in the later Middle Ages. In feudal times, the military aspect was paramount and the second element played a secondary role, but in the period under consideration the roles were reversed and the military role was less significant.

Generalizations can be demonstrated only by actual examples. As with High Medieval castles, it would be infeasible here to discuss developments across the Continent, so the British Isles will be used as an illustrative case study. A convenient example to start with is Kenilworth castle, Warwickshire. It had been heavily fortified in the early thirteenth century with elaborate waterworks that stood it in good stead in the famous siege of 1266. No doubt there were ample domestic buildings at this time, but in the middle of the fourteenth century they were massively rebuilt, first by Henry of Lancaster (the 1347 contract for the hall roof survives) and later by John of Gaunt. The ruins of his splendid hall survive (dating by architectural evidence), and their character suggests a transformation of the castle into a palace. As far as is known, the fortifications of the castle were maintained, but no additions were made. At the turn of the century, Henry V created the Pleasaunce, an elaborate summer house or pavilion on the edge of a lake. It was reached by boat and had its own dock. The banks of the layout survive, but the buildings within, no doubt of wood, were removed by Henry VIII. The way of life and its pursuit of pleasure suggested by these changes are not compatible with the sort of life lived in the castle in the thirteenth century.

Windsor castle, Berkshire, saw vast works carried out by Edward III (1327–1377), not on the defenses but on the living accommodation in both wards and the works associated with the new creation of the Order of the Garter. There is no suggestion that he let the defenses slip—quite to the contrary—but clearly it was the palace aspect of the castle and the new order of knighthood that were his main concern. The expenditure was one of the heaviest recorded at a single castle.

Bolton Castle. Built by Richard le Scrope, fourteenth century. PHOTOGRAPH BY JASON SUTCLIFFE

Although few castles of traditional form were built, there was still a vigorous tradition of castle building in certain areas that tended to develop their own special forms. The word "castle" is used loosely; they have been recently studied in a work entitled *Greater Medieval Houses of England and Wales.* Bolton castle in Yorkshire may be used as an example. Bolton castle was built by Richard Lord Scrope during the last twenty-five years of the fourteenth century. and was started in 1378 (a contract survives). It is a rectangular structure with an open courtyard in the middle and four very large corner towers, square or rectangular, projecting beyond the broad ranges (structures built inward from the thick exterior walls of the castle) that link them. Outside it has a grim castle-like appearance with tiny windows in its three stories, but inside it is quite different. There has been more than one detailed analysis, and it is a domestic setup with two halls, kitchen, chapel, and number of lodgings in the towers or ranges. It is in fact a large late medieval house put into a castle-shaped container. The appearance was important. Individual lodging chambers had appeared rather like the arrangement in a medieval college at Oxford or Cambridge during the fourteenth century. Clearly, a castle appearance's was important for status, but it is probably quite wrong to assume that the protection it gave was not also in the minds of the occupants.

Going north to the border, Scotland, and across the Irish Sea from the fourteenth century onward, the tower house was normal, larger in Scotland than in Ireland. It could have three or four stories, and the ground floor was closed in Scotland by a gate—a grill or "yett." In southern Ireland, they are very common, so much so that standing in one spot, a person can see six, seven, or more. It has recently been claimed that they were not defensive structures but rather status symbols. However, the Scottish examples sometimes have so-called pistol holes (small gun-loops for firing out) so, although this proposal is tempting, one should not follow it all the way. It may be significant that in one Celtic area, Wales, there are scarcely any tower houses, a fact that has not been fully explained.

In England, too, tower houses are not common. An example in stone is the tower added by William Lord Hastings in 1462 to the earlier manor house at Ashby de la Zouch, Leicestershire. It was a four-storied structure, and the windows in the remaining

half show that the principal room was on the first floor above the ground floor. A more impressive effect could be produced by using brick, its redness enhanced by reddening the mortar with ocher, and it could be made even more striking by using dark glazed bricks to form geometric patterns, initials, or even shields in the brickwork. Bricks had been known since at least the thirteenth century and had been used in the church at Kingston upon Hull in the fourteenth century. Normally, brickwork was hidden under plaster, but in the fifteenth century its display qualities were appreciated.

Perhaps the most spectacular use of brick in the fifteenth century was at Tattershall castle in north Lincolnshire. There had been a thirteenth-century castle on this site; the bases of its round towers survive. In the 1430s (the building account that survives is general not particular), Ralph, Lord Cromwell added a great brick tower of four stories over a vaulted basement. It had round corner turrets with conical roofs and traceried windows worked in stone, but the most elaborate feature was the machicolations with wall walk above at the top of the tower. Machicolations are discussed subsequently. It has been suggested that the tower shows German influences, and there is evidence that foreign bricklayers were employed at Farnham castle.

Farnham castle, Surrey, in addition to its twelfth-century stone outworks and shell-keep, has a great brick tower over its entry that dominates the town. Its appearance has been very much altered by the later insertion of sash windows. It is known from entries in the Winchester accounts that these windows were built in 1470–1475 by Bishop William Waynflete. The doorway has portcullis grooves, but it can never have been a serious defensive work; it was almost entirely a display of power and authority. As the original entry tower—the demolition of which is recorded—was presumably a serious defensive work, this is a significant indication of changed function. There are a number of such brick additions to castles or indeed even to manor houses converting them into pseudocastles, like the bishop's palace at Buckden, where a huge brick tower was added to the Bishop of Lincoln's palace in 1475–1485. At Hertford castle, Edward IV constructed something similar. The purpose, in most cases, seems to have been provision of a suite of rooms for the owner, a kind of self-glorification.

Machicolation refers to a platform projecting from the wall top supported on corbels with apertures through which the defenders could inspect the outer face of the wall and drop missiles if necessary on anyone attacking it. The device had been well known from Italy and the Continent since the twelfth century, but in England, it was adopted much later. Machicolation was not used on Edward I's castles in Wales but from the mid-fourteenth century was fairly common. The most striking use is on the two towers of this period at Warwick castle. There the platforms were functional, but so strikingly did machicolations alter the appearance that later they were used ornamentally, without the apertures which had been their original purpose.

Three other castles of more regular form may be discussed, all of which give rise to controversy. The earliest is Bodiam castle, Sussex, where Sir Edward Dallingrigge received a license in 1386 "to strengthen and crenellate his manor house of Bodyham near the sea . . . to construct and make thereof a castle in defence of the adjacent countryside and for resistance against our enemies" (Calendar of Patent Rolls, 1385). The enemy were the French, who had made raids on the south coast at this time, and the wording suggests that Sir Edward was being allowed to convert his home house into a castle. What he made can be seen today: a regular rectangular structure with round corner towers and square towers in the middle, two forming the gatehouse on the south side. The gatehouse and square towers are heavily machicolated, and the whole castle is surrounded by a broad moat, almost a lake. It is entered by a causeway interrupted by bridges that turn through a right angle on an octagonal island in the lake. The buildings inside constitute a full medieval domestic ensemble identifiable from the windows and fireplaces in the curtain wall. There has been controversy recently whether the "castle" was a serious defensive work; the complexity of the entry and the reference in the license to the king's enemies surely indicate

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the builder's desire to be able to resist any French raiding party. The occurrence of French raids is well documented as are near contemporary works for defense elsewhere, as at Canterbury West Gate. Herstmonceux castle, also in Sussex and near the south coast, was probably erected after a license was given to Sir Roger Fiennes "to enclose crenellate and furnish with towers and battlements his manor of Herstmonceux" (Calendar of Patent Rolls, 1441). What he constructed has even less fortification about it than Bodiam. He built in brick using a square design (208 by 214 feet), with octagonal towers down either side and at the corners. The gatehouse with flanking octagonal towers has a serious look about it, but the general impression of the castle with its broad lakelike moat and red color of the brickwork is of an architectural tour de force rather than a serious defensive work. It was entered by a causeway, and the bridges and broad moat gave some protection. Unfortunately, the original domestic buildings do not survive, but the wealth of chimneys in old prints suggests an ample provision of the characteristic lodgings of the period.

Although the point where the idea of the castle as a serious work of defense is approaching, two other castles of the fifteenth century suggest that the castle spirit went on until Tudor times, at least in areas away from the south coast. The first of these is in Wales, the castle at Raglan. Called by Emery a palace-fortress because of the castle's lavish domestic buildings, it was largely constructed by William Herbert in 1455 to 1456 to protect his manor house in the disturbed times in Wales. A most remarkable structure emerged: two courts with pointed towers on the angles and in the gatehouse, which has gunports, and an enormous hexagonal keep with a concentric wall and side moat attached on one side with its own bridge. The ground plan does suggest a converted manor house with highly individualistic shapes. It only had a serious siege in the Civil War in the seventeenth century. It is the motive for its construction that indicates the surviving castle idea, but not a living tradition for its design.

The second castle referred to is Kirby Muxloe, Leicestershire. It is built of brick and is rectangular with square towers at the corners and polygonal towers forming the gatehouse on its north side. Although the whole plan was laid out, only the north side stands. A set of building accounts survives and has been published; William Lord Hastings started the work in 1479, but on his execution in 1483 work ceased. The moat had been dug and was 45 to 70 feet wide; it was fed by a local stream with controls for entry and exit. The castle has gunports, but it apparently enclosed an earlier building with chalk foundations that would have been then replaced by the new ranges. So a fairly normal sort of small castle was still envisaged just before the Tudor period.

The mention of gunports serves as a reminder that firearms using gunpowder were introduced early in the fourteenth century and that cannons were relatively common by the middle of the century. In a number of English castles or town gates, gunports—round apertures or key hole shapes—are found, which are intended for use of handguns, antipersonnel weapons of small caliber. No English castle was strong enough either to stand up to cannon bombardment or suitable for mounting cannons. These were used mainly in the field but on the Continent were used by the French to drive the English out and by Mehmet II in his assault on Constantinople (Istanbul) in 1453. England was to some extent behind the Continent in this area. The full adoption of cannons in fortifications by Henry VIII is reflected in his coastal forts that were designed as batteries and to resist shot with large round bastions. The gunports on English castles leave little doubt about the intention, but whether they were actually used or were to a degree a status symbol, as some have argued, it is impossible to say.

[*See also* Artillery *and* Fortifications, *subentry on* Overview.]

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CASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI

(1281–1328), ruler of Lucca between 1316 and 1328, briefly its duke (1327–1328), and creator of a short-lived regional state centered on this city. Born on 29 March 1281 to a mercantile family that was a branch of one of the great patrician clans of his town, he was exiled in 1301 as a result of a factional feud, and fled to Ancona and then to England where his stay was cut short when he killed a fellow Lucchese. He was consequently forced to escape to Flanders, obtaining employment there as a mercenary and continuing to follow that profession when he returned in 1304 to Italy. In 1314 he was readmitted to his native city as a result of two developments—the enlistment of some of the troops in the army of the lately deceased emperor, Henry VII, by the Pisans and the appointment by them as their captain of Uguccione della Faggiuola.This led to the defeat of the Lucchese, who were therefore compelled to allow their exiles to reenter their town. Once in it, Castruccio conspired with Uguccione, in June of that year, to betray the city and set up a regime subject to Uguccione. Castruccio's own prominence, however, excited the apprehension of his city's new lord. Arrested on a trumped-up charge by Uguccione's son, Nieri, he was on the point of execution when a plot, concocted by his supporters in Lucca and those of the Gherardesca family in Pisa, freed him from prison. As a consequence of this revolution, Castruccio was, in 1316, appointed captain-general of his state, initially for a term of six months but, in July 1317, for ten years. In April 1320 his authority was further endorsed when he was made lord of the commune for life.

In the ascendant in Lucca since 1314, and in power partly because of his kinship with the leading families and partly because of his ability, acquired during his banishment, to handle mercenary troops, he proceeded to strengthen his position through military force, which enabled him both to quell opposition in his native city and to defend it effectively against its enemies. His main problem was that, during the periods 1316–1317 and 1320–1328, he was at war with a much stronger and wealthier Florence. His response to the situation was to seek to expand his territories with the aim of gaining a rough parity in resources with his main antagonist.

He began, between 1317 and 1321, by consolidating and extending his hold over the lands to the northwest of Lucca, thus securing the province of Lunigiana, some towns at the eastern extremity of the Genoese Riviera and Pontremoli, a place that gave him easy access to Lombardy. In 1321–1322, he took advantage of the route opened up in this way to send his troops to support the Visconti of Milan in their military operations against their enemies, thereby earning credit that would later allow him to call on their aid when he needed it.

Castruccio next turned his attention to Pistoia. Engaging in negotiations with its leading family, the Tedici, he succeeded, in May 1325, in obtaining its cession to him through an agreement with one of its members, Filippo, to whom he married his daughter Dialta. The Florentines reacted to this coup by dispatching an army to invade Lucchese territory through the marshy Val di Nievole. Occupying and fortifying the heights above this plain, Castruccio permitted his enemies to beseige and take Altopascio, the town at the center of it, through the summer, during which their numbers were reduced by sickness and desertions. Then, as they were about to move toward Lucca, he raised a forced loan from the merchants of his city to pay for eight hundred knights who had just been dispatched from Milan under Azzo Visconti. Their arrival provided him, for the first time in this campaign, with a tactical superiority in mercenary cavalry over the Florentines. He immediately exploited it by moving his troops along the northern ridge of the valley and descending into it to block his adversaries' line of retreat. The two thousand mounted soldiers and eight thousand

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infantry to which they had shrunk by this stage proved no match for his ably led, heavily armed twenty-three hundred knights who, on 22 September 1325, succeeded in routing them. Castruccio's victory was all the more complete because the terrain through which the Florentines had to withdraw was crisscrossed by water courses and flanked by swamps and a lake. Unable to escape, some three thousand of them were killed and many captured, including a large number of Florentine patricians whose ransoms enabled Castruccio to defray most of the costs of his military operations over the preceding summer.

This battle of Altopascio not only allowed Castruccio to continue to hold Pistoia but, thanks to the devastation of his opponents' territory in the wake of this defeat, to create for himself the appearance of invincibility. He realized, however, that his triumph might turn out to be short-lived unless he could further add to his possessions. To acquire these, he needed the help of a powerful ally, namely the Holy Roman Emperor. Validating his authority by securing vicariates over the cities he ruled from the occupants of the imperial throne had been his policy for some time. In 1320 he had been accorded one for Lucca by Frederick of Austria and, in 1325, one for Pistoia by Ludwig of Bavaria. It was the descent of the latter into Italy in 1327 to proceed to Rome for his coronation that presented Castruccio with the opportunity to get his hands on the city of Pisa and its dependencies. Ludwig had with him many troops, but not the money to pay them, being thus dependent on his Italian supporters for subsidies that would permit him to travel to Rome and back. It was thus not difficult for Castruccio to deflect him into a seige of Pisa that, once taken, passed under the nominal lordship of the German emperor but fell, in effect, under the administrative control of his Lucchese protégé who derived the further benefit from his close collaboration with his patron of being granted the title of duke in November 1327.

This honor did not, however, prevent Castruccio from suffering a serious reversal when the Florentines recaptured Pistoia. Returning in haste to Tuscany, Castruccio threw his resources into setting up defensive positions to the west of Florence to prevent its troops from relieving Pistoia while he beseiged it. In August 1328 Castruccio retook the city. This left him in possession of a swathe of territories, the combined revenues from which would have allowed him to support an army equal to any that the Florentines could field. But he did not hold these dominions for long, succumbing on 3 September 1328 to disease, probably brought on by the privations endured during the recent investment of Pistoia. His death had grave consequences for the state he had built up. Ludwig of Bavaria, on his way home to Germany, seized Lucca, in order to exploit it for his own financial gain. He then abandoned it to his still-unpaid knights, who occupied the town and tried to sell it to the highest bidder. After the emperor departed from Italy, Pisa and Pistoia, in the absence of a strong military leader who could continue to keep them in subjection, recovered their independence, if only briefly, falling under Florentine overlordship in 1329.

The disintegration of the regional principality Castruccio had created illustrates the problems facing a ruler from a relatively minor center who, through military means alone, sought to expand his territories so that they could match those of the stronger powers. Despite his failure, he had nevertheless developed a strategy capable of temporarily neutralizing an initial position of weakness. This involved acquiring the skills to lead professional troops, relying on allies to supplement his forces at crucial junctures in his campaigns, strengthening his hold on subject cities by marriages with members of their dominant families, and exploiting the terrain in which he fought to trap and destroy his enemies or to hold them at bay.

[*See also* Altopascio, Battle of.]

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CASUALTY RATES

Just as accurate numbers for medieval armies are rarely available, working out casualties with any precision presents enormous problems. Distinguishing between injured and dead is impossible, partly because although medieval physicians had their successes, most of the injured or diseased must have died. What is certain is that most losses were due to disease rather than enemy action. In 1166 Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa (r. 1152–1190) launched a great army into Italy, crushing the Roman army at Tusculum and going on to besiege Rome. Plague then destroyed his army totally. This was an extreme case, but in 1415 Henry V of England (r. 1413–1422) landed with an army of about twelve thousand at Harfleur. The town held out until 22 September, inflicting some casualties, but it was largely disease that caused the English army to dwindle to about seven thousand when it marched on into France.

Campaigns in which there were battles or major sieges were quite exceptional, and for the most part fighting consisted of skirmishes, often provoked by ravaging by the force that was on the offensive in enemy territory. In these conditions, armies suffered a steady but unspectacular and unrecorded erosion of numbers that merged with losses from desertion, disease, and accident. When battle did occur, casualties could be very high. Hastings in 1066 was unusual in that savage fighting raged all day between two armies, roughly equal in size (about seven to eight thousand men), and the pursuit of the defeated English went on into the evening. It is usually reckoned that the Normans lost three thousand and the English about five thousand. In 1119, at the battle of the Field of Blood, the Crusader Army of Antioch with seven hundred knights and three thousand foot soldiers was trapped by a much larger force and virtually annihilated. In July 1187, at Hattin, the twenty-thousand-strong army of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem was confronted and destroyed by Saladin's thirty-thousand-man army, suffering some seventeen thousand losses, although the ratio of killed and wounded to prisoners is not known. In November 1237 Emperor Frederick II (r. 1198–1250) ambushed the army of Milan at Cortenuova. Both armies were about ten thousand strong but the Milanese suffered terrible casualties, with at least a thousand knights and three thousand infantry captured, and the rest were either scattered or killed. In 1346, at Crécy, sixteen thousand Englishmen confronted twenty thousand Frenchmen, whose knights and esquires alone lost more than fifteen hundred men with thousands of infantry casualties, whereas the English lost only three hundred.

Precise numbers may not be available, but it is evident that casualty rates in battle were very high, partly because medieval armies were poorly articulated, with weak command structures. When battle was joined, command virtually broke down and there could be no question of negotiating a surrender because fighting had become a matter for individuals and small groups of men fighting at close quarters. If both sides were determined, as at Hastings, casualties would inevitably be heavy, and if there was a pursuit, the losing side would suffer terribly. In this situation, surrender was individual and survival was chancy. In 1102, at the battle of Ramlah, the army of the Latin Kingdom was defeated but a knight aroused the admiration of the enemy, as Albert of Aachen reported: "Conrad, indeed, peerless in courage and strength, inflicted extraordinary slaughter on the Saracens with his sword, until all who were there marvelled and feared; they kept well away from him and held back their hands, asking him to desist from the horrible massacre and to

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clasp their right hands in return for his life." This was a procedure, but granting surrender was in the hands of the victorious, and on this occasion others were slaughtered.

Assaults in siege warfare involved very heavy casualties because the attacker had to surmount fortifications that protected the defenders. Because command structures remained intact almost throughout the confrontation, surrender was possible. However, if a city or castle was stormed, the defenders were at mercy, because after break-in their forces and those of the attackers divided, reproducing the situation of battle. Storming was exceptionally bloody. In July 1099, at Jerusalem, the siege lasted about a month and culminated in two days of assault. The garrison fought well, and the crusaders suffered terrible losses. Unusually, good figures are available. Raymond of Aguilers says there were thirteen hundred knights and twelve thousand infantry in the army that arrived before Jerusalem in June 1099. On 12 August 1099 a force of only twelve hundred knights and nine thousand infantry marched out to defeat an Egyptian army at Ascalon. The apparent stability in the number of knights was due to many dismounted knights who were looking for fresh horses and thus served on foot. Allowing for this, overall the army suffered about 25 percent dead from all causes.

[*See also* Ascalon, Battle of; Cortenuova, Battle of; Crécy, Battle of; Death; Harfleur, Siege of; Hastings, Battle of; Jerusalem, Siege of (1099); *and* Medicine, Military, *subentry on* Medical Treatment.]

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John France

CATALAN COMPANY

The intrusion of the Aragonese monarchy into central Mediterranean affairs began in 1260 with the marriage of Prince Pedro (soon to be the Aragonese king Pedro III [r. 1276–1285]) to the Hohenstaufen heiress Constanza. This union ultimately linked the Aragonese crown with the French cadet house the Angevins in a rivalry that endured throughout the later thirteenth century. When Charles of Anjou was forced from power in Sicily on 30 March 1282 and replaced by Pedro, an Angevin-Aragonese naval conflict ranged over the southern French, Catalan, Greek, and Anatolian coastlines for the next two decades. Even though this struggle eventually motivated the French pope Martin IV (r. 1281–1285) to put the Aragonese crown under interdict and preach a crusade against it in 1285, succeeding Aragonese rulers had moved for a meaningful peace with France and the papacy and attained it with the Treaty of Caltabellota (1302).

With the return of peace to the central Mediterranean, a generation of men who had made war their only profession were in desperate need of employment. Hoping to rid themselves of this troublesome population, Jaime II of Aragon (r. 1291–1327) and his brother, Fadrique III of Sicily (r. 1295–1337), eagerly responded to the call for troops from the Byzantine emperor Andronicus II Palaeologus (r. 1282–1328) to shift their excess warriors eastward. As a result, a company of some seven thousand soldiers and sailors assembled under the leadership of a Templar who had deserted his vows to marry and start a family, Roger Blum (known in Catalan as Roger de Flor, 1280–1305). Included in this formidable group were both heavy cavalrymen and a large number of *almogaveres*, irregular infantrymen who had learned their survival skills and highly aggressive fighting

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style during the Aragonese reconquest of Valencia (1234–1244).

The mercenary band, which was predominantly Catalan and Sicilian in nationality, quickly made its way to Constantinople in the fall of 1303. After showing themselves equal in ferocity to the crusaders who had ravaged Byzantium in 1204, Flor and his men forced Andronicus to pay in advance a portion of the group's salary. The mercenary band then marched into Anatolia, gaining impressive victories against the Seljuk Turks before 1303 had waned. At first hailing the newcomers as saviors, Andronicus's son and co-emperor Michael IX Palaeologus (r. 1295–1320) soon fell out with the western barbarians over salary issues. Luring the company leader to Adrianople on 5 April 1305, Michael invited Flor and many of his companions to a lavish banquet where he had them murdered. The remaining members of the company, shaken but burning for revenge, elected the Catalan knight Berenguer d'Entenza as their leader, and he unleashed the so-called Catalan Vengeance on a wide swath of northern Greece. The two-year rampage across Thessaly spared neither Christian nor Muslim, laymen nor cleric.

This brutal record earned for the company excommunication by Pope Clement V (r. 1305–1314) who characterized his co-religionists as "senseless sons of damnation." The Catalans lived up to this brutal reputation in 1307 when their elected leader was assassinated by his major rival, Bernat de Rocafort. When his comrades fell out with Rocafort because of his despotism, the company's third leader paid with his life in July 1308. For the next three years, the group operated under an oligarchy of captains that included the great chronicler Ramón Muntaner. In time, the badly wounded organization recovered and won its greatest victory on 15 March 1311 at Kephissos near the ancient battlefield of Chaeronea. Having fallen out with their latest employer, Walter of Brienne, the Angevin duke of Athens, the Catalans chose a favorable position on an uplift surrounded by marshy ground. The company's infantry withstood the charge of Walter's heavy cavalry and threw the horsemen back into the bog where it proceeded to slaughter them. In the melee, the Athenian duke lost his life. Because of this momentous victory, the duchy of Athens came under the company's control and would remain so until 1379.

Though the Catalan Company was eventually subsumed by the duchy of Athens, its stunning achievements would have far-reaching effects on military affairs during the fourteenth century. As a body of mercenaries who elected their leaders and used terror tactics to have their way with peasants and townsmen alike, the company set the standard for the mercenary organizations that dominated the last phases of the Hundred Years' War. Like Courtrai (1302), Bannockburn (1314), and many other battles of the early fourteenth century, the Catalan victories between 1303 and 1311 plainly show the dominance of massed infantry over cavalry that became so apparent at Crécy (1346), Poitiers (1357), and Agincourt (1415).

[*See also* Agincourt, Battle of; Bannockburn, Battle of; Charles of Anjou; Courtrai, Battle and Siege of; Crécy, Battle of; Jaime II; Kephissos, Battle of; Pedro III; *and* Poitiers, Battle of (1356).]

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CATALAN EXPANSION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

In 1137 two very different realms were bound to the control of one ruler: Aragon, which trended in language and culture toward Castile, and Catalonia, which faced toward the Mediterranean through its great seaport, Barcelona. This wedding of states, later known as the Crown of Aragon, would eventually emerge as a power in the western Mediterranean.

Szerzői jogi védelem alatt álló anyag

From the late eleventh century, a steadily growing Catalan merchant marine plied its trade up and down the Spanish littoral. By the thirteenth century, the members of this merchant community had linked themselves under an unofficial legal and lobbying organization known as the "consulate of the sea" (*consolat del mar*) that eventually assumed the functions of a modern admiralty in the Catalan ports of Barcelona, Palma de Majorca, and Valencia. The cohesiveness of the Catalan merchant fleet was demonstrated in 1229 when the ships of Barcelona and other Catalan towns transported to the Balearic Islands an expeditionary force of the great reconquest warrior, Jaime I (r. 1214–1276), and kept his army supplied until the Muslim archipelago was captured three years later.

With the wealth of his Balearic entrepôt and his dynasty's marriage connections to the Ghibelline prince Manfred, Jaime I and his successors became Mediterranean rulers who quickly acquired powerful enemies, including the wealthy mercantile commune of Genoa, important members of the French royal family, and a number of French popes. When at vespers on 30 March 1282 the citizens of the Sicilian town of Palermo rose against their foreign master, Charles of Anjou, and agreed to replace him with the Aragonese king Pedro III (r. 1276–1285), Catalonia's political position in the Mediterranean suddenly grew to match its commercial reputation. Finding all of his realms under interdict and himself "deposed" in 1285 by Pope Martin IV (r. 1282–1285), Pedro soon faced a French invasion from across the Pyrenees into Catalonia. Rapidly beating off this incursion, the Aragonese sovereign and his immediate successors became embroiled in a series of conflicts that touched most of the western and central Mediterranean.

In the two decades following the Sicilian Vespers, the kings of France and Aragon engaged in a number of bloody sea battles and amphibious landings from Sicily to Greece to the Anatolian coast. Thanks to its superior vessels, logistics, administration, and training, the Sicilian-Catalan navy, under the command of the great admiral Ruggiero di Lauria (1250?–1305), repeatedly defeated the French-Papal coalition and forced it to accept peace on extremely disadvantageous terms. Through the treaty of Caltabellota (1302), the Aragonese ruler Jaime II (r. 1291–1327) retained indirect control of Sicily while emerging as the head of a major Mediterranean power.

With peace restored to central Mediterranean waters after 1302, a good number of Jaime II's sailors and marines were thrown out of work. To obviate the danger these men posed to his lands, Jaime II's younger brother, King Fadrique of Sicily (r. 1295–1337), agreed that a company of his veterans—including a body of irregulars (*almogaveres*), now known as the Catalan Grand Company and under the command of the privateer Roger de Flor (1280–1305)—would enter the service of the Byzantine emperor, Andronicus II Palaeologus (r. 1282–1328), in fighting off a Turkish invasion of Anatolia. When the emperor refused to pay them and then had their leader executed to boot, the company unleashed two years of destruction—the so-called Catalan Vengeance—on Byzantium. Far from disbanding, these "senseless sons of damnation," as Pope Clement V called them, went into business for themselves, eventually conquering and maintaining the duchy of Athens for the next eight decades. Though Aragonese sovereigns had not officially supported the Catalan Grand Company, they profited from its activities and indirectly assumed government of Athens through their claim to Sicily.

With the peace of 1302, Jaime II changed from an excommunicant to a papal favorite who was granted the island of Sardinia for his faithful service and eventually invaded it in 1323. Finding Sardinia divided between the enclaves of Genoese, Pisan, and native baronial leaders, Jaime and his great-grandson, Pedro IV (r. 1336–1387), spent a great deal of time and treasure in finding out that the conquest of Sardinia was truly unattainable. They recouped most of these losses, however, by establishing commercial outposts at Tunis and other North African ports from which they monopolized the trade of a number of lucrative commodities, including slaves in the western Mediterranean. With the reign of Alfonso V (r. 1416–1458), an Aragonese-Catalan presence was solidified in both southern Italy and Sicily,

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and this disparate set of realms would become a linchpin for Spanish control of the Mediterranean in succeeding centuries.

[*See also* Alfonso V of Aragon; Charles of Anjou; Jaime I; Jaime II; Pedro III; Ruggiero di Lauria; *and* Sicilian Vespers, The.]

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CATAPHRACTS

See Kataphraktoi.

CATHOLIC MONARCHS, THE

Isabella I of Castile (1451–1504) and Ferdinand II of Aragon (1452–1516) married on 19 September 1469, thus consolidating the dynasties of Castile and Aragon under one crown and giving birth to the kingdom of Spain. The two monarchs reigned in Castile from 12 December 1474, after the death of Henry IV (r. 1454–1474), and later ruled Aragon from 19 January 1479, following John II (r. 1458–1479). Isabella and Ferdinand are considered the last of the medieval rulers and the first of the modern within the central states of the Iberian peninsula.

The political strategy of the Catholic Monarchs was based mainly on the use of all political and material resources at their disposal to impose absolute monarchical authority while adhering to existing laws. The monarchs combined tradition and innovation and applied them in the military arena. Although the War of Succession (1474–1479) and the conquest of the Nasrid kingdom of Granada (1481–1492) are considered the last Spanish wars of the Middle Ages, the Italian campaigns against the French monarchy and their allies (1495–1504) represent the beginning of military actions and the modern organization of the Spanish army. To undertake two military initiatives of such scope, high levels of economic and administrative resources were needed, which until this period were extremely uncommon. The Catholic Monarchs were especially adept at organizing a highly effective system for collecting money and extorting subsidies from the Church.

The war of Granada provides several examples of how traditional and modern elements were used in the army. The most important of these aspects were recruitment, structural organization of the army, and establishment of a supply chain for provisions. All of these were based on traditionally used methods. During the Middle Ages, as well as for the conquest of Granada, the Castilian army remained composed of temporary rather than permanent contingents, and was formed from many heterogeneous units. The Catholic Monarchs made better use of the kingdoms' other armed forces, supplied by certain cities and the nobility. These forces were united in a stabilized structure known as a *hermandad* (brotherhood) to create a permanent, professional, and superior army. All contingents were paid by the cities, by the Military Orders, or by the noble landed gentry. Provisions, although ordered by the crown, were organized, funded, and supplied, for the most part, by the old Andalusian cities.

In addition, for centuries, in Castile, there had been a relatively small body of permanent soldiers composing the *Guardas Reales* (Royal Guards), an armed retinue in personal service to the monarchs. It was made up of several hundred knights and crossbowmen. The Catholic Monarchs continued to make use of this force but increased its numbers significantly.

The cavalry was composed of men from the ranks of nobility, whereas troops from the Military Orders and cities were composed mainly of peasants. Although heavy cavalry played a role, there was a

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ten-to-one ratio of light cavalry (*jinetes*) to heavy cavalry. The two main innovations put in place at this time were the increasing significance and effectiveness of the peasantry among the ranks and the diversification of weaponry. Along with the traditional crossbowmen and lancers, the Castilian army began to rely more heavily on the use of *espingarderos* (handgunners).

The widespread and decisive use of artillery during military sieges was a major innovation in warfare. The *lombardas* (bombards or wall-breakers) were heavy, short-range pieces, whereas *ribadoquines* (ribaldoquins), *cerbatanas* (culverins), and *pasavolantes* (small, powerful fast-response cannons) were lighter guns with greater range but lesser power.

During the conquest of Granada, more than two hundred pieces of artillery were used and were a decisive factor in the success of the Catholic Monarchs' armies. The war was essentially carried out by a series of sieges of the larger cities, including Ronda, Malaga, Baza, and Granada. The use of these weapons demanded not only a specialized artillery corps, but also efficient logistics to guarantee their effective transport. Each campaign required the mobilization of construction workers to build new roadways that would transport the cannons.

The Catholic Monarchs incorporated the infantry into their traditional tactics, while assigning the men a greater role and instilling in them a higher discipline than they had previously possessed. These factors made the war of Granada a training ground for military command, which later would be incorporated into the modern army, as demonstrated clearly by Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba, "the Great Captain."

At the end of the war of Granada, and taking full advantage of the first military incursions into Italy, the Catholic Monarchs continued to develop the more innovative methods that were practiced in the war against the Muslims. They created a unified, structured, and professional organization with stable and hierarchical lines of command, which were regulated under the ordinances promulgated in January 1496 and September 1503. As a result of these reforms, the Spanish military was essentially an infantry, the organization of which was based on large units, called *coronelías*, and made up of more than ten thousand troops. *Coronelías* were composed mainly of an infantry (armed with long lances to thwart the charge of heavy cavalry, short lances for man-to-man combat, crossbows, and portable muskets called *arcabuces* and *espingardas*), heavy and light cavalry, and artillery. The structure of the *coronelías* was used from that time on and decades later characterized the Spanish *tercios* that would triumph in the battlegrounds of Europe for more than a century. Tactical predominance, of course, was left to the peasantry and not the knights. The greatest military contribution on the part of the Spanish monarchs was unquestionably their transformation of medieval warriors into a modern army.

In addition, Isabella and Ferdinand were significantly involved in military operations, although they took on very different roles. Ferdinand, an extraordinary military leader, not only laid out broadly conceived political and military strategies for his kingdom, but also personally led his armies during destruction campaigns, known as *talas*, on the battlefield, as at the battle of Toro; in minor combats; and in siege attacks on Ronda, Loja, Velez-Malaga, Malaga, Baza, and Granada, among the most important cities. He led troops, planned operations, and controlled developments from beginning to end. Isabella, meanwhile, charged mainly with financial and logistical aspects of their military campaigns, devised formulas for financing, organizing provision supply systems, and even created a hospital for the wounded. Moreover, she was personally involved in some of the operations, especially the more complicated sieges; her presence was an unequivocal sign of determination to win, reinforcing the morale of the combatant troops while debilitating that of the enemy.

[*See also* Granada, Siege of; Iberia, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1500); Orders, Military, *subentry on* Iberian Orders; Reconquest, Concept of; Setenil, Sieges of; Toro, Battle of; *and* Zahara, Sieges of.]

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Translated from the Spanish by Daniella Sforza

CAVALRY

Historians writing in the nineteenth and well into the twentieth centuries saw medieval warfare largely in terms of pitched battles and believed that during the Early and High Middle Ages (up to the fourteenth century), cavalry—that is, soldiers who fought on horseback—dominated the battlefields of Europe. Some historians saw the age of cavalry as dawning with the victory of the Gothic horsemen over Roman infantry at Adrianople in 378; others, noting that sixth-century Franks fought mainly (and very successfully) on foot, concluded that the real rise of the cavalry to dominance came as late as the eighth century. There are not many descriptions of combat from the seventh or early eighth centuries, but it does appear that as late as 732/3 Charles Martel's army at Tours fought on foot against an all-cavalry Muslim force. In the nineteenth century Heinrich Brunner argued that Martel's experience of fighting against horsemen there—and of being unable to pursue them effectively after his battlefield victory—persuaded him that he needed to greatly strengthen the cavalry force available to him. This in turn (Brunner argued) led him to arrange for vast tracts of church-owned lands to be redistributed to his soldiers so that they would have the resources to equip and prepare themselves for mounted combat. The estates thus distributed as *beneficia* (favors) were not transferred outright: the recipients gained the usufruct, or use, of the land, but ownership technically remained with the church, and the soldiers' retention of the *beneficia* was contingent on their military service. Royal lands were also thus distributed, and magnates emulated the technique to recruit well-armed cavalrymen into their own service. Eventually, a large portion of all the arable land in Francia had been converted into fiefs for vassal knights, and feudalism was born.

In the 1960s Lynn White Jr. largely accepted (and expanded) Brunner's argument, except regarding the root cause of feudalism. White explained the eighth-century rise in importance of the cavalry with reference to the introduction of the stirrup. This simple and inexpensive piece of technology, he argued, had great significance, for it greatly enhanced the effectiveness of the horseman in hand-to-hand combat. Most significantly, it gave a cavalryman the ability to brace himself against the tremendous impact that could be achieved by locking a lance under the armpit and charging at an enemy at full speed. The stirrup essentially enabled the rider to fuse his body, armor, horse, and lance into a single mass, and thus concentrate unprecedented momentum behind the lance tip.

Historians writing after White have shown that he overemphasized the importance of the couched lance. More knights on the Bayeux Tapestry are shown stabbing overhand than employing the couched lance. At Lincoln in 1141 horsemen wielding swords defeated men charging with lances. Indeed, the very idea of Carolingian feudalism has been strongly challenged. Yet much of White's logic still stands: stirrups without doubt did make cavalrymen more effective. And the admittedly thin evidence does suggest, although not all scholars would agree, that by the late eighth century the Franks not only had strong cavalry forces, but valued them so

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highly that they expected them to be able to campaign and win battles even without infantry support. When Charlemagne summoned Abbot Fulrad and his vassals for military service, he specified the weapons each horseman should have, but made no clear reference to foot soldiers. The military games of 842 described by Nithard were cavalry exercises, culminating in mounted charges and countercharges by the kings of East and West Francia "and all the young men." In 891, when King Arnulf set out with an all-mounted force to attack the Vikings entrenched on the Dyle, the stated reason that he hesitated to launch the assault was "because . . . there was not room for the cavalry to attack," which necessitated an unaccustomed step-by-step advance on foot. Based on evidence of this sort, scholars from Charles Oman to J. F. Verbruggen conclude that, in the latter's words, "medieval warfare was characterized by the dominant role of the heavy cavalry."

Starting in the 1970s Bernard S. Bachrach mounted a vigorous revisionist attack on that thesis. He argued that sieges rather than battles were the principal mode of medieval warfare, and that cavalry "had at best a minor role to play" in siege warfare, which was conducted mainly by footmen and engineers. It has now become common thought that medieval heavy cavalry far from dominated even the battlefield, and that consequently the idea of an age of cavalry is simply a myth. There can be no doubt that medieval aristocrats generally saw their role as armored cavalrymen as central to their class identity: *chevalier, caballero, cavaliere, Reiter,* and *equite* (French, Spanish, Italian, German, and Latin words for "knight") all are etymologically equivalent to "horseman." But historians of the new school have argued, in essence, that medieval aristocrats chose to train, equip, and (most expensively) mount themselves as cavalrymen more for status than for military efficiency. Similarly, it is argued that the battlefield narratives and illuminations in the chronicles, romances, and *chansons de geste* (songs of heroic deeds) exaggerate the importance and effectiveness of the knights because these works were written mostly by and for members of knightly families.

Yet this new orthodoxy has been too readily accepted. First, while it is true that battles were much rarer than sieges (especially after the year 1000), that does not necessarily mean that battles, and the ability to win battles, were less important than sieges. The principal cause of the success of the Norman conquest was the battle of Hastings. The crusaders of the First Crusade could not have even begun the siege of Antioch had they lost at Dorylaeum, would not have taken that city and subsequently Jerusalem had they not won three more major battlefield victories in a row, and could not have built the Kingdom of Jerusalem had they not defeated the Fatimid army at Ascalon. The main ebbs and flows of the *Reconquista* (the retaking of the Iberian Peninsula from the Muslims) were determined by great battles. And many or most of the battles of the High Middle Ages were won, in the end, by cavalry charges, despite doubters' claims to the contrary.

Moreover, devastation was at least as important as sieges in medieval warfare, and effective cavalry forces were crucial in harassing and covering dispersed soldiers engaged in what H. J. Hewitt called "the work of havoc" (plunder). Since most medieval armies heavily relied on foraging—often virtually indistinguishable from ravaging—to feed the troops, the same considerations made cavalry vital to the success of siege-based campaigns. In addition, the cavalry was predominant in the vital missions of reconnaissance and postbattle pursuit. When all this is considered together, the old conception of an age of cavalry appears valid.

Even after the fourteenth-century infantry revolution, which made men fighting on foot the main determinant of battlefield victory or defeat, the cavalry retained its principal roles in scouting, pursuit, shadowing, and perhaps ravaging. Moreover, its tactical importance, if no longer predominant, remained far from minor, as demonstrated, for example, at the battle of Othée in 1408. Indeed, as Malcolm Vale has emphasized, improvements in plate armor and the spread of the *arrêt de cuirasse* (the lance-rest attached to the breastplate, which enabled better control over a heavy lance) gave the

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heavy cavalry a new lease on life in the fifteenth century, so that in standing armies developed at the end of the Middle Ages in France, Burgundy, Brittany, Milan, and Venice, mounted men-at-arms remained predominant in importance, if not in numbers.

[*See also* Compagnies d'Ordonnance; Hobelars; Infantry, Mounted; Stirrups and Stirrup Thesis; Strategy; Stratiotes; *and* Tactics, Battle.]

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CELTIC STYLES OF WARFARE

Because the Indo-European peoples usually called Celts were widely dispersed throughout Iron Age Europe, it is not surprising that there is much variety in descriptions of the Celtic warriors of antiquity by classical writers (the best known being Caesar's in *The Gallic Wars*)—from savage war bands to tragic champions engaged in deadly single combat, from lightly armored charioteers to foot soldiers daubed in blue paint running naked into battle, the diversity and contradictions are many.

Even if we restrict the term "Celtic" to the barbarian communities of northern and western Britain and Ireland, beyond the Roman Empire, differences in warfare are considerable throughout the Middle Ages. War among the Gaels of Ireland and western Scotland differed significantly from that practiced by the Britons of Wales, and it is, needless to say, misleading to assign "Celtic" attributes to armies from regions that were never Celtic in the first place (such as, for example, the fabled pike-wielding "schiltron" of Scottish armies from the time of Wallace and Bruce). But even within the Celtic sphere there were important variations, dictated by geographical factors—highlanders organize themselves differently for war than do dwellers on the fertile plains, and naval prowess is usually the prerogative of maritime folk—and by historical experience, so that the notion of specifically Celtic warfare in the historic era is problematic. Just as Britain was incompletely conquered by Rome, and Ireland not at all, so Anglo-Saxon, Viking, and Norman engagement differed from region to region, and affected warfare accordingly.

The best insight into Celtic warfare is the saga literature of Ireland, written and rewritten throughout the early Middle Ages but set in and probably containing some genuine traditions of Ireland's pre-Christian past. The society it depicts cherishes valor and honor, but it is violent and bloodthirsty: aristocratic warriors will sever the heads of their foes, boast immodestly of their martial prowess, scorning longevity for the fame that comes from an early death in combat. Annalistic, legal, and other evidence confirms this picture of a heavily militaristic society—which is broadly true too of Wales—where men delighted in plunder, which provided booty, largess to dispense, and glory in which to bask. The emphasis in both Gaelic and Welsh society on a man's honor meant that seemingly indiscriminate violence was in fact blood-feuding between kin groups seeking to uphold their besmirched honor when, for example, a kinsman was slain (although revenge killings of the early period were commuted to fixed compensation fees in a later age). These were lands of many kings, but, however blue his blood, a man gained kingship by military might. Welsh kings were entitled to military service (usually for six weeks) by all free males from the age of fourteen, and the king's

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military retinue was his *teulu* (similar to the *lucht tighe* household troops maintained by Irish kings), comprised of elite young warriors whose leader, often a royal kinsman, was a commanding figure at court.

In Ireland, the cavalry, spurning the use of saddles and stirrups, was undoubtedly a select corps among a king's army, the bulk of which was composed of foot soldiers brandishing short swords, circular shields, and javelins (the twelve or more terms for spearlike weapons in medieval Gaelic attest to their ubiquity). Armies wore little beyond linen tunics—presumably what Giraldus Cambrensis meant by them charging "naked" into battle. One of the few contributions of Ireland to medieval warfare is, at least according to one recently challenged interpretation, the hobelar, a light cavalryman mounted on a hobby horse, first recruited for Edward I's Scottish campaign of 1296, commonly participating there and in England's Continental wars thereafter.

In stark contrast to Ireland's prized cavalry, in Wales infantry made the greater impression, the bow being their weapon of choice, something in which the Irish and Gaelic Scots were less proficient (indeed, military archery may have died out there in antiquity and been reintroduced by Vikings). The skill of the South Welsh with the bow, compared to the lance favored in North Wales, is testimony to the variations in military technologies even within one Celtic country. Large numbers of Welsh troops were recruited (and, following their conquest in the late thirteenth century, conscripted) to participate in English campaigns in Scotland (where their discipline sometimes broke down) and in France during the Hundred Years' War, although there appears little evidence for the much vaunted Welsh role in the development of the longbow.

In Ireland in the high Middle Ages, rulers striving to emulate the powers of kings elsewhere were not content with receiving personal submission from rivals and taking hostages as sureties, but waged protracted campaigns throughout the island to reduce competitors' territorial power. They paid a kind of ceremonial wage called *tuarastal*—sometimes to the tune of thousands of cattle—to military vassals, and hired mercenaries including native "kerne" (from *ceithearn*, "a band") and, increasingly from the thirteenth century, "galloglass" (from *Gall-óglach*, a military vassal from Innse Gall, the Hebrides). The Viking battle-axe and long sword had long been borrowed by the fighting men of the Gaelic world, and although armor achieved only a limited currency in Gaelic Ireland, it epitomized the infantry companies of galloglass, who wore iron helmets and long mail tunics and collar-pieces, and carried long-handled axes and two-handed swords almost the length of a man.

The galloglass troops came as members of a clan group (sometimes from a discarded segment seeking compensation as warriors for loss of territorial power) under the command of a noble kinsman with the borrowed Anglo-Norman title of constable, and were a formidable addition to Irish armies. By the end of the Middle Ages, the hereditary galloglass contingents of Scottish origin were being supplemented in Ireland by seasonal mercenary recruits from Scotland called "redshanks," who proliferated in Ulster until the Elizabethan reconquest.

Irish warfare ressembled Welsh in a native preference for hit-and-run as against the pitched battle sometimes unwisely favored by their external enemies, and they were similar also in the extent to which native armies operated ongoing hostilities along the March on the margins of English settlement; here, wars were often local, and the enemy was less often a government force than the private army of a Marcher lord or a muster of local townsmen. Native lords emulated Anglo-Norman practice, O'Neill of Ulster, for example, maintaining a standing army or bonaght (from *buannacht*, "billeting") that he imposed on his subject lords just as the Anglo-Norman earls of Ulster had first done on him. And as native lords relied less on the traditional hosting by free subjects, such professional armies could lead to a form of lordship little short of tyranny—the infamous "coign(y) and livery" (from *coinnmheadh*, "guesting") of late-medieval Ireland.

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Where Welsh and Irish lords differed most in strategy was in their response to the Anglo-Norman construction of castles in their midst. Welsh lords were, by the 1170s, themselves occupying captured stone castles, but the earthen mottes and the castles of stone that were then beginning to dot the Irish landscape were still being razed to the ground by their unreceptive Irish attackers a century or more later, long after the steam had run out of Anglo-Norman expansion. Even so, Welsh fashion for incastellation was as nothing compared to the magnificence of the West Highland tradition that, from the twelfth century, saw the erection of a system of formidable fortresses without parallel anywhere in the Celtic lands.

The tendency for these castles to hug the coastline testifies to the significance of the sea to their builders, and, it is no surprise that the other great contribution of these maritime lordships to warfare should be the West Highland galley. By comparison with these Hebridean communities, naval capacity and activity among the Irish and Welsh seem modest, and it is undoubtedly the case that Viking settlement in the region had a transformative impact in this regard.

[*See also* Britain, *subentries on* Sources *and* Narrative, *and* Vikings.]

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Seán Duffy

CERNOMEN, BATTLE OF

See Črnomen, Battle of.

CESENA, MASSACRE AT

The billeting of foreign troops in occupied towns and villages and the abuses against local communities that ensued were principal causes of popular insurrection during the late Middle Ages. Perhaps the most widely reported of these was in 1282, when a French officer grabbed a Sicilian woman and began "touching her indecently [*disonestamenti*] with his hands all over her, as they were accustomed to doing" (*Due cronache*, p. 19), at a local village festival on the outskirts of Palermo. With cries of "Moranu li Franchiski!" (Death to the French!) the massacre of the French, known as the Sicilian Vespers, spread like wildfire across the island.

A similar incident, but with much graver consequences for the local population, occurred in the medium-sized commercial town of Cesena in the Emilia Romagna, 15 kilometers (about 9 miles) from the Adriatic. On 1 February 1377, citizens, led by butchers, rioted against the occupying Breton soldiers, killing more than a hundred. According to the *Cronaca malatestiana*, for two months the Breton mercenaries "had consumed everything on the outskirts of Cesena, forcing all the peasants to take refuge inside the city because of the great beatings they were getting. And after all had been consumed outside, the troops came into the city and devoured everything there, raping (*sforzavano*) men and women, to the point where the residents could endure it no longer" (pp. 42–43).

The repression that followed was incomparable in the history of popular revolt for late medieval Italy. The papal legate, Cardinal Robert of Geneva, soon to become the papal contender Clement VI, immediately sent for the English troops at Faenza, who broke down the city walls of Cesena, marched into the city, and

> whoever they found, men, women, or babes at their mothers' breasts, they killed them all, filling all the

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> squares of Cesena piled high with the bodies of dead men and women.... Some fled by the city gates, but the Bretons pursued them, killing or robbing some, raping others. They brought the beautiful women back into the city, where they raped, then killed them. By these means, not a single man or women remained in Cesena. . . . They put more than a thousand baby girls and boys to their knives. They then robbed the city, carting off the most valuable property to Faenza, where they sold it to those from Forlì, Ravenna, Rimini, and Cervo. . . . And thus the entire city had been laid to waste. All the monks and nuns had been captured, robbed, and murdered. And eight thousand, among the rich and the poor, left for Rimini, all forced to beg for charity, except a few artisans whose skills were needed. And thus these Bretons completely consumed Cesena. (*Cronaca malatestiana*, pp. 42–43)

This reprisal for popular unrest against an entire civilian urban community was unique for western Europe from the twelfth to the mid-fifteenth century. By the late fifteenth century, and increasingly during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, similar behavior on the part of rulers against their own populations became usual, as seen in the histories of Bruges (1440), Ghent (1453), Dinant (1466), Liège (1468), the sack of a number of Dutch cities between 1477 and 1492, Brescia (1511), Prato (1512), Rome (1527), Pavia (1528), Genoa (1532), and many more cities.

[*See also* Italy, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1493).]

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CEUTA, SIEGE AND BATTLE OF

On 25 July 1415 approximately two hundred ships carrying twenty thousand men from the fleet of King John I of Portugal (1385–1433) left Lisbon and set out to conquer Ceuta. This city, which now belongs to Spain, is on the North African coast. Lying on the Strait of Gibraltar, it has long been a key port for the control of the passage between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean and a strategic point between Europe and North Africa. The Portuguese initiative had been thoroughly planned for several years before the invasion and was maintained under an impenetrable cloud of secrecy.

The Portuguese fleet arrived on 9 August 1415 off the coast of Ceuta, searching for the most favorable point from which to launch the invasion. The city's inhabitants barricaded themselves behind its walls in preparation for the attack. After two weeks of indecision by the Portuguese king, a severe storm nearly destroyed the fleet, endangering the entire operation. King John I finally ordered the attack on 21 August. A portion of the Portuguese army, commanded by Prince Don Enrique, disembarked onto the beaches of Ceuta. Before the Muslims could secure the city's main gate, however, the Portuguese vanguard, backed by several hundred men-at-arms and peasantry from the Portuguese countryside, was able to penetrate Ceuta's walls.

While the Muslim garrison sought refuge in the citadel, King John I ordered the remaining units of his army to disembark. During the battle in the narrow

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streets of Ceuta, which lasted for several hours, the Portuguese troops left no house unscathed. When night fell, the Muslim fighters who had been holed up in the citadel escaped their place of refuge, leaving the Portuguese to discover the abandoned fortress and to capture the structure without a struggle. Meanwhile, the pillaging, capture, and murder of Ceuta's townspeople continued in the city streets.

The Portuguese army had conquered in a single day a port of great strategic, economic, and commercial importance. Victory had several repercussions for the empire. On the one hand, it served as a cornerstone in the Portuguese monarchy's and nobility's battle against Islam. It reestablished an age-old tradition that had been interrupted a century and a half before, when the Portuguese crown had put an end to the war against the Muslims on the Iberian Peninsula after the mid-thirteenth-century conquest of the kingdom's furthest region, the Algarve. On the other hand, and more significantly, the conquest of Ceuta ushered in the beginning of the Portuguese expansion into the north of Africa and the grand colonial empire Portugal would win over the next two centuries.

[*See also* Iberia, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1500).]

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Francisco García Fitz

Translated from the Spanish by Daniella Sforza

CHANDOS, SIR JOHN

(d. 1370), viscount of Saint-Sauveur and constable of Aquitaine. The son of one of Edward III's household knights, John Chandos became one of the preeminent military leaders of his generation, a founding member of the Order of the Garter, and a close companion of Edward III and Edward, the Black Prince. Chandos was a central figure in numerous operational theaters in the early English campaigns of the Hundred Years' War; he also became a chivalric icon and noted hunter. A contemporary praised him as "the most famous of knights."

His early military experiences were probably on the Continent, and according to Froissart he distinguished himself at the siege of Cambrai in 1339 and was knighted by Edward III. On his return Chandos fought in the Scottish campaigns and in the following year (1340) in the naval battle of Sluys. Such was his growing experience and reputation that the king placed him alongside the Black Prince in the vanguard at the battle of Crécy (1346). As a consequence, Sir John was named among the founder knights of the Order of the Garter.

Chandos took part in the naval battle of Winchelsea (1350) and played a key role in the Black Prince's 1355–1356 *chevauchées.* With Sir James Audley, with whom he was closely associated, Chandos commanded the scouts in advance of the main army. He fought at Poitiers, where (according to Froissart) Prince Edward's orders were determined largely by Chandos's advice. He may also have saved the prince's life in the fighting, and he received a reward of six hundred gold crowns and an annuity of £40. During the Reims campaign (1359–1360) he often operated alongside Henry of Grosmont and John of Gaunt and carried out a number of successful raids during the siege. He participated in the negotiations preceding the treaty of Brétigny in 1360. In the same year he received the rank of banneret, although he would not display his banner until the battle of Nájera in 1367. As warden of Barfleur, the king's lieutenant and captain-general in France, and later as constable of Aquitaine he oversaw the transfer of territory after Brétigny.

In the following years he became involved with the Breton civil war and commanded Jean de Montfort's army at the victory of Auray (1364), where he captured Bertrand du Guesclin. Although opposed to English involvement in the Castilian civil war in

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support of Pedro the Cruel he served as constable of the Black Prince's army and led the vanguard of the army over the Pyrenees and at Nájera, again fighting alongside John of Gaunt.

After the return to Aquitaine, Chandos retired to his estates in Normandy, but with the situation in the principality deteriorating and war with France looming, he returned to replace his friend James Audley as seneschal of Poitou (1369). He was involved in a siege at Compeyne in June 1369 and fatally wounded in a skirmish at Lussac. He died at Chauvigny on 1 January 1370.

[*See also* Auray, Battle of; Crécy, Battle of; Edward III of England; Edward the Black Prince; Guesclin, Bertrand du; John of Gaunt; Nájera, Battle of; *and* Sluys, Naval Battle of.]

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CHANSON DE ROLAND

The oldest major work of French literature, the epic poem *La Chanson de Roland* exists in seven manuscripts and three fragments, the earliest of which dates to the middle of the twelfth century; the general consensus for the date of composition is around 1100. The work was meant for oral performance and contains many formulaic phrases and much direct speech.

The story is based on an actual historical incident, the battle of Roncesvalles (also Roncevaux) Pass in 778, in which the rear guard of Charlemagne's retreating army was attacked by Basque forces and slaughtered. The poem is a fictionalized and stylized account of the encounter, in which the heroes Roland, Olivier, and other French peers are determined to fight until the last man rather than surrender to the Saracens. Three times Olivier urges Roland to sound his horn to summon reinforcements from Charlemagne, but Roland, proud and intent on winning renown, refuses to call for help until it is too late. They all die heroic deaths, and the latter part of the poem deals with Charlemagne's return and defeat of the Saracens.

Approximately one-third of the poem is a depiction of fighting, a mixture of single combats interspersed with general overviews of the battle. There are frequent descriptions of "epic blows" (such as those that split a man and sometimes also his horse in half), although there is also realism in terms of how weapons are used and in what order the blows are struck. There are graphic descriptions of injuries, such as eyes jumping out of heads or brains and entrails being spilled, and other touches of realism that would presumably have struck a chord with contemporary audiences, as when Olivier fights with the broken stump of his lance because he has not had time to draw his sword during the heat of battle (Oxford text, laisse 106, in Duggan 2005).

The poem was clearly well known and is thus a useful indicator of the type of military tale that contemporaries liked to hear as entertainment; the wealth of modern secondary literature testifies to its enduring popularity.

[*See also* Epic Poetry *and* Roncesvalles, Battle of.]

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CHARLEMAGNE

(742–814), king of the Franks (r. 768–814) and emperor of the West (r. 800–814). Einhard, the famous

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Charlemagne (742–814). The king and his paladins battle against the Saracens. Miniature from Charlemagne and His Paladins, thirteenth century. PRIVATE COLLECTION/INDEX/ THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

biographer of Charlemagne, begins his description of the deeds of his hero with a long enumeration of all the wars led by the emperor. This underlines the importance of war for the renown of a medieval ruler. Fighting successfully against mighty enemies was the most important criterion for being accepted as a ruler by the medieval warrior nobility. In the eyes of the Carolingian elite, Charlemagne embodied the ideal of a perfect warrior-king. All the wars he led ended successfully, the only exception being the Spanish war (which ended with a defeat in the battle of Roncevalles in 778). Importantly, Charlemagne combined military success with economic success. When speaking of one of the most brilliant successes of Charlemagne, the war against the Avars, which began in 791 with an expedition from Ratisbon and ended in 796 with the destruction of the "Ring," their main fortress, Einhard does not forget to mention the fact that no other war that brought so much plunder and booty into the hands of the Franks could be remembered by anyone. Einhard also states that the conditions of warfare were changing in the times of Charlemagne. The king was not personally engaged in all battles. He normally delegated the command of the army to leading members of the Carolingian high nobility—not only because the theater of war had greatly enlarged geographically, but also because wars sometimes had to be led simultaneously on different fronts. For example, Charlemagne committed the long-lasting siege of Pavia (773–774), the capital of the Lombard kingdom, to a Frankish commander, and it was not the emperor himself but his son King Pépin and the margrave Eric of Friuli who finally succeeded in bringing down the Avars in 796. Charlemagne was only personally present on the first expedition against them (791).

It was natural that Charlemagne, whose body was worn out by decades of annual campaigning, finished the age of expansion after the war against the Avars at the end of the eighth century. Then began the time of fortifying the empire against the enemies in the north and west, the so-called Vikings. In the west and in the southwest, he began to build up a system of "marches," which were under the command of margraves. He succeeded in establishing the Pyrenees as a stable frontier and secured the territory south of the mountains, the so-called Spanish march (in later times called Catalonia) as a sort of *cordon sanitaire* against the Muslims. So the coronation of Charles, which occurred on Christmas of 800, marks a clear distinction. In the eyes of his contemporaries, Charlemagne deserved the title "emperor" ("Imperator Augustus"); he had successfully enlarged the Frankish kingdom by great territorial gains, and so he had fulfilled his duty as an emperor who, following his Latin title, Augustus, has augmented (*auxit*) his kingdom.

From a modern perspective, one can speak of Charlemagne as a brilliant strategist who avoided the error of many other great war leaders (before and after him) of overstretching the naturally limited capacities of the empire that was committed to him. He saw also the weak points of the Carolingian military system and wanted to improve his effectiveness. Particularly, he wanted to strengthen the role

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of the so-called *liberi* (common free men) as the base of the Carolingian army. He promulgated strict sentences concerning the obligation for army service, and he set up minimum standards for the equipment of warriors, among other measures. Behind all these measures was a constant effort to improve the military potential of the Carolingian empire that he had founded.

[*See also* Charles Martel; Einhard; Louis I; Pépin the Short; *and* Roncesvalles, Battle of.]

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CHARLES, DUKE OF BURGUNDY

See Charles the Bold.

CHARLES MARTEL

(d. 741), Mayor of the Palace of Austrasia. He was the son of Pépin II "the Middle" and Pépin's second wife, Alpaida; father of Pépin the Short; and grandfather of Charlemagne. His nickname, "the Hammer" (Latin *martellus*), arose in the late ninth century.

Charles's stepmother Plectrude (d. 717), his father's first wife, wanted to secure the government for her grandsons after Pépin's death in 714, so she had Charles arrested. At this time, the Neustrians wanted to become politically independent. They won a battle at Compiègne (715) against the Austrasians, who dominated the eastern part of the Merovingian empire, and had installed their own Mayor of the Palace in Neustria, named Ragamfred (d. 731). They also entered a coalition with the Frisian ruler Ratbod (d. 719). Charles escaped from prison and won great military prestige from several victories over Ragamfred and his ally, Duke Eudo of Aquitaine (d. 735) (Amblève, 716; Vinchy, 717; Soissons, 718). In 720 he was officially recognized as Mayor of the Palace over the whole Frankish kingdom.

In the 720s Charles began to expand the frontiers of the Merovingian reign in the north against the Frisians. In the east, he demonstrated his military and political supremacy by leading several expeditions against the Saxons (720, 722, 724, 738), the Alemanni (725, 728, 730), and the Bavarians (725, 728).

In Aquitaine, in the southwest, the political situation was quite difficult. Duke Eudo had to come to terms with Charles after 720 because of a new enemy coming from the former Visigothic Spain. The so-called Saracens—Arabs and Berbers from North Africa—had begun to invade his territory after they had eliminated the Visigothic kingdom in 711, striking as far as Burgundy in the 720s. In 732 Eudo was obliged to flee to his former enemy Charles Martel—who had invaded his lands in 731—after the Muslims, under the command of Abd ar-Rahman, the Arab governor of al-Andalus since 729 or 730, burned Bordeaux and Poitiers. In this difficult situation Eudo sought an alliance with Charles, who stopped the Muslims' progress at the battle of Poitiers (732). His victory over Abd ar-Rahman enabled him to extend successfully the Frankish supremacy over Aquitaine in the following decade. In 735 Hunold, Eudo's son and successor, had to accept Frankish superiority formally by giving an oath of fidelity to Charles Martel, who had once again invaded Aquitaine, reaching the Garonne.

Charles also succeeded in overcoming resistance in the south (Provence), where he broke up a political collaboration between the local nobility and the Saracens. He successfully besieged Avignon in 737. The Saracens, supported by the Christian duke Maurontus of Marseille, started another military offensive (738/39). With the help of Liutprand, king of the Lombards, who personally intervened with

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his troops, Charles was able to restore his control over Provence in 739.

Concerning his abilities as military commander, the quantity of expeditions and the speed with which Charles conducted his campaigns across widely spread regions are remarkable. A thesis propounded by the German scholar Heinrich Brunner established a firm link between the use of Carolingian mounted warriors and the introduction of the feudal system, supposedly by Charles Martel. This also has been stressed by Lynn T. White, who even pointed toward the importance of the emergence of the stirrup for cavalry attacks. Most scholars are now convinced that the appearance of the so-called feudal system must be placed in a later period—even into the eleventh or twelfth century, according to Susan Reynolds. There was no military obligation at all based on any sort of feudal system in the times of the early Carolingians. Evidently, as Paul Fouracre has argued, "It was essentially the income from the soil which supported the social elite." Therefore, when followers of Charles were endowed with land by him, this naturally encouraged their readiness to take part in the wars of the Mayor of the Palace. Furthermore, other scholars, such as Bernard Bachrach, also warn against the overestimation of the military value of using stirrups. Their adoption by Carolingian horsemen seems to have been a process lasting over a century.

[*See also* Al-Andalus; Arabs; Avignon, Siege of; Charlemagne; Franks, Merovingian, *subentry on* Narrative (482–751); Italy, *subentry on* Narrative (476–1000); Pépin the Short; *and* Tours, Battle of.]

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CHARLES OF ANJOU

(1226–1285), king of Naples and Sicily, son of Louis VIII of France. Born in March 1226, and died on 7 July 1285, Charles was the brother of the king of France, Louis IX, lord of Anjou and Poitou. He acquired by marriage sovereignty of Provence (1246), and, by conquest, southwest Piedmont (Italy, 1259–1260) and the Kingdom of Sicily, which comprised the whole of southern Italy (1266). He also ruled Tuscany from 1267, several Lombard cities from 1270, and Albania from 1279. At the peak of his power he therefore governed much of the central Mediterranean.

Thanks to the richness of his possessions, Charles was able to keep numerous forces in service. In addition to the army of the kingdom, which he personally led, Charles had at his disposal an army from Albania, and contingents from Provence, Tuscany, and Lombardy. In the Kingdom of Sicily, Charles also had at his disposal a formidable fleet of galleys, thanks to the activity of the arsenal of Messina.

Charles was an able military commander and demonstrated his worth in the two large field conflicts of Benevento (1266), in which he defeated Manfred (king of Naples and Sicily, r. 1258–1266), and Tagliacozzo (1268). In the latter, although his forces were inferior to those of his rival Conradin, duke of Swabia, Charles knew how to come out the winner thanks to his ability to maneuver his forces on the field and his strategic reserves. After Charles and his early supporters stopped going to battle, the quality of the Angevin army declined, demonstrated by the defeats suffered by the seneschal of Piedmont at Roccavione (10 November 1275) against the troops of the municipality of Asti and by the captain of Albania at Berat against Byzantine forces in 1281. In March

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1282 the inability of Charles's military commanders to repress the great revolt that flared in Sicily (called the Sicilian Vespers) marked the definitive fall of the Angevin dream of building a great Mediterranean empire.

[*See also* Italy, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1493), *and* Sicilian Vespers, The.]

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Translated from the Italian by Joe Jackson

CHARLES VII OF FRANCE

(1403–1461), king of France (r. 1422–1461). Born to Charles VI and Isabeau (or Isabella) of Bavaria, Charles became the dauphin (heir to the French throne) on the death of his brother John (1417). He became the leader of the Armagnac (anti-Burgundian) faction in the struggle to control government during his father's insanity. His involvement in the murder of Duke John of Burgundy (1419) pushed John's heir Philip into an alliance with Henry V of England; this led to control of Paris and the royal government. Charles was disinherited by the Treaty of Troyes (1420), and although he succeeded to the crown in 1422, he was often referred to as "dauphin" in the 1420s.

The turning point in the reign of Charles VII came when he entrusted Joan of Arc with lifting the siege of Orléans (1429). He was then able to obtain the traditional royal anointing in Rheims; however, neither this nor the Burgundian defection from the English in 1435 resulted in the end of the war. After a failed reorganization of French forces in 1439, Charles's Ordonnances of 1445 established an army of heavy cavalry companies and infantry, known as franc-archers. He also built up an artillery train. This reorganized army undertook the reconquest of Normandy (1449–1450) and the capture of the English possessions in Aquitaine (1451–1453). Charles was plagued by poor health, and his participation in campaigning was irregular (although not insignificant, especially in the Norman operations). His relationship with key figures, especially Joan of Arc, remains controversial. However, the Ordonnances created a permanent, tax-funded force under royal control, which is seen as the origin of the modern French army.

[*See also* Formigny, Battle of; Joan of Arc; *and* Orléans, Siege of.]

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CHARLES THE BALD

(823–877), king of France (r. 840–877) and Holy Roman Emperor (r. 875–877). Charles was the late-born son of Emperor Louis I the Pious, by his second wife Judith, daughter of count Welf. Charles's birth upset the carefully balanced division of inheritance among his three elder half brothers. Now it became an idée fixe of Louis to also give an adequate portion of his empire to the young Charles, who received a careful education at the court, including exposure to the *De re militari* of the late-Roman military writer Vegetius. Bishop Frechulf of Lisieux gave Charles a copy of this handbook.

Following his investiture as king of Aquitaine by the will of his father (838), Charles the Bald played a more active role in the wars that followed the death of Louis the Pious in 840, up to the Treaty of Verdun (843), which fixed the division of the Carolingian empire into three parts. Nevertheless, Charles's great noble supporters, "whose gifts were esteemed

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highly by them," did not want to risk the life of their young king in battle, according to the contemporary historian Nithard, himself a member of the Carolingian family. Therefore, it is not likely that Charles fought personally in the front lines in the famous battle of Fontenoy in 841. He and his brother Louis the German defeated Emperor Lothar, and through the previously mentioned Treaty of Verdun Charles received the western part of the old empire. The eastern frontier of his territory was roughly defined by the rivers Schelde, Meuse, Saône, and Rhône.

Charles the Bald faced long-lasting resistance by Pépin II, king of Aquitaine (838–852, d. after 864), during his reign. Charles's warriors suffered several difficult defeats. The year 845, with his defeats against the warriors of Pépin II and the Bretons, was a black one for Charles, who nevertheless after a victory over the Norsemen invading Aquitaine was acclaimed, anointed, and crowned as king of Aquitaine in 848. Still, up to the end of the 850s, Aquitaine remained a center of strong resistance. Twice (854, 858), Aquitanian nobles invited the nephew and half brother, Louis the Younger, and his father, Louis the German, to take over the government. It was the clear support of his episcopate, under the leadership of Archbishop Hincmar of Reims, that saved Charles's crown and life in 858 and 859; in mid-January 859, Louis the German had to withdraw his troops from the western parts of Charles's realm.

Charles himself started two military offensives in the last two decades of his life. First, he initiated the invasion of Lotharingia in 869 after the death of his nephew Lothair II, who left no legitimate son. Second, he invaded the realm of his deceased brother Louis the German in 876. In both cases, Charles failed. He had to accept the division of Lotharingia with his brother Louis the German, and he lost the battle of Andernach (October 876) against Louis the Younger, one of the sons of his deceased brother. This was a heavy loss of prestige for Charles, who had become emperor only in 875 after the death of his nephew Louis II. Although one can see reconsideration and a sort of reestimation of Charles the Bald in the judgments of modern historians (for example, Janet Nelson), one must be skeptical about the specific military abilities of this Carolingian ruler. Like others, he failed to stop the Norsemen and could not prevent them from plundering and ravaging his country. But instead of organizing the resistance against them, he engaged in fruitless military adventures in the south (Italy) and in the east (Germany). In the west he suffered heavy blows at the hands of the Bretons, whose independence he had accepted formally since the mid-850s. Even his strong supporter Archbishop Hincmar of Reims made a devastating appraisal of the military capabilities of his king, whom he had himself crowned as king of Lotharingia in 869, and criticized him severely for his behavior, especially the payment of tribute to the Vikings. Charles's attitude has been excused by modern historians (such as Simon Coupland), who note that Charles sometimes had no other viable options, and that these payments could be well afforded by the contemporary Carolingian economy.

[*See also* Andernach, Battle of (876); Lothair I; *and* Louis I.]

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CHARLES THE BOLD

(1433–1477), son of Philip the Good and last Duke of Burgundy (1467–1477). Born in Dijon, Charles bore the title of Count of Charolais until the death of his father and then succeeded to the ducal title, the heir to a vast assemblage of domains, comprising the duchies of Brabant, Limburg, and Luxembourg, the counties of Flanders, Artois, Namur, Hainaut, Holland, and Zeeland, the duchy of Burgundy, and the Franche-Comté (the county of Burgundy).

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His physical and military education was consigned to John IV, Lord of Auxy, ducal counselor, experienced man of war, and knight of the Golden Fleece. Well trained by this master, Charles took part in his first jousting tournament in Brussels in the spring of 1452 and was able on that occasion to match himself against the famous Jacques de Lalaing. He then took part in his first military campaign during the war that his father waged against the city of Ghent. He participated in the battle of Rupelmonde (June 1452) and the battle of Gavre (July 1453). This direct and practical experience of the military life and of combat complemented the intellectual and theoretical education that Charles drew from his classical reading. He was a close reader of the authors of antiquity, such as Xenophon, Caesar, Valerius Maximus, Livy, and Vegetius, whose *De Re Militari* was a source of inspiration for him.

After some years of opposition to his father, the Count of Charolais obtained a leading role in the government of the Burgundian state, and in 1465 he became the duke's lieutenant general in all his lands. Under this title, he took his first command of an army, during the War of the Public Good waged against King Louis XI. His actions in the battle of Montlhéry (16 July 1465) showed that, although he was capable of setting his troops in a coherent battle order, he did not yet possess all the qualities of a great tactician. He had opportunities to improve his technique during campaigns waged in the Liège region, during which he directed the siege and capture of Dinant (August 1465), ordering it to be destroyed; won at Brustem (October 1467); and besieged and captured Liège (October–November 1468), which was, like Dinant, largely destroyed.

Having become Duke of Burgundy in June 1467, Charles was thereupon drawn into a war, broken up by truces, against the king of France. The theaters of operation were located mainly in Picardy and on the borders of the duchy of Burgundy. These hostilities led to disappointment for Charles. He lost key positions on the Somme, notably Saint-Quentin and Amiens, both taken by the French in February 1471; he led a fruitless expedition between May and August 1472, during the course of which he failed to capture the cities of Beauvais and Rouen; and finally, the troops defending Burgundy were defeated twice, at Buxy in March 1471 and at Montreuillon in June 1475.

It was in this difficult context that the duke undertook a profound reform of the Burgundian military institutions. As a first step, beginning in December 1470, he reorganized and simplified the military services due from fief holders, requiring them to provide, according to set standards, a certain number of fighters in proportion to the annual revenue of the fiefs. This was an effective reform, and it is known that in 1472 the troops levied on a feudal basis, in the Burgundian Netherlands as well as in the duchy and county of Burgundy, numbered about fifteen thousand. Second, the duke set up a permanent army. The creation of *compagnies d'ordonnance* (regular companies) gave rise to a succession of normative texts of remarkable precision and detail (the ordinances of Abbeville of July 1471, of Bohain of November 1472, and of Saint-Maximin-de-Trèves of September 1473). In this legislation, the prince specified the composition and the strength of companies, as well as the type of weaponry, horses, and equipment, and he established standards for the discipline, pay, regulation, movement, lodging, and training of troops. This set of regulations was accompanied by a diversification in the recruitment of soldiers, by integrating into the permanent army Italian mercenaries whose captains were hired on contract, beginning in 1472. In 1474 the 2,200 "lances" (a group of soldiers of specified kinds), on the regulation strength, theoretically represented 19,800 fighters. Charles the Bold also worked to develop the quantity and quality of his artillery. Conversely, although he did not ignore naval issues, which were important in the context of his relations with England and France, he did not bother to establish a permanent war fleet.

Beginning in 1473, simultaneously with his conflict with the king of France—interrupted by a long truce in September 1475—Charles the Bold engaged in a succession of large-scale military enterprises within the empire. First came the conquest of the duchy of Guelders (July–August 1473); next the siege of Neuss (July 1474–June 1475), which was a failure, in spite of the sizable resources devoted to it; then the rapid conquest of the duchy of Lorraine

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(September–November 1475). After this last success, the Duke of Burgundy took action against the Swiss confederates and their allies, who had declared war on him in October 1474. Underestimating his enemy's tactical capabilities, he suffered a defeat at Grandson (March 1476). He tried to reorganize his troops with a final military ordinance (Lausanne, May 1476), by which he changed the composition and the organization of his companies, considerably increased the role and strength of the infantry, and reinforced discipline. In spite of his efforts, he was defeated a second time, at Morat (June 1476). Still, despite the losses sustained in that disaster, he managed to assemble a new army with which he tried to reconquer the duchy of Lorraine, which had risen against him. In the course of this final campaign, begun in October 1476, he was defeated and killed beneath the walls of Nancy on 5 January 1477.

[*See also* Montlhéry, Battle of; Nancy, Battle of; *and* Vegetius.]

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CHARLES II

See Charles the Bald.

CHÂTEAU-GAILLARD

Château Gaillard was built in 1197–1198 at Eure in Normandy by the English king Richard I the Lionhearted, who, at war with Philip II Augustus, king of France at the time, was looking for an imposing spot to place a fortification in which to garrison a sizable army. Its location was certainly imposing. Château-Gaillard stood on a precipitous cliff, over 90 meters (roughly 300 feet) high, overlooking the small town of Les Andelys and the Seine River. The castle consisted of three baileys arranged in a line, each surrounded by a large wall. The outer bailey had a triangular plan with its apex facing the valley below. Its wall was fortified by one large circular tower at the apex and three other smaller semicircular towers, and it was completely surrounded by a moat, 17 meters (56 feet) wide and 15 meters (almost 50 feet) deep. The middle bailey was located across the moat to the northwest of the outer bailey. Its wall was also

Château-Gaillard. The circular donjon may have been a later addition to the castle. PHOTOGRAPH BY CLIFFORD J. ROGERS

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fortified by three semicircular towers, located on the two corners facing the outer bailey and on its northern face, and by one square tower on its southern face. The inner bailey, which was enclosed completely by the middle bailey, had no wall towers, but was built on higher ground rising more than 12 meters (39 feet) above the middle bailey. It too was surrounded by a moat. Access to the middle and inner baileys was possible only over a drawbridge connected with the outer bailey. The outer bailey in turn had only a single entrance, on its northwest corner, which was guarded by a flanking tower and was accessible only by a drawbridge.

Château-Gaillard's keep, which may have been a later addition, was constructed on the edge of the cliff, mostly within the inner bailey, but also forming a part of the southeast face of the wall. The keep was circular, with walls 3 to 4 meters (10 to 13 feet) thick, except for a side that jutted out almost like a beak toward the courtyard in the direction most exposed to attack and was another meter in thickness. The keep also contained machicolations supported by buttresses built along the wall, adding further protection. It contained two stories, but researchers have suggested that it was probably only used as a barracks for the troops garrisoned at the castle and not as the residence for any baron. Other courtyard buildings, constructed along the inside of the inner bailey wall, also served as barracks and other domestic structures. The keep could only be entered by a long flight of stairs, which ascended from the courtyard to a guard room in the upper story.

Château-Gaillard was constructed relatively quickly, in less than two years. It was also one of the most expensive castles constructed during the Middle Ages, costing an estimated 21,203 pounds sterling, including the cost of materials and extraction, transportation, and labor.

Although Richard the Lionhearted died in 1199, his war with Philip Augustus continued under his brother, King John, who was a far less effective general than his brother. Soon Normandy in general and Château-Gaillard in particular became a target for French conquest. The castle was attacked in August 1203. For more than seven months French armies besieged Château-Gaillard, using siege machines and mines to break through the fortifications. Each bailey had to be conquered separately, with the English garrison retreating to a more inner fortification when the outer two baileys fell. Late in 1203 as deprivation began to affect the besieged, they decided to expel the noncombatants, with Roger de Lacy, their leader, using the famous phrase "useless mouths" to explain why he was doing so. Rather than letting the ejected English through the siege lines, the French forced them instead to remain in the moat next to the castle throughout the very harsh winter of 1203–1204 in an effort to weaken the English resolve. Only when Philip Augustus arrived at Château-Gaillard in spring were the few survivors fed and allowed to leave. Finally, on 6 March 1204, an assault breached the inner wall of the castle and the remaining garrison—20 knights and 120 men-at-arms—surrendered. From then until the fifteenth century the French held the site. However, during the latter part of the Hundred Years' War it was besieged four more times: in 1418, the French lost the castle to Henry V's English force after a six-month siege; in 1420, the French regained the fortress, only to have it again captured by the English before the end of the year; and finally, in 1449, Charles VII restored it to French control.

[*See also* Château-Gaillard, Siege of; Hundred Years' War; John; *and* Richard I.]

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CHÂTEAU-GAILLARD, SIEGE OF

In his quest to wrest mastery over Normandy from King John, King Philip II by August 1203 controlled most of the strategic points along the Seine River except for Château-Gaillard. Gaillard, built by John's brother Richard, was a state-of-the-art fortress designed around three independently fortified wards surrounded by ditches. To isolate Gaillard, Philip sought to capture another fortification on a small island in the Seine, the Isle of Andely. Upon Philip's approach, its garrison destroyed the bridge connecting the island to the west bank. Philip's access to the Seine remained blocked by a wooden barrier across it until volunteers swam to the barrier and hacked through it. Philip then constructed a pontoon bridge in front of the isle and crossed the river "like Xerxes," according to William the Breton.

King John proposed to counter Philip's movements by a two-pronged attack. One force would attack from the west and seize the pontoon bridge, while a flotilla descended the river to resupply and reinforce the Isle of Andely. The landward army moved at night down the west side of the Seine. This force slaughtered many sleeping camp followers; the survivors fled to the pontoon bridge and raised the alarm. Philip's soldiers counterattacked from the east side, causing John's troops to retreat. Soon after this John's boats unsuccessfully attempted to seize the pontoon bridge. These failures left the Isle of Andely without hope of rescue.

Philip sent a swimmer carrying pots filled with burning charcoal to a weak point in the isle's defenses, a double wooden palisade. The swimmer threw his pots against the palisade, igniting not only the outer wall but also the main fortification. The panicked garrison abandoned the fortification to the French. Meanwhile, the population of neighboring Petit-Andely fled to Château-Gaillard. Gaillard was too strongly built to assault, so Philip blockaded it, having his men dig trenches from river to river, sealing it off. Gaillard's castellan, Roger de Lacy, soon regretted admitting the refugees. Three times he expelled noncombatants. Twice the besiegers permitted them to pass but the unfortunates of the third group were forced to spend the next three months between the lines in shelters scraped out of the hillside. Roger de Lacy finally chased all the dogs out of Château-Gaillard, and the starving mob ate them, amid reports of cannibalism. When Philip, who came and left several times during the blockade, arrived to check progress, these people cried for mercy and he finally allowed them to enter his lines.

By February 1204 Philip's army leveled the only approach up to the outer ward despite many casualties caused by Gaillard's rock throwers and mangonels. The assault stalled before the tower at the outer ward until a few men braved the missiles and pried out the stones at the tower's base and dug a mine, eventually firing the timbers shoring it up. The tower wall fell. As the French moved through, the garrison burned the first ward and retreated over a steep ditch into the second. The French, however, discovered a fatal weakness in the walls they now faced. In a small chapel on the southeast corner, there was a latrine with a passage for waste emptying into the ditch. Five of Philip's soldiers discovered this opening and scrambled up into the chapel. Once inside, they broke down the door to a lower storehouse, but somehow the building caught fire. The flames spread so quickly that the garrison abandoned the second ward for the third. The five French sergeants took refuge in a storehouse or cistern. After the flames passed, they opened the drawbridge for their comrades. The third ward, too, had a serious flaw in that it was accessed by a natural rock bridge. Philip had a cat slide along the rock bridge to the wall. Inside, miners dug a hole in the foundation. Roger dug a countermine, but the weakened wall caved in under fire from one of Philip's rock throwers, and the French swarmed through the breach. Roger de Lacy and his men initially refused to capitulate, but on 6 March 1204 about 160 combatants and many others finally surrendered.

The great "Saucy Castle," as William the Breton called it, had fallen after a four-and-a-half-month blockade and an active siege of about five weeks. It represented the last great obstacle on the Seine

Bahan dengan hak cipta

before Rouen. The capture of Château-Gaillard proved that Philip could triumph over a fortress built by his greatest nemesis, Richard the Lionhearted, and defeat Richard's brother John.

[*See also* Château-Gaillard; John; Philip II; *and* Rouen, Siege of (1204).]

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CHILDREN

In the Middle Ages, there were at least two kinds of connection between childhood and war. On the one hand, very young nobles were trained for war and took part in battles. On the other hand, many children were victims of war.

Among the aristocracy, boys (especially the eldest sons) received careful military training. Physical training was basic for the young nobleman to prepare him for the responsibilities implicit in his birth. The three pillars of military training were horsemanship, hunting, and the use of arms. In the thirteenth century, the pedagogue Philip of Novara wrote: "Anyone who stays in school until the age of twelve, without riding a horse, is fit for nothing but a clerk's life." Thus, the young aristocrat was introduced to riding very early. He had to know how to handle a bow and toss sparrow hawks and falcons for hunting, but also how to use the long sword, the javelin, the battleaxe, and the shield, for battles to come. One young prince of about six years of age, buried under the Cologne cathedral in the sixth century, had in his tomb a long sword, a helmet, a shield, a francisca (a throwing axe), an angon (a type of javelin), a lance, and arrowheads. The child's instruction began very early: when Louis the Pious became king of Aquitaine at the age of four, he was set on horseback, in armor, and taken around his new kingdom. By the age of eight, he was an excellent horseman. The little suit of armor of Charles VI, king of France, has been preserved; it is less than twenty-eight inches (seventy centimeters) tall. In addition, this purely physical training was rounded off with moral education, because, in the world of war as in other activities, the young aristocrat had to learn the virtues that would allow him to bear arms with prudence and wisdom.

Children were sometimes victims of war as well, especially during the waves of invasions at the beginning of the Middle Ages. Numerous sources attest to aggression against the very young. Gregory of Tours, at the beginning of the sixth century, says that the Thuringians, for example, "hung young boys from trees by the nerves of their thighs; they savagely killed more than two hundred young girls." There are many examples of aristocratic children who, in the fratricidal Merovingian wars of the sixth century, suffered the same fate as their fathers. Such massacres of children are also seen in the second wave of invasions of the West, in the ninth and tenth centuries. Abbo of Saint-Germain describes the ravages committed by the Normans at the end of the ninth century: "Children of all ages, young men, hoary old men, fathers and sons and mothers, too, they kill everyone. They slaughter the husband before his wife's eyes, the wife falls prey to the carnage; children perish in the presence of their fathers and mothers." Even if caution is called for with these reports, whose primary function is to show the ferocity and

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cruelty of the newcomers, they undoubtedly speak of real violence. When children were not killed in these battles, they were sometimes taken prisoner and sent into servitude.

[*See also* Immunity from War; Noncombatants in Armies; Youth: Before 1000; *and* Youth: After 1000.]

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CHIOGGIA, BATTLE OF

During the Fourth Genoese War (1378–1381), the city-states of Venice and Genoa battled one another over the control of trade in the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean. The battle of Chioggia—the final naval battle of the war—took place in and around the Venetian lagoon. It represented perhaps the darkest moment of the Venetian republic, when Venice came closer to being conquered by a foreign power than at any other time in its history, from the attacks of the Carolingians in 810 to the arrival of Napoleon in 1797.

The summer of 1379 was one of the bleakest in the history of Venice. The fleet of the patrician commander Vettore Pisani had been ambushed and defeated at Pola in the spring of 1379, giving the Genoese full access to the northern Adriatic. While Pisani was thrown in prison, the Genoese fleet received reinforcements and began to attack Venetian ships within sight of the lagoon. The Genoese fleet set fire to towns on the Lido, and the Venetians began to fortify outposts near the mouth of the lagoon, barricading the central entrance to the lagoon with cogs lashed together. While they undertook these precautionary measures, however, the Genoese took the city of Chioggia in the southern lagoon on 16 August 1379. The Genoese then commanded both the northern Adriatic as well as one mouth of the lagoon so that Venice was blockaded. Although the Venetians sought to negotiate, the Genoese replied that they wanted only to bit and bridle the horses of Saint Mark (Venice's patron saint).

The Venetian state rallied popular support by releasing Vettore Pisani from prison. Pisani had indeed been guilty of engaging in a disorderly battle at Pola, but he was adored by workers and seamen, and his release and new command over six galleys dramatically boosted recruitment. Pisani and his forces began to employ the same strategy Venetians had used against Pepin and the Franks hundreds of years earlier: sinking ships weighted with stones in the main channels of the lagoon. They did this both in the canals leading from Chioggia to Venice as well as the canals leading from Chioggia to the open Adriatic, in order to separate the Genoese from both the mainland and the rest of the Genoese fleet while the Venetians waited for the commander Carlo Zeno and the Venetian fleet to return. On 23 December 1379 Venetian forces attacked Chioggia by sea to distract the Genoese just long enough to block up these channels in the lagoon. In effect, the Genoese had placed Venice under siege, forcing the city to run dangerously low on food and supplies. However, by blocking the main channels of the lagoon, the Venetians under Pisani's command succeeded in blockading the Genoese inside the lagoon as well. As the stalemate grew, the doge himself, Andrea Contarini, also out on the high seas, vowed despite all hardships not to give in until Chioggia had been retaken.

Just as the Venetian besiegers were unable to endure any longer, Zeno returned to assist the blockade of Chioggia on 1 January 1380 with fourteen galleys and an army of Italian and English mercenary soldiers. Deprived of food and gunpowder, the Genoese finally surrendered in June 1380. In the ensuing peace between the two powers, the Treaty of Turin (1381),

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Venice accepted several punitive conditions. It gave up the strategic island of Tenedos near the Dardanelles, and the right to trade at Tana on the Black Sea for two years; it also recognized Genoese sovereignty on Cyprus. Nevertheless, the control of the Adriatic returned to the Venetians; thus the city continued to maintain its monopoly over trade in this region that was so essential to its economic survival.

The battle of Chioggia was one of the earliest naval battles where gunpowder played a significant role as the Venetians mounted cannons on the front of their galleys. In addition, the battle demonstrated the clear connections between warfare and political culture. In the wake of this battle and the heroic efforts on the part of many families to defend the lagoon, the Venetian republic dramatically decided to admit thirty "popular" families to the noble class in September 1381 as reward for their sacrifices and contributions to the war. This resulted in a decisive and fundamental shift in the structure of the Venetian ruling class by giving power to new families at the expense of older ones, fundamentally altering who wielded power within the halls of the Venetian government. After the entrance of these thirty new families (like the Curti), older noble families (like the Longhi) would not produce a doge for several hundred years; the doges after 1382 tended to come from these newly admitted families.

[*See also* Genoese-Venetian Wars: Fourth War.]

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CHIVALRIC BIOGRAPHIES

The life stories of knights or princes who were considered to be exemplary, chivalric biographies date from the thirteenth to sixteenth centuries. They are anecdotal in style and contain eyewitness accounts of the deeds of their heroes; some were written by clerics, others by men who themselves had experience in warfare and campaigning. Chivalric biographies were composed for a variety of purposes, some simply to commemorate the deeds of a renowned companion or ancestor, others to be used as exemplars or handbooks for aspiring knights. Their defining characteristic is that authors seek to present their protagonists in the best possible light: they select and rearrange episodes from their subjects' lives, sometimes at the expense of historical accuracy, in order to demonstrate that they excelled in whatever were considered at the time to be the principal knightly qualities.

A precise corpus of chivalric biographies is difficult to establish. However, the generally accepted major examples from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries are the *History of William Marshal* (who lived c. 1146–1219; the text was written c. 1226); Jean de Joinville's *Life of Saint Louis* (1214–1270; c. 1309); John Barbour's biography of Robert Bruce (1274–1329; c. 1375); Guillaume de Saint-André's biography of John IV of Brittany (1295–1345; c. 1382–1385); Cuvelier's biography of Bertrand du Guesclin (c. 1320–1380; c. 1385); and Chandos Herald's *Life of the Black Prince* (1330–1376; c. 1385). The principal chivalric biographies from the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries are those of Boucicaut (c. 1366–1421; written c. 1409); Don Pero Niño de Buelna (1379–1453; written c. 1431–1449 by his standard-bearer Gutierre Diaz de Gamez); Richard Beauchamp, Earl of Warwick (1382–1439; written c. 1485–1493, possibly by John Rous); Jacques de Lalaing (1421–1453; written c. 1470–1472 variously by Jean le Fevre, Georges Chastellain, and the herald Charolais); and the Chevalier Bayard (c. 1473–1524; written c. 1527 by Jacques de Mailles).

Although they have some features in common, chivalric biographies vary considerably in style and content. This may be due to distance: some authors were closer than others (both personally and chronologically) to their subjects. Some narratives are realist in nature, whereas others are highly idealized, to the extent that there can sometimes be a blurring of the genre lines between fact and fiction, with narratives being influenced by the style of contemporary romance. The subject matter also varies, in that some of the men depicted, such as William

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Marshal or Bertrand du Guesclin, made their way in the world by using their wits and their strength, while others, such as the Black Prince or the Chevalier Bayard, were destined for greatness from birth. Chivalric biographies also exhibit a chronological development in the way they depict warfare and heroes: in the earlier texts, William Marshal is depicted as strong, brave, and clever, but he is no proponent of courtly love or extravagant largesse; Joinville's *Life of Saint Louis* depicts the king as pious, brave, and wise, but does not mention ostentatious chivalry. However, later biographies depict their heroes fighting for honor alone, even though this was not necessarily the case in the real world, where financial gain was imperative. Each subject of a chivalric biography is as much the "ideal knight" of his time as any other, but the definition of the ideal knight developed over the centuries.

In some respects, chivalric biographies need to be treated with caution. For example, their chronology may be suspect or deliberately compressed for dramatic purposes: the *Life of the Black Prince* is structured around three important campaigns, but it is not made particularly clear that these took place over a period of twenty-five years. Depictions of the deeds of protagonists should also be analyzed carefully, as the primary purpose of the author is not to attempt a neutral account of events, but to praise his hero. Despite these caveats, however, chivalric biographies may be useful to the modern scholar in a number of ways. They demonstrate that medieval audiences had an appetite for tales involving war and violence, even those which depicted the death or injury of contemporaries; they also provide much useful information regarding the armor, weapons, and fortifications of the period in question: however embellished the deeds might be, the subjects performing them did so with real weapons and in real places. They also illuminate codes of behavior: if the hero of a chivalric biography is depicted as acting in a particular way, one may extrapolate that such behavior was admirable or at least acceptable. In this way chivalric biographies are useful sources for contemporary perceptions of war and the conduct of war.

[*See also* Chandos, Sir John; Edward the Black Prince; Guesclin, Bertrand du; Joinville, Jean de; Louis IX; Marshal, William; Pero Niño; *and* Romances.]

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Catherine Hanley

CHIVALRY

[*This entry contains three subentries, an overview of chivalry, on chivalric sources, and on chivalric historiography.*]

Overview

The word "chivalry"—in French *chevalerie*—derives from the French *chevalier*, meaning a mounted warrior or, more specifically, a knight, and came into common use in French vernacular texts from the twelfth century onward. Sometimes—and especially early on—"chivalry" means simply a body of cavalry, a collective of *chevaliers*. The word can also be used to describe the warrior's art of war, as when Jean de Meun's translation of Vegetius's late classical treatise on military tactics and training is entitled *L'art de chevalerie*. In the classic medieval division of society into three functionally related estates—those who pray (the clergy), those who fight (the secular warrior nobility), and those who work and till the soil to

Knights in Battle. Illustration from Faits d'armes et de chevalerie by William Caxton, 1489.
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support the other two superior estates (laborers and peasants)—"chivalry" is one of the labels often used to identify the second estate, the warrior knighthood. Used in that sense, chivalry is often described as an "order," and so by implication it is comparable to a religious order with a rule of life to which its followers are pledged. Out of this interpretation the use of the word to denote a rule or code of conduct for knights is a natural development. Combining these various meanings and shades of meaning in medieval usage, "chivalry" has come to be interpreted as the word that best describes the aristocratic and military way of life—the ethos and culture of medieval European knighthood—and this is the sense in which it is most commonly used by historians today when writing of the period from the twelfth to the early sixteenth century.

Chivalrous Value System. It was during the twelfth century that the ideals and culture of chivalry originally achieved discernible and distinctive shape. In the chivalrous value system, as writings and records of that age and of the thirteenth century reveal it to us, three constitutive strands appear interwoven together. One strand is martial, and the key value word here is "prowess" (*prouesse*), denoting the combination of courage, physical strength, and skill in the use of weapons and in horsemanship that distinguishes a warrior as *preux*, that is, as a man of prowess. This combination had long commanded respect in the early medieval world, but in the twelfth century's chivalry there is, as the word "chivalry" implies, a special emphasis on horsemanship (*cheval* means "horse"). A second strand is aristocratic, identifying chivalry with nobility of blood and making fear of shame—of losing esteem among men of good birth and breeding—and the preservation of personal honor by living up to its code its key social imperatives. The third strand is religious, recognizing that the military calling, when directed toward just ends, renders a service to society that is acceptable and pleasing in God's eyes. The early history of chivalry is the story of how these three strands came to be woven into a single fabric.

Origins. The close association of martial service and proficiency in arms with free and noble status has a long ancestry in medieval social structures, going back to long before the twelfth century. Already in Carolingian legislation the military calling is clearly associated with social status: for certain grave crimes the penalty for a freeman or vassal

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

Knights Jousting. John Chalon of England and Lois de Beul of France at a joust. Illustration from the Royal Armoury Manuscript, 1448. PRIVATE COLLECTION/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL.

was loss of standing and loss of the right to wear the *cingulum militare* (what was later translated as "the belt of knighthood"). In the witness lists of eleventh-century charters, witnesses who attest as *milites*—and who are listed immediately after the nobility proper—are clearly using *miles*, a word that originally meant simply a soldier, as a title of status. Before the end of the century, moreover, we find *miles* coming to be used specifically to denote a mounted warrior, a knight. Chronicles of the First Crusade (1095–1099), for instance, regularly distinguish the *milites* from the humble footmen, the *pedites*. Likewise in the early twelfth century, we find signs that the greater nobles—the dukes, counts, and castellans—men who earlier would have been glad to distinguish themselves from "mere" knights, were becoming anxious to identify themselves as *milites*, or knights, and thereby to associate themselves with what Karl Leyser has called the "collective sense of their own worth" among both "the great and the rank and file" (p. 549) of the military estate.

Among the influences that went to form this collective sense of worth and identity among knightly warriors, Leyser stresses two in particular: the eleventh-century advances in the techniques of mounted combat, and what he calls "the Church's novel use of warfare." That seems as good a way as any of describing the third strand woven into chivalry as the value system of the knightly order: the church's blessing on martial violence when directed toward its proper vocational ends—namely, the upkeep of order and orthodoxy in Christian society and the defense of the Christian *patria*. There was a clear shift away both from the pacific tradition of the early church and from the earlier medieval penitential teaching that imposed penances for killing, even in war. The shift climaxed in the last years of the eleventh century with the church's call to the warriors of Europe to take up arms against the heathen and join the martial pilgrimage to Jerusalem. The resultant Crusade and the promise to crusaders of remission of sin promoted fighting—the business of the warrior estate—to the status of a religiously justified vocation. As Guibert de Nogent wrote,

> In our day, God has instituted a Holy War, so that the order of knights and the unstable multitude who used to engage in mutual slaughter may find a new way of gaining salvation, so that now they may

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

Knight of the Garter. King Henry IV (1366–1413) makes Richard Beauchamp (1382–1439) a member of the Order of the Garter following the battle of Shrewsbury in 1403. Image from the *Beauchamp Pageants*, c. 1483. © THE BRITISH LIBRARY BOARD (COTTON JULIUS E. IV, ART. 6, F. 4V)

> seek God's grace in their wonted habit and in the discharge of their own office, and no longer need to be drawn to seek salvation by utterly renouncing the world in the profession of the monk. (quoted in Keen, pp. 48–49)

The religious crusading orders, the Templars and the Hospitallers, actually sought to combine the chivalrous and the monastic ways of life: their knights brethren took the same vows of chastity and personal poverty that the monk took, pledging themselves at the same time to the defense in arms of the Kingdom of Jerusalem and its holy places. The crusader poet Aymer de Péguilhan put secular knighthood's more normal view of the ideal of crusade in words very like Guibert's, but with an overtone of aristocratic pride, not of monastic austerity: "Behold, without renouncing our rich garments, our station in life, and all that pleases and charms, we can obtain honour down here and joy in paradise" (quoted in Jeanroy, p. 208).

In these two passages from Guibert de Nogent and Aymer de Péguilhan, the three strands interwoven in chivalry are brought together into the single context of a secular way of life that is pleasing to God in its own right. The twining together of worldly honor and Christian vocation that can be a path to paradise—and this as the basic goals of a martial nobility—was the very essence of chivalry and the key to the self-confidence of the warrior estate of knighthood in its own chivalric values and style of living.

Institutionalization through Social Practices. Three developments of this same early-twelfth-century period helped to give definition to chivalry, to what were recognized as its quality and values and

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to the sense among the chivalrous of their place and role in society: new techniques of mounted warfare and the new sport of tourneying that this encouraged, the rise of heraldry, and the appearance of a formal rite for making a man a knight. Each of these three developments mirrors one of the three strands in chivalry: the tourney mirrors the martial strand, heraldry mirrors the aristocratic, and the rite for making a knight mirrors the religious. Together they mark a move toward the institutionalization of chivalrous culture in social practices.

The Tourney. The rise of the tournament was closely linked to one of those "advances of military techniques in mounted combat" whose importance Leyser notes as a feature of the period. The introduction of the stirrup (an Eastern invention) into Europe in the eighth century had already greatly enhanced the importance of cavalry in European warfare, giving the mounted warrior much greater stability in the saddle and an altogether improved control of his horse. Under the Ottonian kings, German cavalry, armed with swords, played an important part in the defeat of the Magyar invaders of Europe in the tenth century. But it was not, it seems, until after the middle of the eleventh century that, as a result of further advances (including notably improved saddle design), the tactic developed whereby the charge of heavy cavalrymen holding lances in the "couched" position (tucked firmly under the right armpit and leveled at the enemy) could be decisive in a pitched field engagement. With the couched lance rider, horse and weapon could be gathered into what has been eloquently described as a "human projectile" (Smail, p. 113). A body of horsemen charging with the couched lance could deliver a hammer blow, provided that they could keep rank together and deliver the shock impact of their charge at full momentum at the appropriate moment in a battle. Such charges were decisive in more than one engagement on the First Crusade.

Charging with the couched lance demanded of a mounted knight high skills in horsemanship and in handling his weapons from the saddle. These had to have their basis in serious training. There were no military academies in the twelfth century. A youth's introduction to the equestrian and martial arts was usually in a lordly household; fosterage in a superior lord's household was the norm for boys of good birth, sometimes from the age of seven or even younger. Once he had acquired adequate mastery of these skills under instructors appointed by his patron, and once he was of sufficient age and strength, participation in tournaments—likely in the following of the lord in whose household he had been placed—provided a superb next stage in a young man's training toward the true business of the warrior estate, fighting in war. At this time tournaments were fought between combatants divided into teams, often on the basis of local feudal allegiance—Normans versus Angevins, for example—and they commonly began with the teams charging each other with the lance. A young man was likely, therefore, to find himself in the mock war of the tournament serving alongside the same men with whom he was likely to serve and execute cavalry maneuvers in real battle.

Early tournaments were indeed in many respects little distinguishable from real battle: the fighting could range widely over the countryside of a selected area, sometimes even into villages; prisoners were taken and had to pay a ransom to their captors; and fatal accidents were common. Their violence and the fierce competition for success and acclaim among the knights taking part earned tournaments sharp ecclesiastical disapproval, but their attractiveness to knights was singularly undented by this disapproval. Tournaments were enormously popular and frequent; to judge by the verse biography of him, in northern France in the 1170s William Marshal was able to get to a tournament every two or three weeks. Always well attended by spectators and followers as well as by combatants, tournaments offered, outside time of war, just the kind of public demonstration of chivalrous skills and prowess in action—and demonstration of the glory that an individual knight could earn by their display—that a proud martial aristocracy particularly prized. For these reasons, and because they drew would-be combatants from far and wide, tournaments were a powerful influence in giving currency among the knighthood of

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regions and provinces far apart from one another to common chivalrous values and aspirations and to a shared code of honor for fighting men: in short, to a common and shared aristocratic and martial culture.

Heraldry. Competition in the quest for chivalrous reputation made it important for an individual knight to be personally identifiable at a tournament. Tourneying was, in consequence, an important factor in the rapid and widespread development of heraldry in the twelfth century. A recognizable device on a shield was clearly a sound means, in the melee of a tournament or battle, of identifying a helmeted warrior encased from head to foot in chain mail. True heraldic usage was early accepted as involving the use of hereditary family devices, not just individual badges; thus the armorial shield of a knight not only equipped him to be admitted to tourney but also at the same time identified him as belonging to a family of privileged standing. The earliest rolls of arms, from the thirteenth century, do not record the heraldic arms of any persons of humbler status than knight bachelor, making it clear that such arms were the special insignia of the chivalrous; significantly, a number of these early rolls were compiled to record the coats of arms of those participating in a particular tournament (for example, the French Compiègne Roll and the English Dunstable Tournament Roll).

It is in the context of the tournament, moreover, that we first hear of heralds, the principal compilers of the rolls of arms. Early references describe them as "judges of the tournament" who recognized combatants by their shields of arms and called out to those watching the names of those displaying high prowess. From this role at tournaments developed the wider role of heralds as registrars of prowess not just at tournaments but generally in all martial doings, along with their role as professors of the lore of chivalry and of genealogy. As tournaments bear witness to the bellicosity of chivalry, so heraldry bears witness to chivalry's exclusiveness, to the accepted noble standing of knights and their martial profession.

The Rite for Making a Knight. The right to heraldic arms and the right to tourney were originally the privilege of the knightly. From the early twelfth century at the latest, this had come to mean those who had been "dubbed" knights in a formal ceremony. The delivery of arms to a young man of good birth as a mark of his coming of age was an old rite of the early Germanic world—we hear of it from Tacitus in his *Germania*—but by the beginning of the twelfth century dubbing seems to have come to imply something more than that. John of Marmoutier's account of how King Henry I of England dubbed his future son-in-law, Geoffrey V Plantagenet, Count of Anjou, at Rouen in 1128 gives a full and evocative account of how ceremonious a dubbing might be when a great man of the high aristocracy was involved. Geoffrey took a ritual bath, we are told; he was then dressed in a tunic of gold cloth and a purple cloak and was led before the king. Gold spurs were affixed to his heels, a shield decorated with painted lions was hung about his neck, and a sword, said to have been forged by Weland, the smith of Germanic legend, was girded on him by the king. In order to do honor to Geoffrey and to mark his knighting as a great chivalrous occasion, Henry made knights at the same time of thirty young men who had accompanied Geoffrey to Rouen, and he distributed to them lavish gifts of horses and arms.

The gold lions painted on Geoffrey's shield were to pass, in due course, into the arms that his descendants bore as kings of England (they are still there in the English royal arms); the golden spurs that were fixed to his heels stand as a reminder that Geoffrey was not just being girded with weapons as an adult noble, but also was being admitted into the order of mounted fighting men, the noble order of knighthood. The significance of dubbing as an initiation into chivalry is brought out again in the twelfth-century chronicle *The History of the Counts of Guines and Lords of Ardres*, by Lambert of Ardres. This chronicle tells of the knighting in 1181 of the count's heir, Arnold of Ardres, who was dubbed in an assembly of nobles gathered together by his father Count Baldwin, together with four companions who had been brought up with him. Especially illuminating is what the chronicler tells of the young men's reaction following the ceremony. As soon as

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they had been made knights, all five young men left home and set out together to seek experience in the tourneying field, "so as to learn to live amply and achieve worldly honor." Now that the tiltyard days of training in the household were over, the imperative for them was to seek reputation through the display of prowess farther away, in the wider world of the tournament and of adult knighthood to which dubbing had given them their formal passport. Their reaction was precisely in keeping with Philip of Novara's advice to young men of good standing, given in his *Quatre ages de l'homme*:

> In his youth a man should use without idleness or delay his prowess, his valour and the vigour of his body for the honour and profit of himself and his dependents, for he who passes his youth without exploit may have cause for great shame ... the young nobleman, knight or man-at-arms should work to acquire honour, to be renowned for valour, and to have temporal possessions and heritages on which he can live honourably. (pp. 38–39)

John of Marmoutier's account of the dubbing of Geoffrey tells of how a young nobleman was dubbed a knight by a secular prince who was himself already a knight. The assumption, which became an established principle, is that it takes a knight to make a knight. There is no hint of any ecclesiastical involvement in the ceremony, no overt trace in what John tells us of that third, religious strand in chivalrous culture. But the strand is there, early and explicitly, especially in churchmen's comments on the rite of dubbing. Étienne de Fougères, in the section on chivalry in his *Livre des manières* (c. 1170), speaks of the sword with which a new knight will be girded as being "brought from the church altar," where it would have been blessed by a priest; and indeed, pontifical records record a number of liturgies for the blessing of a sword. Ramon Llull, in his *Libre qui es de l'ordre de cavalleri* (c. 1270), which rapidly came to be accepted as the classic didactic textbook of chivalry, assumes that the ceremony will normally take place in a church, ideally at one of the great church feasts (Christmas, Easter, or Pentecost), and that aspirant knights, after taking the ritual bath of knighthood (as in John of Marmoutier), will spend the night before their dubbing in church in a vigil of prayer and meditation. The religious significance of the ceremony is thoroughly explicit: it is a rite that admits a young man of good birth into an order, albeit a secular one, that has a religious and military vocation in Christian society—the aristocratic order of chivalry.

Literature. Older than Llull's book, and older than the *Ordene de chevalerie*, the early-thirteenth-century account of the ritual and symbolism of the dubbing ceremony that influenced Llull's and others' accounts of it, is the passage in the romance of *Lancelot* in which the Lady of the Lake instructs her charge, Lancelot, in the duties of knighthood and the symbolic religious significance of a knight's arms. Chivalrous epic and romantic narrative literature, its stories of Charlemagne and his paladins, of Arthur and his Round Table knights, and of the antique chivalry of the Trojan War, was a powerful influence, providing, for knights and for literary authors of advice literature for knights, a vivid presentation of chivalrous ideals and values in action. Their interpretation of these was the more authoritative because it was generally assumed that there was an underlay of genuine history behind all these stories.

The stories' medieval raconteurs were fully conscious of the stories' didactic significance. "In this book you will learn of things delectable and worthy to be remembered for the exaltation of *noblesse* and chivalry, and to the edification and example of all men, above all those whose will it is to achieve in arms the highest honour" (quoted in Pickford, p. 265): so runs the introduction to a late version of the prose romance of *Lancelot*. The models of knighthood presented through the Arthurian romances were indeed particularly significant. Arthur's court was a kind of headquarters of chivalry from which Arthur's knights set out on their adventures and to which they returned; courtesy and courtliness, the style and manners appropriate to a court, thus acquired a place beside martial prowess among the virtues to be expected of an ideal knight. And it was through such stories as those of Lancelot and

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Tristan that the troubadour ethos of courtly love was absorbed into chivalrous culture, and a knight's urge to prove himself worthy in the eyes of a beloved woman came to be given a special value as an honorable inspiration to chivalrous endeavor and achievement, including the earning of distinction in war.

Jean Froissart, the fourteenth-century chronicler par excellence of chivalry, explained his purpose as a historian in much the spirit of the romances: he set out to compile his history, he says, "so that the honorable enterprises, noble adventures, and deeds of arms performed in the wars between England and France may be properly related . . . to the end that brave men, taking example from them, may be encouraged in their well doing" (Vol. 2, p. 4). For Froissart and his contemporaries and readers, romance had opened the way to what may fairly be called a chivalrous interpretation of history that singles out as of special significance in the human story the high deeds of prowess performed in war by men fighting in causes that they believed in. This interpretation and its cultural assumptions underpinned both the sort of history that Froissart and other chroniclers of his ilk wrote and the advice that their writing conveyed to the knighthood of their time. The chivalric attitudes and values that Froissart hoped to promote through what he wrote in his chronicle were traditional and had been already set in a firm mold a century and a half before his time and more than half a century before Llull put together his *Libre* of the order of chivalry. The later Middle Ages indeed saw little change in the essentials of the martial and aristocratic ethos and value system that the twelfth century had formed. Changing material, cultural, and political conditions did mean, inevitably, that later times saw adjustments and modifications, some of them significant.

Changes. After the fall of Acre in 1291 and the final end of the age of crusades to the Holy Land, the most obvious and visible means of discharging in arms the religious vocation of knighthood became much less accessible to would-be knights errant. There were still opportunities for adventurous spirits to join expeditions to fight the Moors in Spain or to campaign with the Teutonic knights against the heathen in Prussia, but by 1300 the advice that the crusader poet Theobald of Champagne had earlier offered to the young knight seeking a reputation for prowess—"blind is he who does not make, once in his life, an expedition to succour God [i.e., go to the Holy Land] and who for so little loses the praise of the world"—had become difficult to follow. This did not mean any loss of confidence in the claim for the martial calling of chivalry as a Christian vocation that, faithfully discharged, was a way of winning paradise in the next world as well as honor in this one, but it did conduce a stronger, religiously tinged emphasis on the warrior's obligation to serve his prince as the divinely sanctioned earthly ruler to whom God had entrusted the common weal of his country. In consequence, in the later Middle Ages chivalry came to be more closely and explicitly involved and associated with princely power and politics and with the ideology of the commonweal of the secular state, and a little less expressly associated with the church's service.

The inherent value of service to the commonweal became a recurrent theme in the political and chivalric advice literature of the later Middle Ages, and the store that the prince should set by the martial service of his knights and nobles was a similarly recurrent point of emphasis. The counsel offered to the prince, to encourage and make the most of the chivalrous aspirations of his aristocratic subjects, implied inevitably giving attention also and equally to their interests, and therefore ensuring due respect for nobility and the maintenance of noble privileges. The cachet that had always been attached to hereditary, lineal noble status in the chivalrous world was thereby enhanced; in the later Middle Ages noble birth came indeed to be perceived explicitly as the principal factor in the definition of that world's social parameters. Chivalrous privileges, such as admission to tourney and the right to heraldic coat armor, that had once been seen as attaching specifically to knights began to be customarily extended to persons who had not been formally knighted but whose hereditary noble status in law was recognized in the vocabulary of social gradation by such additions as "esquire," *damoiseau, gentilhomme*, or "gentleman."

These men were now accepted as belonging, along with knights, to the chivalrous sector of society.

Fewer noble families were, in any case, putting forward their sons to be knighted in the later Middle Ages. Seigneurial revenues from land were declining, and many noble families, especially among the lesser nobility, were no longer prepared to meet the heavy costs of a formal dubbing—of appearing for the ceremony with the full arms of a knight and of distributing the customary largesse to heralds and other officials. Taking knighthood thus came to be viewed as signifying high status in the warrior estate (or a promotion on grounds of merit) rather than admission to the order of chivalry. This same decline of seigneurial incomes had the effect of cementing the perceived common interest and concerns of princely authority and the nobility. In order to maintain the style of living and appearances that they deemed appropriate to their social standing, nobles, and especially lesser nobles, needed to look for other sources of income, and the most obviously accessible means to this end was through the paid service of the prince or a great nobleman.

The services that they could offer included paid military service, which had the further attraction that it could so easily open the way to such additional and incidental financial rewards as the ransoms of prisoners and legitimate spoils of war. In the war-torn fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, riven with dynastic rivalries and confrontations between princes and over mighty (and rich) subjects, there was no lack of princely paymasters willing and eager to use funds—raised by the taxation of their subjects—to hire military expertise. This is the reason that mercenary captains and mercenary companies of soldiers play such an important part in the military history of the later Middle Ages, as it is also the reason that they are a key stage in the story of the origins of properly paid national forces.

For such paymasters, expenditure not only on hiring soldiers but also on chivalrous pageantry and ceremony that they knew to be to the taste of the noble and martial was money well spent. In particular it was a sure way of encouraging military and chivalrous ambitions among the nobility of a prince's own territory. It was eminently worth the prince's while, therefore, to make military service in his hosts look honorably glamorous, as well as adequately remunerated. Princely ambition and princely wealth were what lay behind the ornate exuberance of late medieval chivalry's fashions and its preoccupation with literary models, theatrical spectacle, and colorful pageantry, which have been so often remarked on and sometimes condemned as wastefully excessive. Lavish it all certainly was, but there were good political, public relations grounds for what critics have censured as conspicuous waste. Late medieval rulers were not so foolish as to spend money on show to no purpose.

Late Medieval Tournaments. The late medieval history of the tournament illustrates aptly these trends toward the spectacular and ornamental and the purposes behind them. Though tournaments were less frequent than in the days of William Marshal—now they were larger-scale and thus more expensive to organize and host—tourneying and jousting remained immensely popular and prestigious among the secular aristocracy. Tournaments were better regulated than in the early days, and thus they were less like real battlefields. The mock combat's arena was defined and limited by the construction of fenced "lists," and the use of blunted weapons became normal. When constructing the lists, a good deal of care was taken for the comfort of the large numbers of spectators that a major tournament was likely to attract.

Jousting—the single encounter of two contestants riding at each other with the lance from opposite ends of the lists—provided a particularly vivid spectacle and became very fashionable. A good deal of care went likewise into the pageantry and theater of the occasion: a tournament might be given a literary theme, with contestants taking the part of Arthurian knights (as, for example, at the tournament staged by the Duke of Orléans at Sandricourt in 1491), or a jousting challenge might be worked up into a romantic novelette, setting a fictional context for the proposed encounter. The costs involved in

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staging a tourneying event naturally rose very high; princes and wealthy lords became the only people who could afford to host them.

That great lords and princes were willing and so often enthusiastic to shoulder these expenses shows that tourneying and jousting had become so popular among the chivalrous that patronage of the sport had become politically significant. For such rulers as Edward I and Edward III of England and the fifteenth-century dukes of Burgundy, staging tournaments was a means of presenting themselves as chivalrous leaders and thus of impressing on their aristocratic subjects and in martial society at large the distinction of serving them in arms. The occasions that they chose for arranging tournaments under their aegis testify to the advantage they saw in giving a chivalrous gloss to their power politics: dynastic marriages, the sealing of treaties of alliance, and the return from victorious campaigns.

Secular Orders of Chivalry. The statutes and organization of the secular princely orders of chivalry, which were a genuinely novel institutional development of later medieval times, illustrate much the same trends in chivalry's story as does the later history of the tournament. The founders of such famous orders as the English Order of the Garter, the Burgundian Order of the Golden Fleece, and the French Royal Orders—of the Star and of Saint Michael—perceived clearly that presenting themselves as dedicated devotees of chivalrous values and as patrons of its ceremonies and rituals was a sound means of fostering among their nobilities a sense of pride in the military service that they could render to their rulers and of the distinction that its discharge could confer on them. The colorful robes and insignia that singled out companions of such orders among their aristocratic peers, both at court and in the field, the elaborate rituals of admission to an order, and the elaborate ceremony of their carefully regulated patronal feasts are eloquent illustrations of the ornate character of late medieval chivalry and of its instinct for and love of display. All these things were skillfully designed to bring out the elite quality of the companionship of a prince's order. The qualifications and standards of conduct expected of companions, again carefully regulated in the statutes, testify to the continuing and lively force of chivalry's traditional value base, to which the orders' foundation charters paid express homage. The familiar interweave of ethical and religious values and purposes with military and aristocratic ones was, as their statutes indicate, the essence of the chivalric ethos of these princely orders.

Thus the companions of an order needed to be men of proven prowess; the founding members of the Order of the Garter, it has been pointed out, had virtually all served Edward III, the order's founder, in the glorious English campaigns in France of 1345, 1346, and 1347. They also needed to be men of standing, to be of noble birth, and to have taken up knighthood; several orders' statutes insisted on a members' having four proven lines of noble ancestry. Statutes also regulated meticulously the religious observances to be followed when the companions gathered for an order's patronal feast, and they usually regulated the companions' day-to-day individual observances as well. The companions were expected to hear mass often, daily if possible, to fast on Fridays, and to go to confession regularly. The Angevin Order of the Croissant enjoined companions to say daily the Hours of Our Lady; the Neapolitan Order of the Ship enjoined the daily repetition of the seven penitential psalms. Several orders—the Order of the Ship is again an example, and the Count of Foix's Order of the Dragon is another—paid special tribute through their statutes to the merit earned by participation in crusades by permitting companions who had campaigned against the heathen to augment their badges with decorative jeweled or golden additions.

The annual chapter meeting of an order of chivalry offered an opportunity for the assembled companions and their sovereign to review the knightly conduct of individual companions over the year past. The statutes of the Order of the Star provided that at its annual feast a table of honor should be set aside for the three princes, the three barons, and the three knights who by common assent had performed the highest feats of arms in war during the

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year. Those of the Knot (of Naples) and the Croissant provided for the keeping of a "book of adventures" to record the deeds of prowess of companions. Nearly all orders insisted that candidates for admission be, in technical chivalrous vocabulary, *sans reproche* (without reproach), and the reproaches that might be raised in chapter either to disbar admission or to justify expulsion (or the imposition of severe penance) are significant. These include treason to the sovereign, violation of churches, slandering of womankind, cowardice in the field, and service with the robber knights of the mercenary free companies. Allegations of breaches of the chivalrous code of honor were taken seriously. After the chapter meeting of 1450, Jean, Seigneur de Montjean, was passed over for admission to the Croissant on the grounds that he was suspected of having once ridden in arms against his sovereign, Charles VII of France, even though it was in the company of the dauphin, Charles's son and heir. Jean, Seigneur de Montagu-Neufchastel, was forced to withdraw from the Golden Fleece because he had quitted the battlefield of Anthon (1430), even though the battle was completely lost when he fled to avoid capture. From the companions of their orders of chivalry, not only did princes expect loyal and committed martial service: they also expected conduct that would reflect credit on themselves as lords and leaders committed to the highest ethical standards of chivalry.

Sixteenth-Century Transitions. As the history of the great princely orders of chivalry bears witness, chivalrous culture retained its full vigor to the end of the fifteenth century, and respect for its code and value system remained profound and general. A hundred years later the word "chivalry" did not, of itself, have quite the same evocative ring as of old, and it was in less constant use. This was a result, not of decline, but rather of changes in the military world that had always been chivalry's native soil. The armies of the sixteenth century were larger than those of the preceding century, and the cavalry arm was less prominent; guns and gunnery had become vital to the art of war, both in the field and at sieges. Infantry contingents were much larger than in the past, and the foot soldiers who served in them, though professional, had nothing to do with chivalry. The task in war of the aristocratic and well-born was to lead these contingents, not to serve in their rank and file.

The officer and gentleman of the new order who had to discharge that task needed an understanding of new developments in tactics and military technology. The skills that tournament experience had once served to develop were barely relevant to the warfare in which he was likely to become engaged, so tourneying finally lost the place it had held so long as a fashionable and honorable exercise for the martial-minded noble. Nevertheless, the close association between nobility of birth and martial service remained embedded in the outlook of the nobility, no less than it had done in chivalry's medieval heyday: "the proper, sole, and essential life for one of the nobility in France is the life of a soldier," wrote Michel de Montaigne (Vol. 2, p. 7) at the end of the sixteenth century. The virtues that were expected of the gentleman soldier were virtually indistinguishable from those that had been expected of the knight: courage, courtesy, and a meticulous concern for personal honor and reputation, together with skills in all the arts of war (and of swordplay in the duel). There was little difference between the honor codes and the value systems of the officer and gentleman and those of chivalry, and the one clearly derived from the other. The word "chivalry" may not have been so much in use around the year 1600 as it had been in 1500, and the weapons and armor that knights had once used may have become obsolete by 1600, but the spirit, ideals, and ways of thought of chivalry lived on, expressed through a vocabulary only slightly amended, as a powerful element in the ideology of nobility in the aristocratic societies of ancien régime Europe.

[*See also* Froissart, Jean; Heralds and Heraldry; Knighthood and Knights; Laws of War and the Just Conduct of War; Orders, Military; Orders of Chivalry and Knighthood; Tournaments and Jousts; *and* Training.]

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Tales of larger-than-life heroes, tales replete with mighty battles, magical events, supernatural influences, and burning love, are today labeled fantasy, a subgenre related to science fiction. But in the Middle Ages, these tales were the majority of all fictional literature. Of course, because medieval authors put contemporary weapons and military techniques into their stories, these were closer to their readers' reality than modern fantasy is to modern readers. It is from this medieval literature that much of our understanding of chivalry and its relation to war is derived, although chivalric treatises, chronicles, chivalric biographies, and legal texts relating to courts of chivalry (discussed below) also make great contributions.

There had been essentially no literature in the early Middle Ages—that is, works meant to be read as fiction, although also carrying serious moral messages. But at the beginning of the twelfth century, at exactly the same time that nobles began identifying themselves in part by their knightly attributes, a literature based on knightly prowess first blossomed. Most stories were set in a heavily fictionalized past, with no effort to be what would now be considered historically accurate. Instead, the authors described a finer and more marvelous version of their own times. Many stories were set in the days of great and semi-legendary kings, especially Charlemagne and King Arthur, and took war and military honor as principal themes. Ironically, even though both fiction and chivalry were new in the twelfth century, these stories frequently invoked an artificial nostalgia, saying that their events occurred back when men still followed the ways of chivalry, unlike the men of their own time. Laments for the decline of chivalry continued to be common in texts of the following centuries. This means that literary texts are generally more useful for understanding how non-knightly contemporaries (few texts were written by the *chevaliers* themselves) thought knights ought to behave and what they ought to value, rather than what they really did do or what their worldview really was like. Nonetheless, it was the knightly class that patronized chivalric authors, and it is clear that the romances were read (or listened to) by actual knights. It can thus fairly be presumed, albeit with some caution, that epics, romances, and didactic chivalric works both influenced and were very much

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influenced by the actual norms of courtly society, particularly with respect to warfare.

Chivalric literature was not written in Latin, as was virtually everything else in continental Europe before the twelfth century, but rather in the vernacular; thus, it is closer to the minds and hearts of the warrior class than works written by churchmen in the language of the church. Originally, chivalric tales were written in Old French, for French and Anglo-Norman audiences, but by the end of the twelfth century and especially in the thirteenth century, German, English, Italian, and even Scandinavian authors were writing their own versions. Virtually all of these tales were rendered in poetry. Literary scholars now draw a distinction between epics (often called *chansons de geste*), stories based on great battles, and romances, stories in which love and emotion are crucial components. However, this distinction was not rigid, for the romances included battles, and the epics often included true love.

Twelfth-Century Epics. The first epic to survive in more than fragmentary form is the *Song of Roland*, an elaboration of a real event in the life of Charlemagne, where part of his army was defeated (probably by Basques) while crossing the Pyrenees. Some three hundred years later (when it was given the form in which it now survives), the story was transformed into a monumental struggle between Islam and Christianity, epitomized by the great final battle between the emir and Charlemagne himself, as well as a struggle between the conflicting demands of chivalry. The hero Roland is enormously brave, but he is also overly reckless, to the point that, when Muslims attack, he refuses to blow his horn to summon Charlemagne to come assist him and his men. "Roland was brave, but Oliver was wise," the author comments, contrasting Roland and his best friend, who together hold off the Muslims for a very long time. Yet this contrast was not between bad and good, for Roland's bravery was admirable, and Oliver, too, was courageous. However, Roland fails to allow his courage to be tempered by Oliver's good sense; Oliver repeatedly urges Roland to blow the horn, but he refuses until it is too late. This led to the unnecessary deaths of all of Charlemagne's best warriors.

The text, like much chivalric literature, is dominated by and reflects the values of a warrior aristocracy enamored with martial prowess. As the Christians and Muslims fight to the death, both sides deliver remarkable blows, sometimes slicing from an adversary's head straight down through his body, his saddle, and his horse. The author states that even the Muslims would have been recognized as excellent knights if only they had been Christian. The poem is essentially devoid of women; Roland's fiancée makes a cameo appearance, to die of sorrow on hearing of his death, and a Muslim woman is to be converted to Christianity at the end.

The other great French epic of the twelfth century is *Raoul de Cambrai*, a violent story of "private" war, betrayal, and revenge. Here women play a much larger role than in the *Song of Roland*, and they tend to be as quick to anger as the men. Although *Raoul de Cambrai* is sometimes read as glorifying violence, in fact it shows the disastrous results when nobles, prickly of their honor, refuse to be reconciled. The plot turns on the problems arising when the king refused to give the infant Raoul his father's fief of Cambrai, and instead he gave Raoul someone else's fief once he grew up. The king thus is described as in the wrong, but the difficulties he caused are only multiplied when all the principals insist on reclaiming their fiefs and are bent on vengeance even for accidental wrongs. It takes an abbot to reconcile the warring parties but only after most of them are already dead.

The *Song of Roland* and *Raoul de Cambrai* were by no means the only twelfth-century epics. Both shorter and somewhat on the lighter side are the ones that make up the Guillaume d'Orange cycle, tales based loosely on a ninth-century count. Guillaume, although a mighty warrior, bold and reckless, is also sometimes a comic figure, easily startled and not particularly smart. In one of the stories, a Muslim girl, of all people, is responsible for saving the day when he is convinced that they are about to die. Such an account carries within it a critique of the very idea of the chivalrous hero.

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John of Salisbury. John of Salisbury's *Policraticus*, one of the most important twelfth-century sources for perceptions of chivalry, was meant not as fiction but rather as history and political commentary. In it the author evoked a pseudohistorical picture of ancient Rome in which an idealized soldier, on being given his "military" belt (in medieval Latin, "military," "knightly," and "chivalric" are all the same word) as a symbol of his status, would swear to serve God as well as the Roman republic. All members of what John called a military order would swear to be loyal, to honor priests, and to avoid hurting the poor. In this work, indicating that a fighter could also be a good Christian, John suggested that such a combination had indeed been possible for a millennium. These themes would later be picked up and expanded by authors such as Raymond Lull, discussed below.

Chrétien de Troyes. The most influential of the twelfth-century romance writers was Chrétien de Troyes, who (drawing on Geoffrey of Monmouth and along with Wace) essentially invented the genre of Arthurian stories in the second half of the century. Although Arthur was probably a historical figure of late Roman Britain (even if not a king), such crucial aspects of his story as the Arthur-Guinevere-Lancelot love triangle, and even the character of Lancelot, did not exist before Chrétien. Hence, the "matter of Britain" as it was sometimes called, the stories of Arthur's court, took the shape it retained for the rest of the Middle Ages—not in Britain but in northern France.

Chrétien had most of his tales of chivalrous adventure turn on a fundamental conflict, such as between love and military honor, or between love and reason. His *Lancelot* is explicitly based on conflicts between the demands of love and honor, with reason unsuccessfully trying to find a way out. Lancelot, the greatest chivalrous knight, who will undertake an unnecessarily difficult task just for the challenge and can defeat another powerful warrior even when fighting with his back turned, is also an adulterous sinner, as the characters and the author knew perfectly well. He is also sometimes made ridiculous by love, as when he passionately kisses and indeed worships some of the queen's hairs that had been caught in her comb. When the queen is suspected of sleeping with someone other than the king, which will destroy her honor—or at least her honorable reputation—Lancelot successfully defends her in a trial by battle, where he has cunningly made the question to be answered whether she had been in bed with the seneschal, whereas of course she had been in bed with Lancelot. Unable to find a resolution to a story that glorifies both adulterous love and high honor, Chrétien left his account unfinished.

But Chrétien did not merely write about adultery. In *Erec and Enide*, a young couple fall in love and get married early in the story. Although love appears triumphant, it quickly comes into conflict with knightly honor. Erec so much enjoys the embraces of his new wife that he spends all day with her, rather than in fighting or tournaments, to the point that he is mocked behind his back. When Enide unwisely comments on his loss of honor, he immediately begins treating her harshly and orders her to follow him all around the countryside as he engages in quests and battles. At the end, after Enide has several times saved the day, Erec realizes that he can indeed treat her with loverly attention without losing all honor, and the pair are happily reconciled.

In *Perceval*, Chrétien's protagonist is a young man who has been deliberately kept from chivalry, both the fighting and the well-bred courtesy, because his mother fears that she will lose him to the dangers of knighthood, as she had already lost her husband. But when he sees some knights and initially imagines them to be angels, he immediately decides to become a knight himself. For much of the story he interacts with other Arthurian characters and becomes a formidable knight, making the story another useful source for studying the question of medieval ideas of what a knightly warrior should be, know, and do.

Retellings of the basic Arthurian story, and new tales in its setting, continued to be written after Chrétien. The Middle English *Morte Arthure*, written around 1400, is proudly English in its approach: its Arthur, a great war hero, conquers the rest of Europe,

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even the Romans—the story is supposedly set in the days of imperial Rome. But in describing the end of what had been portrayed as the most chivalrous court the world could ever know, the work made clear that chivalry carried within it the seeds of its own failure. It has therefore been read by some as an ironic work, with the ostentatious glorification of violence really meant to convey criticism of England's aggressive conduct of the Hundred Years' War and a desire for peace, although this interpretation is controversial.

Other Chivalric Literature. The Arthurian stories were not by any means the sum of chivalric literature. In Germany, around 1200, an anonymous author was writing the *Nibelungenlied*, a story that came from German rather than French or Celtic traditions. The *Nibelungenlied* is structured to make stark the contrast between the two major components of chivalry, courtliness and bloody warfare. For much of the first half of the book, all the emphasis is on elegant behavior. Fine silken outfits, sumptuous feasts, and refined manners predominate. Yet the love that is cultivated in this courtly context is said from the beginning to be the cause of suffering and death. As the story progresses, quarrels over a ring and the question of who takes precedence entering church lead to demands for revenge. Murder is followed by a further round of vengeance, and the entire final section of the book is a series of battles, where thousands lose their lives and friends are forced by circumstance to attack each other. By the time the story closes with everyone dead, the author has clearly made his point that not only would it be impossible for one person to meet all the conflicting demands of chivalry, but also that the raw brutality of warfare could not be restrained by fine clothes and good manners.

Thirteenth-century chivalric literature could also adopt a lighter tone. Quite different is *The Service of Ladies* by Ulrich von Liechtenstein, written in Middle High German. In this long poem that purports to be an autobiographical memoir, Ulrich recounts how he first fell in love at age twelve with the lady of the court where he served as a squire. Eager to win her love, he turned himself into one of the very best fighters on the tournament circuit, fighting his way across the Holy Roman Empire. This linkage between love and warlike prowess is an important one in chivalric literature; it is found already in the work of the twelfth-century poet Wace, who describes Arthur's court as a place where "for love's sake and to please their lady-loves, knights perform knightly deeds." Geoffroi de Charny, the sober author of one of the most important treatises on chivalry and regarded in his day (the mid-fourteenth century) as one of the greatest knights of the world, comments that it is good for knights to engage in love, since the desire to please their secret lovers will embolden them and drive them to do great deeds in tournaments and in war. On the other hand, he notes that "noble ladies should, as is their duty, love and honor these worthy men-at-arms who, in order to deserve their noble love and their benevolence, expose themselves so much to physical danger as the vocation of arms requires." Antoine de La Sale's mid-fifteenth century *Little John of Saintré*, in which a young page is gradually transformed into a great knight by his lover, takes the subject as a principal theme, although ultimately (it seems) with satirical intent.

In Ulrich's story, the protagonist fought in his lady's honor for some years—even while apparently married to someone else—and at the end presented himself to her, hoping to be rewarded by an invitation into her bed. However, she refused him, in spite of being honored by his warrior skills. In this account, love is not associated only with distant yearnings, for Ulrich had hoped for quite real physical closeness, nor with adultery, for the lady refuses to become an adulteress. By the end, Ulrich learns that to be a great tournament champion has to be its own reward, not a way into intimacy with a lady far above him.

Less fictionalized than *The Service of Ladies*, although it should not be treated as a straightforward work of history, is the *History of William the Marshal*, which Matthew Strickland has called the "*sine qua non* for the study of warfare, the tournament, and knightly values in the later thirteenth century." William the Marshal was widely considered the best knight of his day, thanks to his combination of

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exceptional physical prowess (demonstrated mainly in a series of lovingly described tournaments), his intelligence, his skill as a military leader, and his loyalty to his lords. Because this extended eulogy of his life (and his companions' deeds as well) is meant to model an ideal of knightly behavior—from the knights' own perspective, rather than that of a churchman such as John of Salisbury—it provides a very clear sense of what knights of the thirteenth century thought was and was not "chivalric," particularly in the context of warfare. A similar point could be made concerning Amboise's *Itinerarium peregrinorum*, or the *History of the Holy War*, which presents Richard I during the Third Crusade as superior even to Roland in his chivalry. Later chivalric biographies, most notably Chandos Herald's *Life of the Black Prince*, Cuvelier's *La Chanson de Bertrand du Guesclin*, the anonymous *Livre de Boucicaut*, Díaz de Gámez's *The Unconquered Knight*, and even (although the chivalric ideas it professes are somewhat unconventional) Barbour's *The Bruce*, offer the historian similar opportunities.

Of course, many medieval chronicles focus on deeds of war, and praise or censure knights and kings for actions deemed chivalrous or the reverse. These texts are far too numerous to treat here, but perhaps the most significant of them all for the study of chivalry is *Chronicles* by Jean Froissart.

Chivalry in the Late Middle Ages. By the late Middle Ages, another key class of sources arises to spell out the nature and requirements of chivalry: chivalric manuals. Interestingly, these manuals were usually framed as a story. The hero is put in a position of having to learn or to spell out exactly what chivalry entails. In the popular *Ordene de chevalerie*, written before 1250, for example, Hugh, Count of Tiberias, earns his release from captivity by dubbing Saladin a knight; the entire preparatory process and its symbolism are described. Enormously influential was the late-thirteenth-century *Book of Knighthood and Chivalry* by the Catalan Ramon Lull. Lull had been a knight in his youth but had experienced a religious conversion and become a cleric before writing his treatise on chivalry. In this rambling work, which glorified knights as the best of men, he indicated that only one man in a thousand could meet the high requirements of chivalry. His fairly comprehensive list of all the things a chivalrous knight was supposed to do included defending the Church and the weak; exercising constantly to keep fit, both by hunting and by partaking in tournaments; serving the king by administering justice; tracking down malefactors; and avoiding lies, lechery, and pride. For Lull, the chief attributes of a chivalrous knight were strength, generosity, humility, and loyalty. He gave a description of how a young man was to be knighted, including an inspection to be sure that he possessed suitable nobility of blood and sufficient wealth and to ascertain that he wanted to advance to knighthood for correct and honorable reasons rather than merely for temporal advantage. The knighting ceremony incorporated a good deal of Christian liturgy, and all of a knight's armor and weapons were given symbolic, generally religious, meaning. Lull indeed suggested that knights and priests were the two pillars that made society even possible.

In the fourteenth century, the Frenchman Geoffroi de Charny, who himself fought in the Hundred Years' War against the English, earning the high honor of bearing the sacred Oriflamme banner into battle, wrote his *The Book of Chivalry* on the life of a knight, again a very influential work. Geoffroi had almost certainly read Ramon Lull's book, but his version of chivalry was somewhat different. He made a concerted effort to incorporate real warfare into his description; a young man could rise from honor to honor, he said, starting with hearing about feats of arms, to partaking in tournaments, to going off to war, of which the Crusade was the highest form. Even while stressing the glories of knighthood, Geoffroi was more willing than earlier writers to see a place within the chivalric orders for esquires and other fighters who had not been dubbed knights—and perhaps never would be. Of course, by his time, actual knighthood had become a relatively rare social status, one much more elevated than it had been in the twelfth century. A constant theme of his work was that the knights of his day no longer displayed the prowess appropriate in knights; he hoped his work would help reform and renew the

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chivalric order. Those who had won great honor through fighting should also, he said, fall in love and be loyal to their lovers and further increase their reputation through devotion to God and the Virgin. At several points, he drew comparisons between religious orders and the "order" of chivalry. Geoffroi is also the author of a set of *Questions Concerning the Joust, Tournaments and War,* designed to be posed to and answered by the knights of John II's "Order of the Star." Although the questions unfortunately have no answers, they nonetheless offer much insight into the grey areas of contemporary ideas about chivalry. Unfortunately, the recent translation of this text focuses on "chivalric sport" (jousts and tournaments) and omits most of the questions about war.

On the subject of tournaments, detailed descriptions of particular ones held in the thirteenth century, notably the Arthurian-themed one at Hem in 1278 and one at Chauvency in 1285, are also available. In addition, there are fifteenth-century manuals describing how tournaments ought to be conducted, such as the one composed by Réne of Anjou, and heraldic works on the subject, particularly the one by Henri de Laon.

Christine de Pizan's *Book of Deeds of Arms and of Chivalry,* which draws heavily on the more legalistic but also very valuable work of Honoré Bouvet's *The Tree of Battles,* is another very valuable and influential chivalric manual. Also worthy of mention, particularly given the relative lack of scholarly attention to Spanish chivalric texts, is the *Doctrinal de los cavalleros* of Alfonso de Cartagena, a broad text dealing with the role of knighthood in fifteenth-century Castile, and the laws of the realm dealing with chivalric matters.

Two more classes of sources relating directly to chivalry also arise only in the Late Middle Ages. The first is the statutes of the new chivalric orders (including most famously the Order of the Garter, but also those of the Toison d'or, the Croissant, and the Star, among others). The second records Court of Chivalry trials, for example, the extensive set of depositions relating to the heraldic dispute between the families of Scrope and Grosvenor, edited by Nicolas. An example of the former class of documents, the statutes of the Order of the Star, can be found in Pannier; the statutes of the Order of the Band are contained in Alfonso de Cartagena.

It is perhaps ironic that the most elaborate descriptions of chivalric behavior and clearest statements of what did or did not constitute chivalry were written when the well-born mounted warrior was becoming less and less important militarily. The most thorough literary treatment of the chivalric knight was by Thomas Malory, who pulled together all the Arthurian stories at the end of the fifteenth century, when the world in which these stories was set was long gone. The earliest chivalric epics had been set in a somewhat ill-defined "past," and late medieval manuals of chivalry also looked backward to a time when, supposedly, knights had been the powerful protectors of society. Even these manuals, supposedly clear statements of the nature of chivalry, were shot through with the basic contradictions that had haunted chivalry since the twelfth century, of how bold and successful fighters could also be gentle Christians.

[*See also* Arts, Visual; Band, Chivalric Order of the; *Chanson de Roland;* Chivalric Biographies; Christine de Pizan; Epic Poetry; Esquire, Armiger, Escuyer, Squire; Froissart, Jean; Geoffroi de Charny; Heralds and Heraldry; Laws of War and the Just Conduct of War; Malory, Sir Thomas; Mirrors of Princes; Orders of Chivalry and Knighthood; Romances; Scrope-Grosvenor Controversy; *and* Tournaments and Jousts.]

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Constance B. Bouchard with Clifford J. Rogers

Historiography

Unlike a number of terms now used to describe medieval society—such as "feudalism" or "manorialism"—the word "chivalry" (*chevalerie* in Old French) is a perfectly good medieval word. To give the most basic definition, "chivalry" was an idealized set of behaviors for mounted warriors and by extension for all noble men. It developed in France into a more or less explicit set of expectations during the course of the twelfth century. Because *chevalerie* is a vernacular term, it clearly had no specific legal or technical definition, or it would have been rendered in Latin. England and Germany adopted the French version of chivalry somewhat later. Scholarly investigations of the meaning of chivalry have focused especially on literary works, epics, and romances. For the subtopic of war and chivalry, however, scholars have made as much or more use of evidence from chronicles, didactic chivalric treatises, and especially chivalric biographies.

Chivalry and Knighthood. Because chivalry was an attribute of elite warriors on horseback, discussions of chivalric behavior have always been affected by how scholars define knighthood. By the Late Middle Ages, only the nobly born could be knights, and thus for a long time the tendency was to read backward and to treat nobility and knighthood as having always been synonymous. But this assumption has now been discredited, and with the notable exception of Dominique Barthélemy, scholars now treat knights and nobles as separate groups before the thirteenth century. (Tony Hunt provides a good summary.) This development in the modern definition of knighthood is based on a number of close regional studies that demonstrate that knights and nobles were very different.

Jane Martindale has demonstrated that nobles were originally characterized by their wealth, their power to command, and their lineage, not by their military function. Knights, who first emerged around 1000, served the nobles but had very different family backgrounds. They were characterized by neither wealth nor power, much less by noble blood, but rather by being mounted on a horse (a *cheval*)—a horse given to them by their noble lords. Fighting on horseback, for that matter, became truly effective only once advances in metallurgy brought down the prohibitively high cost of horseshoes and once the stirrup became common. Lynn White emphasized the latter development in the 1960s, and although many criticized his work (for example, Bernard Bachrach), the basic point remains valid. Many, though not all, scholars now accept—contrary to the earlier belief that Carolingian armies were dominated by horsemen—that before the eleventh century, almost all fighting was done on foot.

Nobles began adopting military attributes as part of their self-definition not long after knights began to play a major role in warfare; the first charters in which a noble might refer to himself as a *miles*, a "knight," date from the end of the eleventh century. At the same time, knights sought to become more like the nobles they served, both by marrying noblewomen whenever possible and also by imitating their lords' behavior. Georges Duby first discussed the desire of knights and nobles to be more like each other, a desire that culminated in the eventual fusion of the two groups in the thirteenth century; this formulation is still broadly accepted. Until then nobles might be knighted, but knights were not necessarily noble. Chivalry was described in the twelfth

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century as an attribute of noble knights, not of the more lowborn knights who served them.

Origins of Chivalry. Both Rome and the Germanic tribes had men whose lives were devoted to fighting, and both cultures stressed loyalty and courage. But the same could be said of all fighting men. Chivalry's origins, to the extent that the term "chivalry" is distinguished from a generic warrior ethos, must be sought rather in conditions unique to high medieval France.

In the past, discussions of the origins and development of chivalry assumed that it was a civilizing force, and hence generations of scholars puzzled over how brutal fighting could have led to refinement. Understandably, attempts to explain the emergence of courtly manners and concern for the weak as the almost inevitable outgrowth of fighting on horseback have failed to convince. Alternately, many old, romantic descriptions of chivalry spoke of rough warriors tamed by religion and poetry, as though knights and nobles themselves had little role to play in the creation of chivalry. Yet because the primary sources began to discuss chivalry only a century or so after the first appearance of service knights, it is clear that chivalry cannot have been some sort of natural result of the emergence of knighthood. More recent scholarly discussions of the nature of chivalry, such as Jean Flori's *L'essor de la chevalerie*, have described it as an idea that took its full form only in noble courts of the twelfth century. If one considers chivalry as the product of twelfth-century nobles trying to make sense of their various attributes and expectations, then it is possible to discuss its origins and development without simplifying it either as the straightforward result of fighting on horseback or as something imposed on knights from the outside.

Although modern writers sometimes speak of a "code" of chivalry, it is a mistake to do so, because that would imply a clear set of guidelines that everyone recognized, whether or not they followed them. No source from the twelfth century gives such a set of guidelines, and although manuals of chivalry, with lists of appropriate chivalric attributes, began to appear in the late thirteenth century, one cannot extrapolate backward—especially because the different manuals gave different definitions, as discussed below. Although all twelfth-century definitions of chivalry suggest a contested, indeed disorderly, sense of what was considered truly chivalrous, scholars long attempted to provide simple, straightforward definitions. Some, such as Z. P. Zaddy, have gone so far as to make a list of everything that is treated as chivalric or courtly—or even merely admirable—in various literary sources and then present these as the "Ten Commandments of Chivalry" or the like. In essence these scholars are assuming that there was actually such a master list and that medieval authors all knew it and incorporated it, even though such a master list does not survive. This inherently implausible hypothesis also assumes that the various behaviors labeled "chivalric" could all easily be reconciled with each other. In fact, the expectations of chivalry were inherently contradictory, which meant that it was impossible for one man to satisfy them all, even if he wanted to.

A major reason why chivalry failed to develop into a systematic and coherent set of rules is that it was an amalgam of a number of very different sorts of expectations. In an insightful though now superseded work, Sidney Painter argued that different sectors of society had their own versions of ideal knightly behavior, and that women, churchmen, and the knights themselves had different visions of what constituted true chivalry. Although Painter was certainly correct in realizing that chivalry could not be reduced to a simple definition or single set of expectations, more recently scholars have seen these differences as present at all times, rather than merely depending on the observer, and as the result of an accretion of multiple meanings on a word that had originally meant little more than being a *chevalier*, riding and fighting on horseback.

In the eleventh century and in the early twelfth, as Flori's *L'essor* has most clearly demonstrated, the word *chevalerie* simply meant battlefield virtues: being a good fighter, brave, and loyal to one's fellows. Matthew Bennett likewise stresses the essentially military nature of early chivalry, though he puts more stress on what might be called "soldierly"

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as opposed to "warrior" virtues: competency in the practice of war, including discipline and the ability to fight effectively in a cavalry formation. But the basic warrior meaning of the term became combined with other meanings during the course of the twelfth century. Being a great fighter also required Christian virtue, courteous behavior, and gentleness toward the ladies.

Over the course of the twelfth century, chivalry increasingly became united with courtesy (*corteisie*), a term meaning behavior suitable for someone at court. By the final decades of the twelfth century, "chivalry" was assumed to include both battlefield and courtly attributes. Indeed, as John Gillingham has shown in his important study of chivalry, the two concepts were so linked as sometimes to be used interchangeably: when in the *Histoire de Guillaume le Marechal* the Marshal advises his lord on how to surprise his enemy with a devastating raid, the king praises his words as "molt corteis." A noble courtier was a well-educated person who knew how to dance elegantly, perhaps play a musical instrument, who kept himself clean and finely attired, and who was always polite and acted with nobility. In addition, as C. Stephen Jaeger has convincingly argued, courtliness contained within it assumptions—ultimately derived from Roman stoicism—of correct manly behavior as requiring self-control and a composed demeanor. According to Jaeger, these ideas were part of a good classical education, and as such they were taught to priests, including the priests who served as the teachers of young knights in training. It should not be a surprise that warrior violence and restrained good manners sometimes mingled uncomfortably.

The various contradictory demands of chivalry were all reflected in the knighting ceremony that attended the coming-of-age of many young nobles (the service knights took up their weapons without any such ceremonies). In the Early Middle Ages there was no particular ceremony when a young man received weapons—unless he was of royal family, and in this case the symbolism was less on becoming a warrior and more on taking up an office. In the twelfth century, however, most young nobles had some sort of coming-of-age knighting ceremony, also called "dubbing." The ritual of dubbing, which has been studied thoroughly by Flori (in "Les origines de l'adoubement chevalresque" and "Sémantique et société médiévale"), is also well treated by Maurice Keen in his magisterial 1984 overview of the whole subject of chivalry. Dubbing became, at least for the noble knights, suffused with symbolism, which was supposed to remind the candidate-knight of the ideals of chivalry and to encourage him to adhere to them.

In practice, of course, as everyone recognized, no newly dubbed knight could follow all the conflicting demands of chivalry at the same time. The inherent contradictions within any definition were used as the starting point of many contemporary works of literature. Each author came up with his or her own definition or understanding of the term, which seems to have been intended in part to refute the definitions of other authors. Rather than simply glorifying chivalry, the authors criticized many of its aspects, particularly its violence, and sought to indicate that not even the most marvelous heroes of old could live up to chivalry's requirements.

To modern scholars the most evident contradiction within chivalry is between the violence of fighting with sword, lance, and (importantly) archery and the romantic vision of the well-behaved knight, protecting the weak and flirting in a refined manner. For a long period, discussion of this contradiction turned on a distinction between reality (or practice) and ideals, with the assumption that the good behavior was an ideal rarely achieved by violent and indeed brutish knights. But this approach is too simple. As Richard Kaeuper has pointed out, even the supposedly idealized chivalric behavior of the romances and epics is shot through with violence. Indeed, as already noted, these sources themselves portray chivalry as internally contradictory, which means that there was no unitary ideal to which behavior might be compared. Of course, real knights and nobles would not have read or listened to tales of courtly romance with such enthusiasm had they not found in them something worth emulating.

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Whatever its difficulties, there is no question that chivalry constituted a set of idealized behaviors, or even goals, from the later twelfth century onward. The question of what led nobles to try to define themselves in this way has, naturally, been asked. The answer once was that nobles created this model of behavior and then used it as a marker that differentiated them from lower-born knights, allowing the latter to join the ranks of the upper aristocracy only if they behaved chivalrously. More recently this rather unlikely scenario has been replaced by a new focus on the relations between the nobles and the crown. There can be no doubt that the growing power and centralization of the French monarchy during the twelfth century put at least potential limits on noble power and independence, which in many cases had been expanding unchecked since the ninth century. The kings did not create chivalry; rather, noble knights created chivalry in part in response to the kings. A related theory is that because of an unexpected financial squeeze that many lords experienced in the late twelfth century—the result of rapidly rising expenses for everything from spices to Crusade expeditions to castle expansions—nobles defiantly set out to create an image of their own inherent worth that included all of the various elements of chivalry.

Chivalry in the Late Middle Ages. This discussion of chivalry has so far focused on the eleventh and twelfth centuries, when the concept of chivalry was first created. As Gabrielle Spiegel has argued, the use of the concept to differentiate the nobility from everyone else intensified during the thirteenth and later centuries. At this time the rather ad hoc sense of chivalry tightened, and there began to be fairly explicit rules as to what was and was not chivalrous. The idea that one should not attack someone who was not in a position to fight back became especially important, even though this would have made little sense to the knights of the early eleventh century. The norms of chivalric warfare that had begun to be solidified by the early thirteenth century—and the somewhat limited extent to which those norms were adhered to—have been well analyzed by Matthew Strickland. By the fourteenth century these general rules had even developed into a sort of common law about war, ransoms, tournaments, and other "knightly" matters, one judged and enforced by "Courts of Chivalry," a topic admirably treated by Maurice Keen in his groundbreaking *Laws of War in the Middle Ages*.

The fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the period in which war raged almost constantly between France and England, fought increasingly with low-born foot soldiers and decided by longbows and cannons rather than by cavalry charges, was perhaps ironically the period in which chivalry was most enthusiastically celebrated. Elaborate rules developed for heraldry, the emblems that knights wore on their shields, including how the oldest son, second son, and so on were to add markers to the emblems to indicate their position. Great pageants were staged, celebrating the chivalry of the participants. A knight considered it particularly chivalrous to swear a solemn vow—not to speak or hunt, for example—until he had performed some particularly spectacular deed. All this was seen by Johan Huzinga, Raymond Lincoln Kilgour, and Arthur B. Ferguson as chivalry's "decline" or "decadence," or "waning," but more recent scholarship has emphasized the utility of late medieval chivalric pageantry in both political and military terms.

As discussed most notably by D'Arcy Boulton, many royal and near-royal courts created "orders of chivalry," especially elaborate organizations with their own insignia, their own rules, and their own imaginative accounts of their origins. Probably the best known of these chivalric orders is the English Order of the Garter, on which one can now see Hugh E. L. Collins's monograph. Several of the less-known chivalric orders are discussed in Malcolm Vale's valuable *War and Chivalry*, which also treats late medieval chivalric display and the literature of honor and virtue. Furthermore, Vale's book contains the best available analysis of how "knightly" heavy cavalry responded to the military challenges it faced at the end of the Middle Ages, retaining its relevance if not its earlier dominance. The extent to which medieval ideas of chivalry continued to influence thinking about, and the conduct of, warfare

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into the early modern era is brought out in the set of essays on the subject edited by D. J. B. Trim, as well as in a recent book by Katie Stevenson focusing on Scotland. Stevenson argues that developments in Scottish chivalry—notably increased control by the monarchy over the ceremonies and ideology of knighthood—intended to channel the nobles' martial energy into service of the state.

[*See also* Heralds and Heraldry; Knighthood and Knights; Orders, Military; Orders of Chivalry and Knighthood; Tournaments and Jousts; *and* Training.]

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CHIZÉ, BATTLE OF

This was the last major engagement in the Valois campaign to reconquer the county of Poitou, which had been delivered to the English by the Treaty of Brétigny (1360), when the Hundred Years' War resumed in 1369. Initially, the duke of Lancaster and Thomas Percy, seneschal of Poitou, mounted a stubborn defense, with good support from Poitevin nobles. But in 1372, Constable du Guesclin, along with the dukes of Burgundy and Berry, made considerable inroads. Poitiers was reoccupied; Percy and the Captal de Buch, attempting to relieve Soubise in neighboring Saintonge, were captured and most of that province returned to French allegiance. Campaigning resumed in early 1373. With his personal company of about four hundred bannerets, knights, and esquires and accompanied by many other captains, Bertrand du Guesclin was at Poitiers by 17 February. In the absence of Percy, Sir John Devereux, captain of Niort, raised a small Anglo-Gascon army, reported as eight hundred men-at-arms, to relieve Sir Robert Mitton, besieged at Chizé, but was soundly defeated by the constable when he arrived around 21 March. According to Froissart, du Guesclin formed two main divisions, one behind the other, and two smaller battalions on the wings, in addition to a concealed force positioned to ambush any sally by the garrison. Mitton did indeed lead his men into the ambush, and destruction. Next, about two hundred Poitevin and Breton light troops, sent to skirmish with du Guesclin's men, instead deserted to his side. Finally, each main force advanced on foot to the engagement—the French leaving a fortified siege camp to do so. Du Guesclin positioned himself on one wing of the main division. Devereux's men broke through the first French division, but were checked by the second and flanked by the wing forces. Few of the enveloped Anglo-Gascons escaped; many prisoners, including Devereux, were taken. Niort, the main town still in English hands, capitulated a few days later, leaving only a few scattered English garrisons in Poitou to be mopped up by 1375. In his will du Guesclin left one hundred francs for repair of the church of Chizé, which had probably been damaged during the action.

[*See also* Guesclin, Bertrand du, *and* Poitiers, Battle of (1356).]

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Michael Jones

CHOJNICE, BATTLE OF

This was the largest battle in the initial stage of the Polish-Teutonic Thirteen Years' War (1454–1466).

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It occurred on 18 September 1454 near Chojnice (German, Konitz), which was besieged by both the Poles and the Pomeranians. The capture of Chojnice would have meant the end of the line of communications between Malbork (German, Marienburg) and Germany. The Polish army, under the command of Casimir Jagiellończyk, consisted of about 21,000 people, most of them raised by a general summons of the nobility. The Teutonic army comprised nine thousand cavalry and five hundred militiamen from Chojnice. They were under the command of Rudolf, Duke of Żagań (German, Sagan), and Bernard Szumborski (German, von Zinnenberg).

At about 3:00 PM the Poles were informed that the Teutonic army was approaching from the west. The two armies were separated by two lakes and a swamp. An hour later the Polish army managed to cross the swamp and attacked the enemy. Part of the army and a supply column stayed near Chojnice to protect the back of the army from an attack from the town.

During the first encounter the Teutonic vanguard was defeated, Rudolf was killed, and Szumborski was taken prisoner. The Poles assaulted a train of linked war wagons (*wagenburg*) that was protected by infantry. Then the back of the Polish army was attacked from the town. The Polish warriors panicked, stopped the offensive against the *wagenburg*, and began to flee. Newly arrived Teutonic detachments chased the Polish warriors. Szumborski was freed. Numerous Poles were drowned in the swamps and lakes that cut off their escape route. The Poles lost between three thousand and seven thousand people, including sixty knights, 350 captives, five banners, sixteen cannons, and a supply column with personal belongings of the king, who escaped from the battlefield. The Teutonic army lost a hundred knights and an unknown number of retainers.

Chojnice is an example of a battle in which a small and disciplined army defeated a numerically superior but undisciplined enemy. Particularly noteworthy is the successful use of the *wagenburg* to repel the Polish cavalry attack.

[*See also* Cavalry; Germany, *subentry on* Narrative (1415–1493); *and* Slavic Lands, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1500).]

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CHRISTIANITY

This world religion was founded by Jesus of Nazareth (c. 4 BCE–33 CE) whose followers call him Christ (that is, the anointed of God). Christianity is now divided into a large number of autonomous denominations, the majority of which teach that Jesus is the incarnate Son of God.

The New Testament, although condemning individual acts of violence, gives no clear direction about Christian attitudes to war. However, it is arguable that by recognizing the authority of the Roman state, Jesus also implicitly accepted the validity of its military system. In the age of persecution, some Christian thinkers, such as Lactantius, argued that Christianity was incompatible with military service, but not all Christians thought this, since a significant number of martyrs were serving soldiers (for example, the Forty Martyrs of Sebastea). In the fourth century, when Christianity became first the religion of the Roman court and later the official religion of the Empire, churchmen no longer questioned the need for an army in a Christian state, although they did seek to regulate its use. Saint Augustine of Hippo (d. 430) defined what constitutes a just war: it must be declared by a lawful authority, normally the secular head of state, and must be fought for a just cause, normally the defense of one's territory, or the recovery of territory that has been unjustly seized. This view gained general acceptance and was modified by later theologians: Saint Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274), for example, argued that participants in warfare should have the right intentions.

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Christianity. A knight receives communion. Detail from the interior facade of the Cathédrale Notre Dame de Reims, c. 1260. PHOTOGRAPH BY ROEL RENMANS

During the Middle Ages, it became accepted that clergy should not bear arms, and since this normally applied to professed monks as well as priests, a significant section of male society was in practice pacifist. The Church always deplored wars between Christians, although it was powerless to stop them, but beginning in the ninth century the Western Church began to give its blessing to wars that defended Christendom against attacks (1) by Muslims in Spain and Italy and (2) by pagan Vikings and Magyars in the north and east. The crusade movement developed in this context in the eleventh century. Taking the cross was conceived by the papacy as a penitential act intended to restore warriors who had committed serious sins to the communion of the Church. Wars that were designated as crusades by the papacy were in theory considered to be just wars against the enemies of the faith, although in practice they were sometimes manipulated by rulers for secular ends. Crusading found institutional expression in the military orders, such as the Knights Templar, the Knights of Saint John, and the Teutonic Knights, whose brethren took the traditional monastic vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, but whose principal work was to fight in the service of God and the defense of his Church. After the sixteenth century the papacy seldom initiated crusades, although it sometimes conferred crusade status on wars at the request of Catholic rulers.

In the later Middle Ages, chivalry evolved as an attempt to sanctify the pursuit of arms. Knighthood was conferred in a religious ceremony, and knights were exhorted to use their military skills in the service of Christian society. In the Arthurian cycle, Galahad represented the chivalric ideal, but he was a literary construct, and few living knights had such lofty aims. Chivalry was a code for the nobility. The professional rank and file, who often served as mercenaries, were subject to frequent censure by the Church because of their lawlessness. Nevertheless, by the end of the Middle Ages Western societies had come to accept that there was no inherent conflict between military service and the practice of the Christian life.

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[*See also* Crusades; Just War, Just Motive; Pacifism; *and* Saints' *Lives*.]

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CHRISTINE DE PIZAN

(c. 1364–c. 1430), French poet and writer. Although there has been frequent disbelief that a woman could write a technical manual on warfare (*The Book of Deeds of Arms and of Chivalry*, 1410), Christine de Pizan, France's first professional female writer, was in fact well qualified to complete this task. She was well educated and widely read. Throughout her life she was an acute observer of the calamitous era marked by the mental instability of Charles VI (r. 1380–1422), the consequent power struggle between the houses of Orleans and Burgundy, and the Hundred Years' War with England. Much of her writing was designed to affect military decisions (e.g., her *Epistle to the Queen*, 1405), to give comfort to women bereaved by war (her *Epistle on the Prison of Human Life*, written after Agincourt in 1415), or to rejoice in military victory (her poem on Joan of Arc of 1429). And finally, she devoted much of her energy to providing manuals of education (including military instruction) in what proved to be a vain attempt to encourage the dauphin, Louis of Guyenne (1397–1415), to abandon his indolent life (her *Charles V*, 1404; *Book of the Body Politic*, 1406–1407; *Book of Deeds of Arms and of Chivalry*, 1410; and *Book of Peace*, 1412–1414, all fall into this category).

Probably commissioned by the duke of Burgundy, John the Fearless (1371–1419), *The Book of Deeds of Arms and of Chivalry* provides a technical manual not just for the dauphin but for all military men, some of whom, unable to read, could at least hear the book read out loud. The treatise is divided into four parts. The first includes a discussion of the just war, the qualities required of a military leader, and battle order. The second includes Roman warfare, a remarkable section on contemporary siege practice, and some chapters on sea battles. And the third and fourth parts deal with the laws of war, safe conducts, letters of marque (license to retaliate), judicial combats, and heraldry.

Though derivative (the author draws on Vegetius, Frontinus, Valerius Maximus, John of Legnano, and Honoré Bouvet), Christine's treatise still merits attention. It is the only treatise of its kind authored by a woman. Her comments on contemporary usage and weaponry are informed by the advice of military experts. What may appear as simply derivative (e.g., the chapters on Roman discipline, the stress put on experience as well as rank, the need for regular payment of ordinary soldiers, the repetition of Vegetius's point that too large an army makes for lack of flexibility) amounts to an indirect critique of contemporary failings in the French army. As Hall has shown, the section on siege warfare and the early use of gunpowder contains a wealth of detail not available elsewhere. Finally, the text may well have influenced the later reform of the French army under Charles VII (r. 1422–1461).

[*See also* Laws of War and the Just Conduct of War; Manuals, Military; *and* Marque and Reprisal, Letters of.]

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Angus J. Kennedy

CHUD, BATTLE OF LAKE

See Peipus, Battle of Lake.

CINQUE PORTS

The original Cinque (French for "five") Ports were Hastings in Sussex and Dover, Hythe, Romney, and Sandwich in Kent. These were called "head ports," each with other smaller places or "limbs" associated with them. The so-called ancient towns of Winchelsea and Rye (both in Sussex) had also become head ports by the thirteenth century. The ports constituted the only confederation of towns in medieval England, and in an attempt to place them under greater royal authority, the constable of Dover Castle was made their lord warden.

Ostensibly, the confederation developed from a shared duty of ship service that the Cinque Ports owed to the crown. This required them to supply fifty-seven ships per year, each with a crew of twenty-two, serving for fifteen days free of charge. In return the ports gained a substantial degree of self-government, honors at the royal court, and economic privileges, including joint control of the lucrative annual North Sea herring fair at Great Yarmouth in Norfolk.

Some of the future Cinque Ports had owed ship service in 1051, but there is no evidence to link this with their duties two hundred years later. Some historians have argued that English kings saw the Cinque Ports as a cornerstone of naval defense, but others have argued that the ports' favored position did not derive primarily from naval considerations. Their nominal ship service was of no real military value, and the ports were in the wrong place to defend the rest of the south coast. Thus the crown's real aim was to buy the ports' loyalty, because they occupied a strategically vital position fronting the narrowest part of the English Channel, opposite Flanders and northern France.

If this was a deliberate policy, it largely failed. Among many other misdeeds, the ports sided with rebels in 1216, 1265, 1460, and 1471. They also preyed on English ports and ships, attacking Portsmouth in 1266 and Southampton in 1321 and feuding with Great Yarmouth over the herring fair for more than a century. Many other English seafarers attacked their own kind, but the Portsmen seemed to have possessed a ruthless flair for it. Royal punishment was never harsh enough to bring them under full control, indicating both the crown's reluctance to alienate them and the limits of its power.

The ports were often called upon to contribute ships for naval service, but usually as part of a wider call-up of merchant shipping. Even if they were not the core of the English navy, however, the ports played an important role in English naval activities in the thirteenth century and the first half of the fourteenth century. Portsmen sometimes advised the government on naval matters, and they supplied significant numbers of ships for major campaigns, including Edward I's Welsh wars of 1277 and 1282, Edward III's invasion of France in 1346, and Edward III's capture of Calais in 1347.

The ports declined as a naval power from the mid-fourteenth century from a range of causes, including French raids in the Hundred Years' War, the dislocation of trade caused by the conflict, the silting of some harbors, and the growing maritime strength of other parts of England.

[*See also* Calais, Siege of (1346–1347); Dover Castle; Edward I of England; Edward III of England; Private War; Sandwich, Battle of; Sea Power; *and* Ships and Sailing.]

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Ian Friel

CIVITATE, BATTLE OF

By 1053 the Normans had made their presence in southern Italy felt to the point that Pope Leo IX and Emperor Constantine IX Monomachos took action against them. The campaign was the only serious attempt to either drive out or defeat the Normans, and its failure marked a decisive step in their conquest of the region. In 1059, Robert Guiscard and Richard of Aversa, the surviving Norman victors of Civitate, would be invested with their present and future conquests by Pope Nicholas II.

Pope Leo's coalition combined recruits from almost every non-Norman magnate in southern Italy, with the notable exception of the prince of Salerno, and included seven hundred trained Swabian infantry who were recruited in Germany after troops originally supplied by Emperor Henry III were recalled. The pope's army marched from Benevento by 10 June, intending to join at Siponto with the forces recruited by the *catepan* (governor) Argyrus in that part of Apulia still under Byzantine control. Although Argyrus was probably better supplied with money than with troops, the Normans clearly wanted to keep the two forces from joining. The direct route passed Norman-held strongholds such as Troia and Bovino, so the pope's troops first marched north along the Biferno River and then turned east to approach Siponto from the north via the mountainous Gargano Peninsula. They encountered the Normans near the fortified hilltop town of Civitate in northern Apulia, near the meeting of the Fortore River and its tributary the Staina. The Normans were described as being short of supplies as well as outnumbered, and appear to have been hastily gathered. They offered to hold their lands as papal vassals; when this proposal was rejected, there was no choice but to undertake a battle.

The Norman troops, estimated at three thousand cavalry but with few infantry, were led by Humphrey de Hauteville, Count of Apulia, who commanded the center facing the Swabian infantry. Count Richard of Aversa was on the Norman right, facing the various Italian contingents led by Counts Trasmund III and Atto of Chieti and Oderisius II of Sangro. Humphrey's half-brother Robert Guiscard and his Calabrians, including the two hundred Norman cavalry of Gerard of Buonalbergo, his wife's nephew, were placed on the left, ready to support either segment at need.

The large but poorly organized group of Italians fled at Richard's charge. Humphrey opened his attack on the Swabians with arrows, which were answered by the enemy's archers. When Humphrey failed to break the Swabian infantry, he was joined by Robert's reserve. Even so, the battle was still ongoing when Richard of Aversa returned from pursuit of the fleeing Italians, and only then were the Swabian infantry killed to the last man. At the end of a hard and bloody battle the Normans were victorious. The pope was taken prisoner and held for six months. Although well treated, he died five weeks after his release.

The ability of the Normans to fight cohesively, despite very real and deep-seated differences among them, was key to their success. Men such as the sons of Amicus—Peter of Trani and his brother Walter—would remain bitter rivals of the Hautevilles in spite of the effective presence shown at Civitate. The battle was the first major military victory of Robert Guiscard, who would rise to prominence if not undisputed leadership of the Normans in southern Italy.

[*See also* Italy, *subentry on* Narrative (1000–1300); Norman Conquests, Norman Expansion; *and* Robert Guiscard.]

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CLARE, RICHARD FITZGILBERT DE

("Strongbow," c. 1030–1176), sometime Earl of Pembroke in southwest Wales in the mid-twelfth century. Strongbow and his associates were heavily involved in the initial English military conquests in eastern Ireland. Dermot Mac Murrough, the temporarily exiled king of the Irish province of Leinster, sought military assistance from Strongbow in 1166–1167 to help regain his position in Ireland. Two factors influenced Strongbow to ally with Dermot. First, although Strongbow's father had been earl of Pembroke, and Strongbow had inherited this title and territory, King Henry II apparently withheld the title from the son starting in 1154. Strongbow and Henry II had a difficult and mutually suspicious relationship thereafter. Second, Rhys ap Gruffudd, scion of the native Welsh ruling family of southwest Wales, was gaining political ascendancy in southern Wales and recovering territory from Strongbow, who saw opportunities for new territoris and power in Ireland.

Although Dermot had sought help directly from Strongbow, the latter was not able to comply immediately, probably because Henry II had sent him on a diplomatic mission to Germany in 1168 to keep him out of the way. Instead Strongbow's close associates, including Robert Fitz-Stephen (his castellan of Cardigan Castle until 1166) and Maurice de Prendergast, landed at Wexford in May 1169 and took that city in alliance with Dermot. Then, reinforced by Maurice Fitzgerald, Dermot and his Anglo-Norman allies took Dublin.

Strongbow himself and his supporter Raymond Fitzgerald (nicknamed "le Gros") arrived in Ireland in August 1170 with two hundred knights and approximately one thousand foot soldiers. He sealed his alliance with Dermot by marrying the latter's daughter, Eva. The combined forces then captured Waterford. Fitzgerald and Miles de Cogan next captured Dublin, forcing its king, Asculf Mac Turcaill, to flee. Late that year, Strongbow assisted Dermot in raids against the latter's political adversaries in east-central Ireland. When Dermot died in May 1171, Strongbow apparently claimed the kingship of Leinster as husband of Dermot's only daughter. Rory O'Connor, the king of Connacht and one of Dermot's major rivals, then besieged Dublin for two months, driving Strongbow to negotiate with him. However, rejecting O'Connor's terms as too onerous, Strongbow and two associates launched a three-pronged surprise attack that routed O'Connor's forces.

Henry II was alarmed by the lands and power that Strongbow was accumulating in Ireland and forced him to agree to hold his Irish lands as a feudal tenant of the king. Strongbow died in April 1176, amid preparations for raids on Limerick. Eventually, his daughter and heir, Isabella, married William Marshal, who thereby succeeded to Strongbow's lands as Earl of Pembroke and Lord of Leinster.

Older sources depicted Strongbow as introducing superior military technology to Ireland and thus accounting for the twelfth-century English success in conquering much Irish territory. However, Flanagan has convincingly argued that Irish military methods at this time were quite similar to those of the English and that the English success resulted more from tactical surprise, audacity, and luck.

[*See also* Henry II.]

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CLAVIJO, BATTLE OF

Legend has it that in the year 844 at Clavijo, 18 miles from Logroño in northeastern Spain, Saint James (Santiago) appeared on the battlefield and helped King Ramiro I of Asturias-León (842–850) achieve a victory over the Moors. Popular accounts say that Saint James appeared on a white horse like a warrior, holding a white banner and a great shining sword, and some stories go so far as to identify the Moorish adversary as ʿAbd al-Rahman II (822–852). Thereafter the epithet *Santiago Matamoros* (Saint James the Moor-slayer) became associated with the apostle, who became the patron saint of Spain. The battle of Clavijo, which had freed Ramiro I from an equally imaginary annual tribute to the Moors of one hundred maidens, was the place where the Asturians first uttered their famous battle cry, "God, Help, and Saint James!"

Some historical sources claim that twelfth-century documents may have been forged from the Order of Cluny in Compostela in order to extract tribute from the Leonese empire. They also claim that Ramiro I had granted the tribute, which was abolished in 834, as a vow of thanks for the upkeep of the monks in Compostela. The actual year of the battle of Clavijo may have been 834, but Ramiro I was not the ruler of the Leonese at the time. Alfonso II ruled Asturias-León from 792 to 842. The historian Claudio Sánchez-Albornoz claims that Clavijo has been confused with the battle of Mount Laturce in Albelda, fought by Ordoño I of León (850–866). Many other legends have been associated with the cult of Saint James.

[*See also* Iberia, *subentry on* Narrative (500–1100); Saints, Military; *and* Santiago.]

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CLERGY, ROLES IN WARFARE OF

According to canon law, clerics were obliged to refrain from fighting. Nevertheless, the realities of governmental and social structures meant that in the medieval West clerics frequently carried out administrative and even military functions in warfare, in addition to the spiritual care of soldiers on campaign.

Sacramental and Pastoral Roles. The most fundamental and long-standing sphere of responsibility in warfare for priests of all ranks comprised sacramental and pastoral duties, together with other morale-building activities. Before engagements a senior cleric would often celebrate mass and distribute the Eucharist to the army, and preach a sermon of encouragement. It was also important that soldiers should be given the opportunity to confess their sins and for the last rites to be given to those who were seriously wounded, sick, or dying. Although these duties had been carried out by clerics serving with armies since late Roman times, it was only several centuries later that their precise responsibilities were described in regulations composed by canonists such as Burchard of Worms

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(d. 1025) and Ivo of Chartres (d. 1115). There was as yet no specific office of military chaplain in the form that it existed in modern armies, and it is likely that the tasks of hearing confessions, assignment of penance, and unction of the dying would normally have been carried out by the clerical retinues of bishops and abbots and the chaplains of lay lords.

The Crusades provided a significant spur to the regulation of the duties of chaplains, particularly as set out in canonical legislation issued by Innocent III (1198–1216) and Gregory IX (1227–1241). The papacy was especially keen to provide spiritual support for wars against Muslims, pagans, heretics, and schismatics, and the foundation of the Dominican and Franciscan orders in the first half of the thirteenth century provided a reserve of suitably trained clerics for such tasks. Because Crusades were often regarded as pilgrimages and penitential expeditions with spiritual benefits, they tended to attract a higher proportion of clerics than would normally be found in military expeditions in Europe. The widespread view that the loss of the Holy Land in 1187 was due to the sins of Christians meant that it was regarded as important for crusaders to receive effective pastoral care, while the use of crusading to support missionary activities on the southern and eastern shores of the Baltic Sea ensured that clerics were present during military campaigns against the pagan peoples of Prussia, Livonia, and Estonia.

Clerics serving with armies were expected to work for victory through prayers and invocations intended to bring about a favorable intervention of God; such public activities would of course also provide a boost to morale. Clerics were also responsible for the care of holy relics, which were sometimes brought to the field of battle in the hope of using the powers of saints to secure divine favor. A famous example of this was the Battle of the Standard (1138), when a Scottish invasion of northern England was met by an English army that included many parish priests and cathedral clergy carrying relics of Saint Wilfrid of Ripon and Saint John of Beverley. However, the bearing of relics in military contexts tended to occur in cases of extreme emergency; in the ecclesiastical principality of Liège, the episcopal army regularly marched under the banner of Saint Lambert but was permitted to carry the saint's relics on only two occasions between the twelfth and fifteenth centuries. Probably the most regular use of a relic in a military context was the exceptional case of the kingdom of Jerusalem, where the relic of the True Cross was carried into battle by a senior cleric (normally the patriarch of Jerusalem) on thirty-one campaigns between 1099 and 1187, when it was lost at the battle of Hattin.

Administrative and Military Roles. Senior clerics regularly served as members of royal councils and often accompanied kings on campaign so that the normal business of government could be maintained; they might then be entrusted with command and logistical responsibilities as well as taking part in councils of war. In France, the Low Countries, and above all in Germany, many bishops and abbots exercised secular lordship and thus had considerable military retinues and vassals at their disposal. From the time of the Carolingian empire, ecclesiastical lords were regularly expected to lead their contingents on campaign in person, and indeed the German monarchs of the Ottonian, Salian, and Hohenstaufen dynasties relied on the military resources of the princes of the church (who were normally royal appointees) in preference to those of the lay princes.

As most of them originated from aristocratic families, German bishops tended to share the values of secular lords and were often quite prepared to take part in fighting themselves; this martial ethos found its literary expression in the character of Turpin, the warrior-archbishop in the *Chanson de Roland* and the *Rolandslied des Pfaffen Konrad*. Even as late as 1288 the Archbishop of Cologne, Siegfried von Westerburg, acted as commander in chief of his own field forces and was captured fighting in the front rank of his knights at the battle of Worringen. Bishops were keen to take part in fighting against enemies of Christendom or in campaigns that were regarded as having a righteous cause; effectively, this meant those military enterprises that had been endorsed by

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ecclesiastical authority. Thus the Norman invasion of England in 1066, a campaign blessed by the pope, was noted for its religious observances, while Odo, the Bishop of Bayeux, commanded a division at the battle of Hastings. During the Investiture Contest in Germany in the late eleventh century Werner, Bishop of Merseburg, boasted of his role in battle fighting for the papal side against Emperor Henry IV.

The Crusades produced a new ecclesiastical institution in the form of military religious orders, such as the Templars and Teutonic Knights. The knight brothers who constituted the main fighting force in these organizations were not clerics in the strict meaning of the term; although they took monastic vows, they were not ordained in clerical orders. Nevertheless, the orders provided a new form of fighting force on the frontiers of Christendom subject only to ecclesiastical oversight. Thus, in the eastern Baltic region of Livonia, the bishops of Riga were able to make use of a newly founded religious order, the Sword Brethren, to establish an ecclesiastical principality under their own control.

The exigencies that arose during Crusades also meant that, irrespective of their intended roles, clerics sometimes had little choice but to engage in frontline combat and suffered casualties accordingly. These expeditions brought to the fore a fundamental difference in attitude between the Latin West and the Byzantine world, which had retained a much more restrictive opinion of the appropriateness of the role of clerics in warfare. Greek writers such as Anna Komnene were shocked by the sight of armed Latin priests fighting in Crusader ranks, considering their behavior scandalous and an affront to the priestly office.

[*See also* Bishops; Noncombatants in Armies; Pacifism; *and* Saints' *Lives.*]

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CLOS DES GALÉES

The Clos des Galées was set up by Philip IV of France in 1293–1295 near Rouen to build galleys for the French crown. The site, on the river Seine, was some distance from the sea, but the river was tidal and navigable, and there is evidence of shipbuilding in the area from about 1226. The French crown had previously relied on vessels hired from the Genoese or on impressed merchant ships to fight the English in the Channel. Edward I of England may have ordered English port towns to build ships for the English crown in 1294–1295 in response to French activity at Rouen. He may have feared that the Clos des Galées was the herald of an entirely new attitude to naval warfare by the French.

The Clos des Galées was located at Richebourg on the left bank of the Seine and began as a very simple establishment with sheds and slipways enclosed by a palisade. By the end of the fourteenth century, there were many separate buildings enclosed by a wall, stores for all kinds of victuals and arms, workshops, galley sheds, and a house for the master of the yard, which had not only a garden and a chapel but also the luxury of stained-glass windows.

Most of the information about the Clos comes from surviving accounts. These reveal that the shipwrights came from all over the Mediterranean and worked in the southern tradition of shipbuilding, even though the amount of repair work on galleys or the building of new ones was limited. Storing arms

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and victuals for royal fleets was a more important part of its work. At sea, the French continued to rely more on galley fleets hired from the Genoese or the Castilians than on vessels based in the Clos. The accounts for 1382–1384 included details of five galleys and three *huissiers* (galleys capable of transporting horses), but these were not in seaworthy condition and were described as having been on stocks in the galley sheds for some time. In 1388, work was proceeding on three ships, but it is doubtful that it was ever completed. The main problem was a shortage of funds and perhaps a lack of royal interest in the yard and its operation.

By the fifteenth century the post of master of the Clos des Galées had become largely a sinecure. There was a brief flurry of activity in 1402–1405 when a semi-official campaign of commerce raiding was being carried on in the Channel by both the French and the English, but after this there was little sign of any real activity in the yard. In 1418 the Clos fell to the English when they took Rouen, and it was burned to the ground. There seems to have been little there except old stores and the buildings. The site was then apparently abandoned. After the reconquest of Normandy in 1450 it was granted to the bishop of Lisieux, but there is little evidence that it was used for maritime purposes.

[*See also* Edward I of England *and* Rouen, Siege of (1418–1419).]

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Susan Rose

CLOVIS I

(c. 466–511; king of the Franks 481–511). Clovis was sixteen years old when he succeeded his father Childeric as king and Roman general, with supreme command over the Roman province Belgica secunda and its capital, Reims. In 486–487 Clovis succeeded in overwhelming the *magister militum* and *rex Romanorum* Syagrius in a battle near Soissons. This was a first but important step in his career. Soissons was, after the metropolis Reims, the most important town in the region, with a strong garrison, arms factories, and a mint. Clovis called on the Visigoths to hand over Syagrius, who had fled to them. Clovis's strategic thinking is also evident after 486 in his political and military union with the so-called Arborykoi, presumably former military colonists living in the region between the Seine and the Loire. In 491–492 he subjugated the Thoringi, probably either a Frankish people around Tongeren (Belgium), or a group of Thuringians settled on the left bank of the Rhine. Clovis's decision to be baptized by the Catholic Bishop Remigius of Reims must also be interpreted strategically. It was the key to getting the unconditional backing of his Gallo-Roman subjects, especially the Catholic bishops. At that time, the other main Germanic kingdoms were dominated by rulers who were Arian rather than Catholic Christians, and thus regarded as heretics by the Church and by many Gallo-Romans. The likely date of the baptism, in the late 490s, must be placed in the historical context of one of the several wars fought against the pagan Alemanni, which ended in the triumph of the battle of Tolbiac (near Cologne) in 496. It was likely shortly after this that Clovis was baptized; this gave him a great strategic advantage for the following war against Alaric II, king of the Visigoths (r. 484–507). Clovis could style his war of expansion as a war of religion, a sort of "crusade" against a heretic. Therefore, it was quite natural that he also received the support of the Byzantine emperor Anastasius (d. 518), who could temporarily neutralize his great opponent Theodoric the Great, king of the Ostrogoths. In 507, Alaric lost the battle of Vouillé—and his life. The most important towns of his kingdom, Bordeaux and Toulouse, were conquered by Clovis's warriors. It was only the late intervention of Theodoric that prevented the total annihilation of the Visigoths.

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Only a small coastal region along the Mediterranean Sea was still under the control of the Goths and Theodoric. All other parts of Aquitaine came under Frankish domination.

Clovis's last wars were directed against other Frankish kings living north and northeast of his kingdom. Most of these "little kings" (*reguli*), as they were called by Gregory of Tours, were killed by Clovis indirectly through trickery and treason. Analyzing Gregory's stories of how Clovis managed to surprise his enemies gives the impression that he had no hesitation at all in breaking existing taboos. For example, he killed his own kinsmen, which was a high crime strictly forbidden by Germanic law. His enemies mistakenly believed that Clovis would respect these taboos, and were therefore caught in his trap.

Nothing is known about Clovis's abilities as a military tactician. Perhaps he fought personally in battle, considering that Gregory tells a story about his kinsman Sigebert, king of Cologne, who was wounded at his knee in a battle at Tolbiac.

[*See also* Franks, Merovingian, *subentry on* Narrative (482–751); Soissons, Battle of; *and* Tolbiac, Battle of.]

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CNUT

(d. 1035), king of Denmark, England, and Norway. Sven (Sweyn I) Forkbeard came to the English throne in 1014. Tradition, recorded in the Icelandic *Flateyjarbók* (the Flatey Book), tells that Cnut (Canute) was with his father on campaign and was trained by Thorkell the Tall, the foremost Viking of the day. Sweyn died soon after, and the exiled English king, Aethelred II, returned from Normandy. Cnut fled to Denmark, settled matters with his brother Harold, and returned in 1016 with an overwhelming force. The English prince, Edmund Ironside, fought a bitter and protracted campaign against him until, after defeat at Ashingdon, Essex, Edmund agreed to divide the kingdom. Edmund died mysteriously soon afterward, leaving Cnut as the sole ruler by 1017. Cnut married Aethelred's widow Emma and consolidated his power, retaining a personal following of Danish troops, the housecarls. The king raised a series of punitive taxes with which to pay off his many followers.

Harold died in 1018; Cnut returned to Denmark to secure the succession for himself, leaving English affairs in the hands of the Anglo-Danish nobleman, Godwin, father of the later King Harold II. During Cnut's absence opportunistic attacks on Denmark by Norwegian Vikings gave Cnut the pretext for invasion, establishing his rule in Norway by 1026. As the single ruler of the three largest polities bordering the North Sea, Cnut was in a unique position to dominate northern Europe. As a dutiful king of England, he issued law codes and regulated trade. He raised armies in England for his Scandinavian campaigns, promoting the church as a unifying element among them.

Despite his successes as a military leader, the union of his holdings fell apart after his death in 1035. His son Hardecnut reigned in Denmark and England until his death in 1042. Hardecnut installed the exiled Edward the Confessor, heir of Athelred II, on the English throne. During Edward's reign, England faced south to Normandy rather than east to Scandinavia, and the legacy of Cnut's ephemeral "North Sea Empire" was lost.

[*See also* Sven Forkbeard *and* Thorkell the Tall.]

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COLOGNE, SIEGE OF (1205–1206)

Cologne was besieged several times in the course of the thirteenth century. Each time the political alignments displayed certain constants: the archbishops at the time, who saw themselves as the rulers of the city, stood in opposition to the citizens of Cologne, who were struggling for autonomy and self-government. These disputes resulted in several armed conflicts, in which both parties sought to secure the support of other regional or supraregional powers.

The siege of 1205–1206 occurred during the struggle for the German throne, in which Philip of Swabia, of the Staufen family, and Otto IV of Braunschweig, of the house of the Welfen family, were competing for primacy in the German Empire. At the time of the siege, the archbishop of Cologne, Adolf I of Altena, was on Philip's side; the townspeople favored Otto. In 1205 the hostilities came to a head: in May, supporters of Philip blockaded the Rhine above and below the city. In September Philip set out for Cologne with an army. The *Braunschweig Verse Chronicle* (*Braunschweiger Reimchronik*), narrating from a pro-Welf perspective in the late thirteenth century, reports on Cologne's preparations for a siege. The townsfolk stockpiled food and laid waste to the land surrounding the city, so as to deprive the besiegers of anything to live on. On 29 September Philip appeared at the gates of Cologne and immediately started an attack on the walls that lasted five days. The sources reveal nothing about the size and composition of his army or about the city's defenses. Eventually, the situation came down to small fights between the besiegers and the besieged, in which Otto IV was seriously wounded.

Philip's troops were unable to make a decisive breakthrough. He therefore called off the attack and retreated with his army toward Neuss, which he was able to conquer. He had similar success with other castles and positions around Cologne, so that his allies could maintain continuous pressure on the city. In the summer of 1206, Philip and his fighting force returned once again to the Lower Rhine. On 27 July he won the decisive battle for the throne over Otto IV and his allies at Wassenberg, west of Cologne. Otto managed to escape to Cologne. The archbishop of Cologne, Bruno IV, who had been supported by the Welf-papal party, was taken prisoner. This isolated Cologne in the struggle for the crown, and it was forced to yield to Philip, who received the city's surrender in Coblenz on 11 November 1206. The city's poor supply situation was the deciding factor. In a letter to Pope Innocent III in September 1206, the Cologne clergy complained that the city was surrounded by its enemies and therefore could not obtain a sufficient supply of food and other necessities, and could hold out no longer. Even though the siege had not been continuously maintained for the entire period from September 1205 to November 1206, in the end Cologne was starved out. The persistent destruction of its access and supply lines forced the city to capitulate.

[*See also* Bishops; Cologne, Sieges of (1252, 1257, and 1262); Germany, *subentries on* Narrative (1125–1250) *and* Sources (1125–1250); Otto IV; *and* Wassenberg, Battle of.]

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COLOGNE, SIEGES OF (1252, 1257, AND 1262)

The history of the city of Cologne in the thirteenth century was marked by disputes between the citizens and the archbishop over the city's constitution and government. By no means did the citizenry act as a monolithic block. People were split according to different family interests, and various alliances were formed between the archbishops and the patrician families. The disagreements between bishops and city sometimes led to armed disputes, in the course of which the bishops attacked the city several times and also partly besieged it, as in the years 1252, 1257, and 1262. All of these disputes ended unsuccessfully

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from the archbishops' point of view; they always ended up coming to an agreement with the townspeople. In this way, bit by bit, the people of Cologne succeeded in expanding their rights according to the city constitution and forcing concessions from the bishops. The defeat of Archbishop Siegfried von Westerburg at the battle of Worringen in 1288 finally marked the end of episcopal rule of the city.

The sources of the sieges in the second half of the thirteenth century are problematic with respect to military questions. The chief source, and often the only witness to events, is Gottfried Hagen's verse chronicle. The author, assumed to be the Cologne municipal scribe Gottfried, reports the disturbances in Cologne as a contemporary witness. Gottfried is thoroughly partisan: he stands on the side of the Cologne nobility and, within the city's family feuds, with the Overstolzen family. His verse chronicle corresponds to the language tradition of the Cologne–Lower Rhine region and displays its author's intellectual training.

In 1252 a dispute arose between Archbishop Konrad von Hochstaden and the people of Cologne over coinage laws. The people were in alliance with Count Wilhelm of Jülich. At the beginning of March, the archbishop attacked Cologne from the Rhine with fourteen warships. He camped on the right bank of the Rhine near Deutz (once a separate town; now part of Cologne) and attempted to attack Cologne (on the left bank) across the water. Gottfried reports attacks with a catapult, to little effect. The archbishop's troops then tried to set fire to Cologne's ships from one of their boats. However, the boat caught fire itself, and the crew perished in the flames. Not surprisingly, that ended the bishop's attack efforts. On 26 March the bishop and the city agreed to set aside their feud as a result of an arbitration decision, which was recorded on 17 April and limited the bishop's rights regarding coinage.

In 1257 armed conflict again broke out between Archbishop Konrad and the citizens of Cologne. In September the archbishop attacked the city from Bonn, believing he had been insulted by the townspeople. Gottfried reports that Konrad stormed the Severinstor (southern entrance) of Cologne with an army of four hundred men. This attempt at a surprise attack failed. Konrad retreated to Rodenkirchen (south of Cologne on the left bank), and his troops blocked all of the city's supply lines—the roads and the Rhine. As the townspeople tried to break through one of the road blocks, a fight arose at Frechen, southwest of Cologne, with the archbishop's troops, whom he had personally led into battle. The townspeople seized the upper hand, and Konrad had to flee to Frechen. The alliances of the respective parties played an important role in the dispute from this point on, especially the behavior of Count Adolf von Berg, who, as advocate of the Deutz monastery (opposite Cologne on the right bank), controlled a strategically important location. At first Adolf sided with the archbishop. The count was able to repel an invasion of the Cologne forces into the territory of Berg; the Cologne army is said to have lost fifty men before they could get back across the Rhine and into the city. Their counterstrike succeeded; they crossed the river, retrieved their dead, and set fire to Deutz. As a result of this, an agreement was reached in October between Cologne and the count of Berg to end hostilities. Thus, Konrad lost a strategically important ally, and on 20 February 1258 the conflict was settled with submission and forgiveness. Everyone promised to drop all claims for compensation arising from the war. The archbishop's military efforts to conquer Cologne by cutting off its food supply had failed.

In 1262 Archbishop Engelbert II von Falkenburg tried yet again to lay siege to the city. Gottfried says next to nothing about the military aspects of this conflict. Bishop Heinrich of Lüttich and the count of Geldern persuaded Engelbert to end the siege peacefully.

The military details (that is, numbers of attackers and defenders, types of weaponry, and siege techniques) of these three sieges can no longer be reconstructed. However, it is evident how difficult it was in the thirteenth century to besiege a large and well-protected city such as Cologne. Cologne had been protected by an encircling wall since 1180. The archbishops were unable to storm the walls, and attacks from the river also proved difficult. Furthermore, the

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city's supply lines could be cut only if the nobles of the Lower Rhine were on the archbishop's side. Otherwise, the city was able, politically and militarily, to stand up to its governors.

[*See also* Cologne, Siege of (1205–1206), *and* Worringen, Battle of.]

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COMITATUS

Taken from Tacitus's *Germania* (Ch. 13–14), *comitatus* traditionally refers to a lord and his immediate military followers or companions (retainers), though the term can be used to denote an entire warband as well. As a distinct form of military organization, the *comitatus* was a longstanding and widespread practice, and one that featured prominently as a topic in heroic literature, especially among the Anglo-Saxons (for example, *Beowulf, Battle of Maldon*) and the Britons/Welsh (for example, Aneirin's *Gododdin*, Taliesin's historical poems) in Britain during the migration and Anglo-Saxon periods.

Seldom having more than a few hundred warriors—and in most cases numbering far less—these warbands could be combined by allied chieftains or lords to form larger composite armies if the need arose. Normally, a warrior's basic weapons-set consisted of a spear and a wood shield, with a leather jerkin for further protection. The lord and a few other notable warriors might have a sword and rarely chain mail or helmet. Other weapons included single-edged swords (military knife or *seax*), axes, and several other more exotic weapons. During later periods, although horses allowed for greater mobility on longer-range campaigns, it appears that warriors usually dismounted and fought battles as infantry. When not campaigning, many of the warriors lived at their lord's hall.

In cultural terms, the reciprocal relationship between the lord and his retainers is clearly the bedrock upon which the structure of the *comitatus* was erected. In this lord-retainer relationship, the lord or chieftain was expected to lead the warband into battle, to provide food and shelter, and to distribute a range of prestige items—rings, weapons, martial accoutrements, and horses—to reward exceptional service. In return, the warriors would fight for victory and to protect their lord in battle, participate in routine hall-life activities (including feasting and hunting), provide advice and counsel, and accompany their lord into exile.

[*See also Familia Regis and* Household Knights.]

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COMMEMORATION OF BATTLES AND WARRIORS

In medieval warfare, possession of the field in the aftermath of battle for between one and three days conferred victory. While battlefields themselves were often accidental landscapes, they were also changed ground. The Frankish soldier-poet Angelbert hoped that "neither dew nor showers nor rain fall on that meadow" on which the battle of Fontenoy (841) had been fought, and Bede, describing the field at Maserfelth (642), wrote that it remained "greener and soil dug from it had curative powers when applied, either to horses or to men." These echoes and allusions reach back to warfare of the ancient world, like Cassius Dio's imagined speech of Boudicca, the leader of the Iceni, during the revolt of 61 C.E.: "For in any case our bodies shall for ever possess this land."

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Battle Abbey at Hastings. Founded by William of Normandy in 1070 to fulfill a penitential vow. The abbey was built on the spot where King Harold II fell during the battle of Hastings in 1066. PHOTOGRAPH BY DAVID HILL

Such postbellum rituals were rapidly Christianized, improvised soldierly communion with clover and the erection of crosses at the center of armies, as at Heavenfield (634), hopefully transforming the field into sacred ground. Commemorations in stone are to be found in new military cemeteries, as at Visby (1361), and on the battlefield itself, as at Towton (1461). Participants also sought to leave on the landscape itself a trace of victory, a memory of the conquest and sometimes of resistance. Initially, memorials centered on rituals connected with the burial of casualties and the process of battle naming. Names might be topographic, toponymic, iconic, or prophetic, each conveying an official or popular memory. Angelbert reported Fontenoy as "the name the peasants give to the spring and village where Frankish blood was shed." Burial or the deliberate act of leaving battle dead unburied as carrion (the latter being the more normal custom until the twelfth century) both pointed to a recognition of the continuing importance of the field.

The provision of permanent memorials may have been more common than has been supposed. Hedged enclosures are known at Shrewsbury (1403), Agincourt (1415), and Wakefield (1460). The addition of a chapel or other memorial church, either at the time of the battle or at some later remove, suggests that battlefield tourism and pilgrimage was significant. Divergent motives have been suggested for their foundation. The pilgrimage of the monks of Hexham to the new church at Heavenfield focused on the iconic role of Saint Oswald's cross, while the fulfillment of a penitential vow has been suggested for Battle Abbey at Hastings (1066). For churches built on the battlefield itself, the motive, divinely inspired or not, was usually triumphal. The tit-for-tat building of memorials in the Frankish east tellingly reveals that the vocabulary was widely appreciated. Baldwin IV founded the Monastery of Saint Catherine *in campo belli* [on the battlefield] at Montgisard (1177); Saladin responded with an ironic Dome of Victory on the site of Hattin (1187),

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although it was smugly reported as desolate by the Christian pilgrim Thietmar in 1217. While battlefield memorial churches are common, they are not ubiquitous. The circumstances of their foundation are thus always significant. Cnut erected chapels on the site of his victories in England after his succession to the crown in 1020, including that at Ashdon (1016). Battle, with its abbey and newly founded town in a formerly marginal landscape, has something about it of the classical Nicopolis, or city of victory. The complex of monuments at Nancy (1477), including a battlefield cross and the Chapelle des Bourguignons, seems to have been crucial in the development of a cultural identity in Lorraine. From at least the twelfth century it was customary for the bodies of the noble dead, at least on the victorious side, to be recovered from the field so that battlefield chapels are to be read as sitting on the corpses of the defeated. The transition is clearly seen in retellings of the *Song of Roland* and the dead at Roncesvalles (Roncevaux; 778).

Memorials to individual soldiers were sometimes constructed, often to commemorate a defeated leader. Crosses may mark the places of death of Lord Audley at Blore Heath (1459) and Sir Ralph Percy at Hedgley Moor (1464). Charles the Bold was buried close to the field at Nancy, and John Talbot, Earl of Shrewsbury, in a chapel at Castillon (1453), although both bodies were exhumed decades later and repatriated. Edward I commissioned tombstones for two English commanders killed a quarter of a century earlier, to be erected on the field at Cymerau (1257). Such memorials are a reminder that the life histories of battlefields too are important, rituals on the site being subject to rise and fall and to reinvention. Stonehenge was widely seen as a war memorial during the Middle Ages. Ninth-century Spanish chronicles posit a near contemporary date for the Marian cave and shrine at Covadonga (722), and in the thirteenth century Alfonso X had his predecessor Alfonso I reburied there. Into the twenty-first century the battle site continues to be a site of contested memory, the lost image of the virgin of Covadonga being rediscovered as recently as 1939.

[*See also* Agincourt, Battle of; Castillon, Siege and Battle of; Covadonga, Battle of; Fontenoy, Battle of; Hastings, Battle of; Hattin, Battle of; Nancy, Battle of; *and* Shrewsbury, Battle of.]

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COMMYNES, PHILIPPE DE

(c. 1447–1511), Flemish noble and chronicler. Having entered the service of the house of Burgundy at a young age, Philippe de Commynes became a member of the household of Charles the Bold, Duke of Burgundy. He left Charles in 1472 to become a councillor to King Louis XI of France. A contemporary and sometimes even an eyewitness of the events related in his *Mémoires,* Commynes was a chronicler and memoirist of high quality. Nevertheless his work, written between 1489 and 1498, has sometimes been characterized by other authors as partly a work of self-justification that, according to them, affects its value as a source. These critical judgments do not diminish the importance of Commynes's work for military history.

Commynes was undeniably an experienced warrior who took part in a variety of campaigns, notably in France in 1465, in the Liège region in 1467 and 1468, in Picardy and Normandy between 1470 and 1472, and in Italy in 1495. During this period he was present at several sieges and three major battles: Montlhéry (1465), Brustem (1467), and Fornova (1495). His *Mémoires* constitute a firsthand source for all these military events. For others that he did

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not witness directly, such as for the campaigns of Charles the Bold in Germany, Lorraine, and Switzerland or for certain engagements of the Wars of the Roses, his accounts rest largely on the reports of informants in the French court.

Most of all Commynes offers his readers the tale of his personal and concrete experience of war, and his accounts are always quite vivid. In addition, he attaches great importance to questions of strategy and tactics. He reflects deeply on the chances and risks inherent in any campaign or battle. He insists on carefully observing and precisely describing the troop dispositions, the difficulties and obstacles of the terrain, and the various uses of artillery. He is always concerned about the size of forces and of human losses. Finally, unlike other historians of his day, he attaches no importance to individual exploits and feats of arms; instead, he prefers to describe war with a mix of anecdotal observations and general overviews.

[*See also* Brustem, Battle of; Charles the Bold; Montlhéry, Battle of; Strategy; *and* Theory, Military.]

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COMPAGNIES D'ORDONNANCE

Mounted units of mixed arms in the early standing French army, the Compagnies d'Ordonnance were established in the fifteenth century. By the later decades of the Hundred Years' War independent mercenary companies mobilized by military entrepreneurs had come to dominate warfare. The greatest challenge facing the Valois monarchs became the need to control their own armed forces, which often ravaged France in periods of military anarchy such as the *escourcherie* ("slaughter") following the Treaty of Arras in 1435. In 1439 the estates-general sanctioned military reforms and taxation that were only fully implemented in 1445 after the defeat of the *Praguerie*, the aristocratic revolt the reforms and taxes provoked. Charles VII forcibly disbanded as many of the free companies as possible and commissioned selected captains to assemble new commands. The reformed army, its veteran cavalry new only in its organization, was further strengthened by creation of the infantry militia *francs archiers* and the expansion of artillery. The Compagnies d'Ordonnance, so named after the royal *ordonnance* that authorized them, were composed of up to one hundred *lances fournies*. These administrative units, which varied in composition over the years, initially represented one man-at-arms, one light cavalryman, two archers, a valet, and a page. Units were garrisoned in frontier towns where they were regularly paid and supplied. The companies provided the backbone of the army that brought the Hundred Years' War to an end in a series of rapid campaigns. First the conquest of Normandy was assured at Formigny in 1450 and then Guienne was secured with the crushing of the English army at Castillon in 1453.

Although *ordonnance* soldiers occasionally relapsed into indiscipline, and the companies sometimes proved more loyal to their commanders than their kings in times of aristocratic revolt such as the War of the Public Weal in 1465 or even the Wars of Religion a century later, this gendarmerie was recognized as militarily indispensible after their decisive roles in the final battles of the Hundred Years, War. The companies became the paramount military instrument of Valois policy both foreign and domestic as Louis XI and Charles VIII used this superlative armed force to defeat all domestic challengers to the enhanced powers of the triumphant monarchy. In the 1470s Louis XI destroyed the rebellious counts of Armagnac in the southwest before turning to seize the lands of the dukes of Burgundy to the east. Finally, Charles VIII conquered the great western duchy of Brittany in 1488. Militarily beyond challenge at home, the Valois could then

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launch innumerable initiatives abroad beginning with the 1494 invasion of Italy and following with the endless campaigns against the Habsburgs until the mid-sixteenth century.

The original units of heavily armored cavalry and mounted archers were tactically conservative, but their permanent readiness and veteran proficiency made them a dominant battlefield force in the campaigns of the late fifteenth century. Subsequent development of battlefield firearms and modern light cavalry and infantry formations eventually ended the tactical preeminence of men-at-arms but the company structure proved adaptable. Far more than a prestigious anachronism, the companies constituted over half of the French army that invaded Italy in 1494 and they endured into the Wars of Religion reconfigured in armament and tactics, serving both heavy and light cavalry functions with harquebusiers attached to the formations. Indeed, it was the sixteenth-century crisis of the political system rather than military obsolescence that forced their demise just as that of the fifteenth century had fostered their creation.

The key element in the reform was always as much political and administrative as military. Whatever the intent of reformers, the gendarmerie entailed an enormous ongoing fiscal and material burden on the populace. The crown worked through regular musters, inspections, and payments by commissioners, comptrollers, and treasurers of war both to control costs and enhance discipline, but the companies nonetheless generated endless complaints and constant tax innovation as garrisoned localities struggled to equalize the burden across jurisdictions and legislatures endlessly renegotiated taxes putatively linked to the companies, the *taille des gensdarmes* and later *taillon*. The total number of companies and men varied across the decades. Four thousand lances in the late reign of Louis XI was a high point. The estates-general of 1484 reduced this to 2,200, establishing a norm, albeit with temporary increases typical in time of war. Favoritism and patronage naturally modified policy. Captains, compensated by unit size, understandably sought the largest companies possible. Companies were rarely wholly in garrison; policy allowed 25 percent leave at any point in time. The gendarmerie enjoyed rising social as well as military prestige. Appointment to command or service in the companies became a key form of princely patronage. Such service was ultimately restricted only to the most privileged echelons of society.

The traditional characterization of the companies as the first standing army in Europe is apt but simplistic if taken to mean that they represent a revolutionary break with the past. Only gradually did the gendarmerie transform traditional patron-client networks while still providing the best paid and equipped permanent heavy cavalry in Europe. The original companies were neither unprecedented in administrative structure nor exceptional in military practice. Where Charles VII and his gifted commanders were creative rather was in their determination in implementing complex reforms and in their perseverance in maintaining troops in garrison in the aftermath of victory. The significance of this achievement is undeniable as contemporaries acknowledged. Chroniclers both celebrated and decried the importance of the new companies while dramatic victories fostered imitation as nearby princes such as the dukes of Brittany and Burgundy established their own companies. Standing companies, and their associated taxes and administrative infrastructure, arguably proved key elements in the emergence of the modern state. In bringing mercenary captains under crown authority and limiting the ability of magnates to raise private armed forces, the Valois took decisive steps in establishing the royal monopoly of violence their legists (legal counselors) had long claimed. In regularizing military service as a remunerative career, professionalizing the art of war, and providing a device for the cooptation of the medieval aristocracy into the disciplined state service, the Compagnies d'Ordonnance represented a radical breach with the medieval traditions of war.

[*See also* Castillon, Siege and Battle of; Charles VII of France; Formigny, Battle of; *and* France, *subentry on* Narrative (1328–1483).]

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Paul Solon

CONDOTTE

Italian states hired mercenaries by means of contracts known as *condotte.* They date from the thirteenth century, or perhaps earlier, and involved a formal written agreement between employer and employee regarding terms of service. They resemble in basic outline contemporary English indentures, stipulating pay and number of soldiers. But Italian *condotte* were usually more detailed than their English counterparts, more lucrative, and issued specifically to mercenary captains rather than citizen troops—the former understood as coming both from within Italy and outside of it, and including crossbowmen as well as cavalrymen.

The first clause of *condotte* usually dealt with pay and duration of service. Salaries were typically apportioned monthly, at separate rates for the captain (higher) and his men (lower). In the fourteenth century, the length of employment was generally limited to four to six months, with an option to renew. Contracts spelled out the number of troops allowed a captain, expressed either in terms of individual men or basic units such as *barbute* or lances. The *barbuta* consisted of two men and two horses and was common among German mercenaries. The lance consisted of three men (a knight, a squire, and a page) and three horses and became standard in Italian armies by the middle of the fourteenth century onward. Captains also received a *prestanze* or loan of one month's pay in advance to help him assemble his brigade.

The contracts laid out additional terms, including division of spoils, replacement (*menda*) of dead and injured horses, and "double pay" to soldiers for "significant" victories. Employers required regular inspections, usually once a month, and assessed fines on soldiers for failure to pass muster. The soldiers were usually granted the right to possession of movables captured in war as well as a portion of ransoms of prominent captives. The state claimed all lands and castles. There was, however, often substantial disagreement over such issues.

Condotte varied in length and content. Those involving English mercenaries during the second half of the fourteenth century contained a clause by which the men pledged allegiance to their king back home, refusing to take part in any action in Italy contrary to his interests. This is not found in the contracts of mercenaries of other nations. The *condotta in aspetto* allowed a mercenary captain to undertake long-term service with an employer, with the right to fight elsewhere during truces, provided he returned when called. The *condotta ad provisionem*, used in the second half of the fifteenth century, contained no mention of brigade size, but allowed the captain to determine this of his own accord.

Scholars have noted the evolution of *condotte* over time. The double pay and *menda* clauses of the early and mid-fourteenth century passed largely out of existence by the fifteenth century. The duration of the contracts meanwhile increased. The typical four- and six-month *condotta* of the fourteenth century gave way to year-long ones in the fifteenth. The transformation has been linked to the emergence of permanent armies, particularly in the city of Venice, for which there is precocious evidence of the use of such contracts. Venetian *condotte* explicitly allowed for service during peacetime, at reduced salaries for the soldiers. By 1433 the city maintained a peacetime force of five thousand horsemen and two thousand infantry.

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The extent to which long-term contracts meant permanent armies has, however, been questioned. Recent studies suggest that Italian states retained the services of mercenaries year-round already in the fourteenth century, creating a de facto continuity of service apart from contractual terms. In Florence officials repeatedly hired the same men on four- to six-month contracts, sometimes for decades. The city chose, however, to grant long-term service to small units of twenty to fifty cavalrymen rather large contingents of several hundred men, in the hope of minimizing the dangers of desertion.

Military contracts thus provide only a guideline to the conditions of service. States continued to rely on levies from the city and countryside, who were not hired by means of *condotta*. The stated compensation in the contracts was often different from what the soldiers actually received. Salaries were subject to a variety of local taxes, while also augmented by "under the table gifts" such as gold utensils, ornamental armor, and cash bonuses in the guise of loans intended to keep captains, particularly prominent ones, happy. Most commonly, however, states fell in arrears with regard to promised pay, delaying often months. This increased the recourse on the part of the soldiers to looting, a major problem during the era.

[*See also* Condottieri *and* Mercenaries.]

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William Caferro

CONDOTTIERI

The term *condottiere* derives from the medieval Italian word *condotta*, meaning "contract." Contracts were used in numerous ways in medieval Italy, but most conspicuously to employ mercenaries to fight wars. In the modern historiography, condottiere (condottieri, plural) has become a synonym for the great captains of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, who played an important role not only in warfare, but also in the political and cultural activities of the era. The nineteenth-century scholar Oscar Browning referred to the period in Italian history from 1409 to 1530 as the "Age of the Condottieri."

The term has, however, been applied more broadly, to include mercenary captains from as early as the thirteenth century, who likewise serve states by means of *condotte*. Thirteenth-century condottieri generally commanded small bands of the men, and often did so alongside another captain or several co-captains. The Guelf leagues of the era encouraged this development, by providing long-term employment for mercenary soldiers, who found it expedient to pledge themselves directly to a captain. The captain then served as contractor-entrepreneur, selling his services and those of his band to the highest bidder.

The major condottieri in late-thirteenth-century Italy were primarily Catalan and French soldiers: the former with ties to the Aragonese ruling house in Sicily, the latter with ties to the Angevins in Naples. Two renowned figures were the Catalan captain Diego de la Rat and the Provençal captain Inghilese of Saint Remy, both of whom worked for the Guelf leagues. Prominent condottieri also included indigenous Italian mercenaries—rulers of small states and members of the rural nobility—whose contribution is often overlooked by scholars. Among the most active of the native condottieri were the

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Varano lords of Camerino, the Malatesta of Rimini, the Ubaldini and Pietramala clans in Tuscany, and the Orsini and Farnese of Rome.

The condottiere system evolved and became more widespread in the fourteenth century. The period saw the large-scale participation of German mercenaries, the result of the involvement of Holy Roman emperors in Italian affairs. Also active, albeit in smaller numbers, were Hungarian mercenaries, who fought in the Angevin succession crisis in Naples, and English soldiers, who came to Italy in search of profit during truces in the Hundred Years' War. Fourteenth-century condottieri included several notorious figures such as the Swabian captain Werner of Urslingen, who styled himself the "enemy of God, pity and mercy," a bon mot he inscribed on his armor. But in general the condottieri of the period have been treated more in their "corporate" context, as leaders of so-called companies of adventure, large autonomous mercenary bands that emerged at this time. The companies took on distinctive names, fashioned often on chivalric orders (Company of the Rose, Company of Saint George) and assumed a corporate structure that has been compared to contemporary business firms. Condottieri gained command by means of election by the soldiers and functioned in a manner similar to a modern CEO. When the condottiere left the company, it continued on, electing another leader. Werner of Urslingen, for example, captained the Great Company in the 1340s. He was later replaced by the Provençal condottiere Montreal d'Albarno, who was in turn succeeded by the German captain Konrad von Landau. It was in times of peace that the companies were most formidable. They undertook raids and extracted bribes from Italian cities, activities for which the condottieri are perhaps best known to modern scholars.

For all the attention they have received in the historiography, the companies were never the dominant feature of Italian military organization. They were its most conspicuous element, but many condottieri commanded small bands as in the previous century. The last years of the fourteenth century saw, however, a transition, as the large companies began to pass out of existence and individual condottieri emerged as valuable commodities apart from their bands, settling into more permanent employment of single states. The English captain John Hawkwood is often seen as an important figure in this regard, taking service late in his career with the city of Florence. This notion is overstated, as Hawkwood moved about among employers. The pattern of long-term service is more apparent in the careers of several of Hawkwood's contemporaries, including Jacopo dal Verme, Ottobuono Terzi, and Facino Cane, who stayed with the city of Milan.

The scholarship on fifteenth-century condottieri has stressed the continued evolution of long-term service as well as the penchant of prominent captains to take over the states that employed them. Facino Cane seized power in Milan after the death of Giangaleazzo Visconti at the beginning of the fifteenth century. His ascendancy was short-lived, but in 1450 another condottiere, Francesco Sforza, effected a more successful coup in that city.

Two of the most broadly influential condottieri of the period were Muzio Attendoli Sforza (Francesco's father) and Braccio da Montone. The men were antagonists on the battlefield, with different fighting styles. They headed so-called schools of warfare or, more precisely, factions, the *sforzechi* and *bracceschi*, which included many of the important captains of the era, among them Niccolò Piccinino and Erasmo da Narni (known as Gattamelata). Piccinino captained Milanese armies for twenty years; Gattamelata worked for much of his long career for Venice.

The relation in the fifteenth century between the condottieri and states they served has been a major scholarly theme. Extant *condotte* suggest that captains, particularly distinguished ones, gained favorable terms, including the right, in the *condotta ad provisionem*, to form their own bands as they saw fit. This differed from the *condotte* of the thirteenth and the fourteenth centuries, which were highly detailed and placed numerous restrictions on captains. The cities of Venice and Milan were leaders in obtaining long-term service from condottieri, which included enrollment during peacetime. Officials kept the

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condottieri in line by means of rewards, including lifetime pensions and the grants of palaces and estates. The last constituted a species of infeudation, which had the additional benefit of protecting borderlands. The Venetians, for example, gave the condottiere Francesco da Carmagnola the towns of Chiari and Sanguinetto, the former on the frontier near Brescia, the latter overlooking the crossing of the Po and southeastern approaches to Verona. This honored Carmagnola and helped solidify Venetian defenses in these key locations.

Relations between the mercenaries and their masters were nevertheless often problematic. Venetian suspicion of Carmagnola eventually led to his execution in 1432. Condottieri for their part accused employers of an array of wrongs, most frequently of not paying salaries on time (or at all). The condottieri system remains in the modern scholarship an emblem of Italy's backwardness in matters of warfare and military institutions with respect to Northern Europe.

[*See also* Attendoli, Muzio; Braccio da Montone and the Bracceschi; *and* Great Companies.]

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William Caferro

CONFRATERNITIES, MILITARY

Confraternities or brotherhoods, with counterpart sororities or sisterhoods, could be secular or religious associations, sodalities, formed locally but spread regionally, for social good rather than individual gain. Many were philanthropies. Often such philanthropy included public works like road and bridge building; irrigation and water works; defense and maintenance of security at gates and on walls; and charities such as care for the poor, ransoming captives, hospices and hospitals, and shelter for pilgrims. As communal membership organizations, they stressed common goals and commitments, and shared an identity displayed in emblems and signs, uniforms, and public rituals and private ceremonies, such as initiation rites. These lay movements were associated with the formation of guilds and monastic and military orders. The church attempted to co-opt such associations to ensure their orthodoxy and gain their support through affiliation, as in the case of Cluny, with its many alliances. Although they date from antiquity, many came and went without formal organizational development to sustain themselves over time. Origins of confraternities are thus often nebulous and undocumented, and their transmutations difficult to follow.

Canonists in the twelfth century tried to define what made an official confraternity, since local churches often recognized them as patrons. Membership benefits involved banking and loans for building, indulgences for good works and charitable contributions, various privileges such as special seating at festivals, church services, or when paying court to visiting dignitaries, and communicable favors. Confraternities also engaged in outfitting militia guards and soldiers, and later crusading. As these organizations evolved, authorization and monitoring for accountability in both material and spiritual matters became more necessary. Confraternities promoted public worship and needed spiritual direction, often by chaplains, lest they foster heresy. When brotherhoods gained clout, for example, when factions or guilds resisted taxation or

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supported communal movements, civil government relied on the church to control dissonance.

Early medieval confraternities were more spontaneous, less organized, and based on a common cause and collective action, often relying on oral communication and charismatic leadership. Confraternities came to be regarded as religious rather than civil associations. Canonists used the concept of a moral person to describe the type of incorporation needed to own property collectively, have a governing body, and act in ecclesiastical and civil courts, as stipulated in the Code of Canon Law. Archconfraternities were umbrella organizations that affiliated or subsumed confraternities.

Such lay organizations for public works and communal protection naturally came to engage in financial support of such special causes as military affairs. Thus, during frontier expansion and settlement, confraternities often appeared simultaneously with ecclesiastical organizations. Sometimes they were established even before parishes, as during the Crusades and in the Spanish Reconquest when fortifying the Mediterranean against piracy and Muslim aggression. In northeastern Spain, for example, the Aragonese reconquest of the Ebro Valley was assisted in 1134 by the military confraternity of Belchite. In the reconquest and restoration of the primatial see of Tarragona, the new metropolitan Bishop Oleguer of Barcelona formed the confraternity of Tarragona on 14 April 1128 to attract settlers and defenders. At the priory of Ager, a former Muslim fortress, strategies for the defense of the frontier included confraternal organizations for contributions in kind, of money, and of service. The archbishop, armed with legatine status, spread the movement from Catalunya to Aragón, and, joined by confrères north of the Pyrenees such as the archbishop of Narbonne and his suffragans, in 1129 officially established one of the first known archconfraternities to extend its influence north into France. This archconfraternity recruited mercenaries and volunteers all the way from Normandy and England to crusade as "soldiers of Christ" in Spain.

Such activities caused confraternities to blend into formal military organizations of laymen, or "familiars" as Alfonso X's lawyers called them in 1262. Confrères lived communally in recovered fortresses to maintain military discipline, and overlaid a spirituality to counter the brutality of their endeavor and provide stability to meet their long-term manpower needs. Their formal incorporation, recruitment, ritualized initiation, military regulation, communal rules adopted from monasticism, and confraternal social organization made for monk-warriors in the Christian cause. The confraternity was similar to its Muslim counterpart, the *ribat* or fortress monastery, which spread in the Islamic frontiers both in the Near East and from North Africa to Spain. The aforementioned Aragonese-Catalan confraternities disappeared, becoming not extinct, but transmogrified into military orders, mainly the Knights Templar, then the Hospitallers, and other orders born on the peninsula itself. Fraternalism was basic in such movements, as were the religiosity and order imposed by such organizations.

[*See also* Militias, Urban, *and* Orders of Chivalry and Knighthood.]

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CONQUEREUIL, BATTLE OF

It is clear that this battle arose ultimately from the rivalry of Fulk Nerra of Anjou (987–1040) and Conan I, Duke of Brittany (990–992), for control of Nantes and its region. More immediately, Fulk had seized the city of Nantes, but he needed to reinforce his men there who were besieging the citadel. To

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prevent this, Conan mobilized a substantial force. Accounts of how the battle was fought differ considerably, although they all make it clear that before their eventual triumph, the Angevins suffered very heavy casualties when they charged into an enemy ditch. The Burgundian chronicler, Rodulfus Glaber, who was generally well informed about the counts of Anjou, suggests that Conan and Fulk agreed on a day for the battle but says that the Bretons came secretly in advance and prepared a concealed trench into which they lured the Angevins by a feigned flight, causing heavy losses. However, the Angevins rallied, captured Conan, and won the day. Richer of Saint-Rémy, whose reports on military matters are generally accurate, says that Conan deliberately provoked the attack on his fortified camp by pretending that he was afraid to challenge Fulk in the field. Having lured the Angevins into battle at a disadvantage, Conan's forces then beat off the attack; the Angevins suffered heavy losses in the ditches around the camp. However, in the course of the pursuit, Conan took a rest in a clearing and stripped off his armor because of the heat, and he was promptly killed by some Angevin soldiers who happened to have been hiding nearby, so victory went to Fulk. The *Chronicle of Nantes* has a much more straightforward story, reporting that Fulk attacked the fortified camp of the Bretons by surprise and, at some cost in blood, won a great victory, killing Conan in the pursuit.

The siege illustrates two important points about medieval battles. First, they frequently took place in relation to sieges. The risks of battle were high, and battles were usually undertaken for some important end—perhaps the most common was the defense or seizure of a vital strong point. For example, the battle of Hattin in 1187 was precipitated by the determination of the army of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem to relieve Saladin's siege of Tiberias. Second, field fortifications were important. Any kind of fortification provided an enormous advantage because even quickly dug ditches and banks were formidable barriers to infantry and cavalry. There are hints that Harold's army attempted to improvise some such obstacles at the battle of Hastings in 1066. At the battle of Legnano in 1176, the triumphant cavalry of Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa (r. 1152–1190), having driven the Milanese horsemen from the field, was unable to crush the enemy infantry behind the fortifications of their camp. This provided time for the Milanese cavalry to regroup and drive the Germans from the field.

[*See also* France, *subentry on* Narrative (900–1328), *and* Fulk Nerra.]

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CONRAD III

German king (r. 1138–1152). When in 1138 Conrad III was for the second time proclaimed German king (from 1127 he had been the rival to Lothair III), he had already acquired considerable experience in the tactics of feud warfare. He and Frederick, his elder brother, had fought a prolonged and—up to 1130—quite successful defensive war against king Lothair III of Süpplingenburg, until they were eventually pushed back into the Hohenstaufen heartlands and forced to capitulate in 1135. After his coronation, Conrad III was faced with opposition from the Guelph party but, possibly unsure of his chances, he avoided a decisive battle at the beginning of his reign. Having deprived Welf VI of the margravate of Tuscany, Conrad confronted him in 1140 in the battle of Weinsberg and triumphed against the numerically superior foe. Relating his active participation

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in this battle, in which he personally slew the standard bearer of the enemy, Godfrey of Viterbo compared Conrad to the Greek Achilles.

In the following years until the campaigns of the Second Crusade (1147–1149), Conrad played no prominent role as military commander; his campaigns against his domestic enemies were mostly confined to the scope of local feuds in which the wasting of enemy lands was the dominant strategy and the siege and capture of a city, such as that of Dachau in 1143, a rarity. A campaign against Poland undertaken in 1146 turned out to be ill prepared and had to be abandoned without a battle.

Also, as a crusader, Conrad was unable to distinguish himself especially. The Second Crusade, in which he participated, failed for a number of reasons; the lack of communication among the leaders and the poor coordination of the armies played an important role. Conrad III himself had occasional difficulties maintaining discipline in the German contingent and orienting himself in the unknown terrain and political constellations, contributing thus to the general state of affairs. His courage on the field of battle resulted in his being seriously wounded but could not change the outcome of the crusade. A partial victory before the walls of Damascus in 1148, in which he again showed his knightly qualities, failed to stem the tide and was as quickly counterbalanced by a strategic mistake.

Conrad III's capacities as a military leader were concentrated in his own personal qualities as a bold and warlike fighter: through his uncompromising determination, he could inspire his troops and lead them into battle against daunting odds. On the other hand, clear-sighted planning and strategic action were not his forte.

[*See also* Lothair III of Süpplingenburg *and* Crusades, *subentry on* Narrative (1095–1183).]

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Julia Knödler

Translated from the German by Duane Henderson

CONRADIN

(1252–1268), German prince, heir to the kingdoms of Sicily and Jerusalem. Born 25 March 1252, Conrad of Swabia, called "Conradin," was the son of Conrad IV of Germany and the grandson of Frederick II, emperor of the Holy Roman Empire and king of Sicily. After the death of his father on 21 May 1254, Conradin's life was spent in efforts to regain the kingdom of Sicily, which first was ruled by his uncle Manfred and then was conquered by Charles of Anjou. Conradin was proficient diplomatically in putting himself forward as the coordinator of all of the forces that were opposed to the power of Charles of Anjou, creating a sizable alliance among the Ghibelline cities of north-central Italy and among the families and communities of southern Italy and Sicily who remained faithful to the Swabians and to Prince Enrique of Castile, a rival of Anjou. Conradin created a sort of government-in-exile for the kingdom, giving responsibilities to his grandfather's principal supporters, who had left Italy after the succession of Charles.

Thus in 1267–1268, Conradin was able to put himself in charge of a powerful coalition of forces that seemed sufficient to dissolve the Guelf supremacy, or papal line, in Italy and to flush the Anjou from

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the south. Too young to lead the army himself, the sixteen-year-old Conradin knew to choose high-level collaborators, thanks to whom, initial difficulties notwithstanding, his expedition became quite threatening: Frederick of Baden, Conrad Capece, and Enrique of Castile successfully exploited the hostility and fear stirred by the politics of Charles of Anjou both in many cities of the north and among the southern aristocracy.

Conradin's campaign, besides its unfortunate end, was brilliantly conducted and was on the brink of overturning the alliances in Italy to favor the Ghibellines. The strategy of Conradin and his officers called for a multifront attack against Charles of Anjou, based not only on the advance of a column of armed men led by Conradin, but also on the activities of the Pisan fleet and the landing of men at various points along the coast of the kingdom of Sicily, with the goal of inciting anti-Angevin turmoil and revolt. By September 1267, while Conradin's forces assembled near Augsburg, his general vicar, Conrad Capece, landed in Sicily; once he beat the Angevin vicar Folc de Puyricard, he assumed leadership of the island. The next spring, Conradin advanced slowly through Veneto, Lombardy, and Tuscany, at times counting on the aid of Ghibelline cities, at times making way by force—as happened for the brilliant victory brought about by Frederick of Baden against the Angevin seneschal Jean de Brayselve at Laterina (near Arezzo) on 25 June 1268. After Conradin's entrance into Rome in July, insurrections in Sicily, by barons in Puglia, by Saracens in Lucera, and in the coastal cities of Campania seemed on the verge of handing him the kingdom. Charles of Anjou was able to force Conradin into battle at Tagliacozzo, preventing him from uniting with those who revolted. Defeated by the superior tactics of the Angevin, Conradin was captured near Nettuno and, found guilty of lèse-majesté, was beheaded in Naples on 29 October 1268.

[*See also* Charles of Anjou *and* Tagliacozzo, Battle of.]

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Translated from the Italian by Joe Jackson

CONRAD OF LANDAU

See Konrad von Landau.

CONSTABLE

In medieval sources, the word "constable" has several meanings. Commanders of garrisoned castles were often referred to as constables, as were the leaders of small units of around 25 to 80 infantry soldiers or of 10 knights. A town, or each ward or quarter of a town, might have a constable in charge of its urban militia. Ships outfitted for war often had a constable, who seems to have commanded the crew in fighting and received pay equal to the ship's master.

At a higher level, the constable—originally the late-Roman *comes stabuli* (count of the stable), responsible for the emperor's horses—was one of the senior officials of a royal or magnate household. By the eighth century, Carolingian constables had important military responsibilities and sometimes served as commanders. By the early eleventh century in the French royal administration, which was a model for many others, the constable was one of the four great officers of the household, and this usage was carried by the Normans into England and Italy. By the end of the twelfth century, the constable had replaced the seneschal as the chief military officer of France. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the constables of the Iberian realms and the Latin Empire of Constantinople had similar status. In the fifteenth century, according to a president of Parlement, the constableship was recognized as "the principal and first office of France in honors and prerogatives, coming before that of the chancellor and all others." Under the king, the constable was the commander of all land forces. In a royal army,

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the constable shared with marshals the duties of maintaining order in the army; judging cases involving the law of arms; registering service and preventing desertion; evaluating horses for *restauratio equorum*; and supervising the watch, billeting, reconnaissance, and the conduct of forays. He participated in councils of war and had charge of arraying the army for battle. According to Christine de Pizan, he was also responsible for managing an army's river crossings, overseeing care of the sick and wounded, and ensuring that the merchants who sold to the troops used fair weights and measures. He may also have had broader provenance over matters of logistics.

In France, the constable received a fee equal to one day's pay from every soldier taking royal wages and was entitled to the horses, armor, and supplies in fortified places captured by assault. In England, he claimed 2 pence from every pound (i.e., 0.83 percent) spent on military wages, along with weekly fees from various camp followers (e.g., 4 pence from prostitutes and all hornless beasts, hogs, and unshod horses taken as booty).

[*See also* Marshal *and Restauratio Equorum, Restor.*]

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CONSTANTINE V

(r. 741–775), son of the emperor Leo III. Constantine, born at Constantinople in 718, was crowned co-emperor at the age of two in 720. Shortly after his accession in 741, his brother-in-law, the *kouropalates* Artabasdos (Artavasdus), attempted to depose him, but in the civil war that followed Artabasdos was eventually captured and Constantine regained his throne and capital city in 743 or 744. After a council in 754, held at the imperial palace of Hiereia opposite Constantinople, he initiated a consistent iconoclast policy, though the evidence for a generalized persecution of monks, relics, and icons is problematic. Constantine was an effective and popular military leader and successful commander-in-chief, campaigning frequently, sometimes on a yearly basis, against the Bulgars to the north and against the Arabs in the east. His military reforms, dictated in part by internal political considerations, included the transformation of the district of Optimaton, within the Opsikion command, into a logistics support division, and the reform of the older palatine guards units into an elite cavalry corps, which became the core of the imperial field army. In general terms Constantine's reign saw the stabilization of the empire's frontiers, successful reassertion of imperial military power in the Balkans and in the east, and a sustained attempt to maintain an imperial presence in the central and western Mediterranean, both diplomatically and in respect of maritime power.

[*See also* Byzantine Empire, *subentry on* Narrative (500–900).]

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CONSTANTINOPLE

[*This entry contains five subentries, on Constantinople's fortifications; on the Rus' attacks of 860, 907, and 941; and on the sieges of 717–718, 1422, and 1453. For discussion of the Sack of Constantinople in 1204, see Crusades, subentry on Narrative (1180–1245).*]

Fortifications

The construction of the new capital began in 324 on the site of the old Greek city of Byzantion, and

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The Walls of Constantinople. The walls, north of the Golden Gate, show the triple nature of Constantinople's defenses: there was an outer wall, a moat, and three inner walls, each separated by a gap. PHOTOGRAPH BY PAUL F. CRAWFORD

was inaugurated on 11 May 330. Constantinople was provided with a defensive land wall that was finished during the reign of Constantius II (337–361). The Gothic attack of 378 was stopped by this fortification, which continued to be used as a secondary defense line until the eighth century. Over time, the Constantinian wall has been completely destroyed. It is believed that the original fortification was provided with U-shaped towers, like some surviving city walls built during the Constantinian period. The main gate (the Old Golden Gate that survived until 1509) was located to the southwest, at the terminus of the Via Egnatia.

New land walls, measuring 1,717 feet (5,650 meters), were built under the direction of the city prefect Anthemius between 405 and 413, during the reign of Theodosius II, to accommodate the increasing population and to repel Hunnic attacks. Stretching between the Marmara Sea and the twelfth-century palace known as Tekfur Saray, they were 0.93 miles (1.5 kilometers) west of the Constantinian walls. The wall had a median width of 5 meters and a height of approximately 12 meters. Its faces were made from regular limestone blocks alternated with bricks. The distance between the 96 octagonal or square projecting towers, each 18 meters high, varies between 50 and 70 meters. On the top is a battlement, 1.4 meters high, accessible through the steps set near the gates. The towers have two stories, the upper being used for defense, including for ballistas.

After the big earthquake of 6 November 447 when fifty-seven towers fell down, the Theodosian wall was repaired in two months. After this, a new wall was built outside it, at a distance of 16 meters from the old one, 2 meters thick and 8 meters high (on the exterior part). On the top of the wall is a battlement. The lower level of the wall has around 2,500 casemates used by archers. The 96 towers were approximately 10 meters high and placed at the middle points between the towers of the old wall. The space between the two walls (*parateichon*) was used for patrol. In front of the outer wall is an open space of 20 meters (*peribolos*), followed by a moat 18 meters wide and at least 7 meters deep, which was filled with water. The moat is divided by several dams. The bridges over this obstacle were made of wood. On the inner side of the ditch was a crenellated balustrade for the first line of archers. With these additions, the

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defensive belt of the city reached a width of around 65 meters and a level difference of 30 meters from the top of the towers to the bottom of the ditch. The defensive system was designed to be this strong because there are no natural obstacles in the terrain. Both walls were many times repaired before 1204, again during the Palaeologian period, and even after the Ottoman conquest. Major earthquakes like those of 557, 740, 864, and 986 caused considerable damage. The repairs respected the original defense system and building techniques. They are recorded by inscriptions inserted on the wall.

A wall from the Constantinian period located north of the end of the Theodosian precinct (at Tekfur Saray) was replaced by another one, erected after the Persian-Avar siege of 626 to protect the church and suburb of Blachernae. It is called *Pteron* ("the wing"). The work was completed under Leo V (r. 813–820) with an outer wall, 1 meter thick, placed at a distance 20 meters to the west. After some decades three towers were added with a height of 26 meters. In the same region of Blachernae where he moved the imperial palace, Manuel I Komnenos constructed after 1150 a new curtain wall with a width of 3.75 meters and a height of 15 to 18 meters. Because this wall is located near a hill, it was not provided with a ditch. The 13 towers placed in a range between 18 and 38 meters have walls with a thickness of 4 to 5 meters, because they were designed to repel the strikes of counterweight trebuchets, a weapon introduced in the Late Byzantine period. The last major restoration of the Theodosian wall occurred from 1433 to 1448, in a desperate attempt to save the city. The outer towers were made higher to accommodate trebuchets.

The shore of the Golden Horn was protected by a wall erected most probably at the time of the city's founding. It is 10 meters high and has 110 towers. In 439 the sea wall was extended along the Marmara Sea, up to the Golden Gate. This section has 118 towers at a height of 12 to 15 meters. In case of a maritime attack, the narrow entrance to the Golden Horn was closed with a chain. North of the Golden Horn, a distinct fortification was built after 1335 by the Genoese colony (Pera).

The main entrance of the Theodosian land walls was the Golden Gate (66 meters wide and 20 meters high), located in the southwestern corner, between towers nine and ten. It was recently demonstrated that this gate was built between 388 and 391 as a triumphal arch which commemorated the victory of Theodosius I over Magnus Maximus, and that the wall was erected in this position to use the arch as a gate. The Golden Gate was reinforced in 1354. At a small distance to the north was the entrance known as the Small Golden Gate used for regular traffic (in modern times called Yedikule Kapi). Along the wall are placed other gates, five military and four civilian, as well as several posterns (small entrances). On the northwestern section of the fortification are another five gates. The sea wall has fourteen gates along the Golden Horn and another four along the Marmara shore.

Provided with such strong land and sea fortifications, Constantinople resisted many sieges. Only the gunpowder artillery and clever strategy of the Ottoman ruler Mehmed II made possible the conquest of 1453.

[*See also* Constantinople, *subentries on* Rus' Attacks (860, 907, and 941), Siege of (717–718), Siege of (1422), *and* Siege of (1453).]

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Rus' Attacks (860, 907, and 941)

The Black Sea was traditionally regarded by the Byzantines as free from significant naval threats. The Rus, a grouping of Scandinavian origin, moved into

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the northern river systems of what is now Russia (named after them), and by the 830s had a tribute-gathering and commercial organization centered on Novgorod, some 1,300 miles from Constantinople. Although a Rus raid on the port of Amastris (on modern Turkey's north coast) is recorded for the 830s, such episodes were localized. So when a sizable war fleet appeared off the imperial capital on 18 June 860, Constantinople's patriarch Photios called it a "thunderbolt": the Rus sailed past the sea-walls with swords raised, "as if threatening the city." They devastated the suburbs and ran amok in the countryside. Yet they had no chance of breaching the city walls; the return voyage by sea limited what they could carry off and their fleet suffered heavy losses in a storm. Soon after, the Rus leadership sent an embassy requesting a religious mission, apparently recognizing the futility of direct assaults on Constantinople.

The Byzantines, too, rated the Rus' chances of military success low, judging by Emperor Leo VI's Taktika: the Rus had to use light boats on the Black Sea because they plied riverways en route. Leo's assessment may look complacent, seeing that Rus were then establishing themselves nearer Byzantium on the middle Dnieper. The Rus *Primary Chronicle*, the main source for events north of the Black Sea steppes, recounts a spectacular raid on Constantinople in 907: the Rus terrified "the Greeks" by conveying their boats on wheels onto the Golden Horn, north of the city; having levied tribute, the Rus leader Oleg hung his shield in triumph from the city gates. However, these sagalike stratagems left no imprint on the Byzantine sources; probably, at most, the Rus made a show of force. The *Primary Chronicle*'s concoction serves to frame the texts of two Russo-Byzantine agreements, portions of which it cites. They show that Byzantine diplomacy was offering the Rus means of self-enrichment more reliable than raiding: trading or military service. Already in 911, seven hundred Rus served on operations in the eastern Mediterranean, probably as marines, and Rus featured in other naval task forces.

When a Rus fleet bore down on Constantinople again on 11 June 941, the imperial authorities were taken by surprise. Romanos I Lekapenos had to demothball the few ships available and rig them out with Greek fire. The attack was unexpected in that trade had been booming, and shortly before 941 the Rus, incited by Romanos's bribes, had seized a key fortress on the Strait of Kerch belonging to the Khazars. The Rus' action suggests their amenability to Byzantine politico-commercial pressure. So when the Khazars drove them from the fortress, forced them to submit, and demanded that they attack Byzantium, they were in a quandary—thus, perhaps, the ineffectiveness of their expedition, which numbered around a thousand boats. Galleys intercepted the Rus at the mouth of the Bosporos, burning many boats, and the rest made for Asia Minor's north coast. Byzantine cavalry harried contingents foraging inland. Although the Rus ravaged the eastern coastline of the Bosporos, burning many churches and committing atrocities, they failed to seize strongholds. The arrival of the main eastern army under the domestic of the schools John Kourkouas intimidated the Rus, keeping them close to their boats. In September, short of food, they attempted a nocturnal breakout to the Thracian coast of the Black Sea, but were spotted and underwent a second crushing defeat. Prince Igor escaped with a few boats, sailing north via Kerch, suffering further losses from dysentery. Igor gained nothing beyond a reminder of the hazardousness of attacking Constantinople. After three years a treaty was negotiated, restoring Rus access to the capital's markets. The strategic advantage still lay with the Byzantines.

[*See also* Khazars; Kourkouas, John; Leo VI; *and* Romanos I Lekapenos.]

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Jonathan Shepard

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Siege of (717–718)

As early as 714, it became known that Caliph al-Walid was planning a great assault on Constantinople. All citizens who could not avail themselves of sufficient provisions for a period of three years were commanded to leave the city. The city's walls were carefully restored, and military engines (trebuchets) were refurbished. In spite of his preparations, however, many were unhappy with the emperor Anastasius. A pretender, Theodosius, was raised in 716 by the army, but when Theodosius could not secure universal support, he was replaced by the *strategos* (general) of the *theme* of Anatolikon, who reigned as Leo III.

Walid died in 715, replaced by Caliph Sulayman ibn 'Abd al-Malik, whose brother Maslamah led the Muslim besiegers. He commanded 120,000 men and a fleet estimated at 1,800 ships. However, Leo III marshaled his forces effectively. Greek fire was used liberally against the besiegers' ships, forcing them to put in some distance from the city walls, near Abydus on the Thracian coast. There, a particularly cold winter with heavy snowfall prevented them from foraging, and cold, hunger, and disease took their toll. Meanwhile, the Bulgarians harassed the Muslim camp from the landward side, preventing foraging even as the snows melted and the land thawed. The thirteen-month siege was as hard for the Arabs as those within Constantinople, and in August 718 they withdrew, only to have many ships destroyed in a summer squall. Reports claim that barely five ships made it home.

Leo III, therefore, enjoyed a substantial victory and gained some time to consolidate his regime. However, the Arab land forces had not been so depleted as the fleet. They withdrew into Syria, and five years later, annual invasions into Asia Minor recommenced.

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Siege of (1422)

Following the Ottoman Turkish wars of succession (1402–1413), the Byzantine government enjoyed outwardly friendly relations with the victorious Sultan Mehmed I (r. 1412–1421). Upon his death, a "war" faction, led by young John VIII Palaiologos, co-emperor and regent for his aged father, Manuel II (r. 1391–1425), rashly chose to intervene in Turkish affairs. Disdaining the legal successor, Murad II (r. 1421–1451), John backed a rival claimant to the Ottoman throne. However, John misjudged both the ungrateful pretender and the formidable young sultan.

In January 1420 Murad brought his forces against the pretender, who was quickly suppressed. Now he would avenge himself on Byzantium by attacking the great city of Constantinople, which his grandfather, Bayezid I (r. 1389–1403), had failed to take in an earlier Turkish siege (1394–1402). The attack began on 10 June, and Murad arrived around 20 June to direct operations himself. We lack reliable figures for the number of attackers or defenders, but know that the Turks confronted the aged land walls of Constantinople with cannon fire for the first time. These cannons were identified, among a bewildering array of arcane military terms, by John Kananos, the eyewitness writer of a prime Byzantine source whose main theme was the traditional rescue of the city by the Virgin Mary.

The city walls held against the bombards, and John VIII redeemed himself by leading a vigorous defense. Murad gambled on a last general assault, on 24 August, which failed. By this time, the ailing Manuel had resumed leadership. His diplomatic efforts on behalf of another Turkish pretender further undermined Murad's resolve. On 6 September the sultan withdrew his forces, ending the siege. Thereafter, Murad made no further direct move

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against the old Byzantine city destined to become the Ottoman capital. That would not come for another thirty years.

[*See also* Constantinople, *subentry on* Siege of (1453).]

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Siege of (1453)

Having first conquered the Balkan and Anatolian territories that once were the historic core of the Byzantine Empire, the Ottoman Turkish sultans would inevitably covet Constantinople as their necessary and natural capital. Bayezid I (r. 1389–1403) failed in the first, prolonged Turkish siege of the city (1394–1402), and Murad II (r. 1421–1444, 1446–1451) abandoned the short second one. Murad devoted his reign to rounding out and consolidating the Turkish conquests as a base for the final seizure of the longed-for city. That task was the initial undertaking of Murad's son and successor, the aggressive Mehmed II Fatih, "the Conqueror" (r. 1444–1446, 1451–1481).

Save for some local towns, a few islands, and the distant Morea, the sclerotic Byzantine Empire was reduced to little more than the city of Constantinople itself. Desperate for aid from the West, the penultimate emperor, John VIII (r. 1425–1448), had sacrificed Greek Orthodox pride in agreeing to Church Union with Latin Christendom at the Council of Florence (1439). That action alienated many of his subjects, introducing grave dissension and resistance within Constantinople, as peril mounted. His brother and successor, Constantine XI (r. 1448–1453), was left to face that peril.



Plan of Constantinople. This sixteenth-century map, probably influenced by Cristoforo Buondelmonte's 1422 plan, shows how Constantinople looked before it was captured by the Turks in 1453. BIBLIOTHÈQUE NATIONALE, PARIS, FRANCE/GIRAUDON/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

Constantine allowed papal agents to proclaim the Union in Hagia Sophia, provoking the disruptive rage of anti-Unionists, led by the former courtier and monk Gennadios (who became the first patriarch under the Turks). Constantine's diplomatic feelers for alliances proved largely fruitless, and, in fact, Europe's Christian regimes would marshal no serious military aid. Cautious at first, Mehmed forecast his intentions in April–August 1453 by building the formidable fortress of Rumeli Hisar on the European side of the Bosphorus to control the straits and cut Constantinople's food supply. Over the winter, the sultan made his full preparations, and in the early days of April 1453 the Turkish besiegers moved into place.

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Built around the elite Janissary corps, expanded by feudal levies, and with numerous auxiliary and allied forces, Mehmed's attacking army has been estimated at anywhere from 80,000 to 150,000 fighting men, plus a large fleet. But Mehmed, a pioneer in the use of cannons, had commissioned some 15 bombards designed to pound the city's great but decayed land walls. With a population of under 50,000 at the time, Constantinople could reportedly muster scarcely 5,000 defenders of its own, augmented by numbers of resident foreigners, including Venetians. Hoped-for outside aid proved limited: mainly a small force of 200 brought by Cardinal Isidore of Kiev (in December) and then 700 under the Genoese adventurer Giovanni Giustiniani Longo (in late January). The Genoese of Galata remained officially neutral. By best estimates, the defenders numbered under 7,000 trained soldiers, with armed civilians totaling few more than 40,000 to oppose the Turks.

The first general assault (on 18 April) was repulsed. The successful arrival of four grain ships (on 20 April) briefly raised the defenders' morale. A second attack was repulsed (on 21 April). The boom and chain Constantine had mounted to bar entry into the Golden Horn had held against assaults, so the Turks one night (21/22 April) secretly hauled nearly eighty Turkish vessels overland behind Galata and into the Horn, thus threatening the Byzantine harbor. An attack on the Turkish ships failed (on 28 April), and Mehmed tightened his control by building a pontoon bridge across the Horn just beyond the walls. The Turks initiated efforts to mine under the walls in early May, but these were detected and counteracted by the defenders. On 18 May Turkish forces began building siege towers to set against the walls, but these actions also failed. Although the defenders had some cannons of their own for return fire, the more powerful Turkish bombards were beginning to damage the walls seriously, despite efforts at hasty repairs, while the incessant pounding was wearing psychologically.

Though the defenders were exhausted, with waning hope of relief, they had nevertheless held off repeated assaults. Fearful that the siege might fail, Mehmed prepared ostentatiously one last general assault, to begin before dawn on 29 May. The defenders held back the first two waves of attack, but the Janissaries' final surge at dawn proved irresistible. Giustiniani, fatally wounded, was carried away, and some other Westerners, including Isidore, made good their escapes. Constantine fought on to a death variously reported, generating romantic legends. By midday Turkish forces poured into the city for three days of plunder and violence.

It would be another eight years before Mehmed could reduce the Byzantine Morea and separatist government of Trebizond, but the fall of Constantinople effectively ended the 1,100-year existence of the Byzantine Empire, as one of the epochal landmarks of history.

[*See also* Constantinople, *subentry on* Siege of (1422).]

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CONWY CASTLE

See Welsh Castles of Edward I.

CÓRDOBA, SIEGE OF

Strategically situated on the Guadalquivir River, Córdoba was under the rule of the emir Abu Ja'far ibn Hud of Murcia in 1236. Muslim Córdoba had two distinct walled perimeters: the old medina, or city

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(with its fortified *àlcazar*, or citadel), and a new eleventh-century *arrabal* (suburb), the Ajarquia, located to the east.

The conquest of Córdoba was unexpected. Early in 1236 a small group of frontiersmen (*almogávares*), aware of the unstable political situation within the city, launched a surprise night attack on the city. Those who could speak Arabic disguised themselves as urban residents and scaled the wall of the Ajarquia. Once these men had killed the sentinels, the other attackers scaled the wall with ladders and secretly seized the district. When they were about to enter the medina and attack the *àlcazar* they were discovered, but they managed to retreat to the towers of the Ajarquia. The Ajarquia's residents fled into the medina, and fighting began. The attackers urgently requested help from both local frontier nobles and the Castilian king, Fernando III (r. 1217–1252).

When their petition reached him on 16 January, Fernando III was in Benavente, about 400 miles (more than 650 kilometers) north of Córdoba. He immediately hastened southward. With his brother Alfonso de Molina and a royal retinue of no more than two hundred knights, he arrived at the city on 7 February, just in time to help in another fight. But his small force was not strong enough to repel Ibn Hud's relief army, which was quickly advancing from Murcia. Because Ibn Hud hesitated, however, by March 1236 the Castilian king was able to besiege Córdoba with a force of at least twelve hundred knights. Once the people of Córdoba realized that Ibn Hud had abandoned them and that the Muslim rulers of Granada and Jaén had joined the Christian side, they decided to surrender. The city capitulated on 29 June 1236.

[*See also* Fernando III *and* Iberia, *subentry on* Narrative (1100–1300).]

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José Manuel Rodríguez García

CORFU, NAVAL BATTLES OFF

In October 1084 Robert Guiscard, the Norman Duke of Apulia, crossed the Adriatic to resume his Byzantine campaign. Most of the gains of the 1081–1082 campaign had been lost after Robert returned to Italy to settle unrest in his own territories and to give some long-delayed help to the pope. Both Henry IV of Germany, who was besieging Rome, and the south-Italian rebels received support from Emperor Alexios I Komnenos, who eventually forced Robert's son, Bohemond of Taranto, to leave for Italy in 1083.

By the time Robert assembled his fleet, some 120 warships plus supply and transport vessels, it was already late in the year. He landed at Butrinto and, after being delayed for two months by bad weather, retook Corfu. He then faced a determined defense by a combined Byzantine-Venetian fleet. In Anna Komnene's version of events, the Venetians sent a fleet of biremes, triremes, and "pirate vessels," with experienced crews. Hearing of the fleet's approach, Robert moved out from the fortified town of Corfu to Kassiopi on the north end of the island. The Venetians moved to intercept him. "A tremendous struggle" ensued in the narrow waters between Kassiopi and the mainland. The Norman fleet was routed but not destroyed. Three days later a second attack by the allied fleet again proved victorious, but the Venetians, who quickly dispatched messengers to announce their victory, apparently overestimated the damage they had done. Despite his losses, when pursued back to the town of Corfu, Robert was able to mount a third attack. Caught by surprise, the Venetians formed a "sea harbor," linking the larger ships together with chains while the smaller vessels were protected within the circle of ships. Anna Komnene writes that because the ships were now empty of provisions, they rode high in the water, and during the ensuing heavy fighting a number of them

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capsized when all the combatants rushed to one side to engage the enemy. She reports that thirteen thousand drowned and that prisoners taken from the captured vessels were maimed before being ransomed.

In William of Apulia's version, there was one battle. Robert decided to focus on nine tall Venetian triremes. Platforms were winched up the masts. From these, archers fired down onto the lower Norman ships; heavy iron weights were hurled onto any vessel that approached too closely. Robert and three of his sons—Bohemond, Roger, and Robert—each took command of five presumably smaller Norman triremes. Roger was wounded in the battle, but succeeded in driving off the Greek galleys (*chelandia*) that supported the enetians. Seven of the Venetian triremes were lost and seven Greek ships captured; 2,500 prisoners were taken.

Anna Komnene reports a fourth and final battle after the Norman victory; the account has been questioned, but Venice undoubtedly had sufficient forces to avenge such a defeat. The Venetians quickly prepared an attack force of *dromons*, triremes, and small fast ships that attacked the Normans off Butrinto, where they were then encamped. In this encounter the Venetians were once more victorious and nearly captured Robert's wife, Sichelgaita of Salerno, and his youngest son, Guy.

When Robert finally laid up his ships for the winter, sickness set in. William of Apulia reports almost 10,000 dead, including 500 of Bohemond's mounted forces, in less than three months. Despite this, Robert fully intended to continue the campaign. In the spring, he refloated his ships, a considerable feat of engineering since the river Glykis where they were sheltered was exceptionally low that year. He then sent Roger to take Kephalonia and followed in person shortly thereafter. As he headed south, Robert Guiscard fell ill with a violent fever and died on 17 July 1085.

[*See also* Alexios I Komnenos; Bohemond I; Byzantine Empire, *subentry on* Narrative (900–1204); Norman Conquests, Norman Expansion; *and* Robert Guiscard.]

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Valerie Eads

CORIA, SIEGE OF

Coria was situated on the Alagón River along a branch of the Roman Silver Road. Located southwest of Madrid, the town constituted an important gateway into Spanish Extremadura from the center of the Leónese-Castilian kingdom. Its position, 25 miles (40 kilometers) from the Portuguese frontier, also made it strategic during the twelfth-century conflict between León-Castile and Portugal. The Leónese-Castilian king Alfonso VII (r. 1126–1157) sought unsuccessfully to besiege Coria in 1138, but returned in 1142 to make a more substantial effort to capture the town. The most important primary source for the siege, the *Chronica Adefonsi Imperatoris* (Chronicle of the Emperor Alfonso), cites the date as the spring of 1143 (Spanish era 1181), but also notes that Alfonso's investment began two and a half years after the conquest of Oreja (October 1139). Modern scholarship has accepted 1142.

Coria's substantial Roman walls had been reinforced by the Almoravids, but Alfonso's second campaign completely surrounded the town, and the Leónese utilized the most recent military technology, including mobile siege towers, rock throwers, and armored roofs. We have no citation of the numbers involved, but the siege probably began before May, prior to the spring wheat harvest, because the inhabitants were near starvation by late May. This and the weakening of a major wall tower caused them to request a truce to seek outside aid at that time, with a promise of surrender if none was forthcoming. Certain that none would be provided, Alfonso granted their wish, accepting their surrender by the end of June.

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[*See also* Alfonso VII of Castile *and* Iberia, *subentry on* Narrative (1100–1300).]

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James F. Powers

CORTENUOVA, BATTLE OF

The year 1237 saw a renewed struggle between the Holy Roman Empire and the Italian city-states as the emperor Frederick II attempted to establish his control over northern Italy. Facing him was a coalition of urban polities known as the Lombard League, the same league that sixty-one years earlier had defeated his grandfather Frederick I Barbarossa at the battle of Legnano.

In August, Frederick descended into the Po Valley, pitching his camp near Verona; he was joined there both by the forces of the cities loyal to the empire and also by between seven and ten thousand Saracen infantry from southern Italy. The imperial army thus totaled some twelve to fifteen thousand infantry and about three thousand cavalry. The Lombard League could count on roughly two thousand cavalry and twelve thousand infantry, placed in a strong defensive position on the road between Milan and Brescia—the latter being Frederick's main objective. For two weeks the rival armies faced each other across a marshy river, until, with December approaching, Frederick made it known that he had decided to take up winter quarters in Cremona. In reality this was a well-planned ruse, aimed at luring the league's army onto unfavorable ground. To give credibility to his deception, Frederick destroyed the bridges over the river Oglio, to his north, and sent his baggage with a strong infantry escort toward Cremona.

The Lombards took the bait, confident that Frederick had retired, and moved north, encamping between Pontoglio and Cortenuova. There on the afternoon of 27 November they were surprised by the imperials, who had crossed the river to the south at Soncino. Hastily, the league's army took up a defensive array, with its left flank resting on the swollen Oglio, just in time to receive the brunt of Frederick's German cavalry. Fighting desperately, the Lombards managed to repulse the onslaught, as well as a second attack mounted by the emperor's Italian knights led by Ezzelino da Romano and backed by Frederick's Saracen infantry. For a few hours the battle raged around the Lombard *carroccio*, with the imperials making little headway until the Bergamo contingent, aware of the local topography, forded the Oglio and turned the league's left flank. The approaching night put a stop to the fighting, but Frederick ordered his men to sleep in their armor, in readiness for the next day. After some debate the Lombards decided to quit the field, leaving behind the *carroccio*, minus its insignia, so as not to be slowed in their retreat toward Brescia.

Frederick's pursuit started at dawn and proved remarkably successful: the Lombards lost nearly ten thousand men, killed or captured. Milan alone lost eight hundred knights and three thousand infantry. Many soldiers drowned in the Oglio while attempting to flee the pursuing imperials. Frederick's victory finished the Lombard League for good, although the emperor's demands for outright surrender caused a number of cities in northern Italy to continue their resistance. Frederick proved unable to take Brescia, but until his death in 1250 he remained the most powerful player on the Italian checkerboard.

[*See also Carroccio*; Frederick II; *and* Lombard League.]

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Niccolò Capponi

COSMIN FOREST, BATTLE OF

In 1497 John Olbracht, king of Poland, led an army of 50,000–100,000 people and 30,000 carts into Moldavia. After the unsuccessful siege of Suceava (24 September–18 October) the Polish army withdrew to Poland. During the retreat, they came under attack by an army of unknown size under Voivode (Prince) Ştefan cel Mare of Moldavia; the battle took place on 25 October 1497 near Cosmin village in Moldavia, in the ravine crossing Beech Woods.

Part of the Polish army had crossed the ravine on 24 October. The rest stopped for a night at the entrance to the ravine. The next morning the army was divided into three parts: the first comprised carts and artillery; the second King John Olbracht and his brother Sigismund, with their regular household troops and contingents of noblemen; and the third mercenary troops and the subsidiary Teutonic detachment. As the Polish army entered the ravine, the Moldavians cut down trees and blocked the passage, and Ştefan's detachments attacked from the wooded slopes. First, they successfully attacked the supply column. Meanwhile, Ştefan's army struck the third part of the Polish army, which was still at the entrance to the ravine. The latter managed, however, to escape and organize a defense at their previous night's campsite. The king sent some of his regular household troops (*curienses*) there to support them, which helped keep the enemy at bay. Having crossed the ravine, John Olbracht ordered his troops to set up camp, in order to provide a rallying point for the rest of his army. The Polish army lost about 2,000–5,000 people. The number of casualties in Ştefan's army is unknown.

[*See also* Ştefan cel Mare.]

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Tadeusz Grabarczyk

COTRONE, BATTLE OF

Despite the number of sources that report this battle, the exact date and location remain unclear. The place-names given either are general (e.g., "in Calabria") or can be variously interpreted (e.g., *in civitate Columnae*). Opinion currently favors a site near modern-day Crotone (previously called Cotrone) in Calabria. Other possibilities are Capo Colonna on the coast a bit south of Cotrone, Stilo farther south and inland, and Columna near Reggio di Calabria at the Strait of Messina. Sources date the battle anywhere from 12 July to 16 July 982, with most scholars preferring either 13 July or 15 July.

As Thietmar of Merseburg reports the battle, the emperor Otto II's troops were victorious in the initial encounter. The Sicilian emir Abu al-Qasim fell, and his troops fled. Otto's troops pursued them, but the Muslims regrouped and turned on their pursuers. In the second engagement, Otto's army suffered heavy losses, and many of the survivors were taken captive. The heavier horses and armament of the emperor's troops may have brought about the initial success, but the subsequent pursuit exhausted the horses. At this point the more lightly burdened mounts of the Saracens would have been fresher. That this was a successfully executed feigned retreat, and the emir's death an unforeseen mishap, is likely. John the Deacon of Venice, a contemporary recorder, mentions a reserve of Saracens, hidden behind the hills, that fell on Otto's troops after the initial victory.

Thus unaware of the size of the army he was actually facing, Otto may have attacked and pursued more rashly than was prudent. Collating the accounts of John and Thietmar leaves the possibility that the feigned retreat lured Otto into an ambush. Abu al-Qasim would have had the dangerous

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necessity of convincing Otto that he faced the emir's full strength, and he may have underestimated the speed and power of Otto's heavier horse as much as Otto underestimated the emir's numbers.

The *Indiculus loricatorum* of 981 is a geographically organized short list of German magnates and the numbers of heavy horse (*loricati*) to be brought or sent to the emperor. Troops supplied by churchmen account for 70 percent of the 2,160 *loricati*, who were reinforcements, not Otto's full strength, which presumably included contingents from the *regnum Italiae* as well as from the Lombard cities. Along with the dozen Germans named by Thietmar, Pandulph the Younger and Landulph IV (sons of Pandulph Ironhead) fell at Cotrone. German necrologies provide additional names. Karl Ferdinand Werner has estimated Otto's strength at twenty thousand, including seven to eight thousand heavy cavalry. Arabic sources place the number of their opponents slain at four thousand, not counting those taken for ransom.

Otto fled the field for a point along the coast where ships could approach closely. He swam a borrowed horse out to a passing Byzantine ship, which refused to take him on. The second time, he was recognized by a former bodyguard and rescued. Although the Sicilian Arabs withdrew without even stopping to collect the spoil, a rising of the Slavs and Otto's premature death the following year put an end to any plans to extend imperial authority into the south of Italy.

[*See also* Italy, *subentry on* Narrative (476–1000).]

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Valerie Eads

COURAGE

See Valor, Morale, and Cowardice.

COURTRAI, BATTLE AND SIEGE OF

On 18 May 1302, in what became known as the "Bruges Matin," more than three hundred French soldiers garrisoned in the city of Bruges were massacred by its citizens. The troops had been sent by King Philip IV "the Fair" into the county of Flanders to chase after rebels who had sought political and economic separation from the kingdom of France. Knowing that this massacre would inspire a violent response from the king, the people of Bruges mustered their militia and sent representatives to the other Flemish towns asking for support. Only Ghent, the Flemish rival of Bruges, refused. Guy of Namur and Willem van Jülich—the son and grandson of Guy de Dampierre, Count of Flanders, who had been imprisoned by the French for rebellion two years earlier—took over the military leadership.

Rebel troops targeted other French garrisons, first at Oudenaarde—which they quickly defeated—and then at Courtrai, the siege of which began on 26 June. The French army marched there to meet them,

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and on 11 July the two armies fought outside the town and castle of Courtrai. There are many excellent contemporary sources for this battle, including the *Annales Gandenses* (Annals of Ghent), Lodewijk van Velthem's *Spiegel historiael*, the *Chronique artésienne*, Guillaume Guiart's *Branche des royaux lignages*, Geoffroi de Paris's *Chronique rimée*, Gilles le Muisit's *Chronicon*, Ottokar von Steiermark's *Österreichische Reimchronik*, Willem Procurator's *Chronicon*, and the Oxford Chest, which apparently was carved by a Flemish sculptor shortly after the battle.

The Flemish army was substantial, estimated by historians at between 7,378 and 11,000, though contemporary tallies are much larger. Almost all were infantry soldiers, well armored in mail and carrying spears, swords, and a popular local weapon known as a *goededag* (literally meaning "good day"). There were also a few crossbowmen and some cavalry soldiers, although the number of these troops was quite small. During the siege of the castle, before their opponents arrived, the soldiers had dug a number of ditches in the fields outside the castle, doubtless recognizing the probability of facing the French in battle there. The French army was also large, although smaller than that of the Flemings; historians estimate three thousand cavalry and four to five thousand infantry. All were well armed and armored. Many of the French cavalry were knights, the "flower of French chivalry," in the words of contemporary chroniclers; these soldiers were recognizable by their golden spurs. Leading them was Robert, Count of Artois.

The French arrived at Courtrai on 8 July, and for three days Robert of Artois and his lieutenants surveyed the situation and planned their attack. Robert also allowed his army to pillage the Flemish countryside around Courtrai. In the meantime the Flemish generals positioned their soldiers in a solid line, with their backs to the river and the ditches in front of them. The cavalry dismounted and joined the infantry in this line.

Shortly before noon on the day of battle, Robert of Artois formed his troops in three lines in preparation for attacking the Flemish army. The battle began with an exchange of crossbow fire, but because there were so few archers on either side, the effect was negligible. The French infantry then marched against the Flemings, making their way across the ditch-filled field (quite easily, it seems). Initially, the attack was successful because the French impetus pushed the Flemings back. But before his infantry could gain victory, Robert of Artois recalled his soldiers, wanting, it seems, to give his cavalry credit for the ultimate defeat of the rebels.

The French knights charged across the battlefield, passing over the ditches and hitting the Flemish infantry. But the cavalry were unable to pierce the line, their horses stopping and backing away from the Flemish soldiers tightly packed in a solid formation. The ensuing cavalry charges did not make any difference, either; on the contrary, these knights and their horses became further enmeshed in the confusion of stopped horses. Soon cavalry soldiers were being forced from their mounts and were falling into the ditches, many of which were filled with water from the river and irrigation. The Flemings slowly pushed forward, keeping in formation and taking no prisoners. Soon the battlefield was covered by the corpses and blood of French soldiers, among whom was Robert of Artois. French casualties were heavy, with an estimated loss of between 40 and 50 percent of the French cavalry. From these, some five to seven hundred golden spurs were collected and hung by the Flemings in the Cathedral of the Virgin at Courtrai, thus giving the battle its modern name: the battle of the Golden Spurs. The rebellion continued.

[*See also* France, *subentry on* Narrative (900–1328); Low Countries, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1479); *and* Willem van Jülich.]

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Kelly DeVries

COVADONGA, BATTLE OF

Covadonga is a cave located at the end of a narrow valley in the Cantabrian mountains near Cangas de Oviedo in Asturias, northern Spain. Pelayo (d. 737), a Visigothic noble, began the Spanish Reconquest there. Pelayo's victory led to the formation of the Asturian kingdom and handed the Umayyads their first military defeat.

Although uncertainty surrounds the accounts, Munuza, who resided at Gijón and may have married Pelayo's sister, was the Umayyad governor. He had sent Pelayo as hostage to Córdoba, but the Christian escaped in 717 and persuaded the Asturians to rebel against the occupiers.

Munuza sent an army of perhaps twenty thousand men led by al-Qama in pursuit of Pelayo, who had three hundred followers. When Pelayo retreated into Covadonga, Opas, a Christian traitor, tried to encourage him to surrender, but he did not. Pelayo hid in the cave with a hundred men and deployed two hundred more on either side of the cliffs. The narrow valley with its high cliffs prevented al-Qama's forces from maneuvering well. From the cliffs, Pelayo's men pelted the enemy with stones and arrows. Muslim arrows shot upward turned in midair, causing great injury to the attackers. Pelayo exited the cave and surprised al-Qama's warriors, who tried to escape. Some fled over the mountains where they were killed by an avalanche, and others drowned in the Deva River. Al-Qama was killed, and Opas was taken prisoner. Pelayo expelled Munuza from Asturias and established his capital at Cangas de Onis.

[*See also* Iberia, *subentry on* Narrative (500–1100), *and* Pelayo.]

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Arnold Odio

CRABBE, JOHN

(d. 1352), Flemish adventurer. Not much is known about this interesting figure who appears several times in early fourteenth-century sources. At times he is variously called a merchant, a pirate, a burgess, and a mercenary. Where Crabbe was born is not known, although it is thought to have been Muiden—his ship was called the *De la Mue*—or whether he was even really Flemish, although that is the nationality he is most often assigned. He appears first in 1305 or 1306 pirating a Dutch ship, the *Waardebourc*, near La Rochelle, from which he

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stole 160 tuns (about 33,600 gallons) of wine and burned the ship. In 1310 in the Strait of Dover he led an attack of a ship on its way to London, from which he stole cloth, jewels, gold, silver, and other booty valued at 2,000 pounds sterling. And in 1311 he caught two ships off the coast of northern England and took eighty-nine sacks of wool. All of these incidents are known because Robert III of Bethune, Count of Flanders, was asked to punish the pirates; although found guilty, on none of these occasions was Crabbe caught or punished. No doubt there were other unrecorded piracies.

But the skills of such a sailor should not go to waste, and in 1315 the Count of Flanders named him admiral of a Flemish fleet instructed to do precisely what he had been doing without sanction for the past decade. Over the next two years he captured several French and English ships—part of his booty actually going to the count. Afterward he settled in Berwick, which he helped defend successfully against the English in 1318–1319. For more than a decade he used Berwick as his base for piracy—even becoming a burgess of the town. And when war broke out between English interests and Scotland in 1332, he fought on the side of the Scots until caught at the end of that year by Walter de Manny, a Hainaulter mercenary then fighting for England.

But King Edward III refused to punish Crabbe, a decision that proved correct when the pirate entered the English king's service, even helping him fight the battle of Halidon Hill and capture Berwick in 1333. Edward was so pleased with Crabbe that he granted him several offices and sinecures. Crabbe then became an advisor to the king, both against the Scots and later the French, during which time he was handsomely paid for his services. In the later 1330s he was especially useful in keeping the English Channel free of French ships so that Edward's army could be freely transported and supplied from England. Not surprisingly, he also played a major role at the naval battle of Sluys on 24 June 1340.

From then until his death Crabbe seems to have gone into semiretirement, although he does appear in the records again in 1341, 1346, and 1348 to perform duties at the behest of Edward III and the crown. He finally died early in 1352 in Lincolnshire, probably nearing if not surpassing his seventieth birthday.

[*See also* Berwick, Sieges of; Ships and Sailing; *and* Sluys, Naval Battle of.]

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Kelly DeVries

CRAVANT, BATTLE NEAR

See Crevant, Battle near.

CRÉCY, BATTLE OF

In the spring of 1346, King Edward III of England sought to assert his claim to the French throne. One force was to attack north from Gascony, another south from Flanders, and a third under Edward from the northwest. Edward landed in Normandy on 12 July and, despite his orders to the contrary, his men pillaged and burned every town along their eastward route. Philip VI of France, yet unready to meet the English host numbering fifteen thousand, consolidated his forces at the strongholds of Caen and Rouen and sought to impede the progress of the invading English. Edward encountered no serious resistance until Caen, which fell nonetheless. In six weeks he had marched within 12 miles of Paris before abruptly turning north. Philip had by this time assembled an army of sixty thousand men and, under pressure to confront Edward's army and end its destruction of the French countryside, left his capital in pursuit.

The French army traveled faster than the English because of the latter's need to forage. Philip caught up with his rival as he approached the

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

SHELLEY REID

Somme, but Edward hired a local to lead him to a tidal ford at Blanchetaque. Archers, who comprised half of Edward's force, dispersed the meager defensive force on the far side of the river, enabling the English to cross just before the French army arrived. Not wanting to risk an assault there, Philip retired a few miles south to cross at Abbeville. Edward continued to a position just north of the Crécy Wood, found defensible terrain, and awaited the French assault.

Philip did not know that Edward was preparing for battle when his army marched out of Abbeville the next morning, 26 August. They were spread out over 12 miles of road when the vanguard sighted the English array. Philip ordered his commanders to consolidate before attacking, but the majority of his knights, representing much of the nobility of Western Europe, were too eager to engage the object of their pursuit. His attacking force was largely devoid of his slow-marching infantry, but consisted mainly of 12,000 mounted men-at-arms and 6,000 Genoese crossbowmen. Twenty thousand dismounted militiamen arrived throughout the battle and the night that followed.

Edward had chosen excellent terrain for a defense along a southeast-facing hillside that extended from Crécy to Wadicourt. His sixteen-year-old son Edward, later to be known as the Black Prince, commanded the first battle, assisted by the earl of Warwick. He led 1,200 men-at-arms, 4,000 archers, and 3,000 Welsh spearmen. The second battle, commanded by the earls of Northampton and Suffolk, also had 1,200 men-at-arms but only 3,000 archers. Edward III commanded the reserve, composed of 1,600 men-at-arms and 4,000 archers. He observed the battle from a windmill to the right and rear of his troops.

Edward arrayed the first two battles in line, providing the tactical advantage of a narrow front to negate French numerical superiority. This formation took advantage of the slope of their position and the steep bank to their east. The young prince's battle faced almost the entire focus of the French assaults. The English men-at-arms fought dismounted, as had become their practice. Their horses and grooms sat to the rear, in a hasty corral of supply wagons. A few infantrymen, including archers and three or more crude artillery pieces, defended the trains. The archers of the main battle line formed up on either wing of the men-at-arms of each battle. They were equipped with the English longbow, a weapon the French king and his allies had not yet encountered in a large-scale engagement.

The French also formed three lines of battle. In the first line were the 6,000 Genoese crossbowmen, and the blind King John of Bohemia and his mounted guard, escorted by 300 mounted men-at-arms. The second line, under the count of Alençon, Philip's younger brother, was the French elite cavalry, numbering 12,000. Philip, like his English counterpart, commanded the reserve, which consisted of the remainder of the mounted knights and the few infantrymen who had arrived in time for the battle.

Shortly after noon, a downpour set in, but quickly subsided. The rain may have lessened the effectiveness of the crossbows, which were already hopelessly outmatched by the longbows. The latter could fire three times as quickly and had a slightly greater range. At about 5 P.M. the Genoese advanced to soften the target for a massive French cavalry charge, but, after

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releasing one volley, they suffered a devastating barrage of arrows from the longbows and began to flee. The count of Alençon, enraged, led a charge against his own crossbowmen, cutting down as many as he could. His knights, too, experienced the withering fire of the massed English longbow. King John of Bohemia ordered that he be led in an assault against the English lines. There, fighting valiantly, he was struck dead, his horse still tethered to those of his retainers.

The French onslaught continued until almost midnight, conducting fifteen waves of cavalry attacks. When young Edward was engaged in a dire struggle, the English king famously denied him immediate reinforcements, instructing his men to allow the prince to "earn his spurs." In desperation, Philip attempted to lead a final charge, but John of Hainault dutifully grabbed his reins and escorted him to safety, only after two horses had already been killed under him. Edward had his men sleep in their armor, prepared for another attack. In the morning Edward sent forth 500 knights to drive off any remaining Frenchmen. They killed 3,000 militia who had arrived hours after the fight ended.

Contemporary records listed 1,542 French or allied knights killed. These included nine princes, most notably the kings of Bohemia and Majorca, the duke of Lorraine, and the counts of Alençon and Flanders. The total number of French dead was probably close to 15,000. The English lost two knights, forty men-at-arms, and a small number of archers and spearmen. The victory demonstrated the tactical advantage of the English longbow against cavalry, particularly when employed in defense, but in practical terms that triumph did little to strengthen Edward's claim to the French throne.

[*See also* Caen, Siege of; Edward III of England; Edward the Black Prince; *and* Philip VI.]

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CREMA, SIEGE OF

The siege of Crema was conducted by Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa, ruler of the Holy Roman Empire, from 1159 to 1160. The siege was part of the struggle between the empire and the Italian municipalities.

After the victory against Milan—a city that the emperor himself called "arrogant"—Frederick summoned representatives from Germany, Bohemia, Burgundy, and northern Italy at Roncaglia in November 1158 to suggest new general rules relating to economic and political matters. In truth these rules were far less about economic issues or the restoration of "regalia" than they were about the intimidation of the Italian municipalities. The emperor wanted to create a committee with his faithful counselors, Otto of Wittelsbach and Rainald of Dassel, with the aim of visiting the towns to replace their consuls with *podestà*, lords of imperial appointment. Also evident was Frederick's intention to favor certain municipalities traditionally hostile to Milan—municipalities such as Cremona, Lodi, and Pavia—while simultaneously moving against Milan's allies.

In 1159 Frederick ordered the destruction of the walls of Crema, a bridgehead of Lombardy, that was protected by marshes, two curtain walls with

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towers, and a moat connected with the Serio River. The Cremonese, rivals of Crema, had offered Frederick 15,000 silver marks to besiege their rival. Frederick had accepted, without realizing that this would affect the internal battles between these communities and that he would become more of a vindictive instrument than a partisan judge.

Before beginning the siege, Frederick wanted to eliminate any possible relief from Milan. After having drawn the Milanese cavalry into an ambush by means of a trick, he captured three hundred knights. The Cremonese began the siege against Crema on 2 July 1159. Against all expectations the siege ultimately lasted about six months, prolonged by the severe winter in northern Italy. Frederick waited for reinforcements marching from Germany, which were led by his lieutenants, his cousin Henry the Lion, Welf of Memmingen, and Rainald of Dassel, the bishop of Cologne, all of whom arrived on 21 July. The empress Beatrice also arrived at that time. The imperial army then immediately drew up as follows: Barbarossa was between the river and the walls to the east, troops from Pavia enclosed the southwest side, troops of Cremona were on the northeast, and Henry the Lion completed the circle, besieging the north side.

Frederick expected to conclude the siege in mere days or weeks. Toward this goal his forces used several impressive weapons: mobile siege towers, as well as at least three *Mangani* and two *Gatti*. The difficulties that Frederick encountered in besieging Crema, a small but well-fortified city, damaged his reputation for invincibility. Frederick, realizing that the campaign was undermining his prestige, became coldly ruthless. He used prisoners from Milan and Crema as human shields on one of the siege towers, forcing the besieged to decide whether to attack their allies or to allow the enemies to approach. The chroniclers tell us that these human shields entreated their fellow citizens to attack regardless; the besieged, despite their anger and anguish, launched missiles in response to those desperate incitements. The tower was damaged, but it was swiftly repaired and reached its target nonetheless. Rahewin, who continued Otto of Freising's chronicle, describes the Germans playing ball with the heads of the Cremaschi, but meanwhile the Cremaschi slaughtered their captured enemies, hanging their dismembered parts on the walls of Crema.

The fight was not only between elite troops of the empire and the besieged Cremaschi; Cremona had also deployed a company of the wretched poor, scornfully called "the sons of Arnaldo," who were armed with only sickles and stones. There were also two specialists of siege machines, one on each side. In the imperial line, a distinguished engineer from Jerusalem was paid by the Cremonese to build a wooden tower that achieved excellent results. The Cremaschi had a man known as the "Marchese"—who may perhaps be identified as a certain Tinto Muso di Gatta—who, when he deserted to the imperial side, was elected count by Frederick for his precious services. Using crossbows and launching fire (the so-called *fuoco acceso*), the Cremaschi were able to make some sorties.

The siege ended only toward the end of the following January, when hunger and thirst and most especially the bitter cold and its hardships defeated the defenders. On 25 January 1160 the city surrendered. In his wrath at the prolonged resistance, Frederick ordered Crema razed to the ground. But the long siege that this little town had withstood against the imperial forces had given an indication that Frederick's strength was not invincible—a lesson that was watched and noted by the many towns of northern Italy.

[*See also* Frederick I Barbarossa; Henry the Lion; Italy, *subentry on* Narrative (1000–1300): Otto of Freising and Rahewin; *and* Siege Warfare, *subentry on* Tactics and Technology.]

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Federico Canaccini

CREVANT, BATTLE NEAR

The battle of Crevant (Cravant) was the most important victory won as a result of the Anglo-Burgundian alliance signed in the wake of the Treaty of Troyes in 1420. In July 1423 an Anglo-Burgundian army commanded by Thomas Montague, Earl of Salisbury, assembled at Auxerre to counter an Armagnac army composed of French, Scots, and Lombards that was laying siege to the Burgundian town of Crevant. The Anglo-Burgundian army consisted of about five hundred English men-at-arms and two thousand archers, with at least a thousand Burgundian men-at-arms and numerous crossbowmen and others. On 29 July the Anglo-Burgundians agreed, swearing a solemn oath in Auxerre's cathedral, to ride to Crevant the next day, dismount, and offer battle to the besieging Armagnac army. The Armagnac army, commanded by Louis, Count of Vendôme, and John Stewart, second Earl of Buchan, consisted of at least eight thousand men, perhaps twice the number of the Anglo-Burgundian force.

On 30 July, for reasons that are not entirely clear but ostensibly to reform his army, Salisbury halted some distance from the town. By the following day, however, he was ready to meet his enemy. The Armagnacs were drawn up on the opposite side of the river Yonne, a tributary of the Seine. After a delay, the battle began when the Scottish archers began to fire into the Anglo-Burgundian ranks; the effectiveness of this fire was reduced by the many large shields (*pavises*) with which the troops had been provided. The Burgundians countered with enfilading fire from their cannon, including thirty to forty *veuglaires*, while English archers pushed back their Scottish counterparts and began to hammer the enemy men-at-arms. Seeing the effect of this fire, Salisbury decided to be bold and forded the river, mounting a frontal assault on the Armagnac lines. Another English contingent, led by Robert, Lord Willoughby de Eresby, crossed a small bridge, dividing the Scots from the French. The French and their Lombard mercenaries quickly fled, leaving the Scots to fight it out. As many as three thousand were killed at the river, with more than two thousand prisoners being taken, including the Earl of Buchan and the Count of Vendôme. The battle was a decisive victory for the Anglo-Burgundians, who lost fewer than a thousand men. Meanwhile the remnants of the Armagnac army retreated to the Loire.

[*See also* Hundred Years' War.]

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ČRNOMEN, BATTLE OF

When the troops of the Ottoman Turks started crossing the Dardanelles in the fourteenth century, they came as mercenaries of the Christian rulers of the Balkans, employed both in international and civil wars. Yet while at the beginning the Turks came only to pillage and then retreat back to Asia Minor, later they steadily settled on the European soil.

An attempt to stop that process was made by Patriarch Philoteos Kokkinos, who sought to initiate an anti-Ottoman alliance of the Orthodox states—Byzantium, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Russia. However, only two Balkan rulers, the Serbian king Vukašin of Macedonia (1365–1371) and his brother, the despot John Uglješa of Serres (present-day Sérrai, Greece), reacted to that appeal, since their territories were directly endangered by the Ottoman invasion. The delay of the Byzantine response to their proposal for

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a joint campaign, however, made the Serbian rulers face the Turks alone in September 1371.

All the sources refer to the international character of the Christian army summoned by Vukašin and Uglješa: it included Serbians, Greeks, and soldiers from Dalmatia, Trebine, and even from Bosnia, Hungary, and Walachia. It was considerable in size; we cannot say with any confidence just how large, but the monk Isaiah, writing in the year of the battle, estimated sixty thousand soldiers. The Ottoman army, which also consisted of elite warriors, was much smaller: the sources mention a force size of between eight hundred and four thousand men, but that was the number of the detachment that attacked the camp of the Christian army, while the total number of the Turkish army is not clear. The army was commanded by Lala Ş¸ahin, the *beylebey* of Rumelia (southern Balkan regions).

The Christian forces approached the crucial fortress of Adrianople from two directions: Uglješa came from Serres (Serrai) crossing the Rhodope Mountains, while Vukašin followed the Hebros (Marica) valley. They camped on the right bank of the river at Črnomen (present-day Ormenion, Greece) some 25 miles (40 kilometers) upstream from Adrianople. While waiting for the arrival of the troops of Sultan Murad I (r. 1360–1389), Lala Şahin sent a detachment to reconnoiter the enemy. Noting the lack of discipline and negligence of the Christian troops, during the night of 25–26 September the commander of the detachment organized a surprise attack on the camp from four sides. The panic among the Christians was so great that they even started killing each other. The Christian army was totally routed: some soldiers were slaughtered, others drowned in the Marica, others became prisoners, and very few managed to escape. Uglješa and Vukašin died, though the circumstances of their deaths are not clear: according to some sources, Uglješa was drowned in the Marica, while Vukašin was killed by his own armor bearer.

Thus, the "battle of Maritsa" or "battle of Črnomen" became a turning point in the history of the Ottomans by opening up the Balkans to them. From then on the Ottoman Turks no longer acted as allies of the Balkan rulers, but turned them into their vassals and became conquerors of their lands.

[*See also* Byzantine Empire, *subentry on* Narrative (1204–1453), *and* Slavic Lands, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1500).]

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Crusader Castle. Montfort Castle, thirteenth century. Photograph by Erich Lessing. ART RESOURCE, NY

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CROSSBOW

See Weapons, *subentry on* Missile.

CRUSADER CASTLES

The two centuries of Frankish rule in the Near East was one of the most influential periods for the development of the medieval castle. The crusader states were in a more or less constant state of siege, facing a numerically vastly superior enemy and remaining a minority even within the territories under their control. In order to overcome these disadvantages, the Franks developed the castle into a highly effective instrument enabling them to withstand attack, to buy time, and, in the long run, to retain territorial control while avoiding, whenever possible, the need to face the enemy in the field. No less important, the castle was a means of controlling and administrating urban and rural populations.

Early Designs. Many of the smaller castles were built in the early decades of the twelfth century when the Frankish hold on the newly occupied territories was still tenuous. These first castles were mainly fortified towers, often without any outworks and with only the most basic defensive elements. Almost uniform in design, tens of such towers were built throughout the crusader states. These were usually two-story structures averaging rather less than 20 meters (65.6 feet) square, with thick walls, a single door, a cistern below the basement, and living quarters on the upper floor. There were archery embrasures on the upper level and the roof had battlements. Typical examples of such towers can be seen at Saforie (Tsipori) in the lower Galilee and at Bessan (Beit She'an) in the Jordan Valley. These towers fulfilled the functions for which they were constructed, as places of refuge for the Frankish settlers when required, as centers of rural administration (later to be replaced in this function by larger, unfortified courtyard buildings), and occasionally as toll stations or to defend roads.

From early on, somewhat larger enclosure castles were also constructed, mainly to fulfill defensive roles. A group of such castles with projecting corner towers (a type known as *quadriburgia*) were built in the 1130s and 1140s to form a defensive ring around the coastal town of Ascalon, which was held by the Fatimids and used as a base for raids into the hinterland of the kingdom. Both of these types—towers and *quadriburgia*—were simple designs, the latter usually being considerably larger than the towers, averaging about 50 meters (164 feet) square, and thus able to house a larger garrison and provide storage space and a protected training ground. They were also much better able to defend themselves; the projecting towers, with arrow embrasures low on their side walls, allowed archers in these positions to control the area immediately around the base of the walls, something a simple tower was unable to do. The combination of these two types of castles—with the tower within the courtyard rising high above the *quadriburgium*, as can be seen at Giblet on the coast north of Beirut—represents, in its simplest form, the concentric fortification that became a hallmark of the great crusader fortresses of the thirteenth century.

Improvements in Design. By the second half of the twelfth century the growing threat of Muslim invasion, together with the employment by the Ayyubid armies of improved weaponry, resulted in more advanced castle designs and the use of enhanced defensive elements. These were largely developed and introduced by the wealthy military orders that at this time expanded their involvement in military construction. Crusader castles became larger, more complex, and more effective as defensive structures. One of the most impressive castle designs of this period is the Hospitaller castle of Belvoir located southeast of Mount Tabor, overlooking

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the Jordan Valley. This is a large *quadriburgium* (about 110 meters/360 feet square) containing at its center a smaller but taller *quadriburgium*. One of the improvements introduced at Belvoir and found also in the expanded Hospitaller castle of Bethgibelin is a complex, strongly defended gateway system. At Belvoir an attacker would have to cross the moat (on the southeast), break through the outer gate, enter a passage while under fire from the walls, possibly pass through a tower (if so, entering the dark and becoming momentarily blinded), make a full 180-degree turn, pass down a second passage while under fire from the west, turn 90 degrees and break through an inner gate while exposed to attack from arrowslits on either side and a slot *machicolis* (a space in the roof of the gate through which boiling liquids or rocks could be dropped onto the attackers)—all this only in order to break into the gatehouse of the outer fortress. He would then need to encircle the inner castle, still under fire, to approach its strongly defended gate on the west. Such complex entrances were later employed in the castles built in the thirteenth century. The very compact and effective concentric design of Belvoir proved its abilities when the castle survived the aftermath of the battle of Hattin and only fell to the Ayyubid army a year and a half after the surrounding territory was lost to the Franks. However, the Franks could not continue to construct castles in areas exposed to the use of the increasingly powerful siege machines employed by the Muslims, and Belvoir proved to be not only the finest example of this type of castle but also unique in its design. There are no other similar castles in the Latin East except for a much smaller one, Saranda Kolones, at Paphos in western Cyprus.

The improvements in castle design in this period—the increasing use of concentric fortifications and the development of the types of large castles that became popular in the thirteenth century—were in large part reactions to the use of more powerful ballistic weapons by the Ayyubid army. The introduction of the counterweight trebuchet and the use of increasingly larger numbers of these machines forced the Franks to abandon the castle types that had previously fulfilled their needs and to begin to build their fortresses on mountains where the steep topography could play a decisive role in preventing or severely limiting the enemy's ability to approach the castle close enough to employ such weapons.

The two types of castles, neither entirely new but now used almost exclusively, are known as spur castles and hilltop castles. The spur castle took advantage of the topography by occupying the end of a mountain spur well above the two converging valleys. Because of the steep slopes on either side, no heavy siege machinery could be brought near enough to the walls of these castles, except on the one side facing the extension of the mountain spur. This meant that defensive works needed to be concentrated mainly on that one approachable side. It also meant that in times of siege, attack was only likely to come from that one side, and the defending forces could consequently be concentrated there. Examples of this type are Teutonic Montfort and Hospitaller Krak des Chevaliers. In both of these castles, the slopes on either side are too steep for approach, and the side facing the mountain range is defended by massive fortification and moats. At Montfort two moats cut off the castle from the spur, and a massive keep with walls up to 8 meters (26 feet) thick occupied the entire width of the spur, rising to a tremendous height. An even better use of topography was the hilltop castle, which was completely surrounded by steep slopes. Castles of this type include the huge Templar fortress of Safed or the smaller but dramatically located castle of Montreal. Castles built on peninsulas or on islands in a similar fashion made use of natural defenses, also being protected on three or all four sides. Templar Château Pelerin (ʿAtlit) was such a castle constructed on a peninsula on the Mediterranean coast south of Haifa.

[*See also* Fortifications, *subentry on* Overview, *and* Krak des Chevaliers.]

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CRUSADER RELATIONS WITH BYZANTIUM

During the medieval period, Western Christendom and Byzantium were the two main centers of Christian faith in the Mediterranean world. For centuries relations had involved a degree of tension, arising largely from the fact that the Byzantines viewed their Western neighbors as the same barbarians who had overthrown the Western Roman Empire and taken control of the papacy in Rome. In the eleventh century, doctrinal differences provoked further recriminations, highlighting the differences between the Byzantine Orthodox faith and Catholicism.

Even so, in 1095 Emperor Alexios I Komnenos (r. 1081–1118) of the Byzantine Empire felt no inhibition from writing to Pope Urban II requesting assistance against the Seljuk Turks, who had conquered Anatolia in the wake of their victory at Mantzikert in 1071. This was not an unusual request; embassies had been sent to Rome previously and increasing numbers of Western mercenaries had taken employment in the Byzantine army. It is probable that he envisaged the recruitment of a few bands of professional soldiers to supplement his own forces. Nevertheless, the response was unprecedented. The papacy transformed this appeal into a call for a military pilgrimage, known as the First Crusade, which was directed to retake the city of Jerusalem for the Christian faith. Urban's appeal found a ready audience and tens of thousands of men, women, and children took the roads eastward toward Jerusalem, through the Byzantine Empire.

In 1096 the first bands of crusaders began to reach Constantinople. They were a motley assortment of unarmed pilgrims, professional soldiers, and camp followers—hardly what Alexios had expected. These early arrivals were shipped swiftly across the Bosporus by Alexios where they were decimated by the Turks. The second wave of crusaders, led by several major princes, was better organized and equipped. Among these leaders were a number of warriors who had fought previously against Byzantium, including Bohemond of Taranto, whose father Robert Guiscard had posed a serious threat to the Byzantine Empire. Not surprisingly, Alexios seems to have viewed these forces with apprehension, unsure whether their stated intention of traveling to Jerusalem was merely a deceit covering a desire to attack Constantinople. In the event, after a series of hostile clashes, he extracted an oath from the leaders that they would return to him any formerly Byzantine cities that they might capture.

From the Byzantine perspective, in 1098 this vow was broken. During the course of the crusade a number of cities were captured and given to Alexios; however, in 1098 the First Crusade captured Antioch and Bohemond assumed control himself. Bohemond argued that Alexios was not entitled to the city because he had not brought his army to support the crusade during the siege and that therefore Bohemond was not bound by his oath. It was in this atmosphere of suspicion that the crusaders established the principality of Antioch and the other Latin territories in the Levant. In 1100 Alexios began to apply pressure on Bohemond and in 1107 Bohemond responded by launching a new crusade, against Byzantium. The expedition was a fiasco and Bohemond was forced to swear fealty to Alexios. This forced agreement did not conclude the issue, however, and Alexios's successor John II (r. 1118–1143), although beset by many foes, was forced to devote considerable attention to securing the submission of the principality of Antioch.

John's son, Emperor Manuel I Komnenos (r. 1143–1180), initially began to follow the policies of his predecessors toward Antioch; however, like Alexios, he had to contend with the passage of a major crusade,

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the Second Crusade, through Byzantine territory. Again, there were fears that the expedition might pose a threat to Constantinople because there was a known connection between one of its leaders, Louis VII of France, and the Norman ruler of Sicily, who attacked Byzantine territory during the crusade. Relations deteriorated further after the crusade suffered a series of defeats in Asia Minor, which were blamed in part on Manuel's supposed perfidy. Nevertheless, after the campaign, relations improved considerably. Manuel's understanding of Western Christendom seems to have been better than that of his forebears and he forged a mutually beneficial relationship with many Western rulers, including the kingdom of Jerusalem, where he became guardian of the holy places, a much-prized title for the Byzantine emperors.

After Manuel's death in 1180, the Byzantine Empire entered a period of disorder. In 1183, Andronikos I Komnenos took the imperial throne. He showed little appreciation of Catholic sensibilities and allowed the Latins in Constantinople to be massacred. More damagingly, in 1185 it became known that the new emperor, Isaac II, was in negotiations with Saladin, provoking rumors that the two were in league. It was in this climate of renewed hostility that a new crusading army passed through Byzantium on its way to the Levant, where the Christian position had collapsed after the battle of Hattin in 1187. This expedition was led by Emperor Frederick I, a long-standing opponent of Manuel's, who was believed to harbor designs against Constantinople. Suspicion led to violence and the resistance shown by the Byzantines caused Frederick to contemplate briefly the very thing that Isaac feared, an assault upon the city. Isaac bought peace from Frederick, but by this time relations between Byzantium and Western Christendom were in tatters. The empire itself became increasingly divided both in the capital itself and in the provinces.

This checkered history of diplomatic relations laid the foundations for what happened next. In 1203 a crusading army sailed up the Sea of Marmara and the following year it captured the city of Constantinople. The army's initial objective had been Egypt, but it became deflected when Alexios IV, son of Isaac II, offered the expedition, which was chronically short of money, a huge reward if it put him on the throne. The leaders complied with this request but, having fulfilled their side of the bargain, Alexios proved unable to pay, leading to a Latin conquest of Constantinople that would last until 1261. This event prompted a huge amount of controversy and many have suspected the crusaders of ulterior motives. Some suggest that they were really driven by greed, others that the conquest was a conspiracy of Western princes, a few that it was simply a product of circumstances. Whatever their real motives, the crusaders proclaimed that with the conquest of Constantinople, the schism between the Orthodox and Catholic churches was over; in reality, it exacerbated a deeply-felt hostility between these branches of the same faith.

[*See also* Alexios I Komnenos; Antioch, Siege and Battles of; Bohemond I; Byzantine Empire, *subentries on* Narrative; Christianity; Crusades; Frederick I Barbarossa; Hattin, Battle of; Isaac II Angelos; John II Komnenos; Louis VII; Mantzikert, Battle of; Manuel I Komnenos; Mercenaries; Robert Guiscard; Saladin; *and* Seljuks.]

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Nicholas Morton

CRUSADER SETTLEMENT

Settlement—defined here as the formation of landed communities by immigrants, mostly from western Christendom—was crucial to the long-term

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economic viability of the crusader principalities in general and to the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem in particular. Once considered a fairly negligible phenomenon, Frankish settlement has received increasing attention since the 1970s, thanks in large part to the work of Joshua Prawer, Ronnie Ellenblum, Adrian Boas, and Denys Pringle.

Of the roughly twelve hundred villages identified in the kingdom, Ellenblum estimated that 235 contained Frankish rural settlements. They were clustered around Jerusalem, around Nablus, north of Acre, and between Caesarea and modern Haifa, as well as around the various castles and fortresses. The settlements were chartered by the king, the church, the barons, or the military orders. Many were entrepreneurial projects initiated in order to turn grants of land to good economic use, though some, particularly around frontier fortresses, were occupied by garrisons. Montreal (founded 1115) and Kerak (1143) are excellent examples of this latter form.

Settlements' military character varied, many either losing their martial functions as the kingdom's frontiers expanded beyond them or else having no military function at their founding. Two of the best examples are Magna Mahumeria (al-Bira), north of Jerusalem, and Bethgibelin (Beit Jibrin), near Ascalon. The canons of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem had received the village of al-Bira from Godfrey of Bouillon in 1099–1100 and had settled it with French, Spanish, and Italian immigrants from Europe, as well as with some families from Palestine. The site was developed with a tower, afterward a castle, and was made into a double settlement: one within the castle walls, and one between the walls and the outer walls of the larger settlement. It was called Magna Mahumeria: this possibly indicates a former Muslim presence and also demonstrates the tendency of Frankish settlement to occur beside or over Muslim or Eastern Christian villages (though never, so far as is known, within or among Muslim settlements). By 1155 al-Bira had roughly ninety families, later increased by fifty more. As often was the case with many settlements, al-Bira possessed rights to some variety of burgess court, and it paid tithes in kind.

Bethgibelin, on the other hand, was developed by the Hospitallers around 1153, after receiving the castle in 1136 from King Fulk. Designed to limit Muslim raids from Ascalon, Bethgibelin served military, political, and economic functions, and the difficulty of attracting settlers to a border zone is indicated by the Hospitallers' giving up the typical right of pre-emption, or priority of purchase should a settler desire to sell his plot. Muslim forces sacked the village in 1158, but by the 1160s it had recovered to thirty-two families. The complex's fortifications decayed after the capture of Ascalon in 1153, only to be repaired and expanded in the 1170s in the face of renewed invasions.

The military utility of the settlements, and the extent to which they provided manpower for field operations, are issues that need further investigation. Aside from their towers and basic walls, few settlements away from the frontiers were defensively well placed to resist prolonged siege and attack. Surviving charters of settlement rarely mention military service as part of the rent fees. The first settlement in Palestine, Ramleh-Lydda, was founded for explicitly military reasons by Robert of Flanders during the First Crusade, and it became an important defensive stronghold against attacks from Ascalon. Yet Edbury's analysis of vassalic obligations to produce knights and sergeants in the *Livre des assisses* by John of Ibelin (John of Jaffa) highlights the difficulty in establishing patterns of military function: there is little evidence to show when and how ecclesiastical and urban communities actually provided the emergency levies outlined in the source. Seventy men of al-Bira died defending Gaza in 1170, indicating that such service probably did occur as the occasion demanded, certainly in fortress settlements. On the other hand, Bethgibelin, though a "fortress," was too small to supply a significant contingent, nor was its population martial in composition. Given that only a sixth of all villages were Frankish, the scale of military contributions is very uncertain, as is the composition of the levies—foot, horse, or archer.

The settlement movement collapsed following Saladin's reconquest of 1187, and most villages

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were destroyed or at least expunged of Frankish inhabitants. Some survived as Muslim settlements; Darum, south of Ascalon, for example, proved too major and productive a complex to suffer the fate of its comrades. There were no new Frankish settlements after the Third Crusade (1187–1192), immigration activity being confined to urban economic infrastructure in the coastal cities still held by the crusader states.

[*See also* Crusader Castles; Crusades; *and* Godfrey of Bouillon.]

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CRUSADES

[*This entry contains ten subentries, on crusader sources from 1095–1183, 1180–1245, and 1245–1500; an overview of the Crusades from 1095–1183, 1180–1245, and 1250–1500; an overview of crusader historiography from 1000–1500; and on crusader historiography from 1095–1183, 1180–1245, and 1245–1500.*]

Sources (1095–1183)

The capture of Jerusalem by the First Crusade in 1099 inspired an unprecedented surge of history writing, first by participants, and then by clerics in Western Europe who were anxious to show that the success of the expedition was God's work. Later Crusades, before the Third, which was a response to the loss of Jerusalem in 1187, were less successful and less well recorded. The spread of Western sources is therefore uneven. It is also difficult to achieve a balance of evidence by using Eastern Christian writings to represent the natives of the lands conquered, or Arabic sources to give the enemy viewpoint, since these groups were understandably less enthusiastic about the activities of crusaders and settlers in the Levant. This survey concentrates on narrative writings, which are richest in military detail, although it is acknowledged that other types of documents may contain useful information, albeit in more fragmentary fashion.

The First Crusade. The most immediate accounts of the first expedition are a few letters written in the course of the campaign by participants. Those from the leaders have the status of official dispatches; there are also two letters each from individuals, Stephen of Blois and Anselm of Ribemont. These and other letters were edited by Heinrich Hagenmeyer (1901), and English translations are included in collections of sources including those of Krey and Peters. Longer narratives were composed by participants after the capture of Jerusalem: by an anonymous author, whose account, *Gesta Francorum et Aliorum Hierosolimitanorum* (The Deeds of the Franks and Other Jerusalemites), was closely related to that of another eyewitness, Peter Tudebode; by

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Raymond of Aguilers; and by Fulcher of Chartres. These three writers traveled with different armies, but they cannot be treated as fully independent, since the *Gesta Francorum* was known to the other authors. Although these eyewitness accounts are invaluable, they should be used with some caution, first because they were written in the knowledge of the successful outcome of the campaign. In addition, the writers were clerics and so themselves did not fight, although of course they were close observers and also would have come from arms-bearing families and so probably had some experience of warfare in the West. Regarding the accuracy of their descriptions of military engagements, they use occasional tags from classical authors (Virgil, Caesar, Lucan) and from the Bible (especially Maccabees), which suggest some literary embellishment. They are particularly unreliable with regard to the numbers involved in battles, commonly exaggerating the size of the enemy army and minimizing their own forces to underline the magnitude of God's favor in granting victory to the Christians. This tendency is more pronounced in three authors who early in the twelfth century produced histories of the First Crusade closely based on the *Gesta Francorum*: Robert of Reims, Baudri of Dol, and Guibert of Nogent. Although all are interesting as texts, as evidence for warfare and military affairs, they do not add substantially to the eyewitness accounts, with the exception of Guibert, who has some original matter in his final section. Baudri's version was used in turn by Orderic Vitalis, who added some detail about Norman participation in the Crusade.

Three writers arrived in the Levant soon after the capture of Jerusalem, and therefore had access to participants' memories. Ekkehard of Aura traveled with the German army on the 1101 Crusade, and Caffaro sailed in the same year from Genoa. Caffaro is especially interesting as a secular annalist, and after his return to Genoa he recorded events in his city, including naval expeditions to Iberia during the Second Crusade. Ralph of Caen arrived in the Levant in 1108 and wrote the *Gesta Tancredi*, celebrating the exploits of the Norman Italians, Bohemond and Tancred. Since Ralph's main informant was Tancred himself, his narrative holds particular interest, although he is more concerned with personalities than with other aspects of the Crusade. A fourth Latin writer providing independent information is the richest source of all: Albert of Aachen. In the first quarter of the twelfth century Albert wrote a long and detailed account of the Crusade based on oral and possibly written sources (now lost). His descriptions of sieges and battles are vivid, and he also has more information on naval warfare than other writers on the Crusade. There were other Western accounts of the First Crusade, but none that was written close to the time or can be shown to provide sound information: eyewitness status has been claimed for parts of the Old French *Chanson d'Antioche*, but the extant poem can be dated no earlier than about 1200.

The arrival of the crusading forces in the Byzantine Empire is described by Anna Komnene, the daughter of the emperor, in her biography of her father, *The Alexiad*. Although Anna was writing some forty years afterward, she probably had access to official records, and although her account is obviously biased against the Westerners, it is more valuable as a corrective, for example, when she explains Alexios's failure to come to the assistance of the blockading forces at Antioch in 1098. Similarly, Matthew of Edessa was able to record an insider's view of the activities of Baldwin of Boulogne when he arrived in Armenian territory in 1097. From the Arabic point of view, the fullest account appears in the chronicle of Ibn al-Athir (1160–1233), who used the writings of earlier historians, including the *Damascus Chronicle* of Ibn al-Qalanisi (d. 1159, aged ninety).

Settlement. The anonymous author of the *Gesta Francorum* and Raymond of Aguilers both ended their histories with the battle of Ascalon in 1099. Fulcher of Chartres, however, who had missed the last stages of the Crusade because he stayed with Baldwin of Boulogne in Edessa, accompanied his lord to Jerusalem to worship at the Church of the Holy Sepulcher at Christmas 1099, and from July 1100, when Baldwin became king of Jerusalem, he was resident there. Therefore his testimony is invaluable for the years 1100–1127, when his account ends.

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He accompanied Baldwin I on campaigns beyond the Dead Sea and into the Sinai Desert, as well as describing the siege and capture of the coastal towns, which was the great military achievement of Baldwin's reign (1100–1118). Albert of Aachen also continued to write, and his narrative for the years 1100–1119 contains much unique information and independent interest. His is the fullest account of the Crusade of 1101, and the details he gives of campaigns, sieges, and battles during Baldwin's reign are often corroborated by Arabic writers. It is sometimes possible to compile and compare the evidence of Albert, Fulcher, and Ibn al-Qalanisi to arrive at a rounded picture, for example, of the siege of Sidon in 1110—in this case there is also some complementary evidence in Norse sources, since the king of Norway provided a fleet to blockade Sidon from the sea.

A work of outstanding interest from the military point of view is Walter the Chancellor's *The Antiochene Wars*, which describes the major battles between Antioch and the Turks in 1115 and 1119, the first a notable victory and the last a bitter defeat known as "The Field of Blood." He comments on strategic decisions, tactics, and the use of scouts and spies for reconnaissance and intelligence gathering. He was probably an eyewitness to the first battle of Tall Danith, 1115, and attempted a description. His account of other battles, and of the ordeals of Antiochenes taken prisoner on the Field of Blood, was obtained firsthand.

William of Tyre, the preeminent historian of the Latin East, wrote about the entire period under review. He was chancellor of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, which gave him access to important documents and (probably) human memories. His account of the First Crusade was greatly influenced by Albert of Aachen, but there is no evidence of knowledge of Albert's *Historia* after 1099, and he used the work of Fulcher of Chartres for the early years of settlement. His work was composed between the late 1160s and 1184, and it becomes more useful as he approaches his own lifetime, which is after both Albert and Fulcher's works ended. His is, for example, the only narrative that traces the foundations and early history of the military orders.

The two Arabic sources, Ibn al-Athir and Ibn al-Qalanisi, become fuller during the period. Ibn al-Qalanisi was based in Damascus, and so the activities of the kings of Jerusalem were of direct interest, while Ibn al-Athir came from a family associated with the Zankid dynasty, centered in the north at Mosul, and was in a position to gather information about campaigns against Edessa and in northern Syria. Usama Ibn Munqidh (1095–1188), the nephew of the emir of Shaizar in northern Syria, wrote the *Kitab al-I'tibar* (book of instruction by example, translated as *Memoirs*), an autobiographical work that contains many anecdotes about contact with the Frankish settlers. Few of them bear directly on military matters, but there are insights into a shared chivalric code governing relationships between the two peoples.

Matthew of Edessa's chronicle, which ran to 1129 and was picked up by Gregory the Priest for 1138–1162, continues to be useful for events in Cilicia and Armenia. There is also an anonymous chronicle written in Syriac covering events to 1234, of which the section relating to the First and Second Crusades has been translated into English, and the chronicle of Michael the Elder (1126/27–1199; usually called Michael the Syrian in English), which is only available in an imperfect French translation. Anna Komnene's *Alexiad*, which ends with the death of her father in 1118, offers a Greek perspective on events such as Bohemond's "crusade" of 1107, which attacked the Byzantine Empire, and reproduces the ensuing Treaty of Devol, 1108, in full.

The Second Crusade. Crusading activity continued sporadically in the first decades of the twelfth century, although it is clear from a variety of records that this was no solution to the manpower crisis. The capture of Edessa by Zanki in December 1144 precipitated a major response from Western powers, preached by Pope Eugenius III and Bernard of Clairvaux and led by two kings: Louis VII of France and Conrad III of Germany. This was the Second Crusade to the Holy Land. At the same time crusades were launched against the Moors in the Iberian Peninsula and the pagan Wends in the Baltic.

The capture of Edessa was described by Ibn al-Athir from the point of view of the northern Turks,

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and by Ibn al-Qalanisi, who was more strictly contemporary but living in Damascus. The anonymous Syriac writer and Gregory the Priest (Matthew of Edessa's continuator) wrote as inhabitants of Edessa who experienced the sack. The Latin account of William of Tyre is less detailed, because the author was absent in Europe at the time, but he commented on the difficulties of defending the city. The availability and usefulness of Latin sources for the Crusade to the Levant were affected by the fact that it achieved nothing: both armies were attacked by the Turks in Asia Minor and incurred devastating losses, and when the remnants of the forces arrived in the Kingdom of Jerusalem, the original objective of campaigning in the north to recapture Edessa was abandoned in favor of an attack on Damascus. Whether this was sound strategy is still debated by military historians; the tactical errors that led to an ignominious retreat from Damascus were much criticized by Western writers at the time. Extracts from Arabic sources for the siege have been usefully gathered by Francesco Gabrieli in his *Arab Historians of the Crusades* (though the translations have been criticized): they are Ibn al-Qalanisi, Ibn al-Athir, and Sibt Ibn al-Jauzi (1186–1256).

From the Western point of view, there are two narrative sources for the French expedition: the more valuable is the work of Odo of Deuil (who accompanied the king as chaplain on the Crusade), *The Journey of Louis VII to the East.* Unfortunately, Odo took the story only as far as Antioch. He was a protégé of Abbot Suger of Saint-Denis, who was regent of France during Louis's absence on crusade, and Odo intended his record to be used in a life of Louis VII to be written by Suger as a sequel to his *Life of Louis the Fat*; however, the *Historia Gloriosi Regis Ludovici VII* (The History of Glorious King Louis VII) survives only in a reworked version of 1165, which has not been translated into English. It has some useful additional details about recruitment for the expedition and preparations for departure. Conrad III was also accompanied on crusade by a chronicler, his half-brother Otto of Freising, but Otto deliberately wrote almost nothing about the experience, because it was such a complete failure. Some insight into the German expedition can be gleaned from letters sent by Conrad himself. William of Tyre was more concerned with accounting for the disastrous outcome of the Crusade than with recording the details. Odo of Deuil's account also sought to find reasons, and it focused on the treachery of the Byzantines; from the Greek viewpoint the story is told by John Kinnamos, a Byzantine official at the time of the Crusade who wrote a history of the years 1118–1176, and by Niketas Choniates (c. 1155–c. 1215).

The extension of the crusading idea to fronts in Europe has been mentioned, as has Caffaro's account of the naval attacks on Almería and Tortosa (now in Spain). The other major source for crusading in the region is the *Chronica Adefonsi Emperatoris* (Chronicle of Alfonso the Emperor), which covers Alfonso VII of Castile-Léon's campaigns against fellow Christians and Moors, culminating in a verse account of the Almería campaign (incomplete). The only unequivocal success of the entire Second Crusade was the siege of Lisbon by a combined fleet of Rhineland, Flemish, and English crusaders. This is recounted by an English writer in *The Conquest of Lisbon* and in several versions of a letter sent from Lisbon to Cologne in the Rhineland. These two texts largely agree as to the events of the campaign in Portugal, although Raol, an East Anglian priest, incorporates some long sermons. The expedition against the Wends, which has also been established as part of the Crusade, was much less successful, and was commemorated only by Helmold of Bosau in his *Chronica Slavorum* (Chronicle of the Slavs), written in the 1170s.

Following the failure of the kings' Crusade of 1147, there was a loss of morale and a decline in crusading activity in the West. However, this was also the period of Muslim resurgence under Nur ad-Din (1146–1174) and Saladin (1174–1193). This was charted by Ibn al-Athir, and the impact on the Latin East was recorded by William of Tyre, whose chronicle is indispensable for this period, when he was closely associated with the royal court of Jerusalem. He described the battles of Mont Gisard and Jacob's Ford, for example, although his account came to an end in 1184 and he was spared the experience of Saladin's victories in

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1187 and his capture of Jerusalem, which brought the First Kingdom to an end.

[*See also* Antioch, Siege and Battles of; Ascalon, Battle of; *and* Saladin.]

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Susan B. Edgington

Sources (1180–1245)

The beginning of this period coincides with the death of William of Tyre (1186), whose *Chronicon*, the most famous and important crusader source of the twelfth century, ends in 1184. Its story is taken up by the "Latin Continuation" and a number of interconnected Old French texts, including the *Chronique d'Ernoul*, which was produced in Outremer. Other continuations, collectively called the *Eracles*, were written in France. Together these sources provide vital, although sometimes conflicting, information on the events surrounding Saladin's decisive victory at the battle of Hattin (1187), as does the detailed description known as *Libellus de expugnatione Terrae Sanctae per Saladinum expeditione.*

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English Sources. A number of English sources survive for the Third Crusade (1187–1192), including Ambroise's *Estoire de la Guerre Sainte*, an eyewitness account of the campaign, written in Old French. It is extremely useful in terms of providing a description of events on the ground written by a member of Richard I (the Lionhearted) of England and Anjou's own forces. However, its authorship, combined with the fact that it is written in verse, ensures that it is not always reliable as it contains very negative representations of Richard's rivals, which are intended to entertain as much as to inform. Another eyewitness account is that of Roger of Hoveden who participated in the Crusade until 1191, while the *Itinerarium peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi*, which was probably compiled by Richard de Templo in London, appears to be closely related to Ambroise's work. Other authors who did not accompany the expedition but are nevertheless well informed include Ralph of Coggeshall, William of Newburgh, and Ralph de Diceto. They are all inevitably biased in favor of Richard the Lionhearted and tend to portray him as an idealized chivalric figure. However, they nevertheless give useful and vivid accounts of Richard's journey to the Holy Land and conquest of Cyprus, his participation in the siege of Acre, his campaigns in Palestine, and his failure to regain Jerusalem. Furthermore, a number of sources do give the German and French perspective, including the anonymous account of Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa's journey to Asia Minor known as the *Historia de expeditione Friderici imperatoris* and Rigord's *Gesta Philippi Augusti*.

The failure of the Third Crusade to regain Jerusalem led to the launching of the Fourth Crusade (1199–1204), but its diversion toward and conquest of Constantinople made it one of the most controversial crusades of all, and this is reflected in the sources. Geoffrey of Villehardouin's *Conquête de Constantinople*, for example, repeatedly seeks to justify the crusaders' actions and tends to portray the Greeks as treacherous usurpers who deserved their fate. This is hardly surprising considering that Geoffrey was one of the leading participants, although his closeness to the action also means that he is an extremely important source for the military events of the expedition. The chronicle of Robert of Clari, also known as *La Conquête de Constantinople*, is sometimes less accurate on dates, but prepared to be more critical of the greed of leading crusaders. In part, this reflects the fact that it provides the common knight's perspective of events, ensuring that it forms a useful contrast to Geoffrey of Villehardouin's "top down" narrative. Indeed, to the military historian the Crusades in general are exceptional in having produced so many sources by humbler soldiers and participants. Although Robert of Clari may only have personally witnessed events until 1204, his work is also useful in covering the subsequent Latin conquests in Greece down to 1216. A similar source is the anonymous *Devastatio Constantinopolitana*, and there are also a number of very biased accounts of individual crusaders, such as Gunther of Pairis's story of his patron Abbot Martin's involvement in the Crusade. Apart from Robert of Clari's work, there are also sources dealing with events after 1204, including the eyewitness account of Henry of Valenciennes down to 1209, which forms a continuation of Villehardouin. Thereafter the *Chronicle of Morea*, which exists in Aragonese, Old French, Greek, and Italian versions, continues the story until the early fourteenth century. It contains many descriptions of campaigns, sieges, and castles being built in central and southern Greece. The key Greek source for the Fourth Crusade is Nicetas Choniates (died c. 1213), whose historical writings (*Chronike Diegesis*) cover the period 1118 to 1207. Although inevitably biased against the Franks, he is also highly critical of the political corruption and in-fighting among the Greeks themselves. He provides a useful first-hand account of the fall of Constantinople, as well as the earlier passing of Frederick Barbarossa's forces during the Third Crusade.

The next major expedition to reach the Holy Land itself was the Fifth Crusade (1213–1221), a failed attempt to regain Jerusalem by first defeating Muslim Egypt. The campaign is described in vivid detail by the eyewitness Oliver of Paderborn in his *Historia Damiatina*. Oliver's account covers the lengthy siege of Damietta in the Nile Delta, as well as other interesting episodes such as the construction

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of the massive new Templar fortress of Château Pèlerin to the south of Acre, and its subsequent successful resistance against an attack by al-Muazzam of Damascus in 1220.

Meanwhile the various continuations of William of Tyre that deal with Outremer itself move on to the controversial crusade (1228–1229) of Emperor Frederick II, who arrived in the Holy Land determined to assert his political authority as regent of the kingdom of Jerusalem and suzerain of Cyprus. On Cyprus this led him into a dispute with the local baronial Ibelin faction over who should control the island during the minority of its child ruler, Henry I. The ensuing civil war (1229–1232) led to a number of clashes and lengthy sieges vividly described in the contemporary pro-Ibelin chronicle of Philip of Novara. On the mainland, clashes between Frederick II's supporters and rivals continued sporadically until 1242, and are covered from the early 1230s onward by the *Gestes des Chiprois*. Written in the early fourteenth century by the so-called Templar of Tyre, a Cypriot knight in the service of the Templar Master William of Beaujeu, this source is perhaps most famous for later providing the only eyewitness account of the final siege of Acre in 1291. However, it also includes many earlier events, as does another Old French continuation of William of Tyre known as *Rothelin*. This covers the period from 1229 until the beginning of the 1260s, including the military setbacks suffered by the crusade (1239–1240) of Count Theobald of Champagne.

Muslim Sources. Muslim sources for the period include universal chronicles such as *al-Kamil fi'l-Ta'rikh*, which covers events from the Creation until 1231 and was written by Ibn al-Athir of Mosul (d. 1233). A similar but later work containing useful descriptions of sieges and warfare in the mid-thirteenth century is *Ta'rikh al-Duwal wa'l-Muluk* by the Egyptian chronicler Ibn al-Furat (d. 1405). More focused on a particular place or region are works such as *Zubdat al-Halab min Ta'rikh Halab*, a history of Aleppo by the scholar and statesman Kamal al-Din ibn al-'Adim, who lived and worked in the city until his death in 1262. An important contemporary writer from Damascus was Abu Shama (d. 1268), whose *Kitab al-Rawdatayn fi Akhbar al-Dawlatayn al-Nuriyya wa'l-Salahiyya* (The Book of the Two Gardens, Giving Reports of the States of Nur al-Din and Saladin) covers events under Nur al-Din and Saladin. The latter's famous military career is also covered in biographies produced by Imad al-Din al-Isfahani (d. 1201) entitled *al-Fath al-Qussi fi'l-Fath al-Qudsi* and *al-Barq al-Shami* and by Baha' al-Din ibn Shaddad (d. 1234) entitled *al-Nawadir al-Sultaniyya wa'l-Mahasin al-Yusufiyya*. Both these writers are extremely flattering toward Saladin, their intention being to portray him as the ideal Islamic ruler whose generosity, bravery, and piety are highlighted through generic and somewhat dubious anecdotes. Alongside the English sources on the Third Crusade, they have therefore done much to create the popular image of the crusades as a chivalric clash between the wise Saladin and the courageous Richard the Lionhearted. They nevertheless contain useful descriptions of Saladin's many campaigns and sieges during the late twelfth century. Moreover, a more critical view of Saladin is evident in Ibn al-Athir (see above): his location in Mosul made him an adherent of the Zengid descendants of Nur al-Din, whose lands Saladin had gradually conquered following the latter's death in 1174. To Ibn al-Athir, Saladin was often more of a usurper than a hero of Islam; a salutary reminder that crusader sources need to be approached with caution if a more balanced overview of politics and warfare in the region is to be achieved.

[*See also* Richard I *and* Saladin.]

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Kristian Molin

Sources (1245–1500)

For the first 150 years of their history, the story of the crusades is largely told in a series of important chronicles, often by participants, which record what happened on each expedition. These sometimes provide information about the history of the Latin States in the East, but they produced their own histories, most notably that of William of Tyre, who provides a full account down to 1183. Thereafter we are reliant on the Old French continuations of his work, which reach through to the mid-thirteenth century. This stream of narratives reflects the profound interest of European people in the crusades and the Holy Land, which also embraced the attempt to conquer the Baltic Lands and the crusade against the Albigensians in Europe itself. This stream of grand narrative continued down to the crusade of Louis IX of France (r. 1226–1270), under whom the crusade became the foreign policy of France. Jean de Joinville accompanied him on his first expedition against Egypt (1248–1254), and his *Life of Saint Louis* provides a vivid picture of the hardships of war in the East. Geoffrey of Beaulieu, the king's chaplain, wrote the story of Louis's crusade against Tunis in 1270, though this work needs careful handling because its real purpose is to lay the basis for the canonization of the king. Other chroniclers like Jean de Vignay and Saba Malaspina of Sicily add much information about the Tunis campaign, and William of Nangis, in his chronicle, reported that many people blamed Louis's brother, Charles of Anjou, king of Sicily, for the failure of this expedition. But thereafter the grand narrative of the crusade fragments. The absence of major expeditions removed a focus for narrative accounts. The Old French continuations of William of Tyre, which provide the most important accounts of the Latin East, and were probably produced at Acre, end with the Florentine version in 1276. Thereafter we have to rely on the early-fourteenth-century

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Gestes des Chiprois, which incorporates a vivid description of the fall of Acre in 1291, the work of the "Templar of Tyre," as well as providing a vital source for the history of Lusignan Cyprus, whose history had been closely linked to that of the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem.

In fact, although chronicles continued to be written, late medieval history in general is based on record sources. This is because government, from the late thirteenth century onward, was becoming more complex and producing enormous quantities of documents recording almost every aspect of its activity. This growing administrative sophistication also extended to the Church and churchmen who were producing vast amounts of written material. But what is most striking is the amount of material produced by private people and organizations, which were becoming increasingly literate. It is a sign of this spreading literacy that more and more writing was in the vernacular. Old French writing dated back at least to the eleventh century, but by the mid-thirteenth century it was becoming increasingly common, as exemplified by the continuations of William of Tyre. People who were not clerics sometimes used Latin, but increasingly mother tongues were employed. In English the outstanding example is Geoffrey Chaucer, a soldier who enjoyed a distinguished career as a courtier, yet wrote English poetry. In Old French there is the very striking example of Christine de Pizan (1363–c.1444), a learned woman of the fourteenth century who earned her living by writing.

In this vast body of material, crusading occupies only a relatively small place. This is the primary reason why, until quite recently, the history of crusading in the later Middle Ages was generally regarded as being confined to a few isolated events in the Mediterranean. Crusading to the east, it was generally believed, really came to an end with the fall of Acre in 1291. Thereafter the Knights of Saint John seemed to be an anomaly as they continued the fight in the Mediterranean. Elsewhere crusading was confined to the Baltic, where the Teutonic Order was its standard-bearer. This view has been vigorously contested in recent years, especially by Norman Housley, who has done much to establish the study of the crusades in later medieval Europe. The essential problem, therefore, is not lack of sources but the sheer quantity of material and the difficulty of sifting through it. In effect the history of crusading in this period has to be told as part of the general history of Europe, and insofar as it has a focus, it lies in the papal records.

Papal Records. The papacy continued to regard the crusade and the recovery of the Holy Land as a very high priority, and bent enormous efforts to that end. But, of course, the papacy had other concerns. Moreover, historians, fascinated by the interplay between this international institution and the rising states of England and France, were often preoccupied by such issues and, of course, by the Avignon papacy and the subsequent papal schism, which seemed to prepare the way for the Protestant Reformation. And crusading itself became more and more bound with general diplomatic history and more difficult to discern as a distinct concern. Thus the papacy after 1266 was caught up in its alliance with Charles of Anjou, ruler of Sicily and southern Italy, and ultimately backed his ambition to seize Constantinople, justifying this as a vital step toward the liberation of Jerusalem. Thus the popes became enmeshed after 1282 in long Italian wars that embroiled most of the powers of the Mediterranean, blurring their concern with the crusade and Jerusalem. The collapse of Charles's ambitions, the weakness of the Byzantine Empire in the fourteenth century, and the increasing threat from the Ottoman principality in western Anatolia led to a change in the papal stance, and desperate attempts were made to bolster the decaying empire with "Holy Leagues" involving all the Christian powers who could be interested in fighting against the Ottomans, especially the Order of the Hospital and the Italian city-states of Venice and Genoa.

The fall of Acre in 1291 and the total loss of the Holy Land caused enormous dismay in Europe, but virtually no practical action to remedy the situation. This was largely due to war between France and England and conflicts within the German Empire that preoccupied the greatest rulers of the age. But it was also partly due to a recognition of the sheer difficulty of

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the task. In 1096–1099 the First Crusade had been able to use a friendly Byzantium as a jumping-off point and faced very divided enemies. But Byzantium was now deeply suspicious of western interference. Acre had fallen to the might of the Mamluk sultans of Egypt and Syria who dominated the whole of the critical area including the city of Jerusalem, and had mobilized enormous resources to create a highly efficient standing army of about twelve thousand well-trained and well-equipped men, which could be enormously expended at need. There was clear recognition that taking on such a power would require careful preparation and would be costly, not least because any expedition would have to be sent by sea. As early as the Council of Lyon in 1274, thoughts had turned to sending a preliminary force to the east in preparation for greater "general passage," all of which would demand careful planning and enormous resources. After 1291 a number of schemes were prepared for a crusade, notably Marino Torsello Sanuto's *Book of the Secrets of the Faithful of the Cross*. This was begun in 1306, and in 1321 a highly elaborate version was presented to Pope John XXII (r. 1316–1334). A Venetian, and a member of the family of the dukes of the Archipelago, Sanuto incorporated a vast amount of information about the enemy and about trade and numerous maps into his work. He proposed an embargo on all trade with the Mamluks, an alliance with the Mongols of Persia, and a descent on the coast of Egypt by a huge crusading force. It was an ambitious scheme, but the fact that others were prepared to consider other parallel attempts indicates that it was more than a mere pipe dream.

About 1306 a royal lawyer, Pierre Dubois, presented his tract *On the Recovery of the Holy Land* to Philip IV of France (1285–1314). The work was in two parts, with the second, which was for Philip's eyes only, urging a virtual takeover of the crusading movement by France. About 1310 a royal minister, Guillaume de Nogaret, argued that if the king took the cross, it should only be done with the support of the revenues of the entire Church. There was a logic to this "nationalization" of the crusading movement in that fleets and armies had become ruinously expensive, especially on the scale perceived as necessary to dislodge the Mamluks with their efficient army. The crusade of Saint Louis to Egypt in 1248 had cost 1.5 million livres over six years, but Charles IV of France (r. 1322–1328) envisaged that a serious expedition would cost 1.6 million livres annually. Sanuto suggested his plans would require 2 million florins per year. Philippe de Mézières was a French nobleman and crusading enthusiast, the companion of the crusader preacher and papal legate, Pierre de Thomas. Philippe had fought the Turks before rising to become chancellor of Cyprus under the Lusignan king Peter I of Cyprus (r. 1359–1369). He visited Jerusalem and there underwent a profound spiritual awakening. Under this influence he devoted his life to the liberation of the Holy Land. His voluminous writings are now relatively little known, but in the most famous of them Philippe proposed a "New Order of the Passion," whose members would spearhead a great crusade to recover Jerusalem, and would stay there to hold it against unbelievers. His order differed from the many contemporary secular orders like the French Order of the Star, whose members died in large numbers at Poitiers in 1356, in that it was a religious organization. It was intended, moreover, that it should be broadly representative of all orders of Christian society who would, thereby, unite in the crusade. He detailed the organization of his order and paid considerable attention to finance, estimating that his crusade would cost 3.3 million francs over three years. He suggested that the noble members of his order would finance it and the expedition, though he also assumed that the kings of England and France would participate.

None of these projected expeditions got anywhere, and the papal letters and other records indicate a changing focus for crusading. The expansion of the Turks into Europe by the 1360s produced an even more urgent desire to support the weak Byzantine Empire by the creation of holy leagues that would contest Ottoman imperialism. But conflicts within Europe made even this difficult. However, hope for a new crusade that would restore the unity of Christendom continued to be a theme in diplomatic activity.

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The outbreak of peace between England and France at Brétigny in 1360, therefore, raised considerable hope, and Peter I of Cyprus, accompanied by Philippe de Mézières, came to Europe and raised a Venetian fleet and an army of ten thousand with the ostensible purpose of recovering Jerusalem. In the event his expedition seized Alexandria, though they were only able to hold it a few days. This and his later attacks on Tripoli and Ayas were celebrated by Guillaume de Machaut in a rhymed Old French chivalric biography. This triumph was widely known and raised European hopes, but Cypriot sources make it clear that Peter was unstable, and he was assassinated by a group of nobles in 1369. Despite this, hope for an Anglo-French peace and, therefore, a new crusade persisted. Richard II of England (r. 1377–1399) seems to have been less than enthusiastic about the war with France and in the 1390s opened negotiations with the French, which promised to lead to a peace and to a solution to the papal schism; it was hoped that this would be sealed by a new crusade. In the event there was no peace. The royal records indicate that the French were very keen but Richard wanted to extract the greatest advantage from a situation that he saw as favoring his interests. However, enthusiasm for crusading was fostered by the Barbary Crusade of 1390, which was very widely reported, notably by Jean Cabaret d'Orville in his *Chronique du bon duc Loys de Bourbon*, written in 1429, by Jean Froissart in his *Chroniques*, and by the anonymous monk of Saint-Denis. Although it failed to capture Mahdia, this crusade was widely reported and hailed as a success. The new mood of confidence and expectation produced a new crusade when the Ottoman sultan Bayezid I (r. 1389–1402) attacked Constantinople. On 25 September 1396 at Nicopolis an allied army of French and Hungarians confronted Bayezid and was totally defeated. This battle was widely noted across Europe. Accounts can be found in the biography of Marshal Boucicaut (Jean II le Meingre), and Froissart recorded it in some detail, though perhaps the best European record was produced by a young participant, Johann Schiltberger, who was captured at the battle but went on to enjoy an adventurous life in the service of Bayezid I and Timur the Great (Tamerlane) before returning to Germany in 1427, when he wrote his memoirs.

Thereafter papal diplomacy focused on saving Constantinople and supporting Hungary, which had become a front-line state against Ottoman expansion. This culminated in the work of Pope Eugenius IV (r. 1431–1447), through whose efforts the crusade dominated the deliberations of the Council of Florence, whose proceedings record new unions with the eastern churches, and especially the Orthodox. Eugenius raised new taxation from the church and his letters record an intensely active diplomacy, seeking to bring in the Venetians to the crusade and including encouragement of the Karamanid revolt in Anatolia against the Ottomans. But the papal bull of January 1443 announcing a new crusade failed to stir up much support in Europe, and the Venetians gave only limited support at sea. The Hungarians enjoyed some limited successes, but their ultimate defeat at Varna in 1444, documented in a recent collection of sources by Colin Imber, opened the way for the successful Ottoman siege of Constantinople, which fell in 1453. However, papal support assisted in the defense of Budapest, which repelled an Ottoman attack, saving Hungary for a century.

State Records. The main crusading assets in the Mediterranean thereafter were the Italian city-states of Genoa and Venice, whose records are immensely rich and provide a valuable resource for the later medieval crusades. The history of Lusignan Cyprus in the later Middle Ages is remarkably well known. The French *Chronicle* of Leontios Machairas, dating from about 1458, provides a good outline. However, when the Lusignan line died out, Venice ruled the island until 1571, and as a result, the records of its laws and government were subsumed into those of the Venetian republic and have survived in quantity. The Knights of the Order of the Hospital of Saint John, after a brief period in Cyprus, established themselves in Rhodes in 1309 and remained there until driven out by the Ottomans in 1522. In 1530 they settled in Malta, which they ruled until Napoleon dissolved the order in 1799. Because they ruled an "Order State" for so long, they preserved and built up a remarkable archive, now in the possession of

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the Republic of Malta. And, of course, they had diplomatic relations with the courts of Europe and continued to hold land across the continent. After the fall of Acre in 1291 the Teutonic Order transferred the main center of its activity to Livonia and Prussia, where it led the crusade against pagan Lithuania. In the process the knights, rather like the Hospital, created "Order States" (*Ordenstaat*) in Prussia and Livonia, though the survival of their archives is more limited because of their dissolution and Protestantization in the sixteenth century.

One of the successes of crusading was the destruction of the Hussite heresy in Bohemia. A recent collection of the sources for the Hussite Wars by Thomas A. Fudge comments on the fact that its texts are drawn from seven languages—Czech, Latin, German, French, Middle English, Polish, and Hebrew. Of two important chronicles, Vavrinec of Bresova wrote his *Historia Hussitica* in Latin, but the *Stari letopisove cesti* is a Czech account. The remarkable range of such documentation, embracing war songs, treaties, declarations, and letters among other genres, is an indication of the remarkable kinds of material that can be drawn upon. While it had the backing of the Church and papacy, the crusade was clearly harnessed to the ends of Emperor Sigismund of Luxemburg (r. 1410–1437), and this was even more clearly characteristic of the most successful of all late medieval crusades—in the Spanish Peninsula.

The sources for crusading in the later Middle Ages are actually richer and far more complex than for the period to 1245. However, they are also more disparate and scattered. The papal archives are very important but they are vast and concerned with a huge range of material, and these mirror the records left by European states and great organizations. Therefore, they lack the real focus of the grand narrative we find in the older crusader chronicles. In effect crusading fell into the hands of interested parties. By about 1500 crusading in the eastern Mediterranean was attached to the interests of Venice, whose self-interest was apparent. In central Europe it was the cause of the Germans in Bohemia, while in the north it was embodied in the Teutonic Order, which increasingly acted like a secular principality. This reflects the simple but important fact that as Europe changed, so did crusading, and it became many things to different peoples.

[*See also* Crusades, *subentries on* Narrative (1245–1500), Historiography Overview (1000–1500); *and* Historiography (1245–1500).]

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John France

Narrative (1095–1183)

By the end of the tenth century, Western Christendom had begun to turn the tide of invasion and defeat against aggressors who for centuries had pressed on its frontiers. As defense turned to offense, noblemen started to look for opportunities for expansion and conquest; warriors traveled to the frontiers searching for land; trading cities saw a chance to acquire commercial dominance over their rivals. As the eleventh century progressed, the advances achieved by these groups increased in pace as the European population entered a phase of sustained growth. Christendom's borders in Iberia, the Baltic, the Mediterranean, and eastern Europe began to be forced back against its erstwhile attackers.

In ecclesiastical circles, a growing sense of religiosity and purpose generated a new determination to spread news of the teaching of Jesus Christ to every corner of Christendom and to all the peoples of the world. To this end, the church increasingly demanded the removal of any secular impediment that might inhibit its mission and the restoration of powers that had previously been usurped by kings and princes. Looking abroad, missionary activity achieved the conversion of many parts of Scandinavia and eastern Europe. These processes of secular conquest and religious expansion found common ground when the acquisition of new territories created opportunities for preaching and evangelism. To encourage and direct this work, the papacy began to endorse the military expansion of Christendom's frontiers. In 1074 Pope Gregory VII (r. 1073–1085) even contemplated leading an army in person to support the Byzantine Empire in its defense of Anatolia. The Byzantine position in this region had been in steep decline ever since its defeat at the hands of the Seljuk Turks at the battle of Mantzikert in 1071. In 1089 the papacy offered indulgences to noblemen in Iberia who were prepared to restore a church in Tarragona so that the town might attract Christian warriors to wage war on this frontier against Islam.

Even so, the conduct of warfare by advocates of a faith that aims to serve God through the compassionate love of one's fellow man needed considerable justification. Since the Christianization of the Roman Empire, Christians had faced the challenge of combining their desire to follow the teaching of Christ with the perceived need to protect their own frontiers with military force. In the fifth century a compromise on this issue was made by Saint Augustine of Hippo (354–430), who argued that a war could be justified provided that Christians fought with the right intentions, under a legitimate leader and for a just cause. As a result, when Pope Gregory VII planned his campaign to the East, he was keen to stress how it met the conditions for "just war." Another element of biblical teaching, which contemporaries considered important, concerned spiritual warfare. While the New Testament makes little allowance for physical warfare in its teaching, it does advocate the spiritual struggle against the devil. In Saint Paul's letter to the Ephesians, Christians are expressly called upon to "put on the whole armor of God" and fight against evil (6:10–17). Primarily, the church taught that this conflict should be waged through prayer and the resistance of temptation; nevertheless, churchmen increasingly began to see the world as an extension of this spiritual battlefield in which it was the papacy's duty to wage physical warfare against those who impeded its work.

Although this evolving concept of warfare was deemed to provide some basis for campaigns authorized by the church, there were many conflicts in

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Crusade Leader. Peter the Hermit leads a group of crusaders. Illustration from *Chronologia magna*, Egerton MS 1500, fol. 45v, fourteenth century. BRITISH LIBRARY, LONDON, UK/© BRITISH LIBRARY BOARD. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

Western Christendom at this time that were not covered by this approach. Particularly in areas of France, weak central authority permitted the proliferation of widespread disorder as bands of soldiers and noble families waged small-scale wars against their neighbors. For protagonists, such conflicts placed them in a difficult position whereby feudal obligation demanded their military service, while the religious authorities continually reminded them that such unsanctioned bloodshed was a sin that would imperil their soul.

The First Crusade. On 12 March 1088 the cardinal bishop of Ostia, Odo of Châtillon, was elected as pope and took the name Urban II. Urban (r. 1088–1099) was a former supporter of Gregory VII and came to power during a turbulent period in the relations between the papacy and the German emperor. Consequently, during his early pontificate, he faced a number of serious challenges. As the leader of the Western church, he was responsible for both the promulgation of Christianity and the continued efforts to unite the (Western) Catholic and (Eastern) Orthodox faiths, which had become divided under Urban's predecessors. As the son of a French noble family, he would have known of the widespread civil disorder that threatened the salvation of many. As a pope under threat from the German Empire, he needed to emphasize his own authority. Accordingly, when at the council of Piacenza in March 1095 the Byzantine emperor Alexios I Komnenos

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Aleppo. Entrance to the castle. Photograph by the American Colony Photo Department/ Matson Photo Service, c. 1900. G. ERIC AND EDITH MATSON PHOTOGRAPH COLLECTION, PRINTS AND PHOTOGRAPHS DIVISION, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

requested the papacy's help for his war against the Turks, Urban launched a campaign that would serve all these policy objectives: the First Crusade.

On 27 November 1095 at the council of Clermont in southern France, Urban offered the knights of Christendom the chance to conduct an armed pilgrimage that would reestablish Christian control of Jerusalem (the city had been lost centuries beforehand in 638 to forces of Islam). Participants were informed that, as with any other pilgrimage, the fulfilment of their vow would serve as penance for their confessed sins. This appeal came at a time when pilgrimages to Jerusalem were becoming increasingly popular and several large expeditions had been conducted in previous decades. In 1064–1065, for example, a major German expedition consisting of several thousand pilgrims traveled to visit the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem. The difference was that *this* pilgrimage would grant remission of *all* confessed sins. For knights, tainted by a career of warfare, the chance to gain salvation without deviation from their professional vocation was an opportunity that could not be missed, and it seems that it was primarily this incentive that in 1095–1096 drove tens of thousands of men, women, and children to accept Urban's challenge and set out to the East. Of course, as with any mass undertaking, people joined for a variety of different reasons. Some may have gone in search of riches, perhaps attracted by the stories of knights who had formerly gained wealth in Byzantine service. Others may have realized, even from the outset, that through such an extraordinary expedition they could gain a powerful reputation. For many of the rank and file, however, the decision to travel on crusade would not have been taken by them as individuals, but by their feudal overlords.

Whatever their motives, the result was the creation of an army that would wage a "holy war"—a war described as a direct extension of God's will. With such a mandate, the participants felt empowered to attack anyone who deviated from Christian doctrine. The first occasion when the crusaders translated this conviction into violent action occurred in northern France and Germany in the months after Urban's sermon at Clermont. In cities

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such as Rouen, Speyer, and Mainz they committed a series of brutal attacks on the local Jewish population, in some cases giving Jews a choice between conversion and death. Although the papacy did not advocate these massacres and forbade forced conversions, religious hysteria had been whipped into fury by local preachers. These pogroms serve, therefore, as a grim reminder—one that was to be felt in the future—that the church could not always expect to control the war machine it created.

The first major force to depart for the East and to reach the Byzantine capital of Constantinople was led by a preacher named Peter the Hermit. His force contained some professional soldiers and had the logistical support of a wagon train, but also included many unarmed pilgrims and lacked the leadership structure of a feudal army. For Emperor Alexios, this motley horde (later known as the People's Crusade) was hardly the tight-knit band of professional soldiers he had requested at Piacenza. He shipped them across the Bosporus, and they swiftly fell prey to the Turkish forces. The next wave was very different. It was composed of the household troops and professional forces of some of Christendom's most important princes, including Raymond, Count of Toulouse; Godfrey of Bouillon, Duke of Lower Lotharingia; Stephen, Count of Blois; Robert Curthose, Duke of Normandy, and Robert II, Count of Flanders. These men knew how to prepare for war and had the funds to maintain themselves. Among these princes was a Norman lord named Bohemond of Taranto. Bohemond's family had a history of antagonistic relations with Byzantium, and Alexios had spent several years of his early reign at war with Bohemond and his father, Robert Guiscard. Nevertheless, this was the man that Alexios was expected to welcome. It is not surprising, therefore, that the emperor greeted these armies with wary caution and demanded an oath of loyalty from the crusade commanders. For the most part, they agreed to this request and promised also that they would restore any formerly Byzantine cities to the empire. In exchange, Alexios swore that he would provide them with logistical support and gave them advice about Turkish military tactics, which later proved invaluable.

Having been transported across the Bosporus, the army helped Alexios to capture the city of Nicaea in northern Anatolia and then proceeded south across the inhospitable Anatolian plateau. During this advance, the marching columns were frequently subjected to Turkish hit-and-run attacks, although arguably the greatest challenge was posed by the ongoing need for food. This demand was supplied partially through resources provided by the emperor or purchased from local Christians, also through foraging, and, when the army reached the city of Antioch, by naval supply. Horses in particular were a vital consideration because the crusaders were reliant upon the shock tactics of their heavily armored knights to shatter enemy formations.

At Antioch, a large, strategically located city commanding the northern approaches to the Levant, the army began a siege that was to take nine months to complete. During this period, the crusaders defended themselves against three relieving armies raised by the Turkish rulers of Damascus, Aleppo, and Mosul. The besieging army was also engaged in near-constant skirmishing with the city garrison. Conditions in the crusading camp deteriorated as foraging parties came under attack and the misery this caused was only exacerbated by heavy winter rains. As the army had advanced toward Antioch, groups of knights had begun to capture the surrounding cities, which could act as supply bases for the siege. As the struggle for Antioch persisted and resources ran low, the efforts made to secure control of the surrounding region were redoubled. In many areas, the local Armenian Christian population welcomed the crusaders and threw out their Turkish garrisons; for those commanders who wished to carve out their own territory in the Levant, this was the perfect opportunity. Baldwin of Boulogne, brother of Godfrey of Bouillon, was the first to establish himself as an independent power when he was invited by the local populace to become ruler of the city of Edessa; this was the first of the independent territories to be established by the crusaders.

At Antioch itself the crusaders were unable to break through the defenders' dogged resistance, so

they attempted to impose a blockade. Nine months into the siege, however, there was still little sign of surrender. It was at this moment that a man named Firuz agreed to allow Bohemond into the city. In conference with the other crusading leaders, Bohemond then demanded ownership of the city if he could conquer it. The other commanders, aware of the imminent arrival of a new Muslim relief force from Mosul, agreed on the understanding that it would be given to Alexios if he came to their assistance. On 2–3 June 1098 Antioch fell to Bohemond, although its citadel, perched above the city, remained in Muslim hands. The following day the army of Kerbogha of Mosul arrived; the besiegers had become the besieged. Having been blockaded already, the city contained very little food and the army was cut off from its supply bases. With the Christians starving and heavily outnumbered, their plight became acute. Shortly before Kerbogha's arrival a number of leading crusaders, including Count Stephen of Blois, left the army and subsequently deserted, evidently considering the army's position to be hopeless. In this atmosphere of deprivation, suffering, and despair, a pilgrim named Peter Bartholomew claimed to have seen a vision in which he was told the location of the spear that pierced Christ's side at the crucifixion. The subsequent discovery of this "Holy Lance" in the Church of Saint Peter produced a level of mass religious fervor that resolved itself into determined defiance when all attempts to find a diplomatic solution with Kerbogha failed. Two weeks after the discovery of the lance, the remnants of the battered army charged into the teeth of the besieging forces to win one of the most decisive and unlikely victories of the medieval period. During the battle, Kerbogha does appear to have made a number of tactical mistakes; however, the key factor seems to have been the zealous momentum of the Christian assault, during which contemporaries claimed that they were supported by Saint George, Saint Demetrius, and Saint Mercurius. With this victory, the road to the Levant lay open and the Christian armies moved south. Although there had been friction among the crusade leadership during the siege, the battle stood as testament to the commanders' ability to work together at a time of crisis. They left behind two newly founded territories centered on Antioch, which had been grudgingly ceded to Bohemond of Taranto, and Edessa. The retention of Antioch naturally breached the crusaders' promises to Alexios; however, these leaders considered their vow to be void because Alexios had failed to support them during their hour of need.

During this episode at Antioch the pilgrims had suffered repeated attacks from major Turkish leaders, but they were never to face a combined Muslim front. This was a consequence in part of the death of the Turkish Sultan Malik Shah in 1092, which created a succession dispute that drew in Turkish commanders from many regions. The political vacuum this created encouraged rivalries between two of the crusaders' future opponents, Ridwan of Aleppo and Duqaq of Damascus, both nephews of Malik Shah, who fought with one another in 1097 in an attempt to gain control of Syria. These divisions were important but they did not prevent the Turkish rulers of the Near East from putting up considerable resistance to the crusaders and, as we have seen, three major armies were sent to relieve Antioch during the nine-month siege.

As the Christian armies marched south into Palestine, they entered a region that was contested between the local Turkish commanders and the forces of Egypt. These two groups were divided both by their political rivalries and also by religion. Since the seventh century, the Muslim world had been split into two major groups, the Sunni and the Shia. These two branches of Islam were old rivals and in 1098, while Turkish (Sunni) attention was fixed on the crusaders at Antioch, the Egyptians (Shia) wrested Jerusalem from their control. As a result, when the armies of the First Crusade laid siege to the city in June 1099, the Egyptian defenders had themselves only briefly been in possession.

On 15 July 1099 the First Crusaders broke into Jerusalem using mobile towers. For the Christian army, this was the final realization of their goal. For three years, they had fought, died, suffered, starved, and prayed to reach this city against overwhelming odds, and the sum of these experiences was a massacre of

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such brutality that eyewitnesses reported that the crusaders stood up to their ankles in blood. The crusaders' possession of the Holy Land was confirmed shortly thereafter when they defeated a large Fatimid expeditionary force at Ascalon. It was on these foundations that the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem was founded.

The Building of the Latin East and the Evolution of Crusading. At the end of the First Crusade, most of the pilgrims returned home. The survivors were a mere fraction of the mighty horde that had set out and around 75 percent had died along the way. There is little evidence to prove that they went back any richer, but they were received as the liberators of the Holy Land. In the West, the scale of the victories won by the army was accepted as definitive proof that God had supported the venture. In the eyes of the church and contemporaries, the "crusade" had proved itself as a concept; crusading would go on.

When Stephen of Blois arrived home, having deserted the crusade at Antioch, his wife Adela, Countess of Blois, demanded furiously that he return to the Holy Land. Other nobles, hearing tidings of the conquests in the East, likewise prepared themselves for a new expedition that was to become known as the Crusade of 1101. Raymond of Toulouse, determined to raise new forces with which to carve out his own principality in the Levant, similarly joined the host. This expedition succeeded, however, only in underlining the incredible success of its predecessor when it was destroyed while crossing Asia Minor.

The First Crusade fundamentally redrew the political and religious map of the Mediterranean world and established three, later four (with the addition of the county of Tripoli in 1109), territories in the Levant. The Christian grip on these lands was tenuous and Fulcher of Chartres, chaplain to Baldwin of Boulogne, claimed that in 1100 the kingdom of Jerusalem possessed only three hundred knights and three hundred foot soldiers. In time these forces were supplemented by settlers and mercenaries who came seeking new opportunities abroad, and also by the thousands of pilgrims who flocked to visit the Holy Land. Given the difficulties involved in traversing Turkish-held Anatolia, most of these travelers arrived in ships owned by the Italian cities of Venice, Pisa, and Genoa. These cities had played an invaluable role in supplying the First Crusade and continued to offer their support to the newly founded Latin East with the transport of pilgrims, war materials, and warriors. They also swept aside Muslim sea power in the eastern Mediterranean and helped to capture many of the Levantine ports, which could then receive resources from Western Christendom. For the Italians, this work created the opportunity to serve the church through the restoration of the Latin East, while winning a series of lucrative trading quarters in cities such as Acre and Tyre. Trading quarters in this region were particularly prized because they stood at the western end of the Silk Route, the great commercial artery that linked much of southern Asia. In time, the crusaders reinforced their position in the East by building castles, which maximized the potential of their limited available manpower and gave them the ability to weather the invasion of neighboring Muslim rulers.

While the kingdom of Jerusalem prepared its defenses against Islam, in the north Bohemond I, Prince of Antioch, faced the additional threat posed by Byzantium. Emperor Alexios maintained his claim to Antioch and felt that Bohemond had cheated him. Bohemond himself was captured in 1100 in battle against the Danishmend Turks. After his release in 1104, however, he planned a new crusade, against Byzantium. Accordingly, he traveled first to the West to secure support and then in 1107 invaded Byzantium across its western frontier. What he *wanted* was to gain control of the empire; to this end he gained the support of the papacy by promising the unification of the churches. What he *got* was a humiliating defeat outside the city of Dyrrachium (now Durrës, Albania), a seaport on the Adriatic. Bohemond's expedition was a fiasco, but it reflected the speed with which the idea of the crusade was evolving. The First Crusade was not an isolated event, but rather marked the start of a new form of Christian endeavor. The victories it achieved set the benchmark for later expeditions, but clearly the hugely popular idea of the crusade was far too

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valuable to be confined to the demands of a single frontier. Christendom was on the march, and the church was prepared to deploy its new instrument of war on many fronts, even against fellow Christians. A further example of this expansion can be seen in the Iberian peninsula (modern-day Spain and Portugal). Iberia's history had formerly been marked by episodes of holy war against the forces of Islam, which had captured much of the peninsula in the eighth century, and the papacy concerned itself deeply with the affairs of this frontier. During the First Crusade, Urban had explicitly prevented Iberian crusaders from traveling to the Holy Land out of fear that their absence might weaken the local defenses. In the wake of the crusade, there was much enthusiasm for campaigns that imitated the First Crusade, and the first occasion when the papacy launched an expedition that can be described as a "crusade" in this area was by Pope Calixtus II (r. 1119–1124) in 1123. From this point onward, Iberia became a crusading frontier and, for its advocates, there was even a distant hope that Christian armies might carve a path down to North Africa and then eastward to Jerusalem.

While papal approval was desirable for such ventures, those expeditions that acquired the pope's endorsement represent a mere handful of the holy wars that sought to recreate the achievements of 1096–1099. The First Crusade had established the principle in the eyes of contemporaries that the penitential military pilgrimage was a legitimate form of Christian service. Consequently, just as Christians did not need papal approval to travel on a conventional pilgrimage, so they did not need to be told that the armed version would similarly win God's blessing. In later decades, many warriors traveled to the East to render aid to Jerusalem without participating in a papal-led expedition, while expecting spiritual rewards. On other frontiers, further noblemen saw their ventures in the same way. In 1108 a group of Saxon magnates planned an expedition against the pagans in the Baltic that was supposed to parallel the "Gaulish" capture of Jerusalem. On a wider scale, the sycophants and followers of warlords and rulers began to style their masters' exploits with the rhetorical gloss of crusading so that they could use its reflected glory to praise such undertakings. In this way, the success of the First Crusade established the principle of penitential holy war that was then idealized by contemporaries.

The privilege that the papacy did retain for itself was the ability to confer the full indulgence. A later campaign to the Holy Land that enjoyed this benefit was organized by Hugh de Payns in 1127. Hugh was the master of the recently formed Order of the Temple. This order, even in the wake of the First Crusade, was a controversial innovation that linked the lifestyle of a monk with the vocation of a knight. Like their monastic counterparts, the Templars took vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, but they were simultaneously professional soldiers who were sworn to the defense of Christendom. Like Bohemond's expedition, or crusading ventures in the Baltic and Iberia, the Templars represented an adaptation of the crusading idea to a new challenge. As noted earlier, the pressing military need in the Holy Land was for permanent and trained soldiers. The scale of support rendered by pilgrim expeditions could not be relied upon because it was inconsistent, seasonal, and variable in quality. For the defenders of the Latin East, the protection of the sacred sites was a religious responsibility, just as these locations had initially been captured by soldiers who had taken a religious vow. These circumstances laid the foundations for Templars, who were established circa 1120, to provide a permanent force defending travelers visiting the holy sites in the kingdom of Jerusalem. In time, the Templars gained immense popularity, partly through the advocacy of Bernard, Abbot of Clairvaux. The idea of the military order also inspired both the militarization of existing orders, such as the Hospitallers, and the establishment of new orders, such as the Spanish Order of Santiago. The military orders were not crusaders in the conventional sense, but they were a product of the crusading movement and were inextricably linked to the defense and expansion of Christendom's frontiers.

The Second Crusade. While the crusading idea took root across Christendom, the military

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momentum created by the First Crusade in the realpolitik of the Levant began to dissipate. For Muslim contemporaries, the monstrous fact of the First Crusade had initially created a feeling that the Christians (or "Franks") were an overwhelming force that could not be beaten. As the century progressed, this illusion began to fade. At the battle of the Field of Blood in 1119, an Antiochene army led by Roger of Salerno was decisively defeated by a force from Aleppo under Il-Ghazi. In 1144 Zengi, ruler of Aleppo and Mosul, captured the city of Edessa, marking the beginning of the end for this, the first of the territories established by the First Crusade. When news of the defeat reached Rome, the papacy felt obliged to respond. In 1145 Pope Eugenius III launched a new campaign to retake Edessa. This expedition, the Second Crusade, was organized on a grand scale. To drive recruitment, the papacy published the papal bull *Quantum Predecessores*, challenging the magnates of Western Christendom to emulate their forefathers' exploits during the First Crusade. They were offered a full indulgence and were reminded that the crusade offered a unique opportunity for salvation. Clearly, the papacy had learned lessons from the First Crusade and it attempted to make legal provisions that would help crusaders to raise money for the expedition. Armed with these emotive messages, preachers began to disseminate this appeal. Chief among these preachers was Bernard of Clairvaux. Bernard traveled extensively across France, where King Louis VII was eager to take part, and at Vézelay in March 1146 he received the crusade vows of many members of the French nobility. During the following months he conducted preaching across Germany and recruited Conrad III, King of Germany. Before committing himself, Conrad needed Bernard to solve some of the many local disputes that divided his realm because he did not want to return home to find that civil disorder had spread during his absence—a vital consideration for any landowner contemplating a crusade. Bernard's considerable success in this mission attracted comment from Conrad's half brother, Bishop Otto of Freising, who expressed amazement that so much strife should have been settled in advance of the crusade. The participation of these two major monarchs and their leading magnates acted as centrifuges, inspiring noblemen and knights to join, and in June 1147 two major armies set out for the East. These forces represented the main thrust of the Second Crusade, but Pope Eugenius broadened his operations to incorporate expeditions on other frontiers. During the preaching of the crusade, a group of Saxon nobles requested the status of crusaders in a campaign against the neighboring pagan tribes. Eugenius consented, marking the first official crusade in the Baltic. In Iberia, plans developed for a venture against neighboring Muslim rulers in Spain and Portugal. This project attracted crusaders from outside the peninsula including the Genoese, who aided first the magnates of Léon-Castile to seize the city of Almería (1147) and later the count of Barcelona to capture the city of Tortosa (1148). A further naval force en route to the Holy Land helped Afonso I of Portugal to capture the city of Lisbon. In this way, the Second Crusade became an immensely ambitious program that embedded the developments of previous decades; the crusade was now an institution of Catholic expansion on all fronts.

In the eastern Mediterranean, the royal armies advanced to Constantinople, where they were a cause of concern for Emperor Manuel Komnenos. Unlike in the First Crusade, these armies had not been requested, and he feared that they might be in league with his Norman enemy, Roger II of Sicily. Just as Alexios I Komnenos had demanded oaths from the First Crusaders, so too did his grandson Manuel seek assurances from Louis and Conrad. Their royal rank, however, prevented Manuel from demanding an oath of loyalty; nevertheless, the Western monarchs were able to appease Manuel and were transported over the Bosporus without serious incident.

The next stage was to cross Asia Minor. Conrad's force was the first to attempt this and he encountered trouble almost immediately. The Greek guides provided by Manuel led the army into an inhospitable wilderness in which crusading forces fell prey to a relentless series of ambushes and hit-and-run attacks by the Turks, which forced them to retreat. On his return journey, Conrad met Louis's army,

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and the two kings agreed to lead their main armies across Asia Minor together, while a small force under Otto of Freising took a longer and safer route that avoided, for as long as possible, any contact with the Turks. In any event, both monarchs were unsuccessful. Conrad became ill at an early stage of the campaign and returned to Constantinople. Under constant harassment and running out of supplies, the main army under Louis managed to reach Adalia (now Antalya in southwestern Turkey) from which a small number, including Louis, set sail for the Levant. The smaller force under Otto also came under heavy attack, and he too opted to take ship for the East.

The forces that assembled at Antioch in March 1148 represented only a small proportion of the armed might that had set out from the West; however, Raymond, Prince of Antioch, was enthusiastic about the prospects of an expedition against the neighboring cities of Aleppo and Shaizar. For Raymond these targets were considerably more tempting than the crusade's original target, Edessa. Nevertheless, the possibility of a joint operation was shattered when rumors developed of a liaison between Raymond and his niece, Louis's wife, Eleanor of Aquitaine. Although it is not clear exactly what took place between the two, they created sufficient suspicion to drive Louis into a fury that propelled him into a march south to Jerusalem; evidently, no campaign would be waged in the north. In the kingdom of Jerusalem, Louis met Conrad, who had been resupplied with resources and manpower by Emperor Manuel. With the arrival of these monarchs, King Baldwin III of Jerusalem pressed for an attack on Damascus. In past decades a series of attacks had been made on this city, which held immense strategic and commercial significance. Accordingly, in July 1148, the armies of Germany, France, and Jerusalem, along with contingents of the Templars and Hospitallers, began to advance through the dense orchards that surrounded the city. After a series of heavy skirmishes with Damascene troops, the Christian forces reached the walls where they initiated a siege. Nevertheless, this undertaking failed. The reasons for this are disputed but seem connected to: dissent within the crusader camp, the imminent arrival of Muslim reinforcements, and the movement of the Christian camp to an area which had little water supply. Whatever the primary cause may have been, the result was the failure of the main campaign of the Second Crusade.

This defeat was an immense shock for Christendom. The results of the expeditions against the pagans in the north were equally unimpressive, and it was only in Iberia that solid advances were made, with the capture of the cities of Lisbon, Tortosa, and Almería. Consequently, contemporaries began to search for reasons why God could have allowed these expeditions to flounder where, they believed, he had led the First Crusade to victory. Many looked for a scapegoat and, at the outer edge of this criticism, there were even those who questioned whether it was acceptable for Christians to wage war on nonbelievers.

The Latin East after the Second Crusade. For the Muslim potentates of the Levant, the Second Crusade provoked an immense surge of confidence. The terror inspired by the First Crusade had been wiped away and in June 1149 Zengi's son, Nur ad-Din, led an army to victory against the forces of Antioch. Over subsequent decades Nur ad-Din consolidated his power with the acquisition of Damascus and the deliberate promotion of the jihad against the Franks. In the 1160s a new dimension evolved in the struggle between the Franks and the Turks, when rivalries emerged within the Fatimid leadership in Egypt. Both Nur ad-Din and Amalric saw an opportunity in this disunity to acquire the fertile lands of the Nile Delta; both men were to be disappointed. By the time of his death in 1174 Nur ad-Din was the titular sultan of Egypt, but his ability to enforce his rule in Cairo was repeatedly thwarted through the insubordination of his lieutenant, Saladin. Even so, Nur ad-Din had succeeded into uniting the Levant and Egypt under Sunni control. In doing so, he executed the virtual encirclement of the Latin East on its landward frontiers. With his passing, Saladin waged war against Nur ad-Din's successors to unite the forces of Islam in the Levant and Egypt. In 1183, after years spent campaigning against his Muslim

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rivals, he completed this objective after taking control in Aleppo.

As the storm clouds gathered over the kingdom of Jerusalem, enthusiasm for the crusade remained low in Western Christendom. In the German Empire, Emperor Frederick I used his resources to exert greater control over the cities of Italy. In France, Bernard of Clairvaux had attempted to rally enthusiasm for a new expedition in the wake of the Second Crusade, but the barons had no stomach for another venture. Until the ascension of Henry II in 1154, England was torn by civil war and even afterwards, although Henry promised to depart for the East, he did not fulfil his vow. The crusading movement was not entirely ignored—the Templars and Hospitallers continued to receive patronage and some magnates made armed pilgrimages to the Latin East—but neither the papacy's encouragement nor the impassioned pleas of the barons of the Holy Land were able to elicit significant aid from the West. Without the support of a major crusade, the Latin East looked increasingly to the Byzantine Empire for help. Emperor Manuel Komnenos proved ready both to supply armed forces and to provide financial support., Nevertheless this avenue of assistance was shut when Manuel died in 1180, replaced with a series of successors who were politically unstable and little inclined to continue Manuel's policies.

Matters became even more threatening in 1174 when King Amalric of Jerusalem died, to be succeeded by a son who suffered from leprosy, Baldwin IV. Although Baldwin's malady did not prevent him from governing his kingdom, there were periods when his illness forced him to seek a regent until he could recover his health. It also prevented him from providing an heir. In this environment, divisions began to appear in the ranks of the nobility of Jerusalem. The growing threat posed by Saladin and the opportunities and concerns posed by the succession created tensions that placed an immense strain on the unity of the Latin East. Although the kingdom of Jerusalem had managed to repel some of Saladin's early attacks, most notably at the battle of Montgisard in November 1177, by 1183 the danger posed by Saladin's combined forces was so severe that the kingdom was only able to raise enough soldiers to face him with the introduction of new taxes. Even with the deployment of all available troops in this year, Baldwin's regent, Guy of Lusignan, felt able only to shadow the Muslim army, rather than face it in battle. Although this tactic meant that he kept both army and the majority of his lands intact throughout the campaigning season, there were many who demanded a confrontation.

Archbishop William of Tyre's history of the Latin East breaks off in 1184 and he died soon afterward. His last chapters, discussing the infighting among the Christian leadership, are filled with pessimism. He did not live to see the great defeat of the kingdom of Jerusalem at the battle of Hattin in 1187, but although this disaster would have shocked him, it probably would not have surprised him. He was fully aware of the internal weakness of the kingdom of Jerusalem, the reluctance of Western rulers to travel on crusade, and Saladin's growing strength. For him, all of these factors were the consequence of sin, a reflection of how far attitudes had changed from the time of the First Crusade.

[*See also* Ager Sanguinis, Battle of; Alexios I Komnenos; Almería, Siege of; Antioch, Siege and Battles of; Bohemond I; Conrad III; Crusader Relations with Byzantium; Damascus, Siege of; Fatimids; Iberia, *subentries on* Narrative (500–1100) and Narrative (1100–1300); Jerusalem, Siege of (1099); Just War, Just Motive; Louis VII; Manuel I Komnenos; Orders of Chivalry and Knighthood; Saladin; Seljuks; *and* Tortosa, Siege of.]

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Nicholas Morton

Narrative (1180–1245)

The sixty-five-year period considered here saw destruction of most of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem by Saladin, and its partial restoration in successive campaigns launched from Western Christendom. So much military activity transpired, and so many changes came about in the organization and execution of crusades and the Muslim responses to them, that any summary must of necessity omit much of interest.

Militarily, crusading warfare in the Latin east was characterized by several major features, which should be born in mind for the account that follows. First, Christian control of the seas, while often taken for granted, was the main reason Crusades could be launched and the crusader states maintained at all; Frederick I's army was the last major force to attempt the land route to Jerusalem. Second, the loss of the bulk of the kingdom in 1187, with its infrastructure of fortresses and military production, forced a reevaluation of crusader strategy for retaking and holding the land, and for relieving Ayyubid pressure on the kingdom in the meantime; Amalric's attempts to conquer Egypt in the 1160s can be seen as the groundwork for strategy in the thirteenth century. Third, while crusading warfare continued to be characterized by lengthy, complex sieges of key cities, Latin forces were increasingly unable to take the operational initiative, even after achieving strategic surprise. Fourth, weakness in command structure continued to plague crusader expeditions to the east, while even the occasional strong leader (such as Richard I or Frederick II) was unable to secure the cooperation of every force in a timely or unanimous manner. Finally, from a tactical and operational perspective, Latin cavalry charges proved less effective as time went on. After Arsuf in 1191, there are relatively few instances of the charge bringing victory; more often, charges went the way of the engagement at Fariskur in 1219, during the Fifth Crusade, where the cavalry passed through the Muslim lines without inflicting much damage. Latin fortresses, meanwhile, generally proved insufficient by themselves to hold the surrounding country, giving an illusion of strength out of proportion to the garrisons' abilities.

Saladin and the Latin Kingdom. From the late 1170s, Saladin's pressure on the Latin Kingdom was steady and draining. Baldwin IV's shocking but costly victory at Mont Gisard, 25 November 1177, bought his kingdom only a little time to fortify sites in the north, where it was apparent the contest would be renewed. In 1179 Baldwin IV was defeated in the forest of Baniyas (southeast of the Sea of Galilee) and then at Marj Ayun (modern Marjayoun,

Bahan dengan hak cipta

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between Mt. Hermon and Beaufort Castle in the Lebanon) where Saladin's army caught the Franks unaware. Following these victories, Saladin was able to besiege and storm the fortress at Jacob's Ford. He thus exposed much of northern Galilee to invasion and compromised the north's strategic depth. The Ayyubid fleet moved on Acre simultaneously, but a general crisis was averted by the arrival of Henry of Champagne and Peter of Courtenay from France. Hostilities resumed in the summer of 1182, when

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Siege of Acre, 1189–1191. Soldiers in armor surround Acre, while one solider (left) climbs up the walls on a ladder. Image from the *Chroniques de France or Chroniques de Saint Denis*, MS Roy 20 E. III, fol. 146, fifteenth century. © THE BRITISH LIBRARY BOARD

Muslim forces raided around the south end of the Sea of Galilee, besieged Belvoir castle, and pushed farther into the kingdom. Saladin, however, was defeated at Forbelet by a heavily outnumbered Frankish army, and Baldwin IV's arrival forced him to abandon the siege of Berytus later in the year.

It is difficult to say whether or not Saladin's operations during this period conformed to a single strategic plan, or whether his greater ability was to turn circumstances to his advantage. The latter seems more likely, but his limited campaigns against the crusader principalities certainly kept the Franks off balance, allowing him to concentrate on unifying his fractious empire. His opponents were numerous and not lacking in resources; the Seljuks of Rum (central and eastern Turkey) claimed various parts of northern Syria, and the Zengids of Mosul managed to form a coalition against him after the failure of the Berytus siege. Baldwin's attempts to distract Saladin from Mosul resulted in small gains east of the Jordan, but Saladin's disregard of these actions showed the degree to which the Latin Kingdom had been weakened in the previous five years. By June 1183 Aleppo had surrendered to Saladin, and Bohemond III of Antioch was faced with the threat of invasion. Strategically, however, Saladin had no immediate interest in Antioch, and returned to Damascus, where he prepared his next campaign against the Latin Kingdom.

The campaign at the springs of Cresson near Sufuriyah, near Nazareth, September–October 1183, demonstrated the kingdom's weakness. Saladin's army raided throughout the north, while the barons held fast in their nearby fortified camp and refused to give battle. The Latin army had recently been reinforced by French and German crusaders, led by the duke of Brabant, but even with this aid Guy de Lusignan, as regent, did not feel strong enough to attack the Muslim army. After a week of stalemate, on 7 October Saladin was forced to withdraw to Damascus as his supply situation became unmanageable. In the short term, Guy's tactic of waiting had worked, but the decision was not popular with many of the barons, and would return to haunt him. The Latin army had survived but, like Philip VI of France at the beginning of the Hundred Years' War, was faced with an unacceptably high price for no gain, as much of the Mount Tabor and Galilee regions had suffered at the hands of the Muslim army.

The year's campaigning was not yet finished, however, when Saladin moved into the Transjordan to deal with Raynald of Châtillon at Kerak, which was besieged on 22 November. Raynald, earlier that year, had attempted, apparently on his own initiative, to disrupt communications between Egypt and the rest of Saladin's empire, raiding down the Arabian coast and harassing shipping in the Red Sea. Ayyubid forces had temporarily suppressed the threat, but Raynald's attacks were too unpredictable and too threatening to Saladin's image as defender

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of Islam to pass without a major response. Saladin was forced to raise the siege of Kerak on 4 December when Baldwin IV, almost helpless from complications of leprosy, led the Latin army to Kerak's relief. Saladin returned next summer, this time with a larger siege train, but again withdrew when Raymond of Tripoli led the relief army. His "withdrawal," however, involved a sweep through Nablus and the surrounding towns, devastating yet more of the kingdom's agricultural and economic infrastructure after a series of poor harvests in the Latin Kingdom and Egypt. Both sides sought a four-years' truce in the spring of 1185.

Until 1187 the kingdom of Jerusalem was wracked by endless intrigues regarding the succession and distribution of power, too complex for lengthy detail here. The main contenders for influence were Guy, Raymond of Tripoli, the Ibelin family, and, to a lesser extent, Bohemond III of Antioch, who had his own troubles with disaffected barons. Baldwin IV died in 1185, and his nephew Baldwin V followed him in September 1186. Guy, now king through his wife Sibylla (Baldwin IV's sister), forced a break with Raymond of Tripoli, and assembled the army in the spring of 1187 to besiege the count at Tiberias. Cooler heads prevailed, and diplomacy had resumed when war with Saladin broke out again. The circumstances surrounding Raynald of Châtillon's attack on an escorted caravan are not entirely clear, but Raynald rejected both Saladin's and Guy's demands for restitution, and the sultan prepared to invade the kingdom yet again. From Damascus, he struck south into the Oultre-Jourdain, devastated the land around Kerak and Montréal, and then, with Raymond's permission, sent a seven-thousand-strong detachment deep into Galilee. The famous engagement near Sephorie, at the springs of Cresson, on 30 April resulted in the death of the Master of the Hospital, the narrow escape of Gerard of Ridefort, Master of the Temple, and the destruction of a significant portion of the orders' fighting strength. Raymond, seeing what his brief alliance with Saladin had cost, rapidly switched sides and joined the army assembling at Suffuriyah.

The campaign of Hattin, in July 1187, has been heavily analyzed by historians, and the outlines of operations are clear, if not necessarily some of the details. Saladin had turned on Raymond's city of Tiberias, taking the lower town and besieging Raymond's wife in the tower. Raymond nevertheless counseled Guy to remain where he was and not attempt relief operations, since the army would have no place to water and resupply if it advanced through the dry ground west of Tiberias. Gerard of Ridefort dissented, reminding the king of how unpopular his decision to wait had been four years earlier. Tempting as it often is to cast Gerard's advice as foolish, it is possible that other factors weighed on Guy's decision to march. There were some weeks left in the campaigning season, and giving Saladin a free hand would almost certainly result in the loss of Tiberias, with unknown consequences. Further, strategically savvy as many thought Saladin to be, he had shown himself far from invincible in the field, and a decisive advance might well have yielded victory.

As it was, the army advanced hesitantly, camping near Birkat Maskana on the night of 3 July, while Saladin's army formed a loose cordon around it. On the morning of 4 July, the Franks resumed their march, apparently trying to reach the Sea of Galilee. This approach, though ignoring the nearby springs of Hattin, would have given the army more options of advance, and perhaps the opportunity to catch the main body of Saladin's army flat-footed as it attempted to mirror the Frankish movements. As it happened, continuous harassment by Saladin's troops disrupted Guys' columns, and when the engagement became general, the Latin cavalry and infantry fought, and lost, separate engagements, as the Muslim forces drew the encirclement ever tighter while repulsing numerous cavalry attacks. By the end of the day, the Frankish army had ceased to exist.

The battle of Hattin was "decisive" in every sense of the word. Guy, Ridefort, Raynald of Châtillon, and many other barons were captured. The Templars and Hospitallers were given the choice of conversion or death; only Ridefort was spared. Raynald

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was executed by Saladin personally, and Guy kept in captivity. The loss of the Latin army left the kingdom indefensible, since town and fortress garrisons had been stripped to virtually nothing in order to provide manpower for the host. The fighting strength of the Templars and Hospitallers had also been wiped out in a single blow, and in the following months the orders were faced with the logistical nightmare of reproducing a semblance of military strength from their personnel in the west.

Some fortresses resisted for more than a year: Kerak until 1188 and Montréal until 1189, and Beaufort until April 1190. Most surrendered, as did the cities. Five days after Hattin, Saladin had obtained the surrender of Acre, and proceeded down the coast, while his brother al-Adil advanced from Egypt with the Egyptian navy protecting his flank. Inhabitants were killed, sold into slavery, or expelled. Ascalon resisted until 5 September, when it surrendered on terms. Ridefort was released in exchange for the Templars' evacuation of Gaza. In the north, Saladin's nephew Taqi al-Din had swept through the county of Tripoli, taking every town except Tyre, which broke off surrender negotiations after Conrad of Montferrat arrived from the west on 14 July.

It was only a matter of time before Jerusalem fell, and, while the surrender of the city on 2 October 1187 was the spiritual and emotional climax for the Muslim army, militarily it was a footnote. Balian of Ibelin had neither the number of soldiers nor enough of the inhabitants' loyalty to resist much longer than he did without hope of relief. After Jerusalem, Saladin marched north to Tyre, where his attempts to finish his nephew's siege ended just as poorly. Christian naval forces, sent by William of Sicily, provided enfilading fire on Saladin's assault parties, and when Christian galleys destroyed nine out of ten blockading Muslim ships toward the end of December, the sultan's commanders prevailed on him to abandon the siege and dismiss the army. Saladin himself decided to winter at Acre with his household regiments.

The Third Crusade. Between the time news of Hattin reached Western Christendom in late October 1187 and the arrival of Philip II in Acre on 20 April 1191, the Latin Kingdom was kept alive by trickles of reinforcements, and one major strategic initiative. The Sicilian fleet arrived first, and then a Pisan fleet in April 1189, with the Pisan archbishop. By autumn the seaborne contingents began arriving, led on September 1 by the Frisian, North German, and English fleet, which had stopped to assist the Portuguese king. The count of Hainault arrived the next day, followed in the next two months by Bretons, the count of Dreux, the bishop of Beauvais, the archbishop of Ravenna, the landgrave of Thuringia, nobles from Burgundy and Champagne, and the king of Denmark's nephew. By the summer of 1190, Henry of Champagne arrived with a large contingent, representing part of Philip II's army. Frederick of Swabia arrived with the remains of his father's army in October.

Why these forces were gathered around Acre, instead of Tyre, is one of the strange turns of the campaign. In August 1189 Guy de Lusignan, released from captivity and finding that Conrad of Montferrat intended to challenge him for the kingship, left Tyre with his few troops, marched south through enemy territory, and assaulted Acre. Though beaten back, Guy's camp on Mount Toron proved unassailable in turn, and, supplied by the Pisan fleet, Guy's force became the focal point for all crusader reinforcements. His decision to besiege Acre surprised Saladin and shifted the momentum of the war, for Saladin was obliged to keep his army in the field continuously for several years, and he had deposited a great deal of military equipment in the town. The situation became a stalemate, as the Frankish forces were defeated on 4 October 1189 and failed to storm Acre on 5 May 1190, but repulsed Saladin's week-long assault on their entrenchments two weeks later. The Egyptian fleet succeeded in breaking the Frankish blockade, and the siege dragged on to the spring of 1191, when the kings arrived.

The papacy, meanwhile, had begun to agitate for a new campaign even before the loss of Jerusalem. From the start, the preaching and recruitment of the expedition exhibited a high degree of planning and coordination, helped greatly by general enthusiasm and the eventual participation of three major

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rulers: Richard I of England, Philip II of France, and Frederick I of Germany. Richard and Philip's expedition was delayed nearly a year by internal warfare against Richard's father, Henry II, who had taken the cross with Philip in January 1188, but subsequently went to war against his sons and the French and king for much of the next fifteen months. Richard's accession to the throne upon his father's death in July 1189 further delayed the campaign, as first the coronation, then a general assessment of the realm and its finances, and finally negotiations with Philip over parts of the Angevin inheritance demanded the young king's attention.

The delays had a great impact on the final form of the Third Crusade. Many of Philip's most powerful nobles left for the Levant while their king fought and negotiated with Richard, thus rendering the French contingent much smaller and less prestigious than the Angevin one. Whatever his shortcomings as a king may have been, Richard showed himself a methodical planner, amassing enough funds to equip and supply his forces for the duration of the campaign. Although the logistical and financial records of the English campaign are uneven, and the proceeds of the "Saladin tithe" and the clerical tax can only be estimated, Richard did not want for money. After discussing strategy at Vezelay in early July 1190, the two kings proceeded south to Marseille and the Genoese transports, which were to take them in stages to Acre; Philip's contract with Genoese suggests that his force numbered around two thousand men. Richard's ships were not in evidence, causing further delays until he was able to hire enough to carry all his troops. The armies were forced, therefore, to winter in Messina, where the kings disputed the division of Sicilian plunder from Richard's reprisals on the Sicilian population.

On 10 April 1191 Richard's fleet departed from Messina; according to Richard of Devizes, it comprised 219 ships exactly, with the army numbering as high as seventeen thousand men. By the 17th, the fleet had reached Crete, minus twenty-five ships, including the ones carrying Richard's sister Joan and future wife Berengaria of Navarre. These ships, having been separated from the main fleet during a storm, had actually reached Cyprus, where several ran aground and were plundered, while the crews were imprisoned. Richard's fleet seems to have been bound for Limassol anyway, but he changed his plans from rendezvous to conquest upon hearing of the mistreatment of his subjects, and that Philip had already reached Acre, thus rendering Richard's presence less vital. On 6 May the English king reached Limassol, and found that the rebel Greek commander, Isaac Ducas Comnenus, had fortified the beaches around the city to repulse any landings. Undeterred, the Angevin assaulted with small boats, covered by archery fire once within range. The Cypriots pulled back after a sharp engagement, leaving Limassol to Richard. By the end of May all resistance had collapsed. Richard resisted Philip's attempts to claim a share of the island, and sold it to the Templars. When they could not make the payments, Richard sold it to his new vassal, Guy de Lusignan, thus laying the basis for the Kingdom of Cyprus. The acquisition of Cyprus essentially allowed the crusader states to survive for as long as they did. Strategically, it provided an agricultural foundation, a naval base, and a transport shelter to the Franks for the next several centuries.

Richard arrived at Acre on 8 June 1191, where he actively joined the succession dispute between Conrad and Guy (this was settled through compromise, in that Conrad was proclaimed Guy's heir). The siege, meanwhile, intensified, thanks largely to the French engineers, who constructed numerous sturdy tower and artillery pieces. The garrison surrendered on 12 July, to be exchanged for ransom and the True Cross. When neither seemed to be forthcoming, Richard had the three thousand prisoners slaughtered, an action which has troubled historians ever since. Philip, sick, exhausted, and with plans for his own kingdom, left for France at the end of the month, making Richard the undisputed leader of the Crusade. With the loss of Acre and its quantities of matériel, port, and fortifications, Saladin's position was very serious. Many of his men and commanders grew mutinous, and his priority now was to hold Jerusalem and attempt to lure Richard into an operational error.

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Advancing down the coast, with the fleet on one side and infantry on the other protecting his knights, Richard made for Caesarea, then Jaffa. On 7 September Saladin attempted to ambush the Frankish army at Arsuf. The English archers ensured some semblance of fire parity, though the Hospitallers, in the rear guard, were hit hard by Muslim archery. Eventually, they charged without waiting for Richard's signal, forcing him to send in the rest of his cavalry to support them. Saladin's forces, unused to this type of defense and facing fresh knights, broke. Saladin managed to counterattack once before a second charge drove his army from the field—battered but not destroyed. Casualties on both sides were fairly light, but Saladin's reputation had suffered a further blow. Richard continued to Jaffa, and rebuilt its fortifications while pondering the next move.

His decision to advance on Jerusalem, only to withdraw on 13 January 1192, when the army was two leagues from the campaign's objective, has been heavily debated among historians, especially since the army advanced again in the summer, only to withdraw on 4 July after acrimonious discussions among the Crusade leadership. Richard had serious reservations about the chances of a lengthy siege at the end of an exposed supply line, as well as the chances of holding such an exposed position should it be captured. Events proved him generally correct since Saladin stormed Jaffa after the Frankish army withdrew to Acre. Richard's recovery of the city by amphibious assault on 31 July and his victory five days later showed his generalship at its best and allowed him to insist on keeping Jaffa in the final truce with Saladin, concluded on 2 September 1192.

The German Crusade was an altogether different beast from its two neighbors. Frederick I (known as "Barbarossa" on account of his red beard) personally organized and controlled the operation more tightly than any previous expedition to Palestine. There has been considerable debate over why the emperor chose the land route to Jerusalem, the most popular explanations being lack of shipping, tighter imperial control of the army, and his familiarity with the route (since he had fought in his uncle Conrad's Crusade in 1147). The initial march through Hungary was easy enough, but Isaac II Angelus decided that a Byzantine alliance with Saladin was the safer course, and war began. The Greek War lasted nearly eight months, and shredded the imperial timetable. The German army was forced to forage in hostile territory and winter in Thrace, where, by all accounts, the crusaders won most engagements with Greek columns and irregular troops. In early 1190 Isaac made a plea for peace in the face of ominous German engineering and naval preparations for an assault on Constantinople itself. By May the German army was approaching the Seljuk Sultanate of Rum with whom Frederick had earlier concluded supply and transit negotiations. The sultan, however, under considerable pressure from Saladin, decided to oppose the German forces, and lack of provisions and fodder, with Turkish raids, nearly destroyed the emperor's army. From 14 to 18 May the main German and Turkish armies fought a running battle, similar in some respects to Richard's march to Jaffa, as the crusaders slowly approached the Seljuk capital of Konya. A sudden assault on Konya and a well-timed charge by the remaining German heavy cavalry won the day. The sultan signed a truce, which allowed the resupplied German army to continue on its way, but the campaign came to an end with Barbarossa's unexpected death in the Saleph River on 10 June 1190, just as they had approached friendly Armenian territory. The personal nature of the emperor's command structure ensured that the army did not survive his death. His son Frederick, the duke of Swabia, led some elements to Antioch, and the remnants of his force finally arrived at Acre late in 1190, where Frederick died in January 1191. Leopold, Duke of Austria, who had arrived by sea, took command of the German contingent in the months to come.

Frederick's son Henry VI attempted to continue his father's eastern campaigns, and the "German Crusade" of 1197 is often considered with that earlier expedition. The gap between the two was due largely to Henry's unstable political situation in Germany and Italy during the intervening years, and the time it took to coordinate preaching, participation, and mustering the army. Rebellion and illness,

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eventually resulting in his death on 28 September 1197, prevented Henry from going personally, and the fleet which left Messina for Acre in September was led by the imperial chancellor and imperial marshal. The German army advanced north from Acre, attempting to link the Latin Kingdom with Tripoli. They were largely successful, taking Sidon and Berytus before stalling at Toron. Certain news of Henry's death, however, led most German nobles to return home, as a double candidacy for the imperial throne split the empire. Politically, the campaign was a major success, as the chancellor crowned the kings of Jerusalem and Armenia, showing all who were watching that imperial influence in the eastern Mediterranean was there to stay—for the time being.

Assessments of the Third Crusade continue to be mixed. Richard's generalship is usually praised, though Thomas Asbridge has lately questioned his strategic sensibility in advancing twice on Jerusalem. Saladin's reputation has also suffered of late, and, Hattin excepted, his tactical conduct of battles was not on an especially high level. Philip II and Frederick I are usually overlooked, although they showed themselves masters of siegecraft and operations, respectively. The uncoordinated forces in Palestine before Richard's arrival get little credit either, even though Guy's politically motivated siege of Acre was a stroke of desperate genius. Finally, the ability of the military orders to reproduce credible fighting forces speaks to their efficiency, though we lack evidence as to just how this was done. Jerusalem remained with Saladin, and the strategic difference between the fractured Muslim world of the First Crusade and the relatively united front of the Third had much to do with it.

The Fourth Crusade. Although the Fourth Crusade is notorious for having sacked Constantinople, militarily it was remarkable that the city fell at all, given the French and Venetians' improvisational siege tactics. Shortly after becoming pope in the summer of 1198, Innocent III proclaimed another Crusade, and the preaching finally bore fruit in the summer of 1199, when Louis of Blois, Theobald of Champagne, and Baldwin of Flanders-Hainault took the cross. The counts sent envoys to Italy to arrange transport for the anticipated army, and these envoys decided on Venice as the most promising of the maritime states. The treaty specified that Venice would supply for one year an army of forty-five hundred knights, nine thousand squires, and twenty thousand foot soldiers, and that Venice would contribute fifty war ships to the armada. Also, the campaign's objective was Egypt, not Palestine, though the rank and file of army were left in ignorance of that detail. The counts and their envoys could not, however, speak for all those taking the cross, and only eleven thousand men had assembled in Venice by April 1202, the rest taking ship elsewhere as it suited them. A transport fleet of the size requested by the crusaders required enormous financial investment from the Venetians, and recent scholarship has been kinder to the Venetians' demands for payment than older accounts.

Since the crusaders, led now by Boniface of Montferrat in place of the deceased Theobald of Champagne, could not pay the cost of the fleet, Doge Enrique Dandolo worked out a deal whereby the crusade would assist Venice in recapturing the city of Zara, winter there, and then set out for Egypt the following year with Dandolo and a major Venetian contingent. The fleet finally left Venice in October 1202, and captured Zara by the end of November. Enraged, Innocent excommunicated his Crusade army, though the sentence on the French and Germans was soon lifted, and much of the army was left in ignorance that any papal sentence had been pronounced. That winter Alexius IV Angelus, claimant to the Byzantine throne, arrived in camp and, with envoys from his brother-in-law Philip of Swabia, persuaded the Crusade leadership to restore his father Isaac II Angelus to power. How this turn of events was achieved is beyond the scope of this article.

The crusaders' initial attacks on Constantinople achieved limited success, occupying Galata, on the north shore of the Golden Horn. The chain across the Golden Horn was cut, and a second assault, coordinated by land and sea, almost managed to take the city, before being repulsed by the Varangian guard. Alexius III fled, however, and Alexius IV and his father took the throne once again.

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Siege of Damietta. A group of crusaders enter Damietta, November 1219. Illustration from *Le miroir historial* by Vincent de Beauvais, MS 722, fol. 418r, fifteenth century. Photograph by R.G. Ojeda. RÉUNION DES MUSÉES NATIONAUX/ART RESOURCE, NY

Their rule was short-lived, as both were murdered in a revolt in January 1204, and the new emperor, Alexius V, showed little intention of cooperating with the Latin army outside his walls. The Crusade leaders decided to eliminate the Byzantine Empire permanently, and drew up a charter in March 1204 outlining the form of the new state. The walls were stormed twice, both times across the Golden Horn and at the same spot; the first time, on 8 April, the Latins were repulsed with heavy losses, the Greek defenses proving too high and too strong to breach. On 12 April the attack was renewed, and by pure accident soldiers from one of the French ships managed to scale and take a tower. Several other towers then fell, but Greek reserves almost turned the tide when crusaders, under Peter of Amiens, managed to breach a postern gate, and resistance suddenly collapsed. The city was taken by 13 April and plundered for three days.

A council of twelve (six Venetians and six French) then elected Baldwin of Flanders-Hainault the new emperor for the Latin Empire of Constantinople. From the beginning, the new kingdom was a ramshackle institution, and suffered a serious blow when Baldwin was defeated and killed at the battle of Adrianople in 1205 by the Bulgars. Boniface, ruling Thessalonica, was killed in battle in 1207, and his son Demetrius lost the kingdom to the Greek ruler of Epirus by 1224. The rump Byzantine Empire, based in Nicaea, tried repeatedly to recover its realm, coming close to recapturing Constantinople after 1225. The Bulgars to the north defeated Epirus and, allied with the Nicaeans, pressed the Latin empire hard, to the point that the barons elected the erstwhile king of Jerusalem John of Brienne as co-emperor. John's military reputation, however, could do little in the face of the resources arrayed against him, and after his death in 1237 the Latin fortunes continued to decline. In 1261 Constantinople fell to the Nicaeans in a single day, leaving the principality of Achaia as the main Latin possession in Greece.

The Fifth Crusade. Between 1204 and 1217, crusading enthusiasm was maintained by Spanish victories in Iberia as well as the controversial Albigensian Crusades. In 1213, in response to reports that the Ayyubids were fortifying Tabor, thus threatening Acre, Innocent III issued the bull *Quia maior*, which called on all the peoples of Christendom to lend material and spiritual support to the war, and this was followed by discussions at the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215. As an attempt to mobilize all of Christendom's resources for crusade (one hesitates to say "total war," though there are similarities with the modern concept), these efforts by Innocent, and after his death in 1216 by Honorius III, were remarkable. The resulting armies, however, were somewhat less impressive, and there is some basis to the claim that the Albigensian Crusade diverted a good deal of French participation, particularly since Simon de Montfort in Toulouse had required significant reinforcements from the spring of 1214 on. The first army to arrive at Acre in the autumn of 1217 was led by Leopold VI of Austria and Andrew of Hungary, having been transported by Venice in return for Hungary's surrender of all claims to Zara.

Although past historians have criticized the ineffectiveness of the army around Acre, James

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Powell's classic study contends that, in fact, operations around Acre kept Ayyubid attention fixed firmly in the north, while strengthening crusader holdings. Even after Andrew, Hugh of Cyprus, and Bohemond IV of Antioch left in January 1218, Caesarea was rebuilt and the Templar fortress of Athlit was expanded. In the late spring Oliver of Paderborn arrived with a significant German contingent, and the leaders discussed what to do next. Discussion as such was a major part of the Fifth Crusade, and one which has also drawn scholarly criticism. With Andrew's departure, only John of Brienne, as King of Jerusalem, held royal rank, and though elected leader of the armies for the assault on Egypt, he had to contend with the papal legate, the leaders of the military orders, and the various German, English, and French nobles who cycled in and out of the army.

The target of the invasion, Damietta, was a strong fortress, but was considered attainable compared to Alexandria. The crusaders disembarked at the end of May 1218, but the sultan's son, al-Kamil, though surprised, managed to assemble a scratch force to oppose them. Damietta lay on the east bank of the Nile, with a tower and chain controlling the river; the crusaders, on the west bank, would have to break Ayyubid control of the Nile if they wanted to cross and isolate the city. Using tactics similar to the Latins' assault on Constantinople, the crusaders finally managed to take the tower, dismantle the chain, and threatened to cross the river. Yet the leaders did not press forward, to Oliver's disgust. The new Ayyubid sultan al-Kamil attempted to pin the crusaders in their camp by a surprise attack on 9 October, but John of Brienne counterattacked successfully.

In the autumn of 1218, as reinforcements cycled in and out of the camp, dysentery set in, and two papal legates arrived, one of whom, Pelagius of Albano, soon alienated many nobles by his attempts to control the campaign and undermine John of Brienne's authority. Internal Ayyubid politics then came to the Latins' rescue in January 1219, as al-Kamil fled his camp after uncovering a plot to unseat him. Cautiously, John's army crossed the river, occupied the camp, and commenced the siege of Damietta on 5 February. The Ayyubids regrouped, and the crusader camp, already suffering from lack of supplies, had to withstand repeated probes and attacks throughout March, culminating in bitter general engagement on Palm Sunday (31 March); their lines held, largely through the leadership of Leopold of Austria, and al-Kamil was forced to cede the field. A crusader attack on the Muslim camp at Fariskur suffered a similar fate, disaster only being averted by the discipline of the military orders. While the sultan's attempts to negotiate a settlement, including large concessions to the Latin Kingdom, failed due to Pelagius's opposition, Damietta finally fell on 3 November 1219.

The capture of Damietta rallied and revitalized the Ayyubid war effort, leading to attacks on the Latin Kingdom; Caesarea fell, but the Templar fortresses generally held their own. Reinforcements continued to arrive in Egypt throughout 1220, including the imperial fleet and the Venetians, but John of Brienne left for Acre, not to return until the spring of 1221, at which point the duke of Bavaria, as Frederick II's representative, had arrived as well. The crusader army finally advanced south from Damietta on 17 July, even though the flood season was imminent. By 24 July it had reached Sharamsah, just as the waters began to rise, and John urged withdrawal. Sitting between a fork in the rivers, the army was surrounded by al-Kamil's forces, and on 26–27 August fought a series of desperate rear-guard actions, beating off successive attacks as they attempted to withdraw. It proved impossible to break out, and the Crusade leaders surrendered on 29 August 29. Al-Kamil was anxious to end matters as quickly as possible, and proposed to let the army go, in return for Damietta and an exchange of prisoners. Frankish leaders in Damietta were not convinced, but were eventually persuaded by the Templar and Teutonic masters that this was the best bargain possible. With that, one of the most indecisive medieval campaigns came to an end, one which had seen the command and organizational skills of both sides pushed to their limits.

Frederick II's Crusade, the Anti-Ghibelline Conflict. Emperor Frederick II's Crusade, while

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materially helpful to the Latin holdings in the east, was a source of embarrassment to Western Christendom at the time, and a source of bitter division among the eastern barons after it was over. Frederick had taken the cross in a fit of enthusiasm in 1215, but had constantly delayed his expedition since then. The reasons for these delays are beyond the scope of this article, but the political complications that dogged Frederick's steps are a strong reminder that the Crusades were not fought in a military or religious vacuum. By marrying John of Brienne's daughter (heiress to the kingdom through her mother) in 1225, Frederick could and did claim the throne of Jerusalem. Enforcing the claim was another matter, and much depended on the course of the campaign. The army, which assembled in Brindisi, was larger than anticipated, and loans from the Lombard cities of northern Italy did not meet the expenses. Large contingents from England and the empire, led by Henry of Limburg, had already left, but Frederick did not depart with his forces in September, as he had fallen ill. Pope Gregory IX was quick to excommunicate the emperor, according to the terms of the Treaty of San Germano in 1225. Undeterred, Frederick set sail on 28 June 1228 despite the sentence. The campaign, therefore, lacked a fixed spiritual hierarchy from the beginning, and Frederick's itinerary demonstrated his determination to bring the east firmly under imperial control.

Every decision Frederick made antagonized his barons. In Cyprus, he pressured John of Ibelin to surrender the government, which he then gave to the Lusignans, who lost an engagement and a siege to John in 1230/31. In Jerusalem, Frederick handed out privileges to his supporters, and especially to the Teutonic order, at the expense of the rights or claims of the established aristocracy. He excluded the patriarch from his negotiations with al-Kamil, and his recovery of Jerusalem did nothing to help the strategic depth of the kingdom—Frederick had made the mistake which Richard I had avoided. On the other hand, during the negotiations, Frederick had assisted Henry of Limburg in refortifying Caesarea and Jaffa, in case diplomacy should come to naught. The terms of the Treaty of Jaffa, as they can be reconstructed, go some length to explaining why the general dissatisfaction with victory by negotiation, rather than battle, ran so high afterward. Jerusalem could be refortified, but the Muslim population and possession of the Temple Mount remained. Frederick was not to come to the aid of the other Latin states in the event of war, nor was he to give aid to various Templar and Hospitaller fortresses. Toron was recovered but could not be refortified.

Frederick departed for Sicily on 1 May 1229, after hearing reports that John of Brienne was attacking imperial lands in southern Italy. In the years following his departure, John of Ibelin resisted attempts to dislodge him from Cyprus, and Frederick sent a Lombard army under his marshal, Richard Filangieri, to finish the job. Filangeri besieged Berytus while John raised Acre against the imperial troops. Filangieri was finally defeated at Agridi, on Cyprus, in 1232, and the anti-imperial front of barons, orders, and churches collapsed into the usual bickering thereafter.

Thibaud of Champagne, the Battle of La Forbie, and the Loss of Jerusalem. The expeditions of the later 1230s, led chiefly by Thibaud of Champagne, Richard of Cornwall, the duke of Burgundy, the king of Navarre, and other French and English nobles, have generally been held of little account, merely prolonging the ultimate destruction of the Latin Kingdom. Yet Jean Richard's argument that they built on Frederick's troubled legacy, mixing diplomacy with the threat of a strong military presence, has considerable force. Until the battle of La Forbie, divisions among the Muslim rulers had worked to the Latins' advantage, particularly the split of Damascus and Cairo into two sultanates. Thibaud's expedition, which arrived in the autumn of 1239, suffered a serious defeat at Beit-Hanun, near Gaza, in November, but negotiations with the sultan of Damascus yielded the hinterland of Sidon, including Beaufort castle, while negotiations with Egypt yielded Ascalon. Richard of Cornwall, brother of Henry III of England, assisted in the repair and refortification of Ascalon and Saphet. Richard, however, tended to support his brother-in-law Frederick II, which only served to antagonize the Templars

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(the Hospitallers had reconciled with the emperor some time before) and various barons.

It is hard to avoid the impression that, but for the infighting among the various crusader factions, the Latin states were on their way to regaining considerable ground in the early 1240s, as castles were rebuilt, monasteries reoccupied, fiefs restored. In attempting to profit from the conflict between the Ayyubid sultans, the Franks even gained possession of the Temple Mount. However, Egypt and Syria went to war in 1244, and Ayyub, sultan of Egypt, turned to the Khwarismian tribes of the north to secure his increasingly shaky throne, against which the Latin Kingdom allied itself with Damascus, Homs, and Kerak. The Khwarismian mercenary bands swept through the Bekaa Valley and reached Jerusalem, which fell with only slight resistance. On 17 October 1244, at La Forbie, near Gaza, the combined Frankish-Damascene army was destroyed. The Damascenes on the center and left were broken, and the Frankish forces on the right were surrounded. Unable to maneuver, the cavalry and infantry became hopelessly intermingled, and the barons and the military orders were cut down. The patriarch of Jerusalem estimated losses at nearly sixteen thousand men, on par with Hattin fifty-seven years before. The war, coming suddenly as it did, meant no help from Western Christendom could reach them. From this point forward, as Jean Richard has noted, the survival of the Latin Kingdom would depend on another major campaign from the west.

[*See also* Acre, Siege of; Crusades, *subentries on* Sources (1180–1245) *and* Historiography (1180–1245); Damietta, Siege of; Hattin, Battle of; La Forbie, Battle of; Orders, Military, *subentry on* Levantine Orders; Raynald of Châtillon; *and* Saladin.]

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Daniel P. Franke

Narrative (1245–1500)

When Louis IX "Saint Louis" returned to France in 1254 from his failed crusade, he left the Latin east in a weak position. It consisted of Antioch in the north and the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, a thin coastal strip from Acre, its effective capital, to Jaffa. Louis had negotiated with the Mongols, whose interest in the Middle East was becoming obvious. The presence of many Nestorian Christians in their ranks encouraged these approaches. In 1258 Hulagu captured Baghdad in a terrible sack, but before he could turn against Syria, the death of the Great Khan Möngke obliged him to return to Mongolia, leaving his Christian general, Kitbuqa, with only about 10,000 Mongol horsemen and various local allies. Nevertheless, Bohemond VI of Antioch and Hethum I of Cilician Armenia saw this as an opportunity and joined the Mongol assault on Syria, which had captured Aleppo and Damascus by 1260. Egypt, now controlled by the Mamluks, was the center of Muslim power, clearly intended to contest the Mongol ascendancy. The kingdom of Jerusalem was deeply divided, as it was on most great issues, about which side to join. There was no king, the nobles were prone to faction, and real power rested with the Orders of the Temple and Hospital who rarely agreed—versus the Italian city-states on whose shipping all relied for their very existence. But the two most important of these, Venice and Genoa, were enemies who, in 1256–1258, fought the War of Saint Sabbas over influence in crusader Acre. In effect, the Latin Kingdom adopted a neutral stance in the great clash of arms that resulted in the Mamluk victory at Ain Jalut on 3 September 1260 and their reconquest of Syria. The Mamluks showed no gratitude for this. The Sultan Baybars (1260–1277) razed Caesarea in 1265, although its garrison was allowed to surrender and go free. Haifa was evacuated in terror at his approach. The castle of Athlit was too strong for Baybars to contemplate assault, so he turned on Hospitaller Arsuf whose garrison, after much hard fighting, capitulated on the assurance of their lives and freedom—an assurance that was broken when they were all enslaved. In 1266 two Egyptian armies attacked. That led by Baybars accepted the surrender of Safed in return for the lives of the people in its Templar garrison, but they were all executed. In 1268 Baybars besieged Jaffa, and although its citizens were massacred, the prisoners in the garrison were allowed to leave alive in return for the surrender of the citadel. At the castle

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

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of Belfort, the men were enslaved, but the women and children were allowed to depart. In 1268 Antioch did not surrender, and when the Egyptians broke in, they shut the gates and killed or enslaved the whole population. In 1271 the garrisons of both Chastel Blanc and Crac des Chevaliers were forced to surrender. Mighty Marqab was put to siege by Kalavun (1279–1290) in 1285; he was so impressed with the valor of its Hospitaller garrison that he allowed people to surrender and depart in full armor with all their goods. In 1289 Kalavun broke the ten-year truce agreed in 1281 to attack Tripoli. When he stormed the city, the entire population was massacred or enslaved with great cruelty. In 1291 Al-Ashraf (1290–1293) captured Acre by storm with an appalling massacre.

Europe was aghast at the fall of Acre, yet it had done almost nothing to save the kingdom in the previous forty years. This was largely because the papacy was the moving force in crusading but in the thirteenth century became enmeshed in a complex political situation. The Emperor Frederick II (1197–1250) united

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Mamluks. Four trainee Mamluks perform sword exercises on the parade ground. Illustration from Nihayat al-su'l, a fourteenth-century Egyptian manual on horsemanship and military practice. © The British Library Board (ADD. 18866, F.140)

Germany and the kingdom of Sicily, and he sought to reaffirm imperial power over the cities of Lombardy. The popes regarded this domination of Italy as a threat to their independence and encouraged the resistance of the Lombard cities, precipitating a long and bitter war. When Frederick died, the popes were determined to destroy the Hohenstaufen and persuaded Charles of Anjou, the brother of Louis IX, to attempt the conquest of the kingdom of South Italy and Sicily, which he duly accomplished by 1268. But Charles's efficient regime, as well as his support for his allies in the cities of Tuscany and Lombardy, made him the dominant force in Italy. Moreover, he had obvious ambitions to restore the Latin Empire of Constantinople, which in 1261 had fallen to the Greeks. In 1270 Charles even persuaded his brother Louis to direct his new crusade against Tunisia, which had refused its usual tribute to Sicily, an enterprise during which Louis died. Pope Gregory X (1271–1276) was deeply uncomfortable at these Angevin ambitions, which were as threatening to papal independence as those of Frederick II. Moreover, they were difficult to combat because Charles claimed that he intended to recover Jerusalem. Gregory negotiated for a union of the churches of East and West with the Byzantine Emperor Michael VIII Palaeologus (1261–1282), which would form the prelude to a new crusade that Gregory actively promoted. At the Second Council of Lyon in 1274, a nominal union was proclaimed, but initiatives for a new crusade came to nothing.

Many blamed the papacy and its crusade against the Hohenstaufen for the failures of Louis IX. Moreover, European politics did not favor a new crusade. Germany was plunged into civil war; England, recovered from factional strife under Henry III (1216–1272), became preoccupied with wars against Wales and Scotland; and France under Philip III (1270–1285) was busy absorbing new territories in the south. Crusading was now very expensive, because a fleet was needed to ferry an army to the east. In addition, the army had to be large because it would face Mamluk Egypt, whose rulers had created a regular army by ruthlessly exploiting the peasantry of Egypt and Syria. This army was recruited, generation by generation, from the young Turks and Mongols of the steppe where the break-up of the great Mongol Empire created a huge reservoir of fighting men for hire. Their native skills as men born to the saddle made them natural warriors; in Egypt, they were provided with superb training and equipment. They were excellent horse-archers, but the Mamluks provided superior bows and armor that enabled them to take on heavy cavalry. But it was their careful and systematic training that made them into a coherent army. Western knights were excellent fighters, but they lacked the cohesion and maneuverability of this standing army. Mamluks served in the retinues of important princes, who formed a kind of military republic and elected the Sultan.

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

Battle of Nicopolis. 25 September 1396. Facsimile of a miniature conserved in the Topkapi Museum, Istanbul. PRIVATE COLLECTION/ARCHIVES CHARMET/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

The papacy remained wedded to a new crusade, but the union of Lyon came to nothing. Charles of Anjou persuaded the petty Frankish lordships of Achea (southern Greece), which were all that remained of the Latin Empire, to support him, and in 1277 he purchased the kingship of Jerusalem. He applied pressure to the papal court, which obligingly elected a friendly pope in the person of Martin IV (1281–1285), a Frenchman, who gave his blessing to Angevin ambitions against Byzantium. For the papacy, this vision of a Mediterranean Empire could be justified as promising the delivery of Jerusalem. But at the Sicilian Vespers on 30 March 1282, arrogant behavior by French soldiers provoked a rebellion against Charles, which rapidly spread to the whole of Sicily. By August Peter III of Aragon (1276–1285), a descendant of the Hohenstaufens, was proclaimed king. Although Charles could not expel him, Peter in turn could not evict the Angevins from Naples, and a long and bitter war broke out that lasted until 1302. The papacy supported the Angevins and even persuaded Philip III to join in the crusade against Aragon, but his expedition across the Pyrenees ended in his own death in 1285. All this prevented any attempt to succor the kingdom of Jerusalem, which duly vanished in 1291.

In 1187, when the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem fell, there had been an immediate upsurge in crusading, but after 1291 nothing comparable happened. Circumstances in the East were not unfavorable to a reconquest. Cyprus under its Lusignan kings provided a base for attack on the Mamluk territories. The instability of the Mamluk regime offered serious prospects of success. The Mongols had become established as the Il-Khanids of Persia and were interested in alliance with the westerners against Mamluk Egypt. Asia Minor was divided between independent Turkish *beyliks* (territories under the jurisdiction of a Bey, roughly translated "lord"), many of which were very weak.

Circumstances in Europe, however, were not favorable to crusading. The Spanish kingdoms were absorbed in their own wars against al-Andalus. Italy and the papacy were engulfed in the War of the Sicilian Vespers. Germany had become a geographic expression, and those of its people who wanted to take the cross could join the Baltic crusade led by the Teutonic Order in the Baltic. Edward I of England (1272–1307) had been to the East and served on Louis IX's crusade of 1270, but he was deeply engaged in Wales and Scotland as well as at war with France for a time after 1296. Although Philip IV of France (1285–1314) was deeply pious, he became embroiled in a quarrel with the papacy and after 1302 faced a protracted rebellion in Flanders. Edward II's (1307–1327) reign in England was troubled, and Philip IV was succeeded by three short-lived kings and then the accession of a new dynasty in the person of Philip VI of Valois (1328–1350). The French pope Clement V (1305–1314), appalled at the chaos in Italy consequent to the War of the Sicilian Vespers, moved the

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papacy to Avignon, where it would remain until 1378. Although Avignon was in papal territory, inevitably the powers of Europe looked askance at what they regarded as a French domination of the Holy See.

This did not mean that westerners had forgotten about Jerusalem. In 1306 Clement V conferred with the Grand Masters of the Hospital and the Temple about a new crusade to which all the kings of Europe agreed in principle. Pierre Dubois, a Norman lawyer, who had served on the estates-general and worked at the royal court, produced his tract "On the Recovery of the Holy Land" about 1306. Part One dealt with the crusade to the east, here envisaged as French-led, but Part Two, for Philip's eyes only, set this in the context of French hegemony. In about 1310 Guillaume de Nogaret, another French royal servant, argued in a memorandum that if the king was to take the cross, the Church as a whole should place its incomes at his disposal and advocated the suppression of the Temple as a means of raising money. Louis of Durand, Bishop of Mende, was an active advocate of the crusade, and Louis of Clermont was an influential leader who dedicated his life to its furtherance. One of the most detailed and practical considerations of the problems of crusading was produced by Marino Torsello Sanudo, a Venetian who belonged to the family of the dukes of the Archipelago. His *Book of the Secrets of the Faithful of the Cross* brought to bear his considerable experience of the eastern Mediterranean and was widely circulated. He suggested an economic embargo on trade with Mamluk Egypt as a prelude to a military assault. Much of the business of the Council of Vienne (1311–1312) was concerned with the crusade, notably the raising of a clerical tithe. Every effort was made to prohibit trade between the west and Egypt. In the 1360s Philippe de Mézières, who had fought in Asia Minor and Cyprus, called for a new "Order of the Passion," with knightly leaders who should spearhead a crusade and form a permanent garrison to defend the Holy Land against its enemies. In 1313, at a grand occasion in Paris, Philip IV took the cross, and Edward II of England followed suit. But Philip died in 1314, and England dissolved into factional struggles. Philip VI of the new house of Valois saw in support for the crusade an opportunity to assert his preeminence among the monarchs of Christendom—particularly because his claim to the French throne was contested by Edward III of England (1327–1377). He persuaded the papacy to levy a tithe for six years on the clergy across Christendom and established a royal committee to organize the crusade to Jerusalem. However, he faced grim opposition from the French towns, and the whole project ended with the outbreak of the Hundred Years' War in 1337.

Europe was preoccupied by its own conflicts, and the sheer cost of crusading gave pause for thought. Louis IX's crusade, 1248–1254, had cost 1.5 million livres over 6 years, mostly raised by taxes on the Church. Sanudo suggested his plans would require 2 million florins per year, but this was probably an underestimate. Charles IV (1322–1328) of France had the matter closely investigated, and his officers envisaged that a serious expedition would cost 1.6 million livres annually. Philippe de Mézières envisaged his order as being based on around 1,000 knights with 2,000 other mounted men and 6,000 sergeants, archers, and so on. They would be supported on the crusade by 12,000 soldiers "not of the habit of the Order" and a huge fleet of 10,000 sailors. The costs of this array were 3,350,000 francs over three years, a gigantic sum that reflected the escalating costs of war in late medieval Europe. In these circumstances, the papacy was driven to organizing more modest expeditions. In 1310 the papacy used its taxes on the Church to support a Holy League of Cyprus, Genoa, and the Hospital, which captured Rhodes; this was held by the Hospitallers until 1522. In 1344 another League of Cyprus, the Hospital, and Venice captured Smyrna, which was held until 1402.

But these were rare successes, because the Christian powers of the Mediterranean were divided. In the Byzantine Empire, Andronicus III (1328–1341) emerged as a strong emperor after a civil war that began in 1320. However, Byzantium had no interest in crusading and dissolved into a protracted civil war after 1341, which left it exhausted. In Frankish Greece, the single strongest power was the duchy

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of Athens, which had been conquered in 1311 by a group of mercenaries, the Grand Catalan Company, who formed themselves into a kind of military republic, with only a nominal allegiance to the kings of Aragon. They were permanently at odds with the principality of Achaea, dominated by their Angevin enemies, but often itself divided, and hostilities were complicated by Byzantine enclaves such as Mistra. The Knights of Saint John controlled Rhodes and had great lands in Europe and on Cyprus, generating the means to support a small fleet and substantial military forces, but they were not strong enough to dominate the area. Venice controlled Crete, Negroponte (modern-day Euboea), and most of the Aegean islands, but after 1346 Genoa secured Chios and Lesbos. Although western sea power was dominant, its effect was severely limited by the rivalry of these two cities. The Hospitaller fleet was really too small to be decisive, and Lusignan Cyprus was dangerously exposed in an area where the Mamluks were building up their navy. The papacy tried to prohibit western trade with Egypt, but neither the Order of Saint John nor the Cypriot kingdom was strong enough to enforce it, and the papacy granted so many exceptions to the Italians that it became ineffective. Cyprus was a declining force, impoverished by changing patterns of trade, for the Italian cities increasingly traded directly with Alexandria, ceasing to call at its ports. This provoked Peter I, King of Cyprus (1359–1369), to take a desperate gamble. In 1362 he went to the west and, taking advantage of the cessation of Anglo-French hostilities after the Treaty of Brétigny of 1360, raised an army of perhaps 10,000 on four hundred Venetian ships. It is not at all clear that Peter had any real idea of what to do with this force. It was inadequate for a serious crusade to the Holy Land but might have been effective against the aggressive *beyliks* of Asia Minor. In any event, he attacked Alexandria, perhaps hoping to gain trading concessions from both western and Islamic traders. The city fell on 9 October, with a vast plunder, but Peter retreated hastily when a Mamluk army appeared on 16 October. It was a spectacular event but did nothing to change the balance of power in the Mediterranean, and in 1369 Peter was assassinated.

By this time a new power was arising from the acute political fragmentation of the Mediterranean, with the emergence of the Ottoman principality in western Asia Minor as a major power. This small *beylik* attracted Turkish freebooters because of the energy and skill of its Ottoman rulers and its proximity to Christian territory. Christian peasants, alienated by heavy taxes and Byzantine neglect of Asia Minor, were attracted by the tolerance of Ottoman rule. The Turks' soldiers were horse-archers from the steppe with no experience of siege warfare. However, their dominance of the countryside isolated important cities; in 1326 they captured Byrsa and five years later seized Nicaea. In 1345 the real breakthrough came, when they intervened in the Byzantine civil war and obtained a foothold in Europe. Such successes attracted more Turks from the steppe, and with weakness all about them, the Ottomans seized Philippopolis in 1363 and Adrianople in 1369, effectively surrounding Constantinople. The threat to the capital led to a rapprochement between Byzantium and the papacy that, with enormous efforts, managed to persuade Count Amadeo VI of Savoy to lead a new crusade in 1363. But he could raise only 3,000 men, and although they were militarily effective, expelling the Ottomans from Gallipoli, they could not effect any real change in the balance of power. The Ottoman Sultan Murad I (1360–1389) then set about creating a real state with a highly centralized bureaucracy. Military reform was very thorough and created an army adapted to fight in European conditions. Murad created a regular infantry, later known as the janissaries, recruited from among young Christians. The elite of this new army were the *sipahis* (heavy cavalry), who could take on the European knights. Both the infantry and the *sipahis* were highly disciplined and supported by specialist groups of engineers, pioneers, and others. This was a standing army, far more advanced than the forces of the European monarchies. They were directly paid by the sultan and clearly intended to break the power of the chieftains who led the Turkish horse-archers, who had hitherto been the main Turkish force. Murad was killed in battle against the Serbs at Kosovo on 15 June 1389, but his son Bayezid I (1389–1402) took over immediately and led the army to victory. The

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Ottoman advance into the Balkans and their domination of western Asia Minor prompted the Hungarians to respond to papal advances for a crusade, especially when Bayezid began the siege of Constantinople in 1394. However, raising a crusade was greatly hampered by the outbreak of schism between two separate lines of popes in 1378, a situation that would continue until 1415. Inevitably, England and France supported different popes, and this perpetuated the split. However, in the 1390s, the French and English kings appeared to be willing to make peace, and a crusade was projected as a seal on this.

The first fruit of this accord was the Barbary Crusade of 1390. Genoa deeply resented Muslim pirates based in Tunisia, base of the Hafsid dynasty, and they were aware of the relative weakness of the regime there. In 1388 they had seized the island of Jerba and clearly wanted to strengthen their position with a view to exploiting the trade in gold and slaves from sub-Saharan Africa. In 1389 they approached Charles VI of France (1380–1422), who was initially reluctant. However, the proposal aroused great enthusiasm among the French nobles, and in the end about 3,000 men, led by Louis of Bourbon, the veteran soldier, joined this crusade. The Genoese provided twenty-eight war galleys and eighteen transports and about the same number of soldiers, including 1,000 crossbowmen. On 22 July the crusaders besieged the port of Mahdia, but they were poorly organized and only began to make serious assaults seven weeks later. The Genoese then opened negotiations with the Hafsid sultan, who agreed to pay 10,000 ducats immediately and a sum equivalent to the revenues of the city for the next fifteen years. On the return journey, the Franco-Genoese force attacked Aragonese Sardinia and seized Terracina on the Italian mainland, although the French subsequently balked at a proposed attack on Pisan Piombino. The French participants were hailed as heroes on their return, and their deed passed into chivalric literature. To modern eyes, the whole enterprise appears to have been a fiasco, but it was then hailed as a success and increased enthusiasm for the crusade, especially in France.

The projected Anglo-French treaty never materialized, but a substantial crusading force was raised. It was mostly French, with a few English, Germans, and others. The intention was that this force should unite with the Hungarians, while the Venetians would take naval action in the Aegean Sea and the Straits. The western army, 8,000 strong, including 2,000 knights, then joined Sigismund, King of Hungary (1387–1437), whose forces were about the same size. They brought the Ottomans to battle at Nicopolis on 25 September 1396 and were completely destroyed. The primary cause of this lay in one of the fundamental weaknesses of all crusading armies. They were composite forces, and from the first the French were deeply distrustful of Sigismund and the Hungarians. Unfortunately, the French themselves suffered from a plethora of leaders, none of whom emerged as a dominating personality as, for example, Bohemond had during the First Crusade. The French cavalry insisted that they should be the vanguard of the attack, and their charge smashed the Turkish light screening forces and infantry. However, by this time the momentum of their attack was lost, and they were slaughtered by the enemy's heavy horse-archers, the *sipahis*. Confusion then followed because both sides were exhausted, but Stephen Lazarevic, a Serbian vassal of the Sultan, arrived with 1,500 Serbian cavalry and crushed the Hungarians, many of whose allies deserted. The crusade did not even make the Ottomans break off their siege of Constantinople, which ended only in 1401 when a new Mongol leader, Tamerlane, invaded Asia Minor. He defeated and captured Bayezid at the battle of Ankara in 1402 but never followed up his victory, allowing the Ottomans to recover under Mehmed I (1413–1421) and Murad II (1421–1451).

Neither did the Europeans seriously attempt to profit from the Ottoman defeat. The front line of Christian resistance to the Ottomans was now Hungary, but Sigismund was distracted by his elevation to the position of Roman king in 1410. He sponsored the Council of Constance in 1415, which eventually ended the papal schism and established a universally recognized line of popes. However, the Czechs of Bohemia resented German rule, and many of the more radical adhered to the Hussite heresy. As a result, a new crusade was proclaimed against them, which did not quell resistance to Sigismund until

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1436. This series of wars was of considerable military importance. The Czech resistance was from the first divided between Utraquists, who simply wanted church reform and, in particular, communion in bread and wine for all (lay Catholics took only the bread), and the Taborites, who argued for a root-and-branch reform of the Church based on biblical precept. This latter group produced a military leader of genius, Jan Žižka. He realized that his hastily raised forces could not face German men at arms and mercenaries in the open field. But he recognized that firearms could be very effective, although their weight and slow rate of fire made them vulnerable in the open field. His solution was the *wagenburg*—large numbers of carts bearing cannons and handgunners. These advanced to within range of the enemy and formed squares or circles within which cavalry and infantry sheltered. Cannon fire would provoke the enemy into a charge, which would then be cut to pieces by handgun and cannon fire. This would in turn allow the troops within to sally out and rout the enemy. No fewer than three crusades were totally defeated by the Czechs, who also began to make successful sallies into Germany. In the end, Sigismund was able to conciliate the Utraquists, who turned on and defeated their former radical allies. But the *wagenburg* had shown how to compensate for the deficiencies of firearms in pitched battle, and it was widely copied, especially by the Ottomans.

After Sigismund, Hungary underwent a prolonged political crisis. But under János Hunyadi, a remarkable soldier, the Hungarians inflicted a series of defeats on the Ottomans in the "long campaign" of 1443–1444, although ultimately their crusade against the Turks, strongly supported by the papacy, was defeated at the battle of Varna in 1444. Hungary held out against Turkish attack and, backed by papal support, recovered Belgrade in 1456. Hunyadi's victories excited much attention in western Europe, but few were moved to join these anti-Ottoman crusades. Germany was profoundly weak. Further west, the Hundred Years' War had again come alive in the early fifteenth century and would continue to preoccupy the warring parties until the English were expelled from France at the battle of Castillon in 1453.

It is hardly a coincidence that 1453 was the very year in which Constantinople fell to Mehmed II (1451–1481). The siege, from 5 April to 29 May, demonstrated the superiority and flexibility of the Ottoman army. By this time, the Ottomans had virtually isolated the city and constructed fortifications along the Straits. Even so, the city was formidable, with its mighty Roman walls. Mehmed could not afford failure and so had mobilized a huge army, on the order of 80,000 men, for the assault. The Turks were known to have light cannons, and Mehmed also employed a European engineer, German or perhaps Hungarian, called Orban, who cast great cannons to batter the walls. The Golden Horn, to the north of the city, was sealed off by a great chain that could be lifted to allow in friendly ships, but the Turks transported ships overland so they could seal off the city. At the same time, every effort was made to undermine the walls. In the end, the 7,000 defenders, including many Venetians and Genoese and a few other westerners, were simply overwhelmed by the highly disciplined Turkish army driven on by the will of its commander, and the city fell, although at great cost in blood. The entire enterprise demonstrated the growing complexity of warfare and the skill of the Turks in adopting the newest techniques. The traditional army that had invaded Europe in 1345 could never have taken the great city of Constantinople, but the military organization established by Mehmed I made this success possible.

Since the middle of the fourteenth century, the crusade had been dominated by the need to counter the Ottoman advance, but Jerusalem was forgotten. It simply seemed more and more remote. In 1425 the Mamluk fleet raided Lusignan Cyprus and converted the kingdom into a vassal-state. Venice held Crete and the islands of the Aegean but was more concerned with trading interests and ready to trade with the Ottoman world. Genoa collapsed as a result of wars with Venice and was taken under French suzerainty. In the fourteenth century individual nobles often went on to crusade with the Teutonic Order against the pagans of Lithuania—the famous *Reisen*. But the union of Poland and Lithuania deprived the order of its raison d'être, and it

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was crushed by Poland at the battle of Tannenberg (modern-day Stębark) in 1410. Jerusalem continued to be remembered in liturgical rites. Crusader manuscripts were still copied, and the glories of the past, therefore, were remembered. Replicas of Jerusalem were constructed and, as at Sacro Monte near Varallo, became popular centers of pilgrimage, often replete with crusading symbolism. The papacy continued to fund crusading and to patronize Holy Leagues. But in real terms crusading had changed, and changed radically.

When Urban II launched the First Crusade in 1099, the papacy stood as a giant over Europe. There were kingdoms and principalities, but they were poorly structured and articulated. The Church was a kind of "superstate," and for it to create its own army drawn from the whole of Christendom to fight for God's cause on the earth was entirely logical. Moreover, crusading offered a real reward to laymen, the indulgence, by which laymen could obtain release from the burden of sin without the vocation of a priest or monk. But in the thirteenth century powerful and well-articulated kingdoms emerged that laid claim to the loyalty of their subjects. In France and England, and even in more obscure principalities, the nobility became absorbed into the fabric of the state. Service to the crown offered paths to wealth and glory. It is interesting that although Germany was not a political unity at the end of the fifteenth century, there was such strong hostility to Rome and the outside interference in German affairs it represented that Martin Luther was able to capitalize on it in his campaign for reform of the Church, which became the Protestant Reformation. At the same time as the state became the center of the life of the leaders of society, so religious exercises were multiplied, eroding the uniqueness of the crusading indulgence. Late medieval spirituality was immensely rich and varied and offered to men and women many paths to salvation. The cult of chivalry was immensely important among the aristocracy in late medieval Europe, and crusading was a vital and integrated part of this value system. However, its adherents were enmeshed in the politics of the state. It was when these two poles of loyalty were combined, when the state took over the crusade, that crusading became genuinely successful again.

This happened in the Iberian peninsula. In Spain, the war against the Muslims of Granada languished after the capture of Algeciras in 1344 as a series of wars between Aragon and Castile, sometimes dragging in Portugal, preoccupied the Spanish kingdoms. In the fifteenth century the kings of Aragon became embroiled in Italian wars, which demanded heavy taxes, alienating their nobility who demanded privileges at the expense of the crown. In Castile, internal conflicts had much the same effect. The Nasrid dynasty of Muslim Granada could count on support from the Marinids of North Africa, and it was shrewd enough to play the factions within the Christian kingdoms off against one another. Moreover, Granada was secure behind mountains whose passes were guarded by modern fortresses. Its population, largely made up of the descendants of people driven out of the rest of Spain, were determined to resist any attack. In 1479 Isabella of Castile and Ferdinand of Aragon married, establishing a union of the two states. They set out to crush internal opposition, and they saw a renewal of the crusading spirit as a means to bring unity to their divided lands. In 1483 succession disputes in the Nasrid clan offered opportunities to attack. Moreover, the Marinids of North Africa were in a time of troubles, which had allowed the Portuguese to take Ceuta in 1415 and subsequently to take the cities of the Atlantic coast of Morocco. But Castile had to mobilize enormous resources to maintain a war that turned on a series of large-scale sieges of cities and fortresses with modern fortifications. A more professional army equipped with cannons had to be created. An army of no less than 50,000 was needed for the siege of Baza in 1489, costing an estimated 50,000 marvedis. In the end, Granada surrendered on terms in 1492, and Spain was enthused by crusading ardor, to such an extent that the idea of a crusade along the North African coast to Jerusalem, first floated in the twelfth century, was revived. On the North African coast, Mers el-Kébir fell to the Spanish in 1505 and to Tripoli in 1510. It is doubtful whether Castile and Aragon would have been able to destroy Granada

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had not leading ecclesiastics mobilized opinion in favor of the war. The enormous sums raised by the Church and papacy were absolutely vital to the success of the conquest. Significantly, there was no substantial foreign participation in the fighting, although small numbers of north Europeans were occasionally present. This was the crusade harnessed by the monarchy for the business of state building. In the process, the kings usurped, through custom, the right to tax the Church.

The Church also found itself excluded from another aspect of the late medieval crusading movement—the voyages of discovery. Portugal started to explore the African coast in the fourteenth century. Her traders were aware of the trade in gold and slaves with sub-Saharan Africa, but there was also a real desire to outflank Islam. By 1475 they reached the Gulf of Guinea, and by 1483 they reached the Congo River. In 1488 they rounded the Cape of Good Hope. In 1509 they crushed a Muslim fleet off Diu in Gujrat and forced themselves into the trading network in the Indian Ocean. While the Ottomans built a traditional Mediterranean fleet to seize Venetian Negroponte (modern-day Euboea) in 1470 and were able to threaten the western dominion of the inland sea, western shipping was far better developed to explore the oceans. Western ships were large and capable of carrying heavy guns, which opened the Indian Ocean to Portugal. In 1492 Spain sent Columbus on a different route to outflank Islam—westward. Although his discoveries were limited in value, in his wake followed the conquistadores such as Cortés, who saw themselves as crusaders and exploited the divisions of the native peoples to carve out a Spanish empire in the Americas. The sheer costs of exploration and conquest on this scale could be met only by state sponsorship, so that despite its important contribution, the Church and papacy did not control or profit from the process except by permission of kings.

Crusading was a living force in the Late Middle Ages, and the papacy went on to coordinate more Holy Leagues in the sixteenth century, such as that which destroyed the Ottoman fleet at Lepanto in 1571. But essentially the rising states of late medieval Europe came to control the movement and to determine its directions, it successes, and its failures. After the thirteenth century the papacy no longer had the means truly to direct the movement. Its enemies, the Ottomans and the Mamluks, were immensely powerful, and at no stage did a truly advanced western army ever confront either of them. Edward III created armies with new tactical skills, above all the idea of strategic offense allied with tactical defense that proved so dynamic. But the forces that actually confronted the Muslims were quite small and, in the case of Nicopolis, had simply not absorbed the new methods. The Ottomans, in contrast, were very advanced in their military organization and thinking and more than capable of defeating the European armies they met. The Mamluks were much less progressive, but they were never truly tested against western methods. The crusade born out of the needs of the papacy, but the European states outgrew its leadership and crusading flourished or failed according to their policies.

[*See also* Crusades, *subentries on* Narrative (1095–1183) *and* Narrative (1180–1245); Mamluks; *and* Ottoman Armies and Military Methods.]

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John France

Historiography Overview (1000–1500)

The most significant development in crusader historiography since the 1970s has been the perception of how central and important the movement was to the development of Europe. Traditionally, the focus had been on the great journeys to Jerusalem, and these tended to be seen as a "bolt-on" to European medieval history—exotic adventures interesting in themselves but of little concern to students of mainstream history. Carl Erdmann undermined this by showing that the roots of crusading lay in profound trends in European development, in particular the growth of the papacy. However, his work was only translated into English and diffused to a wider readership in 1977, and even then it was overlaid by traditional arguments about crusader motivation. For many historians the religious purpose of crusading had always been merely a cloak for a rather more disreputable pursuit of wealth and glory, and this "domestic argument" among crusader historians helped to maintain the crusading ghetto.

The most important single work that began to expand the view of crusading was Jonathan Riley-Smith's *What Were the Crusades?* Its long life and frequent editions indicate its importance. Riley-Smith emphasized the importance of crusading in northern and eastern Europe and, indeed, in the western European heartland, firmly establishing that it was not an exotic movement confined to the Holy Land. More important, Riley-Smith redefined the movement, arguing that once it was seen to be detached from Jerusalem, it could only be defined as a papal institution whose legitimacy sprang not from any particular destination but from papal initiative. This inevitably provoked a reaction, notably from H. E. Mayer and French historians like Jean Flori, for whom the Crusade is inseparable from Jerusalem. Most recently, Christopher Tyerman has argued that Urban II initiated a Christian holy war whose only true objective was Jerusalem. The liveliness of the argument between "Jerusalemites" and "pluralists" is evidence of the vigor of crusading studies, but this must not obscure the enormous change in the grounds of debate. All parties now recognize the centrality of the papal role, and in turn the centrality of crusading to papal development. It is no accident that three studies of the papacy in English in the past twenty years have been produced by writers who have also interested themselves in the history of the Crusades. H. E. J. Cowdrey emphasizes in his study of Gregory VII how crucial the reign of this pontiff and his bitter conflict with the empire of Henry IV was to the refinement among ecclesiastics of the idea that war could have positive uses. I. S. Robinson's history of the papacy contains an extended chapter on the Crusades. Colin Morris's work on the papal monarchy demonstrates how central crusading was to the papacy and how its successes and failures reflected those of the medieval papacy. It is interesting to note that John Moore's study of Pope Innocent III contains two chapters on the Crusades, in contrast to Helene Tillmann's biography of the same pope, written in German in 1954 and translated into English in 1980. The works of Norman Housley and Sylvia Schein have shown conclusively that crusading was not a short-lived phase in the history of the papacy, but a major preoccupation stretching across the Middle Ages and one of consuming interest even when the papacy was enmeshed in troubles of its own in the West.

If the whole development of the papacy was caught up in crusading and is inseparable from it, the movement has also been seen as having a profound influence on other aspects of European life. James Brundage's pioneering study placed crusading in the context of medieval canon law and was followed up by others, notably John Gilchrist. The influence of Crusades was not limited to canon law because as monarchies grew they, too, had to make provision for the needs of crusaders. The impact of the Saladin tithe on the development of royal taxation has long been understood, while in Spain and

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South America the tax known as the *cruzada* was still being collected in the nineteenth century. The economic effect of the Crusades on western Europe has been the subject of much general debate, but perhaps the best insights come from the work on Genoa and its trade by Michel Balard, M. D. Jacoby's studies of crusader Acre and its place in Mediterranean trade, and Harvey's study of the Byzantine economic revival. However, although a good deal of work has been done on the Italian city-states and on the economic life of the crusader settlements in the East, we lack a general study that seeks to establish the contribution of crusading to European economic development. The liturgical impact of the Crusades has recently (2003) been explored in a deeply learned book by Amnon Linder. The work of C. T. Maier has explored the contribution of crusading to the body of Western sermons, revealing its enormous impact upon medieval communication. "Chivalry" is a shorthand term for the compound of ideas and attitudes that formed the code of the arms bearers in society—the kings, lords, knights, and their supporters. Its nature is much debated, and while traditionally it was seen as a positive and even civilizing force, historians are now more critical, C. B. Bouchard perhaps less than R. W. Kaeuper. But all would agree that crusading made an enormous impact on the outlook of the European upper class, and that this is very much reflected in the literature that they enjoyed, explored in the work of D. A. Trotter and, more recently, Helen Nicholson (2001).

Recent work on the Crusades has had a very substantial focus on the origins of the movement and the vexed question of what motivated men and women to undertake these terrible and dangerous journeys to the East. It was Erdmann's great achievement to have made a synthesis of the evidence bearing upon the nature of piety among the eleventh-century aristocracy. It is universally accepted that contemporaries suffered from a deep sense of sin, which could only be purged by penance, and in particular by pilgrimage and the cult of saints. J. S. C. Riley-Smith has argued that "the attitude of eleventh-century Christians towards Jerusalem and the Holy Land was obsessive." Others, however, have found little evidence of this, though a recent book by Colin Morris suggests that the Holy City had a greater rather than a lesser place in devotion in the age of the First Crusade. Erdmann believed that Christian attitudes to war became much more positive in the eleventh century, but this has come under attack, and not only among those influenced by the ideas of Riley-Smith. However, Flori rejects totally the notion that out of the Augustinian "just war" medieval people evolved a notion of "holy war" from which grew the Crusade. He suggests that the sacralization of war grew out of the anxiety to protect churches and church property and that in the eleventh century the power to define "holiness" devolved upon the papacy, which as a result developed very far-reaching ideas. This, in fact, is not a great change from the ideas of Erdmann, and as a survey, the book suffered from the same limitation as that of Erdmann in that Christian attitudes to violence in the Dark Ages were really not seriously examined. An attempt to fill this gap suggests that Europeans evolved no specific doctrine of holy war, but rather a series of ill-defined notions pointing in the same direction, and that Urban II, therefore, gave a new focus to existing feelings in 1095. The most radical attack on the Erdmann synthesis was mounted by M. G. Bull, who argued that the "theologians of violence" who served Gregory VII had very little impact on the lay arms bearers. More surprising, Bull posited that the peace movement had less influence on laymen than had been supposed, and that the French expeditions to Spain were very marginal. His achievement was to reveal evidence that suggested that pious aristocrats were influenced by monks who favored the reform papacy of Urban II. This marched well with Riley-Smith's emphasis on aristocratic piety and "crusading families" in which crusading was characterized as not a mass movement but a minority interest into which some were drawn but many were not. Bull's work on monastic influence has found widespread support, but historians, above all Flori, have been less willing to dismiss the role of the peace movement, while it is increasingly clear that the seizure of Toledo in 1085 and the subsequent Christian defeat at Sagrajas in

1086 seem to have commanded enormous attention. Moreover, the theologians of violence may have had little impact upon lay people, but their ideas clearly influenced the papacy.

There is common ground that Urban wanted to bring peace to Europe by projecting its quarrelsome upper class against an outside enemy. Since a key article by H. E. J. Cowdrey in 1970, there has been a consensus that Urban used Jerusalem as a focus for his expedition. However, just how central he saw it in the first place remains in doubt, and this is the focus for the sharp division between pluralists and Jerusalemites, among whom Alain Demurger produced a reassertion of the traditional position that in polemic intent exceeds even that of Christopher Tyerman. An attempt has been made to suggest that Peter the Hermit played an independent role in the conception of the Crusade, but historians have been reluctant to credit him with a major role. When it comes to the reasons why people went on crusade, the work of Riley-Smith has convinced everybody that crusading was essentially a religious phenomenon. However, this is not to say that crusaders went simply or even mainly for religious reasons. Riley-Smith has argued forcefully that crusading was expensive and risky, and that therefore "it is hard to believe that most crusaders were motivated by crude materialism," and that point must have become clearer and clearer as the crusading movement went on. But at the start it was perhaps less apparent, and even afterward we should always remember that people travel always in hope, often against all experience; otherwise, nobody would enter the lottery. And there was glory and wealth to be won in the East, as shown by the story of the Lusignans. Most historians would agree with Riley-Smith that we must dismiss the notion of the Crusades as a cover story for imperialism and capitalism as Marxist cloud-cuckoo-land, but at the same time all experience is that human beings have mixed motives. Perhaps the last word will always rest with an anonymous participant on the First Crusade, who recorded the crusaders' battle cry as they suffered in terrible straits at the battle of Dorylaeum: "Stand fast altogether, trusting in Christ and in the victory of the Holy Cross. Today, please God, you will all gain much booty."

It is a natural consequence of the attention given to the origins of the crusading movement that the First Crusade has been intensively worked over in recent years. Outstanding are two works by Riley-Smith already referred to. However, many of the fruits of this great volume of research have been distilled in a volume by T. S. Asbridge, which provides a useful and accessible summary for students. A new biography of Bohemond by Flori is notably welcome.

If the beginnings of crusading have been the subject of much research, the same is true of its ending. In one sense this is a result of freeing the Crusades from the prison of Jerusalem. On a Jerusalemite reading, anything after the fall of Acre in 1291 could be dismissed as a minor irrelevance. It is no accident that the leading historian in this field is a pluralist, Norman Housley, whose many works have established firmly that the Crusade continued to be a major preoccupation of Europeans and especially of the papacy throughout the later Middle Ages. This has had its effect upon writers of general accounts of crusading. Recent works in French by Balard and in German by Nikolas Jaspert reach deep into the later Middle Ages, while France has extended the story into the eighteenth century, though Andrew Jotischky is more conservative in lengthening the time frame. Moreover, much attention has been paid to the Crusades in the north. Eric Christiansen's study remains the standard introduction in English to the Crusades in northern Europe, while William Urban has contributed much. A fascinating collection of essays by T. M. S. Lehtonen and K. V. Jensen offers many insights into Baltic developments. Sven Ekdahl has produced a study of the famous battle of Tannenberg and Urban a general history of the Teutonic order. Both Ekdahl and Sarnowsky have published editions of very important records of the Order.

The intense focus on the beginning and end of the crusading period led to a neglect of the classic numbered Crusades, which is now starting to be rectified. Two volumes of essays on the Second Crusade

have explored the various aspects of this great event, and in particular Alan Forey and M. Hoch have suggested that the decision to attack Damascus was essentially quite reasonable. Over half a century ago Giles Constable published an elegant essay in which he suggested there was a papal plan for this Crusade, and this has recently been contested by both Forey and France. Jonathan Phillips has produced a very valuable study of the political and diplomatic context in the twelfth century and an important study of the Second Crusade. There has been nothing like this range of activity around the Third Crusade, of which there is no good recent study. A certain amount of work has been done on the Fourth Crusade, but the consensus established by Donald Queller and Thomas Madden, that there was no conspiracy to seize Constantinople, still stands. Michael Angold's study of this Crusade, however, presents a Byzantine viewpoint and brings out the full consequences for the empire. More particularly, Byzantine-Venetian relations have been explored to some considerable profit in a recent work by Madden. On the wider question of Byzantium and the Crusades, Ralph-Johannes Lilie's work remains very important, but Jonathan Harris's study of the same subject is eminently clear and accessible. Angold's general study of Byzantium remains vital, while Harvey surveys economic development and John F. Haldon the military history of the empire. Perhaps the most magisterial study of any single Crusade after the first is that on the Fifth Crusade by J. M. Powell, which brilliantly handles the complex comings and goings of armies and individuals during this protracted and complex event. A critical factor in the failure of this Crusade was the unfulfilled expectation that the emperor Frederick II (1197–1250) would join it. However, he launched his own expedition, and in 1229, as part of a treaty with the Egyptians, negotiated a restoration of the Jerusalem kingdom. His reign is usually discussed in the context of his conflict with the papacy, though Jotischky has recently summarized his crusading activity. The Crusade of Theobald of Champagne, despite its remarkable achievement in restoring the Kingdom of Jerusalem, was for long known only from the chapter in K. M. Setton's *History of the Crusades*, but a fine article by Peter Jackson and a volume of essays by Michael Lower have done something to change this, while the Western context has been reexamined in two articles by Björn Weiler. Two splendid recent studies, by William C. Jordan and by Jean Richard, have increased our knowledge of the Crusades of Saint Louis, and this has been substantially expanded by the work of Jean Dunbabin on Charles of Anjou and David Abulafia on Mediterranean naval powers in the thirteenth century. In addition, the whole subject of political Crusades has been dealt with by Housley.

Our knowledge of the crusader states is still very focused on Jerusalem. Asbridge's work on Antioch breaks this pattern, but unfortunately ends in 1130. The subsequent history of this principality needs a good study, comparable to the work of Monique Amouroux-Mourad on Edessa and Marshall W. Baldwin and Jean Richard on Tripoli. These studies of Tripoli are now very old, and a good deal of work needs to be done to bring our knowledge of the other principalities into line with that of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem. Alan V. Murray has written a very valuable study of the early kings of Jerusalem. P. W. Edbury, who produced the standard history of crusading Cyprus, has followed up his earlier work on the kingdom with studies of John of Ibelin and a remarkable edition of the Assises. His articles are too numerous to list, but his study of faction at the royal court in the run-up to Hattin has proved immensely authoritative. Bernard Hamilton, who also wrote an account of Baldwin IV, is the author of the study of the secular church in the Latin Kingdom, which has recently been supplemented by Jotischky on the monks. B. Z. Kedar has skillfully elucidated the campaign of Hattin, and R. C. Smail has cast light on King Guy's choices on the eve of the disaster. This intensity of work on the last years of the kingdom stands in stark contrast to the limited interest in the reigns of Baldwin III and Amalric I, while the kingdom in the thirteenth century has yet to find a good study outside the pages of general histories and the biographies of Frederick II and Saint Louis.

But perhaps the most exciting work on the kingdom has come from archaeology. The remarkable work

of Denys Pringle has deepened knowledge of the extent and nature of crusading's remains. But a new archaeology of the kingdom, drawing upon the totality of our knowledge as well as on actual excavation, has emerged with important results in two books by Roni Ellenblum. These demonstrate that the Latin population was spread across almost the entire kingdom, notably in association with native Christian settlements, demolishing the old notion of a narrow colonial elite confined to the cities. Intensive work has also revealed a great deal about the nature of fortification and its relationship to political history. The kingdom produced one peculiar institution, the military orders, and these have, in recent years, attracted much research activity. Riley-Smith and Malcolm Barber are the authors of authoritative studies of the Hospitallers and the Templars, respectively, while Helen Nicholson has contributed a study of how they were perceived and general accounts of both orders. Forey has written about both orders, while Anthony Luttrell has produced a remarkable corpus of studies embracing almost the entire history of the Hospitallers. In addition, a regular conference publishes important work on the subject.

Of course, the Crusades have been studied primarily as a western European phenomenon because they clearly form a vital part of its religious, intellectual, and institutional structure. They are much less central to Islamic development, and until very recently seem barely to have been part of its memory of the past. Islamic fundamentalism, with its designation of all Western initiatives in the area as "crusades," has hardly contributed to clarity. Moreover, significant gaps in the historiography of the Middle East have obscured much reality. The Turkish domination of much of the area from 1055 to 1919 is a fact of history that Westerners and Easterners have preferred to ignore, though this steppe incursion projected an alien ruling class upon the Middle East. This had physical consequences in the establishment of citadels at Damascus and Aleppo as "safe houses" for alien rulers. Moreover, these rulers needed to validate their domination, and this was surely a major influence in the growth of jihad after 1099. These are uncomfortable facts for an Arabist reading of the medieval past, and find little echo in, for example, Amin Maalouf. For those seeking an introduction to the Middle East in the age of the crusades, P. M. Holt's work has much to offer, but undoubtedly the finest study is that of Carole Hillenbrand, which successfully breaks away from traditional Western perspectives.

The most significant work on the military history of crusading remains that of Smail, which has now been extended to cover the thirteenth century by his pupil, Christopher Marshal. John France produced a military history of the First Crusade that envisaged it as an alliance, heavily dependent upon sea power, an important and neglected topic for which we remain heavily dependent upon John Pryor. Siege warfare was especially important in the Latin East and has received a brilliant treatment by Randall Rogers. The study of the relationship between the warfare of the West and that of the Latins in the East has largely focused on the military architecture of castles. This is summarized in the excellent introductory study of crusader castles by Hugh Kennedy, but France has argued that crusader castles were purely Western in origin and had no real influence on developments in Europe. However, Roni Ellenblum's work marks a major step forward in our understanding because he has shown how the Franks, faced with an increasingly unified Islamic world, radically developed their fortresses. Belvoir, built in 1168–1170, was a true concentric castle in that it was designed so that the garrison in the inner castle could support those on the outer defenses. Massive structures of this kind characterized the Frankish East in its age of insecurity, in contrast with the rather simpler fortifications built in the period of settlement. Most of our studies have focused upon Western warfare, but this is changing with works by M. C. Lyons and Peter Jackson on Saladin, Peter Thorau on Baybars, Yaacov Lev on the Fatimids, and, most particularly, Reuven Amitai-Preiss on Mongols and Mamluks, while the recent volume of Muslim military architecture edited by Kennedy is very welcome. A greater balance in our perceptions of the clash between Europe and Islam is important, and in military terms an effort has

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been made to understand the two forms of warfare and the way they adjusted to one another, but this is an area which needs further study.

No field can develop without good editions of texts, and the recent edition of the chronicle of Adémar of Chabannes by P. Bourgain, R. Landes, and G. Pon is to be welcomed, and can now be read in tandem with Rodulfus Glaber. Thanks to the splendid scholarship of R. B. C. Huygens, we have magnificent editions of Guibert of Nogent and William of Tyre. Edbury's excellent edition of the Assises has already been noted. A very notable achievement has been the edition and translation of the work of Albert of Aachen by S. B. Edgington in Oxford Medieval Texts. But crusading scholars have had to come to terms with the extraordinary popularity of the subject, and this is reflected in the number of general and introductory works noted in this essay. In these lack-of-Latin-days, though, it is difficult for such beginners to deepen their knowledge, and as a result, there has been a remarkable surge in translations of sources. Helen Nicholson has produced a collection of materials that ranges over the period from the eleventh century to the fifteenth. Important Spanish chronicles have been made available by Simon Barton and Richard Fletcher, while Robinson has published significant material on the development of the eleventh-century papacy. The crusader histories of Guibert of Nogent and Robert the Monk are valuable additions to the already considerable body of translated histories of the First Crusade. The translation by B. S. and D. S. Bachrach of the life of Tancred, read in conjunction with T. S. Asbridge and S. B. Edgington's translation of Walter the Chancellor, provides vital material on the early history of the principality of Antioch. The vernacular epic tradition of the First Crusade has now been made accessible by Carol Sweetenham and Linda M. Paterson's translation of the Occitan *Canso d'Antioca*. Edbury has published sources for the Third Crusade, while Marianne Ailes and Malcolm Barber have produced a good annotated version of Ambroise, and Nicholson has done the same for the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum*. It is particularly pleasing to note that the work of one of Saladin's senior servants, Baha al-Din, is now available in English. Henry of Livonia was translated into English many years ago by Brundage, but has now been reissued, providing a useful way into the northern Crusades. Remarkably, two important sources for the Albigensian Crusade, those of William of Tudela and William of Puylaurens, have recently been translated. A substantial volume by Barber and K. Bate provides a wide range of material bearing upon the Templars.

Handbooks and encyclopedias of the Crusades continue to be produced. Peter Lock has a nice short companion, while Murray has edited an enormous four-volume encyclopedia. However, the last comprehensive bibliography of the crusades by H. E. Mayer is now very old. Murray produced an update on the First Crusade in 1995 and the Bulletin of the Society for the Study of the Crusades and the Latin East annually lists published work. Perhaps the society's journal, *Crusades*, could arrange to feed Mayer's work into an electronic database, which could then be updated annually.

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John France

Historiography (1095–1183)

The proclamation of the First Crusade by Pope Urban II in Clermont on 27 November 1095 generated an unprecedented movement that was to change the Near East and have significant repercussions on the political, economic, religious, and social life of medieval Europe. "Crusade" is a term often used, or rather misused, to refer to violent religious and political conflicts. The fascination with the Crusades is reflected in the enormous number of professional and amateur publications on the historical events. This and the following entries aim to outline the main historiographical trends of studies of the Crusades and the Latin East for the periods 1095–1180 and 1180–1245. The goal is not an exhaustive survey of historical writing, but rather a presentation of the most significant work, examples of the latest publications that characterize a specific trend, and

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historiographical surveys on particular themes. The entries focus mainly on the historiography of Crusades to the Latin East written since the 1970s.

Origins and Definitions. A historiographical survey of the Crusades should begin with their origins, the factors that generated the Crusade movement and elicited an extraordinary response to the call for a crusade. Modern research on these subjects begins with Carl Erdmann's *Entstehung des Kreuzzugsgedankens* (English trans., *The Origin of the Idea of Crusade*, 1977). Originally published in Stuttgart, Germany, in 1935, in a highly volatile ideological atmosphere, Erdmann's work sought the sources of the Crusade movement. He found them not in the East but in Europe, mainly in the eleventh-century ecclesiastical reform movement and in the church's changing attitude to war. Jerusalem, he argued, was not Urban's II main purpose: Urban's main purpose was to help Byzantium. Although many aspects of Erdmann's thesis are now dated and have been revised, and Crusade historiography has changed dramatically since the book's publication, the book is a landmark in Crusade studies because it sparked prolific, multifaceted research on the origins, aims, and scope of the Crusade movement, as well as on the motivations of those taking the Cross.

The Western roots of Crusade ideology are widely accepted in modern scholarship, as is the perception of the Crusades as an ideological religious movement. Not all scholars agree, however, about the elements that helped shape this pious idealism and the elements' relative weights. At the heart of this process stands the church's reform movement, which aimed at unifying and purifying the Christian world. It has been argued that this both prepared the ground for the leading role of the papacy and the church in the First Crusade and also promoted the evangelization of the laity. Scholars such as Giles Constable ("Cluny and the First Crusade") have studied the influence of reform institutions on the ideals of crusading, promoting pilgrimage, the ideal of sanctified knighthood, holy war, and the peace movement. The Peace and Truce of God movement, for instance, has been discussed by H. E. J. Cowdrey ("Pope Gregory VII and the Bearing of Arms") for its significance in the development of the Crusade movement as a means by which the church could influence the faithful, set moral standards for warriors, divert their violence to ends established by churchmen, and instill an ethos of holiness into their wars. Not all historians agree with the direct link posited between the peace movement and the Crusades. Marcus Bull maintains that the laymen's religious ideals derived from their close relations with local religious communities, not from the ethical teachings of the intellectual monastic or clerical elite.

Still, whether through organized movements or through intimate relations with local clergy, eleventh-century society seems to have been more pious than before, driven by religious anxiety to look for ways to salvation. Cowdrey ("Christianity and the Morality of Warfare") and other historians have shown that engagement in war was increasingly considered one such way. The Christianization of warriors, together with the evolution of the ideal of holy war, facilitated warriors' recruitment in the early 1080s to fight for papal interests, with the promise of spiritual rewards. Pope Urban II's call in Clermont promised those willing to fight for God the remission of all their sins. This concept of penitential warfare has been considered revolutionary, and in a groundbreaking article published in 1980, Jonathan Riley-Smith called the crusaders' work an act of love of both God and their Christian neighbors—an act of Christian charity. The subject of sanctification of warfare has attracted much interest among historians, including Jean Flori in *La guerre sainte*, who have endeavored to clarify the process by which two topics that are seemingly so opposed to each other—Christianity and violence—become one, a meritorious Christian holy war. Historians such as John France ("Les origins de la Première Croisade") have also stressed the role of Urban II, who was able to fuse all the above elements into an innovative and extremely attractive new idea.

Definition has been one of the most controversial issues in Crusade historiography. In the Crusade movement's early stages, contemporaries often called the Crusade a "pilgrimage," "expedition," "general passage," or "holy war." Only in the thirteenth

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century did the terms "crusade" and "crusader" come to enjoy a clear and legal definition. This lack of precise definition and the continued use of established penitential terms led Christopher Tyerman (*Invention of the Crusades*) to negate any possibility of speaking about crusades in the twelfth century. This view was strongly opposed by others, who recognize distinct crusader characteristics already from the early twelfth century: vows and the marking of the Cross. Moreover, they argue that despite the profound connection between pilgrimage and crusade, the latter was an entirely new type of penance, an armed pilgrimage. Yet this radical change notwithstanding, historians such as Hans Mayer have pointed to the central and continuous function of the pilgrimage's penitential practices for the crusaders.

The aim and scope of the Crusade movement are also topics that stir intense debate. It is today accepted that Jerusalem and the Holy Land were the focal point of Urban II and of those taking the Cross in the First Crusade. But were these the only possible targets for the launching of a crusade? Some historians, often referred to as "traditionalists," consider a crusade only a religious war whose aims are the reconquest or defense of Jerusalem and the Holy Land. "Pluralists," by contrast, see nearly every religious war that is fought in the name of God and the "defense" or expansion of Christendom as a crusade. Ideologically, in this view, Jerusalem continues to be a prime objective, but the movement's geographic and chronological frame has become far broader. For the pluralists, what define a crusade are its characteristics: papal authority, crusader vows, and the remission of sins.

The First Crusade, which set off from Clermont in November 1095, culminated more than three years later, in July 1099, with the conquest of Jerusalem. An unprecedented event of enormous magnitude, it has attracted a great deal of historical writing by contemporaries and modern historians alike. Important work has been conducted on the editing and translation of the First Crusade's chronicles, a recent example being Susan Edgington's praiseworthy edition of Albert of Aachen's *Historia Ierosolimitana*. Ironically perhaps, of all the documentation of the First Crusade, Urban II's sermon at Clermont has not survived, yet the rich extant written evidence has led to the development of neglected or new fields of study. Mainly these are official and popular preaching, specific studies on preachers' rhetoric and techniques, military history, logistics, financing, demographic evaluations of the number of participants and casualties, the role of religious practices as well as of relics and visions in military campaigns, the crusaders' image of the Muslims, and the Crusades' relations with the Byzantine Empire. In the *First Crusaders*, Jonathan Riley-Smith made use of this rich remaining evidence to engage in prosopographical research on a large database of crusaders he compiled. This enabled him to shed light on the crusaders' backgrounds, the mechanics and logistics required of the crusaders and their families, and the Crusades' motivation.

Motivation is an old and unsettled issue in Crusade historiography. Modern historians have emphasized the great cost of a crusade, which rather than enriching the participants through plunder or seizure of lands—as has been commonly argued—could have resulted in their families' impoverishment. (Certainly, great riches were acquired along the way by some: W. G. Zajac has offered a valuable study of how plunder was divided by the soldiers of the First Crusade.) For most modern historians the dominant motive for men to take the Cross was religious, not material, although there are historians—John France in *Victory in the East*, for example—who persuasively defend a different view. In "Ideology and Motivations in the First Crusade," Jean Flori reviews the state of research on motivations and lists the predominant ideas that historians have had on the subject: making a penitential act for the remission of sins, the prospect of martyrdom, clan solidarity, revenge (vendetta), communal identification and the rejection of the "other," eschatological expectations, conversion of the infidels, search for personal glory, and social obligations.

The crusaders' relations with non-Christians have also attracted great attention from historiographers. Generally, two patterns of behavior toward

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non-Christians are notable: (1) incidents of violence and intolerance during the Crusade and in the first stages of conquest, and (2) a relatively tolerant attitude in the crusader states, as will be shown below. The 1096 massacres of the Jewish communities in the Rhineland and the massacre in Jerusalem in 1099 exemplify the first pattern. Since the late twentieth century, historical approaches to the 1096 massacres have focused on the perpetrators and their motives, the influence of Christian culture and values on the Jews' reactions to the persecution (mainly martyrdom) and on their narrative, and the historical facticity of the Jewish chronicles. Historiographical studies on the 1096 massacres have been published by, among others, Judith Bronstein and Benjamin Kedar ("Crusade Historians and the Massacre of 1096"). Scholarship on the Jerusalem massacre mainly concerns motives: That is, was this an act of war or an ideological act for the purification of the city? This question and the extent of the massacre have also been addressed by John France (*Victory in the East*) and Benjamin Kedar ("The Jerusalem Massacre of July 1099").

Crusades after the First Crusade. After the conquest of Jerusalem, more waves of crusaders set out for the East. The major Crusades to the Levant have been traditionally numbered, but erroneously: there were more crusades to the Latin East and in Europe than the accepted number of eight. Indeed, a major characteristic of the period between the First Crusade and the fall of Jerusalem in 1187 is the expansion of the movement to other crusade theaters outside the Latin East. This was the most innovative aspect of the Second Crusade, launched simultaneously to Spain and the Baltic, but this aspect, too, has aroused scholarly debate regarding the level of planning and papal commitment to all crusade theaters: see the discussion presented by Alan Forey ("The Second Crusade"), for instance. Another important twelfth-century development is the inclusion in Gratian's *Decretum* (c. 1140), the first comprehensive corpus of canon law, of the justification of violence against the church's enemies. This was used to legitimize the Crusades against heretics and political rivals of the papacy. James Brundage made major contributions to understanding the difficulties faced by ecclesiastical authorities and canon lawyers having to deal with these developing concepts of crusades and the emergence of military religious orders.

Another feature of this period is that following the creation of the Latin crusader states, crusades launched to the East in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries were often, but not always, launched in response to crises in those parts. The Second Crusade was a response to the fall of Latin Edessa in 1144. Although that event has enjoyed relatively little historical attention, it heralded important developments for the Crusade movement. The Second Crusade was proclaimed by Pope Eugenius III, but unlike the First Crusade it was led by two European monarchs, Louis VII of France and Conrad III of Germany; historians have debated the contribution of each of these figures to the campaign's initiative and success. Close attention has also been paid to Saint Bernard, considered the Second Crusade's main promoter. These points have been reassessed in a collection of essays on the Second Crusade edited by Martin Hoch and Jonathan Phillips in 2001. One of the Second Crusade's main features is its large-scale recruitment. In his comprehensive monograph on the Second Crusade, Jonathan Phillips explains this success as resulting from the European admiration of the First Crusade and its conquest of Jerusalem. Through prosopographical research Phillips was able to show that the remission of sins and the defense of holy places were the crusaders' primary motives.

Crusade preaching, as well as Eugenius's crusade encyclical *Quantum praedecessores*, stressed the link between the crusaders and Jerusalem. Crusade encyclicals—formal papal bulls containing the reasons for the crusade, an exhortation to take the Cross, and a list of crusade privileges—were crucial for the success of expeditions and for the future development of the Crusade movement. *Quantum praedecessores* became the basic form for future encyclicals. Penny Cole has shown that by 1181 the papal curia had developed machinery for the encyclicals' dissemination and preaching.

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The reasons for the siege of Damascus and its failure have been of great interest to historians such as Alan Forey ("The Failure of the Siege of Damascus") and Martin Hoch. These historians are also concerned with the siege's consequences, which characterize the state of the Crusade movement by the end of the twelfth century: a changing strategic situation in the Latin East, diminishing enthusiasm for the Holy Land, and mounting Western criticism of the Latin settlers.

The Latin East, 1095–1180. Crusade studies encompass not only the history of the Crusade movement but also the fate of the crusader states established mainly along the eastern shores of the Mediterranean following the First Crusade. The crusader states have attracted much scholarly attention since the 1970s; established concepts have been reevaluated and new research fields developed. Through prosopographical analysis, Alan Murray has shed light on the Bouillon dynasty in Jerusalem and the problem of Godfrey's succession. Prosopography has become an important methodology through which historians have also studied cultural influences and the mobilization of personnel by the military orders. The prevailing view in the 1960s and 1970s was that the religious character of the Crusades, as well as the hostile environment in which the crusaders, and later the Franks, had to live, led to the creation of a segregated society, isolated in the cities with little or no interaction with the indigenous inhabitants.

The challenge to this "segregated" approach has been among the most significant developments in the historiography of the Frankish states. Studies on archaeology and settlement, government, religion and liturgy, diplomacy, art and architecture, culture, and language and name patterns all reveal that although the Franks had created a new social and ethnic hierarchy based on religious affiliation, their attitude was more tolerant than had been previously believed. They developed a relatively pacific coexistence with the local population, converting the Latin states into exceptional meeting points between different religious and cultures: Latin Christian, Greek Orthodox and other Christian sects, Muslims, and Jews. The topic of multicultural influences is an ongoing debate. One approach—exemplified by the articles in *Die Kreuzfahrerstaaten als multikulturelle Gesellschaft*, edited by Hans Mayer—stresses the continuous links that Frankish society maintained with western Europe, through which they shaped their cultural identity. Another approach—as in the work of Michel Balard and Ronnie Ellenblum, among others—posits the creation of close social, economic, and cultural relations between the Franks and the local Christian population.

Encounters and confrontations between Christians and Muslims have likewise attracted much attention and should continue to do so in view of modern-day interfaith tension. Many conference sessions and subsequent proceedings have been dedicated to the topic. Benjamin Kedar's pioneering 1984 work *Crusade and Mission* studies attitudes to Islam up to the fourteenth century. In subsequent articles Kedar has also investigated attitudes to the Muslim population in the crusader states, showing that although there was little interaction between conquerors and conquered, the Franks were tolerant of Muslim religious beliefs and culture. New approaches have been elaborated to gain a better understanding of multicultural meetings and influences; Kedar's article "Convergences," for example, studies "shared spaces"—that is, worshippers' convergence on shared holy sites. Warfare could also be a "shared space," and more work needs to be done in applying prosopographical and cross-cultural approaches to military topics. Islamic historiography of the Near East at the time of the Crusades is a vast topic, but it falls outside the scope of this survey; scholarly writing on the subject has been reviewed by Helen Nicholson.

The crusaders encountered not only different cultures and religions in the Near East but also long-standing administrative patterns. Against the traditional view that argues for the crusaders' rejection of these patterns and their introduction of a rigid feudal system exported from Europe, historians such as Jonathan Riley-Smith ("Government and the Indigenous in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem") have shown that many of the local patterns

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were adopted by the Latin ruling class. The dissociation from the colonialist model is also reflected in what researchers have learned about art: it has been demonstrated that art in the Holy Land was not purely an import of the western European style but rather was a blend of local, European, Byzantine, and Muslim influences, creating a unique multicultural phenomenon also called "crusader art." Art historians studying sculpture and architecture, wall and icon painting, manuscript illuminations, and numismatic and minor arts have added a great deal to our knowledge of the works and schools of art, workshops and artists, patrons and audiences—all examined in light of their historical and regional context, as with the research of Jaroslav Folda.

Archaeology, and Religious and Military History. Archaeology has also seen extensive research since the late 1980s. Large-scale excavations have taken place in urban centers such as Acre, where magnificent discoveries have been made of a great part of the Hospitaller compound. Magisterial surveys of secular buildings and churches in the Latin kingdom have been conducted by Denys Pringle. A newer approach to archaeology tends to be interdisciplinary, opening possibilities for innovative and exciting research, such as Piers Mitchell's *Medicine in the Crusades.*

More than any other archaeological remains, castles are associated in popular culture with the Crusades. Archaeologists and historians have followed three major lines of research: location, purpose, and the castles' architectural origins. Against the traditional approach, which saw for the castle only a military purpose, it is now agreed—following R. C. Smail's important 1956 work—that castles also had central social and economic functions. Yet notwithstanding these functions, the study of castles' military roles has not been neglected. Historians evaluate the complexity and strength of castles' fortifications and also the size, components, and activities of their garrison. Not only did these troops have a defensive role, but they also escorted pilgrims and travelers, joined, if necessary, the field army of the kingdom, and were engaged in constant raids in enemy territory. Two examples are the Hospitallers' fortified settlement of Bethgibelin and their massive castle of Crac de Chevaliers, studied by Jonathan Riley-Smith in *The Knights of St. John in Jerusalem and Cyprus*, among others. Siege warfare played an important role in the First Crusade and in the conquest of the fortified Palestinian coast. Randall Rogers has examined the use of siege warfare during the First Crusade; the development of crusader siege techniques, logistics, and siege machinery; and the structure of the forces, including military and supportive personnel. The question of the castles' architectural origins and influences is still unanswered: a comparative approach should reveal the influences of military architecture from western Europe, Byzantium, and the Near East.

Medieval warfare in general, and in the Crusade movement in particular, was long treated by historiographers as an essentially masculine activity in which the roles of women had little relevance. But from the late 1970s and 1980s, studies on women's participation in the Crusade movement, women's status in the crusader states, and Christian and Muslim perception of women all led to the rapid burgeoning of scholarly writing on these and related subjects. This significant historiographical development has done much to illuminate the actual roles, military and supportive, that women fulfilled in the Crusades and in the Latin states both in combat and in the rear. It also contributes to an understanding of the ways in which gender ideals are reflected in the Christian and Muslim narratives, as shown in *Gendering the Crusades*, a collection of essays edited by Susan Edgington and Sara Lambert. This growth in scholarship is not limited to the Latin East in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. It is also reflected in publications dedicated to the role of women in other crusader theaters besides the Latin East, in later crusades, and in the military orders in the Latin East and Europe. Anthony Luttrell and Helen Nicholson collected research on this topic for *Hospitaller Women in the Middle Ages.*

A central issue in the study of the Latin kingdom is the Latin church. The establishment of a new ecclesiastical hierarchy raises complex and crucial questions about its aims and characteristics. These

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issues were first addressed by the pioneering work of Bernard Hamilton in his 1980 *The Latin Church in the Crusader State*. In the early 2000s Cristina Dondi traced the origins and development of the liturgy used by the canons of Jerusalem's Church of the Holy Sepulchre and found that their highly influential liturgical usages emerged from the Western liturgical tradition and later Augustinian uses. Amnon Linder has looked at crusader-related prayers that appear in the medieval liturgy in general, considering this an important channel of information and propaganda, such as masses for the Holy Land and crisis-related rites for the destruction of Jerusalem.

R. C. Smail's highly influential *Crusading Warfare, 1097–1193* (1956) was a breakthrough in the study of Crusade military history and still remains of great importance, as witnessed by its 1995 republication with additional material by Christopher Marshall. The book is particularly significant for its downplaying of the importance of pitched battle relative to sieges and Vegetian-style defenses—that is, the avoidance of battle in favor of the destruction of the enemy by ravaging and devastating logistics and supplies. Although Smail includes discussions of Muslim armies and modes of warfare, along with chapters on crusader castles, crusader armies, and the Latin field army in action (with a particularly noteworthy section on "fighting on the march"), he does not consider the influence of Middle Eastern warfare on the Latin settlers. John France has done so, and both in *Western Warfare in the Age of the Crusades, 1000–1300* and in a number of innovative studies on military history in the Latin states, he has suggested that the Latin settlers' acute shortage of manpower and their constant state of war caused them to adapt their warring style to suit local conditions. They developed an aggressive style based on readiness to engage the enemy in battle. A high degree of discipline and cohesion in their forces enabled them to introduce the mass cavalry charge, made up of heavily armed knights reinforced by large numbers of native light mounted archers. These light cavalry, known as "turcopoles" and examined by Yuval Harari, were an important addition to the limited number of troops available to the Frankish armies. Although the origin of the turcopoles is still debated, they seem to have been recruited from the local Christian population, which was also a source for the recruitment of paid foot soldiers. Christopher Marshall has showed that these troops considerably augmented the size of the Frankish armies, composed of feudal hosts (knights, mounted and foot sergeants) and armed pilgrims and volunteers, as well as the armies of the military orders.

Logistics is a crucial component of the study of warfare: research into quantities of food and supplies, roads and means of transport, manpower, animals, and access to water sources, and so on, could expand significantly our understanding of the capacity to conduct crusades and other military campaigns. This is a relatively new field of study: *Logistics of Warfare in the Age of the Crusades*, a collection of articles edited by John Pryor, himself an expert on naval logistics, reveals the field's great potential. In this vein also is Bernard Bachrach's study of the Byzantine navy's role in the First Crusade.

Since the late 1980s, advances in the study of the military orders have been tremendous, so that the subject now possibly constitutes a subdivision in crusader studies, with specialist conferences held throughout the world. Research has been conducted on different orders in different theaters of war, on their local commanderies and priories, and on the orders' international deployment and the connections between East and West. Historians, notably Malcolm Barber, Alan Forey, Anthony Luttrell, Klaus Militzer, Helen Nicholson, and Jonathan Riley-Smith, have paved the way to a blooming of scholarly writing on a wide range of topics dealing with religion and ideology, liturgy, gender studies, charitable activities, archaeology, education, relations with the Muslims, institutional, economic, political, and military history, and so on, all in the context of the military orders of the Crusades. Indeed, in the first decade of the twenty-first century, volumes dedicated to the military orders were published in three consecutive years in three different countries: a volume edited by Roman Czaja and Jurgen Sarnowsky published in Poland, a volume edited by Victor Malia-Milanes in

the United Kingdom, and a volume edited by Isabel Cristina Ferreira Fernandes in Portugal.

[*See also* Armies, *subentry on* Organization; Castles, *subentry on* Crusader Castles; Crusader Relations with Byzantium; Damascus, Siege of; Knighthood and Knights; Logistics and Transportation; Naval Combat and Tactics; Peace and Truce of God; *and* Siege Warfare, *subentry on* Tactics and Technology.]

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Judith Bronstein

Crusades: Historiography (1180–1245)

The end of the twelfth century and the first half of the thirteenth witnessed great crusade activity because of the deteriorating situation in the Latin East but also the expansion of the crusade movement to theaters other than the Levant.

The Crusade Movement, 1180–1245. Correspondence from the Latin East with Europe became intense, and numerous envoys were dispatched, following the battle of Hattin and the loss of Jerusalem. Transmission of information was crucial, and scholars such as Jonathan Phillips (1996) have studied communication channels, purposes and aims of the correspondence and envoys, the addressees, the languages and images employed, the nature of information provided, and the many obstacles before this communication. Addressees' ability to respond to appeals from the East also varied according to circumstances of the European monarchies and the papacy. In general the papacy supported the crusade to the East, but scholars including Rudolf Hiestand (2001) have nevertheless shown the curia's variable attitudes throughout the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Regarding the Third Crusade, however, the papacy was key in disseminating the terrible news from the Latin East and promoting a new crusade, as shown by Silvia Schein in *Gateway to Heaven* (2005). The news caused great distress which she shows is reflected in a tremendous literary activity. This facilitated the resumption of preaching in England, France, and Germany, whereby many men and much money were mobilized, as discussed, for instance, by Peter Edbury (1996). Attention has been given to the organization and course of each of the crusades. Hiestand (1992), for instance, had studied the organization and course of Frederick Barbarossa's crusade. Alan Murray (2007) has shed light on what he calls the "financial logistics" of Frederick's land-based crusade transportation and use of funds in the expedition. Of the Third Crusade leaders, Saladin and Richard I have attracted the greatest attention. Historians, among them Malcolm Lyons and David Jackson, Yaakov Lev, and John Gillingham, have studied their lives and their leadership and military skills. Gillingham's article on Richard I and the "science of war" especially is worthy of the reader's attention.

Innocent III (1198–1216) is identified more than any other thirteenth-century pope with the crusade movement, generating huge scholarly interest. Historians such as John C. Moore in *Pope Innocent III (1160/61–1216): To Root Up and to Plant* (2003) have analyzed his overall perception of the movement, which they find linked to his concept of reform, unification of Christendom, and papal primacy. James M. Powell (1994), among others, has paid close attention to new elements introduced during his pontificate on the financing and organization of crusading: preaching, taxation of the church, redemption and commutation of crusader vows, and partial indulgences in return for material help. Scholars such as Colin Morris in *The Papal Monarchy: The Western Church from 1050 to 1250* (1989) have dedicated work to Innocent's involvement in particular crusades: the Fourth Crusade (1202–1204), the Albigensian (Cathar) Crusade (1209–1229), and the Fifth Crusade (1217–1221), as well as crusading in Spain, the Baltic, and an unconcretized crusade against the imperial representative in Italy.

Two different approaches portray Innocent's involvement in the Fourth Crusade, itself a subject of major scholarly controversy. The traditional view is that the pope opposed royal participation in this expedition, which he wanted under his own control. This has been challenged by historians such as Vincent Ryan, who showed the pope's plan to involve monarchs, including King Richard I. Contemporaries' perceptions as well as individual and collective memory are currently leading historiographical trends, including a 2003 study by Michael Angold that analyzes contemporaries' changing attitudes to

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the conquest of Constantinople as well as the political, social, and cultural consequences of the event. A major historical debate centers on the causes of the Fourth Crusade's diversion from Egypt to Constantinople. Some historians consider the conquest of Constantinople to be a premeditated event, mainly driven by the Venetians to gain control over the city. However, since the publication of Donald Queller's influential *The Fourth Crusade: The Conquest of Constantinople* (1971), scholarship predominantly denies the notion of a preconceived plan and tends to see the diversion and its outcome as the result of a series of events caused by difficulties encountered by the crusaders. A reassessment of Venice's responsibility for the diversion was made by Thomas Madden in *Enrico Dandolo and the Rise of Venice* (2003). From a close analysis of the city's internal political and social situation, Madden contested charges against Venice of greed and ambition: the crusade was an enormous economic burden, not welcome by all. Venetians were driven not by economic motives alone but also by piety and a sincere concern for fellow Venetians living in Constantinople.

The original aim of the Fourth Crusade was an attack of Egypt, as a way to recover Jerusalem and restore Christian control of the Holy Land as before Hattin. This would also become the aim of the Fifth Crusade and a common feature of crusading to the East in the thirteenth century. There has been little scholarly writing on the Fifth Crusade, but a particularly important contribution is James Powell's *Anatomy of a Crusade* (1986), which studies the preparations, including Innocent's III careful planning and the crusade itself. In this book and subsequent articles Powell, like other scholars, is greatly interested in the role of Frederick II in the events leading to the failure of the Fifth Crusade and the fate of the emperor's own crusade. The current dominant view is that the emperor was driven by deep commitment to the Holy Land and the Crown of Jerusalem. The consequence of Frederick's crusade and his ability to recover Jerusalem by diplomacy, despite being excommunicated, is seen as a turning point in crusade history: a shift from papal to royal leadership and a continual struggle between these two powers to retain control. This last point has been stressed by Michael Lower in *The Barons' Crusade* (2005). He shows that the crusades to the Holy Land between 1239 and 1241 were launched contrary to Gregory IX's efforts to divert them to Constantinople. Moreover, the political struggle in Europe between the Holy See and the Western emperor gravely affected the West's capacity to respond to events in the East. In spite of an ongoing decline—the defeat at La Forbie and the loss of Jerusalem (1244), Saint Louis's failed crusades (1248–1250 and 1270), the Mongol and Mamluk threat—a feature of crusading from 1245 onward is the diversion of resources away from the Holy Land.

Crusade preaching and propaganda are important factors in crusader studies. Christophe Maier in *Preaching the Crusade* (1994) analyzes the way the papacy utilized the newly created mendicant orders to preach the Cross, thereby creating, from the pontificate of Gregory IX, a highly developed propaganda machinery. In *Crusade Propaganda and Ideology* (2000), Maier studied models of crusade sermons and their adaptation by the preachers according to the circumstances and audiences to convey a deep spiritual message. Another important thirteenth-century development is recognition and promotion of missionary activities, but as Benjamin Kedar and Jean Richard have shown, these were less successful in the crusader states. On the other hand, Caroline Smith (2006) has shown the significance of literary works (including *chansons de geste*, poems, and popular songs) in inspiring crusading efforts in the time of Saint Louis.

The Latin East, 1180–1245. The years from 1180 to 1245 evince great political, military, territorial, economic, and social changes in the history of the Frankish states, attracting much scholarly writing on a variety of topics. The political situation in the Frankish states, mainly the Kingdom of Jerusalem, has been the subject of ongoing scholarly debate, centering on issues related to the shifting balance of power between the monarchy and the nobility. In *The Feudal Nobility and the Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1174–1277* (1973), and in several subsequent articles, Jonathan Riley-Smith challenged the traditional view of a strong royal authority. He shows the rising

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power of the lords, obtained through inheritance, marriage, political skills, and exploitation of legal procedures to their own advantage. The issue, however, is still not settled. In *Monarchy and Lordship in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1099–1291* (1989), Steven Tibble argues that the monarchy, at least in the twelfth century, exercised a high level of control over the lordships. The balance of power has been also examined through study of the fate of prominent noble families, as in Peter Edbury's *John of Ibelin and the Kingdom of Jerusalem* (1997). Edbury reveals the dynamics behind the expanding role of a leading Frankish noble family in the political life of the kingdoms of Jerusalem and Cyprus. Of great interest to historians of the Latin kingdom is the internal political turmoil prior to Hattin. The events, as well as the roles of specific individuals such as Guy of Lusignan, Reynald of Châtillon, and Patriarch Heraclius, have been reexamined by Peter Edbury (1993), Benjamin Kedar (1992), R. C. Smail (1982), and Bernard Hamilton (1978). Hamilton's work *The Leper King and His Heirs* (2000) reassesses favorably the reign of Baldwin IV, challenging traditional views that see it as a period of decline, ultimately leading to the defeat at Hattin.

Of great importance for the study of the political, institutional, and social history of the Frankish states—and for the military history that is so interwoven with all these other aspects of history—has been the publication of a number of legal texts. Hans Mayer, in *Die Kanzlei der lateinischen Könige von Jerusalem* (1996), has studied the work of the chancery of the Kingdom of Jerusalem up to 1225, editing also a number of unpublished charters. Peter Edbury's *John of Ibelin, Le Livre des Assises* (Leiden, 2003), is a critical edition of the legal treatise by John of Ibelin, Count of Jaffa and Ascalon, who died in 1266.

The economic history of the crusader states, particularly the Kingdom of Jerusalem, has attracted close attention. Historians such as David Abulafia and David Jacoby have studied the place of the Frankish states in Mediterranean commerce and trade routes. Historians have probed local and regional agrarian and industrial development, which aimed at producing surpluses for consumption and trade, of raw and processed goods (sugar, cotton, flax, silk, etc.). And although the dwindling of the Latin territory after Hattin increased dependence on supplies from overseas and neighboring territories, it did not halt local production: lay and ecclesiastical lords, mainly the military orders, made great efforts to maximize their profits, at least until the Mamluk invasions. (References to these studies can be found in a 2007 article by David Jacoby.) The crusader conquest led to the flourishing of port towns on the eastern Mediterranean coast, which served as ports of embarkation and departure of crusaders, pilgrims, merchants, and merchandise. Acre was to become the most important port town in the twelfth century, a status that would only increase after 1192 when de facto it became capital of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. Scholars such as Benjamin Kedar (1997), benefiting from major archaeological excavations since the late 1980s, have studied the city's layout and harbor. Great quantities of imported pottery and of local high-quality glass vessels, meant for export, have been unearthed—items that historians interpret as reflecting the large volume of the city's commerce. The economic growth of the Frankish states would have had a direct impact on the burgesses' development, role—including military service—and legal status, as shown in Marwan Nader's *Burgesses and Burgess Law in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem and Cyprus* (2008). He suggests that, like in Europe, burgesses established in towns and villages owed some form of military duty in return for their freedom and alienability of their property. Rural settlements were also an important component in the mechanism of occupation and government. Another robust historical theme has been that regarding the Italian communes in the crusader states. Historians, notably Michel Balard, David Jacoby, and Benjamin Kedar, have studied the communes' commercial, legal, and territorial privileges, the obstacles to their implementation, and the political consequences of these impediments. These studies illuminate the communes' relations with Frankish rulers and society and with their republics overseas. The fleets of the Italian cities were essential for the survival of the Frankish

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states as they maintained a constant link with the Christian West, providing foodstuffs and supplies as well as manpower: crusaders, traders, settlers, and pilgrims, some of whom were to become an important addition to the Frankish armies. These fleets contributed also to the conquest of seaport towns and the obstruction of Muslim's maritime supply lines. These topics have been examined mainly by John Pryor in *Geography, Technology and War* (1988).

Acre's prosperity in the thirteenth century also influenced the production of art, as Jaroslav Folda reveals in *Crusader Art in the Holy Land, from the Third Crusade to the Fall of Acre* (2005); it led to the emergence of more secular art, supported by the aristocracy and ecclesiastical circles, but also by prosperous merchants. The events of 1187–1188 are also of great significance for military historians, who have endeavored to clarify the events leading to the battle of Hattin and to estimate the forces as well as the logistic problems involved, and gain an understanding of the battle's conduct. Citations to this extensive literature can be found in a 2007 treatment by Michael Ehrlich. The collapse of the Frankish army carried long-term military consequences, and led necessarily to changes in the practice of warfare. In *Warfare in the Latin East, 1192–1291* (1992) Christopher Marshall points at characteristics of military activities in the Latin East in the thirteen century: low-level warfare, raids, skirmishes—conducted against Muslims and Christians alike—and temporary possession of castles and lands. Another important feature indicated is the shift from small enclosure castles to massive concentric fortifications, strategically located and adapted to resist improved Muslim siege machines. These massive thirteenth-century concentric castles such as Château Pèlerin, Krak des Chevaliers, Marqab, and Saphet were held by the Hospitallers and the Templars. A number of general books on crusader castles have appeared since the late twentieth century, reflecting the great interest generated by the topic, among them Hugh Kennedy, *Crusader Castles* (1994); Adrian Boas, *Archeology of the Military Orders* (2006); and Ronnie Ellenblum, *Crusaders Castles and Modern Histories* (2006). New approaches have been elaborated by historians of the military orders, among them Judith Bronstein and Malcolm Barber, to gain a better understanding of the ways the orders deployed their international resources and manpower to maintain their firm, but also extremely costly, commitment to the Holy Land.

[*See also* Acre, Siege of; Castles, *subentry on* 1150–1350; Crusader Castles; *and* Hattin, Battle of.]

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Judith Bronstein

Historiography (1245–1500)

The later Crusades have not attracted as much scholarly attention as the earlier Crusades have, particularly the First Crusade. This is in part because of the former tendency among historians to declare the Crusades over with Louis IX's last expedition in 1270.

There are other reasons for the neglect, however. The source materials for crusading expand exponentially in the later centuries of the Middle Ages, but these are not as extensively edited and published as materials for the earlier expeditions are. The range of languages needed also expands, and as the complexity of society increases in the later Middle Ages, so does the difficulty of mastering the context in which crusading takes place. In addition, subsequent periodization stereotypes sometimes have led scholars, as well as lay readers, to assume that in the later period there remained only an antiquated attachment to the idea of crusading on the part of some romantically impractical souls. But in fact no such cessation occurred: late medieval people were commonly as interested in crusading as their forebears had been. If they happened to be less able or willing actually to mount and execute successful crusades, then perhaps their shortcomings call for more attention, not less.

General Coverage. For the period 1245–1500 the second and third volumes of *A History of the Crusades* form a good base. The second volume was edited by Robert Lee Wolff and Harry W. Hazard, and the third was edited by Hazard. The articles are sometimes uneven, however, and some are out of date. Kenneth Setton's *The Papacy and the Levant* remains useful and for some aspects is still unsurpassed. The last volume of Steven Runciman's *History of the Crusades*, though magnificently written, must be used with caution because it has historiographical flaws.

The later Crusades, through the fifteenth century, are covered in Norman Housley's *Avignon Papacy, Italian Crusades,* and *Later Crusades.* Also useful is Housley's *Contesting the Crusades* (especially Chapter 6 and part of Chapter 5), as well as *Crusading in the Fifteenth Century*, a volume of articles

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edited by Housley. Aziz Atiya's *The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages*, published in 1938, is now outdated and is often flawed, but it is still sometimes worth consulting.

After 1291 the only surviving crusader kingdom was that of Cyprus, usually allied with the native Armenian kingdom in Cilicia. Peter Edbury's *Kingdom of Cyprus* is the benchmark for the crusader kingdom of Cyprus, though Volumes 2 and 3 of Sir George Hill's *History of Cyprus* are still useful in many places. There is a large lacuna in the scholarly literature regarding Armenia, partially filled by Angus Donal Stewart's *The Armenian Kingdom and the Mamluks*; Armenia's castles, the remains of which are rapidly disappearing, were studied by R. W. Edwards.

The military religious orders have spawned an immense literature, much of it recent and far too extensive to cover in any detail here. Alan Forey's *Military Orders* is a good place to start. For the Templars the touchstone overview is Malcolm Barber's *The New Knighthood*; for the Hospitallers one must consult the various articles of Anthony Luttrell, in conjunction with Jonathan Riley-Smith's *Knights of St. John* and Helen Nicholson's *Knights Hospitaller*. The best recent treatment of the Hospitallers in the fifteenth century is in German, by Jürgen Sarnowsky. Though published in 1913, the French work of Joseph Delaville Le Roulx still contains useful material.

For the Teutonic Knights and the Baltic Crusades, see William Urban's *Teutonic Knights* and Eric Christiansen's *Northern Crusades*. The Order of Saint Lazarus in England is treated by David Marcombe in *Leper Knights*, but the definitive overview of Saint Lazarus in English has yet to be written—and, because the sources are scattered and sometimes confusing, would be rather challenging to carry off.

The military religious orders were, in the fourteenth century and beyond, imitated by orders that were founded by monarchs and thus were increasingly secular. These so-called monarchical orders were often strongly oriented toward crusading, especially the early ones such as the Cypriot Order of the Sword. They are discussed at length by Jonathan Boulton.

Proposals for recovering the Holy Land after its loss in 1291 are discussed in a text by Antony Leopold, and some of the actual projects are covered by Sylvia Schein. Elizabeth Siberry's *Criticism of Crusading* extends its coverage of objections and criticisms through 1274 and the Second Council of Lyons.

Bernard Hamilton's *Latin Church* contains some material covering the period 1245–1291, and Nicholas Coureas's *Latin Church in Cyprus* looks at its subject across a long thirteenth century, up to the suppression of the Templars.

Material relevant to crusader castles, including those of the later period, may be found in Hugh Kennedy's work, as well as—somewhat controversially—in Ronnie Ellenblum's. There is some coverage of the military history of the period 1245–1291 in Christopher Marshall's *Warfare in the Latin East*, but more work needs to be done on the later period, especially from the fourteenth century onward.

Crusader art, including that dealing with warfare or found in castles, has been covered extensively by Jaroslav Folda. Crusader coins, including those of the military orders and (despite the book's title) going up to 1489, are discussed in technical detail in the work of Alex Malloy and others. General archaeology, including military structures, has been treated by Denys Pringle in a number of works, including *Belmont Castle*, cowritten with Richard P. Harper.

For crusading and the *Reconquista* in Spain, see Derek Lomax's *Reconquest of Spain*, as well as Joseph O'Callaghan's *History of Medieval Spain*. Much has been written on the subject in Spanish, but it is relatively neglected in English.

The Islamic side of the later Crusades is poorly represented in the English-language secondary literature, at least in part because of the necessity for researchers to work in languages such as Arabic and Turkish. The best is Carole Hillenbrand's *Crusades: Islamic Perspectives*, but P. M. Holt's *Age of the Crusades* is also useful. Peter Thorau has written a fine study of the career of Baybars, but there is much need for more English-language work.

Hans Eberhard Mayer and Joyce McLellan provided a comprehensive bibliography of the Crusades

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that includes the period 1245–1500 at the end of Volume 6 of *A History of the Crusades*, but it is now out of date. The annual bulletin of the Society for the Study of the Crusades and the Latin East (SSCLE), incorporated into the serial journal *Crusades* since 2002, provides a yearly summary of work in the field, and there is a useful shorter bibliography in the 2001 volume edited by Zsolt Hunyadi and József Laszlovszky, but no comprehensive up-to-date resource exists.

The best method of keeping up in the field is to read *Crusades* and the associated volumes of papers from the quadrennial conferences held by the SSCLE. In addition, the volumes of papers generated by the approximately quadrennial London Conferences on the Military Orders are useful. Some Crusades-related articles can occasionally be found on the pages of the *Journal of Medieval Military History*, the *Journal of Medieval History*, and the *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*.

1245–1312. The Seventh and Eighth Crusades (sometimes called the Sixth and Seventh, or the Crusades of Saint Louis) lack recent monographs devoted specifically to them. William Chester Jordan and Jean Richard have covered the life and activities of Louis IX, including much material about these crusades. But an up-to-date definitive history devoted just to these expeditions would be very welcome.

The fall of the crusader states in 1291 has not received much coverage in English or any other language; there is some coverage in Sylvia Schein's *Fideles crucis*, but this book must be used with caution. The best complete treatment is by Erwin Stickel, in German. This is another neglected area that badly needs more work.

In contrast, the arrest and suppression of the Templars have been subjects of interest almost continuously since 1307. Malcolm Barber's *Trial of the Templars* is indispensable here, especially his essay on recent historiography. Useful works include, for Spain, that by Alan Forey; for northwest Italy, that by Elena Bellomo; and for Britain, that by Helen Nicholson. The question of Templar guilt, formerly debated, has largely been resolved in favor of those who reject most of the charges against the order, and who search for other motivations for the arrests. The significant exception is Jonathan Riley-Smith, who seems to believe that at least some of the charges may have had some truth (see "Were the Templars Guilty?" and "The Structures of the Orders of the Temple and the Hospital in c. 1291"). A rebuttal of Riley-Smith's argument may be found in Alan Forey, "Could Alleged Templar Malpractices Have Remained Undetected for Decades?" In 2003, Barbara Frale published the so-called Chinon Parchment, which suggests that a papal commission in 1309 found the Templars guilty of some irregularities, which were pardoned, but did not find them guilty of heresy. This document had already been published in an abridged form, however, and has not significantly changed historians' views on the subject.

The Hospitallers' capture of Rhodes between 1306 and perhaps about 1309, and their establishment of the order-state on the island, has received some attention, especially from Anthony Luttrell. The precise date of when the Hospitallers achieved complete control of the island is still unclear, however.

1312–1396. One of the best general introductions to the various individual Crusades of the fourteenth century is still Anthony Luttrell's article "The Crusade in the Fourteenth Century." It covers the smaller expeditions, such as the 1344 papal expedition to Smyrna, as well as larger and better-known Crusades.

There is no good book-length treatment of King Peter of Cyprus's 1365 Alexandrian Crusade; some up-to-date material can be found in Edbury's collected articles, *Kingdoms of the Crusaders*. Outside *History of the Crusades*, there is scant secondary material available on the Crusade of Amadeus VI of Savoy or on the 1390 Barbary Crusade.

The last book-length scholarly English-language treatment of the Crusade of Nicopolis in 1396 is Aziz Atiya's *Crusade of Nicopolis*, published in 1934. Though aimed at a somewhat different audience, David Nicolle's *Nicopolis 1396* contains useful information.

مادة محمية بموجب حقوق النشر

In short, there are a great many opportunities for further research on the fourteenth-century Crusades.

1397–1500. Crusading in the fifteenth century has also lacked study, and there are few book-length treatments of the subject generally or in particular, despite a plethora of activities waiting to be researched. The debacle of the Teutonic Knights at Tannenberg in 1410 is covered by William Urban in *Tannenberg and After*. For the Hospitallers, see the works dedicated to them by Luttrell, Nicholson, Riley-Smith, Delaville Le Roulx, and Sarnowsky. For the fifteenth-century military orders in general, good coverage can be found in Desmond Seward's *Monks of War*, though this is not precisely a scholarly work, and the title itself is misleading because members of military orders were not also monks.

The best introduction to the Crusades against the Hussites in the first part of the fifteenth century is still Frederick Heymann's chapter in Volume 3 of *History of the Crusades*, as well as his *John Zizka and the Hussite Revolution*. For the Crusade of Varna (1444) see Martin Chasin's chapter in Volume 6 of the *History of the Crusades*. These should be read in context with the more general works, especially those of Norman Housley.

Norman Housley's "Giovanni da Capistrano and the Crusade of 1456" is virtually the only significant treatment in English of the Turkish attack on Belgrade and of the Crusade put together in 1456 by János Hunyadi and Saint John Capistrano to relieve the city. The 1480 and 1522 sieges of Rhodes are covered to varying degrees in several works, including that by Eric Brockman, but there is need here for a thorough up-to-date scholarly treatment.

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CUMANS

Cuman was the name of a Eurasian nomadic confederation of Turkic peoples, often called also *Kipchak* in Muslim sources and *Polovets* in Russian ones. The Cumans played a prominent role in the political and military history of Byzantium, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Hungary from the 1180s until the 1330s. They were the founders of three successive Bulgarian dynasties

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Cumans. A group of Cumans attack the region of Kiev and take many prisoners. Illustration from the Radziwill Chronicle, p. 210v, fifteenth century. Photograph by Erich Lessing. ART RESOURCE, NY

(the Asenids, the Terterids, and the Shishmanids) and the Walachian dynasty (the Basarabids).

In the mid-eleventh century, as a result of large-scale nomadic migrations in the Eurasian steppe zone, a people called *qun* (Marvazi), *Kumanoi/Komanoi* (Byzantine), or *Comani/Cumani/Cuni* (Latin) appeared in the Pontic steppe region. This ethnonym, which means "pale or fallow" in Turkic, was translated as *Kharteshk'* in Armenian, *Valwen* in German, and *Polovtsi* in Russian. In the twelfth century, the confederacy occupied an immense land stretching from the Irtysh to as far as the Lower Danube. This vast territory, called *Dasht-i Qipchaq* (Kipchak Steppes) by Muslim authors, had never been politically united by a strong central power before the advent of the Mongol conquerors in 1241. After the first Tatar military blow at the River Kalka in 1223 and then the mortal defeat in 1241, the Kipchak-Cuman tribes were partly dispersed, some becoming subject to the new Tatar-Mongol conquerors. Many of these dispersed people took refuge in eastern Europe, especially in Hungary and Bulgaria, where they were gradually assimilated into the local cultures.

The Cumans played a special role in the military history of the Balkans and the Kingdom of Hungary in the twelfth to fourteenth centuries. Their decisive role can be ascribed mainly to the war techniques of the nomadic light cavalry. Although an ambush from the rear was commonly regarded as dishonorable in European warfare, the Cumans often and successfully resorted to it. Similarly, running before the enemy in a feigned retreat and then suddenly turning around and attacking was a method adopted without fail—for example, in the battle of Adrianople, in 1205, the Bulgarian ruler Kaloyan sent his Cumans to ambush the crusaders.

These nomadic horsemen were excellent horse archers, skilled in skirmishing. They used a new type of composite reflex bow and various types of sharp arrow heads that could effectively pierce armor. They wore mainly leather armor to protect their bodies as well as mail coats. They protected their heads with cone-shaped iron helmets but hardly ever used shields. Among weapons for close-range fighting, the saber and the traditional hitting weapon, the iron or bronze mace, must be mentioned. The bodkin-pointed two-handed lances were also effective in hand-to-hand combat, such as at the battle of Adrianople.

The overgarment of the Cuman warriors included a caftan reaching to the knees and cinched in by a belt. Cuman warriors did not wear trousers but stockings reaching to the groin. They wore a long, pointed high cap with a rolled-up edge that had no fur on it. (In medieval Hungary, it was called the Cuman cap.)

[*See also* Auxiliary Peoples, Military; Béla IV; Hungary, *subentry on* Narrative (1000–1300); Kalka, Battle at River; *and* Vlachs.]

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István Vásáry

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Damascus, Siege of

In June 1148, King Baldwin III of Jerusalem met with the leaders of the Second Crusade, King Louis VII of France and King Conrad III of Germany, at Palmarea to discuss how their combined forces could best be employed to protect and expand the Latin East. The armies led by the latter monarchs had both suffered enormous casualties during their march to the Holy Land across Asia Minor; however, there still remained sufficient troops to assemble a sizeable force. From the time of Louis's arrival in Antioch in March, many plans had been proposed for the employment of his and Conrad's troops, but it was only at this council that the matter was finally settled. The army would march on Damascus. This city had long threatened the Christian control of Jerusalem, and the Franks had tried to capture it on two occasions, in 1126 and 1129. Moreover, in 1147 the Damascene ruler Unur and the neighboring governor of Aleppo, Nur al-Din, had signed a treaty that raised the dangerous possibility of a joint attack on the Latin East.

On 24 July, after an uneventful march through Muslim territory, the combined armies of France, Germany, and the kingdom of Jerusalem, along with contingents of Templars and Hospitallers, began their attack on the city. Damascus' fortifications were not particularly impressive, but the city was surrounded by dense orchards that were the scene of intense skirmishing. After some fierce resistance, the crusaders reached the city walls and encamped on the banks of the Barada River.

It was at this point that the Christian leadership made a critical error. Acting on information that the southern-eastern sector of the city walls was in a poor state of repair, they moved their camp to this area. This information was inaccurate, however—and the army's predicament worsened when it became apparent that there was no local source of water. With the routes back to the Barada blocked by hastily constructed barricades and the arrival of Muslim reinforcements, the Christian forces felt that they had no choice but to withdraw.

After their return to the kingdom of Jerusalem, there were suggestions that a new offensive should be staged against the city of Ascalon but nothing came of the plan. Ultimately, the siege of Damascus marked the end of Louis and Conrad's attempt to aid the Holy Land, and news of their withdrawal provoked a stream of recriminations and accusations. Archbishop William of Tyre claimed that the critical decision to move the army's camp was the product of huge bribes offered by the Damascenes to the local Frankish nobles. Other chroniclers followed this line, although some blamed the Templars. Certainly, contemporaries felt that a scapegoat was needed.

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They believed that crusading was an extension of God's will and the defeat of such a venture could only be explained if it was ascribed to the sinfulness of its participants. For the forces of Islam, however, this event was a considerable victory that did much to break the crusaders' fearsome reputation.

[*See also* Conrad III; Crusades, *subentry on* Narrative (1095–1183); *and* Louis VII.]

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Nicholas Morton

DAMIETTA, SIEGE OF

From early in its planning, the Fifth Crusade (1213–1221) was intended to strike against Egypt, heart of the Ayyubid sultanate's power. The idea that an assault on Egypt would increase the crusaders' chances of securing and maintaining possession of Jerusalem and other Christian holy places in the Near East was not new; Egypt had been the original goal of the Fourth Crusade, called in 1198, and a report submitted to the papacy the following year described the port of Damietta, on the eastern Nile delta, as "the head and key of all Egypt." Damietta became the preferred target for an invasion of Egypt, rather than Alexandria, because it was more accessible from Christian-held ports in the Levant and because it had benefits as a base for a campaign into inland Egypt; it was slightly closer to Cairo and would offer both a better line of attack and a more secure route of retreat if one were required.

Damietta was also smaller than Alexandria, although its man-made and natural defenses were extensive: it was protected by three walls of increasing height, with twenty-eight towers at intervals around the second wall. North of the city was the Mediterranean, Lake Manzala was to the east, and the Nile flowed to the west. A chain stretched from a tower in the northwest wall to another built in the river, near its western bank, controlling the movement of ships into Damietta's port and farther upstream, while a bridge of boats provided a supply route for the city's defenders in case of siege. When their fleet arrived there in late May 1218, the crusaders set up camp on the western bank of the Nile, north of the chain tower.

In the absence of Frederick II, king of Germany, who had taken the cross but remained in Europe while his efforts to secure coronation as emperor were ongoing, the crusade army was led by Jean de Brienne, regent of Jerusalem. The defense of Damietta fell to al-Kamil, son of Sultan al-Adil, who arrived with his army in June 1218. The crusaders' early attempts to capture Damietta's chain tower and to threaten the city itself met with failure, but a breakthrough came when a special siege engine mounted between two ships was constructed for use against the tower. The designer was Oliver, bishop of Paderborn, who later wrote an eyewitness account of the Fifth Crusade. The engine was an innovative one for the Middle Ages (although Oliver may have been aware of precedents from the ancient world), consisting of a fortress set atop four masts, below which a ladder projected thirty feet or more beyond the ships' prows. The chain tower fell on 24 August 1218. Materials from the engine were later recycled for use in another unusual construction. After the fall of the city to the crusaders, a wooden tower was built on an earthen mound on the opposite side of the Nile from the city to defend Damietta's harbor; this was a rare instance of a motte-like structure being built by crusaders.

The chain tower's capture demonstrates that the army of the Fifth Crusade could be imaginative and bold in its military strategy. The larger story of Damietta's conquest is a less dramatic one (but

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

Siege of Damietta, 1218–1219. Illustration from Matthew Paris's *Chronica maiora II*, MS 16, fol. 59v, thirteenth century. © CORPUS CHRISTI COLLEGE, OXFORD, UK/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

one more typical of medieval sieges), in which the patience and resilience of both the besiegers and besieged were primary concerns. Manpower and resources were a constant problem for the crusaders. The erosion of their forces caused by battle casualties, and the intermittent departure of some contingents meant that regular reinforcements were required. In some instances useful reinforcements did come, as in the autumn of 1218, when a large number of crusaders arrived, including the papal legate Cardinal Pelagius of Albano. Pelagius told the crusaders to expect Frederick II and his forces soon, but the German king did not set sail for Egypt, and over the following months the influx of reinforcements failed to match the crusaders' losses. These losses increased when a severe storm in late November 1218 flooded the crusader camp, followed by the arrival of disease (perhaps scurvy) that killed many crusaders over the winter of 1218–1219. The crusaders' morale declined along with their numbers.

Meanwhile, circumstances had changed for Damietta's defenders. Al-Adil died in August 1218, and the Ayyubid lands were divided among his sons. Al-Kamil became sultan of Egypt, and from this time he had to balance concern for Damietta's protection with a need to secure his position in relation to his brothers, who had become potential rivals. This translated into opportunity for the crusaders when, in early February 1219, they learned that al-Kamil had withdrawn from Damietta in response to reports of a conspiracy against him. The Christians crossed the Nile and occupied his former camp, south of Damietta. Without a defending Muslim army and with no supply line, Damietta's inhabitants were in a vulnerable position. But the depleted crusader forces were themselves suffering from food shortages and unable to seize the moment of al-Kamil's absence to launch an assault on the city. The sultan's army returned in March, setting up camp at Fariskur, to the south.

The summer of 1219 saw a stalemate between the opposing armies. Despite the predictions of Francis of Assisi (who came to Egypt to preach peace to Christians and Muslims, and to offer conversion to the latter) that a planned attack on the sultan's camp would fail, the crusaders, frustrated by inaction,

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went ahead with the assault on 29 August. Francis's fears were borne out: the crusaders were defeated, although the sultan was unable to oust the crusaders from their position outside Damietta. Attempting to break the deadlock, al-Kamil offered the Christians a truce that would have returned Jerusalem to them, together with strongholds west of the Jordan, if they would leave Egypt. While some among the crusaders (including Jean de Brienne) favored accepting the proposed truce, others (including Pelagius of Albano, the Templars, and Hospitallers) favored rejection, primarily because the crucial fortresses of Kerak and Montréal in the Transjordan were excluded from the sultan's offer. The party that favored rejection won out when negotiations were abandoned in late September 1219; they had resulted only in prolonging the siege of Damietta and opening up divisions within the Christian army that would cause increasing difficulties as the Fifth Crusade continued.

Preparations for a renewed Christian assault were underway when fortune favored the crusaders. It was observed during the night of 5 November 1219 that one of Damietta's towers had been left unguarded, allowing them to enter and take the city unopposed. Damietta's population had been decimated by the lengthy siege, with the remaining few survivors greatly weakened by disease. But the crusaders' ultimate success in capturing Damietta had come at great expense in terms of Christian lives, too, and the forces of the Fifth Crusade would struggle to capitalize on this achievement in the face of dwindling human and financial resources, and of increasing disunity within the army's military and religious leadership.

[*See also* Frederick II.]

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Caroline Smith

DAMME, BATTLE OF

In 1213 the king of France, Philip II Augustus, decided to invade England. He gathered a great number of boats, developing a heterogeneous fleet. On 22 May, Philip Augustus learned that the king of England had just reconciled himself with the pope and placed his domains under papal protection. There was no further question of invading. But Ferrand of Portugal, Count of Flanders, had clearly demonstrated his support for the king of England, and Philip Augustus, Ferrand's legitimate suzerain, decided to use his army against the rebellious vassal. The French did not meet any resistance except at the city of Ghent, which was besieged.

The French fleet was moored in the harbor of Damme, in the port of Bruges. The basin was not large enough to accommodate all the ships; thus some of the ships remained at sea, and others were put at dry dock on the bank. On 30 May an English fleet commanded by William Longespée (Longsword), Earl of Salisbury, appeared in front of Damme. Because most of the crews and the men-at-arms were on shore pillaging the surrounding countryside, the French fleet was virtually unguarded. The English quickly captured the ships that were moored at sea—with their cargoes of grain, wine, bacon, and arms—and emptied and burned those on the beaches, inflicting what one chronicler called the worst naval disaster since the time of Adam. The rest of the fleet was blocked in the port. The following day the English landed, intending to capture the city and destroy the remainder of the fleet. Just before they launched their assault, the French army appeared. Panic stricken, the English tried to reembark and put to sea but were thwarted by the low tide. The English were beaten but were able to return to England with all their plunder—more than

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anyone since the days of King Arthur, according to one chronicler. In spite of this victory, the king of France evacuated Flanders because of the loss of his ships and the supplies in their holds.

[*See also* Philip II.]

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Sergio Boffa

DANUBE FORTIFICATIONS

A large building program was started along the Roman *limes* (military frontier road) on the Danube during the reigns of Diocletian and Constantine, as a response to the Gothic invasions. Many earlier camps were restored and other forts were erected in the most sensible points (like Dinogetia, at the bend of the Danube), sometimes north of the river as bridgeheads. From Singidunum (Belgrade) to the Danube mouths was thus completed a chain of around 160 large and small fortifications, in the provinces Moesia Prima, Dacia Ripensis, Moesia Secunda, and Scythia. In the fourth to sixth centuries, some of them were also peopled by civilians (fortified cities). The most important were Singidunum, Viminacium (Kostolac), Novae (Svištov), Durostorum (Silistra), Carsium (Hârşova), and Noviodonum (Isaccea).

The defensive system was able to resist the Gothic attacks, but in the first half of the fifth century, the *limes* were considerably affected by Hun invasions. The restoration was initiated by Anastasios and continued by Justinian, on the entire Danube frontier. Former bridgeheads on the northern bank like Dierna (Orşova) and Sucidava (Celei) were occupied again in the sixth century. This intensive building activity did not provide a real shield against invasions because the garrisons were small and weak (Justinian directed the majority of the available forces to the wars against the Ostrogoths and Persia). In such circumstances, the Kutrigurs, and later the Slavs and the Avars, were able to penetrate the frontier many times after 540.

The annexation of Pannonia by the Avars in 567 meant the appearance of a strong rival power center, which increased the strategic importance of the Danube frontier. Because the Byzantine Empire was still fighting with Persia, it was difficult to provide enough forces on the Danube. The most important city, Sirmium, was lost in 582 after a three-year siege. In the next four years, the entire Danube *limes* was ravaged, and some fortresses were destroyed. The Avars and the Slavs continued the attacks during the reign of Maurice, but a recovery took place after 593. The war with Persia was ended and the Byzantine army turned to an offensive strategy at the Danube. The Avars agreed by a peace treaty in 598 that the Danube would be their frontier with the Byzantine Empire, but the *limes* between the Iron Gates and Ratiaria or even Oescus had already been destroyed. Contrary to common opinion, the frontier was not abandoned at the rebellion of Phokas. The remaining fortresses were preserved by the Byzantine army until 614, when a new series of Avar and Slavic invasions started. The troops were then moved to Asia Minor.

During the seventh to tenth centuries, the Byzantine navy undertook several campaigns on the Danube against the Bulgarians. The Danube area was recovered by the Byzantine Empire during the offensives of 971 (against the Russians) and 1001–1002 (against Bulgaria). Only some of the old Roman forts were restored (for instance, Troesmis, Dinogetia, Noviodonum, Aegyssus). Other fortifications were built new, in the most strategically important points. The old Durostorum, now called Dristra, became the main military center on the Danube. The first strategic purpose of the Danube

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frontier was to prevent future Russian attacks. A naval base was built after 971 on the island Păcuiul lui Soare to defend Dristra against them. When the Pechenegs started their invasions in 1027, this frontier was considerably damaged. Additional destruction was caused by the invasions of 1047, 1053, 1065, and 1095. Rebellions of the local population between 1072 and 1091 had similar deleterious effects. After the last Pecheneg attack of 1122, which destroyed the fortresses Păcuiul lui Soare, Garvăn, and Nufăru, the single fortress that defended Dobrudja was at Isaccea. All these events contributed to the dismantlement of the fortification system on the Danube, especially in Dobrudja.

In the twelfth century Byzantine strategic concerns were mainly focused on the western part of the Danube frontier, where the wars against Hungary led to the strengthening of the fortification system along the Danube west of the Iron Gates. The cities of Belgrade and Branicevo were restored after 1150. In the first one, a new fort for the commander was built, while the fortifications in the second were extended. The Danube frontier was abandoned after the uprising of the Romanians and Bulgarians in 1185, which restored the Bulgarian state, and after the expansion of Serbia in the area of Branicevo in 1190.

[*See also* Anastasios I; Avars; Justinian I; Maurice; Phokas; Slavic Lands; *and* Viminacium, Battle of.]

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DARA, BATTLE OF

Built from 505 to 507 as the new headquarters of the *dux Mesopotamiae* (Roman seat of Mesopotamia), Dara was a forward point on the Byzantine-Persian frontier. The elevation of the 1.68 mile- (2.8 kilometer) long curtain walls of the fort was doubled with a second story (from roughly 10 to 20 yards or 9.14 to 18.29 meters) between 528 and 532, when the Byzantines and Persians again engaged in war. The eastern and southern gates were protected by outside ditches.

In 530 an army of twenty-five thousand men was concentrated at Dara, under the command of Belisarios and his deputy Hermogenes. Learning that the Persian army of General Peroz (Firuz) was marching toward Dara from Nisibis (11 miles [18 kilometers] away), Belisarios determined to display his forces outside the fort (the walls of which had not been fully reconstructed). The open position outside the southern gate was strengthened with trenches made to protect the infantry located in the center against the advance of the enemy cavalry. Near the trenches on the flanks he placed the cavalry, which included three hundred Heruls and twelve hundred Huns. The Persians, estimated at around fifty thousand and congregated on two lines without any field obstacle in front of them, faced the Byzantines. They were also deprived of water.

On the first day, an attack by the Byzantine cavalry corps commanded by Bouzes was repelled. On the second day, the Persians received fresh forces from Nisibis (ten thousand horsemen). The fight began with archery on both sides, followed by an advance of the Persian line against the entire Byzantine combat force. The center of the Byzantine front was struck, but the Persians were encircled by the Huns and by a detachment that emerged from hiding. This action caused the death of approximately three thousand Persian horsemen. Firuz decided to start a new frontal attack using the last reserve, the elite warriors. At the beginning, they pushed back the Byzantine cavalry on the right flank, but Belisarios was able to dispatch supplementary forces from the left flank. The counterattack destroyed the Persian combat force. Remnants of the Persian army withdrew toward Nisibis.

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Victory came after a series of defeats on the Persian frontier, but it was not exploited by the Byzantines. The enemy was not pursued, and Belisarios suffered a disastrous defeat at Callincum the next year. After 530 Daras remained a major Byzantine stronghold, several times disputed with the Persians and next the Arabs, who occupied it in 639.

[*See also* Belisarios; Byzantine Empire, *subentries on* Sources (500–900), Narrative (500–900), *and* Historiography (500–900).]

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Alexandru Madgearu

DAVID I

(c. 1085–1153), King of Scotland. The youngest son of King Malcolm III of Scotland, David received his education and knightly training in the household of the Anglo-Norman kings of England. Rising in prominence after his sister Matilda's marriage to Henry I in 1100, David may well have fought for Henry in Normandy and at his crucial victory at Tinchebrai in 1106. He thus had gained an intimate knowledge of Anglo-Norman military organization and tactics before his marriage to Maud de Senlis in 1113 made him earl of a great Midlands lordship centered on Huntingdon. It was perhaps the threat of Anglo-Norman military intervention on his behalf that forced his elder brother Alexander I (r. 1107–1124) to cede him an extensive appanage in Scottish Cumbria and southern Lothian, and David soon began to grant out fiefs, held in return for knight service, to followers from England and Normandy. On becoming king of Scotland in 1124, David continued this process of enfeoffment both in southern Scotland and north of the Forth. The total knight service yielded by these fiefs was not large, but the possession of even a comparatively small body of well trained and equipped heavy cavalry gave David a decided advantage over dynastic rivals such as Angus, mormaer of Moray, who was killed in battle near Stracathro in 1130. Similarly, the settlers' growing number of motte and bailey castles served to extend royal authority and guard the frontiers with volatile separatist regions such as Galloway and Moray.

David maintained a firm peace with Henry I (d. 1135), but immediately on Stephen's accession in 1135, the Scots king invaded northern England, nominally in support of his niece the Empress Matilda (whom Henry I had nominated as his successor). In 1136, Stephen regained Northumberland (which David claimed in right of his wife, Maud [Matilda], daughter of Earl Waltheof of Northumbria), but David retained southern Cumbria and Carlisle, to be held by his son Henry from Stephen. In 1138, David launched a series of devastating raids during which his native troops, particularly the Galwegians, were accused by Anglo-Norman chroniclers of widespread atrocities. David's former steward and friend Ailred, abbot of Rievaulx (d. 1167), deplored the paradox that a king imbued with concepts of chivalry and with a retinue of Anglo-Norman knights should lead an army of "barbarians" who still practiced slaving and indiscriminate killing. Penetrating as far as Northallerton in Yorkshire, David's army was decisively defeated at the battle of the Standard (22 August 1138; also known as the battle of Northallerton), in which the ill-discipline and lack of defensive armor of his Celtic troops proved no match for the combined defensive formation of Anglo-Norman dismounted knights and longbowmen. Nevertheless, Stephen's position was so weakened by civil war that in 1139 he had no option but to grant Henry the earldom of Northumberland, except for the key castles of Newcastle and Bamburgh. Earl Henry died in 1152, but it was not until the reign of Malcolm IV, who succeeded his grandfather in 1153, that King Henry II (Henry of Anjou) was able to compel the restoration of Cumbria and Northumberland to the English crown, thereby reversing what had been an apogee of Scottish power under David I.

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[*See also* Northallerton, Battle of, *and* Stephen.]

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Matthew Strickland

DEATH

Death and killing in battle have only recently received explicit attention in the history of warfare, although fighting inevitably entailed severe physical and spiritual risks. Analytical approaches account for differences between norms and practice and illuminate how divergent ideologies could lead either to exaggerations or to strategies that downplay the role of death in the sources.

While early medieval warrior societies cultivated heroic ideals of killing and dying on the battlefield, the Christian proscription against killing presented difficulties for soldiers. High medieval literature frequently mentions repentant soldiers retiring to monasteries (*moniage*). But sources also attest to the participation of clerics in battle (for example, archbishop Bruno I of Cologne, d. 965). In the eleventh century, the Roman theory of just war resurfaced, legitimating killing in battle under precise conditions. The concept of holy war, promoted by Bernard of Clairvaux in the twelfth century, first appeared in Carolingian times and during the Crusades. The idea that killing a non-Christian pleased God, as did death in battle against the infidel, became prominent.

From the eleventh century onward, "chivalric conduct" aimed at capturing the adversary rather than killing him, but it did not lead to more "civilized" warfare, since it excluded non-knighted soldiers. The latter incurred higher risks in fighting and imprisonment. Widespread norms (as described by Honoré de Bouvet [Bonet] in the late fourteenth century) delineated the rights of prisoners, but captives were frequently killed or sold into slavery, particularly when they could be marked as divergent, either socially (urban troops) or culturally (Muslims, pagans).

Rituals concerning death and killing become more discernible toward the eleventh century: troops were responsible for recovering and burying their dead, while the winners were bound to allow the defeated to execute their duties. Infrequently, victorious leaders might claim the remains of their adversaries (for example, William the Conqueror claimed the body of Harold after the battle of Hastings in 1066). Spiritual preparation for battle, which might include individual and collective fasting and prayer (Swiss troops, for instance, prayed with outstretched arms), was intended to ascertain God's favor, but also to prepare the individual, through confession and absolution, for potential death in a state of grace. Toward the late Middle Ages, the development of military technique and tactics was accompanied by increasing numbers of casualties. Premeditated and explicit killing of adversaries and prisoners (as practiced in particular by the Swiss) was, however, severely criticized.

[*See also* Atrocities; Casualty Rates; Chivalry; Commemoration of Battles and Warriors; Disease; *and* Just War, Just Motive.]

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DESERTION

Medieval commanders regularly faced problems created by desertion. As Vegetius had argued in his *De re militari*, written at the end of the Roman era, a properly selected and trained army approached a conflict with a certain confidence. Too often, however, the medieval army consisted of levied men, who had neither skill nor proper training in arms nor any ambition to fight. In such circumstances, desertion was quite common. It might reflect opposition to war or a desire to return home; it often resulted from a lack of motivation. It could also reflect poor discipline or inadequate equipment, both of which led to a decline in morale. As the years progressed and pay became the norm, desertion was encouraged by the irregular payment of wages, which made it difficult to maintain discipline on campaign.

Such systematic failures encouraged men to desert, as Edward I found late in 1299 when large-scale desertions forced him to withdraw from a winter campaign in Scotland. By the fourteenth century, attempts were made, in France, for example, to reduce desertion by requiring soldiers to take an oath not to leave the army before their term of service had expired, and not to move from service under one captain to service under another without permission. The problem here was to avoid fraud on the part of the soldier, and the need of the army's still primitive administration to ensure that a man was not paid twice for his service. With the introduction of the indenture, or contract, the soldier who wished to leave for legitimate reasons, in particular domestic ones, was required to obtain a special pass (*commeatus* [Lat.], *congié* [Fr.], bille [Eng.]) authorizing his departure and his right to return home. Without this, he might be arrested and accused of breaking the terms of his indenture, which, by the fifteenth century, was coming to be regarded as a legally binding undertaking to serve the public good, the breaking of which was increasingly seen as an act of lèse-majesté, or treason, against both ruler and people. Such desertion ("departyng") could bring down the full force of the law upon the man guilty of it: a fine, imprisonment, deprivation of office, confiscation of goods and property, even execution. In particular, for the soldier guilty of desertion from the battlefield, a sentence might follow, sometimes imposed by a military court, reflecting the fear that his action could have had an adverse effect upon the fragile loyalty and security of his fellow combatants or upon the outcome of a particular enterprise, presented as having been undertaken for the common good. The study of desertion has much to reveal about those serving in armies, about how they were treated and paid, about the attitude of the rank and file soldier to fighting the war, and, not least, about the manifold difficulties experienced by medieval military administrations as they strove to create new and effective national armies at the end of the Middle Ages.

[*See also* Discipline *and* Recruitment.]

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DEVASTATION AND RAVAGING

Devastation was the principal activity of medieval warfare. As soon as an army entered enemy territory, outriders and scouts were sent out, and behind their cover came a cloud of troops and noncombatants

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who stripped the farmsteads and villages of the countryside of everything valuable, then burned or smashed most of what they left behind, as vividly described in the twelfth-century *Chanson des Lorrains*:

> The incendiaries set the villages on fire and the foragers visit and sack them. The terrified inhabitants are either burned or led away with their hands tied to be held for ransom. Everywhere bells ring the alarm: a surge of fear sweeps over the countryside. Wherever you look you can see helmets glinting in the sun, pennons waving in the breeze, the whole plain covered with horsemen. Money, cattle, mules and sheep are all seized. The smoke billows and spreads, flames crackle.

Bread, wine, sausages, and so forth would go to provision the invading army. Livestock, depending on circumstances, might be slaughtered and left lying, rustled home, or driven with the army for later consumption. In one case, for example, a raid on a single monastery yielded 432 horses, 552 cattle, 800 pigs, and 8,000 sheep. Wagons filled with oats and hay would provide sustenance for the thousands or tens of thousands of the invaders' horses. The troops would load up the pack animals with as much money, plate, fine cloth, good cooking pots, or other valuables as they could carry. Then the soldiers would torch the houses, mills, inns, barns, and other wooden structures. If time allowed and pity did not forestall them, they might strip the bark from or chop down fruit and olive trees, trample the grain in the fields, and torture captured peasants to learn the location of hidden or buried valuables.

All of this served multiple purposes simultaneously. It provided the invading troops with the sustenance they needed and the profit they desired, thus helping ensure that they would be able and willing to continue the campaign (and to serve on the next one they were summoned to). It reduced the resources available to the enemy both immediately (an army coming up behind the invaders, for example, would find it difficult to provision itself) and for the longer term (devastated villages could not pay taxes). Strategically, devastation pressed the enemy to respond to the destruction in some way that could make it stop. This might be seeking peace terms, which might mean the accomplishment of the ravagers' war aims, or bringing an army capable of doing battle with the invaders directly against them. If the invaders were seeking battle, devastation would have served an important strategic purpose then; if they were not, they would try to get their plunder back behind the walls of their own strongholds without being overtaken, and then threaten more devastation in the future if their terms were not met.

Rulers not infrequently engaged in the preemptive devastation of their own lands, to deprive invaders of food and profit. "Cause all provisions to be brought in from the open places and put into the fortresses," Pere III of Catalonia ordered his border forces in 1334. "If it happens that the country people make difficulties, which they ought not to do, then cause the provisions to be burnt, for it is better that these be consumed by fire or lost than that they should serve the enemy." Similarly, townsfolk expecting a siege often emptied out and burned their own suburbs and the villages nearby so that their enemies could not benefit from them as shelters or sources of construction materials.

Some historians have been skeptical of the capacity of medieval armies to do real, lasting damage, but medieval agriculture did not produce large enough surpluses to make it easy to absorb the capital losses suffered with the burning of farm buildings, the loss of plow animals, or the seizure of stores of seed corn. Such losses could be inflicted over wide areas even in a single campaign: the English armies of the Hundred Years' War, for example, commonly created a twenty- or thirty-mile-broad band of devastation around their line of march. A document describing the half-completed destruction of the small village of Cagnoncles lists damages equal to about 40,000 man-hours' worth of skilled-labor wages; in the relatively small-scale 1339 Cambrésis-Thiérache campaign, hundreds of villages suffered comparable harm. When the army of Liège invaded the county of Namur in 1430, 300 villages, 32 fortresses and fortified houses, and 17 mills were destroyed.

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One hundred eighty-seven of the county's inhabitants reported suffering damages amounting to the vast sum of more than 450,000 gold florins.

Not only field armies caused terrible destruction. Small castle garrisons, operating over an extended period, could collectively lay waste an area even more thoroughly than a large army that was passing through. These soldiers' raids normally served the same purposes as larger-scale ravaging expeditions: enrichment and provisioning of the soldiers combined with impoverishment and terrorization of the enemy. Just as sovereign rulers might do on a larger scale, garrisons often used the combination of devastation and threats of further ravaging to extort peace money from neighboring areas.

[*See also* Fire; Logistics and Transportation; Raids and Raiding; Rewards for Military Service; Siege Warfare, *subentry on* Tactics and Technology; *and* Strategy.]

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Díaz de Vivar, Rodrigo

(*El Cid*, c. 1043–1099), Spanish military leader. In 1043 the son of Diego Laínez, Rodrigo Díaz de Vivar, was born in Vivar to a minor noble house serving under King Fernando I of Castile-León (r. 1035–1065). Rodrigo's earliest documented life was that of a squire to Sancho, the Castilian crown prince. During his service with Sancho, Rodrigo performed bravely while protecting the *taifa* of Zaragoza against the attacks of Ramiro I of Aragon (1035–1063). With the ascent of Sancho II (r. 1065–1072) to the Castilian throne, Rodrigo received a royal appointment as the king's standard-bearer. While performing this crucially important office, Rodrigo was in the forefront of many battles, where his exploits gained him the nickname *Campeador* (master of the battlefield). He was also recognized by his Muslim enemies with the nickname *Cid* (Lord). Many of these events were documented in *El cantar de mio Cid*, one of the earliest medieval epics. There are serious doubts, however, about the full validity of this work.

In 1072 King Sancho II was assassinated. His son Alfonso VI (r. 1065–1109) took the throne but only after being forced by Rodrigo to swear he had no responsibility in the death of his father. Alfonso swore to this and Rodrigo pledged himself as the new king's vassal. The imposition of this oath, however, caused Alfonso to harbor animosity against Rodrigo and largely contributed to the Cid's fall from royal favor.

In 1074 Rodrigo was granted the right to marry Ximena Díaz, great-granddaughter of King Alfonso V (r. 999–1028). Alfonso VI honored this arrangement and the couple was married in the spring of 1074. This marriage was advantageous for Rodrigo's family, but King Alfonso used the match as an opportunity to remove Rodrigo from his important military post. Rodrigo's enemies falsely accused him before King Alfonso and this gave the sovereign reason to banish his vassal from Castile-León in 1081.

Rodrigo had nearly two thousand men when he was banished from Castile, a force that later grew to seven thousand combatants. As a mercenary commander of the Moorish lord, al-Mu'tamid of Zaragoza, Rodrigo developed a close friendship with his employer. In the Zaragozan ruler's service, the Christian mercenary earned for his bravery and honor the title El Cid. In 1086 Alfonso VI engaged in combat with an Almoravid army under Yusuf ibn Tashfin at Sagrajas and was badly beaten. The humiliated Castilian king called for Rodrigo's help, and before 1087 had waned, the two men were reconciled.

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Historical records concerning Rodrigo's career during this period are few. In the next two years, however, he reconquered much of the territory taken by the Almoravids and expanded Castilian influence. Tribute promised Alfonso from the *taifa* of Valencia was not forthcoming and this led Alfonso to believe that his retainer had been plotting to take Valencia as his own kingdom. In reprisal, Alfonso exiled the Cid in 1089, after confiscating his lands and properties and attempting to imprison his wife and children.

Cantar II describes the Cid's efforts to weaken the control of Valencia's Muslim rulers and then his eighteen-month-long siege against the *taifa*'s capital, which he finally captured in 1090. In that same year, the Almoravid ruler Yusuf reentered Spain and within two years controlled all of Andalusia. Only the Cid, in Valencia, stood between the Moors and northern Spain. Internal political rivals turned Valencia against Rodrigo during his absence in 1094. In reprisal, the great warrior laid siege to Valencia and its surroundings. He finally became the unquestioned ruler of Valencia and its environs in June 1094 when Valencia, without the support of the Almoravids, could hold out no longer. Yusuf was determined to defeat his old enemy and supposedly sent 150,000 men against him. In 1094, however, the Cid, using a surprise flanking attack, defeated the Almoravids outside the city of Cuarte before they could mount an attack on Valencia. According to Cantar II, Rodrigo, though covered with blood, was not wounded in this action.

Cantar II is considered more historically accurate since it was based on Muslim records that cast new light on the end of the Cid's life. It was clearly more trustworthy than Spanish sources of the period. The *Chronica del Cid* was a detailed and less romantic version of the Cid's life and death. In it the Cid, Rodrigo Díaz de Vivar, one of the greatest warriors of the Spanish reconquest, became sick during the battle of Cuarte and, after a month of this illness, died in Valencia on 19 July 1099.

[*See also* Alfonso VI of Castile *and* Iberia, *subentry on* Narrative (500–1100).]

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DINANT, SIEGE OF

No principality of the southern Low Countries was more rebellious in the fifteenth century than the Prince-Bishopric of Liège. Rebellions occurred in 1402–1408, 1417, 1429–1431, 1435–1436, 1445, 1452, 1456–1457, 1461–1462, 1465–1468, and 1490. Most of these were fought over the appointment of new prince-bishops backed during the 1400s by the dukes of Burgundy. In 1465, the prince-bishop was Louis de Bourbon. He had held the appointment since 1456 and had already survived two rebellions. The Liégeois viewed him as a Burgundian puppet, correctly it seems, because Louis had been raised and educated in the court of Duke Philip "the Good" of Burgundy. In 1465, judging that Philip "the Good," at sixty-nine, was too old to respond to their rebellion and that his heir, Charles of Charolais, was too busy leading the Burgundian army in the War of the Public Weal against King Louis XI in France, the Liégeois set up their own candidate, Marc von Baden, as prince-bishop.

Philip was aged but not incapable, and he mustered a considerable army to counter this rebellion. On 20 October 1465, the two sides met in battle at Montenaeken, with the Burgundians victorious, and in December a peace treaty was arranged, seemingly ending the rebellion. But the War of the Public Weal had also ended, and Charles was on his way home. In his opinion, his father had not dealt harshly enough with the Liégeois rebels.

By this time, the rivalry between Dinant and Bouvignes, lying across and down the Meuse River, was well established. In the 1465 rebellion, Bouvignes was loyal to the dukes and the prince-bishops; Dinant always sided with those who rebelled against them. In the spring of 1466, the Dinantais attacked the Bouvignois, bombarding the town's walls for several

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days with gunpowder artillery. Charles of Charolais now had a reason to march his army to Dinant.

It was a large force, more than thirty thousand men and a large number of artillery pieces. These were fired at the town walls across the Meuse. Mortars were fired over the walls at the houses and inhabitants. The bombardment was heavy, and many were killed. The Dinantais returned fire with their own gunpowder weapons, and they also killed several of the besiegers. At first they were able to repair the damage to their walls and houses, but after eight days, the defense of Dinant began to flag, with attrition increasing and supplies, especially gunpowder, decreasing. Finally, after rejecting two calls for surrender, the Dinantais gave up. Charles refused to be merciful. As a punishment for their resistance, the Burgundian leader tied eight hundred citizens back-to-back and cast them into the Meuse River to their deaths; in addition, the town's master of artillery was cast into the town from the high mountain overhead. Dinant was then pillaged and burned, and its walls and gates were razed.

[*See also* Charles the Bold *and* Low Countries, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1479).]

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DIPLOMACY

The history of the envoy, or diplomat, goes back a long way in the history of the ancient world. The importance of negotiation or diplomacy, seen as the alternative or the complement to war, was first recognized in the Byzantine, or Eastern, Empire, where it played an important part in the emperor's relations with other states. Historians have long noted the institutional practices favoring active diplomacy peculiar to the Byzantine world, as well as the high rank or quality of ambassadors, often chosen from those closest to the emperors themselves, which reflected the importance attached to diplomacy as the chief means of maintaining peace within their sphere of influence.

In western Europe, by contrast, envoys were for a long time little more than messengers or bearers of letters, with very limited authority to exercise their own initiative. Instead, from the tenth to the twelfth centuries, major discussions and negotiations often took place at meetings between rulers themselves (as kings of France met with their imperial or English counterparts), which might take place either on neutral ground or near frontiers, as the need for symbolic neutrality or security dictated. This system reflected the still very personal nature of rule and of the authority it exercised. But as states developed and consolidated, and as the differences between them often led to war, the need for a system that would allow those states to meet and negotiate through suitably empowered ambassadors (Latin, *ambaxiatores, nuntii, oratores*) became clear. By the end of the thirteenth century war and diplomacy, two sides of the same coin, were developing together.

To bring this about, there had to be developments in both the practice of diplomacy and the recruitment of those who carried it out. An ambassador accredited to a foreign court had to reflect the power (and wealth) of the prince or state he represented. He expected to be received with respect, if not honor, and he enjoyed a measure of immunity in his travels through foreign lands, although he was sometimes regarded as a spy protected by the immunity granted to his position. A small embassy might be led by a royal secretary who was not only familiar with the business at hand, but whose position at court also marked him out as a man who worked closely with the king and enjoyed his confidence.

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When the occasion demanded, noblemen of high standing (secular or ecclesiastic) were often placed at the head of larger embassies, their social position and the numbers accompanying them (sometimes a hundred or more) conveying the importance attached to their embassies' affairs by those who sent them. Embassies related to commercial affairs, usually limited in size, normally included merchants, while those arising directly out of war had experienced knights among the ambassadors. In no case was an embassy complete without the presence of at least one lawyer (in practice, often more) trained in either the canon or the Roman law (the nearest the Middle Ages came to international law); his role was to provide legal advice to his fellows. All were paid wages according to a scale reflecting their rank and position in society. Careers in diplomacy were thus beginning to be made.

The ambassadors' staff included those responsible for preserving diplomatic records, which, in England from the late thirteenth century onward, were preserved as a separate category. Records were made available for consultation to a departing embassy, so that its members could read past reports, proposals, and counter-proposals to obtain knowledge of and historical perspective on the issues to be discussed or negotiated. Negotiations between countries or princes were increasingly regarded as possessing a measure of continuity, as underlined by the reappointment of envoys to negotiate when diplomatic contacts with a particular country or ruler were in hand. Diplomacy was increasingly formalized and organized, the effective practices of one country mirrored those adopted by others. Everywhere the "specialist" or "professional" diplomat was beginning to make his mark.

There can be little doubt that the development of diplomatic practice owed much to the need to end the many wars that characterized the history of late medieval Europe. The role played by diplomacy and negotiation in the Hundred Years' War illustrates this point. The history of the war is punctuated by attempts to reach a mediated settlement, with papal diplomacy often playing a leading role, not always successfully. Papal envoys, for instance, made last-minute attempts, unsuccessfully, to prevent the armies of France and England from meeting in combat outside of Poitiers in September 1356, and they failed again in later attempts to reach a lasting settlement. Peace, however good the intentions of those taking part in negotiations, did not come easily; there were intractable problems to be confronted. Belief in the power of arguments—historical, legal, material, even emotional—led not toward peace but away from it. However much a state of military stalemate or, on the other hand, the military superiority of one side, might demand a negotiated peace, political stubbornness had the last word. While the English were finally chased out of France in 1453, the long war was never formally ended by treaty or negotiated diplomatic settlement. Force proved more effective than diplomacy. At the same time, however, it should be noted that peace on the Italian peninsula, which had long been absent from the relationships between the growing number of independent states, was finally achieved at Lodi in 1454. Destined to last for half a century, the Peace of Lodi showed what diplomacy could bring about even in an area of Europe that had long suffered from internecine wars and rivalries. The presence of the first permanent embassies, which date from the end of the fifteenth century, constitutes evidence of the increased awareness of the growing importance of inter-state relations, in times of both war and peace.

[*See also* Hundred Years' War *and* Propaganda.]

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Christopher Allmand

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DISCIPLINE

Discipline was always a problem in medieval armies. Because forces were recruited for single campaigns and were rarely retained for long periods, enforcing rules and regulations was hard. If pay was in arrears, a commander had little hold over his soldiers, and if—as on crusading expeditions—their service was voluntary, the difficulty was even greater.

Commanders were well aware of the importance of discipline. In the late fourteenth century the French marshal Boucicault selected experienced men as his officers, and he gave express orders that they were to be obeyed on pain of punishment. A number of disciplinary regulations were issued; prior to the fifteenth century these were mainly concerned with preventing crime and disorder within an army, rather than with military conduct. The Holy Roman emperor Frederick I Barbarossa produced an ordinance for his army in Italy in 1158. He was concerned with preventing both theft and quarrels in camp between soldiers. There was also a stringent clause aimed at preventing soldiers from keeping women in their quarters. Little was said, however, about the army on the march or the conduct of war, though the burning of captured castles was forbidden unless orders were given to the contrary.

The English king Richard I laid down rules for his crusading fleet; Richard II, hardly a warlike monarch, set out instructions in 1385. In the fifteenth century, England's Henry V was responsible for a plethora of military edicts. The Hussites under Jan Žižka had their written rules, which emphasized obedience to orders. Charles the Bold, Duke of Burgundy, set out very detailed regulations for his armies; in his 1473 ordinance, Charles showed much concern that his soldiers behave properly toward civilians. Companies on the march were to keep together; no one was to leave the ranks to forage. The principles of sharing out booty, potentially the subject of much squabbling, were carefully set out. No company was to be accompanied by more than thirty women, and no man was to keep a woman to himself.

It is hard to know how effective such disciplinary codes were. Normally it was the marshals of an army who were responsible for maintaining order. A rare marshal's roll survives from the 1296 Scottish expedition of the English king Edward I. Many of the cases concern thefts; there were also arguments among groups of men about the distribution of the spoils of war. Only a very few cases concerned military discipline in the purest sense. One man was accused of advancing in front of the army's banners, contrary to orders. Six men who refused to obey their officer were fined three shillings; another who refused to go on a foray when ordered was sent to prison. Severe punishment was rare in medieval armies. Richard II's ordinance threatened with hanging, drawing, and quartering those who caused a major affray, but in practice this was never carried out. Henry V's having a soldier hanged on the march toward Agincourt for stealing a pyx (the box holding the reserved sacrament) was a notable exception to normal practice.

Discipline could easily collapse: medieval armies did not have a sufficiently robust structure of command to maintain order properly. In 1137 the English king Stephen threatened Anjou. The Flemish mercenaries in his army quarreled with the Normans, and the outcome was that the expedition had to be abandoned. Because there was no clear single command, particular problems existed for crusading forces. The mixed Anglo-Flemish force that captured Lisbon on the Second Crusade was bound by a common oath to adhere to strict disciplinary articles, but these were disregarded by the Flemings, who pillaged the city without mercy. At the battle of Arsuf (1191), Richard I was unable to prevent the Hospitallers from charging; all he could do was order his men to follow.

Drink might cause problems, as on the eve of the battle of Falkirk (1298) when a drunken dispute between English and Welsh soldiers caused the Welsh to abandon the camp, leaving Edward I with a seriously depleted force to fight the Scots. The sack of a town often saw discipline break down completely among the victorious troops. Desertion was common and was particularly hard to deal with. In fifteenth-century Italy, often the best that cities could do was to denounce deserters with as much publicity as possible. Portraits of commanders who had changed sides might show them hanging upside down, or might be displayed in brothels.

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[*See also* Desertion *and* Plunder, Division of.]

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DISEASE

Troops in the past would have been exposed to disease from a wide range of sources, even if they never received a wound in battle. They may have suffered from malnutrition, dysentery, parasites, epidemic diseases, frostbite, or venereal diseases, and descriptions of all these conditions are found in medieval manuscripts. We would expect these diseases of the army camp to have significantly impaired the fighting strength of a body of men. Along with contracting diseases, armies could potentially spread diseases too.

On campaign provisions were generally limited to preserved foods that stored well, and, unless they could be obtained by foraging, fresh fruit and vegetables were often unavailable. This explains the descriptions of dietary deficiency diseases such as scurvy (vitamin C deficiency) and night blindness (vitamin A deficiency) for a number of medieval armies. In situations where food ran out completely, such as long sieges, starvation would eventually lead to death. Dysentery was often described in medieval chronicles as affecting armies. One notable victim was King Louis IX of France who, we are told by his court chroniclers, died from dysentery while on campaign at Tunis in north Africa in 1270. Modern archaeological research has now identified which microscopic organisms caused dysentery in medieval Europe and the Middle East, these being *Entamoeba histolytica* and *Giardia duodenalis*. Other parasites would have been present in the troops of such armies as they were virtually ubiquitous in medieval populations. These include fleas, head lice and body lice, and intestinal worms such as roundworms, whipworms, and tapeworms. These worms compete with the host for food in times of scarcity and often lead to chronic anemia and tiredness in those with a heavy worm load in their guts. Many other specific diseases would have been present, of course, and modern histories of medieval warfare often claim epidemics to have been caused by cholera, typhus, and bubonic plague. However, it is usually not possible to identify such diseases accurately, as the descriptions given in the written sources are not sufficiently detailed. Where medical treatment was available, the general approach of a medieval physician would have been dietary modification to rebalance the four humors (black bile, yellow bile, blood, and phlegm), bloodletting, medicines as pills or enemas, and therapeutic bathing if available.

Risk of Death from Disease on Campaign. Some military campaigns have left sufficient records of the participants' death or survival to allow an estimate of the chance of survival to be approximated, and perhaps the best-documented are for the Crusades to the Middle East. In general, records of clergy survival are particularly helpful in predicting the likelihood of death from disease and malnutrition, as clergy did not usually fight and so did not risk death in battle. Studies of the First (1096–1099), Third (1187–1192), and Fifth Crusades (1217–1221) have all found surprisingly similar results. It seems during a two- to four-year campaign, 15 to 20 percent of clergy died. Clearly, poor foot soldiers would have had less money than clerics to buy food in times of famine or pay for medical care if they contracted an infectious disease. We would therefore expect that an even higher percentage of the poor foot soldiers died from disease than was the case for the clergy, but no reliable data for their outcome has survived.

Medical Efforts to Prevent Disease. There were some attempts during the late medieval period to improve the health of an army in response to the high mortality during arduous campaigns. The Spaniard Arnald of Villanova wrote the work

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Regimen Almarie for King Jaime II of Aragon about 1310. The regimen started with advice on the healthiest place to locate an army camp, avoiding marshy areas. The water supply should have dead plants and logs removed from it, and then be tested for purity by dipping a clean white linen cloth in it and hanging it out to dry. If green or brown stains were present on the cloth the water was deemed unfit to drink and likely to spread disease. Arnald advised that pits be dug outside the camp where dead animals, soldiers, and human feces could be placed to reduce the risk of epidemics occurring in the camp. When they were half full, they were to be covered with soil to prevent sickness from breaking out. All these points seem very sensible from a modern perspective, but there are many examples after this date when armies failed to follow the recommendations of Arnald. Infectious disease was to remain the scourge of military campaigns for centuries to come.

[*See also* Black Death *and* Medicine, Military.]

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DISTRAINT OF KNIGHTHOOD

The knight (Latin: *miles*) was the archetypal warrior within European armies during the Middle Ages. Between the late twelfth and early fifteenth centuries, however, numbers of knights within some countries declined dramatically. This was particularly acute in England, where for mainly economic reasons the number of knights seems to have fallen from around four thousand in the early thirteenth century to little more than a thousand just a hundred years later.

Distraint of knighthood was the English crown's response to this problem of declining numbers. The term refers to a process by which landholders possessing a particular amount of landed income per year were forced to accept knighthood or pay a fine. The initiative was taken by Henry III (r. 1216–1272), who in 1224, no doubt prompted by his advisers, issued the first of his twenty-six writs ordering distraint of knighthood. Although Henry and his council did not invent the concept of forcing men to become knights, the reign does seem to have been the first to witness the systematic use of compulsion. The first writ, of 1224, was issued to all laymen of full age possessing at least one knight's fee, but subsequently only men with twenty pounds or more of landed income per year were distrained. The emphasis in this form of obligation had shifted from "feudal" tenure to wealth. In times of goodwill, the number of men forced to take up knighthood might be reduced. In 1285 Edward I (r. 1272–1307) restricted the order to those possessing at least a hundred pounds in land per year, possibly in recognition of the success achieved against the Welsh three years earlier. During the fourteenth century the usual criterion for inclusion was the possession of forty pounds in land per year, and the land had to have been held for at least three years.

The wording, and often the timing, of the distraint orders suggests that military considerations were paramount. Individuals were given an ultimatum: take up knightly arms (*arma militaria*) by the deadline or (from 1253, when the option of commutation was introduced) pay a fine. Such orders were often issued shortly before the launching of military campaigns. That of 1242, for example, was made with Henry III's forthcoming expedition to Gascony in mind; and the writs of 1316 and 1325 seem to have

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been sent out in connection with Edward II's activities in Scotland and Gascony, respectively. Yet, the introduction of the option of commutation, and the weakening during the reign of Edward III of the connection between distraint to knighthood and the planning of military expeditions, suggests that sometimes the raising of money might have been the crown's main concern. Knights were also needed for administrative service. Indeed, in the long term distraint of knighthood failed to arrest the decline in the number of knights serving in English armies. Although such writs continued to be issued during the fifteenth century, by that stage knights regularly constituted no more than about 5 percent of the total number of active men-at-arms.

[*See also* Knighthood and Knights *and* Obligation, Military.]

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DOMESDAY BOOK

From the Middle English spelling of "Doomsday," or "day of judgment," Domesday Book was the name used since the 1300s for the record of the Great Inquest or survey of the lands of England ordered by William the Conqueror. The name connoted the record's final authority. The ruthless pragmatism of the Norman rulers of England is nowhere more clearly demonstrated than in their use of existing English governmental apparatus to secure and dominate their newly acquired territories. The Anglo-Saxon royal secretariat had been able to raise taxes quickly and efficiently for English kings through meticulous and thorough documentary records; the Norman king William I drew on the same secretariat to enforce his wish to know all about the economic and military potential of the land of England. Although primarily an instrument of tax assessment, Domesday offers us a unique insight into the economic base of medieval warfare fought by thegns (given in the Latin transcription "tainus"), a professional military cadre whose duty it was to provide a range of arms and armor for themselves and their followers when summoned.

The order to undertake the survey and compile the information went out in December 1085, and the first assessment had been completed by August of the following year, covering most of England south of the rivers Ribble and Tees (then the effective Scottish border). The inquiries were made by two teams acting independently, the second cross-checking the first; the informants were the headmen and elders of the villages and settlements visited. The inquisitors recorded, in Latin, the name of the person who held the manor currently and in the time of Edward the Confessor, what the manor comprised in livestock and other assets, and what it was worth. Each tenant had to submit data for his holdings, which were cross-checked by local informants.

The book was compiled into two volumes: "Great Domesday," covering most of England, and "Little Domesday," covering the eastern region of Essex, Norfolk and Suffolk; the latter may not have been completed until after William's death in 1086. The records for the two major English cities of London and Winchester are likewise absent. This is unfortunate since London's citizenry had been militarily important since the time of Cnut (d. 1035) and an assessment of the military capacity of that city would shed much light on the forces potentially available to a late Anglo-Saxon king.

Some manors are listed as "waste" (*vasta*), especially in the northern parts of England. This is often due to the episode known as the "harrying of the north" in the winter of 1069–1070, during which the king systematically destroyed a large part of the economic base of those areas still resisting Norman rule. An attempt at secession by Anglo-Saxon thanes

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and churchmen had led to the murder of a Norman nobleman, Robert de Comines, briefly the earl of Northumbria. Support from Danish and Irish military forces was obtained by disaffected Anglo-Saxon landowners whose continued existence was threatened by the coup d'état. William could not afford to allow such a flagrant challenge to his authority. The Danes and Irish were bought off with a hefty Danegeld payment, and William's men set about the devastation of the countryside, including the destruction of livestock and stored food, which led to widespread depopulation. For years, perhaps decades to come, Norman barons with land in the northern shires found it difficult to find tenants for their farms due to this wholesale devastation. Furthermore, because the records show the value of estates both before and after the invasion, it is possible to see where William's men laid waste to southern Sussex; not only entries for estates marked *vasta*, but also a severe reduction in the numbers of taxpayers (burgesses). This is most noticeable between Pevensey and Hastings on the coast, where both cavalry and infantry forces had seized all in their path.

[*See also* Norman Conquests, Norman Expansion.]

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Stephen Pollington

DORESTAD, BATTLE OF (695)

In the late seventh century when Pépin II (d. 714)—the mayor of the palace of Austrasia, the eastern part of the Frankish realm—began his policy of expansion against the Frisians, Dorestad (present-day Wijk bij Duurstede, near Utrecht in The Netherlands) was an old center of trade and commerce in the Rhine-Maas delta at the frontier between Friesland and Austrasia. Dorestad had come under Frankish control during the reign of Dagobert I (r. 623–639). In later times Dorestad had once again become Frisian, and it was Pépin II who reintegrated into the Frankish realm this important strategic point from which routes to Anglo-Saxon England and to Scandinavia began.

Little is known about the battle itself. The so-called *Continuatio Fredegarii* (Chronicle of Fredegar) mentions only the place of battle, Castro Duristate, where the Austrasian leader Pépin II and the Frisian ruler Radbod fought against each other. Pépin won the battle and conquered Utrecht. Afterward his son Grimoald married the daughter of Radbod. Notwithstanding some Frisian incursions undertaken by Radbod into Austrasia after the death of Pépin II in 714, Dorestad remained an undisputed property of the Franks after the death of Radbod in 719.

[*See also* Dorestad, Sack of (834), *and* Franks, Merovingian, *subentry* Narrative (482–751).]

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See the bibliography on page 29.

Hans-Henning Kortüm

DORESTAD, SACK OF (834)

Located at the confluence of the rivers Lek and Rhine (near present-day Wijk bij Duurstede, near Utrecht in the Netherlands), Dorestad, "Gateway Place," was one of the great trading settlements of the Carolingian empire. The growth of the emporium began in the late seventh century, and extensive archaeological excavations between 1967 and 1977 have revealed that at its peak, around 825, this entrepôt sprawled over an area of about a hundred to a hundred and fifty acres (forty to sixty hectares). As early as 630 a mint was established at Dorestad, and the artifacts preserved in the soil testify not

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only to local craft industries but also to a lively interregional and international trade that included slaves.

These lively activities of craft and trade, conducted without protective walls, made Dorestad an ideal target for depredatory raids from the sea. Thus when the Frankish sphere erupted in a bitter power struggle between the emperor Louis the Pious (r. 814–840) and his three eldest sons, this tragic political context provided an excellent opportunity for aggressive Danish bands to attack the town and the entire Frisian coastline. It was certainly not mere coincidence that the Vikings launched their first large-scale assault on Carolingian lands in 834, amid serious conflict within the Frankish royal family. The contemporary sources seem to indicate that it was Lothair (I) who invited the Danish attack on Frisia. The entry for 834 in the *Annals of Saint-Bertin* observes, in typical laconic style: "A fleet of Danes came to Frisia and laid waste a part of it. From there, they came by way of Utrecht to the emporium called Dorestad and destroyed everything. They slaughtered some people, took others away captive, and burned the surrounding region."

In these first years the Viking tactics were very simple. Conducted with swift long ships of shallow draft, ideally suited for surprise raids on coastal locations, the attacks were hit-and-run incursions. The Danes took what they could in precious metals, slaves for sale, and captives for ransom. After the plunder of Dorestad in 834, the Danish actions became a virtual plague in the following years: Dorestad was apparently burned to the ground four times in the period 834–837, and again in 847, 857, and 863. The town is not mentioned in written sources after 863, and no archaeological evidence has been uncovered for the tenth century. A shift in the course of the "Crooked Rhine," rather than the abandonment of the emporium because of the Viking raids, may explain the disappearance of Dorestad.

[*See also* Dorestad, Battle of (695); Franks, Carolingian, *subentry on* Narrative (751–899); Low Countries, *subentry on* Narrative (855–1300); *and* Vikings.]

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Manuel Rojas Gabriel

DORNACH, BATTLE OF

The battle of Dornach was the last in a series of battles and combats during the so-called Swabian War. For the Swiss confederates, it was a glorious victory. The cause of the war was the increasing alienation from the Holy Roman Empire of the towns and countries allied to the confederates, while, at the same time, interference from the empire increased. The outbreak of hostilities early in 1499 led to heavy fighting in the region from Graubünden to the area of Lake Constance, and then as far as the Alsatian Sundgau. The fighting was characterized by both sporadic heavy engagements and a cruel guerilla-style warfare. The latter caused serious damage to the region's economy due to plundering and burning of villages and towns. From May 1499 on, Royal Field Marshal Count Henry of Fürstenberg concentrated troops in the Alsatian Sundgau, amounting

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eventually to fifteen to sixteen thousand soldiers. They attacked the castle of Dorneck (Dornach) near the town Solothurn in the northwestern part of the Swiss Confederation in order to relieve pressure the confederates were putting on the area of Lake Constance and the Alpenrhein. The conquest of that castle would have meant the invasion of the Swiss midlands, but the negligence and the arrogance of the royal field marshal led to a military disaster. A confederate relief force numbering about five thousand men began the battle on 22 July 1499. The vanguard opened the attack before the whole Swiss army was on the field, in order to gain the benefit of surprise. The main body joined in before the vanguard could be overwhelmed, but the Swiss were fought to a standstill by *Landsknechte* from Gelderland, who had been trained and equipped in the Swiss style. Near dusk, a thousand Swiss reinforcements arrived on the battlefield and brought victory to their side.

While only about six hundred to nine hundred men were killed among the Swiss confederates, the casualties of the royalists were about four thousand men, the field marshal among them.

The glorious victory of the Swiss confederates destroyed the hopes of Maximilian I to bring the Swiss confederates definitively under the sway of his empire. The Peace of Basel (22 September 1499), negotiated by the Milanese duke Ludovico Sforza, brought the hostilities to an end.

[*See also* Maximilian I.]

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DORNBÜHL, BATTLE OF

The victory of the free city of Bern over the Austrian-ruled city of Fribourg im Üechtland and its allies, the French-speaking Burgundian nobles of the region, in the battle of Dornbühl (also known as Donnerbühl or Oberwangen, in the present-day municipality of Köniz, southwest of Bern) in 1298, marked the start of Bern's territorial ambitions. This victory, combined with disputes over the throne of the Holy Roman Empire between Adolf of Nassau and Albert I of Habsburg must be understood as the beginning of Bern's rise to become the largest city-state north of the Alps in the late Middle Ages. Very little about this military event is known from the sources; the main report of the battle comes from the *Chronica de Berno*, a text incorporated into the annals of St. Vincent's parish church in 1325, considerably after the event. According to this report, the Fribourg army and its noble allies had laid waste to the region surrounding Bern, prompting the Bernese, supported by the troops of Count Hartmann von Kyburg, to decide the matter by force of arms on 2 March 1298 near the village of Oberwangen. Still according to the chronicle, the Bernese army killed sixty men, took fifteen hundred prisoners, and captured eighteen banners. The rest of the enemy army fled; on the Bern side, exactly two men are said to have fallen. Bern later took advantage of this victory to defeat and destroy the castles of Bremgarten, Geristein, and Belp, forming a power base for the local nobles around Bern.

[*See also* Germany, *subentry on* Narrative (1250–1415).]

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Translated from the German by Johanna M. Baboukis

DOROSTOLON, BATTLE OF (971)

Although the Byzantines stopped the incursion of the Kievan Rus' leader Sviatoslav at Arcadiopolis in 970, they were unable to consolidate their victory. In the spring of 971 the emperor John I Tzimiskes

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set out from Constantinople to complete the job. He sent the navy ahead to prevent a Rus' retreat on the Istros (Danube) River and then proceeded himself to Adrianople. He was accompanied by his elite cavalry regiment, known as the Immortals, and according to Leo the Deacon he was followed by fifteen thousand heavy-armed infantry, thirteen thousand cavalry, additional soldiers, and units transporting siege machinery. After an initial victory at Preslav, Tzimiskes moved to Dorostolon (Roman Durostorum, modern Silistra in Bulgaria), where the Rus' under Sviatoslav waited.

A series of open field encounters took place over a number of days, all resulting in Rus' retreats behind the walls. Leo describes the Byzantine battle formation as having the cataphract cavalry on both wings and slingers and archers at the rear. Tzimiskes' tactical use of the heavy cavalry, which he led personally, against a Rus' shield wall was decisive in one major encounter. The Byzantines then constructed a palisaded encampment and began a siege, and although the Rus' had brief success in burning some of the Byzantine siege machines, a final Rus' stand before the walls was defeated. Leo the Deacon reports 350 Byzantines killed, with fifteen thousand Rus' casualties—figures to be viewed with skepticism. With his provisions now nearly exhausted and his retreat blocked by the Byzantine fleet, Sviatoslav sued for peace and was allowed to leave without opposition.

[*See also* Arcadiopolis, Battle of (970) *and* John I Tzimiskes.]

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Denis F. Sullivan

DOROSTOLON, BATTLE OF (1087)

See Dristra, Battle of.

DORPAT, SIEGE OF

See Tartu, Siege of

DORYLAION, BATTLE OF

A major battle fought between the forces of the First Crusade and the forces of Kiliç Arslan I (r. 1092–1107), the Seljuk sultan of Rum, and his allies, the battle of Dorylaion took place close to the city of Dorylaion (Dorylaeum) on the edge of the Anatolian plateau. Kiliç Arslan had been absent from his capital of Nicaea when the crusader siege began on 14 May 1097, and his attempt to relieve it failed on 16 May. On 19 June, Nicaea surrendered, and on 26 June the crusaders began their march across Anatolia.

The crusader force was very large—perhaps fifty thousand strong, with five to six thousand cavalry as its most effective element—but it was hampered by the presence of many noncombatants. The force consisted of a number of armies, each grouped around one of the major princes who together constituted the directing committee. Although determined and in good spirits after its victory at Nicaea, the crusader force lacked cohesion because its elements were not yet used to fighting together, and in a truly multinational army there must have been many problems of communication. Moreover, although both their Byzantine ally, the emperor Alexios I Komnenos (r. 1081–1118), had told them something of the fighting methods of the Turks, and also one of their leaders, Bohemond of Taranto, had actually encountered the Turks before, the mass of the army had little knowledge of the enemy they faced.

It's not known why the crusaders decided to take the road up to the Anatolian plateau via Dorylaion. Nor is it known why, as the sources make clear, the army became divided into a vanguard, whose most prominent figure was Bohemond, and a larger main force some three miles (five kilometers) behind, with substantial elements straggling between. It is likely

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that the frictions of movement simply produced this strung-out and highly vulnerable formation. In any case the formation gave Kiliç Arslan the opportunity to destroy the vanguard, whose two thousand cavalry were outnumbered by his army of approximately six thousand, and thus to defeat the whole crusader army in detail.

On 1 July 1097 the Turks ambushed the vanguard. This was the first occasion on which the crusader armies encountered a major Muslim force in a pitched battle, and although aware of an enemy presence, they were badly surprised by the nature of the actual attack. For this was a fascinating clash of military styles. The Western armies were made up of poorly trained infantry masses led by heavily armored knights on large Western horses. Such forces had limited mobility and aimed to close with the enemy as quickly as possible. By contrast, the Turkish army was entirely mounted and largely consisted of horse-archers equipped with strings of light horses; they sought to use their mobility to surround and unhinge enemy formations, bombarding them with arrows and javelins before destroying them in the close-quarter battle. An anonymous knight later remembered the speed with which the crusader force was surrounded: "Our men wondered exceedingly whence had arisen so great a multitude of Turks, Arabs, Saracens and others, for almost all the mountains and hills and valleys and all the level places, within and without, were on all sides covered with that excommunicate race." A priest of the army later remembered his astonishment at these tactics: "The Turks crept up, howling loudly and shooting a shower of arrows. Stunned, and almost dead, and with many wounded, we immediately fled. And it was no wonder, for such warfare was new to us all" (Hill, p. 19).

On the appearance of the Turks, Bohemond had ordered the infantry and noncombatants to make camp, while the cavalry formed to fight off the Turks. But the knights panicked when the advancing enemy enveloped and threatened to surround them, and it took all the efforts of Bohemond and Robert II Curthose, Duke of Normandy, to rally them in a confused mass by the partially erected camp. The Turks were then drawn into a close-quarter fight in which their mobility counted for little amid the mass of tents, wagons, horses, and people. This grim hacking match lasted from early morning until noon, by which time the Turks had broken into the camp and were on the brink of victory. But Bohemond had sent for aid to the main force, whose arrival routed the Turks because elements of the force threatened them from the rear.

The sources are vague on the precise location, but they speak of a battle near Dorylaion. The crusaders could hardly have reached that city in the time available, but these same sources suggest that the encounter was fought where two valleys meet, and the most likely place is the junction of two valleys north of modern-day Bozüyük.

[*See also* Bohemond I; Crusades, *subentry on* Narrative (1095–1183); Robert II Curthose; *and* Seljuks.]

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John France

DOVER, BATTLE OF

King John of England died suddenly in October 1216, leaving the English crown in a perilous position. The rebel lords who had compelled John to agree to the Magna Carta in 1215 had invited Prince Louis (heir of Philip Augustus of France) to take the throne. At John's death, French and rebel forces controlled much of central England, but they suffered a shattering defeat at Lincoln in May 1217 by forces led by

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William Marshal, Earl of Pembroke. Reinforcements were urgently summoned from France. A large fleet (about eighty ships), commanded by the notorious French corsair Eustace the Monk, set sail from Calais on 24 August. In his chronicle, Matthew Paris included a dramatic but not entirely accurate account of the ensuing battle with the English. The English had fewer ships, probably around thirty, half coming from the Cinque Ports. Their commander, Hubert de Burgh, had had problems putting a fleet together. Many nobles refused to serve, saying they were not sea soldiers, pirates, or fishermen. The fleet left Sandwich when the French were sighted heading for the Thames. A swift change of course to profit from the southerly wind allowed the outnumbered English to fall on the rear of Eustace's unsuspecting squadron. After an initial shower of arrows, the English grappled with the enemy ships, boarded them, and, in triumph, brought all but fifteen as prizes into Dover harbor. Eustace was discovered hiding in the bilges of his vessel and was summarily executed. Now with no hope of help, Prince Louis sued for peace and withdrew to France, allowing William Marshal firmly to establish the rule of the young Henry III. This battle has justifiably been called one of the most decisive medieval naval battles in northern waters.

[*See also* John; Louis VIII; Marshal, William; *and* Sandwich, Battle of.]

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Susan Rose

DOVER CASTLE

Although the spur of high ground on the eastern side of Dover town bears evidence of a prehistoric fort, a Roman lighthouse, and a Saxon church, implying occupation from an early date, not until after the Norman conquest of England in 1066 was the great castle visible today erected. After the battle of Hastings, William I rewarded Bishop Odo of Bayeux, who had accompanied him from Normandy, with charge of Dover castle. There is no documentary evidence about the nature of the existing defenses or what Odo may have done on the site, as pipe rolls, or annual accounts of expenditure recording expenses on construction work by the king, are not extant before the accession of Henry II (r. 1154–1189). The figures were very substantial, not only at Dover but also at Newcastle, Scarborough, and several other castles. A massive tower keep, usually rectangular, was the essential element in the new work. At Dover heavy expenditure on the castle is recorded during the reigns of Richard I (1189–1199), John (1199–1216), and Henry III (1216–1272).

At the heart of the castle stands the Norman keep, built in the 1180s, square with corner turrets and a central pilaster on each face. These were not solid but contained rooms, with spiral staircases in two cases or latrines with internal chutes discharging at the base, at four floor levels. The internal area was divided into a hall and a smaller chamber beyond at the entry level. It supported the roof above. The entry door, at well above ground level, was reached by steps at right angles through the covered forebuilding. Above this was the chapel, for the building was conceived as a place to live, however ill-lit the rooms might be with only arrow slits giving light.

The square tower, or keep, with its massively thick walls up to twenty feet, had a symbolic value proclaiming the lordship and authority of its owner, and practically served as a place of last resort in the event of the enemy breaking through the outer defenses. The occupants could fight back through the arrow slits and of course from roof level either by shooting arrows or dropping missiles. Its grim appearance perhaps gives an exaggerated idea of its defensibility. The use of mining to bring down a corner of the keep at Rochester demonstrates the Achilles' heel of such a structure.

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Much more aggressive defense was provided by the double circuit of curtain wall furnished with towers at fairly close intervals enclosing the knoll on which the castle stands. Those of the inner line are square and were part of the original design when the keep was built in the twelfth century while the later ones of the outer line are circular, providing a better all around view and presenting a glancing surface to missiles. Much of the south side has been destroyed and walls intended to extend south to the cliff edge built under Henry III have been destroyed in modern times. The hollow, three-story towers overlooked the outer wall face, enabling defenders to use enfilading fire against any assault.

The inner circuit of walls overlooked the outer circuit, creating in effect a "concentric castle," perhaps more by accident than design. The gap between the two circuits varies, but it is usually much wider than the later true concentric castle, which made the range for shooting over the outside curtain very great for bowmen on the inner wall.

In 1216, Prince Louis of France, the eldest son of the French king Philip Augustus, assaulted from the high ground on the north and by mining (the soft chalk beneath the castle is easily worked), which brought down the tower on the east side of the gatehouse. The defenders were able to block this with timber and held out. After the fighting the old gate was permanently blocked with a painted, beaked tower and a new gateway created on the west side—much less vulnerable because it faced a steep downward slope.

[*See also* Castles, *subentry on* 1150–1350.]

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Michael W. Thompson

DRISTRA, BATTLE OF

In 1087 the Byzantine emperor Alexios I Komnenos was soundly defeated by the Patzinaks at Dristra (also known as Dorostolon; modern-day Silistra) on the Danube. The Patzinaks had moved into the region of the lower Danube in the 1050s. In 1087 they raided deep into Thrace. Alexios gathered an army of local soldiers, Paulicians from Thrace, Turkish allies, and Frankish mercenaries. He led them north to Dristra to confront the Patzinaks on their own territory. Alexios engaged the enemy in a pitched battle in which he suffered a complete defeat. The Patzinaks captured the Veil of the Virgin, a relic Alexios had used as a standard. After their victory the Patzinaks advanced into Thrace and raided virtually unimpeded until their defeat at the battle of Levounion.

Our principal source for the battle of Dristra is the *Alexiad* written by Anna Komnene. Her description of the battle closely matches that of the battle of Adrianople, in which the Goths defeated the Roman emperor Valens in 378. The implicit comparison with the ancient Roman defeat may have been intended to excuse Alexios for his disastrous loss. Whatever the rhetorical purpose of Anna's comparison, it means that we cannot trust the information provided about the course of the battle.

[*See also* Adrianople, Battle of (378); Alexios I Komnenos; Byzantine Empire, *subentry on* Narrative (900–1204); Levounion, Battle of; *and* Patzinaks.]

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Leonora Neville

DRUZHINA

Druzhina is the Slavonic word for the prince's escort, which was composed of free warriors of the *kn'az*, the tribal and clan leader, whom they loyally followed to war. The escort is a feature of transforming and differentiating barbaric societies, a stratum that easily accepted and assimilated

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warriors from various ethnic origins: the link was the prince's service. It was advantageous for the prince to embrace members of foreign descent because their own clan constituted no hindrance in fulfilling the prince's will.

The role of the escort varied according to ethnicity and time period. Initially the *druzhinas* were assembled for particular military campaigns; later they became a more regular social group, who also served as advisers for their lords. In case of the Germanic peoples this development took place in the first century in the Kievan Rus', in the ninth century, in both cases in the period preceding the early state formation. Among the nomadic peoples of the steppe it played a role in forming the tribes. The members of the escort were supplied by the tribal leader himself and he gave them a significant portion of the plunder acquired in military operations, getting hold of which was a major interest of both the prince and the escort.

In the Kievan Rus' the prince consulted the escort (*s'em*) and had feasts with them (*pir*). The escort differentiated: there was a smaller circle and a wider one. The success of a member could make that member preeminent, and lead to the breaking up of the escort. The escort of the transition era is by no means identical with the later royal guard or the ecclesiastical and secular nobles following the king.

[*See also* Plunder, Division of *and* Slavic Lands, *subentry on* Narrative (500–1000).]

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Marta Font

DUNOIS, JEAN, COUNT OF

(1402–1468), French commander. The illegitimate son of Louis, Duke of Orléans, Jean was born in November 1402 and raised in his father's household. After the death of his father in 1407 and the capture of his half brothers at Agincourt in 1415, Jean became the effective head of the household and a staunch supporter of the Armagnac cause. In 1418 he was himself captured by the Burgundians, but he was released two years later. Jean fought for the dauphin, later Charles VII, at the battles of Baugé in 1421, Crevant in 1423, and Verneuil in 1424. His military credentials were established in 1427 when, along with the constable of France, Arthur de Richemont, and Étienne de Vignolles (La Hire), he forced the English lieutenant general of Normandy, Richard Beauchamp, Earl of Warwick, to abandon his siege of Montargis. In February of the following year Jean was wounded at the French defeat at Rouvray.

Dunois was one of the most important French commanders at the siege of Orléans in 1428–1429, and he was one of the first to recognize the military potential of Joan of Arc. In 1432 he was co-commander of the army that forced the regent of France, the Duke of Bedford, to abandon his four-month siege of Lagny, and later in the year his forces captured the city of Chartres. He was a more conventional commander than his contemporaries Jean Poton de Xaintrailles and La Hire were, and his successful campaign in the Seine basin in 1436 allowed Charles VII to reenter Paris later that year. Jean played an important part in the military reforms of the 1440s, and in 1449–1450 he was one of the principal commanders in the French reconquest of Normandy, having been appointed lieutenant general by the king. In 1451–1452 he also led the initial campaign to reconquer Gascony. As well as being a skilled field commander, Jean was an astute politician and courtier. Enguerrand de Monstrelet called him one of the most eloquent men in France and noted that he was able extemporaneously to recite "in a style that would have done credit to a doctor, a history of the war between the kings of France and England."

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Jean was created Count of Dunois in 1439 and Count of Longueville five years later. His political skills were important in the 1440 rising known as the Praguerie, where he first joined those in rebellion against Charles VII and later served as an intermediary between the king and his dissident nobles. On Charles's death in 1461, Dunois transferred to Louis XI's service, but he joined the League of the Public Weal against the king in 1464. The following year, however, he was reconciled with Louis and became president of the Council of Thirty-Six. Dunois died in 1468, leaving his son by his second marriage, François d'Orléans-Longueville, as his heir.

[*See also* Agincourt, Battle of; Baugé, Battle of; Charles VII of France; Crevant, Battle near; Joan of Arc; La Hire; Orléans, Siege of; Rouvray, Battle of; Verneuil, Battle of; *and* Xaintrailles, Jean Poton de.]

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David Grummitt

DUPPLIN MOOR, BATTLE OF

In the "Shameful Peace" of 1328, which secured Scotland's independence from England, it was agreed that, generally, Scots who had forfeited lands in England would not have them restored, and vice versa. Certain individuals, including the *soi-disant* (self-proclaimed) earls of Buchan, Angus, and Atholl, were excepted; their cases were left undetermined. By 1332, it had become clear that these "Disinherited" would not recover their estates by diplomacy or law. With covert support from Edward III of England (who, as a minor, had opposed the Treaty of 1328) and the participation of Edward de Baliol—an exiled pretender to the Scottish throne—the "Disinherited" collected a mostly English army of five hundred men-at-arms and one thousand archers. Anticipating aid from supporters in Scotland, they aimed to crown Baliol in place of the infant David II.

The invaders sailed to Kinghorn in Fife, forced a landing, and moved overland toward the capital, Perth. At the River Earn, they were blocked by an army of perhaps fifteen thousand Scots led by the regent Donald of Mar. The "Disinherited" were dismayed; they had counted Mar among their supporters. In this desperate situation, they forded the river and staged a night attack on the ill-guarded Scottish camp, killing many. But dawn revealed that they had not routed their enemies. Hastily, the invaders deployed in a thin line across a narrow valley, with dismounted men-at-arms (about four deep) in the center and archers thrown forward on the wings. Steep slopes protected their flanks.

Mar and Robert of Carrick, the leaders of the Scottish main body and vanguard, respectively, quarreled. Each swore to be the first to engage the English and led his division racing forward. Carrick was in the lead, but haste and the effects of English archery disordered his men badly before they could engage. Pushing into a double envelopment and raked by arrows from the flanks, the Scottish formation became badly compressed. Disarray turned to utter disaster when Mar's men piled in at the rear. According to Andrew of Wyntoun, more than a thousand men were smothered or trampled to death without losing a drop of blood. In the end, the corpses made a pile six hundred feet long and up to a spear's height. Every Scottish earl who was present was killed, or captured in the subsequent cavalry pursuit, and English losses were minimal. Perth, lacking defenders, soon surrendered, and Baliol was crowned at Scone. However, within a year, quarrels among his supporters allowed a Bruce resurgence. Edward III's subsequent intervention on behalf of his protégé escalated the conflict and eventually contributed greatly to the outbreak of the Hundred Years' War.

[*See also* Edward III of England; Halidon Hill, Battle of; *and* Hundred Years' War, *subentry on* Causes.]

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Clifford J. Rogers

DURBEN, BATTLE OF

In the summer of 1260 the Teutonic Order planned a large military action to subjugate Samogitia (northwestern Lithuania). The gathered troops included Teutonic knights from Prussia and Livonia, local native militiamen (Estonians, Curonians, Sambians, etc.), Estonian vassals of the Danish king, and Swedish crusaders. The army met the Samogitians at Durben in Courland (present-day Durbe, Latvia) on 13 July. The *Livonian Rhymed Chronicle* (written in the 1290s) reports that the Curonian militia abandoned the battlefield. The *Prussian Chronicle* of Peter of Dusburg (1320s) tells about a conflict between the Curonians and the other parts of the crusaders' army about whether the Curonian women and children captured by the Lithuanians should be freed or treated as booty. According to Dusburg, the disappointed Curonian militia switched sides and attacked the Christian army from the rear. Most of the Livonian and Prussian native militia fled, and the knights, together with the Prussian Sambians, suffered a heavy defeat.

Among the soldiers killed were 136 knights of the Teutonic Order, as recorded in the order's obituary, including the Livonian master Burkhard of Hornhausen and the Prussian marshall Heinrich Botel. This was out of perhaps six hundred Teutonic Knights in Livonia and Prussia in that period. The Swedish duke Karl Ulfsson also fell, together with his men. The winners followed the fugitives and collected a great quantity of arms and armor as loot. The battle weakened the position of the Teutonic Order in the region, and revolts in Courland, Prussia, and Ösel (Estonian Saaremaa) followed. The battle demonstrates the important role of the native militia in Baltic crusading warfare. Dusburg's chronicle concludes that the order lost the battle because the cavalry lacked infantry support on the field.

[*See also* Baltics, *subentry on* Narrative (500–1300) *and* Orders, Military, *subentry on* Northern Orders.]

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Anti Selart

DURHAM, BATTLE OF

See Neville's Cross, Battle of.

DÜRNKRUT, BATTLE OF

The battle that took place between the regions of Dürnkrut and Jedenspeigen in Lower Austria, northeast of Vienna, on 26 August 1278 pitted the Holy Roman Emperor Rudolf of Habsburg against King Otakar II of Bohemia. Rudolf's victory not only confirmed his own kingship, it laid the groundwork for Habsburg rule over Austria and thus influenced the history of Europe into the twentieth century.

The conflict between Rudolf and Otakar went back to Rudolf's election as king (1 October 1273), which the Bohemian king did not recognize. Rudolf's revanchist policy attempted to regain for the crown the rights and possessions that had been usurped by the princes during the interregnum (1250–1273); it was directed particularly against Otakar's extensive possessions—Bohemia as well as Austria, Styria, Carniola, and Carinthia. The first military encounter between Rudolf and Otakar came in 1276.

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Rudolf gained a strategically advantageous position and was able to push as far as Vienna with the imperial army. A negotiated settlement between the combatants was achieved in the army camp outside Vienna, preventing war. During the next few years, however, tensions rose again, leading both parties into renewed campaigns in the summer of 1278. At first Otakar held the strategic advantage, as he had managed to assemble his army largely unnoticed. Rudolf was forced to react and turned to divisions from his ancestral regions of Alsace and Switzerland, troops from Austria and southern Germany, and, above all, the army of the Hungarian king Władysław II. Otakar squandered his advantage by not moving decisively against Vienna, where Rudolf was waiting with his troops; instead, he confined himself to seizing strategically unimportant places and besieging them unsuccessfully. Thus Rudolf was able to leave Vienna and join up with the Hungarian army in August. After a few preliminary encounters between small divisions, Otakar camped near Jedenspeigen on 20 August. On 25 August, Rudolf camped south of Dürnkrut on the Marchfeld. The battle took place on this plain the next day.

Although the sources for this battle are good compared to some other events, we can only speculate as to the exact placement and size of both armies. Both were probably arranged in three parts, which entered the battle one after another. Rudolf placed his Hungarian allies in the first wave, thus giving them the honor of the first attack. The greater part of the Hungarian contingent consisted of Cumans: lightly armored mounted archers who approached the enemy in small groups, shot their arrows, and then withdrew before close combat could be joined. Rudolf's second division consisted of the Austrians; the third included the south German and Alsatian-Swiss soldiers from Rudolf's homeland. He himself led the third division. Otakar, on the other hand, led the second of his three contingents. In the vanguard of his army stood the Bohemian and Moravian troops; in the second division, soldiers from Germany; and in the third, groups from Poland and Silesia. During the battle, the three sets of troops engaged one after another, so that neither of the two armies could unleash its full strength at any given time. As with all medieval battles, any statement as to the exact strength of the armies or the arming of individual units is difficult. Otakar probably fielded some six thousand men—about a thousand heavily armed and five thousand lightly armed cavalry. Rudolf probably commanded about three hundred heavily armored and four thousand light cavalry, consisting partly of Hungarian riders, plus the Cumans. The number of the latter is difficult to determine, but probably did not exceed five thousand. Rudolf's army would thus have been numerically superior, but he would have had at his disposal fewer of the heavily armed riders so essential to the conduct of the battle. Assuming that the three waves of each army were approximately the same size, Otakar would have fielded three groups of 2,000 each, and Rudolf would have had about 2,150 in each of his last two groups.

Like the strengths and dispositions of the armies, the course of the battle is difficult to reconstruct. The Marchfeld obviously offered the cavalry a level terrain for their maneuvers. Each army was encamped on the far side of a stream: the Bohemians north of the Jedenspeigen, the Austrians south of the Waidenbach. Both streams flowed into the March, which marked the southeastern edge of the battlefield. The Hungarian Cumans probably led the first attack, followed by the Hungarian light cavalry. They were clearly successful in putting Otakar's first wave to flight. Otakar's well-armed knights gained the advantage, however, when the second waves met; they were able to drive their enemy back as far as the Waidenbach. Then Rudolf's third division attacked, led by the German king. Thus, in the final and decisive phase, both kings were personally fighting. Rudolf is said to have been attacked by an enemy soldier as he was advancing across the stream, and he was knocked off his horse. Since the cohesiveness of medieval armies depended essentially upon personal leadership, this was a decisive moment in the battle. Rudolf, sixty years old at the time, managed to remount and continued to lead the crucial countercharge. Thus Rudolf's third wave succeeded in repelling Otakar's second.

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The critical element of the Habsburg victory, however, was probably the intervention of a tactical reserve force that the king had placed in ambush; this division of about two hundred men is reported to have attacked Otakar's flank at this decisive moment, from their position at the edge of the battlefield. This action is first recorded in the so-called Styrian Verse Chronicle, dating from the early fourteenth century. It reports that Rudolf had trouble appointing a leader for this unit, since the noble warriors regarded ambushes as dishonorable and refused. In their view of things, shaped by the ideals of knightly honor, it was not permissible to stand back idly and watch one's own troops fight. We see here a noble self-image reflected in an honorable way of conducting war. Comparable actions were, however, not unusual in medieval battles, so that, here as elsewhere, a distinction must be made between the demands of an honorable war and the demands of reality.

Otakar's second division turned and fled, taking with them the third group, who had not even actively entered the fight. Otakar remained behind on the battlefield with a few loyal followers, where he was killed—perhaps out of personal vengeance. The death of the Bohemian king drew negative comments from contemporary sources, even though it made the battle into a decisive and undisputed victory for Rudolf. A large part of the Bohemian army was killed by the Cumans as they fled. Reliable data on the casualties on both sides are difficult to obtain; it is certain, however, that the Bohemian king's losses were much greater.

[*See also* Přemysl Otakar II *and* Rudolf I.]

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DYRRACHIUM, NAVAL BATTLE OF (1081)

In March 1081, the Norman Robert Guiscard, Duke of Apulia and Calabria, sent his son, Bohemond, across the Adriatic with fifteen ships to establish bases in preparation for a coordinated attack on the Byzantine port of Dyrrachium (modern-day Durrës in Albania). The fleet included transports provided by the duke's allies in Dalmatia. Bohemond secured Butrinto, but Corfu held out. Robert assembled his main force in Italy and sailed in May. Between the two departures, the emperor Nikephoros III Botaneiates (r. 1078–1081) was overthrown by Alexios I Komnenos (r. 1081–1118).

Although the varied accounts emphasize different aspects of the invasion force, they are somewhat in agreement. Geoffrey Malaterra gives a strength of thirteen hundred knights (*milites*), whereas William of Apulia specifies fifty galleys (*liburni*), a fleet that could transport about one thousand horses. Bohemond's ships could account for another three hundred horses. Anna Komnene describes a fleet of 150 ships, including monoremes (ships with one bank of oars on each side), triremes (ships with three banks of oars on each side), and *dromons* (warships), and estimates Robert's total strength at thirty thousand, with each ship carrying two hundred men with armor and horses. The larger figure, which no doubt includes seamen, archers, engineers, and both light and heavy infantry as well as cavalry, is thus a reasonable average complement. Anna specifies that horses and riders went on the *dromons*, that the largest vessels carried wooden towers intended for use in the siege, and that the fleet set off in good order. The formation described is probably a single curved line, with the flagship in the recessed center.

Corfu had held out against Bohemond's smaller expedition but surrendered to Robert's troops, as did Valona farther up the coast; his sailors sacked Vonitza to the south. The bulk of the army marched northward with Bohemond, while others traveled on the ships with Robert. The fleet ran into a violent storm off Cape Glossa. Despite the loss of lives, supplies, and siege equipment, Robert and Bohemond were able to invest the city. In the meantime the new

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emperor had obtained the help of the Venetian fleet, which arrived at Dyrrachium.

The accounts again diverge, but it seems clear that the Venetians had superiority both in technology and also in actual fighting at sea. In the initial encounter the Venetians either offered to negotiate before engaging or feigned a retreat after an initial engagement. In either case they used the night to prepare secretly for battle. Anna Komnene describes the ship's boats being winched up between the masts. From this vantage the Venetians could fire missiles or hurl heavy pieces of wood tipped with sharp iron nails onto the enemy ships. There is no mention of a swing-arm or other mechanism for doing this.

After Bohemond's ship was sunk, the Venetians pursued the Normans and, aided by a sortie from the city, continued the battle on land and drove the Normans to the entrenchments of the siege camp. Geoffrey Malaterra writes that Greek fire was used. In an alternate scenario, the Venetians chased the Norman fleet back into port before being driven off by Ragusan and Dalmatian archers. This was repeated three times, and some Norman ships were cut loose and taken. All accounts agree that the outcome was a victory for the Venetians, who now held the port.

[*See also* Bohemond I; Dyrrachium, Siege and Battle of (1081); Galleys; Naval Combat and Tactics; *and* Robert Guiscard.]

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DYRRACHIUM, SIEGE AND BATTLE OF (1081)

In mid-June of 1081 the Norman duke Robert Guiscard invested the Byzantine city of Dyrrachium (also known as Dyrrachion or Durazzo; modern-day Durrës), an endpoint of the Via Egnatia and an important port on the Albanian coast. The size of the invasion force has been given as thirty thousand, a figure roughly consistent with the specified size of the fleet, but except for a core of thirteen hundred mounted its composition is unknown. A storm destroyed some ships along with crew, siege engines, and supplies, but the bulk of the army disembarked farther south at previously secured bases and approached the city by land.

The emperor, Alexios I Komnenos, who had obtained his crown only in April, sent his kinsman, George Palaeologus, to head the defense. Alexios gathered an army to relieve the city and arranged for support from the Venetian fleet, which defeated the Normans at sea. A coordinated sortie from the city drove back the land forces into their fortified camp, which was set up close ("within bowshot") to the city. Dyrrachium was situated on the southern tip of a peninsula separated from the mainland by a lagoon and marshes, and connected by a narrow strip of dry land close to the northern end. Mountains on both sides of the lagoon left little flat, dry land. There was also a bridge across the entrance to the lagoon at the southern end. Despite the loss of siege equipment in the storm, Anna Komnene describes the city surrounded by siege engines (*helepoleis*); the Normans constructed a tower that topped the city walls and provided a platform for rock-throwing machines. The height of the walls allowed city officials to parley with those on the ground and to easily recognize an imposter below. The city walls were reinforced, defended by catapults and topped by loose boards

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that would not bear the weight of an armored attacker in the event of an assault. Palaeologus was severely wounded leading a failed sortie, but the Normans' great siege tower was first blocked by constructing an opposing tower and then burned.

The relief army is estimated at twenty thousand, with units of cavalry, light and heavy foot, and archers recruited from a number of sources, including Turks and twenty-eight hundred "Manichaeans" who suffered three hundred casualties, the only statistic specified. Upon its arrival in October, the decision was made to engage in battle rather than set up a countersiege.

Alexios originally intended a surprise attack on Robert's camp, carried out by troops sent through the marshes, while he himself attacked from the front. But during the night, Robert had emptied his camp and crossed the bridge. He commanded the center; his son Bohemond had the left. Count Amicus of Giovenazzo (Amiketas), who had only recently been in rebellion against Robert, commanded the right, where Robert's wife, Sichelgaita of Salerno, and her troops were positioned. Alexios commanded his own center; the Caesar Nikephoros Melissenos and the *domestikos* Gregory Pakourianos commanded the right and left, respectively. The Varangian Guard, heavy infantry distinguished by employing two-handed axes, were commanded by Nampites and positioned forward of the main body, with Turkish archers between them and Alexios's line. Robert's initial cavalry feints were driven off by Alexios's skirmishers (*peltasts*). Amicus's wing moved against the Varangians and was sent running when attacked by Pakourianos. Despite William of Apulia's effort to present the retreat of Amicus's troops as a feigned flight, the Normans were clearly in disarray, and were likely saved from drowning when Robert's wife rode across their path and turned them back to the fight. William ignores Sichelgaita until the end of his account, where he describes her as wounded, frightened, and saved only by the mercy of God.

Alexios did not move to exploit the advantage gained when Amicus's wing fled. The Varangians joined in the pursuit of the Norman right and exhausted themselves; separated from the main formation, they were cut off and massacred. The now exposed center was attacked by Norman heavy cavalry. The emperor was forced to flee, leaving the rich plunder of the imperial camp to the Normans. Byzantine losses are estimated at about one-fourth of the army, a heavy blow to an empire already short of troops. Among the Normans only thirty cavalry are reported lost. Many of the inhabitants of Dyrrachium were immigrants from Amalfi and Venice. Seeing the defeat of the relief army and departure of the ships, they surrendered the city in January or February of 1082.

[*See also* Alexios I Komnenos; Norman Conquests, Norman Expansion; Pakourianos, Gregory; Siege Warfare, *subentry on* Byzantine Siege Warfare; *and* Varangian Guard.]

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